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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 10, Issue 2 | February 2018 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (ICPVTR) Opium Production and Countering Terrorism Financing in Afghanistan: Learning from Thailand’s Royal Projects Neo Wee Na Institutionalisation of Sufi Islam after 9/11 and the rise of Barelvi Extremism in Pakistan Muhammad Suleman Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones Gregory Rose Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note The Enduring Terror Threat in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region In recent weeks, the situation in Afghanistan time. The spate of attacks could possibly be in has rapidly deteriorated as the Afghan Taliban reprisal to US President Donald Trump’s new and the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISK) Afghan policy which has hinted at stepping up unleashed their acts of terrorism in different the war efforts in Afghanistan to reverse the parts of the country. The recent wave of war momentum prior to exploring a political violence in the war-torn country is a grim solution. In recent weeks, the US has stepped reminder of the enduring character of the up its airstrikes against the Afghan Taliban in terrorist threat and the counter-productive different parts of Afghanistan. The upsurge of Wnature of militarised approaches to counter- violence in Afghanistan could possibly also be terrorism. This drives home the point that a in retaliation to the resumption of drone strikes viable solution of the war in Afghanistan lies in against the Haqqani Network in the political termination of the conflict. As long as Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal region. the conflict simmers, terrorist groups like Al- Qaeda, ISK and the Afghan Taliban, among Coupled with this is the booming opium others, will find ungoverned spaces to survive production in Afghanistan, which has financed and exploit the public resentment to their the Taliban insurgency and enabled it to benefit. continue indefinitely. The failure to break the supply-demand nexus and encourage the Alarmingly, some foreign fighters from Iraq farmers to cultivate alternative crops has left and Syria are now making their way to them with no choice but to grow opium. Afghanistan after the defeat of the Islamic Corruption, lack of technical expertise and State (IS) terrorist group. The presence of resources and absence of government’s writ in French, Moroccan, Chechen, British and the rural areas of Afghanistan, where much of Uighur militants affiliated with IS has been the opium grows, have also hampered efforts witnessed in Afghanistan. This will generate a to eradicate drugs. Disrupting and dismantling heated inter-group competition between the the financial sources of the Afghan Taliban are Taliban and ISK for possession of resources, as important to reverse the war momentum as new recruits and fighters, and monopoly over dismantling their overseas sanctuaries. These the ideological narrative of jihadism that could urgent issues are discussed at length by Neo negatively affect the already abysmal security Wee Na in her article on the insurgency- situation in Afghanistan. Resultantly, the narcotics nexus vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and violence is likely to increase in Afghanistan how Afghanistan could learn from Thailand’s ahead of the fast approaching fighting season success in arresting drug dealers and in the summer. providing alternative livelihood to the farmers and simultaneously isolate the terrorists and The wave of high profile attacks by the Afghan drain their financial sources. Taliban, mostly in the urban centre, is a bid to demonstrate that they, not the ISK, are in The rise of extremist groups in neighbouring charge of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an equally troubling development. they can strike anyone, anywhere and at any Muhammad Suleman describes how the rise ADVISORY BOARD Editor Sara Mahmood Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Dr. Fernando Reinares Associate Editor Abdul Basit Professor of Security Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Head of International Centre for Political Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Copywriters Jennifer Dhanaraj Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Violence and Terrorism Research Teertha Samal Madrid, Spain Sylvene See Dr. John Harrison Associate Editor Journal of Transportation Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja Dr. Stephen Sloan Security Professor Emeritus, The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna The University of Oklahoma not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses authors are affiliated.Volume Articles 9, may Issue not be4 |reproduced April 2017 without prior Associate Professor Lawrence J. Chastang, permission. Please contact the editors for more information at Head of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback National Security Studies Programme The University of Central Florida2 or comments. Editorial Note The Enduring Terror Threat in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region of Barelvi extremist groups on Pakistan’s political landscape in recent years has pushed the nuclear-armed Muslim nation further into the abyss of religious extremism. The state’s naïve promotion of Sufi Islam against Deobandi and Wahhabi groups - mainly blamed for promoting jihadism and militancy in Pakistan -- without thinking through the Wideological fallout of such policies has proved to be counterproductive. Pakistan’s best bet to overcome the violent-extremist threat lies in promoting the rule of law and liberal- democratic values as enshrined in the country’s constitution. This issue also discusses the utilisation of local charities to finance terrorism in foreign conflict zones. On one hand, specific charities in parts of the Middle East have been designated as terrorist organisations. On the other hand, international charitable organisations have provided funds to Hamas in Gaza and the Maute clan in the Philippines. Gregory Rose suggests the introduction of risk assessment from intelligence agencies, sharing of information on suspicious transactions, and public transparency and accountability systems, as a few possible policy responses to prevent charities from becoming a source of financing for terrorist organisations, within and beyond Australia. ADVISORY BOARD Editor Sara Mahmood Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Dr. Fernando Reinares Associate Editor Abdul Basit Professor of Security Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Head of International Centre for Political Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Copywriters Jennifer Dhanaraj Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Violence and Terrorism Research Teertha Samal Madrid, Spain Sylvene See Dr. John Harrison Associate Editor Journal of Transportation Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja Dr. Stephen Sloan Security Professor Emeritus, The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna The University of Oklahoma not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses authors are affiliated.Volume Articles 9, may Issue not be4 | reproduced April 2017 without prior Associate Professor Lawrence J. Chastang, permission. Please contact the editors for more information at Head of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback National Security Studies Programme The University of Central Florida3 or comments. Opium Production and Countering Terrorism Financing in Afghanistan – Neo Wee Na Opium Production and Countering Terrorism Financing in Afghanistan: Lessons from Thailand’s Royal Projects Neo Wee Na The opium production in Afghanistan, which Nangarhar, and Ghazni3 provinces.4 The has sharply risen in recent years, has Taliban are dependent on poppy cultivation bankrolled the Taliban-led insurgency in the for funds due to the increased regulations on country and undermined the international terrorism finance since 9/11. As such, there community’s efforts to overcome this is a nexus between drug dealers and the problem. Thailand’s anti-drug efforts may Taliban insurgents that ensures high profits offer possible lessons for Afghanistan on for the dealers and uninterrupted funds for drug eradication. Thailand focused on the insurgents. By destroying the physical providing alternative livelihoods to entice production of poppy and interdicting drugs, poppy farmers to collaborate with the the Afghan government can break this drug- government in drug eradication. Through the terror nexus, which is critical to curbing Thai Royal Development Project, the terrorism financing and eventually weakening government provided facilities and support the insurgency in Afghanistan. for farmers to gain economic independence The New York Times referred to Helmand and break their dependency on Communist province as a narco-state administered insurgents. Joint collaboration enabled directly by corrupt government officials. Thailand to resolve its drug cultivation Officials have also imposed taxes on poppy problem when forced drug eradication was farmers similar to the Taliban taxation on unsuccessful Even though Afghanistan and areas under their control.5 This has been Thailand faced different circumstances, the another catalyst for the steady increase in country can learn from
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