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July, 2014 - Volume: 2, Issue 7 IN THIS BULLETIN HIGHLIGHTS: English News 2-4 ECP says no UNDP officials were removed 02 from polling stations District Profile 5-21 FIA seeks PAT chief’s assets details 02 from ECP Articles 22-24,32 KP govt seems losing interest in holding 02 LB polls Maps 25-28 MPs body be constituted for poll reforms 03 PPP puts its weight behind PTI 03 Urdu News 29-32 PK-45 defeat exposes rift in PTI 04 SC orders ET to hold verification of thumb impressions 04 Political Directory 33-40 in NA-154 HYDERABAD GENERAL ELECTION - 2013 UNION COUNCIL HYDERABAD VISUAL PROFILE MAPS UNION COUNCIL HYDERABAD CANTT 4 VISUAL PROFILE UNION COUNCIL QASIMABAD 4 VISUAL PROFILE HYDERABAD GENERAL ELECTION - 2013 68°0'0"E Constituency wise Total Number of Voters Matiari-Cum Hyderabad - NA-218 Syed Waseem Hussain Legend Total Voters 55% 45% 288653 HyderabadI - NA-219 Winner Party - 2013 Total Voters Hyderabad II 44% 302211 56% (Old Hyderabad Syed Amir Ali Shah Jamot Hyderabad II(Old HyderabadIII) - NA-220 III) NA-220 Muttahidda Qaumi Movement Total Voters 43% 57% 274281 Pakistan Peoples Party HyderabadIV - NA-221 Makhdoom Muhammad Parliamentarians Amin Fahim Total Voters 53% 47% 269066 Hyderabad Haji Abdul Sattar IV NA-221 HyderabadV - NA-222 Total Voters Matiari - cum 45% 260060 55% Hyderabad NA-218 HyderabadVI - NA-223 Total Voters Hyderabad 47% 300956 53% VI NA-223 Dr. Khaliq Maqbool Date of Creation June 12, 2014 Projection/Datum WGS 84 Geographic Page Size A3 Past Elections Result - 2002 & 2008 Constituency Year Winner Party ¯ 2008 Hyderabad 0 5 10 NA-218 Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim PPPP I NA-219 2002 Kilometers NA-219 2008� Syed Tayyab Hussain MQM 2002� Prof. Khalid Wahab Naveed Qammar NA-220 2008�Syed Ameer Shah Jamot MQM NA-220 Dr. Sahibzada Abul 2002 Khair Muhammad Zubair MMA +92.51.282.0449/835.9288| [email protected] N N " " 0 0 ' ' 0 0 ° ° www.alhasan.com 5 5 2 2008�Syed Ameer Shah Jamot 2 NA-221 PPPP 2002�Syed Ameer Shah Jamot Khairpur Dadu S. Benazirabad Lasbela 2008 Sanghar Hyderabad Matiari NA-222 Syed Naveed Qamar PPPP V NA-222 Jamshoro 2002 T. Hyderabad Ayar Umerkot 2008 Mrs. Shamshad Sattar Bachani Mirpurkhas NA-223 2002 Mr. Shamshad Sattar Bachani PPPP T. M Thatta Khan Karachi Badin Tharparkar 68°0'0"E ISSN 2312-1289 205-C 2nd Floor, Evacuee Trust Complex, F-5/1, Islamabad, Pakistan Landline: +92.51.2820449, Fax: +92.51.835.9287 E-mail: [email protected], Website: www.alhasan.com BE INFORMED 1 ELECTION BULLETIN ©Copyright 2014 ISSN 2312-1289 ALHASAN SYSTEMS PRIVATE LIMITED 205-C 2nd Floor, Evacuee Trust Complex, Sector F-5/1, Islamabad, 44000 Pakistan For information: Landline: +92.51.282.0449 Email: [email protected] Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/alhasan.com Twitter: @alhasansystems Website: www.alhasan.com ALHASAN SYSTEMS is registered with the Security & Exchange Commission of Pakistan under section 32 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 (XL VII of 1984). ALHASAN is issuing this Election Bulletin free of cost for general public benefit and informational purposes only. Should you have any feedback or require for further details and Metadata information please call Landline: +92.51.282.0449, Fax: +92.51.835.9287 or email at [email protected]. LEGAL NOTICES The information in this publication, including text, images, and links, are provided "AS IS" by ALHASAN SYSTEMS solely as a convenience to its clients and general public without any warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement. ALHASAN SYSTEMS assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions in this publication or other documents which are referenced by or linked to this publication. This publication could include technical or other inaccuracies, and not all information/ services referenced herein are available in all areas. Changes are periodically added to the publication, and ALHASAN may change the information or services described in this publication at any time. Should you choose to respond directly to ALHASAN SYSTEMS with comments, questions, suggestions, ideas or the like relating to this publication and ALHASAN SYSTEMS other services and products, you agree that such information shall be deemed as non-confidential and ALHASAN SYSTEMS shall have no obligation to respond and be free to reproduce, use, disclose and distribute the information to others without limitation, including but not limited to developing, manufacturing, and marketing products incorporating such information. For further explanation of these legal notices please contact [email protected]. ©2014 www.alhasan.com BE INFORMED 2 ELEC TION BULLETIN NEWS HEADLINES DETAILS ECP says no UNDP officials ISLAMABAD: The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) on Saturday belied the claims of PTI were removed from polling chief Imran Khan that a UNDP election result gathering project was halted after Nawaz Sharif’s stations speech on May 11, 2013. According to the ECP, the record of all 69,802 polling stations was still th available with the commission. Talking to The News, a senior official of the ECP who was involved The News 29 June, 2014 in the data gathering process claimed that the UNDP project had nothing to do with the announcement of election results as it was an exercise aimed at data gathering for analysis and future reference. “We still have scanned result of each and every polling station of the country from all 849 constituencies and any political party can compare this with its own data collected through the party’s political agents,” said the official of the ECP. He said the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) chief’s claims of rigging through data operators are totally based on a misconception about the automated system which was introduced for the first time in collaboration with United Nation Development Programme (UNDP). Speaking at a public rally in Bahawalpur on Friday, Imran Khan had said that soon after the “victory speech” of PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, the data operators stopped sending computerized result copies to the ECP. According to Khan, the operators were told by the returning officers to slow down, and later handwritten results were sent to the ECP to manipulate results and cause the defeat of PTI candidates. “There is no truth in this claim. The system of computerised record keeping has nothing to do with the announcement of results as the returning officers did not need computer data to announce the result on the spot,” said the ECP official. Under the project, he said, two computers along with scanners were provided to each of the 425 returning officers across Pakistan. “The automated system was an alternative arrangement for recording election results electronically. It has no bearing at all on the results as they were separately announced by the concerned returning officer according to election laws,” he added. “These computers were operated by two IT professionals who scanned the result of each polling station (Form 14) and each constituency and sent it to the central database in ECP headquarters where it is still preserved for data analysis and further reference,” he said. The ECP official said it is true that owing to internet problems in some areas, the central data base of the commission could not receive some scanned copies of results through the internet and the same were later received through USBs. “But the political parties had their own polling agents in each polling station. There is no question of rigging if all polling agents could bring the signed copy of the result of their respective polling station. Computer data collection could not impact the result collected through polling agents and announced by the returning officers,” he said. FIA seeks PAT chief’s assets ISLAMABAD - In a new development, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) probing cases of details from ECP accumulation of assets and other financial crimes against chief of Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) The Nation 27th June, 2014 Dr Tahirul Qadri has asked the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to provide details of assets of Dr Qadir and his party. It is apparent that FIA, the key investigation agency of the federal government working under the Ministry of Interior, has opened the cases of Dr Qadri under the directions of government to keep him silent for bringing a so-called revolution in the country by overthrowing the democratic setup. FIA is a letter written to the Election Commission of Pakistan has sought details about the assets and accounts of Dr Tahirul Qadri when he was elected MNA in 2002. Similarly, the agency has also sought details of assets of his party - PAT and the details of his income and expenditures. FIA has informed the commission that the agency was investigating the assets case of PAT chief Dr Tahirul Qadri and his party. Under the law, each parliamentarian and the political party have to submit his/its assets details before the commission. An official of FIA explained that the purpose of seeking assets details was to compare these with his existing assets and to see how much assets his party and he accumulated during this period and whether these would match with his/its sources of income. A senior officer of the Election Commission of Pakistan confirmed that they had received the FIA letter in this regard. Before the arrival of Dr Tahirul Qadri in Pakistan from Canada on June 23, FIA had opened a number of investigations against him and his educational; organizations that have the status of NGO. These cases include assets case, money laundering case and tax evasion case and cases were also opened against his educational institutions - Idara Minhajul Quran, Minhajul Quran Welfare Society etc for getting tax exemptions with the status of NGOs.
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