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Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms Marin Lucio Mare University of South Florida, [email protected]

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Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms Marin Lucio Mare University of South Florida, Luciomare@Mail.Usf.Edu University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 4-8-2016 Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms Marin Lucio Mare University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the History Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons Scholar Commons Citation Mare, Marin Lucio, "Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6311 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Leibniz’s More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms by Lucio Mare A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Roger Ariew, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Douglas Jesseph, Ph.D. Thomas Williams, Ph.D. Stephen Turner, Ph.D. Daniel Garber, Ph.D. Date of Approval: April 1, 2016 Keywords: Individuation, Atomism, Unity, Ontology Copyright © 2016, Lucio Mare DEDICATION To my family, Maria, Marin, and Michael. With all my love. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am thankful for the advice and encouragement of my committee members. To Douglas Jesseph, for his expertise in early modern sciences and those few directed studies where I was left stupefied by Seventeenth-century physics and his knowledge of mathematics. To Daniel Garber, for being generous with his time and providing valuable comments on my chapters. To Thomas Williams, whose course on “Medieval Voluntarism” taught me a different writing style than my rhapsodically French one. To Stephen Turner, who through his courses made sure I know more about Twentieth-century social and political philosophy than I could write on a piece of napkin. And especially to my advisor, Roger Ariew. To me his work has been an inspiration and a model of doing scholarship from before he “tricked” me into coming to the US. In addition to these, I have greatly benefited from the discussions with my colleagues at USF, especially Joe Anderson, Aaron Spink, Daniel Collette, Anthony Desantis; I am also grateful to my other USF or former USF friends, Aret Karademir, Dave Cheely, Erli Mertika, and Ali Elamin. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Morgan Jennings for putting up with the abstruse Latin terminology and earnestly proof-reading my work. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE: THE INDIVIDUAL IN LEIBNIZ’S FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1663- 1686) ............................................................................................................................................... 3 CHAPTER TWO: FROM INDIVIDUALS TO ATOMS: VARIETIES OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ATOMISM .................................................................................. 27 Minima Naturalia and Semina Rerum: Two Sources for Early Modern Atomism .................. 30 Sennert’s “Religion of Form”: the Divine Origin of Forms ..................................................... 33 Breaking up the Atom: Early Leibniz against Minima Naturalia Theories and Atomism .................................................................................................................................... 37 Leibniz’s Aristotelian Stance against Atomism in the Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas (1668) ........................................................................................................................ 41 Magis Amicus Aristoteles? From Reconcilement to a Neo-Platonic Account of Substantial Forms...................................................................................................................... 47 Leibniz against the Minima Naturalia Theory: on the Origin of Forms................................... 55 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................. 63 CHAPTER THREE: FRAMING HYPOTHESES: THE PSEUDO-ENIGMATIC ATOMISM OF YOUNG LEIBNIZ.............................................................................................. 71 Disentangling Presumed Enigmas ............................................................................................ 76 Handy Influence-Mongering: the “Gassendian” Leibniz ......................................................... 84 Atoms and the Void in Paris and before ................................................................................... 91 Leibniz’s Soul Pointilism: from the Resurrection of Body to the Indestructibility of Bugs in Bugs ............................................................................................................................. 99 Sources and Uses of the “Flower of Substance” Theory ........................................................ 102 Conclusion: The Fate of “Pointilism” in Leibniz’s Mature Works ........................................ 109 CHAPTER FOUR: TOWARDS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: THE FATE OF INDIVIDUATION..................................................................................................... 113 i Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 113 Seventeenth-century Views on Individuation: Leibniz’s Critique of Descartes and Cordemoy ................................................................................................................................ 117 “Astounding Things which have not Come into the Mind of any Scholastic” or Cartesian: The Individual in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy (1686-1714) ..................................... 133 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 151 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 156 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... 156 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 157 ii ABSTRACT I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy. I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms. I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, iii 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic.
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