THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION IN ASIA China’s Manned Space Program What is that all about? BY JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE hina is on a fast track into space. Indeed, a demons. Prestige, in this scenario, becomes the Chi- great deal has been written in the international nese brass ring. Conquering space represents an op- Cpress about China’s wide-ranging space pro- portunity in what it refers to as mankind’s “fourth gram, particularly concerning the impending launch frontier” to recapture its lost legacy of technological of Chinese astronauts, called taikonauts. The Chi- mastery and innovation. A Chinese quest for pres- nese are clearly not engaged in a Wizard of Oz, pay- tige is undeniable. Chinese scientists and policy-mak- no-attention-to-the-man-behind-the-curtain space ers eagerly point out that when—not if—China program. The three launches since 1999 of the launches taikonauts into space, it will be only the third Shenzhou rocket intended to launch their taikonauts country in the world to have that capability. No Eu- into orbit evidences substantial Chinese technical ropean countries can do so, or Japan either. It will be achievement, and the seriousness of their program. an exclusive club of the United States, Russia, and Consequently, those achievements, plus their pro- China. The domestic, regional and international im- nouncements about timetables, space laboratories, plications of that exclusivity are considerable. But shuttles, space stations, lunar bases and now Mars are they enough for a country that daily faces missions, naturally make one wonder just what the Herculean challenges keeping its population fed, Chinese are up to. Is there a new, twenty-first cen- employed and stable as prerequisites for continua- tury space race brewing, and if there is, who is racing tion of essential domestic modernization efforts to and toward what goal? Analysis and commentary have spend an estimated US $2 billion annually on a space spawned several alternate, and often one-dimensional, program? scenarios. If not, then maybe the reason the Chinese are Policy and academic analyses of Chinese space pursuing a manned space program is to draw atten- activities have been limited, and stovepiped. With few tion from its military space activities, which will clearly exceptions, analyses has focused on either technical benefit from the dual-use nature of the technology parameters, or been highly politicized as part of a being developed. Under a worst-case scenario, the threat assessment, usually in the context of US plans Chinese manned efforts are just a Trojan horse. It for missile defense. In the case of the former, even has already been suggested, for example, that per- though much of the Chinese program remains haps Chinese leaders see potential military value in cloaked in secrecy due to both the nature of the Chi- Shenzhou as a reconnaissance platform. Chinese nese system and the military aspects of the topic, government officials have, after all, included national considerable agreement exists across technical analy- defense in the stated aims of their space program. ses concerning Chinese capabilities, now and poten- Both history and a logical policy analysis, how- tially in the future. Securing agreement regarding po- ever, reject Chinese reasoning as an either-or situa- litical “intent” remains more difficult. Some observ- tion. Far more likely, Chinese motivations for eagerly, ers see China’s race to space as a battle with its own even aggressively, pursuing a space program, includ- ing manned space, are multifaceted. Unless they suf- JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE is Professor and Chair of the fer a technical space disaster, which they are ardently Department of National Security Studies at the Naval War working to avoid, space yields high returns on their College in Newport, Rhode Island investment in multiple policy areas. Indeed, in the Harvard Asia Pacific Review 25 United States as well space has always been a sub- complements national pride. Images of the Shenzhou field of other policy areas: foreign, national security, vessel that basically make people feel good about economic, and science policy being the most promi- themselves and their country are found on consumer nent. Examining the Chinese space program under goods from phone cards to water heaters. Also, do- the same assumption, or set of premises, allows for a mestic pride and international prestige also yield in- better understanding of what they are doing and why. creased domestic governmental legitimacy, a strong Further, by extrapolating the current environment consideration in Beijing. Internationally, regional poli- into the future, the context for a potential next space tics and vying for the “top-spot” comes into play. race subsequently becomes apparent, as well as why Few areas of exclusive technical achievement remain it is likely the United States and China will be the from the 1960s as many countries have satellites and primary—though not the only—competitors. launch capabilities but globally there are still only two Popular history tells us that the Apollo program with manned space capabilities. Hence with prestige exemplified the “can-do” attitude and visionary ap- as a factor, accepting the exponentially higher costs proach of the Kennedy Administration. If only, some associated with manned versus unmanned launches space exploration advocates still wistfully muse, an- becomes obligatory. other US President would possess such imagination Economically, the benefits of the space race and vision, the glory days of the US vigorously pur- generally and the Apollo Program specifically, were suing space activity through NASA would return. far-reaching, direct and indirect in the United States. Those reflections are both about half right. Popular Education and on-the-job experience for the Apollo history’s view of the Apollo days rightly glorifies the scientists and engineers created a generation of “can-do” spirit, but greatly embellishes the vision as- highly-trained technical personnel. Engineering pro- pect. On another level the knowledge and hardware grams were specifically set up in colleges and univer- created accrued additional multiple domestic benefits sities to accommodate the need for new and special- beyond the symbolic and military arenas. ized aerospace skills. The University of Science and There are several parallels that can be drawn Technology of China, Beijing University of Aero- between US decision-making in support of Apollo nautics and Astronautics, and Beijing Institute of in the 1960s and in China today for a manned space Technology are all among the top universities in program. Domestic, regional and international pres- China, and all eagerly discuss and promote their in- tige are clearly factors in Chinese decision-making. volvement in the space program. Student interest in Domestically, a positive public “rallying” factor space is said to have exploded in China. If the Chi- 26 Fall 2002 – Volume 6, Number 2 nese experience parallels anything close to what has effective in encouraging a hard-line US government happened in Japan already, universities and industries stance on anything Chinese. The effectiveness of their use even a remote possibility of being involved in activities was fully recognized in China, and inter- space ventures as a lure for the best and the brightest preted as signaling mainline acceptance of their views. into their programs. That providing an opportunity for backlash from While the US blazed through the heavens up the Chinese hard-liners, triggering a dangerous action- steepest of learning curves, other countries recog- reaction cycle. Therefore, any activity having the po- nized a technology gap was developing, potentially tential to increase Chinese capabilities in an area of detrimental to their future. In the late 1960s and into clear and expanding US dominance—like space— the 1970s, Europe aggressively pursued space activ- would easily garner support in Beijing. ity, separately and then collectively, for economic rea- Taken together, the political, economic, and mili- sons. In Canada, public and political justification for tary benefits to the Chinese in pursuing space activ- space activity to avoid being on the wrong side of ity, including manned space, validate their course of the technology gap came through a space program action as a rational policy decision. Although certainly designed to focus on one technology at a time, the not a full-blown Cold War, there are considerable technology carefully selected to directly benefit the parallels to the Apollo-era US rationales in terms of Canadian people. Likewise, China keenly appreciates domestic benefits, surrogate struggles for regional these earlier established relationships between space influence, and both global political and military pos- and technology and economics and domestic poli- turing. Indeed China itself is clear that it is pursuing tics. space activity not just as an end in itself, but part of And finally, there is the military consideration. a larger strategy. According to the Stockholm International Peace Re- In November 2000, the Information Office of search Institute, “no country can currently rival or the State Council issued the first Chinese white pa- contest US space dominance or the advantages that per on space, called “China’s Space Activities.” The this provides to its terrestrial military operations.” technical milestones laid down were impressive, and Wired magazine put it differently in April 2002. the language insightful. It reminded