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UDGIVET AF SØE-LIEUTENANT-SELSKABET NR. 3-4 · 2017 · 188. ÅRGANG

Enduring lessons from the Falklands War for the U.S.Navy Marinehjemmeværnet. Skitse til Flådplan 2032 Danske ubåde i Østersøen? Søkadet 1942-43. Erindringer Salget af De vestindiske Øer Redaktørens spalte Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War om ubådsvåbnets fremtidige muligheder i Seidelin, redegør for status for selskabet ENDURING LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS WAR denne udvikling. Orlogshistorikeren Hans i formandens beretning, der er gengivet i FOR THE U.S. NAVY Christian Bjerg var indkaldt som særligt dette nummer. sagkyndig til at fremkomme med sit syn 35 YEARS LATER på ubådens muligheder i Østersøen. Han Selskabet har været inde i en større om- efterlyser i sit indlæg en genoptagelse af kalfatring i forbindelse med revision af By ubådsvåbnet i det danske søforsvar, og medlemslister, abonnementer til tids- Dr. Sebastian Bruns peger specielt på det arbejde omkring skriftet og kontingentopkrævninger. Det- University of Kiel ubåde, der er indledt mellem den norske te har været årsagen til, at tidsskriftets RJGHQW\VNHÀnGH(WXGYLNOLQJVDUEHMGH årgang for 2017 bliver udgivet i papirud- Dr. Sebastian Bruns heads the Center for Maritime Strategy & Security (CMSS) at the som Danmark, efter hans mening, burde gave senere end beregnet. Årgangen vil Institute for Security Policy University of Kiel (ISPK). His work focuses on naval stra- have tilsluttet sig for at følge med i, hvad bestå af to dobbeltnumre med lidt udvi- tegy, maritime geopolitics, the German and United States navies, and maritime security der sker inden for dette område, der fort- det sidetal i forhold til de normale udgi- issues. Dr. Bruns holds a PhD in Political Science (U of Kiel). His study “US Naval Stra- sat er under rivende udvikling. velser. Medlemmerne har været varskoet tegy and National Security. The Evolution of American Maritime Power” (Routledge: om dette forhold, ligesom tidsskriftets London, 2017) follows American naval strategy from 1981 to 2016. He is the editor of I år var det 100 år siden, at de dansk vest- 2017, 1-2 nummer har været tilgængelig the Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security, together with Joachim Krause indiske øer blev solgt til USA. Redaktøren VRP SGI¿O IRU PHGOHPPHUQH 'HW IRU - (Routledge: London, 2016). He is the Director of the Kiel Seapower Series, Conference publicerer i den anledning et essay, hvori ventes, at årgangen 2018 vil indeholde Chairman of the Kiel International Seapower Symposium, and was a major driver behind KDQ J¡U RSP UNVRP Sn GHWWH VDOJV Àn - tre numre. the Kiel Conferences on Maritime Security Challenges in 2016 (Focus: High North) and demæssige aspekter. Siden 1860erne har 2015 (Focus: Baltic Sea). GHQ DPHULNDQVNH ÀnGHOHGHOVH Y UHW NODU Det har tidligere herfra været nævnt, at over den strategiske betydning specielt af bestyrelsen for Søe-Lieutenant-Selskabet Exocet antiship missile, costing the li- havnen på Skt. Thomas, og var gennem planlagde en digitalisering af Tidsskriftet, ves of 20 of her crew. The sevenyear old, 50 år interesseret i en amerikansk erhver- fra det begyndte som Archiv for Söevæse- 4,800ton warship was mortally disabled. velse. Under 1. verdenskrig var det i høj net i 1827 og frem til i dag som Tidsskrift It eventually foundered and was abando- JUDGÀnGHSROLWLVNHJUXQGHGHU¿N86$WLO for Søvæsen. Denne plan er ved at tage ned. Six days later, it was scuttled using at fremprovokere en dansk afhændelse. form, og vil efter alt at dømme blive rea- depth charges. In the process of being re- liseret i 2018. Tidsskriftet er en guldgrube scued from the doomed vessel, sailors and Søe-Lieutenant-Selskabet er fortsat inde for al maritim forskning i Danmark igen- RI¿FHUVDUHUHSRUWHGWRKDYHVWUXFNXSWKH i en god udvikling med velbesøgte fore- nem snart 200 år. song “Always Look on the Bright Side (of drag. Formanden, kaptajnløjtnant Anna Hans Christian Bjerg Life)” together, a tune made famous in the 1979 movie “Monty Python’s Life of Bri- an”. Although this illustration may be cy- nical to the casual observer, the incident Artikler og indlæg der ønskes optaget i tidsskriftet, offers a sense of the mindset with which bedes fremsendt elektronisk i WORD format. Britain went to war over the Falklands three and a half decades ago. Obviously, Bøger, der ønskes omtalt eller anmeldt, fremsendes til redaktørens WKHFRQÀLFWLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLFSURYLGHG privatadresse eller ekspeditionens adresse. I. A peculiar little War a host of other, much more sober insights One of the more anecdotal accounts of – not least for the United States of Ame- Annoncer og individuelle abonnementer tegnes ved the Falklands War relates to a rather chil- rica in general and the U.S. Navy in par- henvendelse til ekspeditionen ling display of British black humour: On ticular. In fact, it remains a principal point 4 May 1982, the Type42 destroyer HMS of departure for many naval observers to 6KHI¿HOG ' ZDVKLWE\DQ$UJHQWLQH understand some dynamics of war at and

88 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 89 Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War from the sea, if only because similar mari- agreement, the political course of acti- time engagements have been far and few RQ ZDV VHW IRU DUPHG FRQÀLFW7KH 86 since 1982. was not a warring party, but Washington soon sided strongly with the government The Falklands War was analysed in great in London. A negotiated settlement or a detail, and not just in the U.K. and Argen- peace plan would have likely frozen the tina 1. The United States tasked a group of VWDWXV TXR VLJQL¿FDQWO\ FRPSOLFDWLQJ researchers under the leadership of noted any British attempts to expel the Argen- naval analyst Norman Polmar to study tine forces from the islands. It also would lessons for the U.S. Navy. As Ian Spel- have robbed the U.K. of diplomatic clout OHU KDV VWDWHG WKH FRQÀLFW SUR - and political and military momentum 2. vided a rare insight into the performance $VUHFHQWO\GHFODVVL¿HGGRFXPHQWVKDYH of many modernday weapons, platforms, shown (National Security Archive 2013), and sensors in actual combat. In additi- the United States covertly supported the on, new tactics and techniques were tried United Kingdom since the early days of and tested. They underlined (and in some war, while publicly assuming the role of case, confuted) particular skills and com- a mediator. This public “ringside seat” petence of the men and the machinery in- (Lehman 2012) included shuttle diploma- YROYHG7KH)DONODQGV:DUZDVDFRQÀLFW cy by Secretary of State Alexander Haig RIPDQ\³¿UVWV´RIZKLFKWKH861DY\ between the United Kingdom and Argen- interestedly took note: tina. Haig and thenU.S. Representative to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, the • ,WZDV¿UVWWLPHLQWKH&ROG:DUWKDWD administration’s strongest advocates for major navy came under sustained attack the Argentine position, were outmano- at sea by enemy aircraft; euvred by the unconditional supporters • LWPDUNHGWKH¿UVWVXFFHVVIXODWWDFNRID of the British in the Reagan administra- nuclear hunter/killer submarine against tion. The United States eventually provi- a major enemy surface combatant; ded intelligence, fuel, missiles, logistical • it was the operational debut of the verti- assistance, and Phalanx guns in support cal/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) of its venerable British ally. As John Le- aircraft, the Harrier (the British lost a hman (Secretary of the Navy 19811987) combined 10 of these jets in combat); unveiled on the occasion of the 30th an- and, niversary of the war in 2012, “so great • LWZDVWKH¿UVWLOOXVWUDWLRQRIWKH5R\DO was the commitment to the cause that I Navy’s new Invincibleclass aircraft car- was authorized to prepare a U.S. helicop- rier in combat action (and accordingly, ter carrier, the USS Iwo Jima (LPH2), this particular warship’s strengths and for use by the Royal Navy should HMS vulnerabilities). Invincible [R05] or Hermes [R12] be lost.” 3 7KH FRXUVH RI FRQÀLFW DOVR SURYLGHG some lessons in naval diplomacy. After In February 1983, the Department of the WKH VLQNLQJ RI WKH FUXLVHU$5$ *HQHUDO 1DY\¶V 'R1 2I¿FHRI3URJUDP$SSUD - Belgrano (C6) (2 May 1982) and HMS isal (OPA) in Washington, D.C. issued 6KHI¿HOG HIIHFWLYHO\ UXOHG RXW D SHDFH DQ RI¿FLDO XQFODVVL¿HG ³/HVVRQV RI WKH

90 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 91 Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War

Falklands Summary Report”. Under a the Department’s Falklands report serve II. The Falklands War as an recurring in world politics well into the 21 st century year after the outbreak of the hostilities in as the point of departure for the following point of Departure for the United (recall the combined operations in Afgha- the United States’ backyard, the Depart- analysis. After pointing to the continuing States and its Navy nistan and Iraq). That and the periodical ment of the Navy’s analysis listed impli- relevance for the U.S. Navy and outlining resurgence of the subject matter underli- cations for the U.S. Navy for no less than some framework thoughts on how lessons The war, and the subsequent report, came ne that the lections of the Falklands War GLVWLQFW¿HOGVRIQDYDORSHUDWLRQVDQG are being learned, this essay looks at sele- DWDWLPHRIVLJQL¿FDQWVHDFKDQJHVIRUWKH should have an enduring relevance on both associated areas. These included air ope- cted issues covered in the report. It will U.S. Navy. Work on “The Maritime Stra- VLGHVRIWKH$WODQWLF,QIDFWWKHFRQÀLFW rations, antiair warfare (AAW), antiship cursorily review how the U.S. Navy has WHJ\´ DQ XQFODVVL¿HG YHUVLRQ RI ZKLFK and its lessons transcend the interest of a missile defence, antisubmarine warfare fared in heeding some lessons associated was eventually published in 1986, was narrow group of naval historians. Instead, (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASuW), with the war. It will explore whether there in full swing. That strategy was a global, as a point of departure it offers valuable amphibious operations, command/con- are patterns within the U.S. that are roo- joint and forwardoperating declaratory broader lessons for today. There simply trol/communications, 4 electronic war- ted in that war, and provide some broad capstone document that confronted the has not been a similar, comprehensive fare (EW), intelligence, environmental observations regarding the larger strategic Soviet Union and served the dual purpose display of naval military technology in conditions, logistics/sustainability, mine lessons that can be derived from the con- of being “a rationale for naval forces and action since. As “the most notable naval warfare and countermeasures (MCM), ÀLFWIRUWKH861DY\IRUPRUHFRQWHP - an overall strategy on how to conduct ma- HYHQWRIWKHGHFDGH´ *URYH 6 personnel, press coverage, readiness and porary challenges. After all, the Falklands ritime campaigns in the event of war [...]” the Falklands War stood out not only for mobilization, ship survivability, special War has a surprising number of similariti- (Barnett 2009:86). “The Maritime Stra- the United States’ muscular support of the forces operations, as well as submarine HVWRPDQ\SRWHQWLDOÀDVKSRLQWVWKDW86 tegy” succeeded in laying out a plan of special relationship between Washington and surface ship operations. As it were, naval (and policy) planners must take into how to strategically use the U.S. Navy in and London. It was more: As an exerci- the Falklands War provided a rare op- consideration in the years to come. These confronting the Soviet Union and it was se in expeditionary operations unrivalled portunity to study a broad number of is- may range from supporting Western alli- placed in an overarching strategic fra- by anything else since the Korean War, sues relating to naval operations, mariti- es against a resurgent Russia in the Baltic mework of reference. It did not emphasize it was a complex conventional maritime me warfare, and strategy – not least for Sea and the Black Sea (as demonstrated Falklandsstyle intraalliance wars per se, and combined arms campaign. It featu- a dominant seapower such as the United in the wake of the Ukraine Crisis since but it anticipated clashes of an offensive- red surface combat, submarine operati- 6WDWHV$QGDVDXQLTXHFRQÀLFWWKLVFODVK 2014), to crisis response in the Western minded naval strategy with Warsaw Pact ons, missile warfare, carrier and landba- from more than 35 years ago holds conti- 3DFL¿FWRGLIIXVHWHUULWRULDOGLVSXWHVLQWKH naval forces, and the resulting possibility sed aviation, longrange bombings, mine nued relevance for naval forces in expe- East and South China Sea. The Navy may of battle at sea. Against that background, countermeasures, amphibious operations, ditionary operations until today and the also need to ensure freedom of navigation drawing operational and tactical lessons and a logistics tail that reached halfway U.S. Navy must heed those lessons in the through the Strait of Hormuz or other cri- from the Falklands War was in consi- around the globe. At least as eyecatching 21 st century. WLFDO DUWL¿FLDO RU QDWXUDO PDULWLPH FKRNH derable demand for the authors of “The were the electronic warfare and intelli- points. In short, one of the greatest con- Maritime Strategy”. However, the end of JHQFHHQJDJHPHQWVLQWKLV¿UVWZDURIWKH Navies often take a certain pride in rela- tingencies to plan for by the U.S. Navy the Cold War rendered the business model emerging computer age. On the strategic ting to some enduring principles regar- in the postCold War, post9/11 world is a of “The Maritime Strategy” useless, for level (regarding the use of military force ding their missions and the constants of regional aggressor that possesses advan- the time being. Instead, the Navy began for political ends), the British expeditio- seapower over the ages despite the advent ced and capable weapons systems and a quest to align its strategy better to the nary operation proved the conviction of of new technology and constant innova- which is determined to conduct an an- realities of the postCold War world, chur- the Thatcher government to stand up for tion and adaptation. When such analyses tiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) campaign. ning out a number of capstone documents British soil. It was also a warning that go back one hundred years and more, to $V *ULI¿Q QRWHG XVLQJ WKH )DO - WRUHÀHFWUHGXFWLRQVLQIRUFHOHYHODQGWKH budgetdriven force reduction as it was the likes of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Ju- klands example, “It may seem strange to budget in the process. 5 conducted in the U.K. at the time was the lian Corbett, it is reasonable that going argue that a 30yearold war between two worst possible way to modernize the for- EDFNDPHUHWKLUW\¿YH\HDUVFDQQRWSRVVL - Western nations is more relevant for the The unique strategic and political rela- ces. bly be a bridge too far for an assessment Navy of tomorrow than the last ten years tionship between the U.S. and the U.K., of enduring principles associated with a of counterterrorism operations, but that is going back long before the Falklands The actuality of the lessons of the Fal- SDUWLFXODUFRQÀLFW7KHLVVXHVLGHQWL¿HGLQ the most likely reality.” War, has continued to be a shaping force klands War is even more apparent if one

92 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 93 Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War accepts the premise that tectonic changes partment of the Navy 2015), the focus on any given event, especially in the military ¿QLWHDQGPRUHVRZKHQ¿QDQFLDODE\V - are underway in the international securi- KLJKHQGZDU¿JKWLQJHPHUJHGRQFHDJDLQ world, can very seldom be easily applied ses, domestic crises, or simply the search ty and geopolitical environment. The – just in time with the advent of thencan- to another even modestly similar occur- for targets of opportunity squeeze defence two and a half decades since the fall of didate, now President Donald Trump and rence. The late American author Mark budgets. 7 the Berlin Wall saw a host of new poli- his notable 350ship navy policy platform. Twain reminds the analyst that, “History cy challenges and military operations $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH ¿JKW DJDLQVW DO4DLGD does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” The U.S. military obviously operates un- that were all too “unFalklandish”. The and its allies has taken more of backse- Strategic, political, technological, and der different parameters, although it is not ³*OREDO:DU RQ7HUURULVP´ LQ WKH DIWHU - at in the U.S. strategic mindset; the rising operational conditions change over time, an independent entity but clearly under math of the terrorist attacks of 2001 for SRZHUDQGLQÀXHQFHRI,VODPLFPLOLWDQWV sometimes hardly palpable, sometimes the direction of the President of the Uni- WKHWLPHEHLQJPDJQL¿HGDWUHQGWRZDUGV in Syria, Iraq, and other failing states rapidly. This makes adhering to lessons of ted States. Military leaders are not elec- transnational and asymmetric threats. notwithstanding. Nation states and their the past, especially the right lessons (or in ted, but rather appointed into functions Climate change, civil wars, famines, in- hegemonic ambitions – from China to other words, the rhyme scheme), a com- and positions. They are required to strike surgencies, organized crime, terrorism, Russia, from Iran to North Korea – will plex and conceptually challenging task for a balance between the political priorities and hybrid warfare were but some of the continue to rise in importance, and recent policymakers and military planners alike. and the demands of short, medium and problems focused upon by policymakers; nationallevel capstone documents like the ,WJHWVHYHQPRUHGLI¿FXOWLIWKHQHHGIRU longterm planning. For instance, deci- but in an increasingly comprehensive, al- National Defense Strategy speak towards abstract thinking prevails, for instance if sions in force posture, in particular in a lencompassing understanding of security, this. Instable states, such as Pakistan, one was not a warring party of the ini- 1DY\KDYHUDPL¿FDWLRQVZHOOEH\RQGWKH these increasingly matter. Naval opera- might engage in military action as well WLDO DUPHG FRQÀLFW LQ DQ\ ODUJHU VHQVH next couple of decades, given that wars- tions (and its underlying strategy) focu- that could be reminiscent of some of the but wants to draw conclusions for one’s hips (that are, on top of that, quite expen- sed on naval operations other than war, Falklands issues. With A2AD of particular own future posture and operations. After sive to procure and operate) remain in including humanitarian assistance/disa- UHOHYDQFHLQWKH:HVWHUQ3DFL¿FLWVLPSO\ all, absent a crystal ball, planning for the service for 30 or more years. Against the ster relief, embargo operations, maritime must be prudent to ask, analyse, and ratio- IXWXUHLVLQKHUHQWO\GLI¿FXOW:LWKRXWWKH backdrop of constantly evolving political security operations, antiterrorism measu- nalize what, for instance, China can learn theoretical (worst case and ultimately un- conditions at home and abroad as well as res, and maritime presence mission. The from the Falklands War, and what in turn desirable) reallife test of a Falklands War and changing frameworks, it is vital to possibility of stateonstate, NavyonNavy, that means for the United States and its 2.0, it is therefore more feasible to focus preserve the military’s institutional know- Falklandslike engagements slowly but Navy. on the macrolevel of planning and facili- OHGJH7KDWLVLQKHUHQWO\GLI¿FXOWQRWOHDVW steadily faded from the minds of political tating military operations at sea. because institutions whose profession it is decisionmakers in the 1990s and 2000s. Two key domestic trends in the U.S. – a WRSUHVHUYHDQGUHÀHFWRQOHVVRQVIURPWKH Only the U.S. Navy, still the world’s qu- growing unwillingness to commit cost- Military and political planning in the recent past – such as military schools, tra- alitatively dominant seapower, and to a ly land forces for years of nationbuil- increasingly fastpaced, events and me- ining commands, or naval history institu- lesser degree some of the European allies, GLQJ DEURDG DQG WKH 86 GH¿FLW FULVLV diadriven environment of today is a chal- WLRQVDUHXQGHUDWOHDVWWKHVDPHHI¿FLHQ - attempt to preserve and project broader deeply affecting defence budgeting and OHQJH6RPHRIWKHIDFWRUVWKDWLQÀXHQFH cy pressures as other parts of the military capabilities – and maintain appropriate force posture – currently change the way defence and security decisionmaking have service. Additionally, an imbalance in the force structure, posture, training, doc- America conducts its security and defen- already been mentioned; on top of them, Navy’s posture may also negatively affect trine, and equipment. The “Cooperati- cepolicy thinking. The long view beyond some issues inherent to many democratic institutional learning. For the U.S. Navy, ve Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower” the “War on Terrorism” and a return to systems of government (and their armed Pete Haynes (2013:7) writes, (Department of the Navy 2007) sought to WKLQNLQJ LQ PRUH FRQYHQWLRQDO FRQÀLFW forces, if democraticallycontrolled) factor capture the increasing focus on broader, patterns comes at a price, but at a time in: For instance, researchers often lament “The establishment after the Second systemic, and ultimately softer naval mis- when the U.S. is increasingly looking in- that politicians quite comprehensibly aim World War of lengthy overseas de- sions. ward. for the next election, which for the U.S. ployments as standard practice me- is never more than six years away (for ant that the institution’s knowledge With the most recent US naval strategic III. Politicians and Military Leaders as the U.S. Senate; four for the President, became almost exclusively operatio- document, the “Cooperative Strategy for members of learning organisations or just two for members of the House of nalexperiential. ‘Operations’ – mea- 21 st Century Seapower Revised” (De- It should be noted that lessons drawn from Representatives). Resources are always ning being at sea – became the lens by

94 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 95 Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War

ZKLFK1DY\RI¿FHUVYLHZHGWKHZRUOG at roughly halfway), the U.S. Navy routi- operations that materiel and personnel These are imperative strategic decisions, and, to most in the Navy, its raison nely and for decades builds on forward- are under increased stress and pressure). because d’être. Given the constant demands deployed forces and advanced bases, with Another aspect related to this is the ques- of operations and advancing naval rotating forces transiting to and from the tion of survivability of a vessel. Both is- ³(IIHFWLYH DQG ÀH[LEOH QDYDO IRUFHV WHFKQRORJ\ 1DY\ RI¿FHUV QRZ KDG continental United States. Bahrain, Ja- VXHVKDYHYHU\UHDOUDPL¿FDWLRQVIRUIRUFH cannot be bought off the shelf when little room in their careers to take up pan, and Italy, to various degrees, serve structure and shipbuilding. In principal, needed. They have to be in place and the (potentially) careerdamaging task DVVXFKIRUZDUGÀHHWKXEVIRUURWDWLQJRU the force structure is a function of the stra- ready for use at short notice to meet of contemplating the Navy’s purpose forwardstationed assets. However, in the tegic role that a Navy is tasked for by the [the political and military] criteria. beyond operations.” face of a relative decline of U.S. military senior policy leaders. Coastal defence na- [...] Because the lifespan of a warship power and the political will to dispatch it, vies do not need aircraft carriers; they can is now 30 to 35 years and a warship If one accepts these broadly sketched “Many U.S. allies and friends are worried ¿HOGVPDOOIULJDWHVDQGFRUYHWWHVDVWKHLU takes 1015 years to design and build, premises regarding the conditions under regarding U.S. ability to guarantee their largest units to conduct sea denial and li- GHFLVLRQVRQQHZÀHHWFRQFHSWVPDGH which political and military leaders insti- safety and the future of the U.S. securi- mited sea control. Escort navies require today need to ensure that the opera- tutionally learn, it is apparent that the ba- ty umbrella.” (Forster 2011:56) Coupled DQRWKHUGLIIHUHQWVHWWLQJ¿HOGLQJGHVWUR - tional concepts used will remain va- lance tilts in favour of the operational, not with advanced propulsion technology yers and cruisers, for example. Bluewater lid.” (Haydon 2011:3) the strategic realm. In the following, some (nuclear power), the ability to forwardba- expeditionary navies may rely on capital selected observations regarding the rele- sed stores and supplies (such as maritime ships such as helicopter carriers, amphi- The British destroyers and frigates were vance of Falklandish lessons for the U.S. prepositioning), mastering of replenish- bious transports, frigates, destroyers, sub- indispensable for the whole Falklands Navy in these two areas will be discussed. mentatsea (RAS), and some allied bur- marines, and corvettes. The Falklands War operation. Without them, the aircraft While the reciprocity between operations densharing, this allows for a considerable reminded planners, however, that smaller, carriers would not have been defensible, (even tactics) and strategy (and politics) degree of global power projection. That cheaper, and lesswell armed combatants the picket ships and the air defence peri- LVRIWHQGLI¿FXOWWRWHDVHDSDUW±RSHUDWL - unique geopolitical and strategic oppor- can be a very false economy because of meter could not have been held, and the onal decisions and events may have stra- tunity still builds on unimpeded logisti- their much higher degree of vulnerabi- bombardment of Argentine positions as tegic consequences, and vice versa – the cal support in times of crises and war, or lity, as demonstrated by the loss of four ZHOODVWKHHVFRUWLQJRIWKHODQGLQJÀHHW following generic division between ope- PRUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ RQ D VXEVWDQWLDO QXP - Royal Navy combatants (Department of to the beaches would have been impossi- rations and strategy should be understood ber of sealift ships (a strategic factor that the Navy 1983:3). 10 In short, the question ble (Dodd 1982:394). The (dire) issue of as purely for analytical purpose, not aca- “The Maritime Strategy” recognized but begged to be answered is, ‘Which types the expendability of warships in the face demic. that has taken a bit of a backseat in more of ships, and how many of them, are to RIHQHP\¿UHSRZHUKDVEHHQPHQWLRQHG recent documents) and a high degree of be built for what kind of purposes?’ The previously. In effect, “those who advo- IV. Some U.S. Lessons in sea control. 8 debate usually comes down between tho- cate a navy comprised of lowercapabili- Naval operations se that favour larger, expensive, versati- ty or niche forces, for whatever reason, A look at a world map will demonstrate The Falklands War also showed the utility le vessels such as aircraft and helicopter do a country a great disservice because the imperative of a reliable logistics train RI D YHUVDWLOH ÀHHW 9 4XLWH JHQHUDOO\ WKH carriers, and those that advocate for smal- they deny politicians the ability to make in support of expeditionary naval operati- discussion relates to the degree of abuse ler, fast, inexpensive combatants such as DÀH[LEOHQDYDO¿UVWUHVSRQVHWRDFULVLV´ ons, as was the case for the British “Ope- ships can take in combat, but also touches the ascending littoral combat ships of the (Haydon 2011:3). 11 ration Corporate”. As the DON report on just how capable ships are to deploy Freedom/Independenceclasses or corvet- states (1983:6), “The old aphorism that to faroff areas and still function under ad- tes and light frigates. At the same time, (ULF *URYH FDXWLRQHG DJDLQVW amateurs talk about strategy while pro- verse conditions. A simple look at photo- not unlike the ‘HighLow’ mix advocated overestimating of the threat of antiship fessionals talk about logistics was valida- graphs of the major units departing from by thenChief of Naval Operations Admi- missiles, stating “The missile’s capa- ted again in the Falklands.” Whereas the Portsmouth and arriving after the end of ral Elmo Zumwalt from the 1970s, those bilities have been overrated. No single Royal Navy had to traverse some 7,000 hostilities illustrates the enormous wear that favour a middle route will often ar- ‘wonder weapon’ can affect something as nautical miles from the U.K. south to the and tear that these ships – not to mention JXHIRUDPRUHEDODQFHGÀHHWDQGVWUXF - complex as maritime operations.” Other Falklands in 1982 (with the staging base their crews – were faced with (although ture (often without being able to point analysts such as Waynes Hughes (2000: of Ascension Island in the South Atlantic it is in the nature of expeditionary naval to what exactly such a balance entails). 153155) noted the vulnerability of wars-

96 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 Tidsskrift for Søvæsen . nr. 3-4-2017 97 Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War Enduring Lessons from the Falklands War hips in the face of contemporary threats. returned to action, serving in the Navy mines and maritime terrorism threats are slogans; and a ship departing a harbour The Falklands War, after all, has demon- until 1995. more likely (and frankly, more common) with people waving is a more instrumen- strated that hits even of unexploded ord- • The same day, another U.S. warship than on the high seas, the risk assessment tal image than perhaps deploying an army nance can yield mission (even unit) kills. was hit by a mine: The Ticondaro- quickly expands in depth and breadth. brigade or an airwing. For the Falklands Examples include the destroyers HMS gaclass guided missile cruiser USS $QG LI GLI¿FXOW QDYLJDWLRQ ZDV QRW DO - War, the media played an important role. *ODVJRZ ' +06$QWULP ' DQG 3ULQFHWRQ &* DOVR SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ ready an issue in such quarters, coastal The heroic, wellstaged images of wars- the amphibious warfare landing vessels “Operation Desert Storm”, and was submarines and asymmetric swarm boat hips departing from Portsmouth naval RFA Sir Tristram (L3505) and RFA Sir severely damaged. No injuries or ca- attacks hold a threat as well. Antisubma- base notwithstanding, the underlying Lancelot (L3029). The Argentines only sualties are reported, and the ship rine warfare (ASW), a key concern for the worry – “What if they do not return vic- KDG¿YHDLUODXQFKHG([RFHWV7KH\XVHG stayed on station before being relie- Royal Navy in 1982, “will remain a core torious?” (Aitken 2013:334) – was only them to devastating effect. The U.S. Navy ved. As of 2014, the cruiser is still in mission area for the United States Navy. muted temporarily. One may also recall has since 1982 had its share of experien- service. Execution of that vital mission will be WKHKHDGOLQH³*RWFKD´E\WKHWDEORLGGD - ce regarding damage control on warships, • In the Yemini port of Aden, on 12 Oc- critical to protecting the strategic speed ily “The Sun” on 4 May 1982, after the too. tober 2000, the guidedmissile destro- and operational agility of joint and coa- VLQNLQJRIWKH$5$*HQHUDO%HOJUDQRE\ \HU 866 &ROH ''* ZDV DWWDFNHG lition forces across the largest maneuver HMS Conqueror (S48). The blurry photo- • The guidedmissile Perryclass friga- by a suicide attack in a small boat. 17 space in the world – the sea.” (Depart- graphs of the stricken cruiser, taken from WH8666WDUN ))* ZDVKLWE\WZR people of the ArleighBurkeclass ves- ment of the Navy 2005:1) Yet, the num- a lifeboat in rough seas, or the horrible antiship Exocet missiles in the Per- sel’s crew were killed, and many more ber of ASW forces in the U.S. Navy has pictures of burning and sinking British VLDQ*XOIRQ0D\GXULQJWKH were wounded in what remains one of declined markedly. It remains to be seen warships on other occasions transported IraqIran War (19801988). 37 sailors lost the few instances of maritime terrorism if the new littoral combat ship (LCS) sea the grave imagery of a war to the audi- their life that day. The vessel, although to date (and sometimes seen as a prel- frames will successfully accommodate its ences at home. 35 years later, for the U.S. badly damaged, survived and remained ude to the terrorist attacks that would planned ASW module. 12 The proliferation Navy, sending off and welcoming home in active service until 1999. follow one year later). The severely da- of dieselelectric submarines boats among warships is today an increasingly common • On 14 April 1988, a sister ship of the maged warship was piggybacked to the South East Asian nations is a signal for way of generating publicity, especially in Stark, the guidedmissile frigate USS United States aboard a specialist com- a rising demand for ASW capabilities. light of the opportunities of modern social 6DPXHO % 5REHUWV ))* UDQ RQ mercial ship. It returned to sea again in Exercises with airindependent propul- media (Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, etc.). an Iranian mine. The blast severely 2004. sion, conventionally powered Uboats 7KH³&11HIIHFW´ WKHUDPL¿FDWLRQVIURP damaged the warship’s structure. The VXFK DV D *HUPDQ 1DY\ FODVV $ media reports on policy decisions, troop VKLS RQ URXWH IRU WKH 3HUVLDQ *XOI Only one of these ships was hit by an an- have repeatedly demonstrated the need morale, and even military operations) has to participate in “Operation Earnest tiship missile, but in all instances, sound for sound ASW capabilities for the U.S. widened considerably. Attempts are made Will”, was eventually saved. 10 sai- damage control proved imperative for Navy. 13 to contain it by providing the public me- lors were injured. The incident trig- the survival of the ship, sparing the U.S. dia with selected, but highly regulated ac- gered a U.S. operation against Iranian Navy larger casualties and potentially 7KH)DONODQGV:DUZDVDOVRWKH¿UVWPD - cess to operations (“embedding”), and by command and control facilities (“Ope- even more harmful images of American ritime campaign that occurred at the time shaping the public’s perception through ration Praying Mantis”). The Samu- ZDUVKLSVJRLQJXQGHU*LYHQWKHSUROLIH - of the advent of cable television and an own reporting (often using the grandio- el B. Roberts is in active service as of ration of antiship missiles and the conti- increasingly fastpaced, assertive media. se images that only seapower can provi- 2014. nuing threat of their use against ships – Thus, the effects of press coverage and de) 14 . On the same token, accidents like • On 18 February 1991, while underway on 14 July 2006, the Israeli corvette INS public imagery and their utilization on the recent collisions involving guided- as part of “Operation Desert Storm”, +DQLWZDVKLWE\DQDQWLVKLSPLVVLOH¿UHG political ends needed to be weighed he- missile American destroyers in Asia with the amphibious assault ship USS Tri- by Hezbollah, but managed to survive – avily in the decisions of policymakers. It GHDGVDLORUVLPPHGLDWHO\ÀRRGVRFLDO poli (LPH10), hit an Iraqi mine. Four the debate about ship survivability against holds true that images of deploying soldi- media and the public discourse (often sailors were injured in the incident, such missiles is likely to continue well ers have been used for propaganda at least inciting wideranging speculation), coup- which temporarily disabled the veteran into the future. With a notable focus on the VLQFH:RUOG:DU,ZKHQ*HUPDQVROGLHUV led with powerful imagery of maimed IwoJimaclass ship. It was repaired and littoral regions of the world, where naval boarded train cars marked with patriotic steel.

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V. Some U.S. Lessons in Strategy the expeditionary operation in the South tial engagements. In 1982, for Argentina, light. Thus it is imperative to learn from Perhaps one of the most striking lessons Atlantic (Dodd 1982:392393). the Malvinas were a matter of national the few instances where combat did inde- of the Falklands War is concerns the stra- pride. For the U.K., the guiding factors ed occur. Regarding naval operations, the tegic consequences of deep cuts in a mi- The U.S. Navy today is in the fortuitous were the principles of selfdetermination vulnerability of surfaced submarines, the litary’s power projection capacity. In the position that it need not make such drastic and international law. This was not a war speed and stealth of nuclear submarines, 1981 Defence Review by the British Mi- cuts akin to those that were proposed in of imperialism or colonialism, nor a proxy WKHGLI¿FXOW\RI$6:WKHYLDELOLW\RIFDU - nistry of Defence, decisions were made the 1981 U.K. “Nott Review”, or the 2010 FRQÀLFWRIWKH&ROG:DUQRUDUHOLJLRXVRU riers, the need for airborne early warning that would have quickly stripped the Ro- Strategic Defence and Security Review (a ethnic strife, nor a war about ancient hatred and electronic warfare defences, and the yal Navy of a large quantity of its vessels. White Paper whose eventual cuts severe- between two nations (Laucirica 2000:84). importance of logistics are among those While these cuts were deduced from the ly curtailed the Royal Navy’s ability for Reagan’s South America policy was illpre- lessons (Swartz 1998:10). Strategically, military planning focus at the time (a land sustained expeditionary operations and pared for an intrasystem war that displayed DV-LP*ULI¿Q QRWHV war on the Central European front that in caused many navalists to rule out a future a certain degree of irrationality. Such “wars the minds of planners at Whitehall could Falklandstyle engagement for the simple of principle” have not ceased to be a threat ³7KH)DONODQGV:DUZDVWKH¿UVWPR - easily forgo naval assets slated for trans- lack of capabilities). 16 U.S. naval ships thirty years after the Falklands War. The dern antiaccess/areadenial (A2/AD) fer/decommissioning) they sent a most KDYH EHFRPHVLJQL¿FDQWYLVLEOHVLJQV RI tensions between causes leading to violen- war, pitting a joint expeditionary force grave signal to the Argentine govern- American commitment to many regions ce remain opaque, and the management of against a regional power with modern ment. 15 The symbolism of planning to cut and are therefore important stabilizers potential risks must rest of the more solid ODQGDLUDQGVHDFDSDELOLWLHV¿JKWLQJ the presence of the U.K.’s Arctic patrol DQG¿UVWFULVLVUHVSRQGHUVLQPDQ\SROLWL - foundations of realist assessments. At the over control of territory close to home. vessel HMS Endurance, the ship on sta- cal conundrums of the world. 17 Examples same time, the global jihadist/Islamic mo- As such, it may prove far more relevant tion at the Falklands at the time, cannot include the only forwarddeployed U.S. vements or the clashing ambitions recent- for the future U.S. Navy than any con- be overrated. Endurance was supposed to Navy aircraft carrier in Japan and the ly displayed in the East and South China ÀLFWLQWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHV´ be withdrawn from service later in 1982 FRQWLQXRXVSUHVHQFHLQWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI Seas transcend hard interestdriven politics. without a replacement. At the same time, Arabian Sea area (usually by the rotating They can serve us well as reminders of Although some pundits may proclaim for costcutting reasons, the aircraft car- deployment of an aircraft carrier and its µ)DONODQGLVK¶FRQÀLFWG\QDPLFVLQWKLV st that this particular war, routed as it is in riers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible task group). Maritime presence comforts century. the context of Cold War days, should in were to be decommissioned, too. An un- and assures allies, deters rivals and com- a metaphorical way slip beneath the wa- derstanding of the symbolic value of gi- petitors, and allows deepening alliance VI. Conclusion ves of history, it is important to remember ving up large capital ships was obvious- coherence and tactical and operational The Falklands War offers some enduring (and even institutionally treasure) its les- ly not far developed at the time (Aitken SUR¿FLHQF\ +RZHYHU ZLWK VKLIWLQJ JH - lessons for the U.S. Navy in the 21 st cen- sons and transfer the experience into the )RU *UHDW %ULWDLQ LW ZDV DQ opolitical priorities and a tighter grip on tury. They also provide models for the minds of 21 st century planners and opera- unexpected coincidence that the cuts did resources, the future of U.S. naval pre- opportunities and pitfalls for security tors. The Falklands War, after more than not come into full effect before the inva- sence in some areas will not be left un- policy and military planning. For many a decade on the backbench of strategic sion of the “Malvinas”, as the islands are touched. In absolute numbers, the U.S. strategists, the three decades since the and operational thinking, has lost none known in Argentina. The two amphibious Navy is in decline. As of December 2017, Falklands War (and in particular since the of its relevance; not least for the world’s ships (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid) the U.S. Navy operated 281 warships, end of the Cold War) provided a host of still dominant Navy. Its allies would do that were the backbone of the operation with roughly 1/3 deployed at any given new challenges and tasks. Missile defen- ZHOOWRDOVRVWXG\WKHFRQÀLFWLQWLPDWHO\ would also have been cut. Had the cuts time. ce, antisubmarine warfare, or an oppo- It is clear that the U.S. does not plan to gone through to full effect, the retaking of nent’s battle force were not likely subjects ¿JKWD)DONODQGVVW\OHZDUDQ\WLPHVRRQ the Falklands would have been virtually Presence cannot, however, always deter of concern during the time when asymme- but it if must, it better be prepared. Per- impossible to conduct. As a traditional se- what John Lehman has termed as “wars of WULFFRQÀLFWVDQGWHUURULVPLQODQGORFNHG haps the 40 th anniversary of the war will afaring nation, Britain was able to mars- principle” (1988:263). Sometimes nations Southwest Asia were high on the agenda. prove whether the lessons – those beyond KDO DQ HQRUPRXV ÀHHW WKDW HYHQWXDOO\ ¿JKW IRU SULQFLSOHV QRW MXVW IRU LQWHUHVWV However, given the geopolitical and geo- the surreal rendition of a Monty Python included more than 100 warships, cargo and military and grand strategy can only strategic trends, the lessons from the Fal- song, that is – have been remember- vessels, and passenger liners) to support hedge against a limited number of poten- klands War are likely to return to the spot- ed.

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VII. Bibliography Department of the Navy (2015): A Coope- UH 7KH )DONODQGV0DOYLQDV &RQÀLFW LQ 2 – Research Paper. Stanford University. Aitken, J. (2013): Margaret Thatcher. Pow- rative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and In- Available online at http://xenon.stanford. er and Personality. London: Bloomsbu- Washington, D.C.: Department of Defen- ternational Relations, Summer/Fall 2000 , edu/~lswartz/falklands.pdf [19 November ry. se. Available online at www.navy.mil/lo- pp. 7995. 2013] cal/maritime/150227 CS21R Final.pdf/ [28 Barnett, R. (2009): Navy Strategic Culture. February 2018] Lehman, J. (1988): Command of the Seas. Swartz, P., with Karen Duggan (2011a): Why the Navy Thinks Differently. Annapo- Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. The U.S. Navy in the World (19702010). lis: Naval Institute Press. Dodd, N. (1982): “Einige Lehren aus dem Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies Falklandkrieg”, in: Europäische Wehrkun- /HKPDQ - ³5HÀHFWLRQV RQ WKH and Concepts . Volume 1, Document No. %HDU* OneHundred Years of Se- de 9/1982 , pp. 392397. Special Relationship”, in: Naval History MISC D0026417.A1/Final. Alexandria: apower. The U.S. Navy, 18901990. Stan- Magazine, Vol . 26, No. 5. Available online Center for Naval Analyses. Available on- ford: Stanford University Press. Forster, L. (2011): “Trust Cannot Be Sur- at http://www.usni.org/print/25075 [10 line at http://www.cna.org/research/2011/ ged. Challenges to Naval Forward Presen- December 2013]. usnavyworld19702010contextusnavycap- Bruns, S. (2012): “30 Jahre nach dem Fal- ce”, in: Military Power Revue der Schwei- stone [14 December 2013] klandkrieg – was bleibt? Einige Lektionen zer Armee , No. 2/2011, pp. 4658. Lundesgaard, A. (2011): “US Navy Stra- für das 21. Jahrhundert”, in: Leinen Los! tegy and Force Structure after the Cold Swartz, P., with Karen Duggan (2011b): (September 2012) , pp. 2225. *ULI¿Q - 6WLOO 5HOHYDQW $IWHU War”, IFS Insights 4/2011 , 30 pp. The U.S. Navy in the World (19702010). All These Years, in: U.S. Naval Institute Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies Bruns, S. (2018): US Naval Strategy and Proceedings, Vol. 138/6/1,311 . Available National Security Archive (ed.) (2012): and Concepts . Volume 2, Document No. National Security. The Evolution of Ameri- online at http://www.usni.org/print/24528 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ (OHFWURQLF %ULH¿QJ MISC D0026417.A2/Final. Alexandria: can Maritime Power. London: Routledge. [10 December 2013]. Book No. 374 , 1 April 2012, edited by Center for Naval Analyses. Available on- Carlos Osorio, Sarah Christiano and Erin line at http://www.cna.org/research/2011/ Cordesman, T./Wagner, R. (1990): The *URYH( The Future of Sea Pow- Maskell with the collaboration of Anne usnavyworld19702010contextusnavycap- Lessons of Modern War, Vo. III. The Af- er. London: Routledge. Morel and Marcos Novaro. Available on- stone0 [14 December 2013]. JKDQ DQG )DONODQGV &RQÀLFWV Boulder/ line at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ San Franciso: Westview. Haydon, P. (2011): “The Falklands War. NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/ [20 November Swartz, P., with Karen Duggan (2011c): Lessons Learned and Not Learned”, in: 2013]. The U.S. Navy in the World (19811990). Department of the Navy (1983): Lessons Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies of the Falklands. Summary Report, Febru- (Summer 2011) , pp. 23. Silverstone, P. (2007): The Navy in the and Concepts . Document No. D0026419. ary 1983. :DVKLQJWRQ'&2I¿FHRI3UR - Nuclear Age, 19472007 . London: Rout- A1/Final. Alexandria: Center for Naval gram Appraisal. Haynes, P. (2013): American Naval Thin- ledge. Analyses. Available online at h t t p : / / king in the PostCold War Era. The U.S. www.cna.org/research/2011/usnavywor- Department of the Navy (2005): AntiSub- Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Speller, I. (2002): “Delayed Reaction. UK ld19811990contextusnavycapstone [14 marine Warfare. Concept of Operations Strategy, 19892007 . Monterey: Naval Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and December 2013]. for the 21 st Century. Washington, D.C.: Postgraduate School. WKH /HVVRQV RI WKH )DONODQGV &RQÀLFW´ Task Force ASW. Available online at www. in: Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 18, Swartz, P., with Karen Duggan (2011d): navy.mil/navydata/policy/asw/aswconops. Hughes, W. (2000): Fleet Tactics and no.4 . 16 pages, available online at http:// The U.S. Navy in the World (20012010). SGI˪>'HFHPEHU@ Coastal Combat . 2 nd edition. Annapolis: HSULQWVQXLPLH6SHOOHUSGI˪ > 'H - Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies Naval Institute Press. cember 2013]. and Concepts . Document No. D0026242. Department of the Navy (2007): A Coope- A2/Final. Alexandria: Center for Naval rative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower. Höpker, W. (1983): Südatlantik. Machtva- Swartz, L. (1998): Beyond the General Analyses. Available online at h t t p : / / Washington, D.C.: Department of Defen- kuum der Weltpolitik. Herford: Mittler. %HOJUDQR DQG 6KHI¿HOG /HVVRQV LQ 8Q - www.cna.org/research/2011/usnavywor- se. Available online at http://www.navy. dersea and Surface Warfare from the ld20012010contextusnavycapstone [14 mil/maritime/ [14 December 2013] Laucirica, J. (2000): Lessons from Failu- )DONODQG,VODQGV&RQÀLFW . Naval Science December 2013].

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Swartz, P., with Karen Duggan (2012): one of the Royal Navy’s capital ships would of national interests in the absence of armed 15. A number of parallel events, competing and The U.S. Navy in the World (19912000). have meant for the campaign – and what sig- FRQÀLFW6KLSEXLOGLQJIURPSURFXUHPHQWWR FRQÀLFWLQJGHFLVLRQVHYHQWXDOO\OHGWRWKH nal the advent of a U.S. warship to participate design and construction, to actual operations, outbreak of hostilities, the exact share of each Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies in the hostilities could have sent to allies and needs to take that into account. GLI¿FXOW LIQRWLPSRVVLEOH WRDVVHVV7KHSXE - and Concepts. Document No. D0026420. antagonists. licly announced cuts to the Royal Navy’s ex- A2/Final. Alexandria: Center for Naval 10. 7KHVHZHUH+066KHI¿HOGWKH6KHI¿HOGFODVV peditionary capabilities may have been a key Analyses. Available online at http://www. 4. This warfare area, owing largely to techno- destroyer HMS Coventry (D118) on 25 May sign of encouragement to the Argentine junta cna.org/research/2012/usnavyworld- logical progress and the multiplication of 1982, the Type-21-frigates HMS Ardent in their quest to retake the Falklands from operational complexities, is known today as (F184) on 22 May 1982, and HMS Antelope the British. As Laucirica (2000: 83) put it, 19912000contextusnavycapstone [14 De- C4ISR, the acronym for Command, Control, (F170) on 24 May 1982. The landing ship RFA “Human actions and decisions, evaluated in cember 2013]. Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Sir Galahad (L3005) and the merchant marine terms of opportunities, mounted on long-held Surveillance and Reconnaissance. cargo vessel SS Atlantic Conveyor were also grievances deeply imbedded in the national For valuable comments on earlier versi- destroyed by enemy action with considerable imagery, set in motion state policies against 5. For a concise overview of U.S. Navy strategy loss of life as well. Two more British destroy- the background of a permissive international ons of this paper, the author would like to and force structure since the end of the Cold ers, 14 frigates, and two landing ships were structure. thank LT Matthew Hipple (U.S. Navy) and War, see Lundesgaard (2011). For a thorough damaged. &'5 UHW &KXFN+LOO 86&RDVW*XDUG study, see Sebastian Bruns (2018). 16. Sequestration,’ or the process of mandatory 11. The U.S. Navy currently operates a deploy- across-the-board cuts in military spending 6. For the United States Navy perhaps only able battle force of 283 ships, with just one enacted in the United States in early 2013, rivalled by the repeated confrontations with class of destroyers (Arleigh-Burke) and one would be hardly comparable to such White QDVFHQW/LE\DQGLFWDWRU0XDPPDU*DGGD¿ class of cruisers (Ticondaroga-type) quan- Papers. The U.S. defence budget is still very over the Gulf of Sidra (Mediterranean Sea) titatively making up the vast majority of the much a product of more than a decade in throughout the 1980s, and the involvement in VXUIDFHÀHHW,QDGGLWLRQWKH1DY\¿HOGVODUJH LQÀDWHGPLOLWDU\VSHQGLQJZKLFKVDZWKH the Iran-Iraq-War (1980-1988), which saw nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers of the expansive investments in the wars in Iraq QDYDOHVFRUWGXWLHVIRUUHÀDJJHGFUXGHRLO Nimitz-class type, a number of amphibious and Afghanistan, and the ‘Global War on WDQNHUVWRZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHFRQÀLFWLQWKH WUDQVSRUWVKLSVÀDWWRSVPDOOHUFDUULHUVIRU Terrorism’. Whereas the cuts are thus only course of which a number of Falklands War KHOLFRSWHUDQG9672/ÀLJKWRSHUDWLRQVDQG relative in nature, they do have the potential lessons had to be readily applied (i.e. damage dock landing ships. Under the sea, the types to inhibit current operations and readiness be- control on a stricken warship, command & of warships in service are the Los-Angeles-, cause of a lack of strategic logic behind it. In control, air defences, etc.). Virginia- und Seawolf-SSN and the Ohio-Class simply withdrawing funds without adjust the SSBN submarines. The streamlining of war- underlying political parameters, one increases 7. 7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVFRQWLQXHVWRIDFHDGH¿FLW ship classes is a notable difference to earlier the risk of catastrophic failure and displays a gap as well as heated partisan confrontations times: Until the 1990s, the U.S. Navy would rather short-sighted policy guidance for the 1. To date the best study remains the book by between Democrats and Republicans about operate several classes in parallel. military. Cordesman/Wagner (1990, pp. 238-436). the future direction of the country. This already led to sustained government shutdowns 12. The other two modules are mine countermeas- 17. For overviews of the U.S. Navy’s very recent 2. President Reagan in fact made a last-minute and harmful across-the-board spending cuts. ures and surface warfare. history, including operations, strategy, and plea to Prime Minister Thatcher that the geopolitical context, see for example Bear, British assault to retake Port Stanley should 8. This was different in the case for the British 13. *ULI¿Q FRQFHGHVWKDW³XQGHUVHD G. (1996), Silverstone, P. (2007), and the be called off. He suggested a diplomatic who in 1982 scramble forces designed for warfare is an easy area to underfund and comprehensive slides by Swartz, P. (2011a-d, contact group to be installed as a mediator. NATO contingencies in Europe and then underemphasize. It is a complex, expensive 2012). According to documents released in December hurled them half-way around the globe capability, with limited utility in low-intensity, 2013, Thatcher (citing the loss of valuable through mostly uncontested waters. In the non-traditional naval missions, or when con- 18. From the German perspective, very little has British ships and invaluable British lives) was immediate waters around the Falklands, the ducting unhindered power projection ashore.” been published on that topic. The only existing unwilling to concede the political-military submarine threat and – closer to the Argentine In short, it can easily be out of sight, and thus monograph is date (Höpker 1983), but only momentum that had built up by the British mainland and the islands itself – air warfare out of mind. short chapters deal with the Falklands War expeditionary operation. Reagan’s call not to were a considerable impediment. Meanwhile, (pp. 12-18), the U.S. force disposition in humiliate the Argentinean forces and General the long, overstretched Royal Navy logistics 14. With the advent of the Tomahawk cruise the South Atlantic (pp. 24-27), and the area Galtieri, the Argentine dictator, fell on deaf tail was buttressed by a temporary forward missile as a weapon of choice in the 1990s, as a concern for NATO (pp. 89-95). The ears in Downing Street 10. base at Ascension. the (odd) image of majestically rising missiles WKDQQLYHUVDU\RIWKHFRQÀLFWLQZDV on their way into a target area has become a UHÀHFWHGLQDIHZQHZVSDSHUVDQGSURIHVVLRQDO 3. It must be noted that this wide-ranging 9. As a reminder: navies are built for war, in symbol of very limited U.S. strikes. Examples magazines, including the author’s own essay commitment never came to be needed, and it the overwhelming number of cases they are include attacks against Iraq, Afghanistan, and (Bruns 2012). ultimately remains speculative what a loss of used MOOTW, thus contributing to protection Sudan.

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