BRIEFING PAPER Number 9184, 25 March 2021 2021: By Claire Mills

emerging defence technologies

Contents: 1. Background – The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 2. Cyber 3. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems 4. Directed energy weapons 5. Space

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

Contents

Summary 3 1. Background – The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 4 2. Cyber 7 2.1 National Cyber Force 9 2.2 The Integrated Review – a full spectrum approach 10 3. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems 12 3.1 Incorporation of AI into defence programmes 13 Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) programmes 15 3.2 New Centre for Artificial Intelligence 16 4. Directed energy weapons 18 5. Space 20 5.1 A new integrated approach 21 A new civil/military space strategy 21 Joint 22

Cover page image copyright: MOD-cyber security by MOD Defence Imagery. Licensed under OGL (Open Government) / image cropped.

3 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

Summary

In September 2020 the MOD launched its Integrated Operating Concept, (IOC) a new strategic vision for defence which recognises that the world has entered an “era of persistent competition” and that the character of warfare has changed. The overriding messages of the IOC, namely multi-domain integration and persistent engagement, subsequently underpin the thinking behind, and the conclusions of, the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which were both published in March 2021. As part of this new approach, embracing new and emerging technologies is seen as a priority. The MOD intends to invest £6.6 billion over the next four years in defence research and development with specific focus given to emerging technologies in artificial intelligence, AI-enabled autonomous systems, cyber, space and directed energy weapons. Higher risk research and innovation is recognised as essential for modernisation. Both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper also acknowledge, however, that embracing new “sunrise” technologies should not come entirely at the expense of more traditional warfighting capabilities. Among other proposals: • A new National Cyber Force has been established. A new cyber security strategy will be published in 2021 that will retain the UK’s competitive edge in this sphere and establish the UK as a responsible, democratic, cyber power. • Artificial intelligence is a key enabler of military capability, across the whole of defence. AI has been incorporated into several key programmes, including the Future Combat Air System, and is the focus of several innovative funding programmes through the Defence and Security Accelerator. An AI defence strategy will be published in 2021 and a new Centre for Artificial Intelligence will be established. • Over the next decade, the MOD will invest £1.4 billion in space-related capabilities. A new Space Command will be established in 2021, along with a new National Space Operations Centre and a new Space Academy. An integrated space strategy will also be published in 2021 which will bring military and civilian together for the first time.

4 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

1. Background – The Integrated Operating Concept 2025

“Some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise”, Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, September 2020

In September 2020 the MOD launched its Integrated Operating We have to move Concept, (IOC) a new strategic vision for defence that recognises that beyond ‘jointery’ – the world has entered an “era of persistent competition” and that the integration is now character of warfare has changed. needed at every The overriding message of the IOC is that to retain strategic advantage: level.

• integration across all operational domains1 MOD, Introducing the Integrated Operating • integration across government Concept, September • international engagement and partnership with allies 2020 • a more assertive posture • achieving information advantage, are all priorities going forward. These assumptions subsequently underpin the thinking behind, and the conclusions of, the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which were both published in March 2021.

Box 1: Relevant documents • HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, 16 March 2021 • Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP411, 22 March 2021 • Ministry of Defence, Introducing the Integrated Operating Concept, September 2020

1 Land, air, sea, space and cyber 5 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

One of the consequences of this new approach is the need to embrace “Capability in the new and emerging technologies, particularly in cyber and artificial future will be less intelligence. defined by numbers of people and In November 2020 the Prime Minister announced some of the first platforms than by expected defence outcomes of the Integrated Review. He announced an information-centric increase in defence spending of £24.1 billion over the next four years technologies, against the 2020/21 budget,2 £1.5 billion of which will be channelled automation and a into research and development. In total the MOD plans to invest at least culture of £6.6 billion over the next four years in military R&D.3 innovation and experimentation”. He also announced that capabilities will be upgraded “across the board”, with specific focus given to emerging technologies such as Defence in a artificial intelligence, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and directed Competitive Age, para energy weapons. Higher risk research and innovation is recognised as 7.4

essential for modernisation. Setting out his agenda, the Prime Minister stated: We will need to act speedily to remove or reduce less relevant capabilities. This will allow our new investment to be focused on the technologies that will revolutionise warfare, forging our military assets into a single network designed to overcome the enemy […] New advances will surmount the old limits of logistics... 4 The focus on emerging technologies in the Integrated Review and defence command paper builds on initiatives that, in some cases, were launched before the last SDSR in 2015. As the Defence Command Paper notes: Our renewed focus on R&D sets a new approach to ensure we use our investment strategically. It is vital that we seize the opportunities for innovation –focusing on game-changing technologies -and protect those technologies that will provide us with a decisive edge. This will enable us to ensure that the UK continues to have competitive, innovative and world-class defence to accelerate the transformation of our armed forces and sustain our strategic advantage.5 Both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper also acknowledge, however, that embracing new “sunrise” technologies should not come entirely at the expense of more traditional warfighting capabilities. In his foreword, Defence Secretary states: In Defence it is always tempting to use the shield of sentimentality to protect previously battle-winning but now outdated capabilities. Such sentimentality, when coupled with over- ambition and under-resourcing, leads to even harder consequences down the line. It risks the lives of our people, who are truly our finest asset […]

2 The defence budget in 2024/25 will, therefore, be £6.4 billion higher compared to 2020/21. 3 Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p.73 4 HC Deb 19 November 2020, c488 5 MOD, Defence in a Competitive Age, para 3.8 6 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

It would similarly endanger our people if we simply wielded a sword of cuts, slicing away the battle-proven on the promise of novelty, without regard for what is left behind. Old capabilities are not necessarily redundant, just as new technologies are not always relevant. Those of us in government charged to protect and defend have a duty to enter new domains, as well as continuing investment in the traditional ones, but always adapting to the threat. Technological advancements have, however, been outlined as one of the reasons for reducing the size of the Army. In his Statement to the House on 22 March 2021 the Defence Secretary stated: The Army’s increased deployability and technological advantage will mean that greater effect can be delivered by fewer people. I have therefore taken the decision to reduce the size of the Army from today’s current strength of 76,500 trained personnel to 72,500 by 2025.6

Box 2: Further reading • HM Government, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, CP410, March 2021 • UK Army to be reduced to 72,500, House of Commons Library Insight, 23 March 2021 • Defence Command Paper 2021: equipment cuts, House of Commons Library (forthcoming)

6 HC Deb 22 March 2021, c638 7 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

2. Cyber

Cyber has been on the MOD’s agenda for over a decade. The military’s approach consists of several interconnected and overlapping strands Defensive cyber which are both defensive and offensive in nature. They are also closely operations (DCO): interlinked with the Government’s wider cybersecurity strategy.7 Active and passive measures to preserve 8 In 2013 the MOD formed the Joint Forces Cyber Group, which consists the ability to use of a number of units to proactively and reactively defend MOD cyberspace. networks against cyber-attack and to develop the capability for offensive cyber-attacks.9 Part of that group is a new cyber reserve unit, Offensive cyber which would see reservists working alongside regular forces to protect operations (OCO): critical computer networks and safeguard vital data. The MOD has Activities that project actively recruited reservists with specialist IT skills. The MOD has resisted power to achieve answering detailed questions on the Joint Forces Cyber Group as “their military objectives in, or disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, through, cyberspace. 10 effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.” MOD, Cyber Primer, 2016 In 2013 the MOD also announced the Defence Cyber Protection Partnership, bringing together Government and the UK’s leading defence and security companies to address cyber security issues in the defence supply chain. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) committed £1.9 billion over five years to “transform significantly the UK’s cyber security.” It also made clear that defending cyber space is part of the armed forces’ core missions.11 In 2016 the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was established, as part of GCHQ, to provide leadership on this issue. The Government also published a new five-year National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (NCSS). In 2015 the Army’s 77th Brigade was formed, specialising in information management, including in the cyber domain. Over the last few years, the MOD has been establishing a £40 million Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), based at MOD . The 2016 NCSS explains that the new centre will use defensive cyber capabilities to protect the MOD’s cyberspace and deal with new threats. The CSOC will work with the National Cyber Security Centre to “confront the MOD’s cyber security challenges and contribute to wider national cyber security.”12

7 The 2010 National Security Strategy identified hostile attacks on UK cyber space by other states and large scale cybercrime as a ‘tier one’ threat to national security. In response, the Government established the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP), to help meet the objectives of the strategy, and in November 2011, published the UK’s first Cyber Security Strategy. 8 This was originally known as the Defence Cyber Operations Group and was referred to as such in the Defence Committee’s 2012 report on cyber-security. 9 It comprises Joint Cyber Units at Cheltenham and Corsham, the Joint Cyber Unit (Reserve) and Information Assurance Units. 10 PQ26326, 11 February 2016 11 Cyber defence is also part of NATO’s core task of collective defence and the Alliance has clearly signalled a cyber-attack could trigger an Article 5 response. NATO defined cyber as an operational domain at its 2016 Warsaw summit. 12 National Cyber Security strategy, para 5.3.10 8 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

£22 million is also being invested in the creation of a series of Cyber Operations Centres across the UK. The intention is to exploit AI, in combination with military analysts to provide 24/7 information and threat analysis. In June 2020, 13th Signal Regiment was created as the first dedicated “cyber” regiment, which will provide the basis of the centres, and headquartered at Blandford. The centres will also work closely with existing Army capabilities such as 77th Brigade. Operational capability is expected in the early 2020s. Both the 2015 SDSR and the NCSS also committed to providing the armed forces with advanced offensive cyber capabilities. One unit of the “We are building a Joint Forces Cyber Group is based at GCHQ as part of a new National dedicated capability to counterattack in Offensive Cyber Programme. cyberspace as part of The Government has been reluctant to be drawn into revealing too our full-spectrum much information about its offensive cyber skills. In 2016 Michael capability.” Fallon, the then Defence Secretary, gave a speech on cyber defence at RUSI, and said that offensive Cyber is now being integrated into military Earl Howe, 12 January 2017 planning alongside the full range of military effects.13 The 2016 NCSS sets out the Government’s ambition to make the UK “a world leader in offensive cyber capability”, stating: we will ensure that we have at our disposal appropriate offensive cyber capabilities that can be deployed at a time and place of our choosing, for both deterrence and operational purposes, in accordance with national and international law.14 Specifically, the Government will: 1. invest in our NOCP – the partnership between the Ministry of Defence and GCHQ that is harnessing the skills and talents of both organisations to deliver the tools, techniques and tradecraft required; 2. develop our ability to use offensive cyber tools; and 3. develop the ability of our Armed Forces to deploy offensive cyber capabilities as an integrated part of operations, thereby enhancing the overall impact we can achieve through military action Ongoing investment in cyber capabilities was subsequently reflected in the 2018 Modernising Defence Programme. In the Autumn Budget 2018, the Treasury allocated an additional £1 billion to the defence budget over the next two years, intended to boost the UK’s cyber capabilities and support the Dreadnought programme.15 Further funding was also allocated to the MOD in the 2019 Spending Round. HM Treasury made an additional £300 million available to the MOD in 2019/20 for priority capability programmes, followed by an additional

13 Defence Secretary’s speech at the RUSI cyber symposium, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016. I n2016 the UK was also the first country to offer its national offensive cyber-capabilities to the NATO alliance (HC Deb 16 July 2016 c25) 14 Para 6.5.2 15 The programme to replace the ballistic missile submarines that provide the platform for the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. The MOD later revealed that £400 million of the extra money would be invested in Dreadnought. 9 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

£1.2 billion for capabilities in 2020/21. In October 2019 the MOD stated: This additional funding will enable our world-class Armed Forces to begin to modernise and meet the intensifying threats and risks we now face, including prioritising investment in key capabilities such as shipbuilding, offensive cyber and the nuclear deterrent. We will decide on the allocation of this funding as part of our normal financial planning and budgeting process.16 In early 2018, a Defence Cyber School also opened at the Defence Academy at Shrivenham, intended to be “a centre of excellence for cyber training and exercise across the Ministry of Defence and wider Government, addressing specialist skills and wider education.”17 The MOD has also developed a bespoke test to identify military personnel with an aptitude for cyber work which is being rolled out in the military’s technical training programmes.18 In its 2020 report, the Armed Forces Pay Review Body acknowledged the issues with recruitment and retention of cyber specialists, among other new technologies. The board concluded: In combination with the future skill requirements of Cyber, AI, space and robotics MOD will face a major challenge unless they change their traditional approach to Terms and Conditions of Service […] We think that MOD should think outside the box of the existing pay and career structure and give serious consideration to the use of a bespoke pay spine for this critical group: we look forward to considering proposals in the future.19

2.1 National Cyber Force As part of its early work on the integrated review, in November 2020 the Prime Minister confirmed the creation of a National Cyber Force (NCF). Building on the success of the MOD/GCHQ joint National Offensive Cyber Programme, the NCF brings together personnel from the MOD, GCHQ, MI6 and DSTL to conduct cyber operations, under one unified command. It remains separate from, and will operate alongside, the National Cyber Security Centre. The MOD provides most of the funding. Director of GCHQ, Jeremy Fleming, commented: Today the National Cyber Force builds out from that position of defensive strength. It brings together intelligence and defence capabilities to transform the UK’s ability to contest adversaries in cyber space, to protect the country, its people and our way of life. Working in close partnership with law enforcement and international partners, the National Cyber Force operates in a

16 PQ290758, Armed Forces: Finance, 1 October 2019 17 National cyber security strategy, November 2016, para 7.1.9 18 Defence Secretary’s speech at the RUSI cyber symposium, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016 19 Xviii and para 6.7 10 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

legal, ethical and proportionate way to help defend the nation and counter the full range of national security threats.20 General Sir Patrick Sanders of Strategic Command said: What distinguishes the NCF, and I believe passionately is its greatest strength, lies in the partnership between Strategic Command, GCHQ and SIS, blending our strengths and cultures to create this operationally distinct force. It is a natural step after decades of cooperation and means we are growing a potent national capability to deter our adversaries, defend our forces on operations and protect our digital homeland.21 The MOD has confirmed that the NCF is currently “training and recruiting at scale”, as well as “investing in the research and development required to establish and maintain world leading cyber capabilities”.22 According to the BBC “the ambition is to grow the force to about 3,000 in the next decade”.23 At present the Government estimates that MOD cyber experts comprise almost half of the NCF’s cyber specialists.24 The Defence Command Paper confirmed: We are investing in a new dedicated career pathway for Defence cyberspace specialists. This will include a new employment model to manage, develop and reward our cyberspace talent and expansion of our Defence Cyber School so we have the right skills in the right teams at the right time. We will enhance our understanding of the domain, through experimentation, education, collective training and by drawing on expertise from our allies, industry and academia.25 Prior to the publication of the Integrated Review the Prime Minister also announced that a new Headquarters for the NCF would be established in the North of .26 A number of commentators considered the announcement on the NCF to be a long time coming and welcomed the step forward.

2.2 The Integrated Review – a full spectrum approach The Integrated Review places cyber at the centre of the UK’s national security. It commits to a “new, full spectrum approach to the UK’s cyber capability” in order to “cement our competitive edge and keep ahead of our enemies”.27 It notes that the UK is the “ third most powerful cyber nation in the world, ranking top in defence, intelligence, norms and offensive capabilities”. As such, the review commits to establishing

20 Ministry of Defence press release, “National Cyber Force transforms country’s cyber capabilities to protect UK”, 19 November 2020 21 Ibid 22 Ministry of Defence press release, “National Cyber Force transforms country’s cyber capabilities to protect UK”, 19 November 2020 23 “UK’s National Cyber Force comes out of the shadows”, BBC News, 20 November 2020 24 Downing Street press release, 14 March 2021 25 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP411, para 7.13 26 GCHQ already has an outpost in Manchester. 27 Downing Street press release, 14 March 2021 11 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

the UK as “a responsible and democratic cyber power, able to protect and promote our interests in, and through cyberspace”.28 A new cyber strategy will be published in 2021 that will focus on greater investment in education, partnerships with academia and industry and integration between the civilian sector and defence and the intelligence services. At the heart of the full spectrum approach will be the NCF and its HQ in Northern England, which will form part of a new “cyber corridor” across the region that will create and sustain thousands of jobs.

Box 3: Suggested reading • “What the integrated reviews means for the UK’s cyber strategy”, RUSI Commentary, 23 March 2021 • Ministry of Defence, Cyber primer • “Why the UK’s National Cyber Force is an important step forward”, International Institute for Strategic Studies Blog, November 2020 • “On the offensive: the UK’s new cyber force”, RUSI Commentary, 23 November 2020

28 HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.35 12 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

3. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems

“Historians will be the judges, but it is plausible that by 2050 (or perhaps before), automation and artificial intelligence will have altered not just the character, but the very nature of war”.

MOD, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Global Strategic Trends, 6th edition

The 2018 Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) identified artificial intelligence and autonomous systems as a significant way in which the What do AI and character of warfare is changing. The MDP thus called for “a more autonomy mean? coordinated approach to work on “families” of technology (for example: artificial intelligence and machine learning; nanotechnology; Artificial Intelligence Theories and techniques man-machine teaming) in order to “exploit opportunities for developed to allow modernisation aggressively and accept higher risk in pursuing novel computer systems to ideas, driving operational advantage and overall affordability”.29 perform tasks normally requiring human or The aim was to use existing engines for innovation such as DSTL’s biological intelligence. Autonomy Programme, the Defence Innovation Fund and the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which were launched in 2016 as part Autonomy of the Defence Innovation Initiative, to work with industry to identify The characteristic of a system using AI to and develop “innovative solutions to our most pressing challenges”.30 determine its own course The MDP also signalled the MOD’s intention to go further and launch a of action by making its range of new “Spearhead” innovation programmes, to “exploit cutting- own decisions. edge technologies [such as AI] at speed”. It established a Defence Transformation Fund to finance innovative military capability, ring Autonomous Systems A system containing AI- fencing £160M of the MOD’s budget in 2019/20 for such purposes. based components that In September 2019 the MOD’s Defence Innovation Directorate went on allow it to exhibit to publish its Defence Innovation Priorities, in tandem with the broader autonomy.

Defence Technology Framework (DTF). The DTF identified AI as part of (Defence Science and one “family” of technologies that “will be critical to drive innovation Technology Laboratory, and radical transformation across a range of Defence activities, from October 2020) optimising the performance of military equipment, to reducing its cost, to enabling new or enhanced military effects”.31 The DTF also identified areas where there is the most potential for transformational change using these families of technology, including: • Space • Platforms • Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) • Logistics and support

29 Mobilising, Modernising and Transforming Defence, December 2018, p.22 30 The 2015 SDSR set out the MOD’s approach to innovation in defence and security, including the creation of the Innovation Fund, worth £800 million over 10 years, and the defence and security accelerator (DASA). SDSR 2015, Factsheet 12 31 MOD, Defence Technology Framework, September 2019, p.10 13 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

• Enhanced cyber and electronic warfare • Next generation weapons systems • Resilient communications • Human enhancement • Next generation command and control (C2) In October 2020 the MOD published its Science and Technology strategy, in which it confirmed that a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit had been established which would work on a strategy “to help the department adopt these technologies at pace”. The Integrated Review confirmed that an AI defence strategy would be published in 2021 (see below).

3.1 Incorporation of AI into defence programmes As the Defence Technology Framework, Science and Technology strategy and the 2021 Defence Command Paper all identify, AI is an The UK does not emerging technology to be exploited through other programmes and possess armed areas of capability to deliver greater military effect across all operational autonomous aircraft domains. It is, in effect, viewed as an “enabler” of military capability. systems and it has no intention to develop Indeed, the DTF considered that AI, along with machine learning and them. data science “are expected to enable radical transformation across almost every area of Defence activity”, but in particular are “critical MOD, JDP0-30.2, enabling technologies for autonomous systems, intelligence analysis and Unmanned aircraft computer network defence”.32 systems, 2017 The Government has been clear, however, that the UK does not possess lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or what are sometimes referred to as “killer robots”, and that it has no intention of developing, procuring or operating them. MOD guidance states: The UK does not possess armed autonomous aircraft systems and it has no intention to develop them. The UK Government’s policy is clear that the operation of UK weapons will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and accountability. Whilst weapon systems may operate in automatic modes there is always a person involved in setting appropriate parameters.33 This policy has been reiterated by Ministers on a number of occasions.34 In 2013 Alistair Burt, then Parliamentary under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, also set out the UK’s position on international efforts to define, and potentially ban, the development of such technologies: The UK has unilaterally decided to put in place a restrictive policy whereby we have no plans at present to develop lethal autonomous robotics, but we do not intend to formalise that in a national moratorium. We believe that any system, regardless of its

32 MOD, Defence Technology Framework, September 2019, p.17 33 MOD, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.2, Unmanned aircraft systems, August 2017, para.4.18 34 Government policy is laid out in HL364, 11 July 2017; HL3864, 13 December 2016; PQ33942, 21 April 2016; 14 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

level of autonomy, should only ever be developed or used in accordance with international humanitarian law. We think the Geneva conventions and additional protocols provide a sufficiently robust framework to regulate the development and use of these weapon systems […] We cannot develop systems that would breach international humanitarian law, which is why we are not engaged in the development of such systems and why we believe that the existing systems of international law should prevent their development.35 There are, however, significant differences of opinion on the definition of lethal autonomous weapons system, and the approach to their regulation.36 Equipment Plan programmes Several of the programmes within the MOD’s current Equipment Plan either have a significant AI element, or are programmes to procure AI- enabled, non-lethal, autonomous systems. The following is a snapshot of some of the bigger programmes: • Maritime Mine Countermeasures programme (MMCM) – a joint programme, acknowledged in the Defence Command Paper, between the UK and France to develop a prototype autonomous system for the detection and neutralisation of sea mines and underwater IEDs. It will be a “system of systems” incorporating several integrated assets, including unmanned surface and underwater vessels, C2 and neutralisation systems. The intention is to deliver a fully autonomous end-to-end mine countermeasures capability by 2030. The MMCM is part of the ’s broader mine countermeasures and hydrographic capability (MHC) programme. • The Route Survey and Tasking Analysis (RSTA) programme, which is also part of the MHC project. The RSTA will deliver an automated capability, using AI-enabled submersibles, to detect and render harmless underwater mines in UK waters by 2022. • Future Combat Air System (Team Tempest)- The Government’s ambition is to develop a new combat air system for the mid-2030s, which will utilise AI. The Defence Command Paper describes it thus: FCAS will deliver an innovative mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous platforms including swarming drones. This will deliver an advanced combat air system capable of fighting in the most hostile environments.37 The Government and industry have pledged £2 billion over the next four years in the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative.

35 HC Deb 17 June 2013, c734 36 This lack of international consensus was addressed by the Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a 2018 report on the UK’s AI capabilities. A number of commentators have criticised the UK’s approach, suggesting that its definition of LAWS sets the bar too high. See for example: reports from Human Rights Watch, August 2018 and Article 36, April 2016. 37 Defence in a competitive age, para 7.42 15 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

Team Tempest, an “innovative Government-industry partnership” has been created to deliver on that ambition.38 • F-35 Lightning - the F-35 incorporates elements of AI, largely through the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) which is an onboard diagnostic system. Future hardware and software upgrades are expected to significantly exploit AI. In the 2019 Equipment Plan the MOD states that current Army Command programmes also include: Utilising the Defence Transformation Fund to deliver innovative capabilities in accelerated timelines including: Unmanned Air Systems, robotic platoon vehicles, development and trailing of autonomous systems to revolutionise logistic support and to deliver information manoeuvre.39 Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) programmes Looking to the future, projects are also funded by DASA either through themed competitions or open calls for innovation. The Defence “Artificial Command Paper identified DASA challenges and funding as key to Intelligence (AI) and AI-enabled maximising “the 'pull through' of R&D investment into cutting-edge 40 autonomous equipment”. capabilities will be A number of AI-related competitions are underway, including: essential to defence modernisation”. • An autonomous underwater capability for the Royal Navy • A project on Behavioural analytics Defence in a Competitive Age, • International Space Pitch Day, which is a joint UK-US initiative p.42 • The second phase of a programme examining Autonomy in challenging environments. The most high profile programme to date, however, is the Intelligent Ship – Next Generation project. In June 2019 DASA launched a project aimed at revolutionising the way warships make decisions and process intelligence and data with the use of AI. The warship has been identified as a prototype demonstrator. The potential for utilisation across other domains from 2040 onwards is a longer-term objective of the project. According to DASA the project is based on: a future vision where elements of automation, autonomy, machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) are closely integrated and teamed with human decision makers. It is expected that this will ensure timely, more informed and trusted decision making and planning, within complex, cluttered, contested and congested operating and data environments (henceforth referred to as the future operating environment).41

38 See also RAF press release, 25 January 2021 for information on a contract to design and manufacture a prototype uncrewed fighter aircraft for the RAF’s Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) project. The aircraft would embrace manned-unmanned teaming and would not be a fully autonomous lethal weapon system. 39 MOD, Defence Equipment Plan 2019, February 2020, p.34 40 Defence in a Competitive Age, para.7.6 41 MOD, Competition document: intelligent ship – the next generation, July 2019 16 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

In January 2020 DASA awarded 9 Phase 1 contracts, collectively worth £1 million. In June 2020 DASA launched Phase 2 of the Intelligent Ship project. Building on phase 1 projects, the specific aim of this second phase is to examine human-machine interfacing. There is £3m of funding available across this phase and in January 2021 nine 16-month contracts were awarded.42

3.2 New Centre for Artificial Intelligence In his November 2020 statement, the Prime Minister announced the creation of a new Centre for Artificial Intelligence. Little further detail was provided at the time, leaving many to question where it would fit within Government, including with the existing Office for Artificial Intelligence, and what role it would have vis-à-vis the MOD’s existing AI capacity. Primarily: • The recently established Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit • DSTL’s AI Lab which was formed in 2018 • Strategic Command’s JHub • The Royal Navy’s centre of excellence in data science and AI, codenamed Project NELSON. Professor Trevor Taylor at RUSI called the new centre “a vision, in search of a role”.43 Several analysts have suggested that it may have a similar role to, and potentially work with, the US’ Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Indeed, in September 2020 the JAIC hosted the first meeting of its new AI Partnership for Defense, involving13 allied partner nations, including the UK. The Defence Command Paper stated that the new Centre for AI will be at the heart of the Department’s investment in defence AI “serving as the nucleus to accelerate the development and exploitation of these critical technologies from the battlespace to the back office”.44 It also confirmed that the MOD is working in partnership with industry and academia to develop a framework for the ethical development and use of AI and autonomy in defence. The UK is also working with international partners to develop international legal, ethical and regulatory norms and standards.

Box 4: Suggested reading • The artificial intelligence battlespace, RUSI Commentary, March 2021 • Unpacking the UK’s newly announced Centre on Artificial Intelligence, RUSI Commentary, December 2020

42 “UK DASA awards nine projects under phase 2 of Intelligent Ship competition”, Government Computing, 13 January 2021 43 Trevor Taylor, RUSI Commentary, March 2021 44 Defence in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.42 17 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

• Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Biscuit book: Building blocks for artificial intelligence and autonomy, October 2020 • Ministry of Defence, Joint Concept Note 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming • House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: ready, willing and able?, HL 100, Session 2017-19 • Chatham House Research Paper, Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare, January 2017

Application of AI in other countries’ defence policies • US Congressional Research Service, Artificial intelligence and national security, November 2020 • US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, February 2019 • Coordinating artificial intelligence: six lessons from the US, RUSI Commentary, August 2020 • European Defence Agency, Artificial intelligence: joint quest for future applications, August 2020 • French Ministry of Defence, Report of the AI task force, September 2019

18 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

4. Directed energy weapons

Laser and radio frequency technologies have been steadily developed since the 1960s and 1970s, but it is only in the last few decades that their serious application in a battlefield context, as directed energy weapons, has been considered. Most of the active research on directed energy weapons has taken place in the US and former Soviet Union, now , largely in part due to the prominent role they played in the US’ Strategic Defence Initiative concept in the 1980s. However, countries like and Israel have also invested considerable resources in the research and development of laser weapon technologies.45 In 2002 the MOD set out its position on the development of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): The importance of utilising technology to create battle winning forces is a key theme of the Strategic . Directed Energy Technology offers a potentially significant military enhancement to our forces but it is just one area of technology development currently being assessed. This assessment is taking place within the boundaries laid down by conventions and international law. The MOD investigate Directed Energy Weapons in order to identify potential technologies that may meet joint capability requirements. Details of programmes are classified…46 Research on laser and radio frequency DEW has been ongoing within the MOD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL),47 but it is only in the last few years that the UK has moved beyond the realms of research and taken steps to demonstrate and develop a viable DEW capability, leading some commentators to accuse the MOD of “playing catch-up”.48 In 2017 an MBDA-led consortium known as UK Dragonfire was awarded a £30 million contract to demonstrate the potential of Laser Directed Energy Weapons. The MOD said “The goal of the programme is to demonstrate a standalone laser directed energy weapon system that is capable of acquiring, tracking and engaging aerial and surface targets at various ranges and in different weather conditions”.49 The programme culminated in a technology demonstrator in 2019. That same year the MOD also announced that it was seeking to develop three new demonstrators to explore the potential of laser and radio frequency DEW and accelerate their introduction into service, as part of the MOD’s Novel Weapons Programme (NWP) which was formally

45 A timeline of major milestones of DEW in a military context was published by Army Technology in August 2020. 46 HC Deb 26 February 2002, c1145W 47 In 2018 DSTL also established a Future Kinetic Effects and Weapons Systems Programme which would examine directed energy weapons, among other things. 48 See for example, Andrew Chuter, “UK shoots for new laser weapons against drones, missiles”, Defense News, 9 July 2019 49 MOD press release, March 2017 19 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

established in 2018/19.50 The MOD acknowledged at the time that “directed energy technologies and systems are now reaching maturity” and that it had “appointed a Senior Responsible Owner and established a Novel Weapons team to specifically investigate the military utility of Directed Energy Weapons”.51 £130 million was to be subsequently invested in this package of demonstrator projects which would integrate mature technology into existing platforms, including: • a high energy laser weapon on-board a ship for air and surface defence applications, • a high energy laser weapon on a land vehicle for ground-based air defence applications including countering unmanned air systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, • a high-power radio frequency weapon on a land vehicle for countering unmanned air systems and counter mobility applications.52 These capabilities would then be placed into the “hands of the user” through significant trials, so as to allow them “to better understand the effects that can be achieved, how they can use Directed Energy Weapons and how to operate them alongside other elements of UK armed forces”.53 The new systems are expected to be trialled in 2023 and are expected to reach the frontline within ten years. A new joint programme office has been established to run the programme. The Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper confirmed the MOD’s investment in these ”next generation capabilities” and the intention to develop future “Test and Evaluate (T&E) capability” for novel weapons, alongside AI and space-based systems, as part of the T&E Futures programme.

Box 5: Suggested reading • Emerging military technologies: background and issues, US Congressional Research Service, November 2020 • Directed energy weapons: a case study in acquisition innovation, Defence IQ, October 2019

50 Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment Plan 2019. The aim of the NWP is to accelerate the introduction of Directed Energy Weapons into all services within 10 years. 51 PQ167182, Weapons, 5 September 2018 52 Tenders Electronic Daily, Prior Information Notice 2019/S 132-323391, July 2019 53 ibid 20 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

5. Space

Space has been used for military purposes for decades, albeit limited to the deployment of non-offensive military systems such as communications, imagery, positioning and navigation and surveillance . Several countries, including UK have developed a “The threat from comprehensive space-based military architecture to facilitate military adversaries in this activities on the ground. As such, it is generally accepted that the rapidly maturing has long been a reality, but not the domain is real and it is weaponisation of space.54 here now. If we fail to understand how to However, space is becoming an increasingly contested environment. operate successfully in Protecting the UK’s space-based assets, both civilian and military, has the Space Domain become a priority;55 while space is increasingly viewed as a military through integrated domain in its own right. In the last few years there has been operations, we lose considerable investment by states, including Russia and China, in our battle-winning capabilities that potentially threaten the use of space by the UK and its edge”. allies.56 Air Vice-Marshal Harv In 2018 RAF Air Command assumed command and control of UK Smyth, Director Space, military space operations to defend the UK’s interests in space; while February 2021 the MOD announced that the number of personnel working in the UK defence space sector would be increased to over 600 personnel by 2023.57 In March 2018 the RAF launched its first ever , the Carbonite II, to deliver high-quality imagery and full-motion colour video from space.58 In summer 2018 the MOD was also expected to publish its first defence space strategy to address the threats and opportunities that face the UK in this domain. In May 2018 the Department published the “headlines” of its intended strategy, which set out a vision of securing “freedom of action in space” that fully exploited “its military and civil potential”. That document acknowledged the synergies between the civilian and

54 Space is part of the global commons and the concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply in space ( Treaty 1967). UK space capabilities are also inherently dual-use in nature given that the same environment, largely the same technology and often the same infrastructure is used to meet both military and civil operations. As such there is an increasing interdependence between the military, civil and commercial space sectors. 55 The strategic importance of space and the national security implications of protecting the UK’s space-based assets was acknowledged in the UK’s first ever National Space Policy, published in 2015. 56 In particular counter-space technologies such as anti-satellite weapons. See for example: Current and future trends in Chinese counterspace capabilities, French Institute of International Relations, November 2020 and Russia’s behaviour risks weaponizing outer space, Chatham House Expert Commentary, 27 July 2020. In 2019 Russia and China also signed a deal on joint lunar exploration and on 11 March 2021 announced that they had expanded that agreement to establish a joint lunar research station either on the surface of the moon, or in its . 57 From a baseline of 500 personnel (MOD press release, 21 May 2018) 58 The programme was also intended to help the MOD and the RAF understand the potential operational and cost benefits that could be offered in the future by a constellation of small satellites. 21 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

military sectors and the need to work across Government, the private sector and with international partners.59 However, the full strategy subsequently never materialised.60 In January 2020 the MOD stated: The Defence Space Strategy has developed significantly. We are currently reviewing the right timing for publication and how best to align it with the emerging National Space Strategy. The Ministry of Defence is firmly committed to a number of space programmes, and we are assessing our space capabilities, coherence and requirements.61

5.1 A new integrated approach The Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper set out the UK’s ambition to be “a meaningful player in space” by 2030. “There is a national ambition to gain In this timeframe the aim is to have “the ability to monitor, protect and and maintain a defend our interests in and through space, using a mixture of sovereign competitive edge in capabilities and burden-sharing partnerships with our allies”.62 space”.

Recognising that there will be “considerable risks to strategic stability” General Sir Gordon if competition in space is not managed and regulated effectively, the Messenger, Vice Chief Government is also committed to leading international efforts to of the Defence Staff “develop norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in space”.63 Over the next decade, the MOD will invest around £5 billion on recapitalising and enhancing its satellite communication capabilities, through the delivery of the 6 programme and a further £1.4 billion on space-related capabilities. Specifically, a new Space Command will be established (see below) along with a new National Space Operations Centre, a new UK-built intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite constellation and a new Space Academy, to develop the skills and training of defence space personnel.64 A new civil/military space strategy The Integrated Review also announced that the UK will adopt a new integrated space strategy in 2021, that will bring together military and civilian space policy for the first time.65 Through this strategy the UK will support the growth of the UK’s commercial space sector and develop a commercial launch capability

59 The MOD already has links with the multinational Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, which improves cooperation amongst the community, plus France and Germany. It also works closely with US and NATO allies. 60 Despite several indications from the Government that its publication was forthcoming: PQ176122, 11 October 2018; PQ202301, 19 December 2018; PQ249251, 7 May 2019; PQ276172, 16 July 2019 61 PQ3707, Defence, 20 January 2020 62 HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.58 63 Ibid, p.57 64 MOD, Defence in a Competitive Age, para 7.16 65 The long-awaited defence space strategy will therefore be merged with the forthcoming civil space strategy. 22 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies

from the UK by 2022. The Sutherland Space Hub in Scotland secured planning permission in August 2020.66 The UK will also increase international collaboration in its space activities. The UK will continue its participation in the EU’s Copernicus Earth observation programme and will deepen cooperation with NATO and the Combined Space Operations initiative, a partnership of seven nations working together to address threats and shared interests in space. Joint Space Command In November 2020, and as part of the first outcomes of the Integrated Review, the Prime Minister announced that a new Joint Space Command would be established. “The threat from Space Command will be based at RAF High Wycombe67 and staffed adversaries in this from all three Services, the civil service and key members of the rapidly maturing domain is real and it is commercial space sector. It will bring together the functions of space here now. If we fail to operations, space workforce generation and space equipment understand how to capability. Strategic Command will continue to lead on the development operate successfully in of joint enabling capabilities across all military domains, including cyber the Space Domain and space. In the space domain such capabilities include satellite through integrated communications, position, navigation and timing as well as intelligence operations, we lose our surveillance and reconnaissance. battle-winning edge”.

In February 2021 Air Commodore Paul Godfrey was announced as the Air Vice-Marshal Harv new Commander, Space Command. Smyth, Director Space, February 2021 The new National Space Council68 will provide strategic policy direction,

through the recently formed Space Directorate within the MOD. Space Command will also work with the UK Space Agency, where necessary, to “deliver joint national space capability”.69

Box 6: Suggested reading • Failure to lift off: the UK’s ambitions, RUSI Commentary, 24 February 2021 • Future of the UK : debate pack, House of Commons Library, 3 February 2021 • Defence Secretary’s speech at the Defence Space Conference, November 2020 • Space as an operational domain: what next for NATO?, RUSI Newsbrief, October 2020 • Dr Bleddyn Bowen, A familiar frontier: British defence strategy and spacepower, RAF Air and Space Power Review, Summer 2019

66 Due to the cost, historically the UK has relied on allies and third-party capabilities, such as the US, India and the to deliver UK satellites into orbit. Background on the development of space ports in the UK is available in House of Commons Library Insight: When will UK be ready for lift off?, April 2019. It was also discussed at length in two recent debates on the UK space industry: House of Lords, UK space industry, 4 March 2021 and House of Commons, Future of the UK space industry, 4 February 2021. 67 Which is already home to the National Air and Space Operations Centre [NASOC]). 68 The 2019 Queen’s Speech outlined the Government’s intention to establish a and to launch a new National Space Strategy. The terms of reference of the new Council are “to consider issues concerning prosperity, diplomacy and national security in, through and from Space, as part of coordinating overall Government policy”. The Defence Secretary is a member of the Council. 69 RAF press release, 1 February 2021 23 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021

• Ministry of Defence, JDP 0-30 UK air and space doctrine, March 2018 • Ministry of Defence, Towards a Defence Space Strategy, 2018

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