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Home , Dutch resistance, Edgar Williams, Frederick Browning, Oosterbeek, Operation Market Garden

Association of Former Intelligence Officers From AFIO's The Intelligencer 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Web: www.afio.com * E-mail: [email protected] Volume 25 • Number 2 • Fall 2019 $15 single copy price to provide the Germans with valuable, and mostly accurate, military information on the Allied advance When Intelligence Made a Difference through Northern France and , thereby prov- ing his worth as an agent. In early , he was ordered to provide information on the plans of the — WWII Era — - as well as those of the Allies - for sending agents behind German lines. As a result, he infiltrated successfully Belgian and groups. He even managed to penetrate the Allied headquarters in Brussels, befriending, among others, Prince Bernhard of the – commander of the Dutch interior forces – and Philip Johns, head of the Section of the Special Forces by Wim Klinkert Headquarters.4 Johns knew about plans to advance to and wanted Lindemans to play a role. Around 8 September Lindemans was thus assigned peration Market Garden was a bold, spectac- by the British to contact the Dutch resistance, in order ular Allied airborne and ground operation, to coordinate the military operations with resistance in , penetrating over 50 miles O activities. The British had no idea about Lindemans’ into Nazi-occupied Netherlands. This operation, double role, although a message by Giskes, indicating which failed to hold the bridges over the River his double role, had been intercepted at the end of at Arnhem forms a dramatic episode in the Allied August. Moreover, some close associates of Prince advance towards the Rhine and has encouraged new Bernhard had expressed doubts about Lindemans’ research about the use and misuse of intelligence by reliability, but as they had no proof no action was the opposing combatants. taken. Lindemans travelled towards the frontline on The British author Anthony Beevor made the 12 September, but only reached Holland on the 14th. latest contribution to this topic in his 2018 In the meantime, on 10 September, the die was cast book, Arnhem, the of the Bridges.1 He discusses the and the Allies’ decision taken to launch Market Garden two important questions that are attached to Market on the 17th. Garden from the perspective of intelligence: first, the Just across the border in Holland, Lindemans supposed betrayal of the Allied plans to the Germans gave himself up to a German patrol, saying he was by the Dutch Christiaan Lindemans, an Abwehr agent. The Germans brought him to Gen- codenamed “King Kong;” and second, the low quality eraloberst5 ’s Fallschirmjäger (paratroop) of Allied intelligence, leading to an underestimation Headquarters in , southwest of Arnhem. Lin- of the German military strength and consequently demans told the Germans that hundreds of British to the failure to hold on to the Arnhem bridgehead. tanks were ready to advance northwards towards Both topics were, and still are, the subject of multiple . Next, he was transported to Giskes’ former publications of varied quality. Headquarters near in the centre of Holland. The Dutchman Christiaan Lindemans worked There, he betrayed a number of British agents and for the anti-German resistance in occupied Western probably gave the Germans military information on Europe, mostly to help Allied airmen escape to safety. the Allies, including Allied plans for a northward Slowly though, his fellow resistance fighters began advance towards the Rhine, including , to lose confidence in him due to his recklessness. In to be executed within a few days. Subsequently the March 1944, when the resistance seemed unwilling to Germans let Lindemans go, to fulfil his mission for the help free his brother, taken prisoner by the Germans, British in Eindhoven. Soon after his arrival the Dutch Lindemans decided to work for the Abwehr2 as well. resistance, considering him very untrustworthy and His main contact and protector was Hermann Giskes unwilling to take risks, incarcerated him. His defini- of section III F.3 From August, Lindemans began tive unmasking took place only at the end of October.

1. Anthony Beevor. Arnhem, the Battle of the Bridges. London: Penguin, 2018. 2. The German military intelligence service. 4. A section of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). 3. The Abwehr counter espionage agents bureau. 5. -.

Fall 2019 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 59 In his detailed analysis, Dutch intelligence his- came down. He rushed to safety, thinking the Allied torian Bob de Graaff makes clear that Lindemans’ forces were there to take him prisoner. information only affected German military operations Although the Germans had their eyes on Arnhem to a limited extent.6 The Abwehr had already realized as a possible Allied objective, the city never enjoyed from other sources, as well as from their own military top priority among military commanders. A Rhine operational analysis, that the next Allied step would crossing more to the East, even on German territory, be an attempt to cross the Rhine, possibly via the was thought to be more probable as well as imminent. Netherlands. Agents employed by Walter Schellenberg, Lindemans had brought Arnhem to the attention of head of foreign intelligence of the Sicherheitsdienst7, had the Germans, but that had not altered their planning also acquired information, via Swedish contacts, that seriously. While they had been surprised by the Sep- the Allies were planning airborne attacks to cross the tember 17 operations, they managed to quickly recover Rhine. Furthermore, a message had come in via the tactically. Lindemans’ information might have had intelligence service of the German Army that inter- more effect on the German countermeasures against cepted Allied radio traffic that such landings were to the ground attack, south of Eindhoven, a city on the be expected from 14 September onwards. The Allies in Belgian-Dutch border. Based on Lindemans’ infor- turn noticed, through decoded Enigma messages, that mation, Student had sent reinforcements to that area, the Germans took such airborne operations, among effectively delaying the ground attack on the 17th. others around and Arnhem, seriously into Another controversy linked to the Market Garden account. All this information was collected between 9 is related to Allied intelligence. Did inadequate Allied and 14 September. Allied reconnaissance flights and intelligence result in a disastrous operational defeat? bombing attacks on the 16th were interpreted by the On what information did Montgomery base his deci- Abwehr as indicators of an imminent Rhine crossing. sions, and was that information correct? Additionally, Lindemans’ information, in fact, only reaffirmed a how was relevant information distributed among the scenario the Germans were already preparing for, Allied commanders, during a period of rapid change although they lacked reliable, detailed information in the military situation? Was Market Garden indeed on the exact time and place. Indeed, as early as 3-4 the intelligence failure, as Lyman Kirkpatrick in his September, they had already put in place some precau- book Captains Without Eyes states?9 Did the relevant tionary measures: a SS- under Sturmbannfürer8 intelligence elements fail to inform the commanders Sepp Krafft was sent to Arnhem, with the assignment of the different risks involved? Was the planning done to prepare for an airborne attack in that region. Similar too hastily? Or did Allied intelligence underestimate preparations were made in other areas as well. Krafft’s the German strength, as Michael Lee Lanning wrote unit was very effective on 17 September, when the in Senseless Secrets?10 To get a general idea of the work- attack actually began. ings of Allied intelligence, one has to look at different Richard Christmann, an Abwehr agent who had levels of information gathering and processing, from interrogated Lindemans near Utrecht, later declared signals intelligence at to actions that the information given by Lindemans was sent on by intelligence officers at divisional level.11 16 September to a different German Headquarters, What did Ultra in fact say in the months, and espe- which did not seem impressed, even expressing doubt cially the weeks, leading up to the Market Garden oper- on Lindemans’ reliability. Christmann also said that ation? Based on Ultra, Supreme Headquarters Allied some small extra units were sent to Arnhem, and Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) published weekly intel- hospitalized soldiers were evacuated, an allegation ligence reports. The one dated 20 August 1944, when which is hard to verify today. In fact, on 17 September the Allied armies crossed the Seine and the Germans all major German commanders proved to be surprised seemed totally beaten, has gained notoriety: by the scale and timing of the attack: only Krafft had The August have done it: the German Army actually been prepared. Most famous, of course, is the in the WEST has had it. story about , having lunch near Arnhem when the parachutists and gliders

9. Lyman Kirkpatrick. Captains Without Eyes. New York: Routledge, 2018. 6. Bob de Graaff Dood van een dubbelspion. Den Haag: sdu, 1997. 10. Michael Lee Lanning. Senseless Secrets. New York: Birch Lane. 1996. 7. German political information service. The subordinate SD was the 11. Joel Jeffson. Operation Market Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored. intelligence and security service of the SS. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 8. SS rank equivalent to major. 2002. Pp. 1-2.

Page 60 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Fall 2019 Crippled, in the NW by appalling losses, in the SW seemed less convinced of the growth of German mil- by sheer futility, and in the SOUTH by totally inade- itary strength in the southern Netherlands. The idea quate reserves, the armies of RUNDSTEDT, of KLUGE, that German resistance would not be too impressive …are committed willy-nilly to what must shortly be still lingered on in the Army Group headquarters. the total surrender of more than two-thirds of FRANCE. At the and divisional levels on the other hand, It is an achievement of which the Allied Armies may there was real concern about the strength of possible well feel enormously proud, and of which the enemy German resistance, concerns mentioned in their intel- is frankly envious.12 ligence estimates in the days following 10 September. But the ‘Victory Disease’ began to show cracks These levels were not privy directly to Ultra. What is not long after that. In the first days of September, it especially noteworthy is that the intelligence reports started to become clear that the Germans had regained of the American airborne divisions, still in the UK at their strength in the Dutch-Belgian border region and the time, did mention German armoured divisions in that the entrance to the port of , the , the area of operations. This was probably partly based would be heavily defended. A total German collapse on information coming from the Dutch resistance. did not seem imminent, something Ultra duly made Additionally, individual staff officers tried to warn the Allied commanders aware of. A German defence Montgomery not to take German fighting power too line from Antwerp to became visible from lightly. Most notable among them were Major Brian 6 September onwards. The simultaneous crossing Urquart, intelligence of the British Airborne of the Scheldt by the German 15. Armee, with tens of Corps; intelligence officer Brigadier Edgar Williams thousands of men reinforcing the southern Nether- (21 Army Group) and, calling by telephone from lands, was also noticed by Ultra. It is remarkable that , his personal adjutant, Major-General Freddie 14 SHAEF’s weekly intelligence summaries did not press de Guingand. Both Urquart and Williams were close 15 these developments home more clearly even though to Montgomery personally. Even Major General Ken- they were mentioned in the daily intelligence report neth Strong, the chief intelligence officer for General of 10 September.13 On 15 September, Ultra reported Eisenhower at SHAEF, personally expressed concern, that the German had established its probably also based on Dutch sources. Montgomery, headquarters at , close to Arnhem. Ultra however, remained adamant. He had no intention of also revealed that the Germans were expecting Allied changing his operational plans at the last minute, advances to either or Arnhem, including nor of risking what he presumably saw as his last employing airborne troops. And while Bletchley Park’s opportunity to attempt a British led Rhine crossing – cryptanalysts, which had not been informed of Mont- an attempt to which Eisenhower had given the green gomery’s plans in order to avoid a biased analysis of light. He did not want to admit that the window of the incoming information, did report the growing opportunity for such a daring operation had passed, strength of the German army in Holland, the problem that it was too late. Similarly, airborne commander was disseminating this information down the line. Lieutenant-General was not very This occurred very slowly and did not reach the corps willing, to say the least, to pass information down the commanders in the field. Both SHAEF and Field Mar- line that could further pessimism on the feasibility of shall Montgomery’s 21 Army Group received this Ultra the operation. information. SHAEF released a new weekly report Apart from Montgomery’s personal ambition, on 16 September, mentioning the arrival not only of the fact remains that the British distrusted any infor- the German 15. Armee in the Netherlands, but also of mation based on HUMINT sources from the Dutch two SS armoured divisions (albeit greatly reduced in resistance. This was probably the result of the previous strength) near Arnhem. experiences with the so-called England Spiel, in which This much less optimistic assessment came too many SOE-agents dropped in the Netherlands had late for the Market Garden planners, who had begun fallen into German hands. The British fear of German collecting detailed information from 10 September infiltration of the Dutch resistance had long been onwards. Their main source was 21 Army Group manifest, so when, on 6 September, Prince Bernhard headquarters, which was also informed by Ultra, but 14. Steven Rosson, An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation Market Garden. Charleston: Eastern Illinois University, 1997. 12. SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary 23, week ending 26 August P. 51. 1944. 15. Joel Jeffson. Operation Market Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored. 13. SHAEF, “G2 Report No. 98w (1200hrs, 10 September to 1200hrs, Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 11September1944), pp. 1·2. 2002. P. 76.

Fall 2019 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 61 presented Montgomery with relevant information on Allied intelligence failure. After all, the correct and the German troops in Holland, he failed to get the relevant information was available and should have Field Marshall’s attention. The Prince later wrote: “The warranted at least further investigations, and certainly British considered us a bunch of idiots for daring to greater caution. Rather, the failure was in higher question their military tactics. The average English- British command levels, hell-bent to make sure that man doesn’t like being told by a bloody foreigner Britain got credit for delivering the knockout punch that he’s wrong.”16 Equally remarkable is that aerial to the Germans but also to test airborne operations photography was sparsely used for the operational before came to an abrupt end. The Germans preparations, despite Urquart’s famous attempt to were more successful in their use of human and sig- convince Browning to undertake aerial reconnais- nals intelligence and successfully deployed their forces sance near Arnhem.17 He succeeded but rather late, to hand the Allies an ignominious defeat. and in any case not much was done with the intelli- gence. The same lack of interest was shown for a more Wim Klinkert is professor of military history at the detailed terrain analysis, although Dutch sources had Netherlands Defence Academy and the University of pointed out that the wet, low- laying polder18 area and . [email protected]. the dykes were unusual terrain features that could slow down an armoured advance.19 Thus, although information was available, it was not considered in General literature the planning process. John Adams. The Battle for Western Europe Bloomington: When considering those aspects surrounding the Indiana University Press, 2010. Market Garden operation, it is clear that it was not an Bob de Graaff. Spion in de tuin. Den Haag: sdu, 1992. , Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard 16. . . London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974. Montgomery New York: Random House, 1994. pp. 508-509. Kershaw. It Never Snows in September. Shepperton: 17. Philip Bradley. Market Garden: was Intelligence Responsible for the The Crowood Press, 1994. Failure? Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, 2001, P. 6 18. Flood plains surrounded by dykes. Geoffrey Powell. The Devil’s Birthday. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 19. Arnold Piper. Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Per- 1993. spective from Operation Market-Garden. Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1997. Pp. 15-19.

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