Of Market-GardenandMelanie
TheDutchResistanceandthe OSS
StewartBentley
on 10 May 1940, the German 10th however,joinedwith the purpose of Army,spearheaded by airborne pretending to collaboratewhile troops,invaded the Netherlands. The remainingloyal to the government- rest of the Wehrmachtforcecommit in-exile.Theirpositionsenabled West 1 ted to theoverrunning ofthe them to keep an eye on Dutchcollab executed the MansteinPlan through orators and to influencepolicy Belgium and the ArdennesForest. making and implementation. The On 14 May1940, the Dutchcom Leegsmafamilyprovided a good manderordered a cease-fire.Three example of this tactic.Agardus dayslater, the entireNetherlands was Leegsma, his brother, and theirfather occupied by NaziGermany.2 joined the Nazi-organizedDutch NationalPolice. Thefather had been Theevacuation to in the Guards TheNetherlandsroyalfamily, led by a professionalsoldier Britain of the of the Dutch royal QueenWilhelmina,alongwithsome Regiment Royal Army 4,600Dutchofficers,sailors, sol during the interwaryears. The family and a cadre of family assistedvariousResistance diers, and policemen,staged a Dutch organiza theDutchGovernment tions the Nazi Dunkirk,assisted by remnants of the during occupation. and the entire During the liberation of the Nether wascritical in country s~avy mer and his chantmarine.Thisevacuation to lands,AgardusLeegsma a brother differentAlliedunits, establishing Britain ofthe royalfamilyand a cadre joined serving as guides and combatants. govermnent-in-exile of the DutchGovernment was criti cal in establishing a government-in- andthe initial exile and the initialintelligence net As the harshness of the occupation works in Holland.Additionally, the inteffigencenetworks grew, so did Dutchunrest and resent to Britain ofNetherlands emigration menttoward the Germans. in Holland. and civiliansfrom all militarypeople IndividualDutchmentook it upon over the Continent and fromover themselves to strikeback.With no 9 seas Dutchpossessionshelpedform centralcommand,thesebraveindi the core of a reconstitutedDutch vidualsbeganrecruitingrelatives, RoyalArmy,Navy, and Air Force. friends, and neighbors into the first Resistanceorganizations. Thedan gerswereexceptionallyhigh: Stirrings of Resistance capturedmembers of the Resistance wereusuallyshot or sent to concen trationcamps.Theprimaryanti-Nazi The initialyears of the Germanoccu activitycameinitiallyfrom the Social pation of Hollandwerecharacterized Democrats and Catholicyouth by the removal ofDutchJewsfrom The DutchCommunists theirhomeland and harsheconomic leagues. beganactivelyresistingafter the and politicalmeasures. TheNazis set Germansinvaded the USSR. up a puppetgovernment at The Hagueheaded by Dr. Seyss-Inquart StewartBentley is a 1996 Maj. and established a DutchNational Members of the Dutchroyalarmed of the Intelli graduate JointMilitary SocialistParty.SomeDutchcitizens forceswho had not escaped to Brit He genceCollege. was an intelligence eagerlyjoined the newpartyandtook ain and had successfullyevaded officer in the US Army. positions in the government.Others, Germancapturesecretlybanded
105 DutchResistance
106 DutchResistance
By operatingcovertly andpassively, members of the
together and begancollectinginfor telephone was theirprimarymeans of Resistancewereable to mation.Under the leadership ofDr. communication, and theyalways functionwithout usednicknames. In face-to-face JohanStijkel, a Rotterdamlawyer, meet Maj. Gen. H. D. S. Husselman and attractingundue ings,maskswereoftenworn to ensuresecurity. Col. J. P. Boltonorganized a Resis attention. tancegroup ofyoungDutchcitizens. The DutchResistancecommand and With the help of radioexpertCorne controlhierarchy was decentralized lius Drupsteen, theyestablished a 9 and compartmented.Additionally, wirelesslinkwith the BritishSecret the creation of smallgroups by indi IntelligenceService(SIS) and began The BritishMilitaryIntelligence Sec vidualDutchmenwith no outside passinginformation to the Allies. tion 9 (MI-9) was set up to exploit links was widespread.Some of these availableEuropeanResistance net groups activities will never be known works and assistAlliedairmenshot Resistanceoperationsconsisted becausemany of theirmemberswere downoverEurope in returning to of and captured and executed by the Ger primarily organizational Britain.MI-9, also known as IS-9, mans.Initially, theyusedleaflets and functions, as well as networking gath infiltratedagents,usually by para undergroundnewspapers as means to eringintelligence on the occupation chute, into occupiedEurope.These enlistnewmembers and raisemoney. forces.Probably the mostheroic and agentswouldlink up with a Resis dangerousaspect ofresistancewas the tance cell and organizeescape-and- and of Netherlands evasionefforts in a particulararea, hiding sheltering TheUndergroundPress after notified the Jews and youngdraft-ageDutchmen usually being by Resistance of the of downed and women otherDutch,collec presence by were airmen. The Undergroundnewspapers help known as onkerduikers agentsbroughtmoney, tively ful, in areaswhere the and false assistthese especially The bestknown maps, papers to ( underdivers ). telephonelinesweremonitored and airmen. The usualroute was either story is that ofAnneFrank. use of radiotransmitterswas too dan south to Switzerland or to southern gerousbecause of Germandirection- France and then to Spain and findingoperations.Thesenewspa IndividualDutchwerehorrified and Portugal. pers helpedcounterbalanceNazi appalled at the spectacle of their propaganda and the German-con and friends rounded OnesuchMI-9 was Dick neighbors being agent Kragt, trolledmedia.Almost as soon as the who intoHolland in 1943. up and takenaway to an unknown parachuted occupationbegan,anti-Nazileaflets fate. MostDutch who He lost his equipment,including his Jews escaped began to circulate.3Periodphoto radio, but continued on, armedonly captureweresmuggled out of Hol graphsshowsuchanti-Nazi Britain with a Colt.45. He managed to link land to via Belgiumthrough newspapers as DeUnionbeingopenly up with a DutchJewnamedJoop France and then to Spain, or from distributed on city streetsdespite the Piller,living in the town of Emst, and Belgium to France, and then to Swit obviousdanger.4 By 1943,under theybuilt a networkdesigned to hide, zerland. out via the groundnewspapers had attained a Smugglingpeople and protect, eventuallysmuggle collectivecirculation of Dutchcoastwas extremelydanger nearly downedairmen out ofHolland. 500,000.Althoughsomewereama ous, as the Germansincreasingly teurish, theywereeffective. Onesuch fortified the coast in anticipation of paper atranslation and transcrip an Alliedinvasion.Someyoung InitialOperations tion of dailyBBCbroadcasts was Dutchmen andwomen as well as produced by the Leegsmabrothers DutchJews hid throughout the war, By operatingcovertlyand passively, working at TheHague.5 participating in undergroundactivi members of the Resistancewere able ties. The undergroundnetworks to functionwithoutattractingundue Anothernewspaper was also a two- established in this mannerwerelater attention.Thisallowedthem to orga maneffort.Working out of a hotel instrumental in and exfiltrat hiding nize theircells,gauge the German room in Grave,GeraldPeijnenburg Alliedairmenshotdown ing over counterintelligencethreat, and estab and a DutchJew in hidingwrote Holland. lish informationnetworks. The and copiedYoungNetherlands.
107 DutchResistance
Bythe middle of 1944, therewerefourmajor Resistance rationfood and Peijnenburghandled the distribu-~- in government to keep organizations the The LO tion, and most of his copieswere tabs on population. madecounterfeit it also passedfromperson to person,provid Holland. coupons; obtainedauthentic from ing somedegree of security.6 coupons 9 loyalNetherlandscitizens in the employ of the DutchNazis.Other conductedraids and robber SlowGrowth groups ies to stealauthenticcouponsfrom of the flat groups maquis.Moreover, governmentagencies.Andsome TheResistancedevelopedslowly for interdicted bodies of terrain, by many Dutchciviliansgave up theirown severalreasons.Because of the Nether and confined water,large small, move coupons to the LO. lands and geographicproximity ment to the establishedrailroads, road cultural ties to Dutch Germany,many networks, and Thesewere eas bridges. Besideskeeping an eye on Dutch col weresympathetic to the ideas ofGer controlled the Germans,who ily by laborators,local LO groupsengaged mannationalism, and a significant establishedcheckpoints to curtailfree in whateverresistance theycould portion of the populationjoined the dom ofmovement.Gasolinewas withoutendangeringthemselves. DutchNaziPartyand even the Wehr scarce, and manyDutchusedbicycles Occasionally, the Leegsmafamily in macht.Therewere also Dutchcivilians for sometimes transportation, riding The Hague was able to use its posi who informed on theirneighbors. the rimsbecause of of on a shortage tion in the policeforce to tip offthe rubber for tires. On the otherhand, LO before the impendingarrest of an TheswiftGerman combined the Germanswere the victory, plagued by onkerduikerwouldoccur. Thefamily with Wilhelmina s Resistance sincessant oftele Queen seeming sabotage also was able to funnelgenuinefood abandonment of the Dutch lines and to the popula phone by damage coupons to the LO. tion,disillusioned and embittered railroads. much of Holland.Manywhocollab While the LO maintained a low pro believed that the oratedreally file, the CentralGovernment Germansrepresented the future and MajorResistance FightingGroup (KP) carried out felt that Nazisuccess was inevitable. Organizations sabotageoperations at the locallevel. For thesecitizens,occupation was Its estimatedstrength was 550 mem merely to be accepted. something By the middle of 1944,therewere bers nationally, but this figure is RuthlessGerman countermeasures fourmajorResistanceorganizations in probably low.Withoutcentraldirec toward anti-Naziactivityfurther any Holland.They did not coordinate tion, the KP attackedtargets of discouragedactiveresistance. As the theiractivitiesunless help from one opportunity in and around the home occupationgrewmorerepressive, a group to anotherwas absolutelynec towns. It tendedmostly to target backlashagainst the Germansgrew, essary; for the mostpartthey did not railroadtracks,telegraph and tele fanned by the government-in-exile. answer to a centralheadquarters. phonelines,Germansupplypoints, Theyconductedtheiroperations as and motorpools, but it occasionally The in-exilemade its government- theysaw fit, and members of the assassinatedindividualGerman sol known the presence through judi groupsoften did not knowwhich diers and Dutchcollaborators.Such of BBC listened cious use broadcasts, organizationtheywerepart of. Many activitiesweredangerous. TheGer to covertly by the Dutchpopulation. did not learn the identity of theirpar manswouldcrackdown on the local became QueenWilhelmina a symbol ticulargroupuntilafter the war. population in the localewhere a kill of hope to occupiedHolland, and ing had occurred;sometimes they CrownPrinceBernhardtook an CentralGovernmentOrganizations carried out a nt-for-tatretribution. Allied for mili active role in planning For Help To People In Hiding TheGermanswouldalsostep up their in the Netherlands. efforts in the taryoperations (LO) was the mostimportantsuch counterintelligence area in eradicate under group. Its primarygoal was the pro an attempt to any Geographyalso slowed the growth of tection and exfiltration of groundcells. the Resistance. Thelack of mountain onkerduikers.Anotheractivity cen A third the Council of ous and forestedterrainprevented the teredaround the couponsused by organization, Resistance in both establishment ofhidingareas for large the Germans and the DutchNazi (RVV),engaged
108 DutchResistance
communicationssabotage and protec and regionalgroups. For example, in MargaretheKelderand her sisterwere tion of onkerduikers.Alliedplanners the Nijmegendistrict, the LO com members of the GroupSander.They regarded this group as soundfrom mander was also the chief of staffof smuggleddownedAlliedairmen and ofview. With the securitypoint sev the districtOD. 1 Dutchonkerduikers to a crossing site eral thousand the members, RVVwas on the Belgiumborder,coordinating in radio with the Bureau contact theiractivitieswith a BelgianResis Almosteverytown of anysize had one Inlichtingen7 (BI), the government-in- tance The femalemembers of ofthese It also group. exile s and or more groups. was intelligenceservice, the PANwere couriers, but for primarily demanded and ammunition. possible one person to belong to arms theywere also valuedintelligence col morethan one suchorganization. In lectors. In earlySeptember1944, some memberssimplywere Anotherorganization, the Order of groups, Kelder and anotherfemaleResis referred to by nicknames, and their Service (OD),focused on preparing tancemember wereasked to go into trueidentitiesremainunknown. for the return of a DutchGovern Many the woodsnearEindhoven to con of the werenamedaftertheir ment Holland sliberation. groups following firm the of a German leader. presence TheOD was made of up primarily antiaircraftbattery. On the pretext of formerDutchofficers and govern gatheringmushrooms, theycon officialswhofoundthemselves ment ductedtheirreconnaissanceand, the Nazis and Dutch supplanted by by TheEindhovenandNijmegen whenconfronted by Germanguards collaborators.8 Its mainmissionswere Undergrounds near the battery,were able to con collect and to intelligence develop vincethem of theirinnocence. plans for the maintenance of admin istrativeservices and civilorder on the Someorganizations,established liberation of Holland. Although the locally by individualDutchmen, AnotherPANgroup in a townnorth OD was thought to havebeenpene operatedwith no formal,structured of Eindhovenconductedsabotage trated,Alliedintelligenceestimated links to any othergroups. In Eind operations. It put salt in gas and oil cells still and that most OD were loyal hoven, a groupknown as the tanks of Germanvehicles and blew could be depended on to provideassis PartisanActionNederlands (PAN) up railroadtracks,usingsmuggled tanceduring the liberation of Holland. functionedalong the lines of the KP explosives~rovided by mining but did not consideritselfpart ofthat engineers. A subgroup, the DutchSecret organization. Service (GDN),functioned as an AfterD-Day,many in the Dutch intelligenceagency for the OD. PANwas founded van and Therewere also some 20 otherintelli by Hoynck undergroundgrewimpatient Papendrecnt. He studiedengineering wanted to conductmoreaggressive genceentities in wartimeHolland.9 at the TechnicalUniversity in DeIft operationsagainst the Germans. The MostResistancegroupsconducted untilApril1943,when the Germans PAN did so by launchingraids somelevel of intelligenceoperations, closed the Dutchuniversities and other the even if it was onlycounterintelli against,among targets, Dutch 20- to 30-manGerman at gence for securitypurposes.When beganforciblyrelocating garrison students to as a the Eindhoven on 5 organized at the nationallevel, the Germany manpower airport Septem and talent Van ber 194414. It also groupsweredivided into regional professional pooi. Pap beganconducting endrechtwentinto and a form of warfare;PAN geographicareas of administration. hiding psychological eventuallymoved to Eind}ioven,where memberswouldapproachGerman At the nationallevel, the National he established the PAN. ByJune 1944, soldierstheyknewand try to the PAN had reached its full them of the of Steunfonds(NSV) was an umbrella strength persuade hopelessness financialorganizationwhichreceived of 80 to 100 youngmen andwomen. Germany ssituati9n and to surren ThePANhad severalsmall cells PAN moneyfrom the government-in-exile oper der. Some memberswere in the small around and conductedcovertfundraising to ating towns reported by Germansoldiers and finance KP and LO operations.~ Eindhoven.Theseincluded the Group arrested. Thepunishment for belong There was someoverlap in responsi Sander,namedafter its leader,which ing to a Resistanceorganization was bilitiesamongmembers of the local worked as a KP and LO subgroup. 2 summaryexecution.
109 DutchResistance
TheResistance
organizationswere part ofthe largely In June 1944, the PAN set its Lavergeconstituted the one-man up unknownstory ofthe headquarters in a house in Eind NetherlandsSection of SpecialIntel hoven. Van Papendrecht had little strategicOSSmission ligence (SI) of the OSS in London. TheAmerican-born of Dutch contactwith the othergroups in the into Holland. son occupied he had been Eindhovenarea, including the RVV, émigrés, personally whichnumberedonlythree of four recruited for the job by Col. William 9, Donovan. As for members, but he was aware of their planningprogressed the existence. The PANleader did con invasion ofEurope, Lt. Col. duct activitieswithother De Vries, the chief of SI, asked somejoint TheResistancegroups in the Eind when he felt the Laverge to develop a plan for using an groups operational hoven areahad a total of several OSSteam to assist in the liberation of need for outsideassistance. One of hundredmembers. The localGDN the leader the Netherlands. On 25 May 1944, his outsidecontacts was KP was led by ArieTromp, a director for Lavergesubmitted his preliminary in Rotterdam, Jan van Bijnen,whose the Phillipselectricalfirmoffice in plan,whichcalled for two officers nom de guerrewas Frank. Frank Eindhoven. His nom de guerrewas and threeenlistedmenwithassoci was Van Pupendrecht speriodic Harry. By placingtheirheadquar atedvehicles and communications source ofweapons and explosives, ters in the EindhovenMuseum, equipment. couriered by suchwomen as Margere GDNmemberswere able to come the Kelder and her sister. and go withoutarousingGerman sus picions. The GDNbeganreceiving Following the Alliedinvasion of looked for taskings and ordersfrom the BI fol occupiedFrance,Laverge To the east ofEindhoven, in the lowing its establishment in ward to having a chance to operate an small of KP town Helmond, a Resis November1942.Tromp and his OSSmission in Hollandsimilar to tance was led by Johan the OSSmission,codenamedSussex, group agentsused the undergroundelectri a formerDutchartil had in Raaymaerkers, cal cables in the Phillipsfactory, which operated France. In July who was a technical 1944, the NetherlandsSectioncame lerycaptain which also had telephonelines, as and owned his own under the control of SI s Continental engineer factory. theirprimarymeans of 15 Division. De Vries HansBertels, a member of the group, communication. orderedresubmis of for the liberation begandistributing an underground sion plans of and newspaper in 1941 in the Helmond occupiedcountries, Laverge Therewereseveralunderground area. Bertels scontactwas a man reviewed the initialwork. The OSS groups in the Nijmegenarea. In the namedKnaapen,whoprovidedhim teamdesignated for Hollandwould itself,someResistanceactivities city under the control of the with the newspapers and occasional come apparentlywerecenteredaround orders. SupremeHeadquartersAlliedExpedi operations SaintCanisiusCollege.JulesJansen tionaryForce(SHAEF)military was an engineeringprofessor at the mission to the Netherlands.TheOSS and one of the leadersofthe South of Eindhoven, in the town of college teamgrew to six officers and eight to local KP. He set a in a small LO con up laboratory Roermond, group 10 enlistedmen. his house for sisting of only 15 members had its manufacturingexplo sives and an indoorfiringrange in his headquarters in a vault in the local Laterthatmonth,Lavergeconsulted basement to teach KP members the cemetery.Anya van Lyssens, later with the BI and used its contributions basics of awarded the Order markmanship. Military for the finalplan,submitted on 5 of William for her actions in the August1944.Both the BI and the member. The Resistance, was a OSSapproved the mission,whichwas OSSInvolvement group had a radio,withwhich it given the codenameMelanie. The maintainedcontactwith a Belgian Minister ofWar in the Dutchexile and Resistancegroup, smuggled The Resistanceorganizationswere government also approved the mis Allied the bor downed airmenover part of the largelyunknownstory of sion,whichwas to gatherintelligence der. By September1944, it was the strategicOSSmission into occu and focus on transmittinginforma creditedwithsaving the lives of piedHolland.Thisstoryessentially tionobtainedfrom the Dutchservice s 29 airmen. began in May 1944,when Lt. Jan intelligencenets,trying to recruit
110 DutchResistance
Boththe BI theDutch exilegovernment s inteffigenceservice] and Dutch into Market-Garden agents, extending nets andthe OSS Operation Germany. 6 approved the Melanie]mission, In earlySeptember1944,Montgom After Lt. Laverge got the greenlight whichwas to gather ery, seeking to maintain the momen for the mission, he beganrecruiting tum of the Alliedbreakoutfrom intelligenceandfocus soldiers for the team,choosingmen Normandy,conceived an operation to he had workedwithbefore in on transmitting outflank the German WestWall England. He also beganbuilding defensiveline. Encouraged by Ultra up informationfromthe his team to ensuremaximumself-suf SIGINTinterceptswhichportrayed a ficiency. In addition to his radio Dutchservice s disintegratingGermanArmy,Mont and two Dutch BI analysts, persuadedSupremeAllied operators intelligencenets,trying gomery he recruited an AmericanArmy CommanderGeneralEisenhower that mechanic, a radiorepairman, and a to recruitagents,and his boldplan of forcing a narrowcorri Dutch-Americanmajorwith no pre dor throughHolland and establishing extendingDutchnets viousintelligenceexperience. The a bridgeheadacross the RhineRiver presence of a Major on the team intoGermany. into northernGermany sRuhrValley wouldprovideLavergewithenough industrialcomplexheld the promise of rank to obtainresources. 9 bringingabout a Germancollapse by the end of 1944.
MelanieMovesAhead Montgomery sOperationMarket- Garden had two parts. He proposed Germanunitcomposition and posi dropping the FirstAlliedAirborne As operations on the Continent tionsbehind the Line. Siegfried Army to seizesevencanal and river speeded up, so did Laverge sprepara bridges in Holland as well as the tions. Thetargetdate for the start of the lowerRhine the the missionkeptgettingmoved for Location ofenemyheadquarters of bridgeacross at kindand names of Germans Dutchtown ofArnhem the ward, and Lavergebegan to worrythat any locatedthere. Market of he would not haveenoughtime to portion Montgomery s operation.Simultaneously, the prepareproperly.Thedecisionwas Locations of the and archi British)OO(ArmoredCorpswould finallymade to deploy an advance planning advance 60 miles a team of two Dutch and twoAmerican val sections of Germanindustrial rapidly along interests. narrow roadcorridor the officers not laterthan 7 September crossing to link with the 1944,with the remainder of the team capturedbridges up airborneforces in Arnhem the to follow as quickly as possible. Information on controllingperson Garden The alities at all levels of the Reich. portion. operation began on 17 September. When the advanceteamarrived in
Locations of and Normandy, it reported to the command,control, TheMelanie with SHAEF G2 Forward. On 9 Septem communicationsnodes. mission, no prior coordinationwith the British)OO( ber 1944, Lt. Laverge metwith a ArmoredCorps,deployedinto Hol MajorKrick of the SHAEF G2. The OSS team was attached and landover the AlbertCanal and Krickapparentlyofferedlittle or no ordered to report to FieldMarshal reachedEindhoven on 21 September guidance to Laverge as to Melanie s BernardLawMontgomery s 21st The established intendedintelligence-gathering pri ArmyGroup. In earlySeptember, 1944. team its base of in a house at No. 2 Vest orities and requirements.According Lavergemoved his team to the Pal operations dijkStreet. to Laverge sreport to his OSS supe ace Hotel in Brussels, in preparation rior, Krickonlymadesuggestions, for deployment into Holland. He whichLavergedeveloped into the also reported in at Montgomery s The Dutchtelephonenetworkwas a followingrequirements: headquarters. vital communications linkbetween
111 DutchResistance
Melanie and the Resistancecellsscat channelwas directly to Paris and the LavergequicklymadecontactwithArie teredthroughout the country.Using a OSSContinentalDivision ofSI. The Tromp, the chiefof the Eindhoven wireless radio the TR-4 telegraph set, exclusion of the 21stArmyGroup G2 Resistance.WithTromp sassistance, team sradio established operators from the intelligencereportingchain LavergerecruitedfourDutchcivilians contactwith the OSS SI section in work and probablystemmedfrom the sensitive, to as interpreters telephone Paris. In addition to the TR-4, the operators. A Resistancemembernamed compartmentednature of all OSS mis teamused a TR- 1 for localcommuni A. Jongbloedwas employed as the mis sions. The team had no contactwith cationswith the DutchResistance sion sintelligenceand liaisonofficer in the Market-Garden of the 10 1st AirborneDivision,whose groups area withDutchcivilianauthorities in Eind operations. Market-Gardenobjectivewas the sei hoven. TheOSSteamused the Dutch zure of Eindhoven andvitalbridges telephonesystem to makecontactwith nearby.TheonlyAmerican Eventhough the teamwas attached to para variousResistancegroupsthroughout the 21stArmyGroup, it apparently trooper the OSS team sawwas a lone Holland.Thisreportingnetworkbegan did not provideintelligence to Mont GI whowanderedpast the house one yieldingexcellentinformationalmost G2. its gomery s Instead, reporting day and asked for a cigarette. immediately.
112 DutchResistance
Theteam s firstmessage to SI exceptdemolitionsquads. Theteam DuringMarket-Garden,intelligence in Paris, on 21 September1944, also reported on otherconcentrations supplied by the variousResistance net reportedthat it had begunrecruiting ofenemytroopsand artillery. 9 works,because of its noncompart possibleagents for workbehind the mentednature, was passedthrough the Germanlines. 7 As the Market-Gar Jedburghteams to the varioustactical In addition to the Melanieoperation, den battleraged up and down the commanders.Thecommanders which was to providestrategicintelli corridoralong Hell sHighway, 8 receivedintelligence on the composi gence on the situationthroughout the OSS teamcontinued its tion and disposition of Germanforces, Holland,OSS/SOEJedburgh2 teams intelligence-gatheringmission, On as well as information on terrain and deployedwitheachAlliedairborne 22 September1944, the teamreported the conditions of the bridges.Once the divisionduringMarket-Garden. The the location ofthe Gestapoheadquar paratrooperswere on the ground, this J teamsworked with ters in Kieve,Germany, a bordertown edburgh closely informationflowcontinued.Some of their divisioncommanders just east of Nijmegen, and the loca respective the Resistancecellswereaware to some and staff.These civil tion of the telephoneexchangethere. teamsperformed extent ofMarket-Gardenbefore its affairs and unconventionalwarfare Thisinformationwas passed via the implementation, but the decentralized missions in much the telephonenetwork by Resistance samemanner as nature of the undergroundnetwork forcesunits but members. A reportdated 24 Septem latter-dayspecial do, guaranteed that not everyonewould ber 1944from a reliablesource theywereprimarilyconcernedwith know the timeand place of the attack. statedthat, as of 22 September, all obtainingtacticalintelligencepro As Alliedparachutesbeganblossom troops are] leavingRotterdam, vided by Resistancemembers. ing, thosepreviouslyunaware ofthe
113 DutchResistance
Resistancemembers a..~. isAirbornetroops~ g over a map nearEir~.hoven. ..~ocourtesy of the author.
operationreacted by mobilizingtheir too small to conducteffectiveopera commanderWolterswas attached to cells and recoveringarmscaches. tions. Onefour-manteam per brigade the Britishdivision, but his stated wouldhavebeenenough, but not mission was focused on Dutchcivil
SomeResistancememberscarried out one team for the entiredivision. The affairsafter the liberation ofArnhem. of this haddisastrous His ad hoc actions independentactionsduring the opera splitting team unplanned, during the entire the demonstrated his consider tion. Othersactivelysought out consequences,placing fighting airbornesoldiers andattached responsibility for the vettingand ableabilities; if his responsibilities had administration ofthe availableResis beenbroadenedbefore he themselves to anyunit thatwouldtake D-Day, the member ofTeam couldhavebeen effective. them. In caseswheretheirloyalties tance on junior evenmore Lr. Knottenbelt. weresuspect,Resistancememberswere Claude, vetted by theJedburghteams.Once Thecommunicationsfailuressuffered this was done, theywerefarmed out to TheBritishplan for using the Resis by Marketforces,especially the 1st Air differentunits the need as arose. tance fell apartafterCol. Barlow, the borneDivision, are legendary.Team officer in charge ofcivilaffairs and of Claude s loss of communications JedburghTeamClaude,attached to workingwith the Resistance in the occurredbecause the teamcarriedonly the British 1st AirborneDivision, was Arnhemarea, was killed.Dutchnaval one radio for the operation,which was
114 DutchResistance
A Dutchcommandotransporting 10 1st Airbornetroopsduring the fightingoutsideEindhoven. courtesy of the a~ithor.
lostduring the initialdrop on D-Day. on the failure of planners to credit columnwerecriticallyflawed, TeamEdward s to communi airbornereconnaissanceindications inability although this lattershortcomingwas catewithTeamClaude and the of recentGermanarmoredreinforce as much a planningfailure as it was an physicalisolation of the two teams ments in the Arnhemarea. intelligencefailure. prevented a clearassessment ofthe sit uation at Arnhem. the in Similarly, operationalplanners, TheDutchResistancewas not alerted theirhaste to meetMontgomery s to the ArnhemdropbecauseBritish deadlines,paid too littleattention to Failure intelligencebelieved the Germans had Intelligence route,terrain, and weatherassess penetratedtheirDutchnetworks. If ments.Theseassessments,moreover, the British had heededwordfrom Market-Gardenranksamong the sufferedfrominsufficientbasicintelli their in Arnhem, would mostseriousintelligencefailures of genceinformation.Selections of drop agents they havebeenalerted the the war. Critiques of the operation zones,especially at Arnhem,were ill- to presence of havefocused on the overlyoptimistic considered, and estimates ofthe road two enemypanzerdivisions. interpretations of SIGINT as well as system sability to support the armored
115 DutchResistance
Carrying On A BridgeToo Far AfterMarket-Garden, the Melanie
missioncontinued to collectmilitary, OperationMarket-Garden andco~nmunications,failed economic, and industrialintelligence. turnedinto a military to seize theArnbem bridge A detailedreportdated 14 December disaster. the Although despite a heroicfight. 1944provided the specifications on a Americanairborne Mausersmall-armsfactory in the town of Oberndorf, The divisionseventually Thesituation in Arnbem Germany. team also providedreportsregarding achievedtheirobjectives grewincreasinglyperilous. Germanatrocitiescommittedagainst TheBritisharmoredcolumn the 82ndAirborne Alliedprisoners and Netherlands parachutedintoGraveand whichwas to breakthrough civilians. Groesbeekandcontrolled to relieve the airborne
the river forcesfellbehindschedule strategic Theunleashing of Germansecret the tankscrawled crossings,while the 101st as along weaponssuch as jet aircraft and the V-2 rocketmadeinformationabout Airborneseizedthe bridges the narrow,congested theseweaponscritical.Melanie at EindbovenandVeghel roadway. Theoperation responded by providinginformation the Germansmanaged to endedless than 10 days on the location ofV-2 launchingsites, with theBritishand demolishone ofthebridges. later, withdetailedsketches.Information Polishairborne In addition, theBritish troops on industrialinfrastructurewas also A dated March 1stAirborneDivision, surrounded in Arnbemand provided. report 3 1945statedthatV-2 the armoredcolumnstalled partswerebeing reinforced by a Polish manufactured in the Croecketextile airborne 10 miles unit, wasdropped away. factory in Hohenlimburg,Germany. toofarfrom its target, the TheBritish able Arnbembridge. were topull In late December,coincidingwith backsome oftheirforces, the Germanattackthrough the Morefundamently,German butnotbefore the Germans Ardennes,Melaniedevelopedintelli killed strength in Arnhemwas or capturedmore genceindicating a secondary, substantiallygreaterthan than 7,000paratroopers; supplementaryGermanattackacross the MaasRiver.Maj. Van der Gracht anticipated in the the twoAmericanairborne reported to his superior,PhilipHor intelligenceestimates. divisionsfightingalong the ton, that in the period of a few days armedAllied corridorlostmorethan Lightly morethan 30 Germancommandos paratroopersfound 3,500. With the debacle in wearingBritishuniforms had been in themselves up againsttwo Arnbeni,hopes ofan early captured Eindhoven,someonly a few blocksfrom the team s SSpanzerdivisionsthatbad end to the warquickly quarters. Van der Gracht also reported,how recentlybeenrefitting in the faded. In the words0/the ever, thatEindhoven had received Britishairborne area. TheBritish/Polish numerous V-2 attacks withsome CommanderGeneral force,sufferingfrom the Boy accuracy. The threatbecame so omi thatVan der Grachtmade loss in the airdrop of Browning,Market-Garden nous plans for the destruction of those files criticalvehicles,artillery, was a bridgetoo/ar. whichcould not be evacuated.
116 DutchResistance
TheSHAFFG-2... reportedthatMelanie providedthe most On 8 February1945,Melanie completeinteffigence genceproduction and reporting, the reportedthat FieldMarshalGoering Melaniemission suppliedmore had established his headquarters in a picturefor its assigned reports for SHAEF sDailyDigestthan trainwiththreecoaches at the Nied otherOSS missionfromSeptem area ofanyintelligence any eraulatrainstation and that he had ber 1944 to May 1945.23 beenthere for severalmonths.Dutch operationduringthe intelligenceagentswereroutinelyable war. to the locations of German report UndeservedObscurity regimental and higherheadquarters 9~ alongwithdescriptions of vehicleand its achievements,Melanie has uniformmarkings.Reports on Ger Despite beenmentioned in mostOSS man unitswereusuallyable to hardly Operations in occupiedHollandwere histories. The onlysources on Mela identify the name of the commander extremelydifficult and dangerous for and sometimeswhatdecorations he nie are survivingparticipants and the Melanie sDutchagents.After an declassifiedOSS records at the wore. This type of informationcame OSSbureaucrathad recommended NationalArchives at CollegePark, fromundergroundsourcesliving in down the because shutting operation Theserecordsinclude the and Maryland. occupiedtowns villages. of a perceivedlack of results,Laverge dailysituationreports,financial respondedangrily: Frankly, if you accountingrecords,operational knewaboutconditions in Holland SI also taskedMelanie to conduct reports, and debriefs of Dutchagents like we do here, you don t see how and submitbattledamageassessment sent behind the lines.There are the hell thosepeopleDutchagents] reports on the results ofAlliedbomb importantgaps in the records;some can accomplishwhat we are ask raids in the Netherlands. documentshavebeenpulledfrom the ing Again, The lack of archival ing. 22 reports files and reclassified. suchreportscouldonly be obtained on the success or failure of thesemis througheyewitnessaccounts pro sionsmakes it impossible to evaluate vided by DutchResistancemembers themauthoritatively. But the SI-IAEF G2, at least, gave and Melanieagents. somecreditwhere it wasjustlydue, when he thatMelanie Melaniecontinued in Eindhoven for reported A 24 December1944memorandum provided the mostaccurate and com the duration of the war. Besides for its from Lt. states that the team pleteintelligencepicture Laverge obtainingintelligence on the strate assigned area of any intelligence had recruitednineDutchcitizens gic and tacticalmilitarysituation, the opera tion the war.24 he five observers and fourwireless tele during As indicated, teamprovidedeconomic,political, Melanie sefforts and the cooperation graphoperators andwas training and socialintelligence on large and and sacrifices of its DutchResistance them in Eindhoven to penetrateGer smallurbanareas and on rural agentscontributedsubstantially to manlines andcollectinformation.21 communities.Melanie also put Alliedintelligenceoperations in Hol Armedwithonlytheirwits and the together a database on Dutch land at a crucial TR-1radio,theseNetherlanderstried, collaborators. stage. withvaryingdegrees of success, to their missions. accomplish assigned From 25 to 31 March1945, the FromSeptember1944untilMay NOTES Melaniemissionsent 251 reports, 1945,severalsecondarymissionswere messages, and maps/sketches to the conducted,eachincluding at leastone OSS/ETO SI section.FromSeptem 1. B. H. Liddell-Hart,History ofthe Sec Thesemissionsinvolved agent. con ber 1944 to April1945,Melaniesent ondWorldWar(NewYork; G. P. variousResistance and Putnam s tacting groups approximately3,200courierreports Sons; 1970),p.65. radio between the establishing contact and 750 cablemessages to the OSS SI and Melanie for intelligence- section in Paris. to an after- groups According 2. E. H. Lockridge, SetEuropeAblaze of the gatheringpurposes.Some actionreportwritten by the SHAEF (NewYork:Thomas Y. Crowell agents did not survive. G-2 in 1945 evaluatingDutchintelli Company,1967), p. 247.
117 DutchResistance
3. GordonWright, The Ordeal ofTotal firsthandaccounts on file at the State 18. XXXCorps advance (the Garden War, 1939-1945(NewYork:Harper Archives in Arnhem. portion of the operation) to link up Torchbooked.;l968),p. 145. with the threeairbornedivisions at Eindhoven, andArnhem 9. Authors sinterview of GerardH.J.M. Nijmegen, restricted two-lane 4. Photographicdisplays in the National Peijnenburg,DutchSecretary of the was to a narrow and the the War and ResistanceMuseum,Over- Armyand LO member;Wassenaar, highway areas paratroop units had secured. Thisroad the loon,Holland. Holland, 18 June 1996. won nickname Hell sHighway for the ferociousfightingtherebetween the 5. The BBC also broadcast and messages 10. Author sinterview ofLeo Heinsman, WehrmachtandAlliedunits. codewordstargeted at variousunder LO member;Beek-Ubbergen,Hol groundgroups.Somemessageswere land, 18 June 1996. orders to conductcertainoperations. 19. NARARG226,Entry# 148, Box 26, Othersnotifiedparticulargroups that Folder378,Melanie 11. Author sinterview of GerardH.J.M. DailyReport, arms andsupplyairdropswouldoccur dated 24 1944. Peininenburg, 18 June 1996. Sept. at a predeterminedlocation.
12. Author sinterview of 20. OSS/SOE teamswere 6. Author sinterview ofGerard H. J. M. Hoynckvan Jedburgh joint Allied that Peijnenburg,DutchSecretary of the Papendrecht;Eindhoven,Holland, 14 specialoperationsteams 1996. infiltrated into to Army and Resistancemember;Was June occupiedterritory recruit and trainlocalResistance senaar,Holland, 18 June 1996. orga nizations for 13. Author sinterview ofMargarethe strategicintelligence and Kelder-Groom;Eindhoven,Holland; operations sabotage. 7. Ultimately, the BI was responsible for 14-15June 1996. establishing a network of intelligence agentsinsideoccupiedHolland. The 21. NARARG226,Entry# 146, Box 26, BI also maintainedcommunications 14. Van Papendrecht was against the ran Folder384,Memorandumdated 24 with the DutchResistance,providing domkilling ofloneGermansoldiers. December1944,Subject:Agent the AllieswithvaluableHUMINT. Melanie He seems to haveregarded this as Recruitment, Mission. ungentlemanlyand serving no 8. Author sinterview of Hoynckvan purpose. 22. LetterfromCapt. Jan Laverge to Papendrecht,PANfounder and CaptainAlden, SI Staff, 27 January Stoottrophenveteran;Eindhoven, 15. Author sinterview of Jan Laverge, 1945,NARA RG 226, Entry # 190, Holland; 14 June 1996.John W. Captain,USA(Retired);OSS vet Box 214, Folder 162. Hackett, I Was a Stranger,(Boston: eran;Richmond,VA., 2 November HoughtonMuffinCo.; 1978); p. 53. 1995. Had SjorsDeKruijff, We Spread a 23. MemorandumfromCapt.Harry A. Bed for the Allies. Unpublished 16. NARA RG Box 214, Rositzke,deputychief,Steering monograph,obtainedfrom the 226,Entry 190, Folder 162. DeploymentOrder,Mel Division, to PhilipHorton,chief, HartensteinAirborneMuseum,Mn- Evaluation of anie Mission,undated. SteeringDivision; hem,Holland, 1996.DeKruijffs DutchIntelligenceProduction, Sept. details monograph Resistanceactivi 1944-May1945,dated 9 June 1945. ties in the Arnhem area beforeand 17. NJARA RG 226,Entry # 148, Box duringMarket-Garden.Much of 26, Folder378,MelanieWeekly his material is drawnfromveterans Report. 24. Ibid.
118