THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION IN ASIA

China’s Manned Space Program

What is that all about?

BY JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE

hina is on a fast track into space. Indeed, a demons. Prestige, in this scenario, becomes the Chi- great deal has been written in the international nese brass ring. Conquering space represents an op- Cpress about China’s wide-ranging space pro- portunity in what it refers to as mankind’s “fourth gram, particularly concerning the impending launch frontier” to recapture its lost legacy of technological of Chinese astronauts, called taikonauts. The Chi- mastery and innovation. A Chinese quest for pres- nese are clearly not engaged in a Wizard of Oz, pay- tige is undeniable. Chinese scientists and policy-mak- no-attention-to-the-man-behind-the-curtain space ers eagerly point out that when—not if—China program. The three launches since 1999 of the launches taikonauts into space, it will be only the third Shenzhou rocket intended to launch their taikonauts country in the world to have that capability. No Eu- into orbit evidences substantial Chinese technical ropean countries can do so, or Japan either. It will be achievement, and the seriousness of their program. an exclusive club of the United States, Russia, and Consequently, those achievements, plus their pro- China. The domestic, regional and international im- nouncements about timetables, space laboratories, plications of that exclusivity are considerable. But shuttles, space stations, lunar bases and now Mars are they enough for a country that daily faces missions, naturally make one wonder just what the Herculean challenges keeping its population fed, Chinese are up to. Is there a new, twenty-first cen- employed and stable as prerequisites for continua- tury space race brewing, and if there is, who is racing tion of essential domestic modernization efforts to and toward what goal? Analysis and commentary have spend an estimated US $2 billion annually on a space spawned several alternate, and often one-dimensional, program? scenarios. If not, then maybe the reason the Chinese are Policy and academic analyses of Chinese space pursuing a manned space program is to draw atten- activities have been limited, and stovepiped. With few tion from its military space activities, which will clearly exceptions, analyses has focused on either technical benefit from the dual-use nature of the technology parameters, or been highly politicized as part of a being developed. Under a worst-case scenario, the threat assessment, usually in the context of US plans Chinese manned efforts are just a Trojan horse. It for missile defense. In the case of the former, even has already been suggested, for example, that per- though much of the Chinese program remains haps Chinese leaders see potential military value in cloaked in secrecy due to both the nature of the Chi- Shenzhou as a reconnaissance platform. Chinese nese system and the military aspects of the topic, government officials have, after all, included national considerable agreement exists across technical analy- defense in the stated aims of their space program. ses concerning Chinese capabilities, now and poten- Both history and a logical policy analysis, how- tially in the future. Securing agreement regarding po- ever, reject Chinese reasoning as an either-or situa- litical “intent” remains more difficult. Some observ- tion. Far more likely, Chinese motivations for eagerly, ers see China’s race to space as a battle with its own even aggressively, pursuing a space program, includ- ing manned space, are multifaceted. Unless they suf- JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE is Professor and Chair of the fer a technical space disaster, which they are ardently Department of National Security Studies at the Naval War working to avoid, space yields high returns on their College in Newport, Rhode Island investment in multiple policy areas. Indeed, in the

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 25 United States as well space has always been a sub- complements national pride. Images of the Shenzhou field of other policy areas: foreign, national security, vessel that basically make people feel good about economic, and science policy being the most promi- themselves and their country are found on consumer nent. Examining the Chinese space program under goods from phone cards to water heaters. Also, do- the same assumption, or set of premises, allows for a mestic pride and international prestige also yield in- better understanding of what they are doing and why. creased domestic governmental legitimacy, a strong Further, by extrapolating the current environment consideration in Beijing. Internationally, regional poli- into the future, the context for a potential next space tics and vying for the “top-spot” comes into play. race subsequently becomes apparent, as well as why Few areas of exclusive technical achievement remain it is likely the United States and China will be the from the 1960s as many countries have satellites and primary—though not the only—competitors. launch capabilities but globally there are still only two Popular history tells us that the Apollo program with manned space capabilities. Hence with prestige exemplified the “can-do” attitude and visionary ap- as a factor, accepting the exponentially higher costs proach of the Kennedy Administration. If only, some associated with manned versus unmanned launches space exploration advocates still wistfully muse, an- becomes obligatory. other US President would possess such imagination Economically, the benefits of the space race and vision, the glory days of the US vigorously pur- generally and the Apollo Program specifically, were suing space activity through NASA would return. far-reaching, direct and indirect in the United States. Those reflections are both about half right. Popular Education and on-the-job experience for the Apollo history’s view of the Apollo days rightly glorifies the scientists and engineers created a generation of “can-do” spirit, but greatly embellishes the vision as- highly-trained technical personnel. Engineering pro- pect. On another level the knowledge and hardware grams were specifically set up in colleges and univer- created accrued additional multiple domestic benefits sities to accommodate the need for new and special- beyond the symbolic and military arenas. ized aerospace skills. The University of Science and There are several parallels that can be drawn Technology of China, Beijing University of Aero- between US decision-making in support of Apollo nautics and Astronautics, and Beijing Institute of in the 1960s and in China today for a manned space Technology are all among the top universities in program. Domestic, regional and international pres- China, and all eagerly discuss and promote their in- tige are clearly factors in Chinese decision-making. volvement in the space program. Student interest in Domestically, a positive public “rallying” factor space is said to have exploded in China. If the Chi-

26 Fall 2002 – Volume 6, Number 2 nese experience parallels anything close to what has effective in encouraging a hard-line US government happened in Japan already, universities and industries stance on anything Chinese. The effectiveness of their use even a remote possibility of being involved in activities was fully recognized in China, and inter- space ventures as a lure for the best and the brightest preted as signaling mainline acceptance of their views. into their programs. That providing an opportunity for backlash from While the US blazed through the heavens up the Chinese hard-liners, triggering a dangerous action- steepest of learning curves, other countries recog- reaction cycle. Therefore, any activity having the po- nized a technology gap was developing, potentially tential to increase Chinese capabilities in an area of detrimental to their future. In the late 1960s and into clear and expanding US dominance—like space— the 1970s, Europe aggressively pursued space activ- would easily garner support in Beijing. ity, separately and then collectively, for economic rea- Taken together, the political, economic, and mili- sons. In Canada, public and political justification for tary benefits to the Chinese in pursuing space activ- space activity to avoid being on the wrong side of ity, including manned space, validate their course of the technology gap came through a space program action as a rational policy decision. Although certainly designed to focus on one technology at a time, the not a full-blown Cold War, there are considerable technology carefully selected to directly benefit the parallels to the Apollo-era US rationales in terms of Canadian people. Likewise, China keenly appreciates domestic benefits, surrogate struggles for regional these earlier established relationships between space influence, and both global political and military pos- and technology and economics and domestic poli- turing. Indeed China itself is clear that it is pursuing tics. space activity not just as an end in itself, but part of And finally, there is the military consideration. a larger strategy. According to the Stockholm International Peace Re- In November 2000, the Information Office of search Institute, “no country can currently rival or the State Council issued the first Chinese white pa- contest US space dominance or the advantages that per on space, called “China’s Space Activities.” The this provides to its terrestrial military operations.” technical milestones laid down were impressive, and Wired magazine put it differently in April 2002. the language insightful. It reminded readers that China “Outer space is where a global cop patrols. America’s invented gunpowder and that development was ac- eyes, ears and nerves are up there, all day, every day, tually the “embryo of modern space rockets.” In a circling the blue yonder. Space vehicles are the ulti- field China sees itself as having initiated and once mate asymmetrical asset. They can’t be reached with prevailed, and was then overtaken in, it now wants to a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax.” The Chinese regain a place of distinction. are well aware of US space The paper also stated that dominance and are cognizant China’s ambitious goals for its of the potential military ad- The political, economic, and military space program will be vantages that this brings. achieved through adherence to The robustness and advo- benefits to the Chinese in pursuing “the principle of long-term, cacy of US military space ef- space activity, including manned space, stable and sustainable develop- forts under the Bush Admin- ment and making the develop- istration—especially in con- validate their course of action as a ment of space activities . . . trast to the generally disap- rational policy decision. serve the state’s comprehen- proving Clinton Administra- sive development strategy. The tion attitude toward military Chinese government attaches space activities must also be considered in the con- great importance to the significant role of space ac- text of US-China relations more generally. Until Sep- tivities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing tember 11th, when many international relationships the country with science and education and that of got turned on their heads and several strange bedfel- sustainable development, as well as in economic con- lows resulted, some US analysts felt that justly or struction, national security, science and technology unjustly, China had been deemed the next enemy of development and social progress. The development the United States. Strained US-China relations pre- of space activities is encouraged and supported by cipitated the formation of a loose alliance united in the government as an integral part of the state’s com- their view that a rising China poses great risks to prehensive development strategy.” In that context America’s vital interests. They were determined and international space cooperation was also promoted,

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 27 placing priority on cooperation within the Asia-Pa- Shrouded in secrecy, the Chinese are deliberately cre- cific region and supporting Chinese participation in ating an aura of mystic and drama around the international launch services. taikonauts. China recognizes its current “catch-up” position China Aerospace Science and Technology Cor- as at least partly a situation of its own making. Space poration (CASTC) was created in 1999 for develop- scientists and engineers did not escape the wrath of ment of national defense and aerospace endeavors, the Cultural Revolution. Facilities were destroyed and from the former China Aerospace Corporation individuals starved and at times beaten, while being (CAC). In an effort to become more competitive, the forced to continue work in austere and sometimes Chinese government reformed the top defense and unimaginable conditions. One early launch account, technology corporations, including CAC, a large State for example, depicts rocket fuel being loaded using a Owned Enterprise (SOE) under direct supervision bicycle pump. It was not that China did not have well of the State Council. With nearly three-hundred thou- trained individuals working on the space program. sand employees, CAC was divided into the China Many, including the program leader, Dr. Qian Xuesen, Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation were trained in the West. Qian, along with approxi- (CASTC) and the China Aerospace Machinery and mately one-hundred other Chinese scientists, was Electronics Corporation (CAMEC), presumably with expelled from the United States in 1955 during the about one-hundred and fifty thousand employees. McCarthy era, and not without long-standing and The tricky part of reorganization and management many say understandable ill-feelings toward the reform in China is that cutting jobs is usually an inte- United States. From those roots, China proceeded gral part of becoming more efficient. Chinese launch tumultuously, though determinedly. site workers, for example, have personally shared that The Chinese must be commended for develop- often three or four people are assigned to a task one ment of what was, until very recently, a virtually in- person could handle, and likely handle better alone digenous space program. Nevertheless, the Chinese rather than having to parcel it out to several persons. always maximized their ability to learn from others. Yet, as previously stated, creating jobs remains an That their Xichang launch site is at approximately 28 important Beijing priority. So China has had to be degrees N latitude—and the Kennedy Space Center creative, balance interests, and move slowly in its re- is at 28.5 degrees N latitude—is not coincidence. They form efforts. The aerospace industry has become picked a similar location to allow emulation of post- somewhat of a test case for them. Among its respon- launch procedures and expectations published in open sibilities, CASTC has general authority for manned source literature. Even today, although the Shenzhou spaceflight, and the Long March series rockets. How- spacecraft bears similarities to ever, it should also be made the Russian Soyuz design, the clear that the Chinese military Chinese avidly defend it as The Chinese government attaches great ultimate controls the Chinese their own product, which tech- space program. nical comparisons seem to importance to the significant role of The Chinese quickly bear out. They view beginning space activities in implementing the made many significant au- with the Soyuz design and then tonomous technical achieve- initiate their own work as sim- strategy of revitalizing the country ments. Within a decade of ply a smart business practice, with science and education. their first launch, the Chinese rather than reinventing the could successfully recover wheel. large satellites from orbit. This The current manned space effort, known as is important today as a critical step in any manned Project 921, is China’s second, if one does not count program, since it requires the development of such Wan Hu, a sixteenth century inventor who built a technologies as heat shields, sophisticated tracking rocket propelled chair—upon testing, both the in- systems and automated controls, and so indicates ventor and the chair met with unfortunate outcomes. Chinese progress. Fourteen taikonauts have been selected, and much Among CASTC’s most important current like the first US astronauts, they were drawn from achievements are the more than twenty consecutive the ranks of military fighter pilots. Although two successful launches achieved since 1996. Although taikonauts trained in Russia, most training is now each of those successful launches is important inde- conducted in a secret facility north of Beijing. pendently, together they build a record of reliability

28 Fall 2002 – Volume 6, Number 2 important to commercial launch insurance compa- maneuvers were conducted before the descent mod- nies. After a series of launch accidents in the 1990s, ule returned to Earth seven days and one-hundred and the subsequent Cox Commission report issued and eight orbits later. Chinese ability to maneuver in the United States, the lucrative Chinese launch the Shenzhou II independent orbital module sur- market quickly dried up. Other than launching thir- prised Western observers. Additionally, international teen satellites for the failed Iridium communication press reports varied, with some stating that the flight venture, the commercial launch market, which had carried cell and tissue samples of eight-seven ani- generated hard currency for China, has been at a vir- mals, plants and microorganisms, while other stated tual standstill. The Chinese that animals (rats) were on probably hope that positive board. Clearly, life support sys- spill-over from a successful In a field China sees itself as having tems were being tested at some manned launch, in terms of level. The Chinese were am- perceived technical capability, initiated and once prevailed, and was biguous as to exactly how, and will benefit their commercial then overtaken in, it now wants to China’s state-run Xinhua launch program. Nevertheless, Agency made no reference to an improved perception of regain a place of distinction. animals in its reports. Dr. Liu Chinese technical capability Yongding, Life Sciences Pay- will neither bring down higher load Manager for the mission launch costs (between US $60-70 million per launch) refused to comment when specifically asked if a mon- compared with others on the international market, key, dog, rabbit and small snails were among the live or change restrictive US export laws. specimens on board. Guidance and reentry technol- Besides launch vehicles, China has numerous ogy was also tested. No pictures of the returned cap- satellite programs. Dong Fang Hong (DFH) com- sule were released though, indeed there was a virtual munications satellites have gone through multiple it- press blackout, leading to Western speculation that erations. DFH-1, also known as Mao 1, was launched there had been landing problems, likely either with in 1970. It is most famous for broadcasting the song the parachutes or the retro-rockets. The Chinese de- “East is Red.” The latest DFH iteration is being co- nied such allegations. operatively developed with Germany. The Fanhui Shi Shenzhou III was launched on 24 March 2002, Weixing (FSW) recoverable satellites were originally and returned to the grasslands of Inner Mongolia developed for photo-reconnaissance, but now are also on 1 April 2002. In each of the three seats dummy used for remote sensing. The third type of applica- humans were wired to medical monitors, all to test tion satellite is the Fen Yun (FY) series, used for me- life support systems, most of which were purchased teorology and remote sensing. The Chinese have also from the Russians. launched a series of Shi Jian satellites, carrying sci- The Shenzhou forward orbital module is used ence payloads. Between 2001-2006, the Chinese have to hold experiments and to act as a docking crew said they intend to launch thirty satellites as part of transfer module for future Chinese space missions. an expanding program, culminating with human These could include docking with another Shenzhou spaceflight. vehicle to form an interim “space laboratory” such The first Shenzhou flight occurred in Novem- as Beijing has talked about. The spacecraft has a rear ber 1999. Statements first made in 1996 gave 1999 as service propulsion system with a manned capsule in the year planned for the first manned launch, to com- between. Shenzhou III left the forward module in memorate the fiftieth launch of the founding of the orbit, likely for future docking tests. It also appears Communist state. Depressed finances and technical to be carrying a relatively sophisticated remote-sens- issues, however, made it impossible to keep to the ing payload (medium-resolution imaging original timetable. There simply was not enough time spectroradiometer, MRIS), transmitting high-quality for unmanned proving missions to assure that they data to Chinese ground stations. The infrared tech- would not meet with disaster. Shenzhou I completed nologies being validated by the instrument potentially fourteen orbits and returned to Earth after just have both civil and military applications (for military twenty-one hours, but achieved a significant step for- satellites), again illustrating the inherently “gray” na- ward for the Chinese. ture of most space technologies and hence any the The second flight was in January 2001 and both complexity of analyzing “intent” behind any space more complex, and more mysterious. Numerous program.

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 29 There is really no need for the Chinese to rush difficult to dismiss the premise that China’s exclusion (to potential failure), especially since small incremental has included a strong political component. The United steps creates considerable (and positive) journalistic States has historically viewed international space co- attention in the West anyway. Per the Beijing Morn- operation as both a political “carrot” and a technical ing Post, they have a three step plan: a taikonaut in way to “guide” other countries’ space activities. Both space, establishment of a space laboratory, and even- Europe and Canada, and later Japan (including in the tually setting up a space station. Wang Zhuangyin, a previously forbidden area of launch technology), en- leading space program engineer, says manned space- joyed the benefits of working with the United States flight will occur by 2005. The official China Daily in space program development. That the United States stated that China would put a man into orbit by 2005, has taken a different path with China has likely, though and on the moon by 2010. Ouyang Ziyuan, chief sci- inadvertently, contributed to China’s determination entist of China’s moon exploration program, stated now to become a space power. It is also interesting to “China is expected to complete its first exploration note that since September 11th and many international of the moon in 2010 and will establish a base on the relationships being subsequently redefined, NASA is moon as we did in the South Pole and the North suddenly much more open to closer ties to Beijing. Pole.” They are adamant about building a sustained Space science traditionally serves as a safe first-area program rather than planting of space cooperation, being a flag or returning a Moon the least threatening from a rock, referencing the US aban- With a successful Shenzhou IV military perspective. Progress donment of its manned lunar precursor launch, the Chinese will toward ISS participation, even program and failure to use it incremental, is a domestic and as a step further into space. In likely go for a first manned regional triumph for Beijing. a truly rational, well-laid out launch in 2003. China has signed coop- (and well-funded) plan, many erative space agreements with analysts feel that any establish- a number of countries, includ- ment of a Moon base (by any country) should ulti- ing Canada, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Russia, mately lead to exploitation of lunar mineral resources. Pakistan, India and Brazil. The scope of cooperation Establishment of a Chinese base on Mars by 2040 ranges from development of the Dong Fang Hong 3 has also been proclaimed as a goal. In any event, with communications satellite with Germany, to a broad the kind of statements being made, going far beyond Russia-China cooperative agreement, to narrow sci- the earlier white paper, the often-reticent Chinese are entific co-ventures. One future area of international going out on a limb in terms of actually placing dates cooperation that will be especially interesting to watch with ambitions. Experience to date, however, has is launch services, since participation in international shown them that they don’t actually have to meet the launch services was included as a white paper goal. dates to keep the rest of the world speculative and The Chinese understand that launch consortia have interested, but just keep working toward them. In the become increasing prevalent, and so they may well case of the first manned launch though, it is likely be looking down the road toward finding partners that they will not wait for 2005. With a successful for the Long March series. Shenzhou IV precursor launch, the Chinese will likely Space weaponry (beyond the handguns that have go for a first manned launch in 2003. been carried into space by astronauts and cosmo- That the Chinese have not been included in space nauts), including both weapons placed in space and projects known as much for their political, coopera- ground-based for use on space-based assets, has un- tive aspects as for their technical utility or capability— til recently been a carefully avoided option by all such as the International Space Station (ISS)—has space-faring nations. For many years too there was been a source of frustration for them. People’s Daily the argument that space weapons were banned in the on 27 December 2000 stated that the Chinese gov- 1967 Outer Space Treaty. What Article 4 of that treaty ernment would seek acceptance into the ISS program. actually says, however, is: “States Parties to the Treaty In all fairness, ISS partners have been expected to con- undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any tribute either technology, or money, (or both) and until objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds recently China has not had either. More recently, how- of weapons of mass destruction, install such weap- ever, Brazil, a country with far less space experience ons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in than China, has become an ISS partner, making it more outer space in any other manner. The moon and other

30 Fall 2002 – Volume 6, Number 2 celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to Early in 2002, NASA discovered potentially vast the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The es- resources of water close to the Martian surface. Sub- tablishment of military bases, installations and forti- sequently, there was considerable speculation that fications, the testing of any type of weapons and the NASA was “on the verge” of announcing plans to conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies send a man to Mars. At a revised estimated cost of shall be forbidden.” The argument against weapons US $50 billion and several other countries (Japan, was hung on the “peaceful purposes” phrase, though Europe, China) gaining space ground, the question the United States has long contended that “peace- was raised as to whether there would be a new race ful” included defensive purposes. The “peaceful pur- to space? Likely there will be, but not because of poses” rational against weapons has been eroding water on Mars. because the parties making that argument often de- Lining up competitors in any potential space race fined “peaceful” as meaning non-military. Increas- today is relatively easy, though there are some wild ingly, however, they found themselves in a conun- cards. Although Russia starts from a presumed posi- drum since in the age of communications, naviga- tion of strength, the country’s cash-strapped situa- tion and reconnaissance satellites, all dual-use, that tion has left it an emaciated version of former self. definition became increasingly problematic for any Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, has said that the military wanting to use space hardware. country now has nothing to be proud of in space. The Chinese clearly see 1998 as a turning point: European efforts, traditionally through the European a time when some in the US began moving from mili- Space Agency, have long been restricted—by having tarizing space—which has a long and accepted his- to get its fifteen members states to agree on goals, tory—to weaponizing space. The US Space Commis- and then funding, and then follow-through. This will sion Report stated it as inevitable that space will be- become further complicated by the new and as yet come a battleground, and so the United States would undefined role of the European Commission in space be remiss not to prepare. Many analysts feel that the activity, and because Japan, the country once touted first “space assault” will likely be a ground-based elec- as the most consistently progressing toward a fully tronic attack on a satellite. Indeed evidence exists sug- matured program, has found its space activities gesting that such assaults have already occurred, re- plagued with problems. India has an aggressive and sulting in satellites being temporarily “blinded.” China impressive space program, but as a democracy In- is purportedly aggressively working on such ground- dian decision-makers are acutely aware of what poli- based laser technology. The easiest way to attack and ticians in the United States have long known—space destroy a satellite, however, is with weapons launched is positively viewed by the public, but considered ex- from the ground. A small missile could deposit a pendable relative to other public concerns. So, while cloud of sand, ball bearings, or other hard objects in India develops specific space technology for civil and a satellites path. The target’s own velocity provides military purposes, and has generated a considerable the impact needed for destruc- regional technological reputa- tion. A dozen or so countries tion, there is little chance that have the capability to build A space race of some sort currently the amount of public expen- such a system, though there is seems inevitable. diture required for a manned no evidence any have done so. program could be tolerated China claims to have devel- domestically. But China oped “parasite satellites.” These are orbiting bombs doesn’t have voters to worry about. Subsequently, al- that attach themselves to enemy spacecrafts for deto- though China has yet to produce a Nobel prizewin- nation when deemed necessary. Verification is diffi- ner who did his work on Chinese soil and remains cult since none have ever been launched. An argu- constrained by economics, they have the scientific ment can be made both that it behooves China to and engineering potential and could have the politi- have the United States think it has these capabilities, cal will, through domestic and action-reaction con- so that the United States will not think China’s siderations with the United States, to stay the course strength “inadequate”—and that claims such as these in space development. Overall a country’s relative prod the United States to be even more aggressive in position on the spaceflight learning curve can pro- its military space development. In either case, there vide a barometer of a nation’s fortunes, and its un- is clearly an action-reaction cycle building from which forgiving nature can dramatically illustrate a country’s there seems no obvious escape. failings just as graphically.

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 31 The Chinese are reaching for the stars—quite literally

The wild card may well be South Korea. It is hedging for many years. Certainly regional action-re- scheduled to launch its first three-stage rocket in action considerations will come into play, with the November 2002, with indigenous plans for launch- pertinent question being how quickly will it expand ing satellites, including military satellites, by 2005. That beyond the US and China. action—because of both prestige and military impli- Though China does not have to be an enemy of cations—could spur Japan to reinvigorate its own the United States, it is certainly destined to be a com- efforts, challenging China, with implications for In- petitor if anything beyond the status quo in Asia is dia. Indeed there has even been speculation that a the benchmark by which competition is measured by successful Chinese manned launch would push Ja- the United States. Subsequently, as long as the US pan toward an autonomous manned program, a bet continues to develop and exploit the obvious mili- that the risk-averse Japanese government has been tarily advantages of space and China feels compelled

32 Fall 2002 – Volume 6, Number 2 to respond, a space race of some sort currently seems a planning perspective, in the context of a country inevitable. It is inevitable because both countries rec- with a five-thousand year continuous history, exem- ognize that space can provide one country advan- plifies the dramatic difference between China’s idea tages, or at least avoid disadvantages, compared to of long-term planning as opposed to that typical in the other. the United States. Nevertheless, the Chinese clearly Assessing whether China intends to take a tor- have committed to the goal of space development and toise or hare approach today’s space race is relative. at whatever rate funding permits, it will be factored China invented the game of wei qi, the Asian equiva- into the precarious balancing act the Chinese regu- lent of chess (commonly called “Go” in the West) larly practice. China’s manned space program is about which has two-hundred and fifty-six pieces with which China’s determination to regain what it considers as to strategize, versus just sixteen in chess. That type of its deserved place in regional and global politics.

Harvard Asia Pacific Review 33