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ZIMBABWE: a POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET Part I: Consolidation and Integration by J

ZIMBABWE: a POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET Part I: Consolidation and Integration by J

1981INo. 14

ZIMBABWE: A POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET Part I: Consolidation and Integration by J. Gus Liebenow

Robert Mugabe has guided skillfully and judiciously into majority rule. Now other problems face the post- revolutionary government: urban and rural violence, exodus of white talent and capital, and dissension within the bipartisan coalition. [JGL-2-'811 ISSN 01 61 -0724 The American Universities Field INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS American Staff, Inc., founded in 1951, is a non- University of Alabama profit, membership corporation of Brown University American educational institutions. It Universities employs a full-time staff of foreign California State area specialists who write from University/Fullerton abroad and make periodic visits to California State Field Staff member institutions. AUFS serves UniversityINorthridge the Dublic throuah its seminar Dro- Dartmouth Colleae films, adwide-ranging [;ub- Indiana Universi< lications on significant develop- for Shipboard ments in foreign societies. Education University of Kansas Michigan State University University of Pittsburgh Ramapo College of New Jersey Utah State University University of Wisconsin System

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THE AUTHOR Association and a member of the Fellow at Harvard University; and re- Executive Council of the International ceived his Ph.D. in Political Science African Institute in London. from Northwestern University in 1955. A member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Professor Liebenow began his field work Kappa Phi, he taught at the University of in Africa in 1953, and he has spent 6 of Texas before coming to lndiana Univer- the past 25 years doing research, teach- sity in 1958. He was the first Director of ing, and service in tropical Africa. He is African Studies at lndiana (1960-1972) the author of Liberia: The Evolution of and served as Dean for International Privilege; Colonial Rule and Political Programs (1968-1972) and Vice Presi- Development in : The Case of dent for Academic Affairs for the the Makonde; African Attitudes towards lndiana University system (1972-1974). Agriculture, Education, and Rural Trans- formation; and of numerous journal articles and chapters in edited volumes. Dr. Liebenow is a specialist on the prob- lems of local government; urbanization; management of the African environ- ment; politics of migration; and feder- J. GUS LIEBENOW, Professor of Polit- alism. ical Science at lndiana University, is one of the pioneers in the study of politics in Dr. Liebenow received his B.A. (summa cum laude) and M.A. from the Univer- @ 1981, American Universities Field sub-Saharan Africa. He is the immediate Staff, Hanover, NH Past President of the African Studies sity of Illinois; was a Goodwin Memorial 1981INo. 14 by J. Gus Liebenow ZIMBABWE: A POLITICAL Africa [J G L-2-'81 I BALANCE SHEET Part I: Consolidation and Integration

Media reporting on political develop- December 1979. The Lancaster violence; much white talent and ments in sub-Saharan Africa all too House agreement temporarily re- capital has left the country; Prime often suffers from a lack of historical established the British colonial Minister Mugabe's government has and sociological perspective. In few authority, which had been shed in had difficulty resettling over a mil- places has this been more obvious when the Rhode- lion wartime refugees; the concept than in coverage of Zimbabwe, sian Front Party of opted of multiparty democracy in Zim- which achieved its independence for a "unilateral declaration of in- babwe is being challenged; and the April 18, 1980. Formerly , dependence" (UDI) for the white leadership has been unable to con- the country became the focus of minority. The 1979 settlement set in vert former guerrilla fighters into world attention during the bitter motion a military cease-fire and soldiers quickly for a unified defense 7-year war in which liberation forces paved the way for an internationally force. These are real problems, and under Mugabe and Joshua supervised election to determine the Mugabe regime recognizes them Nkomo sought to end the 92-year which party or parties would lead as such. The relevant question, domination of 7 million blacks by a the new country at independence. however, is "compared to what?" white minority of roughly 250,000. More than 25,000 Africans and sev- The incongruity between the news If one is properly to assess the state eral hundred whites had lost their coverage of postindependence of affairs in Zimbabwe after ten lives before international pressure events and the actual situation was months of independence, then the brought the parties to the nego- readily apparent to me during a visit pessimistic reporting of today must tiating table. Under skillful British to Zimbabwe in mid-1980. This is be measured against the dire pre- prodding, a settlement was put to- not to suggest that the reports had dictions of irresolvable turmoil that gether at in Lon- been falsified. There have indeed Lowering the British at ln- don during the waning days of been incidents of urban and rural dependence, April 18, 1980. followed UDI in November 1965. predictions. It was assumed, for which the Smith regime paid an Informed observers then were pre- example, that the Zimbabwe strug- enormous price. (During the boy- dicting that the wave of indepen- gle would eventually become the cott, the only currency into which dence sweeping East and West focal point of regional, continental- the Rhodesian dollar could be con- Africa in the 1960s would stop dead, even global -confrontation. Indeed, verted was the South African rand.) short of the southern "white re- these predictions were partially doubtu-that is, , realized late in the war when the Indeed, Zimbabwe is doing better South-West Africa (), Por- white-dominated regime began than anyone had a right to expect, a tuguese-controlled and bombing bridges and railroads lead- view I share with other recent , and Rhodesia. In the ing to guerrilla sanctuaries. In some scholarly visitors. Much of this last case, the great disparities in cases the Rhodesian troops pene- cautious optimism centers on the power and control over resources, it trated deeply into Angola, Mozam- creative personality of Robert was argued, inevitably subordinated bique, and , the "frontline Mugabe. Far from being the obsti- the black majority to white minority states" which, along with Tanzania nate and doctrinaire radical leader rule. It was alleged, furthermore, and , provided concerted depicted by his critics during the that the ethnic, ideological, political, support to the liberation efforts. war, 55-year-old Mugabe has and personality cleavages within the emerged as a refreshingly mature black leadership cadre were so deep Predictions of global confrontation statesman. Already enjoying influ- that the majority was incapable of reposed on the fact that military ence beyond his country, Mugabe mounting a concerted liberation support for the guerrillas came pri- was lionized by the other heads of effort. Moreover, many observers marily from the socialist bloc. The African nations during his inaugural predicted that, if push came to Chinese supplied Mugabe's Zim- appearance at the Organization of shove, the apartheid regime in babwe African National Liberation African States summit meeting in South Africa would come to the Army (ZANLA), based in Mozam- Freetown in July 1980, and he re- rescue of the beleaguered white bique, while the sup- ceived elaborate coverage from the ported the rival Zimbabwe African Rhodesians, the price for support American and foreign news media being imposition of an even more People's Revolutionary Army during his New York oppressive form of racial discrimina- (ZIPRA) of Nkomo, which operated appearance when Zimbabwe was out of Zambia. Iraq, Libya, and other tion. At the other extreme, it was admitted as the 153rd member. asserted that a black victory and the socialist states were also involved. Within central and southern Africa, subsequent expulsion of white The prophecies of American inter- moreover, there is growing senti- settlers would leave chaos in its vention were based on U.S. strate- ment that Mugabe and his country gic and mineral interests in Zim- wake, with the black survivors should become the new focal point babwe and southern Africa gener- backsliding into ancient animosities for regional economic and political among the Mashona and Ndebele ally. However, memories of Vietnam cooperation to counter South and fighting over what remained of and the abortive C.I.A. efforts in Africa's growing grip over its a decimated economic and social Angola, in which President Ford northern neighbors. order. backed the losing side, reinforced the Carter administration's support The transformation in attitudes to- Not one of these predicted extremes of human rights and liberation ward Mugabe is nowhere more has materialized. Despite isolated efforts against right-wing pressures striking than in the words of praise cases of violence since indepen- for direct intervention or recognition uttered three months after inde- dence, and the February 1981 clash of the Smith-controlled Muzorewa pendence by his most intransigent between former guerrilla forces of regime. On balance, the skillful dip- wartime antagonist, former Prime Nkomo and Mugabe quartered near lomacy of U.S. Ambassador Donald Minister Ian Smith. The white Rho- , peace has returned to McHenry contributed substantially desian and South African portrayal Zimbabwe. Some whites have left or both to the negotiated settlement at of Mugabe as a wild-eyed revolu- are leaving, but most have re- Lancaster House and to enhancing tionary is daily belied by his fastidi- mained. Instead of a program of America's image in Black Africa. ous attire, his calm and deliberate revenge and recrimination against Moreover, contrary to predictions manner during press conferences white settlers and rival black leaders, that the victory of Mugabe-an and in other public forums, and in has sought recon- avowed socialist -would deliver his ability to comprehend complex ciliation in economic, social, and Zimbabwe to the "Red" camp, the governmental problems and articu- political matters. Mugabe's long- Russian presence in Zimbabwe at late his positions on them in a con- time nationalist rival, Joshua this writing has yet to be asserted, vincing fashion. Although the term Nkomo, serves in his Cabinet, as do and Chinese efforts appear now to "charisma" has been much abused, two whites. Mugabe sits in the same be largely economic in nature. there is little doubt regarding the Parliament with the two bitter depth of the empathetic bond opponents who preceded him as Similarly, the difficulties the Mugabe - between the Zimbabwean leader Prime Minister: Ian Smith and government has encountered in ob- and the majority of his people. Bishop , who taining foreign loans and grants headed a white-supported govern- should be compared to the 15-year The conciliatory policies Robert ment in 1979. , United Nations' economic boycott Mugabe has pursued are all the of Rhodesia. Then, the white more remarkable when one con- The moderate nationalistic policies regime's only economic contact siders his personal history. During Mugabe pursues in foreign affairs with the outside world was covert Ian Smith's rule, the former school- today must also be read against past trade through South Africa, for teacher's political activities cost him Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (left) with two other Frontline leaders, President of Tanzania and President of Zambia. ten years in detention-without expansionist goals in southern known as PF (ZAPU) and ZANU- benefit of a trial-then five years in Africa. Called by some a "Black PF respectively; details are given in exile after he had escaped to Tito" because of his skill in nego- Part II of this Report.) Mozambique, where he personally tiating between bitterly hostile directed the liberation efforts of the groups and his ability to subordinate Ironically, this transformation in the Zimbabwe African National Union ideology to practical politics, he has international perception of Mr. (ZANU). Despite his repeated in- been able to bridge the political, Mugabe's talents as a leader may sistence on his commitment to ethnic, and racial gaps separating constitute his greatest liability. Un- , Mugabe has liberally him from his wartime opponents realistic expectations of immediate blended Marxist teachings with and to transcend differences among success have been imposed on him traditional African values and in- his erstwhile political allies, such as to resolve the resettlement problem, herited Christian experience (he is a the Reverend demobilize the former guerrilla practicing Catholic) to produce a and, especially, of forces, and reconstruct the econ- kind of Christian democratic social- the Patriotic Front (ZAPU), the omy. The current expectations of ism. His policies and acts since inde- former Zimbabwe African People's his overseas former critics are al- pendence provide no sign that his Union. (During the campaign for the most the inverse of the earlier pre- espousal of socialism constitutes a February 1980 elections, both ZAPU dictions of disaster. Given the threat to freedom of enterprise in and ZANU appropriated the Patri- nature of modern communications, Zimbabwe or support to Soviet otic Front label, afterward becoming moreover, Mugabe is obliged to wrestle in a goldfish bowl with his other facets of capitalist ideology. claim little credit for the fact that problems. Every new act, each new Furthermore, the caste-like distinc- Zimbabwe at independence had a policy statement, the arrival of every tions erected to separate the white remarkable cadre of educated blacks important visitor from abroad, all minority from the black majority prepared to assume the responsi- appear to raise either new fears or easily lent themselves to Marxian bilities of government. Most current new hopes. It is for this reason that analysis of class conflict as a neces- Cabinet members and other senior contemporary events in Zimbabwe sary step on the path to socialism. officials had survived on foreign must be viewed in their broader his- scholarships while receiving their torical and sociological context. Indeed, violence was a persistent wartime education in Britain, the element in whitelblack relations United States, Eastern Europe, or Mugabe's Economic Strategy from the outset of the colonial era. other African countries. Hence it Much of the attention since This was most evident in the settler was natural to assume that a Mugabe's surprising victory in the confiscation of land, a cardinal Mugabe government would give February 1980 elections has focused target of the revolutionary ideology. high priority to such populist on economic strategy. It appeared The 3 to 5 percent of the population demands as free or low-tuition to be an insurmountable task to which was white occupied roughly education, extension of rural medi- satisfy simultaneously the needs of 50 percent of the land inclusive of cal services, subsidized urban hous- the impoverished, land-hungry most of the arable soil and known ing and other programs of a socialist masses, the desires of the white mineral deposits. The 95 percent of nature. farmers and businessmen for con- Zimbabwe's citizens who were black tinued prosperity, and the concerns were thus left to occupy the poorer The disposition to pursue the path of the international investors and land, to migrate to work at the of socialist development was thus entrepreneurs who seek a stable mines or white-owned farms for compelling. Moreover, Mugabe environment for their commercial wages, or to drift to the cities as part wanted to satisfy not only the pursuits. Mugabe's use of socialist of a growing mass of unemployed. legitimate material hopes of his war- rhetoric in describing programs for Many blacks were compelled to weary people but also the fiery de- reconstruction and development leave the country in search of wage mands of those ZANU-PF leaders pleased the blacks but disturbed labor in order to have the cash who sought rapid and radical re- almost everyone else. What many needed to pay their taxes and meet ordering of the inherited colonial external critics failed to realize was their material needs. It was thus economy. Quickly, however, that the socialist idiom was a logical that a victorious black party Mugabe came to appreciate that political necessity for Mugabe: after would take steps to recapture land aspirations had to be tempered with all, and the Soviet Union had from the whites. While not ruling recognition of realities-not all of provided the principal military and out the continuation of some form them negative. economic assistance to the Zim- of private freehold or even a return babwe liberation forces in Mozam- to traditional usufruct, it was First, the returned exile group bique and Zambia. While the United assumed that some variety of acknowledged that they had in- States and other capitalist-oriented national ownership or collective herited a fairly healthy economy. states in the West had provided sig- operation of farmland was required Despite racial injustices, wartime nificant diplomatic support, their to accelerate African farm produc- devastation-particularly in the rural economic gestures consisted largely tion. The fact that ZANU had suc- sector-and privations resulting of promissory notes, to be honored cessfully experimented with collec- from the United Nations' sanctions, once the cease-fire had been tive farming in Mozambique during the white-controlled Zimbabwe secured. Excepting Botswana, all the war enhanced this expectation. economy had survived the war in the were committed relatively good shape. The global Similarly, the Mugabe group had set to some form of socialist develop- isolation of Rhodesian whites had as a goal achieving a more equitable ment. Indeed, there are few leader- compelled the Smith regime to distribution of educational and ship groups on the African conti- become self-sufficient in many areas medical services, of employment and had accelerated exploitation of nent that have boldly espoused the opportunities in both the public and tenets of free enterprise . mineral resources. Independence the private sectors, and of other had also coincided with a dramatic External pressures aside, there are government services, for the in- rise in the price of gold, which once other reasons why Mugabe might equities were legion. In contrast to again had become Zimbabwe's logically have been expected to the well-staffed white hospitals, for leading export earner. Even petro- embrace socialism. The system of example, most African hospitals in leum purchases had become rela- white settler exploitation against the cities were overcrowded and tively less troublesome: the ending which black Zimbabweans rebelled substandard, while rural medical of sanctions meant Zimbabwe could had been based upon a "robber services for Africans were almost buy oil at OPEC prices rather than baronn-style capitalism. Although, nonexistent during the war. Black on the higher-priced spot market. in fact, the colonial government leaders were especially galled by the Zimbabwe's other energy needs, during more than 90 years had been Smith regime's educational policies; moreover, were being met in great the main provider and protector of "Equality" meant that the govern- part by the production of electrical white economic privilege in Rho- ment allocated revenues in equal power at the huge Kariba Dam desia, the settlers had constantly portion for the education of the complex, constructed during the paid lip service to free enterprise, white minority and the black period of settler domination. Finally, market determination of prices, and majority. The Smith regime can the end of the war meant that the shorter routes to the sea through for most Zimbabweans, will con- cipitously on a course of radical Maputo or Beira would again be tinue. socialist development. Although available. Indeed, the obvious health there are of course many complex A conservative approach for the ex- factors involved in the case of of the Zimbabwean economy led port market is also apparent inas- one recent Zambian visitor to Mozambique, the socialist experi- much as the production of cotton, ment there has been marked by complain to me about the sacrifices tobacco, and other agricultural his country and Mozambique had severe food shortages, inefficiencies earners is largely in white hands. in the operation of ports and rail- endured to secure Zimbabwean The situation with respect to mineral liberation. "Now that the war is roads, and serious balance of production is similar: foreigners- payments problems. Indeed, antici- over," he stated, "the Zimbabweans many of them white South Afri- have the prosperity and the well- pating the July 1980 state visit of cans-provide close to 70 percent President , thought- stocked shops, while we have soar- of the investment capital. Indeed, ing inflation and food shortages." ful commentators in Salisbury ob- the diversity of mineral produc- served that while Zimbabweans From the steady influx of foreign tion-gold, asbestos, chrome, owed much to Mozambique for its businessmen and investors to Salis- nickel, copper, coal, tin, iron, silver, military support of liberation, the bury, it has become apparent that and cobalt-is one of the prin- new nation should look to or many foreigners are interested in cipal strengths of the inherited Malawi for its models of economic contributing to the further economic colonial economy, insulating Zim- development. growth of the country. Hence, the babwe against the shock of drastic Mugabe government has come to fluctuation in world prices for any Still, the rhetoric of socialism appreciate that a precipitous ideo- single commodity. If Zimbabwe persists, as when Mugabe in logical assault on the white-con- wishes to enjoy a continued flow of midJuly stressed his intent to trolled private sector would have Western investment capital, a favor- create worker committees in virtu- immediate and long-range conse- able balance of trade, and employ- ally all enterprises, on the Yugo- quences for blacks and whites alike. ment for black mine laborers, slav model. The workers' involve- Mugabe will probably be obliged to ment in decisions directly affecting Second, Mugabe's group recog- soft-pedal any discussion of nation- them would foster a sense of iden- nized the need for caution in its alization. He has already had to tity with the enterprise, thereby approach to the critical area of food avoid imposing further limits on re- enhancing production. In the same production, which is both a do- patriation of investment earnings. interview, however, Mugabe said he mestic and a regional concern, since Mugabe's appointment of inter- did not anticipate nationalization of Mozambique, Zambia, and other nationally respected Bernard Chid- private industries unless they were neighbors already face the pros- zero as Minister of Economic being badly mismanaged.' pect of food rationing. Internally, Planning and Development has Mugabe's ideological options have been of great help in winning ex- The 1980 Budget Speech been limited by the need to provide ternal investor confidence. In a political system which emulates food not only for the settled popu- the British parliamentary model, the lation but also for 35,000 former While the pressures for rapid Afri- reading of the annual Budget guerrillas and more than a million canization of the mining and busi- Speech is a moment of great sig- civilian refugees or displaced per- ness enterprises as well as of the nificance. The speech not only sons. public bureaucracy have intensified, reveals the financial health or weak- it is difficult to overcome in one year ness of the nation, but it also enun- For cultural reasons as well as the the neglect of nine decades. The ciates the government's economic consequence of discriminatory token changes introduced during philosophy, spelling out unambigu- settler or colonial policies, the the brief Muzorewa period did little ously its plans with respect to taxes, majority of the 700,000 black fam- to alter the fact that Africans had new projects, and programs. It is a ilies engaged in agriculture pursue been systematically denied the blueprint for action. In cases where subsistence cultivation in the less- opportunity for education and man- the government commands a solid developed Tribal Trust area. In con- agerial positions. While the Mugabe majority in Parliament, one may trast, some 80 to 90 percent of the regime has opted for now to depend assume that subsequent legislation 2.5 million tons of food and other on the talents, skills, and "institu- will fairly closely adhere to the cash crops produced in Zimbabwe is tional memory" the European rhetoric of the Budget Speech. grown on the highly capitalized bureaucrats have tended to monop- The reading of the first postindepen- farms belonging to roughly 7,000 olize, programs for of dence speech by Finance Minister white settlers. Historic injustices the bureaucracy have been acceler- Senator was awaited aside, the Mugabe regime recog- ated, and the high salaries, generous anxiously. ZANU-PF radicals of the nizes that the white-controlled agri- pensions, and other perquisites left and extremist white settlers and cultural sector is efficient. It could, if formerly enjoyed by expatriates and businessmen on the right made dire properly nurtured, continue to keep local white bureaucrats are being pronouncements in anticipation of Zimbabwe self -sufficient in food curtailed. production and also make it a decisions on how the Z$1.4 billion regional granary. One further reason Finally, Mugabe's economic think- (U.S.Sl.82 billion) was to be dis- for caution in disturbing the status ing is reputedly influenced by what tributed in the first peacetime quo is fear that the two-year happened in Mozambique after that budget. Such an aura of mystery drought, which has already reduced former Portuguese colony expelled and majesty had accumulated that stocks of , the dietary staple its alien talent and embarked pre- Mugabe and his chief ministers even slightly left-of-center of Roosevelt's problem," and that individuals and version of New Deal capitalism private employers had obligations in during the American depression. that area. Furthermore, in a gesture Without disappointing his strife- to please low-income blacks, the weary black constituency, it never- sales tax was removed from many theless attempted to make life under basic commodities such as milk a black majority government palat- products, fish, and kerosene for able to even the most conservative lamps. whites. The more ardent socialist critics It was, as advertised, a "people's within ZANU-PF were disturbed by budget," in that it attempted to sat- the cautious approach to land isfy some of the populist demands acquisition and distribution: only of those who had given Mugabe his Z$34 million had been allocated. decisive electoral victory. Some of Since the Lancaster House agree- the greatest increases in govern- ment barred confiscation and mental spending over the preceding pledged the new government to Muzorewa-Smith budgets were in purchase land from the present social services. Education, which owners at mutually agreed upon Senator Enos Nkala, Minister of Finance. accounted for Z$184 million of the prices, the process of redistribution total, was up 53 percent, a giant was bound to be protracted. Nkala cut short their visit to Botswana, step toward the achievement of noted frankly that the government where they had attended the funeral Mugabe's goal of free primary still expected the British and Ameri- service for Sir Seretse Khama, in school education. Funding for the can governments to deliver on their order to be present for the budget Ministry of Health was up 55 per- pre-Lancaster pledges (of the Calla- reading. cent, to Z$83 million, and one-fourth han-Kissinger era) to fund the land its allocation was earmarked for purchase scheme. The slow pace of The budget, read before Parliament rural medical services. Although land acquisition also had its impact July 24, 1980, revealed Robert projected expenditures on govern- upon other postwar problems, such Mugabe to be a master politician. In ment housing increased more than as the demobilization of ZANLA and a remarkable balancing act, the 65 percent (from Z$32 million to ZlPRA guerrilla forces and the re- budget seemed to have something Z$53 million) and funds for housing settlement of refugees. The cost of for everyone. While proclaiming loans eightfold, Senator Nkala clothing, housing, feeding, and socialism, the announced program stressed that the housing shortage for development came out only was "not merely a government Viewof Salisbury, capital of Zimbabwe. maintaining the former guerrillas in dividend earnings that could be re- Nazi collaborators, and the various the assembly camps contributed mitted to some nonresident share- ethnic secessionist groups into a substantially to the apparently high holders would continue, there were single Yugoslav national army. In level of expenditure for the military. no ceilings on the size of corporate some respects the racial, ethnic, Defense, for example, included dividends, and there was movement ideological, and technical problems maintenance of ZIPRA and ZANLA in the direction of unfreezing funds facing Mugabe are even more com- forces in the rural development that had been blocked at the time of plex. Individual military experience project called "Operation Seed." UDI. Despite the government's and skills range from a full exposure Thus, in the future a good portion of preference for "localization" of to the mechanization and tech- the 16 percent of the current budget business, moreover, there was nology required for modern warfare allocated to defense could be re- explicit acknowledgment that for- down to the kind of bootstrap sur- directed to social services. eign skills would for the time being vival tactics which characterize hit- have to make up for severe short- and-run guerrilla operations. The reaction of the white commu- ages of artisans, technicians, and nity upon whom Mugabe depended engineers in both private industry For the immediate future the largest for continued economic growth was and parastatal organizations. positive. White leaders in and out of element in the new Zimbabwe Army government were encouraged by The general euphoria regarding eco- may continue to be the remnants of Senator Nkala's support of a mixed nomic growth-which could reach 6 the Rhodesian military. At the height of the war the white-con- economy and his statement that "I percent by the end of 1981 -must trolled security forces numbered would like to think of our socialism be tempered by the realization that close to 75,000, including regulars, as Zimbabwe-oriented and not as an the sudden importation of manu- conscripts, and about 22,000 re- alien prescription."2 Instead of the factured goods will contribute sub- stantially to a rise in inflation and a servists. The white presence was confiscatory personal and corporate further maintained by 8,000 para- income taxes the whites had feared, serious balance-of-payments prob- lem for the new regime. Economic military police, 35,000 police re- the Mugabe budget seemed to rely serves, and 10,000 auxiliaries.6 on deficit spending to achieve his growth will also hinge upon the ability of the new government to What was not always apparent in populist goals. Several white busi- the external reporting of the war resolve its other domestic and for- nessmen at a Rotary Club meeting was that 85 percent of the security eign problems. repeated to me Senator Nkala's forces were black. Despite fears that comment that "the object of the Demobilizationand Integration of ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters might system is not to bring everyone seek recrimination against the black down to a lower standard of living the Guerrilla Forces One of the keys to the success of soldiers who had served in the but rather to achieve greater , the Grey Scouts, equality by raising the living stan- Mugabe's economic programs is the question of the demobilization and and other units which had fought so dards of the poorer sections of the effectively against Zimbabwe lib- community."3 One white editor integration of the former guerrilla forces into the national armed eration, the integrated units have commented that: "Instead of follow- functioned smoothly. Indeed, the ing the usual socialist trend of taking forces. The 34,000 wartime freedom Mugabe government used former a larger slice of the national income fighters (roughly 22,000 in Mugabe's security force personnel to assist in cake through greater direct taxation ZANLA and 12,000 in Nkomo's training and integrating the ZANLA [Nkalal has given us the incentive to ZIPRA) have constituted a signifi- and ZIPRA troops into the new bake more cakes."4 cant manpower pool which, if pro- vided with land and otherwise Army, and it was soldiers of the Although there were explicit warn- usefully employed, could advance former that ings to local whites and foreign busi- reconstruction goals. Conversely, if restored order in the Bulawayo area nesses to include more blacks in not employed or if their aspirations in February 1981 (discussed below). their operations and to underwrite are not satisfied, they could become black entrepreneurs, there was a source of great political and social Although some white officers and general relief among the whites that instability. Behavior of the former enlisted men have remained in the these developments would be pro- guerrillas, moreover, directly affects postwar Army, roughly half by the pelled by preferential tax treatment. the ability of Zimbabwe to attract end of 1980 had already returned to Representatives of the Chambers of foreign investment and trade and to civilian life. All-white units such as Commerce, the Commercial convince international monetary the have Farmers' Union, and even Rhode- agencies and foreign governments been disbanded. The status of the sian Front members of 's stability. career white soldier, however, un- praised the budget speech. One fortunately was linked to the con- The task of military integration M.P. commented: "If that is how tinuing presence of one man- which Mugabe inherited from the the Minister is going to handle Lieutenant-General . Lancaster House agreement is socialism.. l must say it is a very Walls had commanded the Rho- . almost without precedent. It is as if good brand."5 desian troops during most of the Marshall Tito at the end of the war. It was he who had convinced The Nkala Budget Speech was Second World War, had been re- Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa equally buoying to the spirits of quired to amalgamate his own Par- during mid-1979 that victory on the European, American, Japanese, and tisans, the Chetnik guerrilla forces of battlefield could not be achieved other foreign investors. Although Mihailovich, the remnants of King and that a negotiated political settle- some restrictions on the amount of Peter's regular army, the surviving ment would be the only way to end the war. For his role in ending the against the vicissitudes of postwar Malawi, Zambia, and other African hostilities, Robert Mugabe retained civilian life." Many fighters were countries, and even during the war, General Walls as Commander of the pessimistic about the ability of the many of the significant jobs were Joint High Command for one year. new government to deliver on its held by the 40 percent who were Walls' primary task was overseeing promises to provide land and jobs. white or foreign black. the training of former freedom Most realized, too, that they were at fighters and the molding of ZANLA, a disadvantage in terms of educa- Other vocational outlets exist, but ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian tion and skills compared to the re- most require substantial training. forces into a single unified Army. In turnees from abroad or to the black There has been, for example, a pro- July 1980, however, Walls suddenly civilians who had accumulated edu- posal by the Medical, Dental, and announced his decision to retire cation, experience, and seniority in Allied Professions Council that a early, amid rumors that he felt his jobs under the Smith and Muzorewa training program be created to task had been hampered by bicker- regimes. Thus, staying in the mili- direct former combat medics into ing among the ZANLA and ZIPRA tary might be a comfortable option. health careers. The additional medi- leadership in the Joint High Com- Barracks were not readily available, cal assistants would facilitate the mand. The decision to resign was however, and most freedom fighters reopening of the rural hospitals and immediately clouded by indiscreet until mid-1980 continued to live at clinics closed during the war. remarks he made regarding the assembly camps in very unsatis- Mugabe's leadership ability during factory circumstances. Housing and caring for former an interview broadcast by the BBC. guerrillas awaiting integration into In that interview he acknowledged The Mugabe government's demo- the national Army remained major that in March 1980 he had recom- bilization plan focused on channel- problems in mid-1980. The miser- mended to the British interim gov- ing the former freedom-fighters into able condition of facilities in the ernment that a "pre-emptive coup" agriculture, hoping thereby to main- cease-fire assembly camps had be undertaken to void the results of tain self-sufficiency in food produc- contributed to the boredom and Mugabe's electoral victory. Al- tion. The plan also capitalized on the aimlessness which manifested itself though Walls charged that Mu- symbolic significance of land reform in violence. Recent efforts to re- gabe's adherents had engaged in in sustaining the revolutionary dia- locate the former guerrillas in armed intimidation, this was not logue. The latter objective would be regular barracks or in unused substantiated by the team of inter- further enhanced if land allocation housing estates near urban areas national observers. On the basis of to demobilized troops was done on were justified as a "half-way house" these incidents, Walls was imme- a cooperative rather than an indi- approach to civilian reintegration, diately dismissed from command by vidual basis. ZANU-PF leaders had but the policy also aroused opposi- Mugabe. The harsh words which high hopes that they could replicate tion. Civilians in the adjacent urban accompanied this action were in independent Zimbabwe their fairly areas-both black and white resi- bound to affect the attitude of the successful efforts at collective farm- dents of Salisbury, for example- white career soldier. The position of ing in Mozambique during the war. protested the relocation of 17,000 the white soldier was further under- By July 1980, two units of former still-armed troops in the vacant mined by reports that the South guerrillas had been demobilized in houses in the Chitunwiza area. African government was success- order to farm collectively. In other Drunkenness among many former fully luring away white soldiers with cases the government has promised guerrillas awaiting training and offers of cash and other benefits to to provide seed, tractors, and other assignment had become almost a fight on the Namibian-Angolan equipment as incentives to veterans way of life. Uncertainties about land border. 7 to convert to cooperative farms a allocation, about the prospects of number of former European-man- disability benefits to wounded Charting the future of the remaining aged estates, which had the advan- fighters, and about the course of ZANLA and ZIPRA forces is far tage of efficiency of scale. To the domestic politics (particularly with more problematic. During the cease- great disappointment of the more respect to the minority Ndebele in fire, most of the former liberation ideologically inclined ZANU-PF ZIPRA) frustrated government fighters were housed in tents and leaders, however, both demobilized attempts to collect weapons in a other crude shelters at assembly veterans and civilian refugees pre- central armory. Thus, shooting points, their disposition uncertain. ferred either outright private owner- sprees within the camps had Mugabe had promised that any ship or a reversion to traditional become commonplace; black and freedom fighter who opted for a tenure. Even on collective farms, the white farmers alike had complained career in the new unified Army of veterans requested that a portion of to the government about attacks on Zimbabwe would be permitted to do the collective land be reserved for unarmed civilians by soldiers and so, a decision made without regard private cultivation by the farmer and about former freedom fighters for cost or needs of a peacetime his dependents. on privately owned land. army. Consequently there was no internal pressure for the former The government has also attempted The greatest disturbances of do- guerrillas, many of whom had been to encourage former freedom mestic peace, however, have recruited when they were very fighters to seek other forms of occurred in the Bulawayo area, young anyway, to return to their civilian employment, including wage which is in the heart of the Ndebele homes. The comradeshihp of the labor on white-owned farms and in homeland that gives Nkomo his military had-as one Zimbabwean the mines. Indeed, until very re- greatest support. Over 3,000 ZIPRA official suggested - provided an cently 75 percent of the African and ZANLA forces fought a pitched "almost womblike protection mine labor in Zimbabwe was from battle there in November 1980. Before the dust had settled over 50 to disarm ZANLA and ZIPRA extend the laws and decrees intro- persons had been killed and hun- troops. Indicating its intention to duced by the Smith government dreds wounded-including many back its demands with stern meas- under the wartime State of Emer- civilian bystanders. A repeat of the ures, the government wisely dis- gency. Bulawayo conflict occurred in Feb- armed Mugabe's own ZIPRA troops ruary 1981 and not only involved in the Bulawayo area before the Beyond the financial and racial many more soldiers and civilians but more apprehensive ZANLA forces problems just outlined, integrating also lasted over a week. The were ordered to comply. Second, the two guerrilla forces and the re- violence, which was touched off by Mugabe used the uprising to placate maining elements of the Rhodesian an argument in a beerhall, left an the local civilian population who had security forces into a unified army estimated 100-300 dead and several objected to the quartering of former implies overcoming ideological, hundred people homeless. The latter freedom fighters in urban areas. ethnic, and factional obstacles. incident-which some foreign Abandoning the argument that Many of the liberation forces have journalists rashly depicted as a "civil exposure to urban life would assist received their military training from waru-was a serious threat to in the readjustment of former Libyans, Yugoslavs, and others who Mugabe's policy of racial and ethnic guerrillas, after order had been re- were ideologically committed to reconciliation as well as to his pro- stored, the separate ZlPRA and more revolutionary socialist ob- gram of military integration. ZANLA forces were each moved to jectives. This accounts in part for new rural locations, 20 miles (in the internal demands that Mugabe The significant difference between opposite directions) from Zimbab- proceed more quickly to create a the November and February dis- we's second-largest city. Marxist state in which vestiges of turbances was that the latter was white privilege have been elimi- not limited to the ZIPRA and The three integrated battalions in- nated. It is from this quarter, too, ZANLA forces quartered in the volved in the violence were dis- that Mugabe has been urged to Bulawayo suburb of Entumbane. mantled and the ringleaders were ignore the Lancaster House pledge Rather, it included members of three court-martialed. The government that Zimbabwe not be used as a of the newly integrated Army units then advanced the pace of integra- staging area for the continuing (the 12th, 13th, and 41st Battalions) tion efforts, on the theory that the military campaign against white stationed at Connemara near Gwelo. continued presence of former guer- in the Republic of South Although the unit commanders rilla troops was a primary obstacle to Africa. were not implicated in the violence, real peace. At the time of the Feb- Although the troops committed to a it was clear they had lost control of ruary riots they still numbered over their troops. Confronted with appar- revolutionary program are probably 22,000 (roughly 14,000 ZANLA, a minority, the potential for disrup- ent ethnic and factional conflict 8,000 ZIPRA). The new integration within the ranks, the Mugabe gov- tion of Mugabe's policies of modera- plan called for creation of roughly tion and reconciliation may be con- ernment elected to use force in three new units each month through putting down the rioters-ironically, siderable. This has already been August 1981, a difficult but not im- demonstrated with respect to Yugo- the specially trained black troops of possible task. the First Brigade (the former Rho- slav-trained police who had to be desian African Rifles), who were still Rural areas where ZIPRA and pointedly reminded by Minister of largely under the command of white ZANLA forces retain power have State that officers. To the relief of the Mugabe also resisted the re-establishment of they "had no right to participate in regime, order was restored within 24 civilian courts and new, national politics and were to obey the hours. administrative structurgs. The Mu- command structure they had in- gabe government has attempted to herited from the former govern- The rioting was clearly a setback for curb ZANU-PF "kangaroo courts," ment."* Even more significant were the military unification program, which mete out justice on ideo- disruptions caused by Libyan- giving credence to the skeptics who logical or factional grounds, and the trained guerrilla troops at Assembly had contended that the four- to six- guerrilla committees which "screen" Point X-ray near Mtoko, 90 miles week crash training courses were returning refugees for their respec- from Salisbury. Clashes with the inadequate to build unit loyalty and tive loyalties to ZANLA or ZIPRA, as police and escalating demands for discipline. Use of the First Brigade farmers attempt to resume culti- better quarters at Point X-ray com- gave comfort to Mugabe's domestic vating their vacated lands. Armed pelled Mugabe in critics and set off rumors that some to make his first visit to a cease-fire committees in several locations 4,000 holdovers from the Smith assembly camp. Indeed, uncertain- have organized residents into polit- army would be kept separate from ties regarding whether the reception ical cells and have engaged in illegal the integrated units to serve as would be hostile or friendly led the Mugabe's "Praetorian Guard." (The action to halt government vaccina- government to shroud his visit in tion campaigns and to control gov- latter is unlikely, as such institution- secrecy. alization would undermine Mu- ernment and mission schools. gabe's legitimacy with his sup- Having had little support from The greatest obstacles to integra- porters.) civilian government during the war, tion, however, have been ethnic and the guerrilla units have found it diffi- factional. In many cases the two The February events in fact gave cult to surrender territorial control overlap, although this was blurred in Prime Minister Mugabe another now that peace has arrived. It was the early stages of the war when opportunity to turn disadvantage to this continued defiance of authority each of the political groups, includ- advantage by beginning in earnest that obliged the Mugabe regime to ing those of Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau, had their own security the broader resettlement issue. managed to bring the best land guards and military wings. Bishop Roughly 1,200,000 people-approxi- under their control. Epitomizing the Muzorewa, according to one esti- mately one-seventh of the black distorted settler idea of "equality," mate, had close to 20,000 armed population-were dislocated during the Land Tenure Act of 1969 (which troops in his Pfumo Revanhu the 7 years of war. Aside from the was built on the 1923 Constitution ("Spear of the People") group. underutilization of their talents, the and subsequent legislation) reserved While the leaders of the frontline plight of the refugees has contrib- 45 million acres of land for the states convinced ZANU and ZAPU uted to political instability and been 250,000 whites and an equal number to cooperate politically and diplo- an enormous drain on the limited of acres for the 7 million blacks! In matically in a united Patriotic Front resources available for education, qualitative terms the discrepancies during the war's final stages, they health, and other public services. were even more glaring. The sectors never succeeded in creating a Depopulation of rural areas, more- reserved for whites had not only the common military command. It was over, threatens the new govern- best soil and the most dependable not merely the personality conflicts ment's ability to maintain self-suf- rainfall but also the tracts known to between former political allies- ficiency in food production and to have significant mineral resources. Mugabe and Nkomo-or even the grow the export crops required to As noted earlier, the majority of ideological differences between the improve Zimbabwe's balance of African cultivators lived in the Tribal two parties that prevented a military payments. As Mr. D. Chefeke, the Trust areas, where land was allo- merger. Rather, it was that Nkomo's Zimbabwe representative of the UN cated under rules of traditional PF (ZAPU) drew its primary support High Commissioner for Refugees tenure, based on usufructory right from the Ndebele and the Kalanga, (UNHCR), indicated to me in an of occupancy. Cultural preference whereas ZANU-PF was most firmly interview in Salisbury: for subsistence agriculture as well as rooted among the Mashona. While restrictive colonial legislation ex- the ethnic lines were not rigid, as The most important problem for us cluded most Africans from participa- evidenced by the fact that many in is to get people resettled in time for tion in cash crop production. There- the Karanga clan of the Mashona- them to have their crops planted for fore, solutions to the refugee prob- speaking people were opposed to the next harvest, If that does not lem must be those which bring Mugabe, the correlation between happen, not only the refugee prob- about the qualitative changes in factional and ethnic cleavages has lem, but the economic survival of black agriculture which are needed nevertheless frustrated integration the country might be threatened, if blacks are to control the country's of ZIPRA forces into the unified This country has been a food ex- economic destiny. Army. porter in the past, but the second year of drought in a row has Only about 260,000 of those dis- ZANU-ZAPU cooperation had fallen compelled us to import maize and located by the war were refugees in apart even before the independence other foodstuffs. the strict sense of the UNHCR elections. Despite gestures in the definition-that is, fugitives from direction of , Beyond the immediate practical their country of citizenship or Ndebele leaders have been stung by dimension of rural resettlement, normal residence. Although most of persistent attacks on PF (ZAPU) getting people back to the country- the external refugees living in leadership by Mugabe's lieutenants. side has ideological consequences Mozambique (the major host coun- Fearing that their minority status for the continuing revolutionary try) or in Botswana, Zambia, and would compel them to accept less struggle. As Movan Mahachi, the other African countries fell under important roles in the unified Deputy Minister in the Office of the jurisdiction of the UNHCR, the Army, ZIPRA units sought to rernain Land, Resettlement, and Rural care of the refugees was shared by intact in the assembly camps. Development pointed out to this church groups, international volun- Mutual distrust at the military writer in July 1980: tary agencies, and both European leadership level intensified with and African governments. The Peter Walls' departure. In searching Unless we deal- and deal quickly - frontline states in particular found for his replacement, it was apparent with the question of land redis- their meager resources considerably tribution, the very legitimacy of our that neither nor strained by the refugee presence, government is at stake. It was to of ZIPRA would be but they accepted the burden in the correct the iniquitous land distribu- acceptable to ZANLA, and the vocal name of African brotherhood. At tion that led many black Zimbab- partisanship of Rex Nhongo (as well times the refugee camps posed weans to take up arms against the as his alleged acts of violence special security problems: during my white settler minority. We cannot against civilians) had made him visit to Botswana in 1977 a local fail them. We cannot long continue anathema to both Ndebele and official indicated that order was with a situation in which the people . Nevertheless, maintained among the 2,000 or after the first three months of inde- who lost the war still have the land more Zimbabweans in the refugee pendence, the pace of integration and those who won the war do not. camp near Francistown only be- quickened, and was accelerated still cause the UNHCR team rigorously Conflict over land ownership and further after the riot in February screened the refugees politically so use has been at the heart of 1981. they could physically segregate whitelblack relations since the initial supporters of Mugabe, Nkomo, point of contact between the agents Refugees and Resettlement Sithole, and Muzorewa. The future of the former guerrillas of and the tribal resi- may be at the core of the rehabilita- dents of Zimbabwe in the 1880s. The UNHCR has assumed a major tion problem, but it is only part of Over the years the white minority role in the repatriation and resettle- ment of refugees under the cease- euphemistically called them) against interests of the black majority fire agreement worked out at Lan- guerrilla raids. The unstated purpose against a dissident, disruptive minor- caster House in which UNHCR was of the villages, however, was to ity. Upward of 600,000 black charged with assisting the return of divide the African population polit- civilians had been herded into the refugees of voting age so that the ically and to deny the guerrillas "protected villages" and separated strength of the various competing access to the civilian "sea" in which from their homes, fields, and liveli- parties would be properly reflected they might find food, information, hood. Many were forced to sell their in the preindependence elections. and moral support. The "protected cattle at a loss or turn them loose in That was no easy task. On the one villages" gave the Smith and the hope of retrieving them later. hand, the refugees were suspicious Muzorewa regimes the propaganda Health conditions in the villages, as of the UN effort and resentful of the weapon of appearing to act in the Minister for Health Dr. Herbert bureaucratic red tape and delays; on the other, the Muzorewa govern- ment obstructed UNHCR efforts, charging that Patriotic Front sup- porters were actually guerrillas in disguise, infiltrating the country in order to continue the armed strug- gle. Officially only 35,133 refugees were processed by the UNHCR at the 7 receiving camps set up near the borders during the cease-fire, but it was estimated that many more refugees had returned of their own vo~ition.~ The UNHCR mandate was extended to cover the repatriation and internal resettlement through the first year of independence. The return of refugees in the postindependence period has proceeded by fits and starts, reflecting the harvest season or the ending of the school year in the host country or the beginning of the planting cycle in Zimbabwe. The tempo of flow has also been influ- enced by reports of rural unrest and the prospects for securing land. In July 1980, for example, just when the UNHCR officials felt that re- patriation from Mozambique was tapering off, a new group of 700 persons appeared at the border one day seeking relocation support. Although UNHCR experience in Zaire, the Sudan, and elsewhere is helpful, in many respects the situa- tion in Zimbabwe is sui generis. The Z$110 million allocated to UNHCR and the additional Z$30 million from the Food-for-Peace Program has hardly been adequate for the task. The size of the external refugee group has been swollen by domestic displaced civilians, who fall into two distinct categories. The first are the families who were removed from their isolated rural homesteads and concentrated into the so-called "protected villages." Nominally, the villages were designed to protect the "loyal" blacks (which the whites

Refugee family awaiting food at UNHCR camps. Ushewokunze pointed out in July the ~hirambahuo camp near titles by offering a take-it-or-leave-it 1980, were deplorable, , dip- , demonstrated against purchase price for uncultivated or theria, and kwashiorkor being rife the requirement that prospective abandoned land. (over 40 percent of the children tenants make a deposit and provide suffered from malnutrition).lo proof that they earn at least Z$100 a Third, the government lacks the month. 11 funds for any massive land purchase Re-establishing these rural peoples program at this time. Although the was no simple matter of removing Evidence that the Mugabe govern- 1980 Mugabe budget in this cate- the guards and tearing down the ment recognized the desire of many gory constituted a 266 percent fences around the protected villages rural migrants to remain in towns increase over the feeble efforts at the end of the war. Many of the was reflected in the eightfold in- commenced under Muzorewa, it villagers needed rehabilitation assis- crease in funds allocated in the first amounts only to Z$34 million and is tance since their farms had reverted budget for general urban develop- set out to cover both acquisition and to bush, with wild pigs and baboons ment and high density housing. rural development. Clearly the Mu- running rampant. Those abandoned Even more than those in "protected gabe government had high expecta- houses the soldiers did not destroy, villages," the urban drifters appre- tions that Great Britain and the the termites did. Hoof-and-mouth ciated the availability of shops, United States would provide the and other livestock diseases had schools, and clinics in the cities and major funding for land repurchase. become endemic in the deserted townships. Some had acquired a Unfortunately, these expectations areas. Getting people to return to stake in urban life through the accu- were based largely on the negotia- their homes was a difficult task. mulation of seniority in a civil service tions of the Callahan-Kissinger Many had to be convinced beyond job or through marriage ties. More- period, when the Western powers doubt that rural violence had sub- over, the informal urban communi- seemed intent on "buying the sided and that the guerrilla com- cation network daily confirmed peace." The advent of the Thatcher mittees had been curbed. Others rumors of food shortages and government in Britain and the con- had found the inconveniences of violence in the rural areas, reinforc- servative turn in the U.S. Congress village life balanced by the availa- ing their decision not to return. under Carter and now Reagan bility of crude amenities and recrea- changed prospects considerably. tional outlets not available in the Land Acquisition The British in 1980 did set up a home area. As noted, the Mugabe regime did matching fund program and the first not wish in the short run to under- allocation of Z$80 million had been The largest block of displaced per- mine the efficiency of white agricul- earmarked by the British for that sons, however, were the 400,000 or tural production. Yet it recognized purpose. American funds, however, more rural-to-urban migrants who that, in the long run, the key are to be directed to rural redevelop- sought safety or jobs in Salisbury, element in resettling the refugees ment rather than land acquisition. Bulawayo, and other urban areas as and halting the urban drift is the re- The amount and character of Anglo- the hostilities escalated. As indi- distribution of white-owned land to American aid in this area compelled vidual migrants, they were often black cultivators. Dealing with this one Zimbabwean official to com- expected to fend for themselves. emotion-laden, ideologically signifi- plain that "We're being offered a The central government was con- cant problem was not easy. Band-Aid when the patient is suffer- cerned about the prosecution of the ing from internal hemorrhaging!" war; while the white-controlled local First, the Lancaster House agree- councils had revenues sufficient ment obliges the government to refrain from confiscation of white Finally, serious efforts to prevent only to handle the needs of the more direct action by landless Zimbab- settled urban population. In the farms. Actual purchase has to be on terms mutually acceptable to the weans in resolving their problems absence of regular jobs as well as are bound to put the government in welfare programs, theft often be- government and the owners or heirs. Thus, the government is pre- an untenable position with its more came the sole option for feeding and ideological supporters. Indeed, plans clothing oneself and one's family. vented from arbitrarily correcting the historic injustice which saw for an orderly rural settlement are The International Red Cross, which being challenged, much the way had assisted in providing food and Europeans acquire tribal land, by seizure or purchase for a nominal urban squatters have moved into clothing to over 60,000 migrants vacated housing estates. One ex- during the war, ceased its support at sum, during the 90 years of colonial rule. ample in the eastern highlands independence. found Senator , Faced with the prospect of limited Second, the government is obliged the 70-year-old Chief of the Tang- help from government or inter- to leave out of production land wena people, giving open support to national voluntary agencies, many which has been abandoned by de- the movement of his people into urban drifters since independence parting whites or is under absentee vacant portions of the 16,000- have taken matters into their own South African ownership. One esti- hectare Gaeresi Ranch. Claiming hands. Some have left the squalid mate is that 11.6 million acres- that this was the land of their refugee camps set up along the roughly a fourth of white-owned ancestors and that they had actually perimeters of urban areas and land-falls into this category. Ulti- squatted on it until the beginning of squatted in abandoned housing mately, under the pressure of the emergency in 1971, the Tang- estates or in recently completed meeting food needs, the govern- wena people have dotted the pine- low-cost government housing. ment may be able to give the forested slopes with plastic shelters Some squatters, such as those in appearance of respecting freehold referred to elsewhere in Zimbabwe as "tangwenas" (in recognition of tures. As one Zimbabwe official We have a serious educational prob- the long history of these people as stated to this writer: lem in that respect. Perhaps we squatters); granaries and chicken have to begin slowly, by setting coops are further signs that they Ourpeople accept the jdea of aside common grazing areas forlive- intend to stay. The government has ism in terms of better distribution of stock and establishing common found it difficult to turn aside their But when it comes to land, marketing facilities. But we want to requests for tractors, seeds, and they exhibit the peasant avoid the extremes both of a return farm implements so they can farm syndrome. " Each person wants his to traditional agriculture as well as more efficiently near the graves of littleplot of land to for him- the dehumanizing experience of their ancestors.12 self and his family. Considering that agro-busjness as it is practiced in many of the white landowners are the Unitedstates. As has been true of demobilized asking us to purchase land at three veterans, civilians being repatriated times the fair market price, we can- in the rural area are reluctant to not afford to have the land utilized move into cooperative farming ven- strictly for subsistence cultivation. (February 1981)

[Photos courtesy of the Zimbabwe Ministry of Information and Tourism1

NOTES

1. RandDaily Mail, July 18, 1980. 2. Salisbury Herald, July 25, 1980. 3. Ibid., July 27, 1980. 4. National Observer, July 25,1980. 5. Salisbury Herald, July 25, 1980; July 30, 1980. 6. Richard W. Hull, "The Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia," Current History, vol. 78 (March 19801, p. 108. 7. Reported by Carl Rowan, Washing- ton Star, August 20, 1980; and Rand Daily Mail, July 19, 1980.

8. Bulawayo Chronicle, July 18, 1980. 9. See Roger J. Southall, "Resettling the Refugees," Africa Report, Novern- ber-December 1980, pp. 748-752. 10. Bulawayo Chronicle, July 18, 1980, p. I. 11. Salisbury Herald, July 30, 1980. 12. The Sunday Mail, July 20, 1980, p. 9.

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