Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy’ and Its ‘Treatment’ of Neurotic Cases, 1941-1945 by Christopher Kingdon, University of Chicago

Wikipedia Commons Behind Closed Doors: Revisiting Air Command’s ‘Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy’ and its ‘Treatment’ of Neurotic Cases, 1941-1945 By Christopher Kingdon, University of Chicago Part I: Introduction Forced to accept the existence of combat neuroses, but wary that too lenient of a disposal policy might encour- “!e airman thereafter developed symptoms of an age shirkers, Dr. Jewesbury’s quote reveals the quandary facing anxiety state and was treated in sick quarters for Royal Air Force (RAF) Command during the Second World a month without improvement. In previous wars War. As Air Command (Command) reacted to the perceived he would probably have been shot for coward- threat of mass noncompliance and a rapidly increasing neu- ice. Today he is a “medical case”, albeit a medical rotic wastage rate, it chose to institutionalize an uncommonly nuisance.”1 harsh disposal policy in September 1941: the Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy (hereafter LMFW policy). Edward Jewesbury MD, RAF Neuroses Specialist, 1943. !is policy was designed to not only lower rates of neuroses, but also simultaneously to deter future cases of noncompliance through its harsh punishment of neuroses and malingering and by the stigmatization of such categorized cases. Considering 1 Edward Jewesbury, M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air recent accusations that Britain’s armed forces continue to at- Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, tach stigma to neurotic disorders amongst its forces deployed Kew Gardens, London. in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is pertinent to return to the LMFW 14 policy to understand its causes and consequences, and then to siderable resistance due to its bluntness, harshness, and impact explore its rami!cations. on operational performance.8 Yet, more often than not, COs Indubitably, Britain had few alternatives than to rely and MOs acquiesced enacting Command’s disposal policy. heavily on the RAF to !ght its early defensive wars (Battles of Not only did Britain’s Secretary of State deem the harshness France and Britain) and subsequent o"ensive war (Bomber Of- and class-orientated nature of the policy ‘indefensible in Parlia- fensive) against the German Luftwa"e. But throughout these ment’ as the war wound down in 1944, evidence reveals that it years, did Command actually understand the neuroses a#ict- failed to stem psychiatric wastage, contributed to higher rates ing its men? If so, how did it choose to treat wartime neuroses? of air accidents, and perpetuated stigmas attached to neuroses.9 Moreover, did the treatment e"ectively rehabilitate airmen, To explore this topic, primary documentation, com- save lives or improve Command’s operational e$ciency? plemented by secondary scholarship, !nally allows for histo- During the war, as Britain’s infatuation with its airmen rians to fully recreate LMFW policy. %us, it is now possible grew, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the govern- to develop a fuller understanding of the severe consequences ment launched an extraordinarily successful propaganda cam- facing airmen. Aircrew faced the policy’s harshest consequences paign evoking the heroic resistance and purported resilience of - transfer to combatant or ground duties.10 %ese airmen, the their young airmen. However, the reality of aviation combat non-o$cer class, included pilots, navigator, wireless operator, told a di"erent story; indeed the lethality of air combat, espe- bombardiers and air gunners; in fact NCOs included all trained cially the bombing campaign, began to take its toll on RAF aircrew who weren’t awarded the rank of o$cer upon gradua- personnel from the outset of the war.2 3 It becomes painfully tion from aviation school. On the other hand, the o$cer class clear that RAF Command not only failed to understand and in the RAF faced softer, yet still stigmatic consequences, such treat combat neuroses, but as a result LMFW policy failed to as demotion and isolative invaliding.11 Both LMFW o$cers rehabilitate airmen. %is resulted in a reduction of combat ef- and aircrew were met with the certainty of the squadron CO !ciency and an increase in air accidents. Indeed as volunteers stripping the &ier of his coveted wings.12 grappled with an ever-increasing attrition rate (the highest of To contextualize LMFW policy in the historiography, Britain’s three services) as well as increasingly harrowing com- this paper examines the British experience with neuroses in the bat experiences, the airmen began to succumb to neuroses at First World War; in particular, the harsh and ine"ective treat- ever-higher rates.4 5 Psychiatric attrition rates in Bomber Com- ment of neuroses during the war and the Ministry of Pensions mand increased from 1.5% in 1939 to 5.4% in 1943.6 obsessive e"orts to reduce pensions for neurotics during the LMFW policy demonstrates Command’s pervasive interwar period.13 %is paper then studies the development of paranoia for mass outbreaks of noncompliance at squadron aviation psychology in the interwar period by focusing on these level – it feared that these outbreaks would render the service sources: the Birley Report on Wartime Neuroses (1921), Bartlett operational ine"ective, and simultaneously dismantle the ser- Psychology and the Soldier (1927) and Gillespie’s Psychological vice’s and nation’s stylized portrayal of its men’s formidable sto- E"ects of War on a Citizen and Soldier (1942). icism.7 Above all, the policy was designed to swiftly remove In light of this historiography, it becomes abundantly men from their squadrons to Neurotic Centers in order to clear that RAF Command had an obsessive predilection, based prevent the spread of noncompliance. Evidence demonstrates upon Freudian concepts, that rises in neurotic rates were attrib- that Commanding O$cers (COs), Medical O$cers (MOs), utable to the character de!ciencies of its wartime recruits, and o$cers and aircrew met Command’s disposal policy with con- not to the combined e"ects of prolonged exposure to combat stress and high attrition rates. Given the above, this paper endeavors to make three 2 “At one point in 1942 RAF bomber crews had no more than 10 per-cent change of surviving a full tour of operations.” Martin Francis, !e Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 8 Squadron Leader D. Reid to Air Command, September 14, 1939-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18-20. 1942, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, 3 Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the London. Battle of Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 223. 9 Minutes on “W” Procedure, October 20, 1944, AIR 19/632 4 Around 45% of all those who served Bomber Command died Papers, National Archives, Kew Garden, London. during the Second World War, 56,000 in total. Max Hastings, 10 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of All Bomber Command: !e Myths and Reality of the Strategic Members of Air Crews who Forfeit the Con!dence of their Bombing O"ensive 1939-1945, (New York: Dial Press, 1979), 1. Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, May 8, 5 “To name, but a few - lack of oxygen in the stratosphere, 1943, AIR 19:632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, anti-aircraft, lack of parachutes, planes that were impossible paragraphs 14-16. to escape as they fell, lynch mobs… incited by German 11 Ibid., paragraphs 14-16. propaganda”. Francis, !e Flyer, 108. 12 Ibid., paragraph 17. 6 Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: !e Allied Experience in 13 Joanna Burke, “E"eminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 129-133. %e Su"erings of ‘Shell-Shocked’ Men in Great Britain and 7 “LMF could go through a squadron like wild!re if it was Ireland, 1914-39,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19 unchecked”. Hastings, Bomber Command, 243. (Jan. 2000): 63. 15 core arguments about LMFW policy. War, this culminated in the LMFW policy that, amongst other First, the totality of the RAF’s war contributed to a transgressions, punished NCOs far more harshly the o$cers. growing disconnect between operational expectations from the Primary evidence reveals that disposal policy punished aircrew government and Command, and the reality of the war facing more harshly than o$cers because Command viewed aircrew, their airmen. During the Battle of Britain a legend of invin- mainly trained and recruited from the lower middle and work- cibility and bravery was born in the skies above Britain, wit- ing classes, as innately more predisposed to psychoneuroses nessed in the nation’s cities and villages (Churchill himself was than their o$cer-class counterparts. "us, the disposal policy an avid nightly watcher). From these scenes, the British gov- was intentionally designed to swiftly remove aircrew succumb- ernment wrought a propaganda machine extolling the beauty ing to #ying stress to combatant duties (thus, deterring future and nobility of air warfare that gripped the public’s attention cases), while merely invaliding or discharging o$cers with the through the media of !lm, print and poster. "ese political and same symptoms. While this is a complex argument, it can ef- military expectations placed on the RAF, and, subsequently, its fectively explain both Command’s con#ation and punishment #iers, fostered a growing disconnect between Command’s ex- of neuroses and malingering amongst aircrew, and the provi- pectations of them and the reality of their experience. "is dis- sion of a more considerate policy for the service’s o$cer class. connect contributed to the disposal policy in that Command used ‘transfer to combatant duty’ or ‘resignations’ to arti!cially Part II: Historiography and Context of the RAF’s War, lower psychological wastage rates conforming to the expecta- 1912-1945 tions of British propaganda.

Load more