TheCom Liberal Democrat – Conservative coalitionpa of 2010–15 wasr not of coursei then only coalitiong the Liberal Democratsc oor the Liberalali Party has ever participatedt in. Jim Wallaceions compares the UK coalition with the party’s experience in coalition in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, while David Dutton draws parallels from history.

Reflections on two coalitions Jim Wallace

hen I was asked to However, the Journal of Liberal His- Jim Wallace and areas, there was reasonable compat- serve as Advocate Gen- tory is as good a place as any to try Scottish Labour ibility between our respective par- eral for Scotland in and commit some of these thoughts leader Donald ties, a coalition was widely seen as W 2 the coalition government formed to paper. Dewar agree the more likely than not. in May 2010, it was to be my sec- The biggest difference in cir- first coalition in By contrast, whilst polls dur- ond experience of coalition, hav- cumstances probably relates to Scotland, in 1999 ing the 2010 campaign pointed to ing been deputy first minister in the creation of the coalition. In a parliament where no one party the Labour–Lib Dem government Scotland, in 1999, there was some would command a majority, such formed after the first election to expectation that the outcome expectations had been confounded the Scottish parliament.1 Indeed, would be a Labour–Lib Dem coa- in the past. Moreover, there did one of the main reasons for my lition. That did not make it a cer- not appear to be any natural politi- appointment was that I had expe- tainty, as I was always prepared to cal affinity between the Liberal rience of having been in coalition walk away from an agreement if Democrats and the Conserva- government. I have often been the terms were not acceptable. But tive Party. Intuitively, a coalition asked to compare and contrast the given that the PR system used for between these two parties seemed two experiences. This is never as the election was not expected to less likely than not. Consequently, easy as it sounds, not least because produce a majority outcome, and in both public and party eyes, there of differences in circumstances. given that in a number of policy were more difficulties in 2010 in

76 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 TheCom Liberal Democrat – Conservative coalitionpa of 2010–15 wasr not of coursei then only coalitiong the Liberal Democratsc oor the Liberalali Party has ever participatedt in. Jim Wallaceions compares the UK coalition with the party’s experience in coalition in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, while David Dutton draws parallels from history.

achieving if not legitimacy, then at policies besides is a tribute to the reflected that the Lib Dem view had least acceptance. negotiating team. prevailed. If the background was different, What we possibly lacked was Moreover, we were assisted in there was a ready comparison in the a good-going row, and a threat to establishing a separate identity by preparations made by the party in break off the talks. Admittedly, the futile efforts of the SNP oppo- the run-up to the election. Based on the circumstances were again very sition to drive wedges between the work done by Philip Goldenberg I do wonder different. In 1999, I did not have coalition parties. Initially, they for Paddy Ashdown before the 1992 to negotiate against a background often used their Opposition Days election, Scottish Liberal Demo- whether a of international financial turmoil to debate issues reserved to West- crats had prepared well for coali- and turbulent markets (a coalition minster where the two parties were tion talks. I had asked David Laws row or two for a devolved administration was not in agreement. As our coali- to distil our manifesto into a pos- never going to trouble the mar- tion agreement did not extend to sible programme for coalition gov- over a signifi- kets). Walking away was an option reserved issues, I insisted that there ernment; whilst preparatory work in 2010, but the downside was could not be a government line, in 2010 by Andrew Stunell and cant policy immense. and we often responded by tabling Danny Alexander ensured that the But more generally, I do won- a coalition amendment which negotiating team entered talks hav- issue, such der whether a row or two over a acknowledged the respective posi- ing given careful thought as to our as we had in significant policy issue, such as we tions of the two coalition parties – coalition goals. had in Scotland over university tui- and our contributors to the debate The contrast was with our Scotland over tion fees and personal care for the could articulate a distinctive Lib respective opposite numbers. In elderly (from which we emerged Dem line. 1999, the Labour Party had given university successful), or landing a big pol- This is not to underestimate precious little thought as to what icy prize such as STV for Scot- the 2010 achievement of policies a coalition government might do. tuition fees tish local government elections, to such as the minimum income tax Donald Dewar’s opening pitch to which Labour was considered to be threshold, the pupil premium or the me was that two Lib Dems should and personal instinctively opposed, would have green policies which are now being join his cabinet and, with a couple been helpful in raising the profile unstitched on a daily basis. I know of junior ministers, we would, to care for the of a battling junior coalition part- just how much effort was put in all intents and purposes, be a con- ner. Indeed, because the tuition fees by ministerial colleagues to secure tinuing Westminster Labour gov- elderly … or issue was not resolved by the part- these; but they were all delivered ernment in Scotland. Interestingly, nership agreement in Scotland and without a major public fall-out, and they do not seem to learn, as UK landing a big was remitted to an inquiry chaired so became more difficult to badge as Labour’s attitude in 2010 did not by Andrew Cubie, that tension was distinctively Liberal Democrat. seem all that different! policy prize evident from the outset. Work- Another difference between However, it was evident from ing relations were good, but there Scottish government and UK gov- the speech which David Cameron … would was not what, after 2010, has some- ernment is scale. After all, prior made on the day after the 2010 times been described as a ‘Rose to devolution, the Scottish Office election that the Tories had been have been Garden phase’. And that lack of was one government department as diligent as we had in making helpful in honeymoon period was not always among many. This led to shorter preparations for the eventuality of to our advantage. In the Hamil- lines of communication, which a ‘hung parliament’. I believe this raising the ton South Westminster by-election undoubtedly facilitated quicker was the experience of our negoti- in September 1999, our candidate decision-making. One of my frus- ating team, when they got down profile of a came sixth behind the Hamilton trations as a minister in charge of a to serious discussions. That we Accies FC Supporters candidate! bill in the Lords was the need for a achieved a coalition agreement battling jun- But once the Cubie committee had lengthy paper chase before I could which incorporated the key pledges reported and ministers (Nicol Ste- accept an amendment which was from the front page of our mani- ior coalition phen, in particular) had worked self-evidently sensible. The theory festo together with a referendum on out implementation, it was gen- is that it is that which secures col- voting reform and other cherished partner. erally accepted that the outcome lective responsibility – fair enough,

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 77 comparing coalitions

but there must be a more efficient and officials, understood and could Commons ministers) to meet coa- way of doing it! act upon. lition peers (of both parties) to try Coalition government also But, as already alluded to, the and identify legislative solutions. requires its own structures and primary responsibility on resolv- Important in these efforts was processes. The UK civil service is ing difficulties lay at the door of the role of special advisers (Spads). instinctively uncomfortable about departmental ministers. It was Writing a piece for the Institute for these. It is a system which has essential that junior ministers were Government on the first anniver- increasingly been built around a the Lib Dem eyes and ears through- sary of the coalition, I said, prime minister, who is the source of out their respective departments. all authority. The need to be sensi- In turn, that required Conserva- My experience of coalition tive to and even accommodate the tive secretaries of state to recognise government in Scotland under- views of two parties in government that their Lib Dem junior ministers scores the importance of these is more challenging than taking the had a legitimate role in represent- advisers. They provided a vital cue straight from the top. ing the party’s interests across the channel of communication with On the day of the Rose Gar- board, and not just within their the backbenches and the wider den, Oliver Letwin and I – and our allocated departmental portfolio. party, both to explain decisions, respective teams – sat in a room Whether or not this worked very and to inform decision-making in Downing Street, trying to fill much depended on personalities.4 with the knowledge of what our in some of the gaps in the primary But where it did work, it ensured MSPs would wear. coalition agreement which the that a policy could command sup- negotiations were never going to port across the coalition. Where At that time (May 2011), I do not be able to cover. I remember being it did not, a good deal of time was Whilst think as much use had been made of quite pleased with a compromise taken up in protracted negotiation special advisers as could have been, which I thought had diluted the and dispute resolution. [the Quad] but their role undoubtedly devel- Tories’ more punitive proposals on As already noted, the scale of oped. I am not in a position to judge knife crime. Oliver thought he had government and the pressured undoubt- their engagement with Commons’ better check out the wording with environment of Whitehall are dif- backbenchers, but in the Lords, the newly appointed justice secre- ferent from the situation in Scot- edly made Elizabeth Plummer5 performed a tary, Ken Clarke. He returned say- land. My workload as deputy first sterling job in keeping Lords min- ing, ‘Ken doesn’t think it’s liberal minister was very substantial; but it demands on isters, and the wider ministerial enough!’ would have been physically impos- team, aware of what our backbench One issue which we did attempt sible for Nick Clegg to have main- the PM, DPM, peers were thinking and what to grapple with that day was a tained the scaled-up overview of would carry and what needed more dispute resolution process. In the whole of government which I chancellor work and attention. Scotland, I sometimes became could do in Scotland. That Nick and chief From a ministerial perspective, exasperated by the number and was able to cover as much as he did as well as Elizabeth, I was fortunate nature of the issues which would is a great testament to his resilience secretary to benefit from the advice and hard quickly escalate to first min- and capacity for work. But it did work of Tim Colbourne and Ver- ister–deputy first minister for underline the important role of Lib … I believe ity Harding when taking the justice resolution.3 I reckoned that with Dem ministers in their respective and security bill through the Lords, considerably extra pressures on the departments. Some commentators that it was and the patience, wisdom and per- prime minister and deputy prime have argued that we should have severance of Matt Sanders and, minister, some filtering process focused on three or four depart- more effec- again, Tim Colbourne, as we navi- was needed. We proposed a Coali- ments; but the nature of our politi- gated the tricky waters of giving tion Committee to which any dis- cal culture is that government as a tive in reach- substance to the Leveson proposals putes that could not be resolved whole is held accountable, and we on the press. This latter cross-party at departmental level could be need a handle on what is going on ing decisions exercise involved not only contact referred. Only if that committee in each department. with our own party colleagues, could not broker a solution would Negotiations were not exclu- which were Conservative ministers and their the prime minister and deputy sively within government. Many advisers, and departmental officials, prime minister be called in. The of the real challenges of coalition, the ‘last but also the Labour Party and the committee never, to my knowl- both at Holyrood and at West- important interested lobby groups. edge, met. Instead the ‘Quad’ minster, were the need to get our word’, than They each fulfilled, in an exem- emerged. Whilst it undoubtedly backbenchers on board. I do not plary way, the role which falls to a made demands on the PM, DPM, think it was ever recognised just a compro- Spad of keeping relevant colleagues chancellor and chief secretary (and how much interaction there was at mise ham- in the loop, passing on intelligence did not remove the need for bilat- Westminster between minsters (of about who was thinking what, and erals between David Cameron and both parties) and backbenchers to mered out at testing waters with those the minis- Nick Clegg) I believe that it was try and satisfy specific concerns. ter has to deal with, so that ministe- more effective in reaching deci- Both as a minister who had to take a lower min- rial time is well used. sions which were the ‘last word’, some contentious bills through the than a compromise hammered out Lords, and latterly as the leader of isterial level at a lower ministerial level could our Lib Dem group in the Lords, I Concluding reflection have been. Viewed from within was aware of just how much time could have I joined the Scottish Liberal Party government, Quad decisions had a and effort was made by ministers in 1972 after reading Russell John- finality, which everyone, ministers of both coalition parties (including been. ston’s pamphlet, To Be A Liberal,

78 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 comparing coalitions because I readily identified with the What I partic- Welsh Assembly government from of coalition government. That was principles and values which Rus- 2000 to 2003, and at Westminster, my experience in both Scotland and sell so clearly articulated. We did ularly resent was parliamentary under secretary of Westminster. On the Monday fol- not even have eight MPs, and so I state for Wales from 2012 until May lowing the heavy defeat of the AV did not entertain a realistic expec- is a view that 2015. referendum and disastrous results in tation of becoming an MP, let alone 2 Even then, there was still hostility Scotland and local government, com- a minister in a Scottish parliament whilst it is to the very idea of Lib Dems in gov- mentators were predicting stormy (although the ambition of a Scottish ernment; to the extent that my wife relationships between coalition min- parliament within a federal United perfectly stopped buying daily newspapers as isters. My Westminster office was Kingdom undoubtedly motivated acceptable she thought that exposing our chil- next door to that of my ‘opposite me) or a minister in a United King- dren to some of the abusive attacks on number’ in the coalition, the attor- dom government. I count it a privi- for Labour, their father was a form of child abuse! ney general, Dominic Grieve. Hav- lege, almost beyond belief, to have 3 On my final night in office as DFM, ing heard me return to my room, done both. What I particularly Conservative Jack McConnell and I literally Dominic knocked on the door and resent is a view that whilst it is per- resorted to a Thesaurus to find word- said, ‘Come and have a drink, you’ll fectly acceptable for Labour, Con- or even SNP ing acceptable to both parties on the be needing one!’ servative or even SNP politicians to issue of third-party rights of appeal 5 Because special advisers were techni- aspire to government office, there politicians in planning decisions for a White cally assigned to cabinet ministers, is something unseemly about a Lib- Paper which had to go to the printer Elizabeth was appointed as a Spad eral Democrat wishing to do so. If to aspire to the following morning. to the (Conservative) leader of the you are in politics, it must surely be 4 One can never underestimate the House of Lords, albeit she worked for to do something – to put into prac- government importance of personalities and Tom McNally and subsequently me tice your principles; not take them relationships in oiling the wheels as deputy leader of the House. home every night to polish up from office, there the comfort zone of opposition. That is why I believe that we is something were right on both occasions – on acceptable terms – to have unseemly Something about coalitions? Historical gone into coalition government. Undoubtedly there were things about a Lib- reflections on the Liberal Democrat that we could have done better; but experience of government 2010–15 I firmly believe that on both occa- eral Demo- sions we left government with the crat wishing David Dutton country in a better place than when we went into power. to do so. istorians are likely to soil our hands with the responsibili- debate for some time to ties of sharing power. We must be Jim Wallace (Lord Wallace of Tanker- come the origins of the bold enough to deploy the coalition H 1 ness) was MP for Orkney & Shetland Liberal Democrats’ decision to case positively.’ This represented a from 1983 to 2001, and MSP for Ork- enter a coalition government with clear repudiation of the ‘long-haul’ ney from 1999 to 2007. He led the Scot- the Conservatives in 2010 and also, strategy of earlier decades – that tish Liberal Democrats from 1992 to as many would see it, the shared the Liberal dawn would eventu- 2005. Following the first election to the origins of the party’s disastrous ally come without the need to con- Scottish parliament in 1999, he became performance in the general election taminate the party’s ideological deputy first minister and minister of of 2015. One possible starting point purity. By ‘simply pretending to be justice in the newly established Scottish must be the election to the party an alternative government in exile executive. He was later (2003–5) min- leadership of David Steel as long we would continue to fail’.2 Partici- ister for enterprise and lifelong learn- ago as 1976. Though Steel’s own pation in a Conservative–Liberal ing. On three occasions he assumed the natural inclinations were towards Democrat coalition between 2010 role of acting first minister. He stood the political left and a possible rea- and 2015 must be seen as the fulfil- down as Scottish party leader and dep- lignment with Labour, he made it ment of Steel’s strategy. uty first minister in 2005. Lord Wal- a clear objective of his campaign Yet the electoral denouement lace was introduced into the House of to succeed Jeremy Thorpe that the of 2015 can only raise uncomfort- Lords in 2007 and appointed advocate broader issue of coalition must be able questions for Liberal Demo- general for Scotland in the 2010 coali- addressed head on. Interviewed crats about coalitions in general. tion government. In 2013, he was elected by The Guardian within weeks of Granted the rise of the SNP (fifty- leader of the Liberal Democrat peers and becoming leader, Steel insisted six MPs from 4.7 per cent of the appointed deputy leader of the House that Liberals had to ‘start by get- vote) and UKIP (just one MP but of Lords. He was re-elected as Lib ting a toe-hold on power which 12.6 per cent of the vote), 2015 was Dem leader in the Lords after the 2015 must mean some form of coalition’. the first general election in the Lib- election. Then, in a well-received speech to eral Democrat/Liberal Party’s his- the party conference in Septem- tory in which it could not claim 1 I am sometimes told that my expe- ber, Steel stressed that if the Lib- even third place in the electorate’s rience is unique, but, of course, my eral Party wished to move from the preferences. Historians must neces- Lords colleague, Baroness Jenny periphery to the centre of the elec- sarily turn to the past for guidance. Randerson, was minister for culture, toral argument, ‘we must not give Contrary to the popular saying, sport and the Welsh language in the the impression of being afraid to history does not repeat itself; but it

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 79 comparing coalitions does offer informative and reveal- Coalitions Party itself survived the upheaval. decision to go into government; ing parallels and similarities. Indeed, it remained in broad con- the Federal Executive voted 27 to Coalitions and more informal and more trol of the overall direction of the 1 in favour; and only a handful of inter-party arrangements were less government. The real damage to the more than 1,500 delegates at the alien to the norm in the history of informal the party, culminating in the cata- special conference called to con- twentieth-century Britain than is strophic electoral outcome of 1918, sider the coalition deal withheld sometimes supposed. Formal coa- inter-party derived from the later split between their support. Moreover, there was litions existed between 1915 and the supporters of Asquith and those surprisingly little pressure within 1922 and again between 1940 and arrange- of Lloyd George. the party hierarchy to pull out from 1945. On both occasions they rep- Similarly, after the entry of the the coalition over the years that resented a natural response to the ments were party into Churchill’s coalition in followed. demands of war and the need to less alien to May 1940, many Liberals worried A second, and altogether more repress domestic differences in the about their loss of an independent significant, group comprised face of a graver external threat. A the norm in identity, fearing that their leader, those voters who accepted the less broadly based coalition was Archibald Sinclair, had fallen broad proposition of coalition, formed in 1931 and lasted until the history of almost totally under the prime but regarded themselves as ideo- 1940. In addition, more informal minister’s masterful spell. Again, logically closer to Labour than to arrangements sustained a Liberal twentieth- the subsequent general election in the Conservatives. A dilemma of government, which had lost its par- 1945 saw the party badly mauled, choice had been inherent in Lib- liamentary majority, between 1910 century Brit- with just twelve MPs returned eral politics for several decades, and 1915, two minority Labour to parliament. But it is doubtful ever since in fact the party fell into governments in 1924 and between ain than is whether membership of the war- third-party status, but the arith- 1929 and 1931, and a Labour gov- time coalition was the critical fac- metical outcomes of the British ernment which had been reduced to sometimes tor. Quite simply, the Liberal Party electoral system had largely kept minority status in 1977–8. seemed irrelevant to the political it at a theoretical level. Back in At first sight the formal coali- supposed. debate of the time, notwithstand- 1926, Keynes argued that, forced tions might seem to offer the most ing the fact that individual Liberals, to make the choice, Liberals would relevant comparisons with what Formal coali- most notably Keynes and Beve- divide into those who would happened after 2010. In each case ridge, had helped shape that debate. vote Conservative and those who Liberals, in their willingness to tions existed More relevant, then, to the experi- would back Labour.6 Now the share power with other parties, ence of 2010–15 are earlier periods choice had had to be made. Many were responding to a national crisis, between in which Liberals were damaged leading Liberal Democrats shared albeit that of 2010 fell short of Euro- 1915 and 1922 by the decision to sustain minority a preference for Labour. Figures pean war. But in terms of impact governments in power. In this short such as Vince Cable and Paddy on the party, these earlier coali- and again essay, the example of the minority Ashdown missed no opportunity tions provide less exact parallels. Labour administration of 1924 will to stress that they had spent their The actual creation of a coalition in between be used to illustrate the author’s political lives fighting the Tories 1915 and again in 1940 was broadly argument. and that sharing power with them accepted. Indeed, both wars ended 1940 and Broadly speaking, the Liberal did not come easily. But the practi- with a widespread belief that coali- Democrats’ decision to join the cal realities of 2010 – not least that tion had been a successful innova- 1945. coalition in 2010 seems to have a Liberal Democrat–Labour coali- tion in the practice of government. alienated three distinct groups tion would not have commanded It is true that it is easy enough to within the party’s support base. a parliamentary majority – forced find contemporary assessments that The first, and probably the small- them to abandon their preferences Asquith’s acceptance of Conserva- est, consisted of those for whom and work in the national interest. tives into his government would ideological purity remained all- For some Liberal Democrat vot- result in catastrophic consequences important – those, in other words, ers, however, it seems that this was for Liberalism. ‘Among Liberal who had never accepted the strat- a step too far. Their support was intellectuals’, reported the Manches- egy propounded by David Steel lost, at least when it came to the ter Guardian, ‘there is a melancholy and followed in differing ways by 2015 election. Yet this argument feeling, very frankly expressed, his successors, that coalition was a should not be exaggerated. The that this is probably the end of the necessary step in the party’s evolu- logic that such voters would now Liberal party for many years to tion. Such voters believed, how- shift their allegiance to Labour come.’3 John Simon had already ever unrealistically, that the party is only partially sustained by the warned that a coalition would be could eventually prevail under its evidence of what happened. Inner- ‘the grave of Liberalism’.4 Charles own colours, even in a first-past- city seats such as Bermondsey did Hobhouse was now ready to agree. the-post electoral system, and that see significant swings to Labour, ‘Nothing will persuade me’, he the differences between Liberal but in the swathe of lost constitu- wrote, ‘that this is not the end of Democrats and the other main par- encies in the Southwest, the Con- the Liberal party as we have known ties were too profound for coalition servatives were the overwhelming it.’5 But while Asquith may be legit- to be an acceptable option. Among beneficiaries of Liberal defec- imately criticised for shrouding the MPs, party activists and members, tion. Furthermore, preliminary whole process of coalition-making this sort of thinking was almost research suggests that Labour was in an unnecessary veil of secrecy, entirely absent in 2010. All the singularly unsuccessful in attract- leaving many of his followers party’s MPs, except Charles Ken- ing erstwhile Liberal Democrat bewildered and upset, the Liberal nedy who abstained, supported the voters in those key marginals

80 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 comparing coalitions that it needed to win to have any been fought specifically on the the Labour wain over the rough chance of forming a government. issue of protection and had left roads of Parliament for two to three The third element may be the the combined Liberal and Labour years, goaded along, and at the end most important in explaining parties holding a clear ‘free-trade of the journey, when there is no the disaster that befell the party majority’. Asquith believed that further use for them, they are to be in 2015. Ever since the beginning Labour, as the larger of these two slaughtered. That is the Labour idea of the Liberal revival in the mid- parties, now had the right to form of cooperation.’9 In fact, Ramsay 1950s, the party has drawn heavily a government. He argued that, if MacDonald’s long-term strategy of upon the support of floating and a Labour government was ever to Ramsay Mac- seeking to destroy Liberalism as a protest voters. Such citizens tend be tried, ‘it could hardly be tried necessary precondition of his own either to be inherently antagonis- under safer conditions’. Yet, like Donald’s party’s further advance was as ruth- tic to the parties of government, Nick Clegg in the early days of the less, and in purely party terms as thereby giving rise to the ‘none 2010 coalition, Asquith overesti- long-term justified, as the Conservatives’ deci- of the above’ vote, or incurably mated the strength of his party’s strategy of sion in the 2015 general election to fickle in their allegiance, with- position. ‘It is we,’ he insisted, ‘if target Liberal Democrat seats as the drawing their support when their we really understand our business, seeking to most promising route to winning (usually unrealistic) expecta- who control the situation.’8 Clegg, a Commons majority. Many Lib- tions of government performance however, at least had the advantage destroy Lib- eral Democrats felt that Clegg had remain unfulfilled. Liberal Dem- of a formal coalition agreement. As been as naïve as Asquith before him ocrat partisans have sometimes Labour took office at the beginning eralism as in seemingly embracing the coali- been reluctant to acknowledge of 1924, no vestige of an agreement tion with enthusiasm rather than the importance of such voters in existed with the Liberals on the a necessary as a slightly distasteful necessity. their party’s success. The belief in content of the new government’s The bonhomie of the rose garden a solid phalanx of committed ‘Lib- programme. In particular, no effort precondition press conference on 12 May jarred eral opinion’ is obviously more had been made to secure a promise with many. Figures such as Vince gratifying. Yet the evidence for of electoral reform, which percep- of his own Cable sought, by contrast, to main- their importance is strong. It has tive Liberals already recognised as tain a certain distance from their been shown that, over the general pivotal to their chances of revival party’s fur- new Tory colleagues. But Clegg elections between 1959 and 1979, in British electoral politics. In 2010 seems to have felt the need to dispel less than 50 per cent of those who Clegg at least won a commitment ther advance the prevailing sentiment, not least voted Liberal at one election con- that the coalition government in the world’s markets, that hung firmed this preference at the next. would hold a referendum on the was as ruth- parliaments were bound to lead The corresponding figures for Alternative Vote. But AV proved to weak, divided and ineffectual both Labour and the Conserva- a difficult proposition to sell to the less, and in governments. tives were around 75 per cent. electorate, lacking the compelling, purely party Also instructive are the reac- Even more revealingly, just 2 per if somewhat questionable, simplic- tions of prominent Conservatives cent of the electorate gave the Lib- ity of earlier campaigns in which terms as jus- to the Liberal–Labour alignment erals consistent support in each of Liberals had equated PR with ‘fair which installed Labour in office. the four general elections of the votes’. tified, as the Austen Chamberlain, former party 1970s.7 Similarly, a striking fea- Yet the Liberal position in 1924 leader and future foreign secretary, ture of the years of Liberal revival was almost as constrained as that Conserva- offered the most eloquent commen- was the party’s ability to secure which Clegg and his party accepted tary. Speaking on 21 January 1924 record swings in by-elections, usu- nearly a century later in a five-year, tives’ deci- in the no-confidence debate which ally at the expense of the incum- fixed-term parliament, with an formally brought down Baldwin’s bent government, performances agreed policy programme which sion in the government, Chamberlain warned which the party found it difficult involved the abandonment of key that Asquith had: to replicate at subsequent general manifesto pledges, including that 2015 general elections. None of this suggests on university tuition fees. Asquith’s taken his choice and he has by a strong and reliable core Liberal Liberals were not in a position to election to that choice constituted his own vote. But, by entering government assess the individual policies of the immortality. He will go down in 2010, the Liberal Democrats Labour government on their mer- target Lib- to history as the last Prime Min- largely forfeited their claims to the its. Only the positive support of ister of a Liberal administration. electorate’s anti-establishment and the Parliamentary Liberal Party eral Demo- He has sung the swan-song of protest votes. It was their misfor- could ensure Labour’s survival. the Liberal Party. When next tune in 2015 that UKIP and, north Even abstention would involve crat seats the country is called upon for of the border, the SNP were well the government’s defeat and pos- as the most a decision, if it wants a Social- placed to fill the resulting void. sibly another general election ist Government it will vote for After the general election of which the Liberals, for financial promis- a Socialist; if it does not want 1923, as after that of 2010, the Lib- reasons, were keen to avoid. As the a Socialist Government it will eral Party made a conscious deci- period of Labour government pro- ing route to vote for a Unionist. It will not sion to install a minority party in ceeded, Liberals seemed surprised vote again for those who dena- office. In 1923 Labour was not even that Labour insisted on behaving winning a tured its mandate and betrayed the largest party, but their Con- in a partisan manner, showing lit- its trust.10 servative opponents (like Labour tle gratitude for Liberal support. In Commons in 2010) had indubitably lost the Lloyd George’s memorable words, The situation in 2010 was signifi- general election. That of 1923 had ‘Liberals are to be the oxen to drag majority. cantly different, but Chamberlain

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 81 comparing coalitions at least understood that, by com- ‘arrangement’ as to turn in large 1 D. Steel, A House Divided: The Lib– ing down on one side of the funda- numbers to the Conservatives? Lab Pact and the Future of British Politics mental political divide, the Liberals The party’s poll rating was poor (London, 1980), p. 25. were likely to lose a section of their from the first year of the coalition 2 Ibid., p. 16. electoral support. Indeed, writ- onwards. Observers expected the 3 Manchester Guardian, 20 May 1915. ing to Samuel Hoare a week later, actual outcome in 2015 to be some- 4 C. Addison, Four and a Half Years, vol. he suggested that two-thirds of what better than opinion polls sug- 1 (London, 1934), p. 35. the Liberal Party was now Labour gested; in fact it was worse. Liberal 5 University of Newcastle, Runciman in all but name and that the Con- Democrats argued that loyalty to MSS 136, Hobhouse to Runciman 28 servatives should strive to absorb well-regarded sitting MPs would May 1915. the remainder.11 The evidence outweigh national trends; it didn’t. 6 S. Lee and M. Beech (eds.), The Cam- from the general election of 1924, The party held on to Chris Huh- eron–Clegg Government (Basingstoke, with three-quarters of Liberal MPs ne’s old seat of Eastleigh in the by- 2011), p. 5. going down to defeat, is compli- election of February 2013, when 7 J. Curtice in V. Bogdanor (ed.), Lib- cated by a significant reduction in anger at the ‘betrayal’ over tui- eral Party Politics (Oxford, 1983), p. the number of the party’s candi- tion fees was still relatively fresh in 102. dates, but does point to a marked the electorate’s mind, but lost it by 8 C. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal drop in its underlying electoral over 9,000 votes just over two years Party: The Road back to Power (Basing- support. later. The debate over this latest stoke, 2010), pp. 94–5. Rather than explaining what strange death of Liberal England 9 J. Campbell, Lloyd George: The Goat happened between 2010 and 2015, (and Wales and Scotland) may well in the Wilderness 1922–1931 (London, history can do no more than offer run and run. 1977), pp. 94–5. interesting lines of enquiry and 10 D. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gen- discussion. Important questions David Dutton is currently researching tleman in Politics (Bolton, 1985), p. 215. remain to be answered. Were the career of Percy Molteno, Liberal MP 11 University of Birmingham, Cham- Liberal Democrat voters, as has for Dumfriesshire, 1906–18. His vote in berlain MSS, AC25/4/19, Chamber- been suggested, so frightened by the recent general election failed to halt lain to Hoare 28 January 1924. the prospect of a Labour–SNP the SNP landslide in Scotland. Important notice for Journal of Liberal History subscribers Discounted prices for books and booklets Subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History enjoy discounted prices (usually a 20 per cent reduction) for the books and booklets published by the Liberal Democrat History Group.

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82 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015