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Security Council Distr.: General 2 November 2017

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Security Council Distr.: General 2 November 2017 United Nations S/2017/924 Security Council Distr.: General 2 November 2017 Original: English Letter dated 2 November 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Kairat Umarov Chair Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea 17-17136 (E) 071117 S/2017/924 Letter dated 2 November 2017 from the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea In accordance with paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), we have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. (Signed) James Smith Coordinator Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (Signed) Jay Bahadur Armed groups expert (Signed) Charles Cater Natural resources expert (Signed) Déirdre Clancy Humanitarian expert (Signed) Tapani Holopainen Finance expert (Signed) Nazanine Moshiri Arms expert (Signed) Richard Zabot Arms expert 2/161 17 17136 S/2017/924 Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 8 A. Mandate .................................................................. 8 B. Methodology .............................................................. 9 II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia .......................... 9 A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin ........................................... 9 B. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia ........................... 14 C. Intercommunal conflict ..................................................... 16 D. Public financial management ................................................. 18 E. Resource governance ....................................................... 24 F. Resurgence of piracy ....................................................... 27 G. Electoral misconduct ....................................................... 28 III. Arms embargo ................................................................. 29 A. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia ........................................... 29 B. Federal Government compliance with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo .................................................................. 32 C. Other Somali security sector institutions: compliance with the arms embargo ......... 35 D. Establishment of a United Arab Emirates military base in Berbera .................. 36 E. Military equipment captured during offensive operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia and Federal Government security forces .............................. 37 F. Security sector reform ...................................................... 37 IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance ............................................. 38 A. Al-Shabaab ............................................................... 38 B. Bureaucratic obstacles ...................................................... 39 C. Major supply routes ........................................................ 40 D. Diversion of humanitarian aid ................................................ 41 E. Attacks on humanitarian workers ............................................. 41 F. Manipulation of aid to exclude marginalized communities and fuel conflict .......... 42 V. Violations of international humanitarian law involving targeting of civilians .............. 42 A. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant .......................... 43 B. Federal and regional forces, clan militias and other criminal elements ............... 43 C. African Union Mission in Somalia and international forces ........................ 44 D. Child recruitment and use ................................................... 46 VI. Violations of the charcoal ban .................................................... 46 A. Production, transport and stockpiles ........................................... 46 B. Illicit export of charcoal ..................................................... 47 17 17136 3/161 S/2017/924 C. Paperwork and criminal networks ............................................. 47 D. Implementation of the charcoal ban ........................................... 48 VII. Correction to the previous report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015) (S/2016/919) .............................. 49 VIII. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea ........ 49 IX. Implementation of targeted sanctions .............................................. 50 X. Recommendations .............................................................. 50 A. Threats to peace and security ................................................. 50 B. Arms embargo ............................................................. 51 C. International humanitarian law ............................................... 51 D. Charcoal ban .............................................................. 51 E. Sanctions list .............................................................. 51 F. Disassociation ............................................................. 52 Annexes* 1.1: Al-Shabaab procurement of weapons following attacks on AMISOM .................... 53 1.2: Al-Shabaab use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* .. 56 1.3: 2 January 2017 VBIED attack in Mogadishu ........................................ 57 1.4: Puntland IED seizures .......................................................... 60 1.5: Al-Shabaab financing in Bay and Bakool regions .................................... 62 2.1: ISIL occupation of Qandala ...................................................... 64 2.2: Leadership of the ISIL faction .................................................... 68 2.3: Mobile phone analysis of Abbas Mahamoud Yusuf and the ISIL faction (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ............................................................ 70 2.4: ISIL attack on International Village Hotel .......................................... 71 2.5: May 2017 ISIL suicide bombing in Bosaso (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ............. 72 3.1: Galkayo conflict: 7 October to 18 November 2016 ................................... 73 4.1: Currency management .......................................................... 81 4.2: Abdullahi Mohamed Nor ........................................................ 83 4.2.1: CADG Engineering Pte. (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ..................... 88 5.1: Berbera port payoffs ............................................................ 89 5.2: Fishing governance ............................................................. 90 5.3: Oil governance ................................................................ 92 5.4: Strategic Natural Resource Management & Consultants Inc. ........................... 95 6.1: The Abdikarim Salah Mohamed a.k.a. Aw Koombe network and the hijacking of the Aris 13 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* .................................................. 97 * The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing. 4/161 17 17136 S/2017/924 7.1: Puntland arms smuggling networks ................................................ 98 7.1.1: Puntland interdiction of arms from Yemen ................................... 109 7.2: Maritime seizure of arms in March 2016 by FS Provence .............................. 110 7.2.1: Belarus sights (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ............................... 115 8.1: Halane Central Armoury inspections, 26 April and 29 August 2017 ...................... 116 8.2: Registration and distribution procedures at Halane ................................... 118 8.3: Review of paperwork related to ammunition distribution from Halane (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ............................................................ 122 8.4: Review of paperwork related to a shipment of weapons and ammunition from Djibouti (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* .................................................. 123 8.5: Diversion ..................................................................... 124 9.1: Establishment of a United Arab Emirates military base in Berbera ...................... 126 10.1: Marginalized communities and humanitarian access .................................. 127 10.2: Involvement of a Lower Shabelle NGO in inter-clan conflict (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* ............................................................ 132 11.1: Destruction of Shiidle villages near Balad, Middle Shabelle ........................... 133 11.2: Child recruitment and use ....................................................... 137 11.3: Update: Abdirashid Hassan Abdinur — obstruction of humanitarian assistance and targeting of civilians ...................................................................
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