1 Introduction
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Notes 1 Introduction 1 For example, while acknowledging that current US UCAS programmes do not meet requirements for an air superiority fighter, Lt Col Devin Cate believes UCAS have the potential to become a future generation air-superiority fighter by 2025. See generally, Lt Col Devin L. Cate USAF, The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense Transformation: Why DoD Requirements Demand the F/A-22 Raptor, Master’s Degree, USAF Air University, 2003. See also, Travis J. Gill, Carrier Air Wing Tactics Incorporating the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (NUCAS), Master’s Degree, Naval Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010. Gill evaluates a scenario in which F/A-18 Super Hornets and F-35C Lighting II aircraft are supported by UCAS in gaining control of the air. 2 See US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011–2036, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 17. Also see, Office of the US Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005–2030, Table 6.2-1, p. 74, and US Department of Defense, United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047, p. 39. 3 Development, Doctrine and Concept Centre, Joint Concept Note 3/12: Future Air and Space Operating Concept, Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 4. See also, ‘House of Commons Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – Current and Future UK Use: Government Response to the Committees, Tenth Report of Session 2013–14, Volume II, Written Evidence’, The Stationery Office Ltd, London, 2014, Ev w2, para 2.13. 4 See UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication 3-63: Joint Air Defence, 2nd Edition, Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, 2003, p. 1.6. 5 Ibid. 6 All acronyms are used for both the singular and plural sense. 7 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005–2030, p. 1. 8 Bill Yenne, Attack of the Drones: A History of Unmanned Aerial Combat, St Pauls, MN: Zenith Press, 2004, p. 67. 9 Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Cambridge, MA: HPCR Harvard, 2010, p. 55. 10 See ‘House of Commons Defence Committee, Remote Control, Vol 2’, which is inconsistent with regards to UCAV terminology. For example, Ev w61, para 13, describes Predator and Reaper UAS as UCAV, while Ev w2, para 2.12 describes UCAS as being able to operate in contested airspace when neces- sary, but such a capability does not yet exist. 11 Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11: Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Terminology, Definitions and Classification, Shrivenham: Development Concept and Doctrine Centre, 2011, chapter 2, p. 1 and Annex: Lexicon, pp. 2–3. 12 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Operating Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare, HQ USAF/SB, Washington, 2011, 153 154 Notes p. 29. See also, ‘House of Commons Defence Committee, Remote Control, Vol 2’, Ev w2 paras 2.9–2.11. 13 Air Chief Marshal Sir Glen Torpy, ‘Foreword’, in Air Power – UAVs: The Wider Context, Owen Barnes (ed.), Shrivenham: Directorate of Defence Studies, 2009, p. 2. 14 Caitlin Harrington Lee, ‘Armed and Dangerous’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 August 2011, p. 38. 15 Jeremiah Gertler, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012, pp. 47–48. A RAND report prepared for the US Navy, contends that UCAS will not be suitable in the air-to-air role in the 2025 timeframe. See Brien Alkire and others, Applications for Navy Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 44. 16 QinetiQ, ‘UK Taranis UAV Passes First Major Milestone’, 2010. 17 Jay Shafritz, Words on War: Military Quotes from Ancient Times to the Present, New York: Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 104. 2 Research Interviews 1 This interviewee was a founder member of Exercise Red Flag, which started in 1975. Aggressor instructors use adversary tactics and doctrine, and sometimes equipment, to teach US and coalition forces how to counter these threats – see S. Davies, Red Eagles, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008, pp. 34–36. 2 Ibid., pp. 34–37. 3 Interestingly, the current UK MOD view is that the operation of weapon sys- tems will always be under the control of a human – see ‘House of Commons Defence Committee, Remote Control’, Ev w2, para 2.13. 4 TPT is the ability of a system/platform to effectively use information from another system/platform, in order to conduct its mission – instigating deliv- ery of weapons from the system’s own vehicle, or from another system, and, in certain scenarios, guidance of weapons. 5 These sorties are Large Formation Employments exercises, such as Red Flag, Tactical Leadership Programme and other COMAO exercises. 6 Details of all interviewees are in the bibliography. 7 Two AAG kills were achieved by Sea Harriers during the 1982 Falklands War – see Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984, pp. 233–245. 8 For the purposes of this book, BVR is defined as being greater than 10 nm from an adversary. WVR is defined as being between 10 and 2 nm of an adver- sary. Close-visual combat is defined as being within 2 nm of an adversary – see S. Schallhorn and others, Visual Search in Air Combat, Pensacola, FL: Naval Aerospace Research Laboratory, 1991, p. 8. 9 For example, see a brief from Brent Nave and Robert McWhorter, ‘Third Party Targeting of SLAM-ER Weapon in Flight via Link-16 Surveillance Messages’ (2011), slides 7–10. 10 Rmaximum is the maximum range an AAM will travel, once launched from an aircraft, before intercepting a target. Rno-escape is the no-escape range of an Notes 155 AAM, which is the range inside which an adversary cannot escape a threat’s AAM by manoeuvring, normally at 9 G, sustaining the same speed, although this can vary – see Brian T. Schreiber, William A. Stock, and Winston Bennett Jr., Distributed Mission Operations within-Simulator Training Effectiveness Baseline Study, Mesa, AZ: Lumir Research Institute: Air Force Research Laboratory, 2006, Appendix G, pp. 27–32. 11 See Dr Kent Gillingham and John Fosdick, High-G Training for Fighter Aircrew, Brooks Air Force Base Medicine: USAF School of Aerospace, 1988, pp. 12, 16–18. 12 For description of HMCS and HOBS AAM, such as the ASRAAM and AIM-9X, see Robert Hewson (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, pp. 38–41 and 44–50. 13 ACM Sir Stephen Dalton RAF – Chief of the Air Staff – 2010 (Interviewed 12 January 2010). 14 ACM Sir Glenn Torpy RAF – former Chief of the Air Staff (Interviewed 11 October 2011). 15 AM Christopher Nickols RAF – Chief of Defence Intelligence – 2011 (Interviewed 12 September 2011). 16 ACM Sir Simon Bryant RAF – Commander-in-Chief RAF Air Command – 2010, (Interviewed 30 March 2010). 17 For F-22 development background and capabilities, see Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2011–2012, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, pp. 788–792. 18 Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Skinner RAF (Postal Questionnaire, dated 24 March 2010). 19 Colonel Gaillard Peck USAF (Retd) (Questionnarie completed electronically and sent by email, 3 August 2010). 20 Major General Lawrence Wells USAF (Postal Questionnaire, dated 11 January 2013). 21 Interviewed under the Chatham House Rule, on 17 November 2011. 3 Overview 1 See United States Air Force: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047, p. 34. 2 For an excellent overview of radar system principles for the non-specialist, see Martin Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems: 2010–2011, 22nd Edition, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2010, pp. 3–6. 3 Robert O. Work and Dr Thomas P. Ehrhard, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for Naval Aviation?, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2007, p. 27. 4 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Advanced Technology Demonstration, Phase 1, Selection Process Document, MDA972-98-R-0003, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington: US Department of Defense, 1998, Chap. 1.1. 5 See Michael Winter, ‘U.S. Fighters Warn Off Iranian Jet Chasing Spy Drone’, USA Today, 14 March 2013. 6 See Nick Smith, ‘Taking Radar to Another Level’, The Institution of Engineering and Technology, March 2013, pp. 10–13. 156 Notes 7 For an overview of the UCAS-D programme, see Work and Ehrhard, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program, pp. 32–39. 8 See Guy Norris, ‘Northrop UCAS-D Completes First Flight’, Aviation Week, 7 February 2011. 9 Naval Air Systems Command, ‘Aircraft and Weapons: Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System’, 2010, http://www.nav- air.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=A1DA3766-1A6D- 4AEA-B462-F91FE43181AF (accessed 11 February 2011). In March 2013, the USN announced its intention to fund four companies to design UCAS as part of its UCLASS programme. A selection is likely in 2016 – see Zach Rosenberg, ‘US Navy Plans to Place Four UCLASS Development Contracts’, Flightglobal, 26 March 2013. 10 Mark Daly (ed.), Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, p. 8. 11 Ibid., pp. 203–204. 12 Nicolas von Kospoth, ‘China’s Leap in Unmanned Aircraft Development’, defpro.daily, 14 October 2009. 13 Russian Unmanned Vehicle Systems Association, ‘China Developing Armed/ Recon UAVs’, 2011, http://en.ruvsa.com/reports/china_developing_armed_ recon_uavs/ (accessed 24 March 2012). 14 For a description of how passive detection systems can be used to cue fight- ers and SAM, see Arend G. Westra, ‘Radar versus Stealth: Passive Radar and the Future of U.S. Military Power’, Joint Forces Quarterly, (55), 2009, 139–141. 15 See Dr Carlo Kopp, ‘Russian/PLA Low Band Surveillance Radars: Counter Low Observable Technology Radars’, Air Power Australia (2009), http://www.