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Mugabe’s Revenge: Halting the Violence in

ollowing elections on March 29—in which Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front the opposition party, the Movement for (ZANU-PF)—Mugabe’s ruling party in Zimbabwe FDemocratic Change (MDC), won control of parliament and won more votes in the presidential contest—the government unleashed a nationwide Why did ZANU-PF lose the March campaign of violence against opposition groups. election and what now? Zimbabwean President Mugabe has never been so close to losing power, and appears willing ZANU-PF’s losses were unexpected because the to use all means available to physically beat his MDC was divided and had made concessions in the opponents into submission. As the international lead up to elections, however, political violence, community considers its response to the complex corruption, and gross mismanagement of the crisis in Zimbabwe, its first order of business must economy proved to be ZANU-PF’s undoing. be to stop the violence. The United States must dip- lomatically engage with African leaders to discuss Since the election, Mugabe has resorted to state a common way forward and put pressure on the organized violence. At least 32 supporters of the regime to end the violence. MDC have been killed, over 6700 have been dis- placed, and over 1000 have been arrested as part of the , or “Operation Key Terms, Groups and People Who Did You Vote For?” All signs point to the situation worsening. Morgan Tsvangira—the leader of the MDC who garnered more votes in the March 29th presidential The MDC has sent mixed signals as to whether it election than all other candidates would contest a runoff vote. Ahead of a runoff, the U.S. must work closely with regional and in- Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—oppo- ternational partners to verify the accuracy of the sition party that won control of parliament in the numbers, send in poll monitors, and ensure a free March 29th election and fair poll. The MDC has clear advantages, but Mugabe will not leave office without a fight. Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Operation Who Did You Vote For?”)—a highly organized campaign using uniformed state security forces and ZANU- What are the Options for Policy PF militias Makers?

Robert Mugabe—Zimbabwean President who has Violence and the political crisis must be dealt with dominated Zimbabwean politics since 1980 and on separate tracks; a political settlement will take now is using a campaign of state-sponsored vio- time, but diplomatic intervention aimed at stop- lence and intimidation against the MDC ping the violence cannot wait. The U.S. government can be the engine that drives a solution, but the Southern African Development Community details of such a solution should arise from partner- (SADC)—a loose regional alliance of nine states in ships with regional governments. Southern Africa www.enoughproject.org

Impose a cost—U.S. diplomats should urge the A New Western Alliance U.N. Security Council to investigate the violence, and impose targeted sanctions on Zimbabwean Past regional efforts have presumed that South officials if they obstruct investigators. The U.S. and Africa would take the lead in negotiations with its European allies on the Security Council should Zimbabwe due to the close relationship of the two press for the case of Zimbabwe to be referred countries and its reputation as an economic and to the prosecutor for the International Criminal political powerhouse on the continent, however, Court (ICC). efforts have not been backed up by action. The U.S. should side-step and conduct contin- Prevent violence through a political settlement—In ued high-level consultations with other key SADC the absence of a process to seat the legitimate win- members, specifically and Botswana. ner, international actors should assist with negotiat- ing a transitional authority that would oversee the development of a popularly supported constitution, Conclusion paving the way for free and fair elections. It’s zero hour in Zimbabwe—a period that will Carrots and sticks to achieve a deal—The U.S. be spoken of for generations as either a time should coordinate with international actors to when the region united to support the will of develop and present a proposal for a settlement the people, or a missed opportunity that led that includes immediate financial and reconstruc- to thousands of deaths and a failed state. The tion assistance in exchange for Mugabe’s exit and a road ahead is difficult, but extraordinary times transition to a democratic government. call for extraordinary measures. Regional lead- ers must publicly recognize gross abuses of law • Carrots—impunity for Mugabe, a plan to convince by ZANU-PF, and develop an African solution militia members to disband, and assistance from to an African problem by applying focused the international community pressure on Mugabe to leave, side by side with meaningful incentives for a solution. The West • Sticks—referring the case to the ICC, targeted should provide support for this effort, but be personal sanctions, isolating Zimbabwe prepared to take strong action should that pressure fail to materialize.