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Home , Anatolian Tigers, Aras (river), Ardahan, Birecik, Black Sea Region, Bozova

UTE STIT FOR IN N Number 27 — August 2015 N EA O R T G E A N I S

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Y H RESEARCH NOTES

T Ideas. Action. Impact.

3 0 ng years stro THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Turkey’s Political Uncertainty IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUNE 2015 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

SONER CAGAPTAY with Caitlin Stull and Mark Bhaskar

Introduction tudying the June 7 election results is useful, S as it reveals interesting trends in ’s On June 7, 2015, Turkey’s governing Justice and electoral behavior especially as Turkey prepares Development Party (AKP) lost its thirteen-year for potential early elections later this year. This parliamentary majority in general elections, drop- paper evaluates the results through the micro lens ping 9.4 percentage points compared to the 2011 of the provincial results, offering insight into the elections. This was the first time since the AKP’s wide-ranging variables that significantly affected ascension to power in 2002 that support for the voter behavior. It maps the shifts of support bases party decreased. Although the AKP had the high- for the country’s main parties—AKP, CHP, MHP, est number of total electoral votes, the party actu- and HDP—in order to determine where sup- ally lost 69 parliamentary seats. port was higher or lower than the national aver- Meanwhile, Turkey’s Kurdish population earned age. After defining the eight electoral regions its biggest voice ever in national politics, as the HDP, that constitute Turkey’s electoral landscape, the which absorbed its sister Peace and Democracy paper analyzes where the largest shifts in electoral Party (BDP) in 2014, received 13.0% of overall votes. support occurred and the sustainability of these This surpassed the 10% required changes in voter behavior. The study also pres- for parliamentary representation and translates into ents the elections’ potential short- and long-term 80 parliamentary seats, tying the HDP and MHP implications for the AKP and President Erdogan; as Turkey’s third largest political group. Turkish domestic politics, including the ; and Turkish foreign policy, including and Table 1. 2015: Published National Tallies

the United States. NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL For the purposes of this study, the authors chose VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE to use the provincial totals listed in Table 2 rather AKP 18,864,864 40.9% 258 46.9% than published national totals displayed in Table 1.1 CHP 11,518,070 25.0% 132 24.0% All analysis in this paper reflects the figures listed MHP 7,519,168 16.3% 80 14.5% in Tables 2 and 3. HDP 6,057,507 13.1% 80 14.5%

OTHER 2,200,030 4.8% 0 0.0% 1. All tables reflect official election results as published by Haber- TOTAL 46,159,639 turk, http://www.haberturk.com/secim/secim2015/genel-secim.

© 2015 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Soner Cagaptay

The rise of the HDP as a new player in parliamen- eral voters could flee the party. If the HDP fails to tary politics has created a complex political landscape, reach the threshold, the AKP would pick up its seats requiring the formation of a coalition or minority as the second most powerful party in the Kurdish government. Previous legislatures since 2002 had had provinces, endowing Erdogan’s party once again with as few as two or three parties in them, affording the a legislative majority. AKP enough seats to a form a government on its own. Several factors played a role in these surprising elec- June Results toral shifts, primarily growing dissatisfaction with the AKP, particularly the leadership style of Recep Tayyip Compared to the 2011 elections, decrease in vote Erdogan, former prime minister and AKP leader, who share and parliamentary seats were the highest for was elected president in August 2014. Conservative the AKP. The CHP’s national average decreased by .8 Kurds, upset by ’s failure to help the Syrian points and the party lost 3 seats. The MHP’s national Kurdish town of Kobani when it came under Islamic average increased by 3.5 points in 2015 and the party State attack in October 2014, seem to have abandoned picked up 27 additional seats. The largest gains were the AKP for the HDP. The HDP also benefited from for the HDP, whose support increased nearly twofold a migration of CHP voters as well as first time vot- with 55 additional deputies. ers, some of them attracted by the HDP’s liberal mes- sage, and some of them secularists who seem to have Due to the rise of the HDP, conservative Kurdish voted tactically to help the HDP cross the 10% thresh- voters defected from the AKP, creating the greatest old. Furthermore, nationalist Turkish voters upset with AKP losses in Turkey’s southeast and largely remov- Erdogan’s efforts in the Kurdish Peace Process and ing the AKP’s presence in the Kurdish-dominated negotiations with the Workers Party (PKK) region. The AKP and MHP’s ideological proximity seem to have defected from the AKP to the MHP. and similarly conservative rhetoric allowed the MHP Upset by the election outcome, President Erdogan to gain where the AKP lost. Both parties share a simi- has been pushing behind the scenes for early elections. lar rural, conservative, and nationalist voter base, with Some analysts suggest that Ankara’s recent campaign AKP supporters prioritizing Islamic values and MHP against the PKK is intended to weaken the HDP in supporters prioritizing the Turkish identity. Histori- case of early polls. The HDP is the political arm of the cally, right-wing voters have shifted their allegiance Kurdish movement in Turkey, though both a product between the two parties rather than shifting to Tur- of and subservient to the PKK. The Turkish president key’s political left. is counting on the HDP being unable to renounce PKK violence, a stance he hopes could cost the HDP Voter turnout was 86.6%, the highest since the the electoral threshold in early elections, since its lib- AKP’s ascension to power, increasing 4.1% from 2011.

Table 2. Summary 2015/2011: Published Provincial Data

2015 2011

NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE

AKP 18,135,262 40.4% 258 46.9% 21,399,281 49.8 327 59.5%

CHP 11,338,730 25.2% 132 24.0% 11,154,972 26.0 135 24.5%

MHP 7,423,011 16.5% 80 14.5% 5,585,513 13.0 53 9.6%

HDP 5,846,255 13.0% 80 14.5% 2,709,029 6.3 35 6.4%

OTHER 2,187,482 4.9% 0 0.0% 2,092,978 4.9 0 0.0%

TOTAL 44,930,740 42,941,773

2 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Table 3. Regional Analysis 2015/2011 2015 ELECTION 2011 ELECTION 44,930,740 TOTAL VOTES 42,941,773 TOTAL VOTES REGIONAL % NATIONAL % REGIONAL PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL % REGIONAL % NATIONAL % REGIONAL PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL % REGIONAL VOTES VOTE VOTE SUPPORT (%) SEATS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURE VOTE VOTE SUPPORT (%) SEATS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURE Metropolitan 14,439,571 32.1% 151 27.5% 31.9% 147 26.7% Turkey AKP 6,023,221 41.7% 39–46 70 46.4% 50.0% 47–52 82 55.8%

CHP 4,169,558 28.9% 24–29 48 31.8% 30.1% 24–32 48 32.7%

MHP 1,993,566 13.8% 11–19 20 13.2% 11.3% 9–14 14 9.5%

HDP 1,383,870 9.6% 5–12 13 8.6% 3.5% 0–5 3 2.0%

OTHER 869,356 6.0% NA 0 0.0% 5.1% NA 0 0.0%

Coastal Turkey 6,175,859 13.7% 66 12.0% 13.7% 66 12.0%

AKP 1,778,468 28.8% 23–37 21 31.8% 37.1% 27–47 29 43.9%

CHP 2,725,990 44.1% 39–53 33 50.0% 42.7% 37–52 31 47.0%

MHP 984,802 15.9% 13–21 10 15.2% 13.1% 6–18 6 9.1%

HDP 436,392 7.1% 1–10 2 3.0% 2.7% 0–4 0 0.0%

OTHER 250,207 4.1% NA 0 0.0% 4.4% NA 0 0.0%

Middle Turkey 4,343,752 9.7% 55 10.0% 9.9% 56 10.2%

AKP 1,772,631 40.8% 36–48 25 45.5% 49.1% 42–57 33 58.9%

CHP 1,248,848 28.8% 17–35 17 30.9% 28.0% 14–35 16 28.6%

MHP 1,000,416 23.0% 16–32 13 23.6% 16.9% 8–27 7 12.5%

HDP 146,551 3.4% 0–6 0 0.0% 0.6% 0–2 0 0.0%

OTHER 175,306 4.0% NA 0 0.0% 5.4% NA 0 0.0% -Aras 3,211,590 7.1% 52 9.5% 7.2% 53 9.6% Valleys AKP 1,578,727 49.2% 10–58 31 59.6% 62.5% 15–69 40 75.5%

CHP 305,629 9.5% 1–25 3 5.8% 12.6% 1–57 7 13.2%

MHP 413,014 12.9% 2–27 3 5.8% 9.1% 1–34 2 3.8%

HDP 751,768 23.4% 1–60 15 28.8% 11.4% 0–31 4 7.5%

OTHER 162,452 5.1% NA 0 0.0% 4.4% NA 0 0.0%

Heartland 4,521,707 10.1% 61 11.1% 10.3% 61 11.1%

AKP 2,629,082 58.1% 50–65 43 70.5% 65.9% 57–69 50 82.0%

CHP 500,111 11.1% 2–16 3 4.9% 12.1% 3–18 4 6.6%

MHP 1,065,052 23.6% 16–32 15 24.6% 16.3% 13–24 7 11.5%

HDP 120,779 2.7% 0–5 0 0.0% 0.0% 0–0 0 0.0%

OTHER 206,683 4.6% NA 0 0.0% 5.7% NA 0 0.0%

Black Sea 3,744,553 8.3% 49 8.9% 8.7% 50 90.9%

AKP 2,056,339 54.9% 51–66 33 67.3% 60.8% 55–68 37 74.0%

CHP 784,440 20.9% 15–28 10 20.4% 20.2% 12–24 9 18.0%

MHP 660,525 17.6% 8–21 6 12.2% 13.1% 7–16 4 8.0%

HDP 54,032 1.4% 0–2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0–0 0 0.0%

OTHER 189,217 5.1% NA 0 0.0% 5.9% NA 0 0.0% Kurdish 2,275,804 5.1% 49 8.9% 6.0% 50 9.1% Dominated AKP 279,668 12.3% 8–30 7 14.3% 36.2% 16–48 25 50.0%

CHP 23,579 1.0% 0–1 0 0.0% 3.2% 0–4 0 0.0%

MHP 41,743 1.8% 1–3 0 0.0% 1.7% 0–4 0 0.0%

HDP 1,824,551 80.2% 60–85 42 85.7% 55.5% 40–79 25 50.0%

OTHER 106,263 4.7% NA 0 0.0% 3.5% NA 0 0.0% Mediterranean 6,217,904 13.8% 67 12.2% 12.3% 67 12.2% Turkey AKP 2,017,126 32.4% 29–49 27 40.3% 42.3% 32–61 34 50.7%

CHP 1,580,575 25.4% 7–36 18 26.9% 29.8% 11–38 19 28.4%

MHP 1,263,893 20.3% 14–41 15 22.4% 19.2% 9–41 12 17.9%

HDP 1,128,312 18.1% 3–17 7 10.4% 4.9% 0–9 2 3.0%

OTHER 227,998 3.7% NA 0 0.0% 3.9% NA 0 0.0% Soner Cagaptay

ROMANIA

TURKISH ELECTORAL REGIONS 2015

BULGARIA

Black Sea Kirklareli Bartin Sinop E Tekirdag Istanbul C uk E E R Sea of Kocaeli Karab Duzce G Sakarya Cankiri Corum Gumushane Canakkale Igdir Balikesir Eskisehir Ankara Agri Kirikkale Kutahya Kirsehir Bingol Mus Tuz Van Usak Golu Elazig Golu Van Izmir Nevsehir Diyarbakir Aydin Nigde Adiyaman Batman Hakkari Sirnak Mugla Kahramanmaras G Sanliurfa R E E C E Gulf of Antalya Regions and Number of Provinces Hatay Heartland: 13 Black Sea: 10 Coastal Turkey: 9 Euphrates-Aras Valleys: 12 SYRIA Kurdish Dominated: 10 Mediterranean Turkey: 7 Metropolitan Turkey: 5

N Middle Turkey: 15 O N 81 Provinces 200 A 0 B E IRAQ miles L

ISRAEL JORDAN

Turkey’s Electoral Geography This region, comprising the megalithic Istanbul Although Turkey is divided into 81 provinces that are conurbation and Ankara, has the largest elector- usually named after the largest city and administra- ate. It includes Turkey’s key metropolitan areas, tive center, it does not have official electoral regions. including its largest city, Istanbul; second larg- In order to understand the dynamic shift in electoral est city, Ankara, and fourth largest city, Bursa; as behaviors, the authors defined eight electoral regions: well as Kocaeli, the country’s most industrialized Metropolitan Turkey, Coastal Turkey, Middle Turkey, province, and the nearby smaller , Heartland, Black Sea, Mediterranean Turkey, Kurd- both sandwiched between Istanbul and Bursa. ish-Dominated, and Euphrates-Aras Valleys. Although the AKP performed best in the region, it Metropolitan Turkey suffered the greatest loss of support, 8.3%, compared to 2011. The CHP performed above its national aver-

5 provinces: Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, Kocaeli, and age, tallying 4–5 percentage points higher in Ankara, Yalova Istanbul, and Yalova.

4 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty

Both the MHP and HDP vastly increased their next to Metropolitan Turkey, for much of Turkey’s presence in Metropolitan Turkey, a departure from international trade, tourism, and service industries, as 2011. Conservative migrants from the Heartland well as export-oriented farming. These two regions and Black Sea regions as well as AKP defectors have have been the recipients of much immigration in helped the MHP establish a much stronger presence recent years due to the variety of economic prospects. in the region. This is Turkey’s secular stronghold and responsible Traditionally, regional support for the MHP var- for most of the CHP’s electoral support, performing ies among provinces, particularly in the instances of 18.9% above its national average with 44.1% of the Ankara and Istanbul; whereas in Istanbul, the MHP vote, an increase of 1.5 percentage points from 2011. performs under its national average due its large Despite performing second-highest and 3.7% middle class, and in Ankara, above its national aver- above its national average, AKP support dropped by age due to its majority conservative central Anatolian 8.3 points from 2011. Its loss in the region was mir- and nationalist demographic. While regional HDP rored by increased support for the MHP, which is support remains low, it exceeds that of the MHP in now a close third party in the province. MHP sup- Istanbul, where the HDP received 12.4% of the vote port is up by 2.9 points since the 2011 election, while to the MHP’s 11.1%. the HDP, still a distant fourth, nevertheless saw a 4.4 At least some of the uptick in HDP support seems point gain in support, compared to 2011, when the to have come from CHP losses, which occurred in all party ran as the BDP. of Metropolitan Turkey, save for Bursa. The Metro- The HDP successfully gained a foothold in Izmir, politan region remains contested between the winner, where it pulled one parliamentary seat from the AKP AKP, and close runner-up, CHP. and another from the CHP, earning 10.3% of the Izmir vote. Eskisehir, a geographic outlier, experi- Coastal Turkey enced an 8.2% decrease in AKP support and a 3.8%

increase in CHP support, which made the CHP the 9 provinces: Aydin, Canakkale, Edirne, Eskisehir, dominant party in Eskisehir with 39.3% of the vote. Izmir, Kirklareli, Mugla, Tekirdag, and Zonguldak Middle Turkey This region includes Izmir, Turkey’s third larg- est city, urban areas along Turkey’s Aegean coast 15 provinces: Amasya, Artvin, Balikesir, Bar- and immediate interior, as well as the provinces in tin, Bilecik, Burdur, Denizli, Isparta, Karabuk, European Turkey (Thrace). In addition, Eskisehir, Kastamonu, Kirsehir, Manisa, Nigde, Sinop, and a liberal university town in Central Turkey, and Usak Zonguldak, a Black Sea coastal province known

for its strong working class and mining traditions, Middle Turkey is Turkey’s economic and social are included. median. The provinces in the region are economi- cally diverse, yet united in their electoral trends Many Coastal Turkish provinces have sizable popu- and ethnic composition. Provinces such as Bilecik, lations of Balkan immigrants, descendants of Turks Manisa, Usak, Isparta, and Burdur in the west and other expelled from the Balkan Penin- have growing industrial economies. Middle Tur- sula, intermixed with the local ethnic Turkish com- key’s provinces along the Black Sea coast have munity. In some cases, such as Kirklareli, Canakkale, mixed agricultural and industrial economies. Tekirdag, and Edirne provinces, the Balkan immi- Kirsehir, Nigde, and Artvin have underdeveloped, grants constitute a plurality and even majority of the predominantly agrarian economies, performing population, endowing the region with a liberal and similarly to the Heartland region. Overall, Mid- open brand of Islam. The economy in this region is dle Turkey is more prosperous than the Heartland among Turkey’s most advanced and is responsible, and Black Sea regions, but less so than Coastal

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5 Soner Cagaptay

or Metropolitan Turkey. All of the provinces have within the respective Kurmanchi and Zaza popula- a Sunni Turkish majority, though Artvin has an tions. The Turks are divided into Sunni and Alevi Azeri community that supports the MHP and communities, while the Azeris in Kars, Igdir, and a Georgian community that supports the CHP. Ardahan are Shiite. The Arabs in are Sunni. Kirsehir has a sizable Kurdish community. And in Broadly speaking, Sunni Turks in this region the inner Aegean provinces, Balkan immigrants vote for nationalist, Islamist, and conservative par- mix with Sunni Turks. ties, namely the AKP and MHP, while Alevi Turks have supported secular political movements, namely This region is a three-way between the AKP, CHP, the CHP. Traditionally speaking, Sunni in this and MHP, with a minimal HDP presence. Three-way region vote for the AKP and Alevi Zazas for the CHP. races were the strongest in Middle Turkey’s west- In 2015, the majority of the Alevi Zazas voted for the ernmost provinces—Balikesir, Bilecik, Manisa, and HDP, a first for that party, as did an overwhelming Usak—with the AKP receiving 36–38% of the vote majority of the Sunni Zazas. Traditionally speaking, share, CHP receiving 28–34%, and MHP 20–27%. Alevi Kurds here have voted for the secular CHP, but HDP support increased in all four provinces but in 2015, at least some of them moved from that party remained minimal with 1–6% of vote share. to throw their lot behind the HDP, joining the Sunni Overall the AKP is the dominant party, retaining Kurds. Smaller populations of Azeris, particularly 36–48% of the vote in each province, though perform- in the Aras River belt, support the MHP, while the ing below the national average in Burdur. Although Arabs in Urfa vote for the AKP. the AKP is often the strongest party, the combination In the provinces of Adiyaman, Ardahan, Erzincan, of CHP and MHP votes is greater than the number Igdir, Kars, Malatya, and Sivas, Sunni Turks and Kurds of AKP votes, and AKP support is overall declining. mix with Alevi Turks and Kurds. In each of these The CHP performed at 3.6% above the party’s provinces, with the exception of Ardahan, Igdir, and national average, with minimal gains compared to Kars along the Aras Valley, the AKP is the dominant 2011. Support for the MHP is strongly increasing, as party due to the conservative Sunni Turkish majority, overall the party performed 6.5% above its national earning between 52% and 58.6% of the vote. However, average. HDP support is among the lowest, less than in Ardahan and Kars, Sunni and Alevi Kurds are more a quarter of its national average. numerous, and in Igdir Sunni Kurds are the majority, rendering the HDP the dominant party with 30.4%, Euphrates-Aras Valleys 44%, and 56.7%, respectively. In addition, the CHP 12 provinces: Adiyaman, Ardahan, Bingol, Elazig, and MHP presence in these provinces is attributed Erzincan, Erzurum, Igdir, Kars, Malatya, Sanliurfa, to Alevi Turks strongly supporting the CHP, and the Sivas, and Tunceli Azeris, along with a nationalist minority of the Sunni Turkish population, backing the MHP. This is Turkey’s most diverse and complicated elec- Voting in Sanliurfa amounts to a competition toral region, a mostly rural area with some indus- between Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurmanchi- and trial base wherein votes are cast along ethnic lines Zaza-speaking Kurds. Arabs increasingly support the in numerous permutations. The region itself spans conservative policies of the AKP, as well as its Syria the Euphrates and Aras River belts from Sanliurfa policy, while the Kurds in the province have been in the south to Ardahan in the north, and includes shifting their support from the AKP to the HDP in Kurdish, Turkish, Azeri, Arab, Sunni, Alevi, and reaction to the AKP’s failure to help Kobani when Shiite populations. that town came under attack by the Islamic State. This The Kurds are linguistically divided into Kurmanchi response also included shifting Sunni Zaza Kurdish and Zaza-speaking communities, and then divided support from the AKP to the HDP. The AKP lost again religiously as Sunni and Alevi communities support in all thirteen of Sanliurfa’s districts, and the

6 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty

following six districts flipped from being AKP domi- rising industrial component in provinces such as nated to HDP dominated: , , Ceylan- Konya, Kutahya, Karaman, Kirikkale, Kahraman- pinar, , , and Viransehir. On June 7, the maras, and Kayseri. Konya is Turkey’s largest con- AKP earned 46.7% and the HDP 38.5% of the vote in servative city and is among the “,” Sanliurfa. This breakdown almost mirrors the Arab- or cities in that have experienced a great Kurd (Zaza and Kurmanchi) ratio in this province. deal of industrialization. The Heartland has a solid Bingol and Tunceli are where Sunni and Alevi Sunni Turkish majority interspersed with commu- Zazas mix, with Alevis a solid majority in the first nities of Alevi Turks. province and Sunnis in the latter. In Tunceli and Since 2011, the Heartland has changed from being Bingol, Alevi Zazas had traditionally supported the an AKP stronghold to being shared by both the AKP CHP due to its secular policies. However, the shift and MHP. In the Heartland, Turkey’s political left is in support of the Alevi Zazas from the CHP to the almost nonexistent, with the combined vote of the HDP led to the CHP’s defeat in the province; the AKP and the MHP at or above 80%, making this the HDP took 60.9% of the vote in Tunceli compared most conservative region. While the Heartland has to 22.2% in 2011. In Bingol, Sunni Zazas mostly not yet become a two-way split between the AKP and remained faithful to the AKP, allowing the party to MHP, the MHP’s large gains in this region indicate garner 46.9% of the vote in comparison to the HDP’s AKP vulnerability and the possibility for future two- 41%. Notably, the AKP still has some support among party competition. the Sunni Zazas in Bingol, allowing the party to win that province. Most notably, combined AKP-MHP votes topped The Euphrates-Aras Valley’s most conservative 88% in the Bayburt, Aksaray, Gumushane, and Can- provinces, Elazig and Erzurum, are mainly com- kiri provinces, respectively, and within Bayburt, the prised of Sunni Turks and Alevi Kurds. However, the aggregate AKP-MHP vote reached 92.3%. Within former are much more numerous in these provinces. the four provinces, several districts reached a 90% The AKP earned 52.9% and 52% and the MHP combined AKP-MHP vote, including Cankiri’s dis- garnered 20.9% and 23.5% in Elazig and Erzurum, trict Kizilirmak, , and Yaprakli; Bayburt’s central respectively. The Alevi Kurdish population supported district; Aksaray’s district Sariyahsi; and Gumushane’s the HDP, helping them become the third player in districts , Kose, Kurtun, and Siran. Moreover, in these provinces. The Euphrates-Aras Valley Region the provinces of Aksaray, Kahramanmaras, Kayseri, is increasingly becoming a battleground between the Kirikkale, Kutahya, Nevsehir, and Yozgat, the AKP AKP and HDP, given the ethnic and religious mix of lost 7.7–12.5 percentage points and the MHP gained its provinces and the additional impact of the Syrian 6.7–2.3 points. war in Urfa. In the provinces of Aksaray, Gumushane, Kayseri, Kirikkale, and Nevsehir, the MHP’s gains were enough Heartland to draw away six MP positions from the AKP. Indeed, AKP losses were nearly equal (within 1%) to MHP 13 provinces: Afyonkarahisar, Aksaray, Bayburt, gains in Afyonkarahisar, Cankiri, Gumushane, Kahra- Cankiri, Gumushane, Kahramanmaras, Kara- manmaras, Konya, and Kutahya. man, Kayseri, Kirikkale, Konya, Kutahya, Nevsehir, Overall the CHP remains weak, receiving less and Yozgat than 15% of the vote in all of the Heartland prov- Comprising most of the provinces in Turkey’s inces save for Afyonkarahisar, Karaman, and Kirik- rural, conservative, and right-wing nationalist kale. Notably, in the Kose district of Gumushane, interior, the Heartland region is Turkey’s politi- the CHP only garnered 0.7% of the vote. The HDP, cally and culturally conservative core. The econ- however, is nearly absent, apart from Kahraman- omy is overwhelmingly agrarian, though with a maras and Konya, the first home of a small native

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 7 Soner Cagaptay

Kurdish community and the second home of Kurds nically, these provinces are dominated by nationalist settled in this province during the . Turks, and as an electoral region, the can be defined by the near absence of the HDP. Black Sea Kurdish-Dominated 10 provinces: Bolu, Corum, Duzce, Gire- sun, Ordu, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Tokat, 10 provinces: Agri, Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, and Trabzon Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, and Van

Comprising two main areas, provinces along the The Kurdish-Dominated region spans the pre- Central-Eastern Black Sea and those in the Sakarya dominantly Kurmanchi-speaking Kurdish areas River Valley, this electoral region is Turkey’s rural, of southeastern and eastern Turkey. It includes conservative north. The economy is primarily a mix Turkey’s most underdeveloped economy and has of industry, agriculture, and fishing, as in Trabzon, the lowest level of infrastructure and industrial although the provinces in the Val- development. The economy is overwhelmingly ley—Sakarya, Duzce, and Bolu—are more indus- agrarian, although there are some large cities in trialized. The region has a Sunni Turkish majority, this region, such as Diyarbakir with nearly one with large Alevi communities on the central Black million inhabitants. The region comprises mostly Sea coast, Circassian, Abkhaz, and Georgian com- Sunni Kurds, some Turks, an Arab minority in munities in the Sakarya River Valley and Central Mardin and Siirt, and smaller Christian commu- Black Sea provinces, as well as Laz and Georgian nities in the provinces along the Turkish-Syrian communities in the Eastern Black Sea littoral. The border, such as Mardin. Black Sea region is more developed than the Kurd- The Kurdish-Dominated region has largely become a ish-Dominated region, yet overall poorer and less single-party region in 2015 due to the large defection industrialized than Middle Turkey. of conservative Sunni Kurds from the AKP to the In terms of voter behavior, the conservative-leaning HDP. For example, in 2011 the AKP garnered 48% Black Sea region appears similar to the similarly con- of the vote in Siirt and 50.7% in Bitlis, while Kurd- servative Heartland. However, the relatively stronger ish independents won 42.5% and 40.2% of the vote, presence of left-wing nationalism in this region, hence respectively. In 2015, AKP support in Siirt and Bit- support for the CHP, renders the provinces in this lis dropped to 28.2% and 30.9%, while HDP support region distinct, as does the of very strong AKP in the same provinces increased to 65.8% and 60.4%, support: the Black Sea region is the AKP’s strongest respectively. base among all electoral regions. However, the prov- Districts such as Sirvan in Siirt and Guroymak in inces of the Black Sea region are clustered differently traditionally pro-AKP and conservative Bitlis expe- than those of Middle Turkey because AKP support is rienced comparable shifts. The AKP vote in 2011 in greater than combined CHP and MHP support. Sirvan and Guroymak was 75.1% and 55.9%, while Because the Black Sea region is conservative- Kurdish independents in the same districts earned nationalist (left- and right-wing), the provinces 16.7% and 38.3%. In 2015, AKP support dropped to are AKP bastions with support far above the party’s 45.4% in Sirvan and 26.3% in Guroymak. The HDP national average, although the AKP experienced a 5.9 numbers increased to 48.1% and 69.5% in Sirvan and point decrease from 2011. The CHP, coming in second, Guroymak, respectively. Overall, the greatest losses increased slightly from 20.2% in 2011 to 20.9% in 2015 suffered by the AKP were in this region. The CHP and support for the MHP increased from 13.1% in and MHP have nearly no presence in the Kurdish- 2011 to 17.6% in 2015. Unlike other regions, the HDP Dominated region, each garnering less than 2% of presence in the Black Sea region remains minor. Eth- the vote.

8 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty

Mediterranean Turkey Party, and other centrist movements. The AKP has 7 provinces: Adana, Antalya, Gaziantep, Hatay, been the majority party in Turkey since 2002, before Kilis, Mersin, and Osmaniye losing majority control in the current election cycle. By combining Turkey’s rural, nationalist core with Mediterranean Turkey includes all the provinces pro-business elements, the AKP enjoyed 13 years of that border Turkey’s southern coast in addition to single-party rule on a foundation of Islamic values the immediate interior Taurus/Amanos Mountain and comprehensive economic reform, contributing provinces of Osmaniye, Kilis, and Gaziantep. This to the rise of the first majority middle class in Tur- region has a diverse economy and ethnic compo- key. During this election cycle, the AKP prioritized sition. Provinces like Antalya and Mersin have the creation of a new constitution for Turkey rooted prosperous tourism and export-oriented agricul- in a more executive-style presidency and continuing ture, trade, and shipping industries, while Kilis and the Kurdish Peace Process, though Erdogan’s ambi- Hatay remain largely underdeveloped and agrarian. tions to change Turkey’s parliamentary democracy One defining factor is that they all have sizable into a presidential system with himself at the helm communities of , i.e. Turks who have a overshadowed these overtures. vivid memory of their tribal past similar to high- land Scots. Another characteristic is that these Regional Support provinces are home to sizable communities of recent Kurdish immigrants from southeastern and The AKP lost support in every electoral region, drop- eastern Turkey. Going east, Gaziantep and Hatay ping from 49.8% in 2011 to 40.4% in 2015. The party’s also have autochthonous Kurdish communities. largest losses were in the Kurdish-Dominated region, while losses were minimal in the Black Sea region. This electoral region is the only region known for The AKP’s results in Metropolitan Turkey mirrored four-way party competition, and uniquely, only the the party’s national results. Only in Yalova did the MHP performs well above its national average. The AKP perform below its national average. In Kocaeli, AKP, CHP, and HDP each perform below or slightly the AKP garnered 46.3% of the vote, 5.9% above the below their national averages. national average. AKP losses were greatest in both The electorate in Mediterranean Turkey is more Bursa and Istanbul, in which support declined 9.1% evenly divided among the four main parties than in and 8.5%, respectively. The AKP lost a total of 12 MPs any other region of Turkey. In provinces such as Adana in the region. and Mersin, the margin between the largest parties— In Coastal Turkey, the AKP performed below its the AKP in Adana and the CHP in Mersin—and the national average in every province; the party’s results HDP narrows to 15.5% and 11.1%, respectively. With were at least 10% below the national average in Aydin, the exception of Mersin and Osmaniye, the AKP is Edirne, Izmir, Kirklareli, and Mugla provinces. AKP the dominant party with 34.9%. Osmaniye is the only losses were at least 15% below the national average province in the country in which the MHP is the in both Edirne and Izmir. After gradually building dominant party at 41.1%, as it is home to MHP leader support in Coastal Turkey during the 2007 and 2011 Devlet Bahceli. elections through a policy of appealing to the cen- Analysis of AKP Support ter, the AKP has imploded in this region. This can be explained through President Erdogan’s polarizing The AKP is Turkey’s Islamist party, led by President extreme-right rhetoric in the run-up to the June 7 Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu. The party elections, which aimed to build a right-wing majority was founded in 2001 by former president Abdullah for the AKP, but also alienated the Coastal Turks. The Gul, Bulent Arinc, and President Erdogan out of the AKP has lost seven MPs in this region when com- Islamist , elements from the Motherland pared to 2011.

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Party support remained steadier in Middle Turkey, Lessons for the AKP declining 8.3 percentage points. The party’s results The AKP’s election results are indicative of some were at least 7% above its national average in Karabuk, unsettling trends for the party’s leadership and, indeed, Kastamonu, Nigde, and Sinop and at least 3% below vulnerability in the coming years. The unpopularity its national average in Manisa. The net change in MPs of the proposed presidential system and the divisive was an eight-seat loss. nature of President Erdogan, combined with the rise The AKP’s results were varied in the Euphrates- of the HDP, abandonment of the Kurdish Peace Pro- Aras Valley region. The party lost 13.3% of the vote, cess, and a number of poor economic conditions and yet performed at least 10% above its national average corruption allegations led to the party’s decisive defeat. At the same time, however, they provide insight into in Adiyaman, Elazig, Erzurum, Malatya, and Sivas ways the party could improve itself and recapture the and 10% below its national average in Ardahan, Igdir, vitality that enabled it to dominate Turkish politics and Tunceli. In total, the AKP lost nine MPs from for 13 years. the Euphrates-Aras Valley region. Though Article 101 of the Turkish constitution AKP support declined 7.8% in the Heartland stipulates that the president cannot have a party affili- region from 2011, though the party performed at least ation, Erdogan has continued to control the AKP 18% above the national average in Aksaray, Bayburt, through his appointment of prime minister and party Cankiri, Kahramanmaras, Konya, and Yozgat and 12% head Ahmet Davutoglu. Ironically, Erdogan’s con- above its national average in all provinces save Kirik- tinued exercise of power from the presidential palace kale. In total, the party lost seven MPs. has stripped his ambition of two-thirds parliamentary representation, which would have allowed the AKP to Losses were smallest for the AKP in the Black Sea amend the constitution, possibly changing Turkey’s region, the sole AKP bastion, where the party regu- government from a parliamentary to a presidential larly received above 50% of overall votes, including system with Erdogan at the helm. The unpopular- in Rize, the home province of President Erdogan. ity of the presidential system, both within the AKP Results were 16.3%–26.4% above the national average electorate and without, in addition to these results, in Duzce, Rize, Sakarya, and Trabzon and at least 10% indicates that Erdogan may need to abandon his above the party’s national average in all 10 provinces. constitutional ambitions. However, the AKP still lost 5.9 percentage points and The defection of Kurdish voters to the HDP and four MP positions in this region. nationalist voters to the MHP presents a serious The AKP’s greatest decline in support was in quandary for the AKP, as in previous election cycles the Kurdish-Dominated region, where the party the party enjoyed support from both groups. With decreased from 36.2% in 2011 to 12.3% in 2015. The Erdogan beginning the Kurdish Peace Process and AKP’s single greatest decrease, 66.8%, was in Agri, opening Turkey’s borders to 1.8 million Syrian refu- while the lowest decrease, 39%, was in Bitlis. Results gees, the AKP alienated some of its nationalist base, were at least 20% below the national average in Agri, allowing for large MHP gains. In addition, due to the AKP’s inaction in Kobani, Kurds felt alienated by Batman, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Sirnak, and the AKP and defected to the HDP. It is possible that Van. This translated into the loss of 18 MPs. the AKP could recapture either conservative Kurds In Mediterranean Turkey, support for the AKP or nationalistic Turkish voters, depending on how the decreased from 42.3% in 2011 to 32.4% in 2015, and party leadership continues, or discontinues, the Kurd- dropped by at least 10 points in Mersin. Losses were ish Peace Process. However, the party can no longer most drastic in Adana and Gaziantep, where the have both. AKP lost 25.1% and 24.1% of the vote, respectively. Yet perhaps the most important factor for the AKP The party had a net loss of seven MP positions. is the economy. A storm of poor economic conditions,

10 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty

including a declining lira and a high unemployment the national average. While Coastal Turkey was the rate, made party losses likely, if not guaranteed, before only region where the CHP performed significantly the election. The AKP’s single-party rule and success above the national average, party support increased in has been based upon a strong upward trend in eco- two additional regions, Black Sea and Middle Turkey, nomic development and the party has never entered a 0.7% increase and a 0.8% increase, respectively. elections before with an underperforming economy. Provincially, the CHP performed at least 12.6% To recover its voter share in future or early elections, higher than its national average in all nine Coastal the AKP needs to reprioritize economic development provinces. The CHP performed at least 5% higher and find new programs that allow for both economic than its national average in two provinces in Medi- mobility and social welfare. terranean Turkey (Antalya and Hatay) and four prov- inces in Middle Turkey (Artvin, Balikesir, Bartin, and Analysis of CHP Support Denizli). In addition, it performed at least 2.2% higher The founding party of modern Turkey, the CHP has than its national average in one province in the Black long appealed to Turkey’s secular and liberal-religious Sea region (Ordu), two provinces in Mediterranean voters. The party’s stable electorate includes larger cit- Turkey (Adana and Mersin), four provinces in Metro- ies and coastal regions, as well as middle class voters, politan Turkey (Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, and Yalova), educated women, academics and intellectuals, and and four provinces in Middle Turkey (Bilecik, Manisa, some labor unions. Since the 2010 election of party Sinop, and Usak). leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the CHP has made efforts On the contrary, CHP performance was 12.6 points to redefine its ideological platform to honor both its lower than its national average in six provinces in the Kemalist roots and Turkey’s evolving social democ- Euphrates-Aras Valley (Adiyaman, Bingol, Elazig, racy. However, the party has been largely criticized by Erzurum, Igdir, and Kars), nine provinces in Heart- Turkish Kurds, particularly in the southeast, for failing land (Aksaray, Bayburt, Cankiri, Gumushane, Kahra- to develop policies that acknowledge and respect their manmaras, Kayseri, Konya, Kutahya, and Yozgat), all basic rights. The CHP has also been perceived as lack- 11 provinces in Kurdish-Dominated (Agri, Batman, ing the strong internal cohesion necessary to inspire Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Igdir, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Turks domestically and promote Turkey internation- Sirnak, and Van), and one province in Mediterranean ally, though the party’s new leadership has made Turkey (Kilis). The CHP performed 5% worse than its strides to eliminate this deficiency. national tally in four provinces in the Black Sea (Duzce, Rize, Sakarya, Trabzon), nine provinces in Euphra- Regional Support tes-Aras Valley (Sivas), five provinces in Heartland Overall, the CHP largely stagnated, earning 25.2%, (Afyon, Karaman, Kayseri, Kirikkale, and Nevsehir), down 0.8% from 2011. Despite this marginal decline, two provinces in Mediterranean Turkey (Gaziantep CHP increased its MP seat allocation by three to 135 and Osmaniye), and three provinces in Middle Turkey and won 10 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, up from seven in (Karabuk, Kastamonu, and Kirsehir). Less significant, 2011, due to significant decreases in AKP support. the CHP performed 2.5% worse than its national aver- The CHP lost support in five of the eight electoral age in three provinces in the Black Sea region (Corum, districts between 2011 and 2015: Euphrates-Aras Val- Giresun, and Tokat), two provinces in Euphrates-Aras ley (3.1% decrease), Heartland (1% decrease), Kurd- Valley (Ardahan and Tunceli), and two provinces in ish-Dominated (2.2% decrease), Mediterranean Tur- Middle Turkey (Isparta and Nigde). key (4.4% decrease), and Metropolitan Turkey (1.2% Of these losses, the most significant is in Tunceli, decrease). Kilicdaroglu’s home province. In 2011, one year after As predicted, the CHP performed best in Coastal Kilicdaroglu’s ascension to power, the CHP received Turkey, winning 44.1%, 18.9 percentage points above 57.5% of votes, a 40.9 point increase from the 16.6%

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11 Soner Cagaptay

vote share in 2007. However, in 2015, the CHP sup- proposed a variety of economic reforms targeting its port decreased by 36.9 points to 20.6% of votes. This agrarian voter base. is due to the Alevi Zazas’ shift in support from CHP to HDP, a move indicative of strong identification Regional Support with “Kurdishness” across the broader Kurdish com- Support for the MHP increased from 13.0% in 2011 munity in Turkey, a first in Turkish politics. to 16.5% in 2015. This 3.5 point increase translated Lessons for the CHP into 80 MP positions in Turkey’s parliament. The party’s strongest performance was in the Heartland The June results indicate that the CHP has main- region, while its poorest performance was in the tained majority representation in Thrace and along Kurdish-Dominated region. Support from the MHP the Aegean coast. While the party performed well increased in every electoral region. in Mediterranean, Metropolitan, and Middle Tur- The MHP’s support in Metropolitan Turkey was key, strong provincial losses enabled the HDP to 13.8% below the national average, 2.5% above the gain where the AKP lost, rather than the CHP, the national average in Yalova, and over 5% below the main opposition. With the formation of the HDP, national average in Istanbul. Overall, support in Met- the CHP has essentially been erased from Turkey’s ropolitan Turkey increased 2.5%, and the single larg- southeast, losing any remaining political appeal in the est provincial increase, from 11.9% to 15.3%, was in Kurdish-Dominated region, with the Euphrates-Aras Kocaeli. Such gains helped the party gain six MPs Valley trending toward the same electoral behavior. from Metropolitan Turkey. The HDP has absorbed much of the CHP’s pre- In Coastal Turkey, support for the MHP was at vious support from liberals and Alevi Kurds. This least 3% above its national average in Canakkale and requires the party to build bases in larger provinces Kirklareli. The party also saw a regional increase of dominated by two-party competition between the 2.8% and increased support in all provinces except AKP and CHP: Adana, Antalya, and Hatay. In all Aydin, where support declined 0.1%. This surge in three provinces, the CHP was within 2% of AKP’s support led to an additional four MP positions from vote share, and in order to increase these figures, the this region. party would need to strengthen its standing by build- The MHP earned 23% of the vote in Middle Tur- ing broader alliances. key. Its share of the electorate increased in all provinces in this region save for Bilecik, where party support Analysis of MHP Support declined 5.3%. The MHP achieved at least 17.6% sup- The MHP is Turkey’s right-wing nationalist party; port in Bilecik, Isparta, Karabuk, Kastamonu, Kirsehir, it prioritizes the preservation of the Turkish identity Nigde, and Usak, while the only province where the and state. Under longtime leader Devlet Bahceli, the MHP was within 1% of its national average was Sinop. party has moved away from its neo-fascist roots of Overall, the MHP gained six seats in the parliament the 1970s and strict Kemalist-style secularism, instead from Middle Turkey. embracing conservative, Islamic values and demo- MHP results in the Euphrates-Aras Valley region cratic institutions. The party shares a voter base with are more varied. The party earned 12.9% in 2015, the AKP and enjoys strong support from rural, Sunni increasing its support by 3.8% from 2011. However, Turks and Turkmens. In addition, the party’s empha- the party performed over 1.7% below its national sis on the “Turkish identity” has earned the support of average in Adiyaman, Bingol, Sanliurfa, and Tunceli, Turkey’s Azeri community in the northeast. This elec- all Kurdish and Arab majority provinces, but 1.7% tion cycle, the party continued to voice its opposition above its national average in Igdir, home to an Azeri to the AKP-started Kurdish Peace Process, which it community. The MHP’s overall share of the vote perceives to be a threat to the unity of Turkey, and decreased in Adiyaman, Ardahan, Igdir, and Kars,

12 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty though it increased by over 6.6% in every other prov- Lessons for the MHP ince. Support for the party was at least 0.7% above The MHP’s successes, though sizable, were more due its national average only in Elazig and Erzurum, to AKP losses and missteps than to the party’s ability both Sunni Turkish majority provinces. From the to win over new voters with new initiatives. Conser- Euphrates-Aras Valley, the MHP picked up one vatives, dissatisfied by the Kurdish Peace Process and additional MP position. the Open Door Policy vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees, The MHP’s strongest performance was in the perceived the MHP as the only viable option. That Heartland provinces, where it received 23.5% of the being said, the MHP needs to focus heavily on draw- vote and increased its voter share by 7.3% from 2011. ing voters away from the AKP and outperform the The party earned at least 1.7% above its national CHP in Mediterranean Turkey in order to potentially average in Aksaray, Bayburt, Cankiri, Gumushane, become Turkey’s main opposition party. Kayseri, Kirikkale, Kutahya, Nevsehir, and Yozgat The election results indicate that the MHP and was within 1% of its national average only in has been nearly ousted from northeastern Tur- Konya. Party support increased by at least 3.3% in key, namely the Aras Valley, previously an MHP all provinces, earning the MHP an additional eight stronghold due to a large Azeri and conservative seats in parliament. Turkish presence. To recoup these losses, the party Support for the MHP increased from 13.1% to needs a stronger presence in the Black Sea and 17.6% in the Black Sea region, 1.1% above its national Heartland regions. Despite being distinctly “right- average. The Black Sea experienced the lowest increase wing,” the Black Sea region has an AKP major- in MHP support of all electoral regions. The party’s ity, with the MHP often a distant second. In sub- performance was at least 0.3% above its national aver- sequent election cycles, the MHP could prioritize age in Giresun, Sakarya, Tokat, and Trabzon and at drawing away AKP voters to bolster its own share least 0.3% below its national average in Ordu and of the electorate, turning the region into one Rize. Party support increased in all provinces except shared by both the AKP and MHP, much like Bolu and Duzce, where it lost 0.1% and 2.5% of the the Heartland. vote, respectively. The MHP gained an additional two The increasing MHP presence in Mediterra- MPs from the region. nean Turkey is also telling. After winning a major- Mediterranean Turkey, with its large Turkmen ity in Osmaniye and besting the CHP in Gaziantep community, is the MHP’s second stronghold and and Kilis, the MHP could seek to become the sec- includes the only province in which the MHP was a ond party in Mediterranean Turkey by drawing away majority, Osmaniye, the home of Devlet Bahceli. The from declining AKP and CHP support, in the long party received 22% of the vote. The party performed term even rendering the region a two-way compe- at least 1.2% above its national average in Kilis, Mer- tition between the MHP and HDP. Overall, the sin, and Osmaniye, and 0.3% below its national aver- party must continue to present itself as the sole out- age only in Hatay, an ethnically diverse province with let for conservative voters to remain viable in the large numbers of Arabs, Sunnis, and Alawites. Party coming election cycles. support increased in every province save Osmaniye, where support declined 0.4%. Such increases helped Analysis of HDP Support the MHP gain three MP positions from Mediterra- nean Turkey. Founded in 2012, the HDP is Turkey’s newest politi- The MHP’s worst performance was in the Kurdish- cal actor—a left-wing, liberal, pro-Kurdish party that Dominated region, where the party received 1.8% of unifies multiple political factions previously repre- the vote. Yet, the support for the MHP increased by sented by independent candidates. While the HDP’s 0.1% from 2011. The party performed at least 14.5% emphasis is on fundamentally shifting Turkish-Kurd- below its national average in all provinces. ish relations, it has harnessed much support from

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left-wing supporters due to a strong party platform support in Turkey’s right-wing-dominated regions— encompassing minority rights including women and Black Sea, Heartland, and Middle Turkey—remained LGBTQ, labor parties, environmentalists, and aca- negligible overall, it is significant that party support demics and intellectuals. Of its 80 MP seats, 37.5%, or increased in all eight electoral regions. 30 seats, are held by women, the highest ratio among The HDP’s parliamentary representation increased Turkey’s political parties. The HDP is also the only in five of the eight electoral districts, excluding the party to be cochaired, requiring one chairman and one Black Sea, Heartland, and Middle Turkey regions. In chairwoman. Despite the party’s objective to repre- Coastal Turkey, the HDP gained two of the district’s sent all of Turkey, the HDP was previously criticized 66 MP seats, marking the first time a Kurdish party for focusing on the interests of Kurds in southeastern was represented in parliament in this region. This Turkey, where the party is strongly supported. shift was due to support in Izmir, which increased The June elections were largely an HDP victory, 5.5% from 2011, to an overall vote of 10.3% in 2015. as the party made a true effort to broaden its base In Euphrates-Aras Valley, MP seats more than tripled, beyond the Kurdish southeast, marking the first time up from four in 2011 to 15 in 2015. that a Kurdish political party surpassed the 10% elec- The strongest gain was in the Kurdish-Dominated toral threshold required for parliamentary representa- region, up 17 seats from 25 in 2011 to 42 in 2015. The tion. Earning more than double the 6.5% of votes in largest MP increase was in Diyarbakir, the unofficial 2011, the HDP received 13.0% of the vote, translat- capital of Turkey’s Kurdish regions, and all but one ing into 80 MP seats—up from 35 in 2011—and tying seat was taken directly from the AKP. Significant MP with the MHP as Turkey’s third-largest political party. representation was also gained in Mediterranean Tur- The HDP’s success is largely responsible for derailing key and Metropolitan Turkey. Representation more the AKP from being the majority party and therefore than tripled in Mediterranean Turkey, increasing from abolishing Erdogan’s ambitions of turning Turkey’s two to seven seats, while 10 seats were gained in Met- political system from parliamentary to presidential. ropolitan Turkey, up from three to 13. Eleven of these 13 seats are from Istanbul, while the other two are Regional Support from Ankara and Bursa. Overall, the HDP won 11 total provinces, up from 7 The HDP has single-party status in the Kurd- in 2015, including 10 provinces in the Kurdish-Dom- ish-Dominated region and a strong position in the inated region and Tunceli in the Euphrates-Aras Val- Euphrates-Aras Valley. The party is nearly nonexis- ley. In the Kurdish-Dominated region, support was tent in the Black Sea and Heartland regions, earning 80.2% overall, nearly five times the national average, below an average of 2% of the vote. and 23.4%, nearly double the national average, in the Lessons for the HDP Euphrates-Aras Valley. In the Kurdish-Dominated region, the vote share The June election results were a proclamation of sus- was at least four times the national average (i.e., at tained political representation for Turkey’s Kurdish least 52%) in all 10 provinces (Agri, Batman, Bitlis, minority. Tied as Turkey’s third-largest political party, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, and the HDP has legitimized the representation of Kurds Van). The most significant gains were made in Hak- in parliament and amplified the efforts of additional kari, Siirt, and Sirnak, provinces in Turkey’s south- minorities to gain similar political validity. eastern-most corner bordering Iran and Iraq. In the In order to remain a competitor in Turkey’s politi- Euphrates-Aras Valley, support was above the national cal arena, the HDP must make efforts to broaden its average in eight of 11 provinces (Adiyaman, Ardahan, ideological and geographical support away from its Bingol, Elazig, Erzurum, Kars, Sanliurfa, and Tunceli). current stronghold: Kurdish voters in Turkey’s south- Bingol and Tunceli received the highest percent of east. Increased migration of Kurds into the larger cit- votes—41.0% and 61.0%, respectively. While party ies of Izmir, Istanbul, Antalya, Adana, and Mersin

14 RESEARCH NOTE 26 Turkey’s Political Uncertainty

present the HDP with opportunities for political and KURDS. On the Kurdish issue, a government includ- ethnic integration in a way that has not been previ- ing the HDP will prioritize Kurdish language and ously afforded. political rights, while a potential MHP government The HDP’s cochairman Selahattin Demirtas will would oppose such rights, with the AKP and CHP also need to make serious strides to increase coopera- falling in between the two parties; the AKP’s cur- tion and dialogue between the HDP and Turkey’s pri- rent hard stance against the PKK and on the Peace mary political parties. Rather than focusing on poli- Process appears to be a tactical move, aimed at bol- cies of isolation, including those of minority rights, stering President Erdogan’s strongman image in the the HDP could broaden its scope to refocus on inclu- run-up to potential early polls. sive policies of integration and liberal politics. . All four parties are likely to be reticent Implications for U.S. Policy regarding an aggressive stance toward Russia. All Turks, including the Kurds, share a historically rooted The analysis of the Turkish election results suggests fear of Russia stretching back to the days of the Otto- the emergence of a four-party system in the coun- man Empire when the sultans fought nearly twenty try composed of secularist/social democrat (CHP), winless wars against Moscow. Islamist/conservative (AKP), Turkish nationalist/ SYRIA AND ISIS. conservative (MHP), and Kurdish nationalist/liberal The four parties present the most diversity in terms of priorities regarding Syria and (HDP) . Each of these poles is an integral part of ISIS policy. The AKP’s priority will be ousting the the Turkish body politic. Given the hung composition Assad regime, and Turkey will remain distracted of the Turkish parliament and the divided nature of from fighting ISIS under future AKP governments. the Turkish society, an analysis of the electoral regions The CHP will take nearly the opposite stance when reveals that not one single movement but a combina- in government: deeply concerned over ISIS, the tion of these movements will rule Turkey in the com- party could even seek to reach a modus vivendi ing years, including in potential early elections later with the Assad regime. The MHP will prioritize this year. the Turkmens in Syria as its overarching Syria pol- DEMOCRACY AND EUROPE. Regarding specific issues, icy objective, sometimes shadowing other objec- both the CHP and HDP will likely push for Euro- tives. Conversely, the HDP will prioritize the wel- pean Union accession and liberal democratic reforms, fare of the Syrian Kurds, making this an overarching while any combination including the MHP or the goal of its Syria policy, but also casting itself as AKP would be unlikely to prioritize EU accession. ISIS’s archenemy.

SONER CAGAPTAY is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Insti- tute, and author of The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power, named by the Foreign Policy Association as one of the ten most important books of 2014. Caitlin Stull is the Yvonne Silverman research assistant, and Mark Bhaskar an intern, in the research program.

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