a report of the csis africa program Beyond Mugabe preparing for zimbabwe’s transition 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Author Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Robert I. Rotberg E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Program Director Jennifer G. Cooke August 2011 ISBN 978-0-89206-654-4 Ë|xHSKITCy066544zv*:+:!:+:! a report of the csis africa program Beyond Mugabe preparing for zimbabwe’s transition Author Robert I. Rotberg Project Director Jennifer G. Cooke August 2011 About CSIS At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel- ops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo: Topographic map of the Republic of Zimbabwe, © iStockphoto.com/fr73/ Frank Ramspott © 2011 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN 978-0-89206-654-4 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 beyond mugabe preparing for zimbabwe’s transition Robert I. Rotberg Zimbabwe is more volatile—and its future political and economic developments more precari- ously balanced—than at any time since 2000. President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 87, long rumored to be suffering from advanced prostate cancer, looks increasingly frail. The NATO intervention in Libya, the successful civil protests in North Africa, and the ouster of former president Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire have all concentrated the minds of Zimbabwe’s neighbors and of Africa more broadly. South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are more critical of Mugabe’s continued authoritarian reign—and more fearful of a chaotic post-Mugabe transition—than ever before. Now is the appropriate time for Washington to reinvigorate its engagement with the Zimba- bwe problem and with Zimbabwe itself. Although the United States has imperfect and limited le- verage, it can encourage and press South Africa and SADC to carry out their oft-reiterated prom- ises to ensure an orderly transition in Zimbabwe from heavy-handed militarily enforced autocracy to peaceful democracy. To enhance its leverage and add to its credibility as an important diplomatic interlocutor, the United States may need to provide incentives capable of helping South Africa and SADC to persist in their newfound determination. Such an approach may demand a willingness to consider greater flexibility regarding current sanctions and financing restrictions in explicit exchange for more robust commitments from SADC and South Africa should Mugabe or the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) continue to renege on existing commitments under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) or attempt to scuttle the election Road Map that Zimbabwe’s chief political par- ties negotiated under SADC and South African oversight. Real, measurable benchmarks should be demanded for any relaxation of the sanctions regime. The United States should offer to partner with South Africa in reframing the Zimbabwe problem as one affecting world order, to train and fund effective short- and long-term election monitors, to support the preparation of a new voters’ roll and a reformed Zimbabwe Election Commission, to build for the long term a new peacekeeping capacity among local military forces, and to finance urgently required agricultural and energy projects within Zimbabwe. Washington The final version of this report benefited significantly from the insightful comments and suggestions of Akwe Amosu, Michael Bratton, Brad Brooks-Rubin, Alfred C. Clark, Jennifer Cooke, Chester A. Crocker, Mollie Davis, Rachel T. Doherty, Mark Green, Frances Lovemore, Callisto Madavo, Todd Moss, Phillip van Niekerk, Lauren Ploch, and members of the CSIS Working Group on Zimbabwe. As the report’s author, I am enormously and lastingly grateful for their close attention to several drafts of this report and am also seriously indebted in the same manner to numerous Zimbabweans of all backgrounds who contributed on the ground and from afar in a variety of critical ways to the development of this report. For security reasons, the Zimbabweans who made a difference must remain nameless. Much of this report was prepared in June 2011 and updated in July. | 1 will need to parley with China and explore strategic initiatives within the UN Security Council; it should engage SADC, South Africa, and the African Union to help win cooperation for these initiatives from potentially reluctant global players. The U.S. Congress may be skeptical of these overtures and reassessments; they are not guar- anteed to succeed, given the many powerful actors within Zimbabwe who will resist a democratic transition. Nonetheless, it is critical this year and next for the United States to reinvigorate its en- gagement as convincingly as possible. Standing aloof cannot bring success or the positive changes that Washington prefers. Disengaged (albeit for the right reasons) and unprepared to take full advantage of potential strategic political openings, the United States may have forfeited earlier op- portunities. Now is the time, however, to work closely with South Africa and SADC on a number of critical fronts and to strengthen regional actors and progressive forces within Zimbabwe. Doing so will enhance the likelihood of a sustainable democratic outcome. For the first time in many years, South Africa and SADC appear to have finally insisted that Mugabe comply with their rules going forward, including the prospective Road Map. In SADC meetings in both Livingstone, Zambia, and Sandton, South Africa, they made it clear to Mugabe and ZANU that Zimbabwe must adhere to the provisions of the GPA, end violence against Move- ment for Democratic Change (MDC) supporters, and contemplate significant changes in Zim- babwe’s governmental operating procedures or forfeit anything like regional legitimacy now and after an election. Following the Sandton summit, Zimbabwe Minister of State Jameson Timba said that the MDC was “fantastically happy.”1 This new determination on the part of South Africa and SADC should allow the United States to play an important partnering role in ensuring democratic progress in Zimbabwe. Decisive Considerations Before this report turns to an assessment of the key current scenarios, it discusses a number of salient economic and political factors that influence how those scenarios may play out. Analyses of those factors, and the scenarios and recommendations that follow, build on vigorous discus- sions that took place at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) throughout the first half of 2011 among an invited group of policy makers and former policy makers, officials of nongovernmental organizations, corporate leaders, and scholars. This report further incorporates the results of intensive additional consultations with civil and political society within Zimbabwe. The Road Map The legitimacy of any national poll, this year or later, depends on the completion of the Road Map recently negotiated by the MDC, MDC-Ncube, and ZANU. In April 2011, after several years of South African–influenced discussions, the negotiating partners appeared to have found the germ of an accord. The parties reportedly agreed on a core set of conditions that must be met if Zim- babwe’s next elections are to be regarded as legitimate. Since April, that accord has appeared less sure, largely because of ZANU backsliding. Nevertheless, the key agreements that are being final- ized include: 1. Subsequent to his statement and other alleged comments, Timba was arrested by Zimbabwean police for “insulting President Mugabe.” He was released by a judge after two days in prison. Reported in Celia Dugger, “Mugabe Faces Pro-Democracy Push from Powerful Neighbor, South Africa,” New York Times, June 11, 2011. 2 | beyond mugabe: preparing for zimbabwe’s transition ■ A completely new, updated voters’ roll, with dead and vanished voters expunged and complete- ly revised registrations. (The current state of the voters’ roll in Zimbabwe, reported the South African Institute of Race Relations, “makes fraud virtually inevitable.” Of the 5.7 million voters listed, more than 2 million have left Zimbabwe or died.)2 ■ An independent new Election Commission comprising members approved by all three parties and provided with an adequate budget. ■ The deployment of foreign and SADC monitors six months before and six months after any election. ■ The conclusion of a new national constitution (still being negotiated among the contending political parties) and its passage by the people in a credible national referendum (preferably with or conceivably without a new voters’ roll.) The MDC is prepared to hold the referendum, if necessary, without a new voters’ roll. Many international observers think that is wrong, but the MDC wants to move the process forward, no matter what. ■ The passage and implementation of legal amendments ending restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly and firm commitments from the security forces to respect those essential freedoms.