TITUTE FO S R IN N Number 27 — August 2015 N EA O R T G E A N I S H T S P A O L W I C E Y H RESEARCH NOTES T Ideas. Action. Impact. 3 0 ng years stro THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Turkey’s Political Uncertainty IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUNE 2015 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS SONER CAGAPTAY with Caitlin Stull and Mark Bhaskar Introduction tudying the June 7 election results is useful, S as it reveals interesting trends in Turkey’s On June 7, 2015, Turkey’s governing Justice and electoral behavior especially as Turkey prepares Development Party (AKP) lost its thirteen-year for potential early elections later this year. This parliamentary majority in general elections, drop- paper evaluates the results through the micro lens ping 9.4 percentage points compared to the 2011 of the provincial results, offering insight into the elections. This was the first time since the AKP’s wide-ranging variables that significantly affected ascension to power in 2002 that support for the voter behavior. It maps the shifts of support bases party decreased. Although the AKP had the high- for the country’s main parties—AKP, CHP, MHP, est number of total electoral votes, the party actu- and HDP—in order to determine where sup- ally lost 69 parliamentary seats. port was higher or lower than the national aver- Meanwhile, Turkey’s Kurdish population earned age. After defining the eight electoral regions its biggest voice ever in national politics, as the HDP, that constitute Turkey’s electoral landscape, the which absorbed its sister Peace and Democracy paper analyzes where the largest shifts in electoral Party (BDP) in 2014, received 13.0% of overall votes. support occurred and the sustainability of these This surpassed the 10% electoral threshold required changes in voter behavior. The study also pres- for parliamentary representation and translates into ents the elections’ potential short- and long-term 80 parliamentary seats, tying the HDP and MHP implications for the AKP and President Erdogan; as Turkey’s third largest political group. Turkish domestic politics, including the Kurds; and Turkish foreign policy, including Syria and Table 1. 2015: Published National Tallies the United States. NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL For the purposes of this study, the authors chose VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE to use the provincial totals listed in Table 2 rather AKP 18,864,864 40.9% 258 46.9% than published national totals displayed in Table 1.1 CHP 11,518,070 25.0% 132 24.0% All analysis in this paper reflects the figures listed MHP 7,519,168 16.3% 80 14.5% in Tables 2 and 3. HDP 6,057,507 13.1% 80 14.5% OTHER 2,200,030 4.8% 0 0.0% 1. All tables reflect official election results as published by Haber- TOTAL 46,159,639 turk, http://www.haberturk.com/secim/secim2015/genel-secim. © 2015 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Soner Cagaptay The rise of the HDP as a new player in parliamen- eral voters could flee the party. If the HDP fails to tary politics has created a complex political landscape, reach the threshold, the AKP would pick up its seats requiring the formation of a coalition or minority as the second most powerful party in the Kurdish government. Previous legislatures since 2002 had had provinces, endowing Erdogan’s party once again with as few as two or three parties in them, affording the a legislative majority. AKP enough seats to a form a government on its own. Several factors played a role in these surprising elec- June Results toral shifts, primarily growing dissatisfaction with the AKP, particularly the leadership style of Recep Tayyip Compared to the 2011 elections, decrease in vote Erdogan, former prime minister and AKP leader, who share and parliamentary seats were the highest for was elected president in August 2014. Conservative the AKP. The CHP’s national average decreased by .8 Kurds, upset by Ankara’s failure to help the Syrian points and the party lost 3 seats. The MHP’s national Kurdish town of Kobani when it came under Islamic average increased by 3.5 points in 2015 and the party State attack in October 2014, seem to have abandoned picked up 27 additional seats. The largest gains were the AKP for the HDP. The HDP also benefited from for the HDP, whose support increased nearly twofold a migration of CHP voters as well as first time vot- with 55 additional deputies. ers, some of them attracted by the HDP’s liberal mes- sage, and some of them secularists who seem to have Due to the rise of the HDP, conservative Kurdish voted tactically to help the HDP cross the 10% thresh- voters defected from the AKP, creating the greatest old. Furthermore, nationalist Turkish voters upset with AKP losses in Turkey’s southeast and largely remov- Erdogan’s efforts in the Kurdish Peace Process and ing the AKP’s presence in the Kurdish-dominated negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) region. The AKP and MHP’s ideological proximity seem to have defected from the AKP to the MHP. and similarly conservative rhetoric allowed the MHP Upset by the election outcome, President Erdogan to gain where the AKP lost. Both parties share a simi- has been pushing behind the scenes for early elections. lar rural, conservative, and nationalist voter base, with Some analysts suggest that Ankara’s recent campaign AKP supporters prioritizing Islamic values and MHP against the PKK is intended to weaken the HDP in supporters prioritizing the Turkish identity. Histori- case of early polls. The HDP is the political arm of the cally, right-wing voters have shifted their allegiance Kurdish movement in Turkey, though both a product between the two parties rather than shifting to Tur- of and subservient to the PKK. The Turkish president key’s political left. is counting on the HDP being unable to renounce PKK violence, a stance he hopes could cost the HDP Voter turnout was 86.6%, the highest since the the electoral threshold in early elections, since its lib- AKP’s ascension to power, increasing 4.1% from 2011. Table 2. Summary 2015/2011: Published Provincial Data 2015 2011 NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL NATIONAL NATIONAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE VOTES AVERAGE SEATS LEGISLATURE AKP 18,135,262 40.4% 258 46.9% 21,399,281 49.8 327 59.5% CHP 11,338,730 25.2% 132 24.0% 11,154,972 26.0 135 24.5% MHP 7,423,011 16.5% 80 14.5% 5,585,513 13.0 53 9.6% HDP 5,846,255 13.0% 80 14.5% 2,709,029 6.3 35 6.4% OTHER 2,187,482 4.9% 0 0.0% 2,092,978 4.9 0 0.0% TOTAL 44,930,740 42,941,773 2 RESEARCH NOTE 27 Table 3. Regional Analysis 2015/2011 2015 ELECTION 2011 ELECTION 44,930,740 TOTAL VOTES 42,941,773 TOTAL VOTES REGIONAL % NATIONAL % REGIONAL PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL % REGIONAL % NATIONAL % REGIONAL PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT % NATIONAL % REGIONAL VOTES VOTE VOTE SUPPORT (%) SEATS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURE VOTE VOTE SUPPORT (%) SEATS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURE Metropolitan 14,439,571 32.1% 151 27.5% 31.9% 147 26.7% Turkey AKP 6,023,221 41.7% 39–46 70 46.4% 50.0% 47–52 82 55.8% CHP 4,169,558 28.9% 24–29 48 31.8% 30.1% 24–32 48 32.7% MHP 1,993,566 13.8% 11–19 20 13.2% 11.3% 9–14 14 9.5% HDP 1,383,870 9.6% 5–12 13 8.6% 3.5% 0–5 3 2.0% OTHER 869,356 6.0% NA 0 0.0% 5.1% NA 0 0.0% Coastal Turkey 6,175,859 13.7% 66 12.0% 13.7% 66 12.0% AKP 1,778,468 28.8% 23–37 21 31.8% 37.1% 27–47 29 43.9% CHP 2,725,990 44.1% 39–53 33 50.0% 42.7% 37–52 31 47.0% MHP 984,802 15.9% 13–21 10 15.2% 13.1% 6–18 6 9.1% HDP 436,392 7.1% 1–10 2 3.0% 2.7% 0–4 0 0.0% OTHER 250,207 4.1% NA 0 0.0% 4.4% NA 0 0.0% Middle Turkey 4,343,752 9.7% 55 10.0% 9.9% 56 10.2% AKP 1,772,631 40.8% 36–48 25 45.5% 49.1% 42–57 33 58.9% CHP 1,248,848 28.8% 17–35 17 30.9% 28.0% 14–35 16 28.6% MHP 1,000,416 23.0% 16–32 13 23.6% 16.9% 8–27 7 12.5% HDP 146,551 3.4% 0–6 0 0.0% 0.6% 0–2 0 0.0% OTHER 175,306 4.0% NA 0 0.0% 5.4% NA 0 0.0% Euphrates-Aras 3,211,590 7.1% 52 9.5% 7.2% 53 9.6% Valleys AKP 1,578,727 49.2% 10–58 31 59.6% 62.5% 15–69 40 75.5% CHP 305,629 9.5% 1–25 3 5.8% 12.6% 1–57 7 13.2% MHP 413,014 12.9% 2–27 3 5.8% 9.1% 1–34 2 3.8% HDP 751,768 23.4% 1–60 15 28.8% 11.4% 0–31 4 7.5% OTHER 162,452 5.1% NA 0 0.0% 4.4% NA 0 0.0% Heartland 4,521,707 10.1% 61 11.1% 10.3% 61 11.1% AKP 2,629,082 58.1% 50–65 43 70.5% 65.9% 57–69 50 82.0% CHP 500,111 11.1% 2–16 3 4.9% 12.1% 3–18 4 6.6% MHP 1,065,052 23.6% 16–32 15 24.6% 16.3% 13–24 7 11.5% HDP 120,779 2.7% 0–5 0 0.0% 0.0% 0–0 0 0.0% OTHER 206,683 4.6% NA 0 0.0% 5.7% NA 0 0.0% Black Sea 3,744,553 8.3% 49 8.9% 8.7% 50 90.9% AKP 2,056,339 54.9% 51–66 33 67.3% 60.8% 55–68 37 74.0% CHP 784,440 20.9% 15–28 10 20.4% 20.2% 12–24 9 18.0% MHP 660,525 17.6% 8–21 6 12.2% 13.1% 7–16 4 8.0% HDP 54,032 1.4% 0–2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0–0 0 0.0% OTHER 189,217 5.1% NA 0 0.0% 5.9% NA 0 0.0% Kurdish 2,275,804 5.1% 49 8.9% 6.0% 50 9.1% Dominated AKP 279,668 12.3% 8–30 7 14.3% 36.2% 16–48 25 50.0% CHP 23,579 1.0% 0–1 0 0.0% 3.2% 0–4 0 0.0% MHP 41,743 1.8% 1–3 0 0.0% 1.7% 0–4 0 0.0% HDP 1,824,551 80.2% 60–85 42 85.7% 55.5% 40–79 25 50.0% OTHER 106,263 4.7% NA 0 0.0% 3.5% NA 0 0.0% Mediterranean 6,217,904 13.8% 67 12.2% 12.3% 67 12.2% Turkey AKP 2,017,126 32.4% 29–49 27 40.3% 42.3% 32–61 34 50.7% CHP 1,580,575 25.4% 7–36 18 26.9% 29.8% 11–38 19 28.4% MHP 1,263,893 20.3% 14–41 15 22.4% 19.2% 9–41 12 17.9% HDP 1,128,312 18.1% 3–17 7 10.4% 4.9% 0–9 2 3.0% OTHER 227,998 3.7% NA 0 0.0% 3.9% NA 0 0.0% Soner Cagaptay ROMANIA TURKISH ELECTORAL REGIONS 2015 BULGARIA Black Sea GEORGIA Kirklareli Istanbul Bartin Kastamonu Sinop E Tekirdag Istanbul C Edirne Zonguldak uk E Artvin Ardahan E Samsun R Sea of Kocaeli Karab Marmara Yalova Duzce Rize G Ordu Trabzon