¡; ¡; MINISTERIO mm* DE ECONOlVlfA

CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION Número 39

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor

25 de marzo de 2003 CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACIÓN 25032003

La guerra de Irak (IV)

1.- Páginas 3-40

2.­ ...... Páginas 41-48 3.­

U.S. OEf'ARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL INfORMATION PROGRAMS Foreign Media Reaction ...... " Páginas 49-93

4.­ HUDSON INSTITUTE ...... Páginas 94-1 04

5.- Cato Instiulte Páginas 105-106 ~~. ~

7.- Knowledge@Wharton Newsletter Páginas 110-120

1 8. -ICiis op-edS] (28 páginas)

9.- (21 páginas)

10.- UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM MINORITV OFFICE (8 páginas)

11.- ml)t~tonpost (3 páginas)

12.- Pravda (3 páginas)

13.- J3(tonomist.oom GLOBAL AGENDA (6 páginas)

2 MARCH 20, 2003

WAR IN IRAQ High Stakes

The aftershocks of war in Iraq will reach every corner of the globe: The U.S. and world economies, big-power relations, and domestic politics

Around the White House, George W. Bush is known as a soul of punctuality, a clockwork manager whose aides are met with a stem glare for being late to a meeting. So it should come as no surprise to anyone, least of all Saddam Hussein, that at roughly 9:30 p.m. on Mar. 19 -­ just 90 minutes after his 48-hour "leave, or else" ultimatum expired, the President initiated a series of attacks that he termed the "opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign" to topple "an outlaw regime." He ordered a pinpoint bomb and cruise-missile strike on Iraqi leadership sites in Baghdad. Anti-aircraft batteries ringing the Iraqi capital opened tire, and the skies briefIy lit up with explosions. Then, all fell eerily silent.

Appearing on national TV less than an hour later, President Bush vowed "we will prevail." With full-scale bombing and a land invasion to follow, thus began the nation's second Iraq war in a little over a decade, a conflict that has sent tremors throughout the Middle East and put the entire world on edge.

In all, 300,000 U.S., British, and Australian troops, 1,000 warplanes, and five carrier battle groups were set to join the campaign to oust Saddam. That has led to predictionsthat it would be a matter of weeks, not months, before the battle would be overo But despite this awesome array of firepower, the world doesn't view this conflict with universal optimismo

MANY FUTURES IN DOUBT. Instead, there's gloom in many capitals over the wide ripples the intervention could cause. Because the U.S. and Britain had to mount a preemptive strike without D.N. support, relations with France, Germany, Russia, and other nations have soured, and a wave ofanti-Americanism swept the world. That has put the future ofthe U.N., NATO, and other multilateral institutions in question and raised doubts about America's role as a superpower.

The stakes are equally large for the world economy. Months of debate over the war have paralyzed D.S. business. The result is a malaise that Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan terms a "soft spot" and that less sanguine economists believe has left the country vulnerable to a second dip into recession. With Japan and many of Europe's econornic locomotives losing steam, a strong U.S. rebound is essential to kick-start global growth. But until it's clear that the President's Iraq intervention is a success and that it will not draw America into a costly quagmire, both the D.S. and the global econorny are hostages.

3 AIso at stake is Bush's political future. The Texan "hasn't done a compelling job of convincing people this is the right thing to do," says Thomas J. Corcoran Jr., CEO of FelCor Lodging Trust (FCH ) in Irving, Tex. Yet Bush is risking more than his own fate. If his strategy succeeds, it could pave the way for a GOP juggemaut in 2004. If it fails -- because the war drags on, terrorists strike, or the economy sinks -- Bush and his party could face the voters' wrath.

PERKIER BUCK. Still, for all the unknowns, a sense of re1ief ran through the markets as it became clear that the onset of war was at hand. For six successive sessions leading up to Bush's Mar. 19 "Get out of Dodge" deadline, the stock market advanced, as investors bet on a short war that would be followed by a retum to growth. And while the minutes on the 48-hour deadline ticked off, the rally broadened, and the dollar perked up.

More important for Bush, his popularity shot up in tandem. His job approval rating hit 64% in a Mar. 17 CBS News polI, up from 54% a month earlier. And despite earlier misgivings about going to war without UN. backing, popular support for removal of Saddam by force hit 71 % in a Mar. 17 Washington Post/ABC News PolI, an all-time high. Bush's wartime standing could quickly soar even higher, at least initially. "Once the first shot is fired, the country unites strongly behind the President and military," observes Henry A. McKinnell Jr., CEO of Pfizer (PFE ).

The question, of course, is how long the rah-rah mood willlast. Administration officials insist that when the smoke clears, pessimists who predict Vietnam-style entanglements will be proved wrong. But even Bush partisans concede that the President has bet the ranch on proving the skeptics wrong. Here's how the intervention could cast a long shadow over the US. and world economy, big-power diplomacy, and domestic politics:

• The Economy. The key to the U.S. economic outlook, say many executives, is a short, decisive war. That could provide re1ief from higher oil prices, which have risen from $25 per barre1 last November to a peak of $38 earlier this month. War jitters drove consumer sentiment in the Conference Board's February survey to its lowest level in nearly a decade.

Triumph on the battlefield could pierce this gloom. Indeed, even before the troops moved into Iraq, the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index rose 8.5% on Mar. 12-19, while oil prices fell 27%, to $29.88. "We have the preconditions for a [postwar] surge in economic activity," says Steve Grossman, CEO of MassEnvelopePlus in Boston.

Most execs agree. "If we could get this war thing off our shoulders," says Stephen P. Wolfe, chief financial officer of Toro Co. in Bloomington, Minn., "we'd be poised for a breakout."

y et, together with the underlying threat of new terrorist attacks, the price of oil is one of the big unknowns for the economy. If Saddam knocks out key oil fields, the resulting shock could trigger a slump. Saudi Arabia has promised to boost capacity to offset a temporary price jump. But because global stockpiles are short and instability is roiling the oil-producing states of Venezue1a and Nigeria, that may not be enough. "The U.S. and world economy are extremely fragile," says Allen Sinai, chief global economist of Decision Economics Inc. consultants. "A prolonged war would likely trigger a full-fledged global recession."

Certainly, sorne industries will be hit harder than others, notably the airlines. Many are :::tlrp.:::tnv r.:::tnr.p.linu fliuht<:: :::tnn hr:::tr.inu for thp. Ufor<::t R:::tnkrnnt TTAL ('OTn (TTAT.) n:::trp.nt of

4 United Airlines, could even face liquidation. "1 would be surprised if no one else went into bankruptcy as a result ofthis war," says J. George Mikelsons, CEO of ATA Airlines (ATAH ), a carrier based in Indianapolis. Adds Thomas 1. Pritzker, CEO of Hyatt: "If the first Gulf War is any indication, the hospitality industry will be damaged for sorne time."

And it isn't only travel-dependent executives who are fearful. Sorne techies have the blues, too. "As soon as [the shooting starts], customers may freeze," says Phillip Merrick, CEO of webMethods (WEBM ), a software company based in Northem Virginia.

While execs debate how strongly the economy may rebound, one thing seems likely: President Bush's economic plan ~ay be an early casualty of the conflict. As worries have grown about a war and reconstruction tab that could exceed $100 billion, so has the feeling that the Administration's $1.45 trillion package of tax cuts should be sharply trimmed. It's now "a real uphill battle" for Bush's tax cuts, says a top GOP lobbyist.

Facing budget pressures, Bush may be forced to accept a scaled-back program that moves up scheduled 2004 and 2006 personal-rate cuts and provides modest investment incentives for business. Says Bruce L. Downey, CEO of drugmaker Barr Laboratories (BRL ) in Pomona, N.Y.: "I'm a big fan of eliminating double taxation. But realistically, a package that large will be deferred because of the cost of the war."

The ability of the world economy to weather Iraq-shock depends on how smartly America snaps back postwar. With Japan in a funk, Germany skirting recession, and much of the euro zone in the doldrums, U.S. growth of 3% to 3.5% is needed to spark a global recovery. But that may not be realistic in light ofBush's mounting war obligations.

• International Relations. In the messy runup to war, just about everything that could go wrong in the Administration's star-crossed drive to build support for "regime change" did go wrong. The Bush team's unilateralism left a trail of wreckage at the U.N. and within NATO. As France, Germany, and Russia blocked Bush's and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's plans to win Security Council approval for war, a U.N. that has tried to keep the peace for a generation seemed to come unglued. One GOP foreign-policy guru says that Bush's ham­ handed diplomacy has "left fissures that won't heal easily."

Now, Bush officials are weighing ways to undo the damage. Overtures are being made to France, Germany, and Russia as U.S. diplomats look for areas of agreement. One way to smooth differences will be to offer trade concessions and a stake in Iraqi reconstruction for sorne of the war holdouts. Administiation officials "clearly don't want to make [rebuilding] a unilateral effort," says Richard H. Solomon, president ofthe U.S. Institute ofPeace.

What's still unclear, though, is how accommodating Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, and other hawks will be to such a warmup. Hard-liners have repeatedly wamed of "consequences" for the refusenik countries when it comes to doling out postwar rebuilding contracts.

A punitive approach could worsen trade relations between the U.S. and European trading partners. And that, in tum, might set back a U.S.-Ied drive for a major market liberalization, with potentially huge costs for the global economy.

That's why U.S. companies with overseas interests will be at the forefront of reconciliation. "T'm VPTV hnnpflll th::lt n::ltinn<: will O"Pt tnO"pthpT ::Inri "tnn ::I~tino" ~hilrli"h " "::IV,, hmp" n

5 Sinegal, CEO of Costco Wholesale (COST ) in Issaquah, Wash. "Costco selIs a lot of goods to foreign countries."

If the war 1S neither quick nor easy, inter-AlIiance tensions will boil. Blair could face further rebellion in Labour Party ranks, vilification of America could intensify, and U.S. moral leadership on other looming crises -- such as North Korea's nuclear weapons push -- could be strained. The danger is that current global resentment of American "hyper-power" could isolate the U.S.

• Political Fallout. White House strategists concede that, despite a wave of war support at the moment, Bush will need to tum quickly to the economy. If he can oust Saddam on his terms, the Texan will acquire sorne muscle for his stalIed domestic priorities. Says Republican consultant Scott W. Reed: "If he wins a swift victory, he'lI be able to pave the streets with whatever policies he desires." For the White House, that means brushing aside deficit qualms to win a hefty tax cut from Congress.

Convinced that Democrats have been stridently antiwar and have let liberals such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) define the opposition, GOP strategists dream of a replay of the 2002 midterm elections. "The theme of the next election is: 'It's national security, stupid,'" says GOP polIster William D. McInturff.

Indeed, a Mar. 3-8 bipartisan polI by McInturff and Democrat Stanley B. Greenberg found that Republicans had opened huge leads over Democrats on a wide array of defense-related issues. White House strategist Karl Rove hopes he can fashion that advantage into an issue that trumps concems about Bush's handling of the economy.

But if history is any guide, a President can coast only so far on his war record. And in an age of unconventional wars and terror threats, clear victories are hard to come by. True, Bush has an opening to transform the politicallandscape in his favor if America's Iraqi adventure goes well. But more likely, his future will be decided by a battle closer to home. That means reviving an economy mired in a post-boom funk and meeting America's mountain of new commitments with a budget that's awash in red ink.

Doable? For sure. But it could be tougher than consigning Saddam to the ash heap ofhistory.

By Lee Walczak, Richard S. Dunham, Stan Crock, and Howard Gleckman in Washington, with Michael Amdt in Chicago, William C. Symonds in Boston, Stephanie Anderson Forest in DalIas, and bureau reports

6 Clase Window

MARCH 20, 2003

WAR IN IRAQ -- COMMENTARY By John Rossant

Europe Can't Afford to Stay Mad for Long

Its economic and politicaI needs make reconciliation urgent -- both on the Continent and with the u.s.

It didn't take long for the thunderbolt to be hurled from the Elysées Palace. Less than 12 hours after President George W. Bush declared diplomacy dead in resolving the Iraq crisis, France's President Jacques Chirac declared Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein "contrary to the wishes of the Security Council and of the intemational community.... To shrug off the legitimacy of the United Nations, and to choose force over justice, is to take on a heavy responsibility."

Tough words, indeed. But Chirac's take-no-prisoners rhetoric disguises a pressing need for France and its fellow Europeans: the need to reconcile with America -- and, just as important, with one another. The damage done by this diplomatic fracas could be as great for the European Union as for the U.S.

That sounds odd at first. Isn't it the Americans who need to mend fences? Of course. But dig down a little and you see how deep the wound to the European body politic is, and why the Europeans have to heal it.

IDENTITY CRISIS. Start with the European economy. It's no stretch to say that the Old World could suffer major collateral damage from the Iraq crisis. Of course, economic activity will pick up if the war is quickly resolved. But no feel-good factor is likely to be big enough to solve the serious problems facing Europe. Thanks to the crisis and the split it has triggered with the U.S. and within Europe, the Continent is facing a massive collective identity crisis just as it is grappling with severe economic shocks.

Germany's banking industry may require a bailout. The accounting scandal at Royal Ahold raises the possibility that Enron-scale time bombs are lurking in the corporate landscape. European equities have imploded far more severely than stocks in the U.S. Sorne of Europe's proudest corporate names are in deep trouble, from Italy's Fiat to France's AIstom and Germany's ThyssenKrupp. Unemployment is steadily rising, and the region is flirting with recession again.

7 Europe Inc. needs is more knocks on the transatlantic alliance, NATO, the EU, or the U.N. "Europeans are more concerned about the breakdown of world order than Americans generalIy are, and that could be reflected in their confidence and their willingness to invest," says Michael Hume, who is chief European economist at Lehman Brothers Inc. Blowback from the U.S. is feared, too. In a recent polI of German engineering companies, 20% feel their business has been negatively affected by anti-German feeling in America.

tl A BIT RESPONSIBLE.tl Second, the Iraq crisis has proved a dangerous distraction for European leaders just as they are focusing on key institutional questions, such as whether the EU can become a true political federation. Thanks to the showdown over Iraq, the EU's political unity is in tatters and its future shape uncertain.

For that, Chirac and his energetic Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, must bear much of the responsibility. "The situation in Europe has been terrificalIy set back, and we are a bit responsible," admits Jacques Andreani, a former French Ambassador in Washington and one of the most senior members of the country's foreign policy Establishment. "Clearly, we need to repair relations with the British, the Spanish, the Italians, and the Poles."

Indeed, many European leaders are fuming with France. Spain is on the U.S. side and has been almost as irked with the French as the British are. The Italians fear the fracas will make it much more difficult to establish good relations between existing EU members and newcomers from the East, whom Chirac undiplomaticalIy attacked in February for their pro­ American stance. A smooth integration of the East was supposed to boost growth.

DIFFERENT AGENDAS. These concerns don't just come from eurocrats looking to expand their turf. The EU badly needs to advance from its role as a sophisticated customs union to a real political entity with a common policy on vital issues like foreign affairs, taxes, investments, and labor laws. But the Iraq crisis has graphicalIy, even brutalIy, demonstrated that when push comes to shove, the EU's individual countries have very different interests and agendas despite the lip service that is given to community ideals. Now, building a common security policy, expansion to the East, and writing a European Constitution could be set back, possibly by years.

Clearly it's in Europe's interests to patch up relations with Washington and restore civility to its own house. Is that possible? No move is likely from the French, who are in no hurry to make up with the governments ofSpain, Britain, and Italy, let alone the U.S.

But openings are there. Surprisingly, the Germans may prove to be the key to restoring sorne harmony. True, Chirac and ChancelIor Gerhard Schroder have been tightly linked on the issue of Iraq. But Berlin is already looking at ways to repair the rift. Even as he warned on Mar. 18 that war "will mean certain death for thousands of innocent children, women, and men," Schroder boosted the number of German troops guarding U.S. bases.

GOOD TIES. He vowed to honor treaties that let the U.S. use Germany as a staging area, and he made no move to withdraw German air force specialists aboard NATO AWACS planes over Turkey. The Germans are keeping their anti-chemical warfare unit in Kuwait. And relations between Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and U.S. Secretary of State Colin PowelI are good, as are ties between Interior Minister Otto Schily and Attorney General John Ashcroft and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge.

8 "There is a mueh bigger group of politieians who realize that Germany eannot support the Freneh way of looking at transatlantie relations," says Bernhard May of Berlin's German Couneil on Foreign Relations. That extends to Germany Ine., too. In May, a group of about 40 business leaders will travel to the U.S. Eeonomies Minister Wolfgang Clement promises to take parto

If the Germans eould find a way to pateh things up with Ameriea, then Franee eventually might feel the need to reeoneile as well. Healing the transatlantie rift would help heal intra­ European wounds. The damage is great. The need to reeoneile is even greater.

Europe Regional Editor Rossant eovers foreign poliey from Paris

9 MARCH 20, 2003

WARIN IRAQ

The Wired War Has Arrived

Unproven technology is seeing its first action as the u.s. Army outfits soldiers with latest computers and telecom devices

In early March, Pentagon analyst Franklin C. Spinney received a troubling e-mail from a U.S. Army captain in Kuwait. In the missive, which Spinney published on a Web site devoted to defense issues, the captain expressed fears about a "logistics nightmare" in a war with Iraq.

At issue: new cornmunications and computer technology that, for the first time ever, the infantry has installed in many of its tanks and arrnored vehicles. The captain, who requested anonymity, wrote that sorne of the technology was buggy. Worse, in sorne cases it was incompatible. "1 cannot overstate the seriousness of the problem," he wrote. "This will slow down and confuse...decision-making."

That could be problematic for the Arrny's Third Infantry Division, or 3ID, which is spearheading the drive to Baghdad. By outfitting many of its tanks and personnel carriers with communications and computer gear, the Arrny hoped to provide the 3ID's cornmanders with a real-time picture of the unfolding war -- something the Air Force has been able to do in the skies for sorne time. Arrny commanders are counting on the technology to fine-tune tactics on the go, as well as to minimize the chance of friendly-fire casualties. That's crucial for a division that can cover a swath of desert 100 miles long and 60 miles wide when it's rolling.

BETA-TESTING TROOPS. But with much of the new technology -- routers, servers, laptops, satellite location gear -- installed recently, no one knows how well it will work in the heat of battle, not to mention under desert conditions. The 3ID has spent much ofthe last 10 weeks in Kuwait working out the kinks.

"They gave us a lot of equipment at the last minute," says Captain Kathy Cage, a signals officer in the 3ID's logistical support unit. "We haven't had a chance to put it to the test."

But ready or not, the 3ID is heading into battle with the system in place. How is it intended to work? Officers will ride in arrnored vehicles equipped with laptops that should provide real­ time mapping ofthe entire battlefield. U.S. vehicles, equipped with global positioning satellite (GPS) units, should show up on-screen as blue icons. Iraqi vehicles, their locations provided hv ::Ip.ri::ll "llTVp.ilbnr.p. "h0111r1 "how 1m in rp.r1 Rv r1iffp.rp.nti::ltina hp.twp.p.n p.np.mv ::Inr1 frip.nr11v

10 vehicles, the Anny hopes to avoid the experience of the first Gulf War, in which 30% of casualties were the result offriendly fire (see BW Online, 3/20/03, "Medical Advances March with the Troops").

"HUGE 8TRIDE8." If a11 goes we11, unit commanders will also be able to communicate with one another by e-mail over a secure intrane1. That should a110w them to finesse attack plans, provide updates of enemy movements, and even wam of chemical or biological attacks. Brigadier General Louis W. Weber, who's responsible for the logistics of the entire 20,000­ man division, says the technology clearly beats the previous method: moving pins and flags around on an acetate map. He adds: "We've made huge strides to be able to command and communicate."

However, the technology is vulnerable. Sorne worry that the Iraqis could disrupt the electronic cornmunications. Moreover, the entire system depends on a pair of Compaq (I-IPO ) servers that will be carried across the battlefield in two air-conditioned vans. The van carrying the main server will travel about 60 miles from the fron1. If that server goes down, either through malfunction or as a result of an attack, a second one -- we11 away from the action -­ wíll take overo If both fail, the troops wíll have to fa11 back on traditional FM radio cornmunications.

And even as the 3ID geared up to ro11 into Iraq, its soldiers fought a constant battle to keep the servers protected from the elements. Outside temperatures were already pushing 90F. Because the vans aren't airtight, Major Bradley K. Bragg, division automation officer, worried that rising temperatures could doom the machines. "Sand is my enemy, heat is my enemy," he frets. "We just don't know how it will hold up in this terrain."

Then there's the question of system compatibility. Like most companies, the Anny is using off-the-shelftechnologies that don't always work smoothly together.

"TEMPERMENTAL." Ditto for sorne existing military equipmen1. In his e-mail, the captain in Kuwait wrote that the 3rd and 4th infantry divisions are using several types of tanks, which feature different communications systems. Thanks to such discrepancies, he says, the on­ screen digital map of the battlefield is a "temperamental piece of equipment at bes1." When the technology isn't working properly, he says, units can't automatica11y update their maps. In sorne cases, he concludes, soldiers will have to manua11y input data into the computers.

Moreover, the 3ID suffers from the fact that its digital systems have not been fu11y implemented. That honor goes to the Fourth Infantry Division, which was chosen as the prototype for the new system. The 4ID features many more wired-up vehicles, and its troops are better trained on the new equipmen1. But because the 4ID was stranded for several weeks off the shore of Turkey, 3ID will be the "first division to use digitized warfare systems in a combat environment," says Bragg.

Of course, the 3ID can always fa11 back on FM radio and maps with pins and flags. But given the risks of friendly fire and the threat of chemical warfare, Bragg and his troops hope it won't come to tha1.

By Frederik Balfour in Camp New York, Kuwait, with Spencer E. Ante in New York

11 12 MARCH 20, 2003

AFFAIRS OF STATE By Stan Crock

Cooperative Models for the 21st Century

The world still needs the U.N. and NATO, but new security threats mean new international organizations are also required

On NBC News's Meet the Press on Mar. 16, Vice-President Dick Cheney made a revealing remark: He believes the institutional fabric built to deal with the conflicts of the 20th century "may not be the right strategies and policies and institutions to deal with the kind of threat we face now." The threat he conjured up: a nuclear-armed al Qaeda. And the institutions on Cheney's mind clearly were the U.N., which failed to pass the resolution Bush & Co. wanted . authorizing the use of force against Iraq, and NATO, which is now fractured into two groups, one backing the U.S. on Iraq and another supporting French and German opposition.

Cheney's observation has an intriguing ambiguity to it. Sorne critics believe his remarks are proof positive that the Bush Administration can't wait to try to toss the U.N. and NATO onto the scrap heap of history. But perhaps Cheney was just suggesting that new ways to handle the issues of the 21st century should be added to the existing framework. Let's hope so. His analysis is flawed and contradictory in sorne ways, but Cheney may be on to something if the Administration wants an effective approach to new security threats.

It's true that sorne Bush Administration officials, such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, would like to bypass international organizations altogether because, in their view, they amount to an opportunity for Lilliputians to tie Gulliver's arms and legs down. They don't like any constraints on U.S. freedom of action. Cheney seemed to take that line when he declared that when it comes to rogue states and terrorism, "the only nation that really has the capability to deal effectively with those threats is the U.S." Others engaged in the debate "don't have the capability to do anything about it anyway," he added.

"STRUCTURAL FRlcnON." In fact, Cheney's analysis is more complicated. A senior Administration official sympathetic to the Vice-President's views explains that the U.N. and NATO were deve10ped to deal with aggression. There was a "set of rules that could be triggered by an invasion," the source says. The problem now, he adds, is that "in the 21st century, you cannot wait until you've been attacked without suffering horrific consequences. y ou can't mass your forces on your border because the attack may come from within."

The problem the U.S. faces is that the countries Washington would depend on for help in such dtllMiono;: 1'.1l1tllr::lllv ::lrf"n't nrf"n::lrf"t1 to ao ::llona "Thf" FllrOnf"::lno;: for J:¡n Vf"::lN h::lVf" t1f"l'it1f"t1

13 things peacefully and unanimously and by compromise," says Michael Mandelbaum, a professor at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and author of The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the 21st Century. "They do not have the habit of thinking seriously about war." Because the Bush Administration sees things differently, he adds, "the friction is structural."

Cheney clearly agrees, noting that European nations have gone to great lengths to avoid repeating the events ofthe first half of the 20th century, when two world wars started in Europe. The problem, he says, is that "they tend to think the world operates the way Europe does."

EXPERIENCE WITH TERROR. That doesn't mean unilateralism is the answer, however. Take terrorismo "The rest of the world hasn't had to come to grips" with the terrorism threat yet, Cheney complains. That's not really true. To reach that conclusion requires ignoring the Irish Republican Arrny, the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, Basque separatists, and other groups that have plagued democracies from Manila to Milan.

And that may explain why after touting the U.S. as the sole power capable of dealing with terrorism, Cheney contradicted himself by boasting that the war on terrorism is making progress because of global cooperation on intelligence, law enforcement, and financial sleuthing. That's what you call multilateralism. And it's possible only because so many countries have already experienced the pain of terrorism that's new to America.

The same need for a multilateral approach applies .to preventive military operations. Washington would be hard-pressed to attack Iraq if it didn't have a base in Kuwait and a central command in Qatar, and it would be easier still if it had access to Turkey.

PARTNERS NEEDED. 1 think it's opportunism, rather than conviction, that dictates whether the Administration takes a unilateral or multilateral approach. And like it or not, Bush & Co. faces challenges ahead that will require partners. The North Korea nuclear crisis is expected to come before the U.N. Security Council in the not-too-distant future. And the Bush team is seeking help from Pyongyang's neighbors to solve that problem. What's more, Washington is expected to seek U.N. help for rebuilding Iraq.

That said, new arrangements may be needed, too. It's kind of like military transformation. The Pentagon wants newfangled stuff like unmanned aerial vehicles, night-vision goggles, and high-tech gear that enables soldiers to see the battlefield and communicate with other friendly forces. But the Defense Dept. still needs B-2 bombers for long-range strikes and Abrams tanks for desert and urban warfare, though critics thought both could be junked once the Cold War ended.

So, too, does the need continue for the U.N. and NATO, even as the Bush Administration looks for new ways to deal with threats, especially terrorismo The ad hoc cooperation in response to September 11 is a start. But it may need to be formalized to boost the odds it will endure. Just about every governing regime has an interest in the campaign's success because it could be the next target of terrorists.

SPECULATIVE WAR. More problematic is the preventive attack. It's exhausting to have to put together coalitions of the willing for every venture. Thomas Pickering, a former U.N. ~m h~<::<::~rlnr ~nrl tnn St~tp npnt nffi('i~1 rp.l'~ llprl rpl'pntlv thM it W~<:: h~rrl tn hnilrl thp np<::prt

14 Storm coalition even in the face of naked aggression: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It will always be a lot tougher to assemble a coalition for a more speculative military invasion, such as the attack on Iraq.

"The old institutions and policies have not been able to rebuild a consensus or a structure for how to deal with the intersection of the new threats: proliferation, rogue states, terrorism, and turmoil in the Arab world," says Richard Solomon, president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, a government-financed think tank.

Solomon believes the world may be at a "break point" in history. What happens in such times is that people, confronted with new geopolitical challenges, try to retum to the old way of doing things. "But if it's a real break point, it doesn't work that way," Solomon says.

JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION. SO what will the new world architecture look like? The U.N. will still be needed for humanitarian relief efforts, peacekeeping missions, and nation-building. Through its defense-planning committee, which doesn't include France, NATO can still playa useful role in sorne military operations.

Washington needs to organize another group, though, one that recognizes that technology has affected sovereignty, long thought to be inviolate. One might disagree over whether Iraq poses a great enough threat to the U.S. to justify an attack, but it's less debatable that the threat of weapons of mass destruction may at times justify intervention within another's nation's borders to thwart their use -- and even their development.

We may be at a point in history that requires a new strategy and alliances to combat this threat. But that shouldn't mean the death knell for the U.N. and NATO.

Crock covers national security and foreign affairs for BusinessWeek from Washington. Follow his views in Affairs of State twice a month, only on BusinessWeek Online Edited by Douglas Harbrecht

15 MARCH 20, 2003 ..las 19ht hmn SAM STOVALL'S SECTOR WATCH • Frorn S&P By Sam Stovall

Now Which Way Will Wall Street GO?

A key question for investors: WiH the patterns that developed during the strong prewar rally persist in the days ahead?

The wait is overo The first missi1es struck Baghdad on Mar. 19, and the U.S.-1ed mi1itary operation to disarrn Saddam Hussein is now under way. For months, investors have been frantically trying to divine how the stock market wou1d react once the U.S. finally attacked Iraq.

Among the questions on their minds: Wou1d it be more prudent to restructure portfo1ios with an emphasis on defense stocks, or defensive issues, such as food and beverage companies? Wou1d the market mimic its pre- and postwar pattems estab1ished in prior conflicts? During the ear1y days of Korea, Vietnam, and the first Gu1f War, the S&P 500-stock index slumped 6% to 8% after the initia1 shots were fired, on1y to advance 10% to 20% six months after the shooting started.

This time around, the market gave few clues to its eventual direction. Year-to-date through Mar. 11, the S&P 500 had slumped 9%, dragging all10 ofits sector indexes 10wer. Not all of the groups suffered equally, of course: The declines ranged from 4.6% for Inforrnation Techno10gy to 21.9% for Te1ecommunications Services. What's more, 91 of the 105 subindustry indexes in the 500 posted year-to-date declines of up to 25%. The cloud of uncertainty surrounding Iraq -- if, and when, the U.S.-1ed coa1ition wou1d engage Saddam -­ certain1y contributed to the market's weakness.

SHIFTING SENTIMENT. The market appeared to reach its tuming point even before the first shots were fired. On Mar. 11, the US. decided not to seek a second U.N. reso1ution on disarrning Iraq -- and Bush Administration officials followed up with hawkish comments that the U.S. was within its rights to defend itse1fand its interests. In an important technica1 signa1, the S&P 500 successfully retested its 10w point of 776.76 reached during the October sell-off as the cloud seemed to 1ift.

The upshot: War was imminent. A conclusion to the year10ng standoff was at hand. In rp.~r.tinn thp. m~rkp.t hp.a~n ~"i"l(-(bv ri"p. nn hp.~vv vnlllmp. illmnina Q ?% ~nrl liftina ~11 10

16 sector indexes by as much as 13.5%. What's more, 102 of the S&P 500's component subindustry indexes advanced, with the top 10 gaining from 15% to 23%.

The table below shows the performance of the S&P 500 sectors and key S&P indexes before and after the rally that began on Mar. 11 -- and the clear shift in sector sentiment. The key question is whether these patterns will persist. S&P continues to believe that the S&P 500 will eventually advance on the year, led by the economically sensitive areas ofthe market.

2003 scorecard (% change without dividends) S&P 500SectorlS&Plndex Through3/11

Telecommunication Services -21.9 13.5

Information Technolpgy -4.6 11.9

Consumer Discretionary -9.7 11.4

Industrials -11.9 11.1

Materials -13.6 10.6

Fináncials -11.3 . 10.1

S&P 500 Growth Index -7.0 9.6

S&P 500 Index -9.0 9.2

S&P 500 Value Index -11.0 8.7

$&P MidCap 400 Ir;¡dex -10.2 6.8

S&P SmallCap 600 Index -11.0 6.3

ConsumerStaples -9.9 6.3

Health Care -4.9 6.1

Ulilities -9.9 5.5

Energy -1.4 2.2

One important take-away from the table is sector leadership displayed during the recent rally. The signal sent by the rapid sector rotation appears to indicate that most investors expect a fairly quick conc1usion to the crisis at hand -- and that the economy, and corporate profits, will benefit from a resultant 10wering of oil prices and improvement in consumer sentiment.

In addition, the 1eadership of the S&P Growth Index over the Va1ue Index conveys a sense of optimism that the economy will not be materially affected by the current conflict and that the economically sensitive areas of the market will offer better price appreciation potential than the "safe-haven" issues that held up relatively well during the prior period of uncertainty.

UP 15.5% FOR THE YEAR. This pattern of sector rotation is not new -- it's actually fairly consistent with sector performances seen in the months following the conclusion of bear markets since 1970. Yet a bit of skepticism remains, since investors continue to favor the relative safety of 1arge-cap issues over the mid- and smaller-cap stocks that usua11y outperform during the early days of a stock market recovery.

We project that the S&P 500 will end the year at 1005, sorne 15.5% higher than its current 1evel, 1ed by the market's economically sensitive areas. A relatively short conflict will 1ike1y give consumer and business confidence the opportunity to recover. What's more, President Bush's stimulus package, which probably won't be passed until the war is over, is still p.vnp.('.fp.n t() 'mnn()rt thp. p.('()n()mv ll'ltp.r in ?OfH l'lnn hp.ln l'l('.('plp.rl'ltp. it<: or()urth in ?004

17 As a result, S&P's sector group heads continue to recommend that investors overweight the consumer discretionary and materials sectors. They also advise not giving up on the energy group. While oil prices have slipped below $30 per barrel from a high of near $40, they're not expected to plummet to the $20 level, as was the case afier the first Gulf crisis.

TECH CAUTION. Today's energy environment is different. U.S. oil and refined product inventories are below their five-year range, which should provide support for higher oil and gas prices this year. As a result, U.S. refinery throughputs have been cut, and quite a bit of stock-building will be required for refined products. Therefore, oil prices are expected to remain in the mid-$25 area, and natural gas prices should average $5.41 per million BTUs in 2003.

S&P also recommends a cautious stance on tech and telecom issues. Even though a gradual fundamental recovery has begun for the technology sector, the pace is apt to remain slow through 2003. In addition, many tech companies should experience a drag on earnings from stock-option expenses, which detract from the quality of earnings. Telecom-services companies are likely to underperform as sales, earnings, and credit-rating trends are expected to continue to pressure these issues.

Stovall is chief investment strategist for Standard & Poor's

Any advice, analysis, or recommendalions contained in articles labeled "Advice from Standard & Poor's" reflect the views of Standard & Poor's, which operates separately from and independently of BusinessWeek Online. It is possible that BWOL may from time to time publish information that is not consistent with advice, analysis or recommendalions that are published by Standard & Poor's. Standard & Poor's and BusinessWeek Online are each units of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

18 MARCH 24, 2003

BEYOND THE WAR By Bruce Nussbaum

Con1mentary: The High Price ofBad Diplomacy Mismanaging the runup to war will do more than squander goodwill and damage allianees

The US. has already lost the prewar battle over Iraq, whatever the outcome of a further U.N. vote. Even if it wins a fig-leaf majority vote in the Security Council, America will be entering its first preemptive war faced with opposition from nearly all of its allies and much of the rest of the planet. A world that rallied to America's side in unprecedented demonstrations of support after September 11 increasingly perceives the US. itself as a great danger to peace. How did things come to this? The failure of the Bush Administration to manage its diplomacy is staggering, and the price paid, even if the war ends quickly, could be higher than anyone now anticipates.

The political effect of this foreign policy imbroglio is already obvious. It can be measured in tattered alliances and global tensions, eroding support for President George W. Bush, and big changes throughout the Middle East. What remains unclear are the economic consequences. In the end, they may be far more significant.

Uncertainty is anathema to investment and growth. Much of the current weakness in the U.S. and the global economy is due to the immediate questions surrounding an Iraq war. Yet the Bush foreign policy of unilateral preemption is so ill-defined and open-ended that it could weigh heavily on the global economy well after the bombing stops. Look at the Administration's agenda. The war in Iraq will be followed by an occupation that could last years, cost many billions of dollars, and involve tens of thousands of occupying troops. That's a big price to pay if bungled diplomacy means that the US. bears most of the financial burden. Then there's dealing with North Korea's rush to build nuclear bombs. And Iran's play for nukes.

The prospect of America taking on this long list of crises -- and perhaps others -- with little international support is making people everywhere jittery. They fear that, beyond the war in Iraq, the global economy may be continuously threatened by political and military umest. It is not a picture conducive to worldwide economic growth and prosperity. The first decade of the new century is beginning to feellike the 1970s, when the turmoil ofthe Vietnam War cast a long shadow over the U.S. economy.

19 It may even get worse than that. Chief executives are beginning to worry that globalization may not be compatible with a foreign policy of unilateral preemption. Can capital, trade, and labor flow smoothly when the world's only superpower maintains such a confusing and threatening stance? V.S. corporations may soon find it more difficult to function in a multilateral economie arena when their overseas business partners and governments perceive America to be acting outside the bounds of international law and institutions.

How did the U.S. lose the prewar? Conventional wisdom holds that September 11 ehanged everything in V.S. foreign policy. It certainly did with regard to Mexico. Before the attacks, President Bush and Mexiean President Vicente Fox were close friends on the verge of a new bilateral agreement liberalizing Mexican immigration to America. Bush made arare trip outside the V.S. to Fox's ranch and had lunch with Fox's mother. Afier September 11, Bush abruptly ended all talks, hurting Fox politieally in his own country. The message was clear: The most critical issue for the President of Mexico was no longer of any concern to the President of the U.S. Fast-forward two years, and the V.S. is heavy-handedly demanding that Mexico deliver its vote in the Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq. Instead of caving, as Washington assumed, Mexico is resisting. Bush alienated a friend and is paying the pnce.

But the seeds of the current diplomatic disaster were planted in the first year of the Bush Administration, well before September 11. That's when Washington defined its foreign policy, which has come to be seen as the three "D/s" -- disdain, disregard, and disrespect for treaties, allies, and friends. In those early months, the Administration managed to insult the heads of both North and South Korea, an amazing policy feat. Bush was quoted as saying North Korea's Prime Minister was a "pygrny," and later said "1 loathe Kim Jong n." And Bush hurniliated South Korea's Kim Dae Jung on his visit to the White House by publicly repudiating his opening to the North, a popular policy at home.

At the same time, the V.S. simply walked away from both the Kyoto global warrning treaty, infuriating the Europeans, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, angering the Russians. A personal rapport between Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin papered over the humiliation felt by Russia. In exchange for help in the war in Afghanistan, the Administration did give Moscow a green light in Chechnya. But it never made the effort in Congress to lifi the Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Russia imposed during the Cold War. In short, Washington treated Russia as cavalierly as it treated Mexico and Europe. Now, bolstered by new oil riches and courted by Franee and Germany, Russia is trying to regain sorne of its luster as a world power by threatening to veto a second U.N. resolution on lraq. The White House has been surprised by the move -- yet another diplomatic miscalculation.

September 11 did matter greatly, of eourse, in redirecting V.S. foreign policy. lnto the breach opened by the first massive act of terrorism against the country, the Bush Administration published The National Security Strategy of the Vnited States of America, a formal codification of the White House's intentions. It rightly stated that two new realities of life -­ terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- are restructuring the global order. The Cold War foreign policies of eontainrnent and mutually assured destruction can't work when suicidal fanatics, rather than rational states, are the major threat to Ameriea. The document also says these policies can't work when terrorists can get access to biological, ehemical, and nuclear weapons from failing states or dictatorships. But the Bush Administration's prescription was a Pax Americana that broke traditional norms of international behavior. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of the sovereignty

20 of states has been sacrosanct. Nations are open to attack only when they actually do something to threaten another country. An imperial America acting alone to spread democracy by the sword may appeal to a handful of neocon ideologues, but it doesn't sit well with many Americans -- and especially not with people around the world.

The Bush Doctrine, laid out in the national security paper, has three tenets: that unilateral measures are better than international treaties and organizations in dealing with global problems; that no country or combination of countries will ever be allowed to challenge US. military dominance; and that the US. is free to take preemptive action against terrorists and states that have weapons of large-scale destruction. In short, it's my way or the highway. As a foreign policy, it is both arrogant -- certain to generate opposition by even the most friendly of countries -- and corrosive, certain to undermine multilateral institutions and agreements, including those in the economic sphere. Worse still, it is ill-constructed and confusing, making for a more, not less, uncertain and dangerous world.

The Bush Doctrine never defines just when the US. will act preemptively and take sovereignty away from a nation. That vagueness is apparent in the first test case of the preemption policy -- Iraq. The White House has said Iraq was helping the terrorists of al Qaeda. Then it argued that Iraq had to be disarmed because of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Then the Administration said a change in Iraqi regime was required to disarm the country. It has offered the grand vision of establishing democracy in Iraq. Washington is now suggesting that regime change and democracy in Iraq would help settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This jumble of reasons has undermined the credibility of the entire invasion, even though there are strong grounds to disarm Iraq. After all, Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who gases his own people, wages war on his neighbors, and builds weapons of mass destruction that terrorists could potentially bring to Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Berlin -- and elsewhere.

North Korea adds further confusion to the Bush Doctrine. Washington insists it has no intention of preempting Pyongyang's nascent nuclear arsenal and wants regional powers -­ China, South Korea, and Japan -- to take the lead in negotiations. But if preemption works in Iraq, why not North Korea? And what about Iran? These questions can only make the world, and the world economy, more volatile and uncertain.

The US. will win militarily in Iraq, but a victory in the period after the war is still in question. Whether the damage done by inept diplomacy will be long-Iasting and deep will depend on whether the Bush Administration acts magnanimously and invites those nations who opposed the war to help rebuild Iraq. Holding grudges, as the White House has done against Germany, will be expensive. There are thousands of German troops in Afghanistan and Bosnia maintaining the peace.

President Bush might want to take sorne advice from his father, who clearly offered it up in a rare public speech at Tufts University in late February. Looking back at his effort at healing his relationship with Jordan, which sided with Iraq in the first Gulf War, the elder Bush said: "1 think there's a message in that for those who today say, How can we ever put things together? The answer is: You've got to reach out to the other persono You've got to convince them that long-term friendship should trump short-term adversity."

But that implies a belief that long-term friendships are important -- a belief that it is not clear George W. Bush shares. From the outset, the Bush White House has emphasized hard power­

21 - the military. Yet the US. derives much of its infiuence from leading a global political economy based primarily on American values. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been moving toward this integrated system of democratic capitalismo Terrorism and the need to fight it don't change that. In fact, a multilateral effort to combat terrorism should reinforce this unity. To win the postwar in Iraq, America needs a multilateral foreign policy shared by its allies and feared by its enemies.

It is true that the Bush Administration did, belatedly, go to the Security Council and did receive a unanimous vote for Resolution 1441, which calls for Iraq to disarm or face the consequences. But then, of course, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the diplomatic gaffe of public1y insulting France and Germany by calling them "üld Europe." This stoked anti-American fires across Europe. France went on to disown 1441. Had it not, the US. might now be poised to fight as part· of multilateral UN. military force.

The price the Bush Administration is paying for its failed diplomacy is high, and it promises to rise even further. A world divided between multilateral economic and unilateral security policies is an uncertain and risky place. It is not likely to encourage economic growth or prosperity. The Administration risks turning what was once trumpeted as the American Century into the Anti-American Century.

Nussbaum is the Editorial page editor.

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22 Close Window

MARCH 24, 2003

BEYOND THE WAR -- THE ECONOMY Don't Bank on a Bounce-Back Growth may Iimp along even after the troops come home by James C. Cooper and Kathleen Madigan in New York with bureau reports

For months, economists, policymakers, and investors have been pinning their hopes on the belief that war is the biggest impediment to the economy's recovery. The general view: Once the uncertainties surrounding the runup to war are past, a quick victory in Iraq will bring a surge in demand that will boost output, business investment, and stock prices in a reprise of the aftermath ofthe 1991 GulfWar.

They don't believe that anymore. Hopes for a post-Iraq rebound are fading fast, and so are forecasts that the second half of 2003 will bring a jump in jobs, orders, and profits. "1 retain that hope, but not the expectation," says Michael J. Birck, CEO of Chicago-based telecommunications-equipment supplier Tellabs (TLABS ). Indeed, from high tech and retailing to financial services and autos, executives are throwing in the towel on the second half.

Why the new doubts? As anxiety over the wait for war climbs with every delay, the looming confrontation with Iraq is combining with a myriad of economic disappointments to dampen prospects. For starters, the Administration's tax plan is losing momentum. With the White House economic team struggling to sell it in the face of criticism of the big deficits it would produce, whatever stimulus plan is eventually passed will likely be far smaller than what the President originally proposed. Oil prices have also been driven up by a risky combination of war jitters and low inventories caused by production disruptions in Venezuela. The sky-high prices are already hurting the economy and look increasingly likely to dampen growth at least through the summer.

It gets worse. On Mar. 7, the monthly employment report released by the Labor Dept. showed businesses cutting a stunning 308,000 jobs in February. Even officials at the Federal Reserve were surprised by the size of the layoffs. The huge dropoff could not be explained by cold weather and the call-up of military reservists. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan is still betting that "geopolítical uncertainties" are holding back demando But other Fed officials are now fretting that businesses are just using the war as an excuse for inaction and that the economy is still struggling with excesses of the 1990s boom. Fed-watchers now belíeve that at a scheduled Mar. 18 meeting, polícymakers will at a minimum shift their official view of the outlook to ref1ect the greater weakness in the economy. That's often a precursor to a rate cut, and sorne economists think the Fed could even cut rates at the meeting.

23 While lower rates would normally help the economy, many economists are nonetheless revising down their forecasts. The Mar. 10 Blue Chip Economic Indicators shows a consensus of economists expect the economy will grow 2.6% for 2003, down from the 2.8% expected as recentlyas January. Wall Street, too, is ratcheting down expectations. Since January, analyst estimates for third-quarter profits growth have been cut by two percentage points for companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock Index, according to Thomson First Callo

The new list of worries joins a host of structural economic woes. "If you woke up tomorrow and found Saddam was gone, you might get a huge relief rally," says Ed McKelvey, senior economist at Goldman, Sachs & Co. "But then after the visceral response, you would still be back facing the same problems."

McKelvey and others point to daunting problems of overcapacity, rising consumer and business debt, as well as the expectation that there's little further lift ahead from housing. In addition, the lack of pricing power, increased foreign competition, and refunding of pension plans at the expense of earnings still hang over the business sector.

That's not to say that the war isn't a huge factor holding down the economy. The endless talk of conflict has already done much damage. The Administration may have goofed when it began beating the drums last fallo Front-page headlines and Sunday talk shows made war seem imminent and increased uncertainty.

But seven months have passed, and the prolonged wait has given executives a reason not to tackle long-standing problems or to commit to new projects. With drags like excess capacity and weak foreign demand still hanging over the economy, any postwar rally in the stock market and consumer demand could soon peter out.

Patrick J. Moore, head of corrugated boxmaker Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. (SSCC ), is one CEO who thinks the effect of anxiety on the economy is overblown and that other factors will keep second-half growth low. He points to foreign competition as the primary obstac1e for U.S. manufacturers. Because of the dollar's 41% rise against a trade-weighted basket of currencies from 1995 to ear1y 2002, he says they simply cannot match foreign prices. So they're relocating overseas. Even a short war won't stop that migration, Moore says.

Overcapacity is another long-term drag that will still be around even if Saddam isn't. The industrial sector is using only 75% of its available capacity, and sorne sectors, like telecom, will be dealing with excess for years. John W. Rowe, CEO of electric company Exelon Corp. (EXC ), thinks the consolidation process is only halfway done: "It's a c1assic case ofwhat you have to do to work offthe after-effects of a bubble."

The excesses aren't just about building and equipment. With no signs of an uptick in the markets, Wall Street is planning more layoffs this year. At its peak in 2000, the securities industry employed 783,000 people; by the end of 2002, the head count was down to 708,000. Compensation consultant Alan Johnson of Johnson Associates expects payrolls to be slashed 10% more this year, with major firms starting to lay off people in May and June.

Rising unemployment and income-tax losses will put a further squeeze on state and local budgets in the second half. Worse, the dragged-out war process could threaten the tax cuts expected from Washington this summer. "War could preoccupy policymakers and tend to push back talks about the tax plan," says Goldman's McKelvey. A delayed tax plan could be

24 the final blow to the consumer sector. The steep February drop in confidence suggests consumers are getting tired. Beside job worries and terrorism fears, higher fuel prices are cutting into household budgets.

A consumer retrenchment is the last thing the economy can handle. And it would hit autos particularly hard. Sales of cars and light trucks were waning before the February blizzard blew across the East Coast during the important Presidents' Day weekend. Now, both General Motors (GM ) and Toyota (TM ) are cutting second-quarter production, with Ford CE ) expected to follow suit. Second-half plans could be trimmed as well, especially since zero­ percent financing has lost its novelty. More important, the key difference between the spending rebound following the 1991 Gulf War and this time out is the prospect of more terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. That could keep families at home, with their bottled water and duct tape.

Further out, the economy will have to digest enormous federal budget deficits, stemming from tax cuts and government spending boosted by the cost of war and rebuilding in Iraq. That threatens to crimp private investment and lift borrowing costs.

For now, the hope remains for a rapid and successful war with Iraq. Yet even the best of scenarios gives no guarantee that the economy, still struggling under the excesses of the 1990s, will benefit much from a postwar bounce.

25 Close Window

MARCH 24, 2003

BEYOND THE WAR -- THE MAr~KETS

The Fed's Plans for Dousing the Fire Greenspan & eo. prepare for the worst-case scenario

In the ideal world of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, a war with Iraq would be a walkover. In its wake, oil prices would plunge and stock markets would rally. The resulting boost to confidence would snap the US. and world economies out of a soft spot and set the stage for a robust recovery.

Now here's the nightmare that Greenspan and his fellow economic policymakers from the U.S., Europe, and Japan know they must prepare for: a protracted war with Iraq, punctuated by massive terrorist counterattacks against the U.S. and its allies -- all sending shock waves through energy, financial, and currency markets. In the unlikely event of such a scenario, Greenspan & Co. are putting in place contingency plans to restore calm to the markets and to shelter the world economy from a financial meltdown. The three-pronged strategy: Flood the economy with money to keep financial markets functioning, cut interest rates to spur growth, and intervene in the currency market to avoid a diving dollar.

There's no guarantee these remedies would work, of course. A protracted war with Iraq could lead to a crisis of confidence in the U.S., throwing the markets into turmoil and overwhelming the Fed's efforts to protect the economy from the fallout. In a speech on Mar. 10, St. Louis Fed President William Poole singled out U.S. mortgage giants Fannie Mae (FNM ) and Freddie Mac (FRE ) as two potential stress points, arguing that they lack enough capital to weather a crisis-induced cash crunch. Both dismissed the fears as overblown.

With the stakes so high, it's no wonder the Fed is ready to take extraordinary measures in the event of a crisis. The first step: opening up the monetary spigots, just as it did after the September 11 terrorist strikes. The Fed would immediately cut the discount rate it charges on loans to commercial banks. Since January, that rate has stood at 2 1/4%, one full percentage point aboye the level that the Fed pegs short-term interest rates in the interbank money market. By slashing the discount rate, the Fed would signal its eagemess to lend the banks all the money they need.

The Fed would likely also lower the interbank, or federal funds, rate, perhaps in tandem with the European Central Bank. The ECB trimmed its key refinancing rate by 25 basis points, to 2.50%, on Mar. 6, and analysts expect it to cut again if war breaks out.

Such coordination would extend to the currency markets as well. Although the Bush Administration is ideologically opposed to foreign exchange intervention, officials say they

26 are ready to work with allies to stabilize currency rates, should the market become chaotic. That could prove crucial if a terrorist strike in the U.S. leads to a dollar rout.

The Fed even has emergency re1ocation plans. September 11 forced the New York Fed to move its open market desk, which is responsible for managing the flow of money to and from the markets, from Manhattan to an office in East Rutherford, N.J. Should East Rutherford go down, another Reserve Bank outside New York can take overo

Private financial institutions also have taken steps to prepare for war or terror-related shocks, but they still have a ways to go. The Bank of New York (BK ), hit hard by September 11, aims to move 1,500 employees to a location outside Manhattan, but it won't be finished until next year. The New York Stock Exchange, which closed for four days afier the Twin Towers collapsed, has also shored up its operations, including establishing a backup trading facility. The NYSE says it's prepared for any eventuality, but critics say it lacks the skilled personnel needed to make the backup location viable.

As the world fretfully awaits the start of the long-anticipated war with Iraq, financial regulators and monetary policymakers are attempting to follow a tried-and-true formula: hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst. In an increasingly risky and interconnected world, that's an ever-growing task.

By Rich Miller in Washington, with Marcia Vickers and Heather Timmons in New York and David Fairlamb in Frankfurt

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27 MARCH 24, 2003

BEYOND THE WAR -- THE ARAB WORLD

How the Arab World Is Already Changing Governments are scurrying to ride out--or profit from--Saddam's faH

Abdul Aziz Sultan has fond memories of his boyhood vacations in the 1940s in Basra, Iraq's second city, before the advent of a series ofrepressive regimes. His family owned a beautiful old house with high ceilings near the market. Sultan thinks the Bush Administration has made a fortuitous choice in Iraq for an experiment in nation-building. "It is rich in resources, and its people are intelligent," he says. If a decent government takes hold and Iraq prospers, "it will have tremendous impact on the region." He even predicts that a secular Iraq could encourage the region's governments to stand up to the fundamentalists who have scored big gains over the last decade.

Granted, Sultan cuts a somewhat unusual figure in the macho Arab culture. Although he serves as the No. 2 of Kuwait City-based KEü Intemational Consultants, an engineering and design firm, his wife, Donna, is its chief executive and mns the business in a no-nonsense fashion. But Sultan is no odd man out when it comes to his sentiments about Iraq. In this oil power in the shadow of a much larger northem neighbor, almost everyone would like to see the U.S. stop bargaining for intemational support and depose Saddam fasto What about the risks of war and upheaval? "Anything is better than Saddam," says Khalil Ali Haider, a Kuwaiti author and columnist. Indeed, the Kuwaitis' biggest fear seems to be that the Americans will change their minds and go home, allowing Saddam to keep menacing Kuwait.

In the West, the debate still rages over the necessity of going to war with Iraq. And Americans, if they think of it at all, have only a fuzzy notion that the Arab world is solidly against the war. The reality on the ground is far more nuanced. With perhaps just days to go before a U.S.-Ied invasion, most Arab governments are resigned to conflicto They may not want war, but they emphatically want an end to the dangerous no-war, no-peace limbo that has paralyzed the Middle East. Saddam's fall will be a major milepost, even though his influence is much weaker than it was before the last GulfWar.1t will mark the most dramatic result yet of a rough and ready American approach to the region that -- like it or not -­ govemments now have to take into account.

The Iraqi leader's imminent demise is already sending shock waves across the region, from North Africa to the occupied territories to the shores of the Persian Gulf. Governments are scurrying to position themselves both to ride out the war and to deal with its afiermath. Sorne countries, such as Qatar, are openly embracing the prospect of a new era in the Middle East afier Saddam is gone. More rigid regimes such as Saudi Arabia are hoping to control the forces ofchange (table).

28 The likelihood of war even looks to be behind Palestinian National Authority President Yassir Arafat's recent moves. Bowing to international and domestic pressure, he finally decided on Mar. lOto appoint a Prime Minister -- moderate Mahmoud Abbas. Arafat is hoping the long­ awaited appointment will spur the U.S. or Europe to press the 1sraelis to resume serious peace talks with the Palestinians after the 1raqi conflict ends. He may not get his wish, but he's angling to survive in the post-Saddam Mideast, too.

But it's the Kuwaitis who have the most to gain from war in 1raq. True, they may have to forego collecting on tens of billions of dollars in 1raqi debt and war reparations. Still, Kuwaitis figure those possible losses will be offset by the major shot in the arm that greater security and a revived 1raqi market would give the country's private sector, which has struggled in recent years.

Kuwaiti merchants are already doing a booming trade catering to the needs of the thousands of British and U.S. troops camped out near the border. These legendary entrepreneurs also hope to cash in on supplying and rebuilding their decrepit but potentially rich neighbor. Kuwaiti speculators have begun to pile into the stocks of local transportation and distribution companies, taking the Kuwait Stock Exchange index up about 12% this year. Tarek Sultan, Chairman of The Public Warehousing Co., says his company is already investing $100 million, 20% of its market capitalization, in state-of-the-art storage facilities in Kuwait that multinationals can use as staging points for forays into the 1raqi market. "We are going full speed," he says.

Meanwhile, wealthy Kuwaiti families say they are digging out deeds to property in 1raq that they 10st under a series of despotic regimes. They are looking forward to being able to drive up to Basra for alcohol, which is banned in Kuwait. Liberal Kuwaitis anticipate that having sin readily available across the border will force their royal family to loosen up. "1 hope they put casinos and bars all along the border," says one entrepreneur.

Other smaller countries in the region are also making plans to profit from the better business environment they hope the post-Saddam era will bring. Dubai in the United Arab Emirates has established itself as a wide-open gulf financial center, where businesses provide services to highly-regulated Saudi Arabia. "The smaller countries feel the need to compete more to survive in the Middle East environment," says Shafeeq Ghabra, a Kuwaiti political scientist who is founding what will be called the American University in Kuwait. "They have to be leaner and faster." The diminutive size and relatively open political systems of the smaller countries have helped make them more flexible and receptive to outside ideas. Jordan's King Abdullah, for example, hopes that the U.S. will reward his country for allowing a low-profile U.S. military presence and for not showing any sympathy for Saddam as his father did in the last Gulf War. Qatar wants the protection of a massive U.S. presence as it continues to experiment with social and political reformo

Encouraging stuff from an American point of view. But the major states -- Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 1ran -- are far more apprehensive than the smaller countries about the post-Saddam era. They fear that after the war they will come under more pressure from both the U.S. and their own discontented peoples. "Arab regimes have a feeling that they may be next," says Emad Shaheen, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.

So the Saudis and Egyptians are doing an uncomfortable dance -- placating antiwar opinion at home while trying not to further alienate their longstanding U.S. ally. The Saudis have felt the

29 most heat after September 11,2001, because 15 ofthe 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals and because of accusations, sorne of them overblown, from American cornmentators that the hermetic Saudi system was nurturing Arab radicalismo

Senior Saudis say that a review of their relations with the U.S., including the presence of American troops and aircraft, is coming after the war. But as the conflict approaches, they are falling into lineo The air war is likely to be run from Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis are opening bases in the north to shipments of war materiel.

More important, the possibility of regional turmoil is spurring political change. Crown Prince Abdullah recently met with signers of a petition that politely called for elections to a Saudi consultative council, whose members are now appointed. The petitioners also want tighter checks on bribery and other financial abuse. A senior Saudi official says that sorne form of elections is "coming quickly" whether senior members of the royal family "like it or not."

Many Saudis are skeptical of such talk. Saudi conservatism and the vast range of views on the desirability of reform in the royal family are obstacles to Abdullah's campaign -- no matter how sincere his intentions. "1 will believe it when 1see it," says an influential Saudi official of the proposed reforms. But the tone is more promising than before, and if the House of Saud fails to open economically and politically, it will face increasing public disenchantment.

The Egyptians have less to fear from a war than the Saudis -- if only because Egypt does not border Iraq. But as he ages, 74-year-old President Hosni Mubarak has become a portrait of paralysis. Mubarak has staked everything on a role as America's most reliable Arab ally. Now, he watches helplessly as Washington prepares to retool Iraq as a potential rival. A revitalized Iraq can only highlight Egypt's moribund economy and stagnant political system.

Mubarak also appears to fear unrest -- irrationally, given the strength of his security apparatus. In an effort to co-opt antiwar feelings, Mubarak's son, Gamal, recent1y led an antiwar rally attended by an estimated 300,000. That was a shrewd way to relieve pressure on the system -- and even build support for Gamal, who is spearheading the drive for market and social reformo

The question is whether the Cairo regime's controlled antiwar stance will be enough to satisfy ordinary Egyptians. Scarier sentiments are coming from other corners. On Mar. 9, Cairo's AI­ Azhar University, the fading yet prestigious font of Islamic scholarship, issued a statement saying a war against Iraq would be "a new crusade" and calling on Muslims "to be on high alert to defend themselves, their doctrine, and their lands." Many people in the Arab countries resent America's new assertiveness, and there could well be a backlash. flThe American interests in the Muslim world will be threatened," warns Essam al Arian, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, Egypt's largest Islamic group. Muslims could disrupt transportation or attack oil facilities, he add!".

Sorne of this is bluster, but the U.S. does face an increasing threat from militants in the region -- especially if it continues to do nothing to resolve the Palestinian problem. Most Arabs consider that a far more important issue than Iraq. Even Kuwaitis say they are troubled by America's eagerness to invade Iraq while being apparently unwilling to press Israel. "The Arab world is ready to be realistic about relations with the Israelis," says Haider, the Kuwaiti writer. "But they need a decent offer."

30 But Middle Eastern troublemakers are more likely than the US. to get hurt in the next few years. Certainly President Bashar Al Assad's Baathist regime in Syria will feel lonely following Saddam's ouster. Not only will fellow Baathists next door likely be facing trial for mass murder and corruption after the war, but Assad risks losing the lucrative oil and trade deals Saddam used to win his support.

Syria could also face pressure to give up its decades-old occupation of Lebanon. And Israel might go after Syrian forces there if the Syrian-sponsored Hezbollah guerrillas step up their activities against Israel during a war. Assad seems to have decided to tough it out, relying on his late father's old guard and giving little ground on political or economic opening. He could be making an historic mistake.

Like Syria, Iran will have a lot to think about after Saddam falls. The Iranian population is growing increasingly discontented with rule by clerics, and a successful secular Iraqi regime could give Iranians a new model to compare with their own regime. Such pressures could force the Ayatollahs to ease up on social restrictions and dial back on the covert operations, nuclear programs, and other off-the-books activities that give Iran such abad name.

Such a turn of events in Iran is a long shot. But the hidebound governrnents will have the most to lose as the power game changes in the region. Their hope is that the U.S. will be too busy in Iraq to risk meddling elsewhere. But having the US. as a neighbor will be a brand new experience. The experiment is just beginning.

By Stanley Reed in Kuwait City, with Susan Postlewaite in Cairo and Neal Sandler In Jerusalem

31 _._. EGYPT Hosni Mubara k has largely il wasboo his hands oi Saddam, eveñ though his party sponsorerl anantiwar demonslratiotl to help cover !lis flanks. He wotTies that a revived Imq will compete ",ith Egypt far regional influence and U,S.affoctions. ""',_. .•__ ~ _. ._ M "'__ .... _. _. __. ~ __ .., ... _. . __._~..... _ ~ •••• IRAH The Islamic Republic will be '""111._ hal1PY to S~ tile end of Saddam, • but It worries that Saddam's demis(f mightencollmge lts mvn domestic opponents. . ..__~ _ •• A~~ ._,. ~~ ••• _. , ~_ ~ __ ._~. __ ~_._.~~_ JDRDAIt King Abdullah is aIlowillg a IIJW~profile U,S, m¡¡¡tal}' presence ano letting the Ira qi op¡:M)sitioo useJordan as a base. He hopes to rema inél tra de partner of his bigger neighbor­ al1d to be rewarded 'with U.S. .aid and inl.testment __ ....._,~_..... ~ __ ~, __N _.~. _._ ~ .~...... _. .• __ ._.__ ~ ~_ ....•..•• ~e~~:~~a~e~~l~~~ il:ar~S~~dg -. opproMuíi1 of the Arab world to geírid oí Saddam once an~ tar alL It hopes cashln 01"1 tbe re~uildlllg, pA1.ESnNIAN AUTHORITV It's no accident mal Yass!r Arafat has finaily ap¡:M)inted a Prime Mínister, Mahmoud Abbas, He istrying tú ret1ucethe chances of an attack by Israel durillg the war aod remain 111 Jhegooo gracés of his fans in Europe. MajOf U.S. help after the

:__wafisstlll .~-__ ...... "",,_ .....__ íft}', .~".~'~ _nowever."" . .v_ ARAFAT ....••.. ,SAUDl ARABIA Begirming to get WlTH .••••• . real abollt polítical reformo It cou!d AnAS . . . booefit from a revived lraq ei;Ollomy . butworries aool.lts!i<'lrpenerl U.S. scrutiny of Its . hermetie sociopolitical system. :~~. _._.••. _._.- _. _.~. ~.- - ~-~-~'--q-"------.-'- --_... ~ - -~, ---~. ~- --- _. _.~.."._-~ -­ 1II 111&[ SIRIA Presiden! Bashar Al A.ssad ••*.1· has been iGlId in his oppos ition lo a • 11 war with Iraq-·al1d no wOllder. He could lose cushy trade and oil deals under <'1 new Iraqi regime-and he worries lhat he might be nex!o

32 Close Window

MARCH 24. 2003

BEYOND THE WAR -- THE ARAS WOF~LD

The Very Model of a Postwar State? Energy-rich,U.S.-friendIy Qatar is a Ieader in reform

At the end of a desert road leading to the Persian Gulf lies the key to prosperity for tiny Qatar: the world's largest natural gas field. The reserve holds enough gas to satisfy U.S. demand for more than 30 years and makes Qatar a natural place for giants such as Exxon Mobil (XOM ), France's Total Fina Elf(TOT), and Japan's Mitsui (MITSY).

Energy supplies Qatar's wealth. But the progressive style of the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, may supply something else: a role model for other gulf states as they contemplate life in the region after Saddam. If President Bush decides to invade Iraq, Qatar will play an important parto Home to Camp As Sayliyah, headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, Qatar is one of the most outspoken supporters of U.S. policy toward Iraq in the gulf. "The United States is a very close friend to Qatar," says Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani, a cousin ofthe emir.

Friendship with the U.S. is an important pillar of Qatar's security and possibly its long-term prosperity. Just as important are the emir's goals and policies. The Qataris have no desire to exist either in the shadow of the Saudis or the Iranians -- they want a future more secular and more Westem than either of those states provides. "The emir has a genuine belief that the world is changing and that it's better to do things now, when we can, and not wait until there's more tension," says Hassan M. Al Ansari, director ofthe Gulf Studies Center at the University ofQatar in Doha. "Change is not an easy thing."

Qatar is no transplanted piece of American society and never will be. But its leaders are shrewdly combining economic and security policy to secure the country's future. After the first GulfWar, Qatar quietly agreed to host American forces. Then, in 1995, the emir deposed his figurehead father in a bloodless coup and began instituting radical changes. These included investing more than $1 billion in an air base, Al Udeid. It's home to a l5,000-foot runway, the longest in the gulf -- and now a centerpiece of America's power in the region.

Just as crucial, Sheikh Hamad followed his welcoming of the U.S. with an easing of immigration rules and the introduction of tax breaks to overseas investors. He oversaw the drafting of a constitution that will eventually create an elected Parliament, lifted the ban on alcohol, and established Al Jazeera, the freewheeling satellite-TV station -- which frequently annoys Qatar's neighbors with its pointed reports. "He has broken all the taboos," says Riad Kahwaji, chief executive of the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis, an independent think tank in Dubai. "He flagrantly talks about democracy. This is encouraging to

33 investors from the West." Along with having a maverick leader, Qatar's size makes it conducive to change. Fundamental shifts in a big country like Saudi Arabia would be much more difficult, Kahwaji says.

The sheikh can conduct his social experiments in a prospering country. Lured by the gas fields and tax breaks, multinationals are pouring money in -- unlike, say, in Jordan, another progressive Arab state that has no major gas or oil reserves to attract foreign capital. Qatari growth has averaged 13.5% over the past five years. Last year, gross domestic product per capita soared to an estimated $27,050 -- higher than France's.

The development of the 900 trillion-cubic-foot natural gas field has provided the state with the money to offer enormous benefits for its citizens. Qataris don't pay taxes, have free hea1th care, and enjoy free electricity and water -- and cheap gas. Nearly every other car zipping along the palm tree-lined highways of the capital, Doha, is a sport-utility vehicle. "Everything is done for the benefit of the people," says Mubarak Mohamed Alboainin, an engineer at Qatar Petroleum who got his degree at Lamar University in Beaumont, Tex., at the state's expense.

In this atmosphere, liberal thoughts creep in. Qatari women participate in the prosperity, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, where their rights are limited and they must remain covered from head to toe. True, most women in Qatar still wear the traditional long black robe, the abaya. But thanks to a push from Qatar's first lady, Sheikha Mouza, women can now drive, vote, and run for office in municipal elections. Behind the push for women's rights is the belief that aH Qataris need to be educated for the country to become a true modem state. In addition, since the Arab state is so smaH and has such a large immigrant population, officials want as many natives as possible participating in the workforce.

Qne successful woman is Hind AbduHa Al Maraghi, a sales and marketing executive at the Doha Club, an exclusive social center in the city's downtown. Al Maraghi, who is working on a bachelor's degree in computer programming, views recent changes as revolutionary. "There's a big future for women in Qatar," she says. That's not to say every aspect of a woman's life has changed: In July, Al Maraghi will marry aman who was picked for her.

Just as cultural traditions will take time to change, so will the government. While Qatari rulers talk glowingly of democracy sprouting up in this barren desert state, the reality is a bit different. Yes, there are hopes for an elected Parliament, but no plans to replace the monarch with an elected head of state. "The question is how you judge democracy," says an adviser to the emir. "Is it democracy in the Westem sense? No. Is it progress? Yes." Progress the U.S. hopes to see replicated in the region.

By Laura Cohn in Doha, Qatar

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34 MARCH 24, 2003

BEYOND THE WAR -- POLlTICS

Suddenly, He's Vulnerable Can Bush reverse the sUde in his approval ratings?

For months, George W. Bush has stirred passions around the world but managed to remain relatively popular at home. Now, that may be changing. Several new public opinion surveys show that amid the runup to possible war with Iraq, the President's job-approval rating has dipped, exposing a vulnerability that has put a glínt back in Democrats' eyes after two years of losing encounters with the White House.

Even as patriotic support for the President's Iraq position builds in advance of a war -- a Mar. 7-9 New York Times/CBS News Poll found that 55% of Americans favor an invasion, despite U.N. objections -- growing concem about his handling of the economy has led to a fundamental reshuffling ofhis support base. According to a Mar. 4-6 Ipsos-Reid Poll, Bush is losing ground with crucial swing voters and has all but lost the moderate and conservative Democrats who rallied to his side after the 2001 terrorist attacks. This polarized electorate makes the President potentially vulnerable in 2004.

In the Ipsos-Reid survey, just 38% of voters say they will definitely back Bush for reelection ­ - down from 54% ayear ago. At the same time, the bloc of Americans who contend they'll back anyone but Bush has jumped to 37%, up from 20%. So who's sticking with George W.? His GOP approval ratings are as high as 97%. But that doesn't translate across the political spectrum. According to independent pollster John Zogby, Bush boosters are "the Republican coalition and líttle more." He adds: "The President seems to have squandered almost all of his post-September 11 bounce."

The Chief Exec's problem is not just a dearth of Democratic support. It's that he's facing defections from independents, who favored him in 2000 and will tip the balance in '04. According to a Feb. 26-Mar. 3 Quinnipiac University Poll, several groups of swing voters say they would now prefer an unnamed Democrat to Bush. Among them: independents, moderates, and upper-middle-class voters eaming $50,000 to $100,000 ayear.

What's more, support for Bush's war plans isn't translating into perrnanent polítical allegiance. Sorne of the strongest backers of an attack on Iraq -- including Jewish Arnericans, Hispanics, and union workers -- still say they favor a Democrat in '04, according to recent polls.

Two intertwined forces have tempered support for Bush. A weak economy has been further damaged by the uncertainty accompanying a potential war and a possible wave of terrorist reprisals. With gasoline prices topping $2 a gallon in sorne spots and the stock market

35 swooning amid growing concems about the health of the expansion, Bush has lost many post­ September 11 supporters.

Then there's the Administration's surprisingly clumsy efforts to woo allies and explain its rationale for war, which have alienated allies and global public opinion. That in tum has raised doubts at home about the President's standing as a world leader. "Bush has the best political communications operation I've ever seen," says a top Republican consultant. "But they've never made the case for this war."

This undercurrent of unease is also being voiced privately in sorne boardrooms. Publicly, most business leaders support the President in his campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. According to a Feb. 24-28 poll of 1,100 CEOs conducted by TEC Intemational, an organization representing small and midsize companies, 60% of CEOs back war with Iraq. But sorne execs fear that a Middle East cont1ict could sidetrack the weak recovery.

The upshot: Even if war worries fade after a U.S. blitz on B~ghdad, Bush could still be vulnerable to economic malaise. In the Ipsos-Reid survey, just 43% of voters approve of the President's economic leadership -- down from 66% ayear ago. "As a wartime President, George W. Bush is doing fine," says Maurice Carro11, director of Connecticut's Quinnipiac University Polling Institute. "As a steward of the nation's economy, he's not doing so hot."

That may be the mood today, Republicans counter, but both the economy and Bush's polI numbers will rebound after the uncertainty posed by the Iraq intervention ends. "1 can't see this [decline] as permanent," says GOP polIster Robert Teeter. "If we've gotten rid of Saddam and stabilized lraq, things will look pretty good."

Teeter, who polIed for Bush Sr., naturally tends to see paralIels between Operation Desert Storm and George W.'s own strike on Iraq. But sorne analysts caution that the analogy may be flawed. True, Bush I got a huge, if transient, ride out of liberating Kuwait. But that was a relatively simple, in-and-out campaign. Bush I1's nation-building strategy in Iraq is a far more complex undertaking. And with U.S. allies scarce and the Arab Street virulently anti-invasion, the chances for a costly stumble are greater. "If [the White House] doesn't have total success ­ - overwhelming victory with few casualties -- then Americans will feel insecure and you could see a drop in support," says Tad Devine, a top Democratic strategist.

Moreover, even if the war unfolds with lightning-like precision, the structural woes besetting the U.S. economy could prevent a quick retum to prosperity. That's when Bush's Commander­ in-Chief credentials could prove of limited use. "After the mellow glow of victory dissipates, voters will think about other things -- like the 24-year-old living with them who doesn't have a job," says Rutgers University political scientist Ross K. Baker. "That worked against the first President Bush, and it could happen now, too."

The fear that economic stagnation could endanger Bush's reelection bid concems Republican strategists. But most think if the President pays close attention to pocketbook issues, he will ride out the storm. "He has to do whatever he can to move the economy," says Republican National Committee pollster Matthew Dowd. One priority will be to use any postwar spike in popularity to lobby Congress to pass his $726 billion stimulus plan. To cinch reelection, says GOP consuItant Dan Schnur, "you don't need a good economy. But you do need one that's improving." Adds former Reagan aide Kenneth Khachigian: "The President ought to be out there pounding the podium and insisting his tax package will tum the economy around."

36 Sounds like a plan, all right. But at the moment, Bush is simply too enmeshed in war preparations to take a page from the Gipper's script -- or anyone else's. And a delayed or protracted conflict could also postpone debate over the President's domestic prescriptions. For better or worse, Bush is now focused on toppling Saddam, not on stumping for his economic stimulus package.

Of course, history teaches us that Americans rally around their President in time of war, so Bush's popularity is likely to move up at the onset of hostilities. But it's the long-term economic outlook that gives Republican strategists pause. And with good reason. It's not only America's international reputation that is at stake in Iraq. It also could be that Bush's very Presidency is on the lineo

By Richard S. Dunham, Alexandra Starr, and Lee Walczak in Washington

HANOUNG Of fOREISN POlley HANDUNG THE IF THHLECTlOHWERE IIEtO TODAV;•• ANO lilE WAR OH TERRORISM ECOHOM'Y OfflmELY VOTE OEHNIIE['( VOTE FOi? BUS/{ FDR SQMECmE MAa.4<62003* 38% 37% JAM.-MAR. 2000'"* 54% 20%

37 MARCH 13, 2003

STREETWISE By Amey Stone

The Market's Ever-Thinner Ice Whether or not stocks rally after a war cornrnences, what has even the pros spooked are the chances they'lI tank again before the shooting

Bears and bulls have been in rare agreement lately, and so far, they've both been wrong. Forecasters thought the market would remain in a "trading range" until hostilities with Iraq commenced and overwhelming U.S. force quickly turned the war into a rout. Then they anticipated a sharp rally -- the bulls a long one, the bears a short one.

What virtually no one expected is that the three-year slíde in the stock market would intensi:fy as the march toward war with Iraq has been prolonged. Yet intensi:fy it has. In mid-January the Standard & Poor's SOO-stock index traded at 930. It closed Mar. 12 at 804, a 14% drop in two months and now perilously close to its October 9, 2002, low of 777. The market is rallying on Mar. 13, but no one knows for sure when war might commence in Iraq, and more nail-biting days could líe ahead.

"1 would have thought the market would stay in a holding pattem, but what has happened instead is that this period of tremendous uncertainty over when and if we're going to war has hurt the economy and the market," says Milton Ezrati, senior economist and strategist at Lord, Abbett & Co. "There's increasing evidence that this uncertainty is more harmful than people thought."

"DOUBLE DlP IN THE AIR." That makes the most pressing problem for investors today not what the market will do after the war commences, but whether stocks will hold their ground pre­ war. "The equity risk premium is now wider than ever," research boutique Trend Macrolytics noted in a Mar. 12 commentary. "Markets don't stay stretched this thin for long -- without either unstretching, or breaking."

That has ominous implications. Investment strategists have been busy lately cutting their estimates for 2003 economic growth following a surprisingly weak Mar. 7 employment report, a dip in personal spending, and rising geopolitical tensions. "A double-dip fear is in the air," Trip Jones, a Fulcrum Global Partners senior vice-president wrote to clients on Mar. 11, a day the benchmark Dow Jones industrial average dropped 172 points, or 2.2%.

For investors, this worsening economic outlook and steeper slíde in equities raises the fTiohtAnino n{)<:<:ihilitv thM inVA<:t{)r<;: C'.{)lllc1 hA in f{)r ~n{)thAr m~i{)r m~rkAt hrA~k t{) thA

38 downside as more and more shareholders throw in the towel.

OSAMA AND ELVIS. The latest consensus is for 2.6% inflation-adjusted gross domestic product growth in 2003, which assumes Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is ousted by May, but terror risks remain elevated, according to Moody's Investors Service. Growth could rise to 3.2% if the war goes well for the U.S., Saddam exits, and terror risks at home are reduced. Or it could slip to 2% if Saddam stays around and the "persistent bunker mentality" remains. "If military action worsens matters, a double-dip recession may not be that far off," Moody's worries.

Yet it's not the long-term outlook but the day-to-day worries that have consumed the market of late. For at least the past year, market action has been dominated by short-term traders. Most recently, even they have been spooked by recent volatility and unpredictability. In his mid-session commentary on Mar. 12, Prudential Securities' Bryon Piskorowski quipped: "With reports of Osama bin Laden's capture now rivaling Elvis sightings, players are becoming more reluctant to trade on rumor and innuendo." Even to traders, staying on the sidelines is looking better than ever.

To make matters worse, with Japan's stock market at a 20-year trough and European bourses nearing eight-year lows, it's becoming hard for investment strategists to argue that U.S. stocks are cheap, points out Robert Smith, president of fixed-income investment firm Smith Affiliated Capital in New York. "We're still a long way from Dow 6,400 and 'irrational exuberance,'" he says, referring to Greenspan's famous December, 1996, warning that markets were too high.

"END OF THEIR ROPE." Meantime, the remaining individual investors who have held onto battered shares may be finding they can no longer afford to wait for a rebound, argues Peter Cohan, an author and investment strategist in Marlborough, Mass. "There are more people at the end oftheir rope," he says pointing to increasing unemployment ranks and record levels of personal bankruptcies. Even though no data are yet available to analyze in real time who's selling these days -- individuals or institutions -- many more people now need the cash they once were willing to risk to equities.

Any further leg down in stock prices -- and the implications that would have for the economy -- would increase the chances that the Federal Reserve's policymaking committee will decide to cut rates at its next meeting on Mar. 18. The jobs figures' decline has already given Fed chief Greenspan any excuse he needs. And the Fed has stepped into the breach before when markets were verging on breakdown. Ezrati puts the likelihood of a Fed cut at 35%, but the Treasury market has already fully priced it in, says David Gitlitz, chief economist at investment Trend Macrolytics (see BW Online, 3/13/03, "Is the Market Getting Ahead ofthe Fed?").

Regardless of the central bank's actions in the near term, bears and bulls alike continue to believe that a rally would commence soon after hostilities with Iraq begin -- and it becomes clear the U.S. can dominate. From there, bulls (the few that remain) think a rally could take hold. Oil prices should drop, consumers should start spending again, and business confidence would retum. The bears, on the other hand, think an upswing would be brief as underIying problems in the global economy that have nothing to do with Iraq -- like overcapacity in the tech industry, deflationary pressures created by China's booming export economy, and a tapped-out U.S. consumer -- would keep weighing on stocks.

39 The bottom line is that investors should be braced for continued sharp volatility in the coming weeks. Not only is growing fear and uncertainty raising the possibility of a steep drop before military action starts but the strength and duration of a post-war rally is being increasingly questioned. Even professional traders are realizing that in a market too hot to handle for all the wrong reasons, seeking shelter is probably the coolest bet these days.

Stone is an associate editor ofBusinessWeek Online and covers the markets as a Street Wise columnist and mutual funds in her Mutual Funds Maven column Edited by Beth Belton

40 from the Mareh 19,2003 edition­ http://www.esmonitor.eom/2003/0319/pOls03-woiq.html

Wur muy re:I~'IHlpe global order It is shattering old allianees and ereating unlikely new ones on a seale not seen sinee World War 11 By Peter Grier and Faye Bowers I Staff writers of The Christian Scienee Monitor WASHINGTON - Today the world may have reaehed a defining geopolitieal moment similar to the late 1940s, when the East-West alignment that eharaeterized the eold war emerged from the ehaos ofWorld War n. As that war shattered old allianees and ereated new ones, so a US invasion of Iraq appears likely to seramble. an order that has seemed as fixed as the stars for almost 60 years. Poland - remember that old term, East bloc? - is sending troops to the Middle East, but not France. Bulgaria is one oí America's new good friends, while Germany, for the moment, has been downgraded from "al1y" to "acquaintance." The naseent US-Russian relationship has cooled, while China looks on warily, unsure what al1 this means for Asia. The Middle East? It will be different. How different, and in what manner, few who have had mueh experience in that battered region are willing to guess. "1 think we're actually in a new period without much modem historieal analogy," says Jim Walsh, an intemational seeurity expert at Harvard University's JoOO F. Kennedy School of Govemment in Cambridge, Mass. "A lot depends on what happens in Iraq." In the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany, countries did not stay divided along the lines of vietor vs. vanquished, as they mostly did fol1owing World War 1. Instead, they reorganized themselves, like iron filings lined up by two magnets, along the poles of newly perceived threats. To the West, it was the rise of an expansionist Soviet Union that drove its organizing principIe. While it did take sorne years for enmity to fade, both Germany and Japan lined up with their eonquerors by the end of President Harry Truman's time in offiee. In the East, the Soviets and their satellites responded in kind. Similarly, today's reorganization is driven by a new threat, and the world's differing perceptions of its importance. In his speech Monday night, President Bush made clear that the desire to prevent further terrorist attaeks on the US is a main reason for his push to topple Saddam Hussein - whether

41 there are explicit links between lraq and Al Qaeda or not. Whether it takes one year or five years, eventually Saddam would foment an attack on the American mainland, claimed Mr. Bush. France and Germany and many other European nations simply do not see lraq posing such an apocalyptic threat. This differing perception is helping drive the old NATO allies apart - along with such other items as resentment about American unilateralism and insensitivity. "The problems oí intemational security have changed dramatically, and there is a gap in the perception of what needs to be done on the part of [the US] and Europe," says Robert Pfalízgraff, an expert in intemational security at Tufts University's Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy in Somerville, Mass. lnevitably this means alliances will be reshuffled, says Mr. Pfalízgraff. NATO will still exist, but it will be different, as it grows larger with the admission of new members of the old Soviet East bloc - nations that happen to feel allegiance to the US for helping them gain their freedom. It's likely that sorne US troops and military equipment will move their permanent homes from Germany to new jumping-off points further east, though such a change will necessarily take sorne time. This rejigging of the Westem alliance can work both ways, of course. It's easy for Americans to forget that Franee was wary of German entry into NATO in the first place, and that for a century prior it's foreign policy was driven largely by its fear of a German invasion. Yet today they are pushed together by mutual belief that the US is making a blustery mistake. "The remarkable thing about France today is that it feels so eomfortable with the Germans," says Pfaltzgraff. Meanwhile, Russia, the core nation ofthe West's former cornmon adversary, has taken an opportunity to stick it to Washington on a major security issue. Whether that means the developing rapprochement with the US is now over is another matter. Long term, President Vladimir Putin still appears eommitted to at least decent relations with Washington, says John Ruggie, a former assistant secretary general of the UN, who is now teaching at Harvard. Through clevemess or happenstance, the Russians allowed Franee to take the lead in saying it would block the US move to war in the Seeurity Council. "The Russians essentially allowed the French to go out and hang themselves," says MI. Ruggie. Of course, the most profound ramifications of a US invasion of lraq might occur in the Middle East itself. The administration claims that lraq will beeome a stable, pro-US platform, exporting both oil and democracy. Critics see something else - a breakup of something that is a nation in name only, and is in fact a stitched-together quilí ofwarring tribes. At the very least, the US will find itself, postwar, in the midst of a very unstable neighborhood. American soldiers and civil personnel will be conquerors in the heart of the Arab world, with lran on one side, and Syria on the otheI. "They will be eyeball to eyeball across fluid and sometimes hot borders," says Akbar Ahmed, of lslamic studies at American

42 University.

from the March 20, 2003 edition ­ http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0320/p02s01-woiq.html Timefine: Tlle roar! to wtlr in Irl1q Compiled by Seth Stern 1990 Aug. 2 - Iraq invades Kuwait. The UN Security Council calls for a full withdrawal. 1990 Aug. 6 - UN imposes economic sanctions on Iraq. 1990 Nov. 29 - UN orders Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by Jan. 15, 1991. 1991 Jan. 17 - The GulfWar starts as coalition forces begin bombing Iraq. 1991 Feb. 24 - Ground invasion of Iraq and Kuwait commences. Kuwait is liberated three days later. 1991 Mar. 3 - Iraq accepts the cease-fire. The primary cease-fire resolution requires Iraq to end its programs for weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD), recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, retum Kuwaiti property, and end support for intemational terrorismo 1991 Mid-March/early April - Iraq suppresses Shiite uprisings in the south and Kurdish uprisings in the north, creating a humanitarian disaster on the borders with Turkey and Iran. 1991 April 7 - The US and coalition partners establish the no-fiy zone over northem Iraq. 1991 April 8 - A plan for the establishment of a UN haven in northem Iraq for Kurds is approved by the European Union. The US orders Iraq to end military action in this area. 1991 April - Working with the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA), the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) is established to ensure Iraq is free ofWMD. 1992 August 26 - A no-fiy zone is established in southem Iraq and patrolled by British, French and US aircraft. 1993 June 27 - US forces fire Cruise missiles at an Iraqi intelligence building in Baghdad, in response to the attempted assassination of former President George Bush in Kuwait in April. 1995 April 14 - The UN allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine as part ofan "oil for food" programo 1996 March-June - UN inspection teams are denied access to militarily sensitive areas. 1996 June - A CIA-backed coup attempt against Saddam Hussein is foiled.

43 Participants are executed. 1997 Oct. 29 - Iraq demands that Americans on the UN inspection team leave; they go but retum on Nov. 20. 1998 Jan 13-22 - Iraq withdraws cooperation with UN inspectors, claiming some are British and American spies. Feb. 23 - Iraq promises UN inspectors unrestricted access. Oct. 31 - Iraq ends cooperation with UNSCOM. Nov. 14 - Iraq allows inspections to resume. Dec. 16 - UN inspection teams are withdrawn, after concluding that Iraq is not cooperating fully. Dec. 16-19 - US and Britain launch a bombing campaign "Operation Desert Fox," to destroy suspected WMD. Dec. 17 - UN creates the UJ"l Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. Iraq rejects the new body. 2000 August - Baghdad Airport reopened, resulting in a stream of flights by countries and organizations to campaign against sanctions. October - Commercial air links reestablished between Iraq and Russia, Ireland, and the Middle East. November - Iraq rejects new weapons-inspections proposals. 2001 Free-trade zone agreements set up with neighboring countries. Rail link with Turkey reopened in May. February - Britain and US planes launch raids to try and disable Iraq's air defense network. 2002 Jan. 30 - President Bush says Iraq is part of an "axis of evil" during his State of the Union address. May - UJ"l overhauls the prohibited-goods list, creating "smart sanctions" which focus on military and dual-use equipment. Aug. 2 - In a letter to the UJ"l secretary-general, Iraq invites Hans Blix to Iraq for talks on remaining disarmament issues. Sept. 12 - President Bush, addressing the UN General Assembly, challenges the UN to confront the "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq - or stand aside as the United States and likeminded nations act. Sept. 16 - Iraq says it will allow intemational weapons inspectors to retum "without conditions." Sept. 30 - UN and Iraq discuss terms for weapons inspections. But talks leave eight presidential compounds off limits, and US seeks authorization for a use of force if Iraq fails to comply with inspections. Oct. 10 - Congress adopts joint resolution authorizing use of force against Iraq. Oct. 16 - Iraq renews offer to UN weapons inspectors after "referendum" gives Saddam Hussein another seven-year term as president with 100 percent

44 ofthe vote. Nov. 8 - UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1441, which outlines an enhanced inspection regime for Iraq's disarmament to be conducted by the IAEA. Nov. 18 - UN weapons inspectors retum to Baghdad. Dec. 7 - Iraq provides U1\J" weapons inspectors with 12,000 pages of information comprising a "complete declaration" of the regime's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Iraq states in the declaration that there are no weapons ofmass destruction in Iraq. Dec. 19 - UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix tells UNSC members that the declaration "is essentially a reorganized version" of information Iraq provided UNSCOM in 1997. 2003 Jan. 12 - The Turkish government gives US military planners permission to examine ports and airstrips to see what upgrades are needed for a war against Iraq. Jan. 16 - In their first significant discovery, UN weapons inspectors find 12 warheads designed to carry chemical weapons. The inspectors suggest the warheads were not accounted for in Iraq's 12,000-page reporto Jan. 16 - Weapons-inspections chiefs report to the Security Council that, while Iraq has provided access to facilities, concems remain regarding undeclared material, inability to interview Iraqi scientists, inability to deploy aerial surveillance during inspections, and harassment of inspectors. Jan. 28 - Bush says Saddam Hussein "is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving," during his State ofthe Union address to Congress. "He has shown utter contempt for the United Nations and the opinion of the world," Bush says. Feb 5 - Colin Powell uses satellite photos and audiotapes of intercepts in a bid to win over intemational opinion during a UN security council presentation. Mar. 1 - UNMOVIC orders Iraq to destroy all its illegally imported Al Samoud 2 missiles and 380 rocket engines. Mar. 1 -The Turkish parliament denies US military forces access to bases in that country. Mar. 5 - France, Germany, and Russia release a joint declaration stating they will "not allow" a res01ution authorizing military action to pass the UN Security Council. Mar. 7 - The US, Britain, and Spain introduce a revised UN resolution that gives Iraq a Mar. 17 deadline to rid itself of WMD. Mar. 16 - The leaders of the US, Britain, Spain, and Portugal meet on the Azores, issuing a one-day deadline for diplomacy. They wam war could start immediately Mar. 17 - The US and Britain withdraw their draft Security Council resolution and advise weapons inspectors to evacuate Iraq. During a televised address, President Bush issues an uitimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq

45 within 48 hours during a televised address Sources: US State Department, GlobalSecurity.org, The Guardian, and the BBC

from the March 20, 2003 edition http://www.csmonitor.com/200310320/p03s02-woeu.html Europe sltifts to post-warfoclls Fearing irrelevance, war's opponents now seek role in rebuilding Iraq. By William Boston ISpecial to The Christian Science Monitor BERLIN - At odds with the US and deeply divided among themselves, Europeans opposed to going to war with Saddam Hussein are now scrambling to playa role in shaping postwar Iraq. For months France, Germany and Russia - key European countries on the UN Security Council - have been trying to stop President George Bush from invading Iraq, severely straining the transatlantic alliance. Now, Europe is looking beyond the war with hopes of ensuring a role for the UN and Europe in Iraq's reconstruction - and rebuilding relations with Washington. The Europeans also hope to restore the relevance of the Security Council, which Bush has accused of failing to live up to its responsibilities. The foreign ministers of Germany, France and Russia planned to address the Security Council yesterday on wartime humanitarian relief. "We will provide humanitarian aid, although we regret its necessity," EU commissioner Chris Patten said Tuesday. Meanwhile, the US and its major Eauropean ally, Britain, are drafting a UN proposal to use Iraqi oil proceeds to pay for humanitarian relief during a war, the AP reported yesterday. And Britain is working with Washington on UN resolutions to reconstruct a postwar Iraq, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, as "an important part of bringing the international community back together again." French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin says that the US can win the war alone, but it needs the international community to win the peace. "We think the United Nations cannot be ignored and will be at the heart of the management ofIraq after Saddam Hussein," he told Europe 1 radio this week. Germany's official policy, has been not to speak about the postwar scenario, since this, officials say, would be to give up on the last hope for peace. But behind the scenes the discussion is heated. German diplomats, according to a report in the weekly Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, are weighing a major financial contribution toward rebuilding Iraq to "buy their way back into the German-American

46 relations," the paper said. The paper cited a document prepared by Germany's UN ambassador Gunter Pleuger that suggests Berlin and other powers on the Security Council gave up trying to reach a compromise with the US, hoping instead that after the war, the US would be more willing to work with the UN. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the report, but said it reflects a "snapshot" ofthe discussion. One of Germany's reasons for opposing military action against Iraq has been fear that a war would destabilize the entire Middle East. Karsten Voigt, coordinator of US-German relations in the Foreign Ministry, says Germany hopes the U1\J" will play a strong role. in postwar Iraq to prevent such results. "We are very skeptical that stability in the region will develop in the way the US seems to believe," he said. Germany's contribution to the peace effort is unclear. With 10,000 troops stationed in UN missions from Afghanistan and Kosovo to the Hom oí Africa at a cost of two billion euros ayear, Germany insists it cannot afford to send more troops abroad. But sorne government officials suggest that a contingent of 1,000 peacekeepers to Iraq is possible. More likely, though, is that Germany will send engineers, doctors, and similar assistance. "They see this as an opportunity to improve German-American relations and to strengthen the UN," said Frank Umbach, security and foreign-policy expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations. For France and Russia, who threatened to veto a UN resolution that would have sanctioned going to war, cooperation in the peace effort could be a way to limit the economic damage from opposing the USo A report commissioned by the French Parliament and published in September 2002 put the value ofFrench exports to Iraq since UN sanctions were eased at $3.5 billion. In 2001, France sold Iraq $650 million worth oí goods - more than any other country. Especially hard hit could be French pharmaceutical companies, who profited after a UN oil-for-food program allowed Iraq to sell crude oil and use the proceeds to buy food and medicines. Other key French players in Iraq include carmakers Peugeot and Renault, the telecommunications firm Alcatel, and the engineering concem AIstom. If Saddam's regime is toppled, France fears it could lose lucrative contracts. But like the US, France is mainly interested in Iraqi oil. In the mid-'90s, the oil companies Elf and TotalFina, who have since merged into TotalFinaElf, negotiated contracts for two huge fields, Majnoon and Nahr Ornar, southeast of Baghdad. The combined reserves of these fields are estimated at 20 billion barreIs. The contracts were not signed because oí the trade embargo, but Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein agreed to wait while France lobbied to get sanctions lifted. The French weapons industry is believed to have sold Iraq $25 billion worth of arms since the 1980s. Industry sources say French companies still have not been paid for all of these sales, so if Mr. Hussein goes, those debts will be a write-offtoo.

47 Russia also has a great deal at stake in postwar Iraq. Before the first Gulf War, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Iraqi oil industry. Most equipment in Iraqi oil fields was of Soviet manufacture and most Iraqi specialists trained in the USSR. Russia still hopes to recuperate the approximately $7 billion that Iraq owes in Soviet-era debt. It also hopes to make good on sorne $40 billion in outstanding contracts for Russian supplies, engineering goods and oil-field investments that have been signed with Saddam Hussein's regime - but not valid until after the ill'J" sanctions regime has been lifted. Russian specialists are not optimistic that a US-run post-Hussein Iraq will honor the debts or the contracts. • Nanette van der Laan ín París, Fred Weír ín Moscow, and wíre servíces contríbuted to thís report.

48 liS. DEPJ\RTMENT Uf $TATE , INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

Office of Research Issue Focus Foreign Media. Reaction

March 19,2003 lRAQ: IMMINENCE üF 'PREVENTIVE' WAR 'NüBüDY WANTS' SINKS IN March 19,2003

IRAQ: IMMINENCE OF 'PREVENTIVE' WAR 'NOBODY WANTS' SINKS IN

KEY FINDINGS

** Critics overseas fear that Iraq might be the test case for U.S.' doctrine of "preventive war." ** A chorus ofBush proponents defend the possible war as "necessary" to defeat terrorismo ** European papers predict a U.S. success on the battlefield, but are less certain that a military victory would vindicate the Bush administration and restore its "moral authority." ** Many continue to charge the U.S with "contempt" for the UN and the "rest of the world."

REGIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

EUROPE:

Split between a 'wrong war' and a 'necessary war'; Brits praise BIair's 'conviction'-­ Most dailies in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Spain and Russia still held that the U.S. advocated a "wrong war," with a number declaring it "illegal" and "aggressive." Madrid's independent El Mundo contended "the perverse doctrine of preventive attack.. .introduces a strong component of insecurity for the future." French and German dailies denounced the US.' sidestepping the UNSC as a "completely unilateral gesture" and a "patent diplomatic defeat" for the Bush administration, putting U.S. "credibility and leadership at risk." Sorne outlets questioned whether a military victory would vindicate Bush. Munich's center-Ieft Sueddeutsche Zeitung c1aimed that "even if Bush is successful in Iraq.. .it will not be enough to regain...the U.S.' authority."

While critics carped that President Bush had failed to convince the world, British dailies extolled PM Blair for "presenting the most persuasive case yet against Saddam" in his speech before Parliament. "He made the speech he should have made months ago," declared the conservative Daily Telegraph "marshaling all his arguments for action--moral, legal, geopolitical and humanitarian." A number of Finnish, Polish and Portuguese outlets likewise supported a "necessary war." One Helsinki daily asserted that "the tentacles of

49 Saddam's machine oftyranny reach so far and so deep" that U.S. intervention is necessáry. Turkish papers, meanwhile, worried that their govemment's "belated action will not be good enough to heal the mistrust" from the U.S. and feared that Turkey "will not benefit from lraqi reconstruction."

ISLAMIC WüRLD:

Ultimatum was 'a declaration of war' full of 'falsifications'-- Outlets criticized Bush's Monday speech for failing to "leave any peaceful or honorable choice for lraq," adding it displayed "mocking, almost lampoonish contempt" towards the world. Sorne papers said the speech inaugurated "a new colonial and imperial era" that values "naked military might over diplomacy and reason." Saudi dailies noted that Saddam "has only himselfto blame" and that "few would weep over his epitaph," but recoiled at the "methodology involved" in his ouster. Qatar's semi-independent Al-Raya concluded, "lraq is trapped between Saddam's tyranny and Bush's war machine."

ASIA!AFRICA:

Concern over 'mortal wounds' to the UN-- Most despaired over "a fractured intemational community." lndia's nationalist Hindu waxed nostalgic for a world "drawn up through multilateral agreement and not by the imprimatur of the hyperpower." Sorne alleged that Bush's ultimatum was aimed not just at lraq, but at "the UN and the entire intemational community." Others predicted the imminent "unjust war" will only "sow more hatred in the Middle East." Several Japanese and Australian papers backed the U.S., with the conservative Australian supporting the "sacrifices required to rid the world of...tyranny." African dailies agreed lraq is no "innocent party" but attacked the U.S. for "sweeping away the UN Charter and the principie ofnational sovereignty."

WEST. HEMISPHERE:

Amid disdain for administration's 'messianistic' approach, some say 'time to put an end to terror'-- Most were troubled by what a Jamaican daily described as the "emergence of this dangerous doctrine of regime change and pre-emptive strike" adopted by the U.S. Further criticizing Washington's strategy, Lima's center-right Expreso called it "a kind of political extortion." Writing in leading Clarin, a former Argentine president denounced the Bush administration's approach as "pathological," typifying the U.So' "worst nationalistic tradition." Others shared a Chilean paper's skepticism that "it is unlikely that the westem invader will be seen as the 'liberator' or that it will easily administer the conflictive relationships" or "resolve the region's social and economic problems." Challenging the anti-war camp, dailies in Panama, Guatemala and Paraguay countered that the "eradication" ofterrorism required the "overthrow" oftotalitarian regimes that "protect and finance it."

EDITORS: Irene Marr, Ben Goldberg

EDITORS' NOTE: This report is based on 100 editorialsfrom 56 countries, March 18-19. Editorial excerpts from each country are listedfrom the most recent date.

50 EUROPE

BRITAIN: "The B1air Paradox"

The conservative Times opined (3/19): "The debate on the government's strategy towards Iraq had at its heart an extraordinary paradox. Tony Blair sat down at the conclusion ofhis speech knowing that he would face a revolt of unprecedented scale and on an issue of national importance. While the seale ofrebeHion last night, involving 139 Labor MPs, was not on the scale that ministers feared only a week ago, it remains of stunning size. Yet, despite the numbers among his own ranks whom he had failed to convince, the Prime Minister was in complete command ofthe chamber. Mr. Blair might emerge stronger than before precisely because he had the courage to proceed despite extraordinary dissent in his own party. Even those who oposed him last night had to concede that the PM and his motives were honorable."

"B1air Has Shown Himself To Be A Leader For Troubled Times"

The Internet version ofLondon's center-left Independent observed (3/19): "Even those who most disagree with war on Iraq have to salute the leadership qualities of the man who is about to commit British forces to it. If there was one occasion in his premiership to which Tony Blair needed to rise, it was yesterday's critical Commons debate. He did so. Tony Blair's capacities as a performer and an advocate have never been in doubt. But this was something much more.... This was the most persuasive case yet made by the man who has emerged as the most formidable persuader for war on either side of the Atlantic. The case against President Saddam's 12-year history of obstructing the UN's attempts at disarmament has never been better made. Despite aH of the recent fuss over perceived confusion about the war's objectives, Mr. Blair made a coherent case yesterday that while disarmament and not regime change is the legal basis for the war, the prospect ofthe latter makes it possible to pursue the former with a 'clear conscience and a strong heart.'... EspeciaHy powerful was his lament that Europe had not, with a united voice, told the U.S. from the start that it would help it to disarm President Saddam, by the collective use of force if necessary."

"Master Of The House"

The conservative Daily Telegraph held (3/19): "It was not only the vote that Tony Blair won in the House of Commons last night. It was the argument, too. By no means do the two things always go hand in hand.... But it was not only because the Prime Minister had aH the best cards that he won the argument. It was also because he played them briHiantly, giving the country arare reminder of what a first-C1ass parliamentary performer he is. He made the speech he should have made months ago, marshalling all his arguments for action--moral, legal, geopolitical and humanitarian--and putting them with such patent conviction and force that his performance deserves to be remembered as one ofthe finest in recent history. The rights and wrongs ofthe campaign to oust Saddam will now be for the historians to argue about... The most important thing now is that we should win the war."

"History's Verdict"

The left-of-center Guardian judged (3/19): "Historians will look back at yesterday's parliamentary debate on Iraq for a range of good reasons.... They will look back to read an impassioned and impressive speech by the prime minister which may give future generations sorne inkling of how, when so many of his own party opposed his policy so vehemently, Tony Blair nevertheless managed to retain their respect and support. But the historians wiH also look at yesterday's debate because it marks a really important moment in constitutional history. Over the centuries, the decision to go to war has rested, first, with

51 kings alone, then with monarchs in privy council, more recentIy with the council acting on the advice of the prime minister, sometimes largely with the cabinet.... By alIowing yesterday's debate and vote, the government delivered on a promise.... When and ifBritain again stands on the brink ofwar, it wilI be parliament that decides. It is hard, even on such a day as this, not to regard that as a kind of consolation prize."

FRANCE: "American DeCeat"

Left-of-center Le Monde asserted (3/19): "More than the UN, it is Washington's political prestige that is tarnished; perhaps also America's moral authority. In spite of the pressure exercised, the U.S. was unable to acquire the political, if not the legal majority at the UNSC. Such a majority, even with a French veto would have had its impact. While not enough.. .it would have proven that a majority within the UNSC shared the U.S. approach. From the start the U.S. has been unable to prove either the reality or the imminence of the Iraqi threat... Washington wrongly assessed France's determination; it wrongly assessed Turkey's reactions; it wrongly assessed public opinion, incIuding in the U.S.; it wrongly assessed its ability to influence the 'little' UJ'J member nations... The resuIt is rather more negative than positive, confirming a patent diplomatic and political defeat, however this unfortunate adventure turns out."

"The War And Then What?"

Jean de Belot in right-of-center Le Figaro (3/19): "The war is no longer avoidable...George Bush knows the risks. His bet is a simple one: a quick war and democracy for the people of Baghdad.... His is not an absurd visiono If America wins the war, its diplomatic defeat wilI soon be forgotten.... And Europe's division is not something that Washington wilI cry over. StilI, wilI a quick war, with a strong media impact, guarantee a political victory...? Nothing is certain about the aftermath ofthe war.... Afghanistan...and Serbia have proved it.. .. Iraq as a preamble to a new equilibrium in the Middle East carries its own load of difficulties and President Bush knows it. IncIuding the risk of a cIash between civilizations.... He has already warned about the aftermath of the war, treating Berlin, Moscow and Beijing differentIy than he treats Paris.... A short-term victory is no guarantee for the future. Further down the road we wilI need to remember Chirac's position."

"The Break"

Patrick Sabatier in left-of-center Liberation (3/19): "The U.S. President, out of frustration, and the British PM, out of a pathetic need to justify himself, are stirring up their electorate's latent feelings of Franco-phobia. By turning France into the scapegoat for their own failures, they hope to elude compromising questions on the eve ofthe war. In so doing they run the risk of a deep and long-lasting break in the western campo While the attacks on France aim Chirac's policy...they affect the French people and what is commonly known as their national character. These attacks are like an echo of the 'Bushblair' diplomatic myopia.... In their simplistic universe, one is either for or against.... France must resist this dangerous sliding. At the same time it must avoid the same pitfalI and stay cIear of anti­ Americanism and Anglo-phobia. Because the Americans and the British, beyond the 'Bushblair', are two people France needs to build Europe and worId equilibrium, and to reconstruct lraq."

GERMANY: "Wanting War"

Stefan Kornelius judged in center-left Sueddeutsche Zeitung of Munich (3/19): "The authority of the U.S. president is not the result of domestic opinion polIs or a vote by the U.S. Congress. The U.S. owes its global power to its status as a role model with a great democratic tradition; a role model that must apply the rules ofthe international community

52 more strictly than any other nation. The U.S. strength grows out of its ability to convince others by sticking to principIes that can maintain alliances and foster friendships. President Bush ignored all of these fundamental realities; he put the U.S.'s credibility and its leadership role at risk, and he has lost. Even if Bush is successful in Iraq, even if Baghdad surrenders quickly and Saddam disappears, it will not be enough to regain the president's legitimacy and the U.S.'s authority. Nobody forced this war to topple Saddam on the U.S. The great game of creating global security and stability does not call for an invasion on the Arab peninsula in fact, it prohibits such a move. As much as one wants Saddam to disappear, this will be George Bush's war."

"Bush's First War"

Wolfgang Storz noted in left-of-center Frankfurter Rundschau (3/19): "The events of the past few days and the ever-accelerating pace of U.S. actions reveal what the U.S. administration thinks of diplomacy in the end: little to nothing. They also reveal what Washington thinks ofthe UNSC: much if it agrees with U.S. positions, nothing if it doesn't. With the Iraq conflict, Bush is letting go of the opportunity to prove himself a statesman who can act prudently as well as decisively. Much indicates that the war will be swift and successful. As in Afghanistan, it will take weeks if not months until it becomes obvious once again that war is not the right tool for pacifying a region undermining terrorist structures, and building up democracy."

"Bush Alone At War"

Hubert Wetzel maintained in business Financial Times Deutschland of Hamburg (3/19): "The U.S. govemment has good reasons for a military strike. After September 11, one cannot pretend that the potentiallink between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction is not a threat. It is also perfectly reasonable to doubt the efficiency of inspections after twelve years of unsuccessfully trying to disarm Iraq. Nevertheless, starting a war now is a mistake. The U.S. administration needs more than good arguments for a military campaign that applies a revolutionary new security doctrine and has such high risks; it needs the backing of its people and allies. Bush can count on neither. By making bad diplomatic decisions, he has tumed this war into a U.S. adventure. If anything goes wrong, the United States will find itself alone, having to deal with problems that only the intemational community can deal with€. France has contributed a lot to making a UNSC compromise impossible, but this war still belongs to Bush and the main responsibility for preparing it well both militarily and politically belonged to Washington."

ITALY: "Powell: '30 Countries With Us'"

Left-leaning, inf1uential La Repubblica opined (3/19): "Thirty countries, Italy among them, will officially form the coalition of the 'willing' who will support the U.S. military intervention against Saddam.... Italy, which still has to confirm if it will allow the use of its bases with a vote in Parliament, was added to the list of the 'official' European allies along with Great Britain, Spain and Portugal.... The State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, added that the coalition that will support the U.S. in the war against Baghdad may still grow. The United States, in fact, is still recruiting additional allies."

"Bush's Wrong War"

Ezio Mauro, managing editor wrote on the front page of left-leaning inf1uential La Repubblica (3/19): "It is a wrong war. With an impending ultimatum, while armies are deploying, it's the right time to clearly say--even if...Iraq's liberation from Saddam's tyranny is achieved--and 1 strongly wish this will be achieved--that this war will still remain a mistake. In fact, fortunately, not only the final goals count in a democracy, but also the

53 means used to reach those objectives are important, as well. In this case the only means is the strength of the U.S. unilateral approach, presented as being both the judge and the avenger, in the name of the entire intemational community. This is something we had never seen in the old century. And especial1y this is something that, through a war, might change the world order, intemational law, all reliable institutions, and those alliances that we have been familiar with until now."

RUSSIA: "U.S. Needs No Multipolar UN"

Georgiy Bovt stated on page one of reformist Izvestiya (3/19): "For Bush to threaten Iraq for so long and not to strike would be a disaster. This is fully consistent with his 'preemptive strike' concepto 'Slick Willie' Clinton would have thought up something. Bush, a Texan, is forthright.... America has made it plain that, with a new world order, it does not need a multipolar UN.... History knows of no instances of reforming the world peacefully. Bush insists on his, to use Putin's word, mistake. Regrettably, it is inevitable. Being part of it would be crazy, to say the least. Resisting it diplomatical1y has proved ineffective. Breaking up with America over Saddam would be stupid."

"Terrorist Act In Defense OfPeace"

Mikhail Zygar commented in reformist business-oriented Kommersant (3/19): "The ultimatum essentially differs from anything that carne before it. In fact, it is more like a declaration of war. Overall, it is a landmark speech in as much as it sets new rules of the game. George Bush, in effect, has explained that there are no longer checks and balances around, and you may just as well forget the notion of 'col1ective security' and replace it with 'national security.'"

"Unlawful War"

Vadim Markushin wrote in centrist army-run Krasnaya Zvezda (3/19): "The ultimatum has caused no shock. Leaking information about war plans has helped let off steam. Washington has moved heaven and earth to prepare the publico It has worked. The intemational community has accepted the upcoming intervention as a given. Here's a new world order for you."

BELGIUM: "From An Ethical Example To An Electoral Blunder"

Martine Dubuisson held in left-of-center Le Soir (3/19): "By presenting the refusal to allow the transit of U.S. equipment in Belgium as the Govemment's position, the Defense and Foreign Ministers Flahaut and Michel have gone a bit too far, something that Berlin and Paris did not do. The limit beyond which Flahaut and Michel went is that which separates political disagreement with an ally from the respect of agreements conc1uded with that al1y, the limit that avoids to give the impression that one is choosing between that al1y and a dictator, or that even unilateral1y breaks the alliance.... Of course, the electoral context facilitated this faux-pas. Belgians will vote in two months.... The result is that they presented as being the Govemment's position something that the Govemment had not even discussed.... The Govemment is no longer united and has harmed its intemational credibility. On the eve of a world war, it exposes itself to discredit. After having set an example, it now reflects diplomatic amateurism."

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: "War And Peace"

Edin Krehic observed in oldest Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje (3/19): "Only a true mirac1e-­ such as withdrawal of Sadam Hussein from power--can stop [war] now. However, the Baghdad dictator is not even considering leaving his palace, regardless of all the suffering

54 his people could face and endure.... Military analysts say that this action will be nothing like 1991 'Desert Storm'.... This time, the U.S. will attack without important allies backing them. Twelve years ago, those allies were with them. In the long run, this will completely change the world political scene. Time will tell what will be consequences of all this."

BULGARIA: "Insecurity Harbors More Losses Than a Quick Strike"

Moderate Novinar (3/19) held: "If things go according to US plans, the prafit will go to the countries that follow a clear and unambiguous lineo Bulgaria is one of them. The losers will be the countries that insisted on long negotiations, delays and double- talk.... Of, course if it hadn't come to a contlict in Iraq because of Saddam Hussein's actions, the world would have been a better place to live.... The choice right now is not between war and peace, because it is obvious that peace is better than war, but between an immediate war and a war which would take place in an unknown future point in time, for an unknown amount of time and an with unknown manner of conducting a war."

CZECH REPUBLIC: "Risks OfBush's War"

Adam Cemy wrate in the business Hospodarske noviny (3/19): "President Bush has an ambitious aim of introducing democracy in Iraq and gradually in the whole region. Many believe it cannotbe achieved, but the U.S. is strong enough to make and implement its own decision. The U.S. has an important target since 9-11, and that is to punish the terrarists and to destroy hostile regimes before they obtain weapons of mass destruction. However, the question is whether the attack will inspire such regimes to obtain the weapons, or discourage them fram doing so."

"To Iraq Neither By Walking Nor By Car"

Radko Kubicko wrote in the centre-right Lidove noviny (3/19): "The Czech Republic will prabably not make a clear statement now. Despite that its political representation is stepping on thin ice, if its statements must make sense both to the public and its American allies as well. The country is lucky in this sense - nobody wants a clear position fram it. Moreover so, that its involvement in the war on Iraq can be considered as merely symbolic."

FINLAND: "A Necessary War"

Finland's leading,centrist Helsingin Sanomat argued (3/19): "The war against Iraq is necessary. Looking at the situation fram an average Iraqi's, and may also fram the neighbors' perspective, the war which seeks to destray Saddam Hussein is inevitable. The tentacles of Saddam's machine of tyranny reach so far and so deep that his ousting without outside help is not possible. The opponents of the war should be asked how long can the outside world allow Saddam to torture Iraqis."

NORWAY: "The US To War Without The UN"

The independent VG commented (3/19): "The U.S. and UK might easily win the war in Iraq, but it will be much more difficult to win the peace afterwards. For that cooperation fram many countries is needed, not least fram Russia and France."

"USA's War Is lIIegal"

The social democratic Dagsavisen (3/19) commented: "Iraq has never attacked the U.S. and has never threatened to do so. Such a war is a breach ofthe intemationallaw. Even though it is clamed that the war is preventive, in reality it is about a war of aggression.... Iraqi

55 children, who already have been betrayed by long-Iasting financial sanctions, risk being the ones paying the highest price. The United States' desire for a change of regime and strategic control does notjustify that Iraqi civilians have to give such a contribution."

"lo Cooflict With The UN"

The newspaper ofrecord Aftenposten (03/19) commented: " ...It is a mistake by the U.S. to go to war alone. It places an enormous responsibility on the Bush administration to avoid the impression of the war as a fight between civilizations - and religions. If this happens, both the US and the rest of the world might quickly lose what has been won by removing Saddam Hussein from the power that he never should have had."

ROMANIA: "Even Strongest Opponents OC War WiII Rationally Wish For U.S. Victory"

Editor in chief loaDa Lupea commented in independent, centrist Cotidianul (3/19): "War is only a matter of hours away. I think that this morning a few presidents and heads of governments are still meditating over whether it was a good decision or not to be in favor or against military intervention in Iraq, given the internal and international political, economic, and security consequences. Tony Blair is facing a huge government crisis. Jacques Chirac has fallen into his own trap, announcing too early the intention to use his right to veto any British-American resolution. Vladimir Putin missed the great partnership with the United States, by playing along with the French president. The Turkish PM Erdogan is hurrying to discuss the Iraqi issue in Parliament, in order not to lose the promised dollars... Tomorrow all will depend on how the conflict ends and less on how it began. Even the strongest opponents of war wil1 rationally wish for the victory of the United States, even though inside, they would enjoya failure. Paradoxical1y, the fate of international political and economic stability still relies on the United States.

SPAIN: "Justifying The Unjustifiable"

Leading left-of-center El Pais editorialized (3/19): "The discussions of Bush, Blair and Aznar in the Azores have left clear that they all agreed not only on war, but also on blaming France for the paralysis in the Security Council.... Powell announced that the international 'coalition' against Iraq counted on the support of more than 30 countries, but the reality is that the U.S., with al1 its military power, has been left practically alone."

"A Danger For The World, A Disgrace For Spain"

Independent El Mundo declared (3/19): "It is hard to understand why a campaign is going to be so short if Saddam is so dangerous and possesses an arsenal as lethal as Bush says.... The perverse doctrine of preventive attack that Bush maintains to justify an intervention against Saddam not only violates international law and breaks old alliances, but also introduces a strong component of insecurity for the future. WilI North Korea be next? Maybe Iran? WiII the U.S. return to the UN or do it by itself?"

"The Great Dictator"

Javier Otiz wrote in independent El Mundo (3/19): "To compare this compromised satrap [Saddam] to Hitler in 1938 is simply ridiculous.... But is there another in the world today with extremely powerful armed forces that is backed by an industrial complex, particularly in the field of armaments, that feels the superiority of its nation and its social model, that doesn't hide its intent to control and rule the entire world, whose arrogance seems to have no limits.... Ifno name comes to mind, look again."

56 "The Arrogance of the Tyrant"

Jaime Campmany commented in conservative ABC (3/19): "It is difficult to believe, but it has been France--the clear beneficiary ofthe intervention ofthe U.S. in a war in which the predominance of democracy over dictatorship was in play in Europe--who was the nation that has undertaken this diplomatic war against the great American power, [France's] ever generous ally.... With this attitude France not only broke the tradition of good relations with the U.S., but divided the Security Council, and left it practically useless for its function.... The arrogance ofthe tyrant is met here in France. Oh, the grandeur."

PORTUGAL: "Solitnde And Conviction"

Editor-in-chief José Manuel Femandes argued in influential moderate-left Público (3/19): "We have the duty to admit that leaders who do the opposite ofwhat surveys tell them, who run enormous political risks, who cannot be accused of having oil interests or ambitions of inheriting one of Saddam's palaces, act by looking at what they judge (rightly or wrongly) to be the national interest, and decide on the basis of their convictions. In this case, Bush, Blair, Aznar and Barroso--with very different levels of responsibility--share the conviction that in the post-September 11 world, the greatest risk is that posed by the potential link between terrorist networks and pariah states with the capability of manufacturing WMD.... The only way for us to avoid this risk is not just to disarm the pariah states, but to extirpate the evil at its root: the fundamentalist fanaticism that has the Middle East as its epicenter. The only way to do that is to fulfill the dream of most of the Arab 'street': to live in a democracy, to take advantage of the progress for which they envy the West. This is the idealism that feeds the conviction that has led this group of democratic leaders to decide on war. They believe the world will be better afterwards. At this moment we can only hope that they succeed, and succeed rapidly."

"A War for Enrope"

Respected historian José Freire Antones noted in leading financial daily Diário Económico (3/19): "The Letter of Eight and the Azores Summit have shown that many Europeans want to be more than Algerians to the French. So who is, after all, the enemy? ... The New York Times is wrong. The emerging second superpower to confront America is not public opinion--naturally averse to wars, especially if by suffrage. The emerging second superpower, with invisible headquarters and supply depots, is terrorismo In fighting Iraq, Blair is also fighting for freedom in Europe."

TURKEY: "Things We Are About To Lose"

Zeynep Gurcanli analyzed Turkey's possible losses in tabloid Star (3/19): "There are three major issues that Turkey is about to lose, besides the money part, in the event of Turkey decides not to actively engage in the Iraq war with the U.S.... Reshaping Iraq: Turkey will not have any say at all about the future of Iraq. The first AKP govemment took its time with the 'if Turkey nods there will be no war' idea. And that was the worst political analysis in Turkey's recent history.... Terrorism threat: Parliament declines the upcoming resolution for a second time, Turkish army presence in northem Iraq will not be in question, and Turkey will have to face with a serious humanitarian issues as well as terrorism risk at the same time.... U.S.-Turkey relations: Iraq is not the sole problem that Turkey is going to deal with. Once it is over, Ankara will have to deal with Cyprus and the EU membership attached to it. When this happens, Turkey will not see a reliable and powerful ally, the U.S., on its side.... The members ofthe Turkish parliament who voted 'against' the first time under intemalpolitical considerations and 'we can prevent the war' dreaming, better think this time about what Turkey is about to lose."

57 "Short-sighted"

Hadi Uluengin wrote in mass appeal Hurriyet (3/19): "The Turkish government finally realized the urgency of the authorization permission and it seems that it is going to pass from the Parliament in an extremely speedy fashion. Yet this belated action will not be good enough to heal the mistrust, which occurred on the U.S. side toward Turkey due to refusal of the resolution (on March 1). The superpower will not treat Turkey as it used to and Turkey will not benefit from the Iraqi reconstruction. Considering the Bush letter to Erdogan as well as Secretary Powell's call to Gul, we can also draw a conclusion that the U.S. is not going to approve Turkish strategy for Iraqi Kurds.... Foreign policy requires fair analysis, rationality and objectivity as opposed to dreams, sentimentalism and subjectivity. We have seen the latter, and now we are paying the price. Even taking the action right now will not solve anything because it is too late already." MIDDLEEAST

ISRAEL: "The Seventh Shoe Falls"

Gideon Samet wrote in independent Ha'aretz (3/19): "Even the war's critics would have lined up behind the administration ifWashington had given them something to latch on to: clear evidence of nuclear arms or chemical and biological weapons. Missing was that 'extra something,' besides the victim's testimony, that the law calls for in rape cases. America's guilt is weighty because, lacking that evidence, Bush's diplomacy created a grave crisis in the ranks ofthe same West it is trying to defend. America, therefore, goes into a war of choice after creating conditions of no choice. To Israeli eyes and ears it seems familiar.... This isn't Israel's war. But the America that initiated it is our principal international supporter. If it were only for that reason alone, we should now keep for her sake our fingers crossed."

"Means and Ends"

Conservative, independent Jerusalem Post editorialized (3/19): "There can be no doubt that in pursuit of America's national aims, the choice of means matters. There is nothing to crow about in the fact that the U.S. now goes to war with only a single real ally, and in the teeth of broad European opposition. Yet one wonders what America could have done differently.... The historical record will show that the Bush administration sedulously and patiently pursued everything practicable to achieve its goal while avoiding war."

WEST BANK: "American Warning Leaves Iraq Without Choices"

Independent AI-Quds declared (3/19): "President George Bush's warning yesterday does not leave any peaceful or honorable choice for Iraq. The warning, which most countries, especially France, Russia and Germany described as illegal, puts the Iraqi leadership in the position of either surrendering to the American legion and voluntarily dismantling the regime and its cadres and accepting the invaders...or facing massive American military forces that are capable of invading countries more powerful than Iraq.... In fact, the American warning is intended to [change] the current international order, threatening the sovereignty and independence of the world's countries. Thus, it is the beginning of a new colonial and imperial era."

58 EGYPT: "Egyptian Worries"

Opposition Al Wafd opined (3/19): "This is a personal war.... It is a sin to tie a country's fate with a single man, even if it is its president. It is a sin to push an entire nation, with history and civilization, to retum to the middle ages, with an American decision.... Bush has forgotten his country's history in the defense ofhuman rights...and role in the formation of the UN.... History will record that this American President killed the world order and announced the death of the intemational organization. It is a Bush-Saddam war for which the Iraqi people, the region, and the entire world, will paya high price. Certainly America also will paya high price."

SAUDI ARABIA: "Final Hours"

The pro-govemment English-Ianguage Riyadh Daily editorialized (3/19): "The simple fact on the table is that Saddam Hussein has only himself to blame for his imminent political debacle. Even before President Bush had given him the 48-hour ultimatum to quit, sorne Arab leaders have themselves asked him to relinquish power. Much has been written and spoken of his tyrannical ways, including gassing his own people, his war with Iran, his invasion of Kuwait...but he has escaped unscathed, so far, for every crime he has committed.... The end of the road appears to have finally come for Saddam. And few would weep over his epitaph. But the methodology involved in his possible ouster, where a president of one country asks another to step down, is what would be questioned."

ALGERIA: "U.S.-Iraq Duel"

French-Ianguage independent La Nouvelle Republique declared (3/19): "U.S. armed forces will wage war against Iraq in few hours. The whole world is holding its breath. We will watch on real-time TV the collapse of Baghdad but not that of the 'tyrant.' Will the disarmed and humiliated UN watch this new US crusade helplessly? Shall we also denounce the complicity of the media?.... Two armies are about to confront each other because oftheir stubbomness and Machiavellism. One is targeting oil and is ready to march over the corpses of an entire people despite all calls for peace including those of its own people, and the other is ready to sacrifice its own people for a throne. In each case it is the same people, the Iraqis, who are caught in the center ofthis vortex."

"Is it War Or Aggression?"

Govemment-run Arabic-Ianguage El Massa editorialized (3/19): "The military operation that has been prepared against Iraq looks more like aggression than a war because Iraq has complied with UNSC resolution 1441.... Iraq no longer possesses the WMD that would justify military intervention.... Therefore it is not capable offacing the U.S. arsenal.... The U.S. will have control over one of the most important oil stocks in the world. This is the main aim of this military operation, through which the U.S. is defying the UN and intemational community. The religious side of this war is that it is a political alliance between Catholicism and Judaism to impose their supremacy in the region."

JORDAN: "The Imminent Iraqi Attack"

Fahd Fanek remarked in semi-official, influential Arabic-Ianguage AI-Rai (3/19): "The world has not witnessed such a blatant aggression since the days of the Moguls. In the name of eliminating alleged WMD, America is going to use WMD; and on the pretext of implementing Security Council resolutions, America bypasses the Security Council, which does not want war. And on the pretext of protecting Iraq's neighbors, America threatens those same neighbors if they fail to provide facilities for the aggression; and under the pretext of saving the Iraqi people, three thousand bombs will fall on Iraqi cities in the first

59 few hours of the war. The president of the most democratic country in the world allowed himself to deliver a fiery speech asking the president of another sovereign country to abandon his country within 48 hours.... Why has America become a country that undermines intemational law, ignores world public opinion and wages a destructive war without provocation? U.S. President Bush's address will go down in history along with speeches by Hitler, Stalin and all other dictators who love war and understand nothing but the language offorce, threats, invasions and destruction."

LEBANON: "America Launches A War On Iraq...And Its Eyes Are On Syria And Lebanon"

Nasir AI-Asaad stated in Arab nationalist As-Safir (3/19): "Political sources disclosed that Secretary Powell's latest position on the issue of Syrian presence in Lebanon.. .lead to the beliefthat Syria could be the next target following Iraq.... Sorne believe that following the war, the U.S. will start to evaluate each country's position on the U.S. dominance over the region and the U.S. road map to peace. Syria has been rejecting the American pressure on Arabs and Islam and was the main obstacle for may of the U.S. designs for the region. It may have to pay the price."

MOROCCO: "War Against Iraq Is A War Against The Law"

Pro-govemment Al Ittihad Al Ishtiraki stated (3/19): "President Bush's speech...was a declaration ofwar and represents a perilous tuming out in intemational relations.... No one finds an excuse for aggression against Iraq except the unilateral desire by America to achieve its goals and special interests.... Peace-lovers consider themselves soldiers against any new world order based on a unilateral stand."

QATAR: "AH For One, But The One Is Not For AII!"

Abdelkarim Hashish stated in semi-independent Al-Raya (3/19): "Waiting for the disaster is much more painful than the disaster itself. Those who urge Saddam to fight and remain in power actually are more dangerous than the hard-liners in Washington simply because they are stupid. Saddam is a tyrant.... We all want Iraq to be safe and we are all against the U.S. plans to attack Iraq, but we all should be with the Iraqi people who have suffered and still suffer from Saddam's regime and will suffer in the future from the consequences ofthe war. Iraq is trapped between Saddam's tyranny and Bush's war machine. Iraq must not pay the price and die for one person."

SYRIA: "A War Speech"

Govemment-owned AI-Ba'th remarked (3/19): "Bush's speech, which was more like a declaration of war, has carried nothing new to Americans who are split about war.... It is noteworthy the speech contained an implicit acknowledgement ofisolation that Washington faced at the UNSC. The Council, which Washington sought to be a tool in its hand, is no more capable of shouldering responsibilities, which President Bush pledged to assume on its behalf.... President Bush considered war a mission ofpeace that require 'free nations' to participate with his armed forces.... Falsifications in President Bush's speech exceeded the limits ofmarketing war; they were even like myths to fool all people including Americans."

TUNISIA: "Last Hopes Have Evaporated"

Chokri Baccouche observed in independent Le Quotidien (3/19): "The last hopes for peacefully solving the Iraqi crisis have evaporated. Even without UN approval, the war will take place. The deadline given by Bush to Iraq leaves no room for doubt on this issue. We have only to count the strikes, the deaths and the devastating consequences of this

60 imminent catastrophe for the world, where nothing will ever be the same.... Meanwhi1e, the new genocide begins to take shape."

UAE: "WiII He Do Anything?"

Abu Dhabi-based semi-officia1 Al Ittihad editorialized (3/18): "Will Saddam do it? Will he be concerned about the interests of his peop1e and not his own? Will he listen to the voices of wisdom and reason in order to save his peop1e who have been suffering for years now, and who are still dreaming that this war cou1d be avoided? Will Saddam, as his habit in the last ten years, back off at the 1ast minute and grant millions of Iraqis the hope they have been awaiting so long?"

"A Model For The Future"

Sharjah-based pan-Arab Al Kha1eej wrote (3/19): "During this crucial time, from the e1imination of the internationa1 system initiated sixty years ago after World War n, something that fell with the U.S. Administration decision in for a war on Iraq, to a new American system, something Washington wou1d like to impose on the world. What is going to face Iraq during this war will be the 'ideal' model that will be imposed on all opponents, nay-sayers, and all peop1e rejecting British-American policies." EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

AUSTRALIA: "Time Has Now Arrived For Disarming Iraq"

The nationa1 conservative Australian editoria1ized (3/19): "The Austra1ian has argued that if there comes a time when the U.S. and Britain are 1eft with no realistic option but to disarm Iraq by force, Australia shou1d consider joining them. That time has now arrived.... In committing Australian troops to a U.S.-1ed coalition, the Howard Government has made the right decision, both in terms of morality and in terms of Australia's national interest.... Yesterday will not be seen historically as a "black day" for Australia. It will be seen as a solemn day, on which this country reaffirmed a long tradition in which it has not been prepared to stand by while others make the sacrifices required to rid the world of the threat posed by tyranny."

CHINA: "The World Is Deeply Worried"

Gu Ping commented in the official Peop1e's Daily (Renmin Ribao) (3/19): "The speech made by Bush shows that a war without UN authorization is on the verge of breaking out. The moment when the Iraq issue will be resolved through military force is coming. The people all over the world and the internationa1 community are looking forward to peace, but not war. The UN Security Council is making every effort to promote a peacefu1 reso1ution tó the Iraqi crisis, and UN weapons inspectors are making progress in Iraq. However, under such circumstances, the danger of war has reached an unprecedentedly high leve1, which deep1y worries the wor1d."

CHINA (HONG KONG SAR): "Bush's Unjust War WiII Upset Peace And Order"

Independent Chinese-Ianguage Hong Kong Economic Times commented (3/19): "U.S. President Bush yesterday morning issued an u1timatum to Hussein to 1eave Iraq within 48 hours.... Hussein, however, has a1ready rejected Bush's demand, and the U.S. is on the brink of war. In bypassing the UN to attack Iraq unilaterally, the U.S. is trying to fight an unjust war, in flagrant disregard of internationa11aw. The harm done to the world is much more serious. President Bush's speech refers to three crimes committed by Iraq: First, the

61 Hussein regime has designs on controlling the Middle East. Second, Hussein has always hated the U.S. and its allies. Third, Hussein has always helped, trained and sheltered terrorists, including bin Laden's al Qaeda. It is farfetched for the U.S. and Britain to use the aboye as justification for military action.... The U.S. is taking a 'pre-emptive' move to send troops and launch an unjust war, setting abad precedent.... Waging war demonstrates U.S. hegemony. It will only sow more hatred in the Middle East and the Islamic world."

TAIWAN: "The War Nobody Really Wants"

Pro-independence, English-language Taipei Times observed (3/19): "In a matter of hours, the world situation will change. Even ifU.S. and British troops successfully oust Saddam, the war may also stoke hostility between Christian and Muslim nations. A clash oí civilizations centered around religious conflict may become a reality in the 21st century, bringing endless conflict and disaster. To avoid this looming war, we can only call on Bush to rein in his horse on the edge of the precipice, and to give the UN weapons inspectors more time to do their jobs, and ease concerns about Iraq's concealed weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise, unless Saddam accepts exile, humanity must bear the consequences of this war with a heavy heart."

JAPAN: "Concern Over Iraq War"

Liberal Asahi editorialized (3/19): "Despite its failure to persuade the world community to join in a war against Iraq, the U.S. is likely to go it alone.... The U.S. action would inflict mortal wounds on the authority and prestige ofthe UN that has created a major framework ofpost-World War 11 international order. AIthough the U.S. hopefully predicts that fighting will come to an early and, it may develop into a land war to 'conquer' Baghdad, victimizing many innocent noncombatants and bringing the world into confusion. We again urge Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq to avert war and save the lives ofthe Iraqi people. This does not mean we support President Bush's ultimatumfor Hussein to leave or face action."

"We Support PM Koizumi's Decision"

Top-circulation, moderate Yomiuri opined (3/19): "The final deadline is set.... Time is running out. Although there is a very little likelihood that Saddam Hussein will go into exile, we are still hopeful that he will surrender power to avoid war. We support the prime minister's unambiguous declaration of support. PM Koizumi stressed the importance oí dealing with world issues in cooperation with the world community, well aware of the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. He said the ruining of confidence in the alliance would run counter to Japan's national interests. It is only natural that the prime minister put top priority on the bilateral alliance from the standpoint of national interests. The U.S.­ Japan alliance contributes not only to Japan's security but also to peace and security in East Asia."

INDONESIA: "As IfHopeless, The World Astounded By U.S. Ultimatum"

Leading independent Kompas contended (3/19): "The U.S. ultimatum raises much concern because it suggests that diplomatic efforts are no longer useful. In fact, many parties have worked hard for the past several months to reject the war and call for a peaceful solution. Movements to reject the war are still prevailing all over the world.... Although the protest movements might not be effective in stopping U.S. intentions to attack Iraq, those protesting voices are very important in reminding the U.S. that the war is very dangerous to humanity."

62 MALAYSIA: "Lock And Load The New World Order"

Government-influenced English-Ianguage New Straits Times observed (3/19): "The mocking, almost lampoonish contempt of the United States' final ultimatum to Iraq--that President Saddam Hussein and sons leave town by sundown tomorrow or be bombed out-­ is the last nail in the coffin of the notion that there could have been any other resolution to this ghast1y farce of a conflict. The first major world crisis of the 21 st century has been a triumph of naked military might over diplomacy and reason. This has been a tragic failure of civilisation. The febrile militarism of the past century has reached out to infect this one; cursing the world with conflict eternal. Who will be next?.... What ofthose who have not aligned themselves with the US in this crusade? Are they, too, condemned to choose between being outcasts or invaded? America will of course 'win' its grotesque little war on Iraq.... The cost to the U.S. and its military allies, too, need be minimal in personnel and material. But it will be political1y stupendous."

SOUTH KOREA: "Power-based V.S. Ultimatum"

Independent Joong-Ang Ilbo observed (3/19): "Washington's declaration of war on Iraq without UN approval demonstrates a fractured international community and U.S. unilateralism. This is undeniably a challenge to the role of the UN as the mediator in international disputes.... Considering that global order is still ruled by power, not internationallaws or morality, the ROK must careful1y calculate how to act to maximize its national interests."

VIETNAM: "At The Brink OfWar"

Quang Loi wrote in Vietnam People's Arrny-run official Ouan Doi Nhan Dan (3/19): "U.S. President Bush has just issued an ultimatum to Iraqi President Hussein and his sons.... Everyone understands that if Iraq is attacked with unconvincing reasons, then any other country could be the next target.... The war in Iraq is a war with clearly identified strategic targets for the U.S., which are: (1) to affirm the world leader position, (2) to re-arrange the order in the region that possesses the world's major oil reserves, and (3) to send a warning signal to any country that dares to resist orders.... The ultimatum from the U.S. president is not only directed to Iraq, but also to the UN and the entire international community. Not only Iraq, but also the UN has been made by the U.S. a hostage ofwar.... This may be the beginning ofthe collapse ofthe current world order." SOUTHASIA

INDIA: "An Vnjustifiable War"

The nationalist Hindu opined (3/19): "None of Bush's justifications stands up to scrutiny but the manner in which the US President has been economical with the truth in respect of the relevant UN resolutions symbolizes the weakest part of the case he sought to make.... The U.S. and its handful of al1ies withdrew the draft resolution which they were trying to get passed...because it was not just unsupported but actively opposed by an overwhelming majority of international opinion.... The U.S. is on the verge of destroying the hopes of a future in which the global community will be governed by institutions and rules drawn up through multilateral agreement and not by the imprimatur ofthe hyperpower."

"Beyond Iraq"

The left-of-center Times OfIndia commented (3/19): "The die is cast. The U.S. is going to war...with no sanction or justification other than self-righteousness.... But one thing is

63 certain. The world will never be the same again. For not only has the US acted with total disregard of the intemational community by bypassing the UN Security Council, but has abrogated the right to continue to do so in the future.... The purportedly benevolent global autocracy of Pax Americana could tum out to be its own worst enemy by sowing the seeds of terrorist reprisa1. Which in tum would make the US even more aggressively paranoid and thus escalate the spiral of retaliation."

PAKISTAN: "Waiting For War"

The centrist national News stated (3/18): "The very language of the Bush ultimatum, however, makes it clear that the U.S. leader does not suffer any hurdles like the UNSC's inability to pass the desired resolution, the failure of the weapons inspectors to find the 'smoking gun evidence' or the reluctance of allies to support the war. The Bush administration made up its mind on the basis of what it considered was correct, not what was legitimate according to a universal moral yardstick. The ultimatum too was dripping with the same arrogance for what was just and righ1. It was not issued by the UN as what was the norm but by a member state without authority.... It was a recipe for other aggressive nations to adop1."

NEPAL: "U.S. Crazy For War"

Centrist Kantipur held (3/19): "The U.S. President, who is going to war without an intemational support, has tried to present him as a true friend of the Iraqi people and defender of their democracy. It is the business of the Iraqi people to keep or remove Saddam. The number of people that agree to Saddam's accusation that the U.S. wants to have total control over Iraq's oH is not too few.... American people are against the war. They are on the side of the world opinion. The war may destroy Iraq, but it will also damage the U.S. economy." AFRICA

CAMEROON: "A Defining Moment"

Ekinneh Agbaw-Ebai wrote in the Yaounde-based govemment-owned bilingual Cameroon Tribune (3/19): "With the clock ticking down on the 48-hour deadline for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave the country, the United states and the world are bracing for war, and the possibility of terrorist attacks.... This war is the biggest gamble of Mr. Bush's already eventful presidency.... Domestically, success against Iraq would almost certainly ensure his re-election to the White House and domination of U.S. politics for years to come. But failure would surely mean the end of his political career.... Intemationally, the stakes are, if anything, higher."

GHANA: "War: What Happens To The U.S. During And After?"

Urban pro-govemmetn Accra Mail stated (3/19): "The current playground for the superpowers is Iraq.... The govemment of Iraq cannot be a role model.... It attacked Iran and...struck again, this time against tiny Kuwait.... Iraq cannot therefore be described as an innocent party. But having said that, what would such a war mean to the distressed economies of Africa? A 101. For starters, if the war should drag, and the price of oil soars, Africa's fragile economies would be hardest hit."

64 NIGERIA: "The Iraq War And A Weakened UN?"

Abuja-based independent Daily Trust opined (3/19): "Things would have gone differently in the era of the Cold War, and America would certainly have thought twice before daring the whole world to follow or give way.... The world had better be careful however because there could arise an issue that it cared more about than Iraq and neither the United Nations nor its Security Council would be there if they are allowed to be emasculated by America now. The world should tell America unequivocally that the United Nations and its Security Council still represent the best hopes of all."

TANZANIA: "History WiII Condemn America"

Kiswahilli-Ianguage pro-government Mwananchi declared (3/19): "From the very beginning, America has been trying to bulldoze the Council to endorse its own plans. Indeed America has behaved like a bully.... America now perceives itself as the most powerful country in the world. But, by snubbing the U.N., America is making a very big mistake. Why is it refusing to respect the opinions and wisdom of other countries? America should not think that, just because it is now the most powerful country in the world, it will always be able to whatever it wants.1t should learn from history."

"Pressure Saddam In A Peaceful Manner"

Kiswahili-Ianguage independent Nipashe commented (3/18): "The whole world is nervous about the war that is about to break out.... Since it looks like the war can't be stopped at this stage, we hope that it will not last long so as to minimize its effects. As for us in developing countries, we can only remind ourselves that: When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. We are already feeling the effects of soaring oil prices. Despite our anxiety about this war, we are still praying that a peaceful solution for this conflict is found."

ZAMBIA: "Dangerous Bush"

The leftist Independent Post contended (3/19): "It is sad that the United States, a country that is prepared to punish others for not abiding by the United Nations decision, is prepared to act in a lawless manner and attack Iraq. We say this because United States President George W. Bush weeks or months ago made it very clear that ifthe United Nations failed to abide by his wishes to attack Iraq, Washington would act on its own. And yet this is the same man who is insisting that Iraq's refusal to abide by the previous resolutions threatened the authority of the United Nations.... But there is no country in the world that surpasses the United States in not abiding by the wishes of the world's majority.... What we are seeing today is nothing but the development of a whole philosophy aimed at sweeping away the United Nations Charter and the principIe ofnational sovereignty."

ZIMBABWE: "End OfThe Road For UN System"

The pro-govemment Daily Mirror alleged (3/19): "The past one month has c1early shown the world how the power of the lJN has eroded.... It is sad that, after so much hard work of inspections and weapons destruction, the inspectors led by Hans Blix were not given a chance to complete their work. There was so much hope that Blix and his team were going to accomplish the disarmament of Iraq without a single shot being fired. Now, it appears as ifthe U.S. President was using the inspectors to point out whatever weapons Iraq possesses, and neutralize them to allow American forces to invade Iraq with minimum resistance. It is now c1ear that the U. S. President was never really serious about UN diplomacy. It is also ironic that in his war speech, Bush asks the UN to continue with its work and provide

65 humanitarian assistance to Iraq.... But the UN system will neverbe the same again after the U.S. and Britain openly disregarded not only the majority of UNSC but the voices of al! those people who demonstrated against war all over the world."

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CANADA: "A Dangerous War"

Michel C. Auger held in mass-market Le Journal de Montréal (3/19): "While most observers agree victory will be quickly achieved, all indications point to a very long occupation of a country where all infrastructure will need to be rebuilt, including the government of a country which has known nothing but one form or another of dictatorship. We should remember that the armed forces of NATO are still stationed in the former Yugoslavia ten years after the end of the civil war and we still don't know when they will return. The occupation of Iraq would be certainly be just as long and would risk generating new waves ofterrorist attacks against the U.S. and the other countries occupying Iraq."

"Canada's Iraq Policy: Inconsistency Ho!"

The leading Globe and Mail commented (3/19): "Canada's real choice may not have been force now or later, but force now or nevero And by requiring a second resolution, Canada effectively gave France authority over whether Canadian troops could invade Iraq. Remarkable. In rejecting U.S. unilateralism, Canada has acquiesced in French unilateralism. Canada will now sit out, at least officially, the war that could begin as early as tonight. Having made this unfortunate decision through pretzel logic, Mr. Chrétien should be especially willing in the months ahead to commit Canada to the reconstruction effort. This country has great capabilities in building infrastructure, peacekeeping, law­ enforcement training and development of federal institutions. Canada can't remain aloof indefinitely, and this postwar involvement would at least fit the Chrétien mould and be politically popular."

"The Defeat OfLaw"

Columnist Michel Venne commented in the liberal Le Devoir (3/19): "Internationallaw and multilateral institutions are the only protection medium-size and small countries have...against the hegemonic temptations ofthe large ones. The rule of law creates justice between non-equals. The American attack in Iraq will be illegal and must be condemned. At the very least, the international community must deny it any legitimacy. Americans coined the expression rogue states. They are the ones behaving like rogues today. To remain outlaws would mean condoning the illegal acts of barbaric regimes."

"A Dangerous War"

Columnist Michel C. Auger opined in the mass-market Le Journal de Montréal (3/19): "While most observers agree victory will be quickly achieved, all indications point to a very long occupation ofa country where all infrastructures will need to be rebuilt, including the government of a country which has known nothing but one form or another of dictatorship. We should remember that the armed forces ofNATO are still stationed in the former Yugoslavia ten years after the end ofthe civil war and we still don't know when they will return. The occupation of Iraq would be certainly be just as long and would risk generating new waves ofterrorist attacks against the U.S. and the other countries occupying Iraq."

66 ARGENTINA: "Senselessness And Fanaticism"

Raul Alfonsin, former Argentine President and present leader of the Radical Party, writes an op-ed page in leading Clarin that says (3/19): "The personality of the U.S. President summarizes the most prominent aspects of the U.S.' worst nationalistic tradition.... Bush, together with Rice, Cheney, Rumsfeld and many more have joined to give each other mutual strength - as is the usual case with those who share the same pathological views -- in sorne cases to overcome old frustrations and in others to serve their disproportionate interests. This is my only explanation in judging the attitude of a man who doesn't mind destroying the UN, placing his people and the entire Europe at risk of atrocious retaliation, leading the Islamic world to suffering the victory ofFundamentalists, dishonoring the U.S., destroying Intemational Law, and strengthening raw globalization (promoted by neo­ Conservative ideas.) Of course, it's a matter of wounded pride -- not deprived of a certain 'elections' interest --, of strengthening unilateralism, of showing that nobody can confront with the U.S. Probably, there is also an underlying economic interest, particularly in connection with oil. But we must understand that this massacre is only possible because it's been carried out by a bunch of madmen."

"U.S. WiII Punish Those Countries That Fail to Support It"

Horacio Riggi, business-financial El Cronista economic columnist, stated (3/19): "Analysts in Latin America believe that Chile and Mexico's lack of support for the U.S. regarding the imminent conflict with Iraq might lead to trade retaliation from the world's leading economy against South American countries.... 'The decision by Chilean President Lagos (who refused to vote in favor of an attack against Iraq at the UNSC) - although a fair and understandable decision - no doubt tenses the diplomatic relationship between the two countries and jeopardizes the bilateral trade agreement that Chile has recently signed with the U.S.,' said a Chilean economist who requested strict anonymity.... For his part, former Mexican Ambassador to the U.S., Silva Herzog, said that the U.S. decision will deteriorate Latin America's moral authority and respect, and will negatively affect the credibility of regional institutions."

"A Tense And Anxious Vigil"

An editorial in daily-of-record La Nacion read (3/19): "The 48-hour ultimatum given by President Bush to Saddam Hussein, demanding his departure from power, has tumed into a tense and anxious vigil..... Diplomacy has lost its battle and everything indicates that in the next hours, the language of weapons will prevail. Bush's words dispelled all doubts: dice have been rolled and only an extreme gesture of the Iraqi leader - hard to imagine in the present context - could avoid, at this stage, the beginning of war..... The deadline is closer. Uncertainty grows. In the precise moment when peace is lost, it will be necessary to rebuild it, with our hopes in a future in which the dignity of individuals and the welfare of peoples are aboye any particular interest." .

BRAZIL: "Mr. Bush Goes To War"

The lead editorial in center-right O Estado de Sao Paulo (3/19) asked: "What makes the Bush administration so sure that even if Saddam were to leave, there would be no resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq? No UN resolution or norm of intemational law can legitimize the invasion of a nation if its leader has yielded to an ultimatum such as the one issued to Saddam. The mere possibility mentioned by Secstate Powell eliminates any doubt about the foundation on which Bush's America is based: the will of the strongest.... The rhetoric of fear has allowed Bush to neutralize multilateral institutions of collective security because they have opposed Washington's imperialist will.... What France has done, with Russia's

67 support, is to oppose both a war that the community of nations repudiates and the 'peaceful entry,' as Powell would say, offoreign troops into Baghdad.... A quick U.S. military victory is seen as certain. Uncertain but presumably high and long-lasting will be the polítical costs of the war, which will involve Blair's career, the UN's destiny and the future of U.S. relations with Europe."

"Bush's War"

Independent Jornal da Tarde (3/19) maintained: "The Bush administration has shown that it gives itself the right to act the way it wants anywhere in the world to defend 'American values.' It has also put at stake the role of multilateral organizations the US. helped to create following WW JI, and has left no doubt that the current basis of US. foreign policy is indeed the will of the strongest.... Military hegemony ensures a quick U.S. victory. But the political costs will be steep in terms ofthe future ofthe UN, US. relations with Europe and peace around the world."

"The Empire"

The lead editorial in Rio de Janeiro's right-of-center O Globo with the boxed comment "Bush has tenaciously constructed U.S. isolationism," stated (3/18): "On the eve of war, it worth taking advantage ofthe moment between the ultimatum and the first bombs to refiect on President George Bush and his way of conducting the foreign policy of a super power.... Every day it becomes more and more clear that the war-like and arrogant Bush prefers to talk rather than hear, give orders than ask advice. With someone like that in the White House, it was practically inevitable that the US. would go into this war alone.... His contempt ofmultilateralism is legendary.... They abandoned the Kyoto Protocol...refused to approve the International Crimes Tribunal...informed the Russians the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty was no longer valid, and backed away from the escalated violence in the Middle East, allowing the Oslo accords to be reduced to dust. How can one expect that such an administration would bend to the Security Council and listen to international public opinion?"

"What's Relevant"

A byline by journalist Zuenir Ventura, in right-of-center O Globo, noted (3/19): "President Bush has repeatedly said the U.N. was running the risk of 'becoming irrelevant' if the Security Council wouldn't approve his unilateral military actions against Iraq.... The truth is that only the superpower's force is relevant today. The Empire's hegemonic will. As the U.S. President said in his ultimatum, 'the US. of A. has the sovereign authority to use force to guarantee its own national security,' which means Washington will carry out the 'preventive attacks' whenever he considers his country is under threat, thus making his dream come true to be bothjudge and executioner. This is the New World order; only his war-like fury is relevant to pit-bull Bush."

MEXICO: "Tragedy"

Proylan M. Lopez Narvaez commented in independent Reforma (3/19): "President Fox's speech on Monday was fair, plausible, and worthy of support, in response to the bellicose, iIIegal, immoral, criminal zeal of the United States, Great Britain, Spain and Bulgaria in declaring war on Saddam Hussein and the innocent people of various ethnic communities that inhabit Iraq. Pury, as well as ambitions for political and economic power in the rich oil region fueled the goals of the refuted leaders--George Bush, Jose Maria Aznar, in spite of the open opposition of Spaniards-and Tony Blair, who faces growing citizen opposition to the war.... The GOM ratified and assumed traditional diplomatic principies. Por peace, the USG make wars. Por democracy, they violate the principies ofthe United Nations."

68 "Extensive Popular Support"

Nationalist El Universal editorialized (3/19): "Mexico's public opinion has unanimously supported President Fox's stand that the Mexican people and government shares the fight against terrorism and the disarming Saddam Hussein with the U.S., but they cannot share the White House's decision to launch a military attack on Iraq.... Nobody in Mexico or in the U.S. has any reason to complain or be disappointed. As President Fox has shown, we can be a neighbor, a partner and a friend of the United States without having to agree on everything and for whatever reason. Agreeing on everything would not be friendship, it would be submission or subordination."

"The Messianism Of Bush"

Carlos Martínez García wrote in left-of-center La Jornada (3/19): "He (Bush) believes and behaves like an illuminati that does not question his actions, but dictates sentences that others must accept without doubt. Whoever hesitates objectively is allied of his enemies. His thought is a mixture of the self-help literature, ideological readings of the Bible--a schema of the reality and an idea of the absolute supremacy of the American and Anglo­ Saxon cultures. All this feeds the messianism of George W. Bush. The messianism of Bush has religious components, but also a designed geopolitical strategy in which an army of think tanks from the best American universities participate. In this sense we are not in front of a thinker that hurls invectives against the axis of evil, but in front of an economic, a political, a scientific and a military complex that looks for redesigning the world in agreement with the interests of a power that considers many acts as a danger to its hegemony."

"A Solely American War"

Emmanuel Carballo wrote in nationalist El Universal (3/18): "The first victim of Bush's preventive war is the United Nations, as well as the fora where global problems are worked out.... The U.S. insists in the military option--not to disarm an irresponsible nation--but to overthrow a government. This is a serious precedent in international relations. Bush lost the public opinion battle to Chirac, because his premises and conclusion are falseo He has forgotten that convincing arguments are the key to solve any dispute in a democracy."

"(Bush) Threatens The World"

Left-of-center La Jornada declared (3/18): "Bush delivered an ultimatum of death and destruction to the Iraqi government. He did so, not by virtue of a popular mandate, but as a result of obscure management and electoral wheeling and dealing. Without a single argument to justify war, Bush exhibits to the international community his domination and geostrategic agenda, his intentions oftaking Iraqi oil, his personal insecurities, his trying to settle accounts on behalf of his father, the first destroyer of Iraq."

CHILE: "President Bush's Speech"

Conservative afternoon Santiago La Segunda (3/18): "The central issue is what President Bush sees as the Security Council's inability to fulfill its duty to confront the Iraqi threat.. .. This is not a matter of authority, said the president; it's a matter ofwill. In other words, the United States has declared the multilateral system of United Nations obsolete given its inefficiency, and will decide by and for itself to intervene in other parts of the planet every time it feels threatened or feels its interests are at stake.... The change from demands for an immediate disarmament to demands for Hussein to leave power in 48 hours draws our

69 attention, though.... Many in Iraq wilI celebrate the eventual fall of the tyrant, but it is unlikely that the westem invader will be seen as the 'liberator' or that it wilI easily administer the conflietive relationships...suppress fundamentalism and imperialIy resolve the region's social and economie problems.... From this viewpoint, the Iraqi crisis could be the beginning ofan especialIy difficult time for intemational order and peace."

"U.S. Ultimatum"

Leading-circulation, popular La Tercera commented (3/19): "There is no certainty about post-war events. The U.S. unilateral action has set a precedent ofweakness for diplomacy in United Nations, an organization that functioned during the Cold War but has not adapted to the new world order.... It is a bit too far afield to decree the death of United Nations, because it has been a useful tool for intemational law and is the only space in which smalI nations can speak out. Perhaps the reconstruction of Iraq, which the U.S. wilI unlikely be able to do on its own, wilI be the first chance for the United Nations to reform."

ECUADOR: "The End Of Hussein"

An opinion column by Heman Perez Loose in Guayaquil's center-right El Universo (3/18): "At this point nothing can prevent a war. When one ofthe permanent members ofthe UN Security Council recently said his country would 'veto anything' proposed by the U.S., the diplomatic option carne to an end... To think that Hussein prefers exile to the destruction of his country is as naive as thinking that his regime could be disarmed peacefulIy in six months, or in thirty days, as France now hurriedly proposes. From a legal perspective, the famous Security Council second resolution was never necessary. For a tyrant of macabre proportions, Hussein is ending his reign in a peculiar way. He has managed, for instance, to ensure that nobody remembers the hundreds ofthousands oflraqis he murdered over the years.... The concept of national security after the demise of Hussein has suffered its most serious setback since September 11. The legitimate defense of a country is not based solely on defending its borders, nor on imminent aggression. Intemational terrorism and George Bush have laid this concept to rest. The world wilI navigate through more realistie waters, but without a doubt, they will be no less uncertain."

"After the Iraq Ultimatum"

An editorial in Quito's leading centrist El Comercio judged (3/18): "The war against Iraq has become irreversible and the alliance of the U.S., England, and Spain has assumed responsibility for carrying out this war.... In these circumstances, after the biggest world debate since the end ofthe Second World War in 1945, only the details ofthe event are left: the magnitude of the attack, the human cost and the unconditional surrender or capitulation of the Saddam Hussein regime.... In these circumstances, we should ponder the global scenario after this war. The Pentagon's other potential battlefronts are unknown, although former Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger has written an essay on the situation in North Korea, which wilI inevitably have to be resolved.... FinalIy, we shalI have to wait for the final bomb to be dropped on Baghdad to leam what responses, terrorist or warlike, wilI happen in the.West or around the world; we wilI also have to wait and see the impact of such an historie and violent event on other civilizations and cultures beyond the West."

GUATEMALA: "The Fatal Deadline For An Announced War"

Leading, moderate Prensa Libre editorialized (3/19): "The entire world sadly awaits the U.S. attack on Saddam Hussein's regime.... Beyond the results of this conflict, the community of nations wilI soon face the need to rethink the UN's role and wilI have to decide if it stilI serves the interests of peaceful cohabitation, or if its Charter has expired."

70 "Priority: Eliminate Hussein"

Inf1uential El Periodico carries a comment by Julio Cesar Godoy stating (3/19): "Terrorist groups are a real threat, and we must not stop the fight to eradicate them at any cost.... The attack by the United States, England and Spain is not illegal because diplomatic means have been exhausted.

"Vigil"

Conservative, business-oriented Siglo Veintiuno held in an op-ed by guest columnist Julio Rodriguez (3/18). "We began this week in fear. Few times since the end ofWorld War 11, has the world felt such fear... There are two dimensions ofthis great fear: What ifHussein really has weapons of mass destruction and may use them sorne day... given his scary background? If the U.S. attacks preventively but Hussein kills himself and tums this victory into a human and economic catastrophe? There is no certain answer, except that those who believe should pray."

JAMAICA: "The Dangers OfWar"

The editor in chief of the centrist, business-oriented Jamaica Observer argued in today's lead editorial. (3/18): "There are now two world superpowers -- the United States and world opinion.... The world, by and large, has spoken. There is no moral basis, it says, for waging war on Iraq. America and its ally, Britain, have failed to make a credible case.... For the most part, the world respects the United States...b. What has happened over the past 18 months, though, is that an American administration, enthralled in unilateralist arrogance, and driven by a mindset of power, has squandered the goodwill of the world, and the consensus against terror, that was built after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.. .It has framed its response to terrorism in the context of conventional war, which requires a specific and substantive enemy....The end game, however, is more than Saddam. Rather, it is the emergence of this dangerous doctrine of Regime Change and Preemptive Strike which the United States and its junior partner, Britain, have arrogated unto themselves.... Unhindered by the moral force ofa multilateral system and having dismissed the constraint of intemational law, the United States can at anytime dislodge a regime that it finds objectionable. It need only say that it was threatened...And, assuming that Tony Blair is still the UK's prime minister, America may take Britain along for the ride."

PANAMA: "War In 48 hours"

Tabloid Critica Libre commented (3/18): "War is imminent.... There has been no c1earer and determined message among Bush's speeches since September 11.... War is not a formula to obtain world peace, but has been a part of man's to achieve a peace that will never be obtained.... Calls and mobilizations for peace in the world have not been fully accepted.... All we can do is pray for the arms to fall silent and a peaceful end to be achieved."

"War And Peace"

Front page editorial in pro-govemment La Estrella de Panama asserted (3/18): "Nobody wants war, but facing a regime, a government and a dictator that threaten the tranquility of their neighbors, the stability of the world and the human rights of their own people, it is time to put an end to terror."

71 PARAGUAY: "Totalitarian Regimes Drive The World To War"

Leading Asuncion daily ABC Color opined (3/19): "The imminent war has its origins in the bloody dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein.... The only way to fight terrorism--and avoid the massacres and extortions that spring from it, that can affect whatever country in whatever place and not just the United States--is to overthrow as soon as possible the totalitarian regimes that protect and finance it, like that of Saddam Hussein, and install in their places a free and democratic rule with respect for human rights.... If it is necessary to confront barbarity with war, it's the responsibility of governments--as has decided President Bush--to take the timely decision."

PERU: "The Terrible Situation In the Middle East."

Center-right Expreso editorialized (3/18): "If Israel and the Palestinian Authority had reached a firm peace agreement in the year 2000...the imminent war on Iraq would have been unthinkable.... The U.S...believes that the world is divided between...those who support the U.S. and those who support Iraq's dictator .. Jt is a kind ofpolitical extortion.... The countries of the world have not been given the chance to adopt an independent position... President Bush's decision to go to war is not the result ofthe world consensus... but ...a decision outside the international law... Bush and his allies have not given an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein...but to the UN Security Council... This absurd confrontation has its origins in the creation the State of Israel in 1948... Thereafter...Americans, Israelis and Palestinians have not been able to eliminate the scourge of war in the region... Islamic fundamentalism... has been exacerbated over the years... leading to confrontations...as it is happening in Iraq."

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72 U,S. OEPA1HMENT 01' STAH " INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

Office of Research IssueFocus Foreign Media Reaction

March 20, 2003 IRAQ: WAR'8 OPENING 8HOT8 March 20, 2003

IRAQ: WAR'S OPENING SHOTS

KEY FINDINGS

** World media largely expressed regret at the outbreak of conflict; despite sorne optimism for a "swift conc1usion" many worried about the war's unpredictable effects and "winning the peace." ** Dailies urged the U.S. to accept a strong UN role in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, which they argued could help "repair" U.S. relations with much ofthe world. ** Most favored ousting "the tyrant" Hussein, but judged the process for removing him "seriously flawed"

REGIONAL IDGHLIGHTS

EUROPE:

Hopes for a quick war and 'few casualties'; U.S. will need help to 'win the peace'-­ Dailies decided that "the debate about the rights and wrongs of this war is over." They expressed the hope that the war would be "as quick and painless as possible" and reminded the U.S. of its "serious moral responsibility" to minimize "the level of bloodshed." While a Romanian daily reproached Saddam's willingness "to expose his own people" to war, Britain's center-Ieft Independent called on the U.S. "to retain the moral high ground" by eschewing the use of certain weapons, including cluster bombs and depleted uranium shells.

Most writers held "the outcome of the war itself is not in doubt" and focused on the need to "contain the tragic consequences to come" to avert "ethnic and religious conflicts." They agreed with Spain's center-Ieft El Pais that the U.S. must "win the peace afterwards" and will need "both the UN and Europe" for this "more complicated" task. Papers in Italy and Lithuania stressed forgetting "disagreements" among the westem nations to "help rebuild" Iraq, while outlets in Spain and Germany called on the U.S. to "repair its relations with half the world." A number urged intemational cooperation in humanitarian aid, which France's right-of-center Le Figaro judged to be "the way to put the UN back in the saddle and start the healing process."

73 ISLAMIC WüRLD:

'War will not stop with Baghdad but will spread to the entire region'-- Many opined that the U.S. was using this "colonial" war to become another "Roman Empire." UAE­ based pan-Arab Al Khaleej saw Iraq as just "a starting point" for "reshaping the future oí the region." While Pakistan's Islamist Ausaf alleged that "Washington is set on the path oí fascism," Malaysian and Indonesian dailies labeled Bush a "lunatic" and "gangster." Algeria's govemment-run Eshaab blasted the U.S. decision to "slaughter Iraqi children and destroy their homes." Other papers hoped the war would help educate the world of "the dangers of American dominance" and impel them to create "other centers of power" to challenge the U.S.

ASIA:

Many worry war will simply increase global 'instability'-- Critical voices focused on how this "most tragic and awful precedent" of pre-emptive war will create global "instability." Australia's liberal Age predicted a "unified Westem Europe and an economically powerful China" would challenge "U.S. hegemony." Moderate Tokyo Shimbun thought that President Bush "sacrificed the UN-based intemational order that has held the key to solving post-Cold War conflicts." While sorne papers denounced the U.S. as a "warmongering country," the independent Philippine Star stood out, praising the "decisive action" to secure "the democratic future of modem civilization."

AFRICA:

'U.S.' raison d'etre for war not disarmament', regime change will invite more terror-­ Many dailies portrayed the U.S.-UK invasion of Iraq as a "war of bullies" and a "war that divides the world." Sorne shared the regret of South Africa's liberal Cape Times that a "tragic and awful precedent [was] set when the U.S. launched that first strike on Iraq." Papers in Namibia, Zambia and Tanzania made similar points that Bush's "insistence on war at all costs...will incite rather than diminish terrorism the world over."

WESTERN HEMISPHERE:

Sorne accept Iraq is the 'right target,' more fear U.S. 'hegemony'--Conservative and financial dailies in Canada, Argentina and Paraguay defended the "plainly just cause of liberating Iraq." Many other outlets in those countries and in Brazil, Chile and Central America fretted that a "stage of uncertainty" has begun which could have "unpredictable consequences." Writers concluded that "U.S. hegemony has been replaced by a doctrine oí maximum security." Taking offense that "Bush ignored the strong intemational rejection oí war," sorne professed a "loss of trust" in the U.S. Critics, like Brazil's right-of-center O Globo, bristled at the Bush administration's "intention" to "impose, worldwide, [its] unilateral monitoring because [the U.S] is the uncontested superpower and, morally, the center of'good'."

EDITORS: Irene Marr, Steven Wangsness, Ben Goldberg

EDITORS' NOTE: This report is based on 80 reports from 50 countries, March 19-20. Editorial excerptsfrom each country are listedfrom the most recent date

74 EUROPE

BRITAIN: "War And After"

The conservative Times argued (3/20): "The ultimate success of this conflict will depend less on the speed at which tanks can sweep towards Baghdad than on three other factors. These are the sensitivity with which the Iraqi people are treated during the war itself; the political blueprint adopted for Iraq once Saddam Hussein has been overthrown and Washington's skill in refining the concept of 'pre-emption' skill so as to reassure the law­ abiding; and its speed in addressing the Israel-Palestine question.... The diplomacy of the United States in the past few months has not always been what friends and allies might have hoped foro This has assisted the drawing of a grotesque caricature.... The Bush Administration would be wise to recognise that this distorted picture exists and address it."

"Hope Against Hope"

The left-of-center Guardian contended (3/20): "This war is wrong. It did not need to happen; it is unnecessary and was avoidable.... This is a polítical war, a war of power largely orchestrated by the ideologues and zealots who surround that most implausible oí presidents, George Bush. This recourse to war is a substitute for thought and understanding, divisive in conception and enormously damaging to the intemational order.... All that remains is the sad, fretful hope that it will soon be over.... The aims ofthis war have been unclear all along. That confusion must now end. The objective is not a U.S.-run Iraq or sorne grandiose, U.S.-designed regional reformation. It is an independent, integrated state led by indigenous Iraqis empowered by free elections and working in partnership with the UN. Tony Blair's assurance yesterday that Britain will seek agreement to establish a leading role for the UN is welcome. Getting in is much easier than getting out; but get out quickly the U.S. must. Whatever Dick Cheney and his far-right friends may think, they have no business there."

"The Nation Must Unite"

The conservative Daily Telegraph editorialized (3/20): "The political importance of this war is...perhaps greater than any since Vietnam. This time even more is at stake than the liberation of a people, the foiling of a genocidal dictator or the fall of a terrorist stronghold. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime will combine all these aims, but it intends to do much more besides. What we, the Americans and our other allies are trying to achieve is still encompassed in the unfulfilled promise of the first Bush administration: a 'New World Order.'... The establishment of a democratic Iraq would demonstrate that America is not only pursuing its own interests, but is also seeking to extend the benefits oí freedom across the Middle East, a region that has for too long known only tyranny, poverty and bigotry."

"When Democracies Do Battle With A Despot"

The center-left Independent editorialized (3/20): "The debate about the rights and wrongs of this war is over.... Políticians across the political spectrum are united in the conviction that the time has come 'to support our troops.' This newspaper agrees, and fervently hopes for a swift conclusion with as few casualties on both sides as is possible.... If the Allies are to minimise the resentment that the war will cause in the Middle East, and among Muslíms elsewhere, the level of bloodshed needs to be minimised.... When democracies do battle with despots it is essential they retain the high moral ground.... If care must be taken with sorne weapons [like MOAB, e-bombsJ, others [such as depleted uranium, cluster bombsJ should not be deployed at all.... In the Commons yesterday Mr Blair insisted that 'any

75 weapons or munitions that are used will be in accordance with intemational lawo' He concluded by saying: 'We will do everything we can to minimise civilian casualties and indeed maximise the possibilities of a swift and successful conclusion to any conflicto' To achieve both those aims would be ideal. The real test will come when the two collide."

FRANCE: "War And Reconstruction"

Pierre Rousselin argued in right-of-center Le Figaro (3/20): "France did all it could to get Iraq to disarm peacefully.... Now all we can hope is for the war to be as quick and painless as possible. This conflict is a failure for everyone. Now, everyone's responsibility is to contain the tragic consequences to come.... The first priority in Iraq will be humanitarian aid. France and Europe must prove to be generous. This is the way to put the UN back in the saddle and to start the healing process for Franco-American relations. Even for Washington, the post-war period cannot be considered outside the UN.... The pre-war days have caused too much damage to see reconstruction stop at Iraq and the Middle East. Transatlantic relations demand emergency treatment. Resentment in Washington has reached such levels that going back to a calm form of dialogue will be difficult. One thing is certain: the slightest misstep in comments about how the war is being led will not be forgiven."

"Saving Tbe UN"

Serge July wrote in left-of-center Liberation (3/20): "Contrary to the Serbian and Afghan situations, this time President Bush wants the post-war period to be a U.S. exclusive. While the war carries its own load of uncertainties, the post-war era carries even more of them.... We may be opposed to this war, but it is no reason to abandon Iraq and the Americans to their fate. The UN must get back in the game.... The UN must take over from the Americans in an Iraq we wish to see liberated."

"Falsebood To Tbe Test"

Bruno Frappat judged in Catholic La Croix (3/20): "When cannons speak, alliances either become stronger or fall apart.... The intense accusations against France have reached a level unimaginable a week ago.... The fact that France differed about the means [to disarm Iraq], not the end, has been quickly forgotten.... President Bush has chosen a narrow version ofthe truth... From now on we will have to be not only wary ofwar, but also ofthe lies that accompany war."

GERMANY: "Marcbing Toward Bagbdad"

Josef Joffe noted on the front-page of center-Ieft, weekly Die Zeit ofHamburg (3/20): "The U.S. has never been as lonely and as powerful as it is now. If a good many nations prefer putting up with a monster like Saddam to entering a coalition with the superpower, the U.S. has a problem that even a glorious victory against Baghdad cannot solve. That is why Washington, once the war is over, has to pay attention to the 'co' in coalition, cooperation, and consensus.... 'Nation-building' means police and administrative responsibilities; it means repair work and investments. Anyone who does not rely on others in such a project has no chance of winning the peace."

"After Tbe War"

Center-right Luebecker Nachrichten (3/20) stated: "Ifthe Iraq war is short, then George W. Bush will have won more than a military conflict. Then there will be a new world order according to the will ofthe U.S., a Pax Americana, for who could stop the U.S.? As far as military factors are concemed, there is no counterweight any longer. And as far as politics

76 is concerned, Bush has aH arguments on his side. Was the war in accordance or against international law, was it a war of aggression or a preventive war? Who should seriously discuss these questions in view of a quick victory, which will, at best, result in the ouster of the dictator, the destruction ofhis weapons and the liberation ofthe Iraqis?"

"Isolated America"

Center-right Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Essen (3120) noted: "As far as the military is concerned, the U.S. is as powerful as never before, but as far as foreign policy is concerned, it is more isolated than ever. Regardless of the outcome of this war, the U.S. will no longer be the undisputed supreme power in the world, at least not during George W. Bush's term... [even] ifBush wins this war quickly."

"Post-War Middle East"

Center-right Rheinische Post of Duesseldorf (3/20) judged: "The U.S. will be able to smooth the angry emotions in the Arab world and its fanatics only if it gets serious about the midwifery for a promised Palestinian state as part of a better perspective for the Middle East."

ITALY: "The No OfThe Reason"

Franco Venturini opined in centrist, top-circulation Corriere della Sera (3/20): "The war already bears a heavy load of political damage, lasting resentments, bitter rifts among government leaders, and of unusual divisions between governments as well as public opinions.... The duration of the war is certainly fundamental.... However, a rapid war would not be enough. After (the war), it will be possible to win the peace only on condition that everyone (the international community) face their conflicting opinions...by going back to the negotiating table."

"Broken Ropes"

Mario Platero observed on the front-page of leading economic daily Il Sole-24 Ore (3120): "Once everything is over, there will be a strong temptation to separate the 'victors' from the 'vanquished.' In the U.S., they are already discussing sorne kind ofboycott against France, and anti-American flags are already waving in Europe.... This is why, no matter how things go, it is essential that the 'victors' be generous with the 'vanquished.'... America will need both the UN and Europe, while Europe will have to give up its reticence."

"The New World Is Boro"

Massimo Teodori commented in leading center-right Il Giornale (3/20): "There are a number of signs that the Iraqi crisis will mark a turning point in the new international system. The UN's crisis of impotence highlights the anachronism of the permanent five's UNSC veto.... The division of the European countries, triggered off by France and then Germany, signaled a revival of national ambitions played in an anti-American key, very far from being a premonitory sign of a common European policy. The impotence of the UN pointed out that the principal multilateral instrument used thus far is no longer capable of carrying out--due to political divisions--duties of security and international stability."

RVSSIA: "V.S. Chooses Death"

Vitaliy Tretyakov held in official government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (3/20): "America has made a choice. It has chosen death.... After America routs Iraq...anti-Americanism will intensify greatly across the world, particularly in Islamic and Arab countries.... America, as

77 a model of democracy 'for itself and 'for others,' is no more.... It is still very strong. It can buy allies with fear and money... [but] it will increasingly feellonely."

BELGIUM: "The Price OfThe New Pax Americana"

Foreign affairs writer Roger Huisman commented in conservative Christian-Democrat Het Belang van Limburg (3/20): "We saw them again on our TV screens: cruise missiles, laser­ guided bombs, stealth bombers, statements that the number of innocent victims would be limited, that the war would be over before we even realize. Nothing is less true, of course. The White House wamed that the war might last longer than expected. That means more people killed,more refugees, more human misery. That is the price of the new 'pax Americana.'"

"Moral Responsibilities"

Foreign editor Jean Vanempten argued in financial daily De Financieel-Economische Tijd (3/20): "The U.S. has a serious moral responsibility in this war.... The U.S. will have to act so that the vacuum does not lead to ethnic and religious conflicts that may cause useless bloodshed. The defeat ofthe Iraqi army is not enough. The U.S. must tum the victory into a democratic state for the Iraqis. Above aH, the Americans must wage this war in a careful manner. A war can never be 'clean' but the undeniable superior strength must not be exploited to hit the defenseless people even harder."

CZECH REPUBLIC: "What Do Kosovo and Iraq Have in Common?"

Pavel Tomasek commented in centrist Hospodarske Noviny (3/20): "IThe moral reason for the attack on Iraq wilI be definitely confirmed once Saddam is gone and new institutions ensuring a better future for the Iraqis are built.... Many feared that [intervention in Kosovo] would set off a new era of global interventionism with unpredictable results. These fears have not been realized. On the contrary, Milosevic is behind bars in the Hague and the people in former Yugoslavia, despite aH problems, face a better future. If the war in Iraq has similar result, the shots will not be fired in vain."

"Bad Good War"

Martin Denemark wrote in centrist Hospodarske Noviny (3/20): "Optimists say that the war will be over soon and that the emotions will settle down shortly afterwards. Even if so, changes within intemational relations will take place and we should have no illusions--the 'new"'What Do Kosovo and Iraq Have in Common?" world wiH be no better that the one we have now."

GREECE: "The Threat"

Top-circulation pro-govemment Ta Nea said (3/19): "Although early for conclusions from the war on Iraq, one could draw sorne even today: First, the intemational community was unable to prevent an unjust war carried out against the will of the vast majority of citizens that wiH not solve a single problem. Second, the UN could not resolve the Saddam problem for over a decade thus proving unable to render itself an efficient mechanism that can guarantee intemationallaw. Third, countries opposing this war were marginalized and unable to influence developments positively. It seems that the end ofthe Cold War left the planet neither wiser not safer!"

78 HUNGARY: "Bush's War"

Leading Nepszabadsag editorialized (3/20): "Problems will not go away with the outbreak of the war, they will only change.... If the war with Iraq ends up being successful...(not only on the level of propaganda but for real) then we can indeed observe what it means to have a single superpower in the world."

IRELAND: "The Quicker The Better"

Center-right, populist Irish Independent argued (3/20): "The outcome of the war itself is not in doubt.... But seldom has a military enterprise of such magnitude been undertaken in conditions of such uncertainty about the long-term intentions ofthe main belligerent.... It is not c1ear that [the Americans] have in place, or can create, a satisfactory Iraqi civil administration.. .in any kind of reasonable timescale. It is surely most unlikely they can hand over to a local regime before pacification, plus progress on reconstruction and ensuring the safety of oil supplies. All that may be more difficult than they realize. Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions are acute. There is a risk of not one, but several, civil wars. The aspirations of the Kurds, the interests of Turkey and Iran, are not well understood in Washington. Nor are the rights ofthe Palestinians. The Americans will win the war. They must learn, and leam quickly, how not to lose the peace."

LITHUANIA: "The Truth Revealed By The War"

Second largest daily Respublika commented (3/20): "The day the war began has brought c1arity to all ofus: it has become evident that it is power that counts, not legality."

"Help Rebuild Iraq"

Top-circulation Lietuvos Rytas editorialized (3/20): "Ifthe U.S. calculations and plans tum out to be exact, not only will the world be set free from this dangerous threatening dictator, but we will have a chance to overcome the crisis.... Forget the disagreements, help to rebuild this country and solve the regional problems."

NORWAY: "The Difficult War"

The independent VG commented (3/20): "The war can bring unpleasant surprises, and aboye all is the uncertainty about what will happen in Iraq and the region once the war has been won. A great deal will depend on finding a fair solution to the conflict in Palestine. The ability of the international community to come together on a solution to the challenges will be decisive. That is why we must overcome the lamentable divisiveness that preceded the war."

ROMANIA: "Saddam's Expensive Tribute: Iraqi Casualties"

Horia Alexandrescu commented in the aptly-named Independent (3/20): "Unfortunately for Iraqi citizens, the war will result in casualties among the civilian population, an expensive tribute paid...due to the stubbornness with which the Baghdad dictator holds on to power.... Saddam is willing to expose his own people, and this should make it c1ear to the Iraqis that instead of being protected by the state, they are being used by it as a shield, in a war, not which the U.S has started against Iraq, but that Saddam himself started many years ago against other countries, including America. "

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: "Defiant Merciful Angel"

Pro-government Politika's foreign analyst D.Rancic compared the similarities and the

79 differences between the bombing of Iraq and of Yugoslavia (3/20): "There is similarity in precedent: if you avoid the Security Council once, then you can do similar things several times and completely diminish the authority ofthe United Nations.... Our 'Merciful Angel' [name ofNATO's military operation in Yugoslavia in 1999] was presented as the savior of a minority nation, which was oppressed by another, majority nation. This operation had the golden image of a righteous warrior who punished with a sword those who used force. We [the Serbs] were demonized and accused of many crimes and we were without support of influential friends and allies .. .Iraq's position is different, maybe better Iraq's issue divided the world, the Security Council, the West, NATO and Europe there were no important divisions about us.... The biggest difference is that four years ago we were one of the few nations...that experienced the full power of American arrogance. Now, America's closest allies and partners can feel that arrogance.... This is not about Iraq but about the perception of truth: America went too far in oppressing the world in accordance with its global strategy of dominance.... Is there a danger that the UN will have the same destiny as a League of Nations? In the case of Yugoslavia, the Security Council was bypassed and ignored but now it is completely neglected."

SPAIN: "Baghdad Burns"

Left-of-center El País (3/20) judged: "This war, which should never have happened, has been started with the absolute contempt for intemational public opinion.... If Bush succeeds in winning quickly, he will have to win peace afterwards. And this will be very difficult in a country as big and politically fragile as Iraq if he does not count on the collaboration of many of those whom he has ignored.... The first task of Washington, once its conquest is over, should be handing over of the management of the Middle Eastem country to the UN. Whether Bush and his close advisors believe it or not, Washington needs friends and allies.... Its diplomatic fiasco in Iraq...should teach the White House that one of its most urgent matters is to repair its relations with half of the world as soon as the echo ofthe last shot ofthis wretched war disappears."

"A War For A Lasting Peace"

Conservative ABC concluded (3/20): "If war is the confirmation of diplomatic failure, one will have to come to the conclusion that the Iraqi crisis has shown in all its crudeness the inability of the current order to effectively defend peace through an intemational security pact." MIDDLEEAST

ISRAEL: "Back To 1956"

Ari Shavit wrote in independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz (3120): "This is...a war to renew colonialization.... It is the war oftwo Westem powers that reached the conclusion that the only way to protect the success of the West from the failures of the Near East is to once again unfurl the umbrella of imperial patronage and send it into a long process of re­ education. It is highly doubtful this amazing attempt will succeed.... It is difficult to see how the soldiers of the airbome divisions will manage to impose a foreign democratic vision on a harsh desert land suffering from an identity crisis. But the need that gave birth to this terrible war is a real need, and the challenge is a worldwide challenge: how to extricate the Middle East from its deep crisis, how to save the Middle East from itself."

"The Spirit Of Israel"

The conservative, independent Jerusalem Post editorialized (3/20): "Observers of our scene

80 both seasoned locals and visiting outsiders must be struck by the composure with which most Israelis are gearing up for the war in Iraq. This is not the fatalistic resignation of an apathetic people. Israelis, in fact, are anything but passive.... The absence of hysterical fear and foreboding doesn't negate the existence of tension and unease, especially as we realize that for us it will not be over with the last air raid over Iraq. At that point the U.S. will need to win back alienated Arab hearts and this might be most readily accomplished by squeezing from Israel concessions that will put Israeli civilians at potentially greater risk than ever. üdds are, then, that our existential struggle will merely move to other arenas and take other forms."

WEST BANK: "Hostile Mentality"

Independent AI-Quds opined (3/20): "The American administration, along with its follower the British govemment, did not bother to heed calls of intemational and public opposition to the unjust aggression on Iraq from all over the world. They insisted on finishing the job...using various trivial pretexts, which have later been proven to be illegitimate and fabricated.... It should not be a source of pride for the U.S. to achieve victory over Iraq, especially considering the U.S.' military and technological superiority over Iraq with its limited capabilities weakened as a result of continuous intemational sanctions and wars.... Nevertheless, the conclusion of this war and all other wars of aggression that follow will help educate the world's nations of the dangers of American dominance and will encourage these nations to act in order to contain these dangers and prevent their damaging effects and consequences."

ALGERIA: "Biggest Treachery"

Pro-govemment Eshaab editorialized (3/20): "All ofhumanity is looking disdainfully upon those who have decided to slaughter Iraqi children and destroy their homes, schools and gardens with the bombs Bush is testing on Baghdad. The aim of this operation is to establish control over the oil wells. History will not forgive the 'over-fed Gulfy elite' who appear from time to time on TV to express shamelessly their deep sorrow for the victims of this war, knowing that they have given their lands, territorial waters, air space and finances to the enemy to bum Iraq. The war will end today or tomorrow, but its results will still have continuing effect. Washington's war plan could have been avoided ifthe Arab leaders had reacted to oppose it. War will not stop with Baghdad but will spread to the entire region."

EGYPT: "Beginning'And End"

Leading pro-govemment Al Ahram columnist Reda Helal wrote (3/20): "The U.S. unilateral decision to launch war destroyed the world order...for the sake of the American imperial tendency.... For the Middle East, the stage that has ended is the national independence stage that started after WWII, when tyrannical regimes emerged in order to sacrifice personal freedom for the freedom of the nation, but instead, they occupied nations and repressed their citizens. Saddam Hussein's regime is a salient example. However, the American occupation of Iraq will mark the beginning of a new stage where Arab nations link between resistance to occupation and the demand for freedom of both the nation and the citizens. Strangely, this tie between independence and freedom was the call of national movements, such as the Egyptian movement to tie the constitution with independence, before the era of military coups--with American help--started. History will move on."

"AH Is Vnclear"

Mohamed Sherdy remarked in pro-opposition Al Wafd (3/20): "No one is capable of saying when will this war stop and no one would be capable of saying what will happen

81 when Saddam disappears. Now everything is possible and any thing could happen. The world is moving towards the unknown. Conflict is leading everybody."

JORDAN: "Who WiII Control The Fire In Iraq?"

Bater Wardam noted in center-left, influential Al-Dustour (3/20): "The great danger Iies not in the change of the Iraqi regime, but in what might follow. We do not know if the Americans have a plan to control Iraq, and how they would deal with the sectarian and ethnic mosaic of that country, which will be the main element in their success or failure. Everyone is responsible for the human tragedy in Iraq, starting with the gang in Washington that is obsessed with war, equalIy the Iraqi regime that has made non-stop mistakes since 1980, and Arab weakness."

LEBANON: "Searching For Great Men During These FateCul Hours"

Gebran Tueni wrote in moderate, anti-Syrian An-Nahar (3120): "President Bush announced the beginning of war on Iraq folIowing the launching of the first missile on Baghdad.... We are living fateful hours...everything will be different folIowing the war on Iraq on the regional and intemationallevels.... AlI ofus are against the war, but we are also against the regime of Saddam Hussein who is responsible for the state his country reached.... What comes after toppling Saddam Hussein? There is no doubt that America will use a carrot and the stick policy on paralIel Iines: a military line along the Iraqi front, and a political line along the Palestinian front.... America has decided to try to appease Arabs by the 'road map' project which will definitely pass through Baghdad. The phase of opposing the war and crying for what could have been should be left behind by all of us. We have to move forward, think about bolstering our countries and positions, and try to think ahead about what we want for the future of our countries in the Middle East.... This change should be based on democracy.... We telI Palestinian groups in Lebanon that we realIy respect their cause but Lebanon has already paid a dear price for their cause in addition to their mistakes in Lebanon.... We are living through historie hours and we need great men to be up to the standard of this important phase. We do not want other countries to decide our destiny."

MOROCCO: "The Seeds OC Greater Terrorism Are Being Sown In The Middle East"

Mohamed Ben Salab noted in pro-govemment Arabic-language Al Alam (3/20): "The war might have started even before this issue reaches the readers. What war lords, war hawks, don't know is that their permanent war against Arabs and Muslims will lead to greater terrorism after the large aggression. America believes that it will win over Iraq and achieve its schemes in the Middle East. This war, from which America wilI come out victorious, will have its impact on millions of people who will protest against America's victory in many countries and peoples from the Middle East. When invaders achieve their victory, then another battle will start and other secret protests that America calls terrorism will follow. America is incapable of fighting terrorism and even govemments tailored by America could not do so. No one could eliminate large and dangerous terrorism spread in alI parts of the world. So this will lead to security, political, economic and social chaos that will bring the world back to Middle Ages. The world will enter the helI of terrorism whose victorious sides do not care about but who will suffer from it."

SAVDI ARABIA: "The Mother OC AH Wars"

Jeddah's conservative Al-Madina exhorted (3/20): "The purpose ofthis war is most likely to enhance the U.S.' tendency to unilaterally ron the affairs of the world according to Washington's desires and its interests only.... Dealing with a war which has as its aim to

82 change the whole world becomes the concern of the entire world.... Therefore, it would be useful for the Arab regional system, which is apparently very close to demise, to answer a vital question about a possible role of Arabs in the next world order.... To insist on waiting for the favors of people with good intentions will not lead Arabs anywhere, except to harvest results of evil actions by others."

SYRIA: "War Speech; Política) Hypocrisy"

Mohamed Khair al-Jamali commented in government-owned AI-Thawra (3/20): "The political hypocrisy practiced by the U.S. under the masks of false concern about world peace, and bright promise to the Iraqi people, is too weak to hide the reality of this war, being a colonial and aggressive war. Therefore; the Iraqi people with their national and pan-Arab consciousness and historical experience in deterring all forms of invasion, will confront the Hulagu of the modern age and will protect their homeland from the fiercest invasion thatjeopardizes the Arab region, its neighborhood and the whole world."

UAE: "A Road Map Is Penetrating Arab Capitals"

Sharjah-based pan-Arab AI-Khaleej declared (3/20): "What comes after it and how long will U.S. troops stay in Iraq? The most dangerous question is the level of coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv in...reshaping the future of the region. It has become known that once U.S. troops enter Iraq they will not depart, which has been confirmed by numerous American officials under the pretext of cementing peace and stability, the elimination of WMD, and curtailing any ethnic disputes.... Iraq will only be the starting point to re-mapping the Middle East, and Israel will playa fundamental role.... Statements of American officials clarifY that the war against Iraq is onIy the first step. The list oí nations and organizations which the U.S. insists on labeling as 'terrorists' is extremely long, except for Israel. Therefore, the American military presence was not meant to 'liberate' Iraqis, but to achieve a new American strategy in the region." EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

AUSTRALIA: "The Rea) Reason America Is Invading Iraq"

Kenneth Davidson argued in the liberal Age (3/20): "Bush personifies the American quest for absoIute security. Americans don't yet understand or care that this status can only be achieved by making everybody eIse absoIutely insecure. This is why the most lasting thing to come out of the war with Iraq is likely to be the faster development of a unified Western Europe and an economically powerfuI China to challenge U.S. hegemony."

CHINA: "The UNSC Should Not Be Reproached For Doing Its Duty"

Li Xuejiang noted in official Communist Party-run PeopIe's Daily (Renmin Ribao) (3/20): "It is a pity for the peopIe of the world that the war couId not be avoided. It shows contempt for the status and authority ofthe UN.... Such behavior sets abad precedent that a powerful country can act willfully, that the UN exists in name only, that international norms are like waste paper and that the Iaw of the jungIe is practiced in the world. This is not what the peopIe ofthe world, including U.S. citizens, want to see."

CHINA (HONG KONG & MACAU SARS): ""A War That WiII Not Make The World Safer"

The independent EngIish-Ianguage South China Morning Post opined (3/20): "The war to drive Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad runs directly against diplomatic efforts

83 involving most of the world's great powers--including China, Russia and Germany--as well as the United Nations. It marks too the first violence associated with the U.S. notion ofpre­ emption, the hastily-created 'Bush doctrine'...the idea--forged in the turmoil after the September 11 attacks--that the U.S. has the right to strike first against a state that may not be an immediate threat, but could prove to be one in the future.... Inflaming much of the Muslim world -- possibly the most important partner America has in the war against extremist terrorism.... This newspaper believes this doctrine not only to be dangerous, with ramifications far beyond the sands ofIraq.... War represents the failure ofdiplomacy.... It will be up to the diplomacy of these nations to keep the world order intact in the aftermath of the coming conflict, however strong the triumph out of Washington. When unity and a sense ofpurpose is needed, Mr. Bush has sewn and exploited discord.... Many more people could be at risk by the instability created by this hasty conflict."

JAPAN: "Attacking Iraq: Despite Everything, We Cannot Agree"

Moderate Tokyo Shimbun observed (3/20): "The U.S.-Ied atttack on Iraq has apparently begun. Even if the U.S. is able to occupy Baghdad, we cannot give our consent after considering the deep chaos it invites for both the Middle East as a whole and intemational conflict resolution in the future.... Clearly, Saddam has commited serious crimes and never meant to carry out the UNSC resolutions. But he had not engaged in massive military prepartions to threaten neighbors like he did in the first Gulf War.... To start a war at this time in this manner, we cannot approve.... After the war, the U.S. military apparently plans to remain in Iraq to establish an occupation similiar to that in Japan after World War 11, but the societes are completely different. The threat of disintegration is stronger than the potential for unity. It is also certain that anti-U.S. feeling and sympathy with Iraq will rise among the masses of Muslim people in response to the attack without lJNSC sanction.... Iraq is not the only tyranny in the MIddle East. Coutnries that fear an upswell of anti-U.S. mass feeling include Iraq's regional pro-U.s. oil-producing neighbors. Post-Saddam anti­ tyranny mass movements for democracy could very well take aim at Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf states. Such instability could create serious consequences for Japan, which imports 87 percent of its oil from this region.... The UN inspections provided results. It is urideniable that U.S. military pressure played a large role in this. But it would have been better if the U.S. had waited for the diplomatic solution supported by unanimous UN votes.... This war is unilateral and preemptive. If we allow the U.S. to engage in such intemationally illegal actions, maybe other countries will also undertake preemptive strikes in the conflicts in Africa, Kashmir and elsewhere,. President Bush has sacrificed the UN­ based intemational order that has held the key to solving post-Cold War conflicts.

INDONESIA: "Bush Needs A Lunatic Asylum"

Independent Media Indonesia commented (3/20): "It is very crucial that all people in this country view the U.S--Iraq war proportionaIly. This war is not war of religions. It is also not a war ofthe West against the East. This war has absolutely no relation to any religion; it has no relation to any ideology likewise.... The war breaks out simply because a superpower country is led by a lunatic president, who tums a deaf ear to world opinion, who does not care about the U.N, because he is a self-righteous person."

MALAYSIA: "Bush A Gangster To The World."

Govemment-influenced, Malay-Ianguage Berita Harian declared (3120): "President George W. Bush looks set to launch a war to topple Saddam Hussein without the support of the UN. In handling the Iraqi crisis, the UN chose to foIlow the path of diplomacy. However Bush has thumbed his nose at the efforts of the weapons inspectors, and has ignored the strong protests of the French, Russians, Germans and Chinese as weIl as the seven smaller nations who sit on the Security Council. While undermining the UN, Bush and his allies

84 have also ensured the cooperation between the U.S. and European countries has been damaged. The smaller countries who relied on the UN as a institute for peace and justice have seen international laws flouted, and cannot again hope for any consideration for their concems at this world body. With this war, Bush has not only ignored the protests of his own countrymen, but that of the world. He has damaged the good image of America through lies and manipulations. Iraq does not have the nuclear weapons nor the connection to the September 11 tragedy, as Bush has claimed. After this, the world will never hold anything but hate for America for wanting to test its own weapons ofmass destruction."

PHILIPPINES: "Political Will"

Alex Magno wrote in the independent Philippine Star (3120): "The source of prolonged threat must be neutralized now. The haven for international terror must be overrun.... Bush, Blair and their partners in this grand coalition of militant democracies do not mind losing their political careers if that is the cost of doing what if right. They do not mind going down in flames if that is the price to pay for taking the decisive action required by the moment.... Tony Blair defied what is currently fashionable in public opinion in order to follow moral conviction. Chirac bowed to what is momentarily fashionable and turned out the cowardly villain.... The present leaders of France and Germany...vacillated in the face of polarized public opinion. They sought convenience when the moment required courage.... The least we could have done was to have adopted a position of acute moral courage. We could have taken a position defined by political will...and better invested in the democratic future of modem civilization."

THAILAND: "Against The U.S.; Against The War"

Elite, Thai-Ianguage Matichon said (3/20): "The invasion of Iraq will reflect where the flaws are in the balance of power and how we can rectify them. Will the UN continue to be the world community's hope?.... And what shall we do to a warmongering country that resorts to war to solve its problem without listening to anybody?"

VIETNAM: "An Unjust War And A Dangerous Precedent For The World's Security"

Trung Chinh commented in Ho Chi Minh City's Police bi-weekly Cong An Thanh Pho (3/20): "The world considers the US and UK's actions of waging war against Iraq a blatant violation ofthe UN Charter and internationallaw. It sets a very dangerous precedent for the world's security in the 21 st century. The US is repositioning the Middle East region for its own, and is taking over Iraq to control one ofthe richest oil countries. " SOUTHASIA

INDIA: "Liberal Contortions"

The centrist Telegraph contended (3120): "If an American attack is justifiable because of the 'wider common good', regardless of the UN, then the question of whether Iraq is disarming sufficiently or not is irrelevant. Even if it were disarming, the U.S. would still be justified in forcibly carrying out a regime change. In which case, the U.S. Government is being thoroughly hypocritical in trying to pretend otherwise. It is wrong to want a UN cover, and liberals supportive ofthe U.S. behavior on these grounds should openly say so, and at the very least, criticize the U.S. for its dishonest and unnecessary dissimulation vis-a­ vis the UN and the general public, American or otherwise."

85 PAKISTAN: "Is Saddam The Only Dictator In The World?"

Islamabad-based Islamist Urdu-Iangauge Ausaf opined (3/20): "The U.S. intensely loathes the Iraqi dictatorship. Apparently this hatred stems from the U.S.' commitment to democratic values and aversion to dictatorial regimes. But is Saddam Husayn the only dictator in the world who is repugnant to Washington? If this feeling of hatred is genuine then why does the United States support dictators in other countries and help them to consolidate their rule? Is its complacency in promoting and strengthening dictatorship not a heinous crime? ... The United States has a skewed criterion for judging who is a dictator. It supports any dictator who is subservient to US interests and follows US policies. It tums a blind eye to such dictatorial regimes.... The United States loves its freedom and liberty, and has no qualms about killing thousands of people to maintain its freedom. But it has no regard for others' freedom. Washington has left a trail of brutalities in the world history: it launched a nuclear attack on Nagasaki and Hiroshima and tumed the two cities into rubble.... Washington is set on the path offascism; it is unmindful ofthe fate offascists.... The U.S. may perpetrate any brutality but it cannot get away with it. It is bound to meet a dreadful end. The United States will ultimately face divine retribution."

"The World After The Iraq War"

Aziz-ud-Din Ahmad held in center-right national Nation (3/20): "Opposition to the role assumed by U.S. of a world policeman could become formidable in days to come.... The war could also get prolonged on account of the tenacity of the Iraqi people. Large-scale casualties of civilians, failure of the occupying forces to control the conquered country, violation of human rights, possible destabilization of the neighboring countries--all these could contribute to American problems. These issues will be used by the critics ofthe U.S. Iraq policy to further coordinate their activities in the UN and other world fora. This could deter the U.S. from attacking other countries. The people ofIraq are thus fighting a war on behalfofthe rest ofthe mankind. Two developments are bound to emerge in days to come. First there would be determined efforts by countries to form a number of other centers of power countering the U.S. Second, movements opposing the imperialist policies ofthe U.S. would forge closer links and thus constitute a challenge to the U.S. desire to become another version ofthe Roman Empire." WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CANADA: "Even As War Starts, Think OfWar's End"

The leading Globe & Mail editorialized (3/20): "Deemed irrelevant by the United States days ago, after Washington failed to win specific authorization for an invasion of Iraq, the UN now seeks to make itself central to reconstruction. It is a role the Bush administration should support. The U.S.-Ied military forces are capable ofwinning a war on their own, but winning the peace will be more complicated. The intemational community must come together during rebuilding--most importantly so that the suffering of Iraq's 25 million citizens is minimized, but also because the countries in the Westem alliance which disagreed so vehemently at the UN must put their differences behind them.... The United States, no doubt, will take the upper hand in the first months after fighting ends. Multilateralism will be a hindrance then, U.S. officials sayo But reconstruction will be a long process. The UN has a big role to play, and should be allowed to play it.... In Iraq...Americans shouldn't try to do it alone. There's a coalition of the willing ready to be involved after fighting ends."

86 "The War Canada Missed"

The conservative National Post had this view (3/20): "As the war to liberate Iraq took shape yesterday, millions of Canadians were struck by pangs of Prime Minister envy. The object oftheir affection: British PM Tony Blair, who on Tuesday delivered an impassioned and convincing call to arms against Saddam Hussein.... Meanwhile, here at home, our own PM was giving Canadians the opposite message.... Inspections were working, Jean Chrétien said, and the war now unfolding is 'notjustified.' Caucus members clapped wildly at these words. But their giddiness will no doubt dissipate in coming months, as the United States realizes what has become of Canada--formerly a good friend, but now just an unusua11y whiny European nation, transplanted stateside.... And so, while delivering our prayers for a speedy and relatively bloodless conclusion to the war that is now upon us, we would also like to send this message to our U.S. friends: Mr. Chrétien speaks for the Canadian government, but he does not speak for a11 Canadians.... The war will be over in days. But the damage done this country in U.S. eyes will likely linger on for years. By placing our self-serving multilateral pieties aboye our alliance with our greatest a11y and the plainly just cause of liberating Iraq, our government has damaged Canada's international position."

"Target Saddam Not Iraqi People"

The liberal Toronto Star editorialized (3/20): "The true 'success' of this war will be measured not by how speedily Saddam is crushed, or how many Iraqi targets are hammered in the first blitz. It will be measured by how successful the U.S. and British commanders are in sparing civilians, and in aiding those caught in the fray. Saddam is not disposed to make it easy.... By wreaking havoc and courting high casualties Saddam may hope to inflame Muslim and world opinion against the United States.... This puts a heavy moral burden on Bush, as America's commander-in-chief, to restrain his military machine. For he chose this war.... How many Iraqis must now be sacrificed, for Saddam's head? In Washington's corridors of power, these arguments and calculations hold no sway. So Iraqis, and the world, must pray that this war is over quickly, with minimal loss of life. And then Bush and his military governor must patch together, what they are about to break."

"A Precipitant War"

Chief editorialist Jean-Robert Sansfayon wrote in the liberal Le Devoir (03/20): "Unlike Bush, Saddam Hussein does not have the support of his people...Shiites and Kurds have been waiting tobe freed from the claws of this murderer since the first Gulf War.... That being said the Americans were unable to show any proof to justify the emergency of any military intervention.... The Americans may solve a problem by ridding the world of a thug, but at the cost of a step backward in recent efforts to make international law and multilateralism the only acceptable avenues to settle dispute between countries. The world has just lost a wonderful opportunity to test the tools at its disposal to make tyrants buckle."

ARGENTINA: "Saddam, Dead Or Alive"

Ana Baron, Washington-based correspondent for leading Clarín commented (3/20): "The target is Saddam Hussein, dead or alive. This is why Washington's military strategy against Iraq is much more like the one used in the 1989 invasion ofPanama rather than in the 1991 Persian Gulf.... In the same way the ones in charge of capturing Noriega were the green berets and Navy Seal elite commands, the ones who have the difficult mission oftrapping Saddam are, this time, the Delta Force elite commands.... The White House prefers Saddam to die rather than be captured. The reason is simple: if he is captured, Bush already promised Saddam would be tried for crimes against humanity. And ifthis happens, the anti­

87 US feeling could increase even more in Arab countries."

"The New Bush Doctrioe"

Jorge Rosales, Washington-based correspondent for daily-of-record La Nacion commented (3/20): "The Bush administration implemented a new national security doctrine, whose main focus is the pre-emptive attack if it feels threatened, and which abandons the rule of military action as the last resource vis-a-vis a foreign attack.... Bush looks to the world as a bible representation of the good against the evil, and this perception has increased during the last weeks, when he not only talked about destroying the Iraqi WMD but also about freeing Saddam's people... When President Bush announced the start of war, he took the most audacious step of his presidency, which is also the most conclusive defeat for the UN diplomacy and which marks the end of an era in the relations among nations. A stage of uncertainty has started and it could have unpredictable consequences.... Bush ignored the strong intemational rejection of war and grounded his action on the need to guarantee the US people's security."

"The Curreot War Aod Perpetual Peace"

Business-financial InfoBae carries an opinion piece by intemational analyst Carlos Escude, who opines (3/20): "Saddam demonstrated his expansionist willingness when he invaded Kuwait and he did not want to disarm afterwards. He demonstrated his ability to develop WMD, his readiness to use them in a genocide way even against his own Shiite and Kurdish people and his inclination to export terrorism.... Because of alI this Iraq is a legitimate target, regardless of the fact that it may not be the most dangerous country in the worId. But precisely because it is near other potentialIy dangerous countries, Iraq is also a useful target... This war means the inauguration of a new worId order, which is the only one that can protect humanity from the dangers emerging from the WMD proliferation. This is why it is good. (However), this goes against the interest of countries who believe they have a right to 'grandeur,' like France."

BRAZIL: "The Decisive Hour"

Liberal Folha de Sao Paulo Chief Editor Otavio Frias Filho remarked (3/20): "U.S. hegemony has been replaced by a doctrine of maximum security. The elimination of the Iraqi regime will be its first real test folIowing the rehearsal that swept the Taliban from Afghanistan. The reasoning is that the U.S. is expected to assume its police role without scruples or hesitation about becoming vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by 'one, two, a hundred Iraqs'.... Given Saddam's background and his relative weakness, Iraq is about to be immolated as an example for North Korea. It is not a stupid or thoughtIess strategy, as many might believe. In addition to being inhumane, it is risky - because violence always generate more violence, which wilI not be easy to step back from in the future."

"The World Aod Brazil lo View OfThe New War lo Iraq"

Business-oriented Valor Economico opined (3/20): "If disrespecting UN declarations were enough to justi:fy a military attack, then India and Israel, among other nations, might suffer the same treatment.... It is not difficuIt to figure out who wilI win. If the victory comes quickly and cleanly, Le., if the casualties among civilian Iraqis and U.S. troops are not many, the trauma will tend to be small.... PoliticalIy, especialIy if it can be proved that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, Bush and Tony Blair will have a good chance of regaining their prestige. Otherwise, the U.S. and worId economies will experience a long period of instability.... It is reasonable to suppose that folIowing the conflict the U.S. will feel the need to legitimate its unquestionable hegemony, which wilI be harmed from an ideological point of view. Therefore, the U.S. wilI be much more likely to

88 try to engage the UN and the largest number of nations possible in plans to reorganize Iraq and to establish peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The GOB should let this supposition guide its behavior in these decisive moments of contemporary history."

"To Reconstruct"

Right-of-center O Globo editorialized (3/20): "Now we have to wait to see if US. troops are more competent than their diplomats and if overwhelming US. military superiority accelerates the outcome. But while the military phase may be conc1uded quickly the peace consolidation phase will demand laborious work and great patience.... Since Bush's ultimatum Saddam's fall has become irreversible. But the old tyrant won't fall alone in an open field, like a corpse one can dispose quickly. Other bricks ofthe complex world order building will fall with him....When he decided to go to the Persian Gulf alone.... Bush seriously hurt the authority of the UN. NATO and the European Union...were also wounded. Not to mention sacred principies such the multilateralism on decisions that affects the welfare and security ofall.... Great challenges will come after the new Gulf war and none is Bush's exc1usive affair. It will be necessary to continue fight terrorism...to disarm erratic regimes that really do have nuc1ear weapons...to protect the environment - a lost cause without U.S. collaboration. And, aboye all, to restore U.N.'s authority and the primacy ofdiplomacy."

"The Iraq War And The U.N."

Right-of-center O Globo carries byline by sociologist Helio Jaguaribe (3/20): "In the case of President Bush and the small, dogmatic team around him, you can see the same profound ignorance of what is really in play, and the same basic fundamentalism that drives the 'forces of good' as those 'of evil....' What is in play, aboye all, is the intention of the Bush government to impose, worldwide, the unilateral monitoring ofthe U.S. because it is the uncontested superpower and, morally, the center of 'good.' The true result of the war will have catastrophic aspects.... In the short and medium term, the U.N., under the leadership of countries like France and Germany with the support of China and Russia may and should administrate what is left of international legitimacy. They can summon the American people, with their profoundly democratic values and the extraordinary commitment to such values and reject Bush's adventurism, compelling this same government or more likely his successor,to resume the course of internationallegitimacy."

CIDLE: "The FTA And The War In Iraq"

Conservative, influential, newspaper-of-record El Mercurio (3/20): "Chile was the only of the 'undecided' countries in the Security Council that openly defined its position on Iraq.... The United States is our main trading partner and a country with which we share the values of democracy and freedom.... But it is evident that the advantages of the FTA are less tangible for the United States than for Chile.... This does not mean the GOC must sacrifice its deepest beliefs over the possibility that the US. will delay the approval of the agreement...but it is in our interest to have a solid bilateral relationship and that all the necessary diplomatic efforts be made to prevent the most recent slip from having a more severe effect."

COSTA RICA: "Loss OfConfidence"

Costa Rica's most influential La Nacion judged in an op-ed today (3/20): "The absolute opposition by many of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, emerges from a total lost of confidence in George W. Bush's team, an act achieved injust 26 months of governing... .In less than two years, Bush Jr. unilaterally cancelled the Russian anti-ballistic missile agreement, renounced commitments to decrease worldwide warming as defined in Kyoto

89 and, as if sorne were 'more equal than others,' rejected the authority of the International Criminal Court for his people. In less than two months, with exemplary diplomatic lack of skill, he also weakened, possibly fatally, NATO and made the UN Security Council irrelevant. This Monday, ill-advised by his advisors, his ultimatum topped off a series of diplomatic failures that characterize his presidency.... If it was previously difficult to trust in the U.S. intentions.. .it will now require an act of faith .... Maybe as the conflict moves forward, the real reasons for which the U.S. sacrificed worldwide confidence will emerge, and with this maybe, will begin its slow recovery."

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: "La Guerra!"

Establishment, pro-business Listin Diario's columnist Cesar Medina asserted (3/20): "What seems totally unjustifiable from all points ofview is that the local focus, Le., the Dominican interest in this crisis, is so detached from our own reality to the point that, everywhere you hear and read different pundits from opinion-makers, people with political and economic power and even well-respected intellectuals, that do not start to understand that this war is our war, even if we don't like it, don't understand it, don't want it or have not caused it. When America is at war, all [of us] Americans participate in it even against our will and consequently, our region, the Caribbean, becomes a strategic war zone. That is why when the U.S. starts the war - which might be happening as we speak - we Dominicans also become involved in it with al1 the consequences it brings."

"Attitude"

Columnist Cesar Duvernay wrote in establishment, pro-business Listin Diario (3/20): "No matter what are the results ofthe Middle East crisis...the Dominican Republic will no doubt feel the effects of the conflictive atmosphere. In under-developed economies such as ours there is no need for a single bullet to be shot for us to suffer economic consequences.... A war...one knows how it starts, but not how it ends. Right now, U.S. investment priorities, our main trade partner, point to weaponry and that reflects in our economy...besides, globalization, makes the consequences of a conflict persist long after the war ends."

GUATEMALA: "Saddam, The Dictator"

In its main editorial, largest-circulation morning tabloid Nuestro Diario commented (3/20):"If anyone wishes to praise Saddam Hussein because of his defiance of the United States...they would change their mind if they knew Hussein's biography.... Nevertheless, all countries in the world, to a greater or lesser degree, are opposed to the U.S.'s firm decision to attack Iraq. This opposition does not imply sympathy for Hussein. Even renowned Americans are against the President's decision... because they firmly believe that the objectives that the U.S. has chosen to attack Iraq... may be achieved through peaceful means."

"The World is at War"

Influential morning El Periodico argued (3/20): "It doesn't matter who is right or who is wrong, if they have to kill to validate their views.... This war may bring us terrible and tragic consequences, such as disease, pestilence, hunger, and environmental contamination.... In this time ofgreat tribulation, the only thing left to do is to pray. .. May God have mercy on us!"

PARAGUAY: "In the Name ofGod, I Kili You!"

Leading Paraguayan ABC Color's lead editorial contended (3120): "All the peoples of the world DO have the right to a legitimate defense, and, in the name of it, to use force in order

90 to prevent being a target of clever attacks like the Twin Towers.... When the allies' anned intervention ends with the tyrant's regime, the population ofIraq will recover its hopes for a life of liberty, without and fear and with respect for human rights."

"The Weakening OfThe International Order"

Left-leaning Asuncion Ultima Hora's lead editorial. opposed U.S. actions, quoting a Western political scientist saying that the U.S. wants to be the model of a superior culture that (3/20): "its people and government deserves intellectual and moral respect. This will be difficult to achieve with this pseudo-war that will be more characteristic of genocide. A barbarity that humanity has always condemned and will never forget. " AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA: "By Any Means Necessary"

Liberal Cape Times commented (3/19): "What is clear...is that Saddam is a tyrant. The end result of a war in Iraq is therefore clear: to remove a cruel despot. Such a pity, then, that the process embarked on to achieve this objective was so seriously flawed.... Bush and Saddam will be gone one day. But a most tragic and awful precedent [was] set when the U.S. launched that first strike on Iraq."

CAMEROON: "Bush Ignores United Nations, Declares War Against Iraq"

The Yaounde-based opposition English-Ianguage Star Headlines carried an article from Peter Abo Nyi stating (3/20): "What many people do not understand is why America embarks on a war when they have more weapons of mass destruction than Iraq? Does George Bush not know that thousands of innocent souls will perish in his war against Iraq? How then will he be helping the people of that country, by killing them in a senseless warfare? America, as the so-called world policeman, must think twice about not doing anything so stupid. If this does happen, then George Bush and his family will live to regret the error.... Ifthe UN Security Council does not stop America then it will simply mean that America has become the United Nations, where they have no one to question them about their wrong doings. Many people are also continuing to ask damnable questions such as why Iraq must always cry when a Bush is in power in America."

GHANA: "Bush's Unjust War And The Future OfThe UN"

A.B.A. Fuseini in the government-owned Daily Graphic with national circulation stated (3/20): "Barring any miracle, the United States, under the orders of President George W. Bush, will push 250,000 or more troops currentIy massed up in the Gulf into Iraq to begin Gulf War JI...The family honor of the Bushes are also at stake here.... The son must, therefore redeem the family honour. The U.S. President also believes that a war against Iraq, which he has desperately and fruitIessly tried to link with Al Qaeda and September 11, will help restore U.S .global prestige, rehabilitate his administration and improve his chances of re-election.... War by the United States and its allies, without the authority of the UN, is undemocratic, indeed, antidemocratic and present war mongers and blood thirsty leaders of this world who harbour territorial designs and ambition over others or who have global hegemonistic ambitions to cite this illegal war as a worthy precedent.... President Bush's move is clearly a reckless move fraught with grave dangers for the world. The shattering of the global coalition against terrorism after the September 11 incident engendered by Bush's unilateral action has dealt asevere blow to an otherwise credible attempt at maintaining consensus in the fight to protect and promote global peace, security and justice.... Let leaders of conscience in the world stand resolutely against this new

91 despotism of Bush who, on the altar of profit and self interest, wants to set the world on fire."

"War OC Bullies"

The government-owned Evening News with national circulation stated in an editorial (3119): "The ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to leave his country for another country is as intolerable as it is irritating. What does the United States of America mean? This is the 'War of the Bullies' which must not be accepted by aH true democrats. How can the United States under the leadership ofPresident George Bush order the seating president of a country into exile because it is believed that he is in possession ofweapons of mass destruction? If President Bush has enough evidence against President Hussein for possessing these weapons, is war the only reasonable solution to the problem?... On the local scene, we are delighted to learn that aH the major political parties including a cross­ section of the public have appealed to the US not to attack Iraq. This is a positive re­ awakening of the people of this country to sample truth from falsehood. "The Evening News" believes that military attack on Iraq willin no doubt bring hardship to many Iraqis, especiaHy the civilian population and those in the Gulf regions who do not even understand the essence ofthis war...We once again urge President Bush and his cohorts to respect the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations and allow time to disarm Iraq through peaceful procedure instead ofthis bellicose stance."

NAMIBIA: "The War That Divides The World"

The independent English-Ianguage Namibian commented (3/20): "There could hardly be a more divisive war than the one that the United States, along with its aHy, the United Kingdom, is about to embark upon. This newspaper, along with many other newspapers the world over, is of the opinion that the channels for diplomacy had not yet been exhausted and that the Iraq disarmament issue could have been resolved by peaceful means. Quite simply, we believe that the raison d' etre for the U.S. going to war is not disarmament, but rather regime change in Iraq. There are other countries in the world with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capability and several of them are states that are not friendly to democracy. Yet they have not been singled out for attack by the U.S. There are also many regimes with horrific human rights records--some of them are allies of the United States. George W. Bush's insistence on war at all costs has simply served to further divide an already divided world, and even worse, in our opinion, will incite rather than diminish terrorism the world over."

TANZANIA: "History WiII Judge America And Britain"

Kiswahili-Ianguage sensationalist tabloid Dar Leo commented (3/20): "The war, which sorne observers prophesize could be the Third World War, has begun.... Experts say that the effect of the war is not only damage to the infrastructure and economy, but will also have great effects after it has ended. After a war has ended, people will continue to live in great poverty, because it takes them years to build up their infrastructure. America and Britain will be blamed for any bad effects that come from this war, and history will judge Bush and Blair, who think that the easiest way to solve a conflict is through military action­ -something that is dangerous for human life."

ZAMBIA: "United States Arrogance"

The leftist Independent Post editorialized (3/20): "It is clear that although the Cold War has ended the arms race continues and military and nuclear hegemony is being perpetuated. But how long do we have to wait for the complete proscription of aH weapons of mass destruction, for universal disarmament and the elimination of the use of force, arrogance

92 and pressure in the context of intemational relation? We want a world without hegemony, without nuclear arms, without racism, without nationalists and religious hatred, without outrages against the sovereignty of any country, and with respect for peoples' independence and free self determination. We want a world of peace, justice and dignity, in which everybody, without any exception, has the right to well-being and to life. None of the present problems of the world can be solved by force. The world cannot be saved unless a path of intemational peace and co-operation is pursued with absolute honesty and avoiding hegemonic interests or national ambition.... The Security Council shouldn't be pushed to give legal support to hegemonic and arbitrary decisions made by the ruling Power, which violate the Charter and Intemational Law and that trespass on the sovereignty ofall states.... Today the Security Council, a hostage of the United States, could only exercise a selective, capricious, arbitrary and ineffective dictatorship, instead ofthe moralleadership.

"The Iraqi People, Not The U.S., Should Decide"

Government-owned Zambia Daily Mail said (3/20): "It must be said that it is quite bizarre that a President of a country could order another President to leave his own country.... OUr fear, since this whole stand-off begun, has been that America would not stop at removing President Hussein from office for whatever wrongs he has committed. Our fear is that President Bush would go ahead and impose a surrogate President on the people of Iraq. This war is beyond what the American President wants the world to believe.... The world knows it all, and whether what has been said about him demands leadership change, it is up to the Iraqi people to decide. How they effect that change, nobody knows, after all no leader is immortal.... Bush's position should be questioned and held responsible for the consequences ofthis war. The world is watching."

93 HUDSON INSTITUTE

düilook Today

March 20, 2003

Four Reasons Why Diplomacy Failed by Ken Colburn

Even before President Bush delivered his speeeh Monday evening, Senate Minority Leader Tom Dasehle (D-South Dakota) began the latest round of Bush-bashing, stating that he was "saddened that this president failed so miserably at diplomaey that we're now foreed to war." Tuesday's op-eds followed suit with similar eritieisms. New York Times eolumnist Paul Krugman observed, "The members ofthe Bush team don't seem bothered by the enormous ill will they have generated in the rest of the world." The Times itself editorialized, "This war erowns a period ofterrible diplomatie failure, Washington's worst in at least a generation." Clearly, the intent of the aboye erities is to blame the messenger for the message: the president's message ofwar is the result ofhis diplomatie failure. Perhaps war with Iraq was not inevitable. Yet it seems clear that even under the most favorable cireumstanees, sueeessful disarmament of Iraq through diplomacy was a long shot and highly unlikely. This at least appears to be what most Amerieans think. A Gallup poll of Mareh 17, eondueted just aft:er the president's speeeh on Monday evening, found that 68 pereent (versus 28 pereent) of Amerieans believe the United States has done all it ean to solve the Iraqi erisis diplomatieally. It also found that 66 pereent approve of Bush's ultimatum to Saddam. A Gallup poll of Mareh 14-15 found that a solid majority of eitizens (64 pereent versus 33 pereent) support a ground war to remove Hussein from power. The same poll reported that 59 pereent ofAmerieans think U.S. efforts to win intemational support have taken too mueh time and 68 pereent believe Franee has been unreasonable in its UN approaeh to Iraq. The pub1ie appears to be pretty mueh behind the job the president has been doing and the deeisions he has made. There are at least four good reasons why diplomaey failed and war with Iraq beeame inevitable. They are, in order of importanee: (1) Saddam Hussein, (2) Franee and Germany, (3) Hans Blix, and (4) The United States. Reason #1: Saddam Hussein. It is hard to argue with the faet that Saddam is the number one reason for the failure of diplomaey. At any time sinee last November--or sinee 1991 for that matter-he eould have made the deeision to disarm and thus avoid war for his people. Yet he has eonsistently refused to do so over the past twelve years. Consider the following list of UN Seeurity Couneil Resolutions: S/Res/687 01' ü3/ü411991-Cease-fire and establishment alld malldate ofUNSCOM;

94 S/Res1707 of 15/08/1991--·-Iraq's compliance; inspection ilights; Iraq to provide disclosures; S/Res1715 of 11/1 0/1991-·-Approval of Ongoing Monitoring and Verification plan; S/Res/l 060 of 12/06/1996---Condemnation of Iraq's refusal to grant inspection access; S/Res/l134 of 23/1O/1997-Condemnation of Iraq's behavior, fwther sanctions threatened; S/Res/l137 of 12/11/l997---Condemnation of Iraq's behavior, imposition of travel ban; S/Res/1l94 of 09/09/1998-·---CondemnatÍon of Iraq's decision to halt all UNSCOM disanllament work; S/Res/l205 of 05/l1/1998----Condemnation of Iraq's decision to halt monitoring; and S/Res/l284 of 17/12/1999-Replacement ofUNSCOM by UNMOVIC. The Security Council passed no fewer than five resolutions from 1996 through 1998 condernning Iraq's failure to comply with the inspection process and disannarnent. Iraq refused to accept inspections for several years following Resolution 1284 until the United States pushed for passage of Resolution 1441 last fali. Passed last November 8, it demanded that Iraq cooperate with the inspection process immediately, unconditionally, and actively, or face "serious consequences." Yet Blix wrote in his January 27 report: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, ofthe disa1111arnent which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Iraq has, in other words, responded to Resolution 1441 just as it has to every previous UN demand that it disa1111. There is nothing very surprising about Saddam's refusal to heed the UN. Saddarn rules Iraq through lies and deception, brutal violence, and ruthless terror. Such has been his modus operandi since the 1970s when he first carne to power. At that time he murdered all of his rivals and sent tapes of these murders to others as a lesson. Saddam mercilessly gassed thousands of Kurds and Iranian soldiers in the 1980s. He invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s. His elite troops cornmitted numerous war crimes such as rape and murder while leaving Kuwait. In 1998-1999, he kicked out and refused to cooperate with UN inspectors. Since then, he has refused to disa1111 peacefully and he has disregarded more than a dozen UN resolutions. The list goes on. It should be obvious that diplomacy does not have a high probability ofbeing effective with despots like Saddarn, who only understand strength and only respond to force. A record of twelve years of failed UN resolutions should demonstrate that diplomacy and inspections were not likely to be an effective tool in disanning Iraq. Indeed, one could argue that President Clinton failed to confront this issue diplomatically or otherwise in 1998-1999, when he should have, because he knew that a peaceful solution to disa1111ing Iraq was highly unlikely. Clinton passed the buck on to his successor and, for this reason, it is disingenuous for critics of Bush like Paul Glastris, editor of the Washington Monthly and a f01111er speechwriter for President Clinton, to blast Bush for his failed diplomacy while praising Clinton ("Turkey Shoot," Slate, March 17).

95 Reason #2: France and Germany. It is very difficult to dismiss the fact that Germany and France practically negated any prospect for successful diplomacy by signaling very early on that they would be strongly opposed to the use of force against Iraq under any circumstances. Stating this view publicly eliminated whatever incentive Iraq had to comply with Resolution 1441 and disarm. Subsequent to that, France's stated intention to use its veto eliminated any real incentive parties in the Security Council had to work toward a compromise, because the guarantee that any resolution would be vetoed made it pointless for fence-sitting council members to support a resolution that would have been unpopularin their own countries. Diplomacy would only have had a chance to work-and this was by no means a certainty given who Saddam is-if the Security Council was willing to back up Resolution 1441 with a credible and nearly unanimous threat to use force if Saddam did not disarm. France and Germany's declared opposition to the use of force, of course, provided Saddam with all the reason he needed to treat the Security Council and its resolutions with a grain of salt. Can anyone fault Bush and Blair for deciding it was time to get off the UN Security Council merry-go-round? As to how and why Germany and France acted as they did, several possibilities come to mind. As the German Marshal1 Fund's president Craig Kennedy observed in a recent speech at the Hudson Institute, at least sorne of the current conflict between Europe and the United States like1y has nothing to do with Iraq but everything to do with "control of the use of America's military power." In other words, France and Germany see Iraq as an occasion for a political opposition rooted in the challenge to America's superpower status and global leadership. In this view France and Germany are offering a rather transparent effort to introduce the European Union as a viable political force and alternative to the United States on the international stage. Much has been made of how the French and German leaders have merely been representing the majority views oftheir citizens, who strongly oppose war with Iraq. Yet there are sorne good reasons to doubt whether this argument is as compelling as sorne have suggested. The Worldviews 2002 Survey of American and European Attitudes and Public Opinion on Foreign Poliey, for example, reports that 69 percent of those pol1ed in Great Britain, 63 percent of those polled in France, and 56 percent of those polled in Germany indicated the "United States should only invade Iraq with UN approval and support of allies." If this poll is correct, as I believe it to be, then this means that French and German leaders played a significant role in influencing public opinion in their respective countries regarding a U.S.-Ied war against Iraq, for if the second UN resolution sought by the United States and Britain had in fact been supported and not opposed by French and German leaders, a majority ofthe French and German population might wel1 have supported war with Iraq. Another reason, of course, for Germany's and France's-and Russia's-reluctance to force Saddam to disarm is economic self-interest. They have provided Iraq with military weapons and other goods in exchange for oil and other business advantages such as oil development contracts worth millions of dollars. Critics argue that al1 of these nations profit immensely from the status quo and they are re1uctant to introduce any regime changes that would upset their privileged re1ationships. Reason #3: Hans Blix. Another very important cause for the failure of diplomacy are the equivoca! and ambivalent reports ofthe chiefUN weapons inspector, Hans Blix. Blix has alternated between candidly negative assessments of Iraqi disarmament in his written reports (especial1y those of

96 January 27 and March 1), and generally upbeat and optimistic views of Iraqi compliance in his oral reports. Aside from a strong negative indictment of Iraq's failure to disarm in his January 27 report, and the comment in his report of March 1 that the "results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far," Blix has for the most part been unwilling to call Iraq on the carpet for its noncompliance. Blix's behavior suggests that he has been over-committed to the inspection process and to the avoidance of war. It appears that he attempted to influence the Security Council to support continued inspections instead of simply providing the facts. Blix's effort to downplay the negatives was illustrated in his most recent oral report to the Security Council on March 7. Whereas in his written report of March 10 Blix related the discovery of two new Iraqi weapons---combat drones and cluster bombs-neither of these items was mentioned in his oral presentation. Blix's apparent political agenda in favor of further inspections no doubt had precisely the opposite effect, making it more difficult for the United States and its allies to make their case about Iraqi noncompliance, which in tum forced them to abandon their diplomatic efforts. Reason #4: The United States. Many have debated whether the United States should ever have gone back to the UN and attempted to get a second resolution passed to authorize war with Iraq. Whatever the wisdom of this decision (undertaken as a favor to Tony Blair), once made, the United States should have done everything in its power to get a second resolution passed, even in the face of a French veto. This is certainly the view held by a majority of Americans, as reported in the Gallup poll of March 14-15: 78 percent of Americans expressed support for war with Iraq with a favorable UN resolution, and 54 percent supported war with Iraq even if the UN rejected a second resolution. But only 47 percent supported war without a UN vote of any kind. If there is any justified criticism of the U.S. diplomatic effort, I believe it lies in the failure to have embraced, first, the Canadian plan, and then the subsequent Chilean plan (a more or less revised and updated version of the Canadian plan). Indeed, Britain itself for a brief period last week latched onto this Canadian-Chilean plan, which focused on clear benchmarks and a firm and short timetable leading to military consequences if Iraq failed to comply. The Canadian plan recognized that both sides in the Security Council had a point: "An open-ended inspection process would relieve the pressure on the Iraqis to disarm. A truncated inspection process would leave doubt that war was a last resort." The Canadian plan required a Final Report from inspectors on March 28 regarding Iraqi compliance with disarmament, to be followed by a March 31 ministerial meeting to determine compliance: "If the inspectors have reported substantial Iraqi complíance, [then] a robust ongoing verification and monitoring system, including increased numbers of inspectors/monitors, investigations, etc., would be implemented. If the inspectors have reported continued Iraqi evasion, all necessary means would be used to force them to disarm." This basic framework was favored by Mexico and possibly other non-permanent members of the Security Council. It might also have made the U.S.-Ied invasion more acceptable to Turkey. When Chile presented its version of the Canadian plan on March 7, the United States called it a "non-starter" because it sought a deadline of three weeks for Saddam to disarm or face war. France, by that time, had already made clear that it would veto any resolution that included timetables or ultimatums. Three weeks would not have been a large price to have paid for further diplomacy, and

97 publie opinion in the United States c1early supported taking the time to do so. Had the Canadian plan been embraeed by the United States before Franee's definitive veto threat, it is possible that the United States would have won more supporters, like Mexieo and Chile, on the Seeurity Council. This eertainly would have strengthened Blair's hand. It is just possible that the United States may have been able to aeeomplish this even by aeeepting Chile's eleventh-hour eompromise plan. Franee would have vetoed it-but in so doing, they would have been foreed to "show their eards," to use President Bush's phrase. That may not have been sueh abad thing. Now, the world will never know.

Ken Colhurn is a Sociology prc~lessor and Director (~f the Urhan Alfairs Program at Butler University, and a Visiting FellO"w al the lIudson Institule.

98 dütlookToday

M.arch 19,2003

WiII the U.S. be Blixed Again?

by Sol ,V. Sanders

The post-Iraq world wilI be a quite different place-whether U.S. military intervention 1S successful or results in a further deterioration of world security. But on the eve of that conflict, N011h Kol'ea begs [01' attention as the majol' trouble spot in that new world.

Washington's North Korean difficulties will be no less complicated than Iraq. North Korea, a rogue state already selling missiles and potentially weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to pariahs, matches Saddam Hussein in its oppression of its own people. Because Pyongyang holds Seoul's population hostage to American forces deployed on the so-called Demilitarized Zone, Washington has few options.

Therefore, the United States is trying what it could not do in the Persian Gulf, where Iraq is surrounded by small and weak (if oil-rich) states. It is trying to rally the region's powers-South Korea, Japan, China-and perhaps Russia to pressure North Korea to disarm. Behind that strategy is the logic that none of these countries wants a nuclear armed North Korea or the arms race it would set off.

That difficult diplomatic process is fraught with handicaps. Not the least is that China is going through a difficult-probably unresolved-Ieadership changeover. Nevertheless, Beijing remains key because of the dependency of the Pyongyang regime on its benevolence. Washington also probably does not have the option---even after the UN Security Council fiasco over Iraq-of excluding the UN, which means the potential for yet more wrangling. And last but certainly not least, the UN Intemational Atomic Energy Agency has already reported to the Security Council the ousting of its inspectors from North Korea.

Into this minefield has danced one Maurice Strong, a Canadian billionaire, self­ appointed messiah of environmentalism, and benefactor of American politicians. (A1though he has admitted to giving to both U.S. political parties to gain inf1uence, he is a soulmate of Al Gore, and in fact his 2000 contributions to Gore's campaign have been under a cloud.) Strong, who says he owes his peculiar philosophy of "socialism with capitalist methods" to his dirt-scrabble childhood during the Great Depression, has moved in and out of the oil business and Canadian government corporations.

He was one ofElliott Trudeau's favorites, a worker in Trudeau's garden offailed

99 efforts to somehow distance Canada from its economic and security dependence on the United States. Strong headed Trudeau's Petrocan, a Canadian government oil fiasco, later soId off to British-Dutch Shell. More than a few of Strong's antics have raised eyebrows-for example, Ontario Hydro, a limping government corporation he chaired, donated sorne Costa Rican wilderness for a national park that just happened to abut one of Strong's ecotourism hotels. His Colorado-based foundation is a magnet for aging New Age devotees. His recent memoir recounts how his fellow UN aficionado Ted Turner literally, Strong says, got down on his knees to beg Strong to head Tumer's new multimillion-dollar foundation promoting the UN, environmentalism, and the former CNN founder's other hobbies.

Strong chaired the first Stockholm UN conference in 1972 that lead to the Kyoto Protocol for the control of greenhouse gases. That treaty would have cost the American economy $400 billion per year, according to the US. Energy Information Agency.

In January, Strong went to North Korea as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's personal representative. (As a dollar-a-year man, he had earlier been working on the UN's accounts.) But instead of quietly reporting back to Annan, Strong, with his usual flamboyance, told newsmen en route back that North Korea and the United States had similar aims. That estimate would be laughable were it not indicative of his diplomatic abilities and his worldview. He also clamored for increased food aid, although there is sorne disagreement among those who know the North Korean food problem about just where it stands. Competent authorities have said Kim Jong Il diverts imported food gifts to his military while more than two million of his countrymen starved in the late 1990s.

Washington has caved in, negating its earlier position that all aid would be dependent on an end to Pyongyang's nuclear programo Strong said there was only a communications problem, and that it could all be remedied with a structure for negotiations. That position is reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's intervention in the Korean crisis and the negotiation by the Clinton administration of the so-called Framework, the breakdown ofwhich preceded the present crisis.

Strong retumed to Korea yesterday for further negotiations. Surely the Korean problem is too important to be left to dilettantes.

Sol W. Sandel's is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a fiJrmer correspondent .Ibr Business Week, U S'. News & World Report, and United Press Internar/onal. He lvrites weekly for World Tribune.com. This co/umn is reprinted with permission.

100 Oütlook Today

March 18, 2003

In Search of an American Foreign Policy

by Herbert l. London

The foundation of American foreign policy molded during the Cold War has unraveled. Whatever happens in Iraq is, at this point, unrelated to a foreign policy stance that requires major alteration.

It is increasingly apparent that multilateral organizations designed to keep the peace in a bipolar world have limited utility in a global landscape with many threats and a terrorism quotient that recognizes neither geography nor deterrence.

That France has a veto over American action in the United Nations Security Council is ludicrous from any perspective: the French government doesn't spend enough to defend its own interests. Likewise, the European Union's much discussed independent rapid deployment force exists largely in the imagination of military theorists; NATO would have been incapable of defeating the intractable Serbs without the presence of American forces; and France is not a "great power" in any sense ofthat phrase.

Therefore, to suggest that American acts should be restrained by a Security Council veto ignores national sovereignty and the reality of national interest. Kofi Anan, UN Secretary General, not surprisingly argues against any war fought without UN concurrence. However, France sent troops into the Ivory Coast without UN mandate. China did not ask for Security Council approval when it sent troops into Tibet. And Russia did not permit UN deliberations over its invasion of Chechnya. One wonders why what is good for the goose isn't good for the gander.

It should also be clear at this stage ofhistory that U.S. hegemony on the world stage is unrivalled. This state will unquestionably breed resentment and alliances designed to thwart American interests. That is natural. What is unnatural is a great power that guards against arrogance and hubris. It is remarkable that the American imperium-if this word applies at all-is based on liberty, liberty in a structural form for those states that align themselves with the United States and the liberty to join or reject the American sphere of influence.

At this moment foreign-policy buffs are polishing theoretical nostrums in an effort to develop the next big foreign policy idea, something on the order of what "containment" meant for the Cold War or Mahan's theory of oceanic dominance meant for twentieth-century America.

Sorne contend that multilateralism, arguably in a different form, might be the appropriate direction. Indeed, an Anglosphere which includes Britain, Australia, Canada, and invited, willing participants is one powerful idea. The National Review editorial board among

101 others embraces this notion.

On the other side of the foreign policy ledger are the unilateralists who contend that American interests should not be constrained by alliances, even informal ones. The unilateralist is an intemationalist who contends that national freedom of action should be the hallmark ofpolicy. This position is not a negation ofthe Anglosphere, merely a refinement.

My own view is that these policy prescriptions tend to overlook an emerging trend that could serve as the balance wheel in a world where chaos is the norm. 1call this the bilateralist perspective.

By this 1 mean regional alliances designed to maintain equilibrium in various "hotspots." For example, despite Turkish rejection of American forces on its territory for the attack on Iraq, Turkey and the United States could organize a bilateral pact for the maintenance of Balkan stability. There are literally dozens of cases where bilateralism would work to our advantage with Japan, the eastem European states, the Baltic states, Russia, Indonesia, India, and Australia.

Bilateralism is a pragmatic approach that takes advantage of the many nations openly friendly to the United States and willing to align with uso It is a policy that is affirmative, yet it takes into account the unique concems in each region without entangling alliances.

North Korean missiles can now reach Alaska, but the fear generated in Japan by such nuclear testing is palpable. This is a worry unlike any the United States feels about this particular threat. While Japan and the United States have a bilateral defense arrangement, it would be appropriate to restate and define its contours in the present world setting.

Bilateralism might vary from region to region but it would not challenge national sovereignty, would not dignify tyrannies, and would not constrain appropriate U.S. action. It would be America's way of making the imperium of liberty a reality. And, who knows, if it works on the national security and diplomatic level, it might be expanded to include free trade under the banner of "free trade for free nations."

With the withering away of NATO and the UN, a new day is dawning, one in which pragmatism will apply. It seems to me that bilateralism may be the next big foreign policy idea in the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the very least, it should be considered as a tactical step toward the future.

I1erbert London is presidenf ofHudson Insfitufe and fhe John M~ aUn Professor of Humanities af New York University. He is lhe author ofDecade of'Denial, recently published by Lexingfon Books. You may visit Herb's website at www.herblondon.org

102 Oüllook Today

March 17,2003

Don't Expect a Peace Dividend After Iraq by Irwin Stelzer

The fog of almost-war seems to be obscuring the vision of many economy-watchers. The dollar's decline is laid at the door of the costs of the coming war and the rebuilding of Iraq. Weak retail sales in February are said to be due to consumers' concems about terror attacks. Faltering business investment and depressed share prices, we are told, result from uncertainty as to the economic impact ofwar.

Would it were so, for then a swift conclusion of the war would put things right. But there are more enduring forces at work. For one thing, the unseating of Saddam will not bring an end to the geopolitical problems the world faces. Thousands of terrorists, intent on destroying America, will remain at large. It is difficult to persuade Americans to stock up both on duct tape and the latest consumer goodies. North Korea will remain to be dealt with, and by the United States acting alone, since other nations say this is a U.S., not a UN problem. In short, eliminating uncertainty associated with Iraq will not remove other geopolitical uncertainties that are saidto be such a drag on the economy.

Then there is the dollar. Despite a surge in the sale of made-in-the-USA goods in January, America rang up its second largest trade deficit. In the past, the world's investors were willing to make up for the fact that America buys more from foreigners than it sells to them by cycling the dollars they earned into American assets. In technical terms, the deficit in America's trade account was offset by a surplus in the capital account.

But the now-shaky stock market is less attractive to overseas investors than when it was booming in the 1990s, and the sorry financial condition of many European firms has dried up their ability and desire to acquire U.S. companies: Vivendi and its ilk are no longer trawling the American economy for companies to buyo All of this means that the demand for dollars is down just when American consumers are flooding the world with dollars to pay for everything from cars to tee-shirts. It doesn't take an economist to figure out that when the supply of something is increasing as the demand for it drops, the price of that something will go down.

Which is what is happening to the dollar. And will continue to happen, war or no war, according to most experts. Sorne see the euro, now worth close to $1.10, rising to $1.20, making Europe's wares more expensive in America, and American products cheaper in Europe. That will help U.S. exporters and cut into the trade deficit, but be devastating for German and other euro-area manufacturers who in the last two months for which we have data ran an average monthly $8.3 billion trade surplus with America. With demand in their home markets stagnant-to-shrinking, a loss of business in America might well force the EU into a serious business downtum, which won't upset Americans outraged at Franco-German antics at the UN.

103 But the reduction in the U.S. trade deficit with Europe is not likely to be repeated with China, which now accounts for the largest portion of the deficit. Because China has tied its currency to the dollar, the cheaper dollar can't affect the U.S.-China trade balance by making Chinese goods more expensive for Americans, and U.S. goods cheaper in China.

The situation is almost the same with Japan. Japanese authorities are determined not to allow their goods to become more expensive in America, and so have been intervening in foreign exchange markets to prevent the yen from rising in value against the dollar.

All of this means that the dollar will likely continue to decline, with Euroland bearing the greatest share of the consequent adjustment in trade patterns. Note: none of this has very much to do with the coming war.

Nor does still another on-going adjustment, the post-bubble fall in share prices. The successful conclusion of a war won't change two hard economic facts-of-life. The first is that in many industries the overhang of excess capacity that is deterring investment in new facilities has yet to be completely sopped up. The second is that profits will be hard to come by. Competition for consumers' dollars is fierce, making it somewhere between difficult and impossible for businesses to raise prices. With health care costs rising, the need to shore up pension funds, payrolls already pared, and price increases out of the question, shareholders are right to take a grim view of the prospects for equity markets. The easing of oil prices will help, and there will be occasional upward spurts, but even an overwhelming victory, topped off by the capture of bin Laden, can't change the fundamental forces Buffeting earnings (pun intended). Which probably means that consumers won't find any cheer from looking at their pension accounts and balance sheets in a post-Saddam world. And with every worker able to produce more as productivity rises, they are unlikely to see the jobs market improve very mucho But they will continue to use the increased value of their homes as a source offunds by refinancing their mortgages, either to reduce monthly interest payrnents or to extract sorne of the equity that has built up in those homes. "Refi" financing in the first quarter of the year is running at an annual rate of $240 billion, compared with $157 in 2002, according to consultants at International Strategy & Investment (1SI). All of these factors will continue in play after Saddam. But so will others that will help the economy to move gradually to a 3+ percent annual growth rate, most notably rising real incomes in response to modest wage increases and stable prices, further cuts in interest rates, and a loosening of fiscal policy as tax cuts combine with soaring spending to pump money into the economy. Like the minuses, these pluses have nothing to do with war. Their effect will be felt long after Saddam is no longer front-page news. Thi.'1 article appeared in London 's Sunday Times on March 16, 2003, and i.'1 reprinted with permi.'1.'1ion.

lrwin Stelzer is a Senior Fel101v and Director (l Regulalory 5'tudies for lhe Hudson Institute. He is also lhe USO economist and political columnist 101' The Sunday Times (London) and The CourierMail (Australia), a columnist jor 17'ze New York Post, and an honorary lellml' 01 the Centre .101' Socio-Legal Sludies 101' wo~t~on College at Oxlord University. He is thefóunder andformer president (?fNational EcononJic Research Associates and a consultant lo several USO and United Kingdom industries on a variety of commercial and policy issues. He has a doctorate in economicsfi'om Cornell University and has laught at institutions such as Cornell, fhe University ofConnecficuf, NeHI York Un iversfty. and Nz4Jield College, Oxlord.

104 Cato Daily Dispatch for March 20, 2003

United States Attacks Iraq "President Bush announced last night that u.s. forces had begun 'the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq,' vowing to wage a 'broad and concerted campaign' to drive Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate the threat from the regime's weapons of mass destruction," repOlts The Washington Post. "Bush addressed the nation from the Oval Office at 10: 15 p.m., little more than two hours after the deadline for Hussein to give up power had passed and shortly after a massive strike aimed at the Iraqi leadership hit Baghdad."

Upon hearing President Bush's announcement, Christopher Preble, Cato Institute director of foreign policy studies, issued the fol1owing comments:

"Under the Constitution, the sole legitimate justification for the use of military force is the defense of vital U.S. security interests. This authority is vested jointIy in the legislative and executive branches of government. Under intemational law, leaders are entitled to take military action if they believe that a threat to their nation is imminent. President Bush believes that Saddam Hussein poses such a threat. The failure to win the support of a majority of the member states on the United Nations Security Council does not necessarily mean that the United States has embarked on an unjust war; it does mean, however, that the evidence presented by the Bush administration was not sufficientIy compelling to convince people around the globe that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq justifies a preemptive war. History will judge who was right. In the meantime, we hope and pray for a swift end to this war, with a minimum of casualties on both sides, fol1owed by a quick transition to Iraqi control over their country, and an evacuation of our forces trom the Middle East, where they have already been for too long." When Rights Collide in the Middle East by Stanley Kober Stanley Kober is a research fellow in {oreign policy studies with the Cato lnstitute. The coming war in Iraq will reshape the map of the Middle East. The Bush administration has proclaimed its intention to establish Iraq as a model for regional transformation toward democracy. This transformation is designed, in part, to facilitate resolution ofthe conflict with Israel. "Old pattems of conflict in the Middle East can be broken, if al1 concemed willlet go of bittemess, hatred, and violence, and get on with the serious work of economic development, and political reform, and reconciliation," President Bush declared on February 26. "America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace. And the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity." This is a daring vision, and even its proponents compare it to the remaking of the world after World War II when the United States transformed Germany and Japan. By invoking these precedents, the administration and its supporters are not only demonstrating the possibility of such transformation; they are also emphasizing its difficulty. Yet history does not repeat itself exactIy, and the differences between the two situations must be scrutinized.

105 One difference in particular stands out: the attachment to land. Reconciliation between the United States and its defeated enemies after World War 11 was possible because the U.S. did not covet their land. To be sure, the United States does not covet the territory of Iraq or any other Arab country. But if there is to be reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians, the emotional issue of the land has to be resolved, because each side believes it has an entitiement to the same land. For the Israelis, this right is rooted in a Biblical legacy. When asked about the occupied territories, Daniel Ayalon, a former advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and now the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, replied that "this land was given to us by God. The lands you refer to are the birthplace of the nation of Israel. This is where our nation was built over 4,000 years, therefore we are not occupiers." Sorne prominent American supporters of Israel have echoed this view. "Our claim to the land -- to which we have clung for hope for 2000 years -- is legitimate and noble," argues a report prepared in 1996 by a study team headed by Richard Perle, now the head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board. "Only the unconditional acceptance by Arabs of our rights, especially in their territorial dimension, 'peace for peace,' is a solid basis for the future." For the Palestinians, their right to the land is rooted in the right of return, which they have been promised by their leaders, and which is enshrined in UN. Resolution 194 (December 1948). To be sure, the U.N. Resolution is not binding and is open to interpretation, and Palestinian negotiators have reassured their Israeli counterparts that any right of return would have to be limited so as not to alter the demographic balance within Israel. The problem, however, is that for the Palestinian people the right of retum is just that -- a right, not a privilege -- and therefore it is not to be compromised. When Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, the PLO representative in Jerusalem (until December 2002), recently visited a Palestinian university to explain the need for compromising the right of return, the students denounced him as a traitor and he was forced to leave. The students' sentiments appear to be shared even by members of the Palestinian diaspora who have integrated into Western societies. "Men like Nusseibeh offer a solution without justice," writes Jaffer Ali, a Palestinian-American, in the Jordan Times. "Palestinians must reject this cold world that prizes expediency over human rights." Thus, just as the Jews who retumed to Israel after centuries of dispersion felt they had a right to the land, so do the Palestinians. Indeed, the language of rights, which underpins our understanding of civil society in a democracy, is also the language of war. When the American Founders declared independence, it was to protect their fundamental rights, which they believed the British had violated. Once people talk about their rights, they are no longer talking about political compromise. A right must be guaranteed in full, or it is not truly a right. Even the willingness to receive compensation in exchange for surrendering a birthright is depicted in the Biblical story ofEsau as dishonorable. The United States will encounter many problems in the aftermath of the Iraq war. It should be under no illusion that bringing democracy to the Middle East will, by itself, change the conviction of people regarding the sanctity of their fundamental rights. And so long as the conflict involves a confrontation of irreconcilable rights, it is bound to endure. In 1913, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace prepared a report on the Balkan Wars that preceded the First World War. The report declared, in part, "War is waged not only by the armies but by the nations themselves ... [t]he populations mutually slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual knowledge and the old hatreds and resentments they cherished." The presence of American peacekeepers in the Balkans almost a century later provides a warning of the degree of commitment the United States might be assuming as it prepares to remake the Middle East.

106 ~ ~.. /'" .-::~~

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT ¡.,r IlfttrllilttfJnal P((Ht

Origins of Regime Change in Iraq Proliferation Brief, Volume 6, Number 5 Wednesday, March 19,2003

Long before September 11, before the first inspections in Iraq had started, a smal1 group of influential officials and experts in Washington were calling for regime change in Iraq. Sorne never wanted to end the 1991 war. Many are now administration officials. Their organization, dedication and brilliance offer much to admire, even for those who disagree with the policies they advocate.

We have assembled on our web site links to the key documents produced since 1992 by this group, usual1y known as neo-conservatives, and analysis oftheir efforts. They offer a textbook case ofhow a small, organized group can determine policy in a large nation, even when the majority of officials and experts originally scomed their views.

In the Beginning In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then-under secretary ofdefense for policy, supervised the drafting ofthe Defense Policy Guidance document. Wolfowitz had objected to what he considered the premature ending ofthe 1991 Iraq War. In the new document, he out1ined plans for military intervention in Iraq as an action necessary to assure "access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil" and to prevent the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and threats from terrorismo

The guidance called for preemptive attacks and ad hoc coalitions but said that the U.S. should be ready to act alone when "collective action cannot be orchestrated." The primary goal of U.S. policy should be to prevent the rise ofany nation that could challenge the United States. When the document leaked to the New York Times, it proved so extreme that it had to be rewritten. These concepts are now part ofthe new U.S. National Security Strategy.

Links to Likud In 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, now administration officials, joined in a report to the newly elected Likud government in Israel calling for "a clean break" with the policies ofnegotiating with the Palestinians and trading land for peace. They said "Israel can shape its strategic environment... by weakening, containing and even rol1ing back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq...Iraq's future could affect the stratellic balance in the Middle East nrofoundlv." Thev called for

107 "reestablishing the principIe of preemption. "

In 1998, 18 prominent conservatives wrote a letter to President Clinton urging him to "aim at the removal ofSaddam Hussein's regime from power." Most ofthese experts are now officials in the administration, including Elliot Abrams, Richard Armitage, JoOO Bolton, Paula Dobriansky, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.

The Power of Planning In 2000, the Project for the New American Century, which is chaired by William Kristol and includes Robert Kagan as a director, issued a report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses." The Project had organized the 1998 letter to Clinton and the 2000 report seems to have become a blueprint for the administration's foreign and defense policies. The report noted, "The U.S. has for decades sought to playa more permanent role in the Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein."

While not explicitly calling for permanent bases in Iraq after regime change, the report notes the difficulty of basing forces in Saudi Arabia, given "Saudi domestic sensibilities," and calls for a permanent Gulf military presence even "should Saddam pass from the scene" as "Iran may well prove as large a threat."

The official National Security Strategy ofthe United States, issued September 2002, holds that our defense "will require bases and stations within and beyond Westem Europe and Northeast Asia."

A Rising Chorus Irnmediately after September 11, Paul Wolfowitz and other officials urged President Bush to attack Iraq. New Yorker writer Mark Danner notes as part ofa PBS Frontline special that they saw this as a "new opportunity presented by the war on terror-that is, an opportunity to argue to the public that Iraq presented a vital danger to the United States." Colin Powell and the joint chiefs opposed them. "Powell's view was that Wolfowitz was fixated on Iraq, that they were looking for any excuse to bring Iraq into this," Washington Post reporter Dan Balz told Frontline. Powell won, but briefiy.

Neo-conservative writers began to urge regime change as part ofa larger strategy for remaking the Middle East. In June 2002, Michael Kelly wrote that a democratic Iraq and Palestine "will revolutionize the power dynamic in the Middle East...A majority ofArabs will come to see America as the essential ally."

"Change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world," claimed Joshua Muravchik in August ofthat year. Michael Ledeen on September 4, 2002, called for the US to launch "a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples ofthe Middle East...1t is impossible to imagine that the Iranian people would tolerate tyranny in their own country once freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow in short order."

Democracy experts, including Camegie's Tom Carothers, call this vision "a dangerous fantasy." But on September 12, President Bush embraced the strategy when he told the United Nations, "The people ofIraq can shake offtheir captivity. They can one day join a democratic Aflrhanistan and a democratic Palestine. insnirin2: reforms throu2:hout the Muslim world." The

108 president seems to have absorbed the entire expansive strategy. Now, for him, regime change in Iraq is not the end, it is just the beginning.

For al] these documents and more insight ¡nto the people and strategy behind thc occupation ofIraq,

Goto: http://www.ceip.org/files/Iraq/index.htm#regime change

109 Knowledge@Wharton Newsletter El mundo empresarial en vilo ante la amenaza de guerra Heridas por la amenaza de guerra en Irale y una persistente desaceleración económica, en muchas partes del mundo las empresas están conteniendo sus inversiones y posponiendo el lanzamiento de nuevos proyectos; ésta fue la conclusión a la que se llegó durante la video­ conferencia a través de Internet organizada por Wharton en febrero. El debate, titulado Business and (he Pending War (Los negocios y la guerra pendiente), reunió a profesores de Wharton y miembros del programa Wharton Fellows-red de ejecutivos senior de todo el mundo-, los cuales compartieron sus puntos de vista sobre cómo las empresas se pueden preparar ante una guerra que cada vez más gente considera inevitable. Esta sensación de que es algo inevitable ha aumentado tras la reciente aparición de una grabación con declaraciones atribuidas a Osama Bin Laden en las que invoca a todos los musulmanes del mundo a defender Irale atacando a Estados Unidos. "Muchos negocios permanecen a la espera", dijo Colin Crook, consejero del programa Wharton Fellows y antiguo director jefe de tecnología para Citibank. "Y la sensación de malestar económico general está poniendo las cosas aún peor. Esta es una... situación muy poco prometedora; un doble golpe. No se ven signos positivos de ninguna clase". Por ejemplo, en el sector de ordenadores y de software, las empresas están aplazando sus compras hasta ver cuánto va a durar la guerra y sus consecuencias, dijo Joseph Msays, director jefe de operaciones de IBM Business Consulting Services para Europa, Oriente Medio y África. En opinión de Msays, si la guerra es corta, el gasto debería recuperarse rápidamente. En concreto, Oriente Medio podría experimentar un incremento neto del gasto en tecnologías de la información. Pero si la guerra se alarga, las empresas seguirán posponiendo sus compras, probablemente hasta 2004. "Eso nos hará mucho daño", señaló Msays. A nivel operativo IBM tiene planes para evacuar rápidamente a sus empleados de Oriente Medio en caso de guerra. El tono de la conferencia a través de Internet de febrero reflejó una mayor sensación de vulnerabilidad -en particular en Estados Unidos-, tras la aparición de la grabación de Osama Bin Laden. Además, el presidente de la Reserva Federal, Alan Greenspan, declaró que la incertidumbre que rodea a la guerra -cuándo empezará, cuánto durará- sigue siendo el mayor obstáculo para conseguir un crecimiento económico más rápido. Sus observaciones se produjeron al advertir al Congreso que una serie de propuestas fiscales aumentaría aún más el déficit estadounidense. Las preocupaciones acerca de la posible guerra y nuevos ataques terroristas han conducido a que empresas como American Express introduzcan en sus contratos ciertas cláusulas para tener derecho de aplazar o cancelar en caso de guerra todo gasto en publicidad, explicaba el profesor de marketing de Wharton Jerry Wind, director académico del programa Wharton Fellows. Es más, varias empresas están intentando potenciar sus actividades en China "ya que en la actualidad consideran este país como el lugar más seguro del mundo para los negocios", señalaba Wind, que actuó como moderador del debate. "El consumo doméstico en China y Corea del Sur continúa bastante fuerte", añadía Marcus Thompson, afincado en Hong Kong y

110 director jefe de inversiones de HSBC para Private Equity Asia, "pero sus exportaciones se están resintiendo". En Bank ofAmerica, la dirección ha redoblado los esfuerzos de su equipo de respuesta de emergencia, según Karen Fukumura, vicepresidente senior en San Francisco. Este banco ­ de Charlotte, Carolina del Norte-, está tomando medidas para garantizar una liquidez suficiente en caso de que se produzca una avalancha de gente en los bancos. "Y por lo que se refiere a los trabajadores, entre ellos cada vez hay una mayor ansiedad, de modo que nos estamos asegurando que todos sepan lo que deberían hacer si tuviese lugar una acción terrorista en su lugar de trabajo". Pero en general, lo que hacen los negocios para prepararse ante la guerra no debería ser tan diferente "en una situación de peligro que en una situación completamente normal", sugería Boaz Ganor, director del International Policy Institute on Counterterrorism (Instituto de política internacional sobre contra-terrorismo) de Tel Avivo "Básicamente, se trata de centrar la atención en las capacidades defensivas, en permanecer alerta y en mantener las conexiones con las entidades oficiales, en especial las de inteligencia". Todas las empresas deberían analizar regularmente cuales son los riesgos a los que se exponen sus directores, mercados y fábricas y planificar actuaciones en consecuencia, dijo. Paul Kleindorfer, codirector del Risk Management and Decision Processes Center (Centro para la gestión de riesgos y procesos de decisión) de Wharton, subrayó la necesidad por parte de las empresas de identificar sus puntos especialmente vulnerables; "dónde y cuándo aparecerán en la cadena de abastecimiento, en los mercados o en las relaciones con los clientes". No sólo las empresas estadounidenses están preocupadas por la guerra. Cada región del mundo se ha visto perjudicada de alguna manera. Empresas de países latinoamericanos dependientes del petróleo, como por ejemplo Chile, ven cómo aumentan sus tipos de cambio, dijo Claudio Engel, vicepresidente ejecutivo del F.H. Engel Group, un conglomerado de empresas en Santiago. "Nuestra respuesta ha sido subir los precios". Pero puede que eso no sea suficiente para contrarrestar el bajo nivel de confianza que muestran en Estados Unidos y Europa los consumidores. "Si el consumo desciende en Europa y en EE.UU. perjudicará a nuestras exportaciones, la principal parte de nuestro negocio", añadía Engel. Un número reducido de sectores está preparado para beneficiarse de la guerra. El grupo de Msays en IBM ha vuelto ahora su atención hacia la red de sectores de seguridad y defensa, en particular hacia la logística en las cadenas de abastecimiento. "Empresas como Nokia y Ericsson poseen muy buenos sistemas de apoyo a la cadena de abastecimiento", dijo. "Pero el interés en temas de defensa no se refiere a cosas como municiones o alimentos para las tropas". Pensando en el largo plazo, IBM está invirtiendo en áreas como las redes informáticas, las tecnologías vía satélite o instalaciones situadas en la costa con el fin de seguir manteniendo sus costes bajos en lugares como China, la India y Filipinas. Del mismo modo, los productores de petróleo de Latinoamérica deberían ver beneficios como consecuencia de la guerra. "La cuestión es si serán a corto o a largo plazo", dijo Engel. Si gran parte de la capacidad de producir petróleo de Irak resulta dañada por una guerra, probablemente los beneficios perdurarán en el tiempo. Es más, algunas empresas pueden encontrar nichos de mercado relacionados con la guerra que pueden explotar. Por ejemplo, en Franklin Mint -fabricante de monedas

111 conmemorativas-, "una parte de nuestro negocio está orientado hacia los incondicionales de la temática militar, de modo que todas nuestras inversiones tienen como destino esa parte del negocio", dijo Bruce Newman, presidente del Centro Franklin de Pensilvania. Al igual que American Express, Franklin Mint ha decidido interrumpir sus gastos en publicidad durante los próximos tres meses, añadía Newman. Si la posibilidad de una guerra ha desalentado las perspectivas económicas para 2003, ¿qué se puede decir para 2004 y años sucesivos? Msays de IBM predijo un aumento a largo plazo del gasto en tecnologías de la información en Oriente Medio, donde en la actualidad sólo tiene lugar el 1% del gasto mundial. Los países de la región probablemente necesitarán instalar sistemas de tarjetas nacionales de identificación, de control de pasaportes y las nuevas tecnologías de identificación conocidas como reconocimiento biométrico. Estos países también podrían incrementar sus gastos en mejorar y proteger las redes eléctricas. "Tal vez en la región sea posible destinar la mayor parte del dinero a avances en el ámbito civil". Por 10 que se refiere a Asia, "se encuentra en mejor situación que Europa, pero sus mercados domésticos no están 10 suficientemente desarrollados, y dependen demasiado de las exportaciones, como para sostener la economía mundial", señalaba Thompson de HSBC. Gran parte del debate se centró en el análisis político de la situación actual. Si, tal y como se espera, Estados Unidos invade Irak, Ganor cree que Saddam Hussein tomará represalias en forma de ataques terroristas, no a través de aviones o mísiles. "Es más cómodo para Saddam. Puede atacar objetivos muy lejanos y no tiene que asumir responsabilidades. Puede utilizar a otros -Al Qaeda, terroristas palestinos- para que actúen por él. Existe la suficiente motivación y creemos que capacidad -tanto química como biológica- también. Y a diferencia de los aviones o mísiles, las necesidades tecnológicas en este caso son muy primitivas". Durante los años posteriores a la guerra del Golfo, Saddam se desmarcó del apoyo público a los terroristas. Pero esto es algo que ha cambiado desde principios de 2000, cuando comenzó la última sublevación palestina. Desde entonces, "ha asumido un papel destacado en el apoyo al terrorismo en nuestra región", manifestaba Ganor. Aun así, la guerra debería ser rápida en caso que la guerra se defina simplemente como un cambio de régimen en Irak. Pero puede durar más si se adopta una perspectiva más amplia. Ganor señalaba: "Hay una gran diferencia entre una campaña estadounidense de largo plazo contra el terrorismo y una campaña de corto plazo contra el propio Saddam".

112 Para combatir el terrorismo es vital adoptar un enfoque de sistemas

Russel 1. Ackoff es profesor emérito de Wharton y uno de los principales defensores del enfoque de sistemas. Recientemente ha acudido a una reunión donde economistas y otros expertos consideraron la posibilidad de que ataques terroristas dañen el sistema económico de EE.UU. Esta discusión sorprendió a Ackoff. "¿Por qué tendrían los terroristas que atacar el sistema económico estadounidense?". "No tienen porqué hacerlo. Los vicepresidentes ejecutivos ya lo están haciendo bastante bien".

Con esta irónica observación comenzó Ackoff su exposición en la conferencia en Washington D.C. sobre el desarrollo de un Enfoque de sistemas para el terrorismo.Organizada de forma conjunta por la Associationfor Enterprise Integration, AFEI ( Asociación para la integración empresarial) y varios centros de investigación de Wharton, la Universidad de Pennsylvania y la Universidad George Washington, en la conferencia se insistió sobre la necesidad de que el gobierno y el sector privado trabajen juntos en el desarrollo de un enfoque global para combatir el terrorismo, cuyos resultados se manifiesten en los negocios y en la sociedad en general. Las sesiones cubrieron aspectos geopolíticos y económicos del terrorismo, enfoques para valorar la vulnerabilidad y temas sobre cómo gestionar el tradeoffentre una mayor seguridad y las libertades civiles en una sociedad libre.

Los temas que los profesores de Wharton y otros expertos trataron en la conferencia fueron especialmente oportunos. Cuando el 16 de Julio el Presidente George Bush presentó en el White House Rose Garden su propuesta de 88 páginas para conseguir la seguridad de la patria, en el documento se incluían medidas como la creación de 'equipos rojos' que fuesen capaces de pensar como terroristas con el fin de identificar objetivos potenciales, el establecimiento de estándares nacionales para los permisos de conducir, inspecciones más estrictas de la carga de los buques internacionales y la creación de un departamento de seguridad nacional entre otras. Se discutió de al menos dos de estas propuestas -la creación de 'equipos rojos' y la inspección de la carga de buques internacionales-, durante el primer día de la conferencia.

Entre los patrocinadores de la Universidad de Pennsylvania se encontraban el Ackoff Center for the Advancement of Systems Approaches, (Centro Ackoff para el avance de los enfoques de sistemas), el Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, (Centro de gestión de riesgos y toma de decisiones) de Wharton, el SEr Center for Advanced Studies in Management, (Centro SEr de estudios avanzados de gestión y administración), el Fels Center for Government (Centro Fels para el gobierno) y el Jerry Lee Center ofCriminology (Centro Jerry Lee de criminología). Pertenecientes a la Universidad George Washington se incluyen a patrocinadores como el Research Program in Social and Organizational Learning (Programa de investigación en aprendizaje social y organizativo) y el Organizational Sciences Program (Programa de ciencias organizativas). La Association for Enterprise Integration (Asociación para la integración empresarial) fue también co-patrocinadora de la conferencia.

"La única forma de luchar a brazo partido con estas cuestiones tan amplias es concentrarse en lo fundamental" dijo Paul Kleindorfer, jefe del Departamento de Gestión de la información y

113 Operaciones de Wharton y codirector del Risk Management and Decision Processes Center. Citando al economista loan Robinson -que una vez dijo que el tiempo fue inventado para no tener que hacerlo todo de una sola vez-, Kleindorfer señaló que la conferencia exploraría las posibles soluciones y además desarrollaría una agenda de investigación para futuros estudios sobre estos ternas. Este informe se basa en dos de los enfoques presentados en la conferencia. Un artículo posterior examinará otros aspectos. Terrorismo: un enfoque de sistemas Ackoff afirma ver una clara relación entre terrorismo y fundamentalismo. Además, señala que todo cambio provoca por norma general tres tipos de respuestas: conservadora, la cual quiere evitar todo cambio; reaccionaria, que trata de idealizar el pasado y deshacer los cambios; y liberal, que intenta que se produzcan pequeños cambios inconexos y cumulativos. Los reaccionarios -añade-, se convierten en fundamentalistas: desarrollan un conjunto de creencias inamovibles y "tratan de encontrar un equilibrio estático en un entorno dinámico". Ackoff distingue entre dos tipos de fundamentalismos: la variedad introvertida, corno la secta religiosa menonita -que rechaza la tecnología-, y que básicamente desea que se la deje en paz; y los extrovertidos, más entusiasmas y evangélicos, que consideran a todo aquél que no acepte sus creencias bien corno conversos potenciales o corno enemigos. Los fundamentalistas que van un paso más allá y utilizan la violencia contra aquellos que consideran enemigos son terroristas. Todos los terroristas son fundarnentalistas, a pesar de que pocos fundamentalistas sean terroristas, opina Ackoff. Para hacer frente a la amenaza del terrorismo "debernos permitir que los fundarnentalistas extrovertidos se ocupen de su entorno de una manera eficiente" explica Ackoff. "Para ello, es necesario proporcionarles los conocimientos y recursos necesarios para lograr lo que ellos consideren un nivel aceptable de vida y de calidad en el trabajo". Además Ackoff establece paralelismos entre tales esfuerzos y los que el gobierno de EE.UU. ha venido realizando desde los años 60 para integrar a sus minorías tanto en el ámbito de los negocios corno en la vida social del país. El problema básico que incita al terrorismo es la mala distribución de la riqueza en EE.UU. y en todos los países del mundo. "Gracias a las comunicaciones se ha difundido el conocimiento de estas desigualdades" señala Ackoff. "No somos capaces de comprender cómo reducir la brecha y el FMI y el Banco Mundial a menudo hacen que las cosas empeoren. No podernos resolver los problemas de los desfavorecidos. Deben resolverlos por sí mismos". Ackoff propone varios pasos a seguir para, contribuyendo a la reducción de las disparidades en la distribución de la riqueza, hacer frente al terrorismo. Para poder ser efectivos, EE.UU. y otros países ricos deben apoyar los esfuerzos en ternas de desarrollo realizados en el resto del mundo. Pero estos esfuerzos se deben realizar -y también ser vistos-, de alguna manera que tenga sentido para aquellos a los que se intenta beneficiar. Por ejemplo, Ackoff explica corno durante la década de los 50 la India quería comprar navíos mercantes americanos que EE.UU. tenía la intención de convertir en chatarra. A EE.UU. no le interesaba el negocio porque tenían miedo de que la India, con sus menores costes laborales, pudiera reducir la rentabilidad de las flotas mercantes americanas. No sólo EE.UU. no aceptó el trato sino que se ofreció a venderles mantequilla, sin darse cuenta de que por aquel entonces la mayoría de los indios no comían mantequilla (que necesita refrigeración) sino ghee (con un mayor periodo de conservación al aire libre y sin refrigeración). Corno apunta Ackoff, este acontecimiento convirtió a EE.UU. en el 'stock de risas de la India'. "La respuesta de los indios fue: 'tu generosidad está dirigida a resolver tus problemas, no los

114 nuestros"'. EE.UU. tendrá que cambiar este tipo de enfoques si quiere ocuparse del terrorismo de una forma efectiva. Ackoff también sostiene que, en caso de disponer de fondos, la decisión sobre cómo utilizarlos debería ser tomada a través de un proceso democrático. Esto implica que no debe haber corrupción en la manipulación de los fondos u otros recursos. Además, expertos deben trabajar para ayudar a los grupos desfavorecidos a tomar decisiones del modo en el que ellos (los desfavorecidos) deseen. Por último, todas estas las condiciones deben ser supervisadas y controladas por un grupo aceptado tanto por los que proporcionan como por los que reciben la ayuda. "A menos de que seamos capaces de hacer esto" afirma Ackoff, "todo lo demás será simplemente defendemos únicamente a nosotros mismos ante el terrorismo". Una perspectiva geopolítica de las causas Brian M Jenkins, asesor senior del presidente de RAND, un foro de reflexión sin ánimo de lucro, señala que los estudios sobre terrorismo tuvieron su propio nicho hasta el pasado año, pero que desde el 11 de septiembre han ganado una audiencia masiva. "El terrorismo no es sólo un conjunto de creencias, sino también un conjunto de tácticas y acciones" explica. Además de las acciones, se incluyen los efectos derivados de dichas acciones, tales como el miedo y las medidas de seguridad que se toman para prevenir posteriores ataques. Por sí mismo el terrorismo tiene un efecto cascada. Jenkins sostiene que inevitablemente los terroristas surgen en entornos que no son los suyos propios, y que es crucial entender cuales son las causas que impulsan a grupos como Al Qaeda, Acción Directa o el Ejército Rojo. Y cita varios motivos por los que los investigadores deberían estudiar las causas del terrorismo. "Es útil para poder predecir y también permite las intervenciones preventivas" explica Jenkins. "El estudio de las causas te permite aprender cómo privar a los terroristas de sus partidarios" Históricamente EE.UU. ha ignorado ciertas causas y se ha concentrado en el contra­ terrorismo. El motivo es que la política de EE.UU. en materia terrorista se desarrolló en respuesta a secuestros y ataques a diplomáticos estadounidenses en el extranjero, y "lo que nos afectaba no eran las causas sino las tácticas" puntualiza Jenkins. "Cuando los ataques se producían en terceros países, para combatirlos EE.UU. necesitaba cooperación internacional. Cuando intentas ocuparte del terrorismo en el ámbito internacional, te metes de lleno en el problema de su definición, problema de muy difícil solución. Lo que para unos es un terrorista, para otros es alguien que lucha por la libertad. Tales discrepancias derivan en desacuerdos y en una incapacidad para luchar contra el terrorismo. En consecuencia, la política estadounidense impuso definiciones de terrorismo basadas en la calidad de las acciones, y deliberadamente prescindió de las causas. Sólo de esta forma EE.UU. podía conseguir la cooperación internacional". Jenkins explica cómo los investigadores manejan cinco supuestos sobre las causas del terrorismo. En primer lugar están las causas que los propios terroristas ofrecen. El IRA resume su causa en "Ingleses fuera", mientras que los·· separatistas vascos proclaman "Españoles fuera". Otros grupos luchan por conceptos más generales, como el anti­ imperialismo o la anti-globalización. Muchas de las causas terroristas se basan en la religión. "Si lees la literatura terrorista, a menudo encuentras que sus objetivos están expresados vagamente" comenta Jenkins. "Si los terroristas no tuvieran pistolas o bombas, te aburrirían hasta la muerte con su literatura". Un segundo supuesto sobre los terroristas tiene sus raíces en las conspiraciones internacionales. "En el pasado, gran parte del terrorismo se consideraba una conspiración soviética, y en la actualidad a menudo se relaciona con una conspiración iraquí", señala

115 Jenkins. "Tales explicaciones no tienen en cuenta los factores locales que impulsan el terrorismo, y en cambio buscan un 'Imperio del Mal' al que culpar de las acciones terroristas. Puede que haya algo de verdad en estas explicaciones, pero generalmente son injustas". En tercer lugar, algunos analistas señalan ciertos factores del entorno como impulsores de las causas terroristas. "Se preguntan porqué los niveles de terrorismo de Italia, España o Alemania son altos, y si esto no estará relacionado con el pasado fascista de estos países". En cuarto lugar, el cambio tecnológico a veces es considerado como causa de terrorismo. Los terroristas observan la aplastante superioridad militar de Occidente, lo que les obliga a buscar nuevas vulnerabilidades y capacidades. Por último, algunos analistas creen que el terrorismo y sus causas pueden estudiarse mejor en términos de su historia natural. El fracaso de las acciones de guerrillas rurales en algunas zonas conlleva un incremento del terrorismo urbano. Cuando las manifestaciones en masa no consiguen alcanzar ciertos objetivos, empiezan a plantearse acciones terroristas que giran alrededor de esas causas. "Es importante comprender las causas porque el terrorismo se perpetua a sí mismo" opina Jenkins. "Las causas pueden cambiar con el paso del tiempo, pero el terrorismo es una constante".

116 ¿Podría un ciber-terrorista hundir tu empresa? No esperes a descubrirlo

Citigroup, con más de 112 billones de dólares de ingresos anuales este año, es un mastodonte global. En un día cualquiera el gigante de servicios financieros mayor del mundo mueve un trillón o más de dólares alrededor de todo el mundo. Así, no es de extrañar que los ejecutivos de seguridad de tecnologías de la información de Citigroup se quedasen atónitos un día de 1994 cuando se dieron cuenta que un hacker se había introducido en las entrañas del sistema y estaba desviando millones de dólares. Tal y como Colin Crook, antiguo director de tecnología de Citigroup recuerda, "fue una experiencia profundamente traumática".

Crook, ahora miembro del SEI Center for Advanced Studies in Management de Wharton, afirma que por fortuna para Citigroup, el culpable -Vladimir Levin de San Petersburgo-, fue atrapado pronto. Había robado las contraseñas de los clientes para transferir 10 millones de dólares a su cuenta, hasta que Scotland Yard y el FB! le siguieron la pista y le arrestaron. Cuando en 1998 un juez de EE.UU. sentenció a Levin, Citibank había recuperado más de nueve millones y medio de dólares del dinero desaparecido. Tras esta experiencia, el gigante de servicios financieros instaló medidas encaminados no sólo a remendar las brechas de seguridad abiertas, sino también a la identificación de señales de que alguien pueda estar intentando entrar en su sistema informático. La entrada en los sistemas no es un acontecimiento aislado; existen indicios previos. "Entre tanta información hay que saber reconocer las huellas" dice Crook.

Crook expuso sus opiniones en una sesión sobre ciber-terrorismo que formaba parte de la conferencia Systems Approach to Terrorism (Un enfoque de sistemas para el terrorismo) celebrada el pasado mes. La conferencia estaba patrocinada por la Association for Enterprise Integration, diversos centros de investigación de Wharton, la University of Pennsylvania y George Washington University. Entre los patrocinadores de Wharton se encontraban Risk Management and Decision Processes Center (Centro de gestión de riesgos y procesos de decisión) dirigido por Paul Kleindorfer y Howard Kunreuther, y el SE! Center for Advanced Studies in Management dirigido por Jerry Wind.

Previamente, y como introducción a la presentación de Crook, Wind explicó como el ciber­ terrorismo representa sólo una de las formas de vulnerabilidad contra la cual las organizaciones deben plantearse la protección. Además, las empresas deben evaluar cuales son sus puntos débiles ante el bio-terrorismo u otro tipo de amenazas. "La vulnerabilidad depende de quien seas", señaló Wind. "Las empresas necesitan planes estratégicos que les puedan ayudar a detectar e impedir el terrorismo y desarrollar acciones preventivas contra las potenciales amenazas".

Wind explicó que cuando las empresas intentan valorar su grado de vulnerabilidad ante las amenazas terroristas, deben tener en cuenta diferentes aspectos. "La vulnerabilidad es un fenómeno local, y se puede manifestar de una manera diferente en Nueva York que en Filadelfia o en Washington DC", señaló. Para Wind, las empresas también se enfrentan al desafío de compartimentar la información o de construir montañas de información

117 inmanejables. Cada una de las divisiones de una organización puede que tenga algo de información, pero a menudo les resulta imposible hacerse una idea de conjunto.

Este problema se agravaría aún más cuando varias organizaciones, como por ejemplo las agencias gubernamentales, disponen de información parcial que no se desvela a no ser que se intercambie con otras organizaciones. Cuando las organizaciones que deben compartir sus conocimientos están dispersas alrededor del mundo, el desafío se vuelve aún mayor, ya que el terrorismo posee en la actualidad una dimensión internacional. "Las dependencias de empresas como Coca-Cola o McDonald's (que claramente se identifican con Estados Unidos) son atacadas por todo el mundo" afirma Wind. En estas circunstancias, para contrarrestar amenazas globales es esencial contar con una estrategia global. "El pellejo de todos nosotros está en juego" añade.

Ciber-terrorismo y el sector financiero

Según Crook, aunque la amenaza de ciber-terrorismo contra las instituciones financieras como Citigroup está presente en todo momento, las empresas deben seguir adelante con sus vidas. "Tendremos que vivir con éste fenómeno durante varias generaciones" señaló, y añadió cómo siempre ha existido una dicotomía entre la confidencialidad y la apertura. "Últimamente hay muy pocas cosas que en los negocios se puedan mantener en secreto. Es necesario asumir que en cualquier momento futuro casi todo la información se desvelará". Además Crook añadió que la confidencialidad en los negocios difiere considerablemente de lo que se entiende por confidencialidad en el ámbito gubernamental o militar. "En los negocios se debería plantear como un gran experimento, y debes adaptarte y aprender" explica Crook.

Crook señaló que la entrada de hackers en sistemas informáticos seguros está en aumento, y que se llegan a denunciar cinco casos al día. Así, identifica varios factores de riesgo. La concentración del poder informático genera fragilidad -señaló-, y crea interconexiones. "Internet no es una red lineal, no puedes aislarte del resto mundo", dijo. "Antes solían existir brechas pero ahora ya no". Otro factor de riesgo es la estandarización. Entre los principales proveedores de tecnología de la información, compañías como Microsoft, Intel y Cisco poseen unas cuotas de mercado de entre el 80 y el 90%. "Esto quiere decir que si tienes un problema en alguna parte del sistema, de hecho lo tienes en todo el sistema" afirmó Crook.

Otro riesgo procede de lo que Crook describió como la paradoja de la seguridad del consumidor. "La actitud de los gobiernos ante la seguridad consiste en mantener fuera al potencial enemigo, mientras que la de las empresas es invitar al cliente a entrar". El contraste entre ambas perspectivas es crucial, porque "dentro de la base de los clientes se encuentran tus enemigos ". Crook enfatizó en la importancia que tiene al diseñar los sistemas de seguridad el contemplar tres principios de seguridad: primero, nunca confiar en una red; segundo, autentificar siempre al usuario pero no confiar en él; y tercero, la aplicación debe protegerse a sí misma.

Por último, Crook proporcionó varias reglas de ciber-seguridad. Entre ellas: El futuro es incierto. Por ello, tener cierta visión es más importante que tener planes detallados. Todo es un experimento. Así, piensa como si se tratase de experimentos, no de hechos confirmados. Formula los planes de una forma que implique transparencia a largo plazo. Últimamente no hay secretos.

118 La experiencia previa puede ser una desventaja. Al igual que los planes detallados, la experiencia previa puede generar lo que Crook llama 'cognitive ¡ocks' (bloqueos cognitivos) a la hora de comprender una situación, y también que se minusvalore la flexibilidad, la cual puede ser muy necesaria. La tecnología es un motor de cambio; acéptala y aprovéchala, no la evites. El mundo está interconectado. Únete a él, no te aísles.

Bio-terrorismo y otras formas de terrorismo

Robert Moore, director ejecutivo del grupo de seguridad· global de Merck, el gigante farmacéutico, apunta a las amenazas que afrontan las empresas como consecuencia del bio­ terrorismo. Desde los momentos posteriores a las muertes por ántrax en Estados Unidos del pasado año, este tema se ha vuelto prioritario en la seguridad de la mayoría de las empresas. Según Moore, para Merck es necesario estar preparado en cualquier momento. "Nadie dice que un rayo vaya a atravesar hoy tu casa, pero seguro que algo la atravesará en algún momento" explica.

Moore señala que una estrategia efectiva para combatir el bio-terrorismo debe estar basada en que son los que proporcionan servicios sanitarios y también las salas de urgencias -y no por la policía ni las brigadas anti-terroristas-, las primeras líneas de defensa. Además, la cooperación mutua entre el sector privado y público es importantísima, y deben crearse asociaciones para poder lograrla.

"Somos gestores del riesgo", dice Moore." Si tenemos que evaluar el riesgo, debemos basamos preferentemente en las relaciones de confianza entre las instituciones más que en las existentes entre individuos". Moore añade que los factores del riesgo deben ser evaluados conjuntamente, los planes de emergencia diseñados entre todos, y la información compartida. Arthur Johnson, vicepresidente senior de desarrollo estratégico corporativo en Lockheed Martín, aboga por la necesidad de que las empresas encuentren el equilibrio entre la necesidad de seguridad y la de privacidad. Respecto a los chequeos de seguridad en los aeropuertos, Johnson opina que en el pasado eran demasiado superficiales, pero sin embargo ahora están llegando al intrusismo. "Una solución para los pasajeros podría ser no volar, pero con esta solución la sociedad no estaría más segura y tampoco se lograría disuadir a los terroristas". Para poder ser efectivo -añade-, cualquier proceso de chequeo debe combinar "una minuciosa seguridad con una mínima invasión de tu intimidad".

Johnson cree que los objetivos de los controladores de seguridad son desalentadores. Sólo en EE.UU. deben controlar 700 aeropuertos y 20.000 vuelos diarios, además de 4.000 millas de costa. "Deben inspeccionar 2 millones de vagones y 11 millones de camiones que entran en Estados Unidos cada año", señaló. Con tal volumen, ¿cómo puede ser posible tener seguridad? Según Johnson, la disuasión no es una opción contra aquellos que están dispuestos a morir. "Tenemos que adoptar medidas intensivas en tecnología en lugar de las intensivas en trabajo", dice. "Estos sistemas deben estar integrados. La mano derecha del gobierno debe saber lo que está haciendo la izquierda. De otro modo nos veremos superados por las tácticas de Al Qaeda".

"Destruye tu marca": El enfoque de Wharton

En un análisis más detallado de las estrategias que se puede emplear para contrarrestar la amenaza del terrorismo, Rick Lieb, presidente de SE! !nvestments y miembro senior del SE!

119 Center de Wharton, dirigió una sesión sobre los retos del sector financiero. Colin Crook y William Doran, socio del bufete de Morgan Lewis y Bockius, también participaron en el debate.

Para ellos, los terroristas cuyo objetivo es para atacar las empresas financieras son muy inteligentes; (por ejemplo, el hacker ruso que atacó Citigroup estaba licenciado en matemáticas por Sto Peterburg Teknologichesky University). Con el fin de identificar qué factores llaman la atención de los ciber-terroristas por su vulnerabilidad, un grupo de profesores de Wharton ha desarrollado un método basado en la iniciativa 'destruye tu marca' (destroy your brand), implantada en General Electric por su antiguo vicepresidente ejecutivo Jack Welch.

La técnica implica reunir uno o más equipos multifuncionales y pedirles que respondan a la siguiente cuestión, "Si fueras un competidor o un terrorista y quisieras expulsar a esta empresa del mercado, ¿cómo lo harías?" Los miembros del equipo celebraron 'reuniones creativas' sobre las tácticas que emplearían. Cuando este ejercicio se realizó teniendo como objetivo potencial a Depository Trust Co. -por la que pasan la mayor parte de las transacciones de títulos en los mercados financieros de EE.UD. excepto los relacionados con los bonos del estado-, los participantes sugirieron unos endemoniadamente simples métodos para desbaratar sus operaciones. Por ejemplo, una idea fue estropear las cintas de las copias de seguridad atacando a la persona responsable de su transporte al final de cada jornada laboral.

El objetivo de las prácticas 'destruye tu marca' es obvio. Una vez que se identifican los puntos débiles, los miembros de un equipo (u otros equipos) pueden desarrollar estrategias de defensa para contrarrestar tales ataques. Asumiendo que los terroristas trabajan con escenarios similares o incluso idénticos en sus ataques planeados, con estas prácticas se asegurarían de tener ya perfectamente preparadas sus defensas antes de que se produjeran los ataques.

Después del 11 de septiembre del pasado año, varios profesores de Wharton sugirieron a Department 01 Homeland Security (Departamento de seguridad nacional) que el método de 'destruye tu marca' podría ser utilizado para identificar los puntos vulnerables de la economía norteamericana y generar estrategias de respuesta. A pesar de que el departamento tardó en contestar, el mes pasado se ha anunciado que, formando parte de la estrategia de la administración Bush para la seguridad de la nación, se crearían dichos equipos de trabajo.

Para poder ser verdaderamente efectivos, estas prácticas deberían estar dirigidas de manera iterativa, donde cada escenario incorpore las posibles defensas y las nuevas amenazas que surgen tras incorporar esas defensas. Por ejemplo, si los terroristas combinasen un atentado contra una institución que ofrece créditos con cierta jugada en la que se contaminase el dinero en efectivo -hay que tener en cuenta que el 25% de los americanos no tienen cuenta bancaria-, se podría plantear un formidable reto para la economía.

"Estos son unos escenarios problemáticos que podrían paralizar la economía" dice Lieb. Sin embargo, afortunadamente ser consciente de tus áreas más vulnerables es también un paso para prevenir esos ataques o bloquearlos con las consecuencias mínimas en caso de que finalmente ocurrieran.

120 Icsis op ... edS] CSIS is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy organization.

March 20, 2003

U.S. ATTACKS IRAQ Opening Highlights Rapid Reaction to Intelligence; Iraqi Leadership Likely Rattled

WASHINGTON, March 20, 2003 - CSIS analysts made the following statements regarding the opening stages of the war in Iraq:

Michele Flournoy, senior adviser, CSIS International Security Program (202-775-3136): "This war did not begin as anticipated or planned. But the opening strike did demonstrate a meaningful change in the U.S. military's ability to respond quickly to take advantage of 'targets of opportunity' intelligence that must be acted upon within minutes or hours. This is one of the fruits of the ongoing process of transformation, and our ability to strike rapidly and with precision will only improve over time. That said, there are a number of wildcards that Saddam could play to complicate this war, so we can't yet assume that this will be 'a walk in the park' as sorne have claimed."

Daniel Benjamin, CSIS senior fellow (202-775-3294): "If the intelligence that prompted yesterday's attack was halfway solid and it is hard to imagine otherwise the strike could have a powerful effect on the Iraqi leadership even if it caused no casualties. The regime's top individuals would have to wonder if the United States targeted that particular location because of either a traitor in their midst or communications that were even more compromised than they knew. Whatever the case, these individuals are likely to be rattled and to have to invest more effort into their personal safety. That will make it harder for them to direct any war effort and complicate their cornmunications. It could also sow suspicion among them, and cause them to make more mistakes."

Clark Murdock, senior fellow, CSIS International Security Program (202-741-3863): "Triggered by intelligence indicating that Saddam Hussein was meeting with his top leadership, the U.S. campaign opened with a small attack of cruise missiles and stealth fighters intended to decapitate the regime. It is too soon to tell how successful the strike was, although Hussein appears to have survived. The planned campaign will probably open this evening (early morning in Iraq) with a massive air attack, using 3,000 precision-guided munitions in the first 48 hours against a broad range of Iraqi military and leadership targets. Although Special Forces are already operating inside Iraq, 1arge1y in the north and west, large numbers of ground forces will probably not be introduced until the air campaign ebbs, perhaps on Saturday or Sunday early morning local time."

Laurence Rothenberg, CSIS fellow and director, Globalization 101 Project (202-775­ 3173): "The laws app1ying to the conduct of war are fairly straightforward. The tough questions arise in applying them to specific cases. Military commanders, lawyers, and Monday morning quarterbacks of all stripes will disagree about the legitimacy of decisions made by U.S. targetters. Inevitab1y, sorne people will accuse the United States of committing war crimes. I wou1d not be surprised if there are certain nations and groups at this very moment planning to level charges against U.S. leaders in the Internationa1 Criminal Court."

121 csls Center for Strategic and Internationai Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3284 [email protected]

After an Attack on Iraq: The Economic Consequences

Review and Update

Laurence Meyer Distinguished Scholar

March 13, 2003 1

Gn November 12, 2002, CSIS he1d a conference on the economic consequences of an attack on Iraq. A team ofa dozen experts-political and military specialists, oil market analysts, macro modelers, and financial market specialists-worked together for about two months to develop the military and political scenarios and then simulate the effect of the war on the U.S and global economy in each ofthree war scenarios. A summary and full transcript ofthe conference are available on the CSIS web site.

In this briefing, 1 will first review the methodology and the conclusions reached at the conference, then consider developments since the time of the conference that may have altered the likely effects in the event ofwar, and provide a brief discussion of sorne ofthe implications ofthe recent developments. While 1 have had discussions with sorne ofthe other participants in the CSIS study, 1 have not asked the group to formally reassess their input and conclusions. 1 am therefore offering this aftemoon my own assessment, though one that has been informed by discussion with sorne ofthe participants. 1 will circulate this update to the participants and revise it based on the comments 1 receive. The revised update will then be posted on the CSIS web site.

Methodology and Conclusions of the November 12 Conference

Tony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, developed the three war scenarios that served as the foundation for the CSIS study: the benign, the intermediate and the worse case. In the benign case, there is a quick and decisive victory, limited casualties and collateral damage, no damage to oil facilities in Iraq or elsewhere in the region, no use ofweapons ofmass destruction, no attack on Israel or Israeli retaliation, no political destabilization in the region, and no dramatic terrorist events. In the intermediate case, there are a number of more adverse outcomes, possibly including modest damage to Iraqi oil fields, greater political destabilization in the region, resulting in sorne reluctance of Saudi Arabia to completely offset the loss ofIraqi oil, a limited attack on Israel with limited response, and sorne terrorist incidents, but without major damage. In the worse case, there is sorne combination of still more adverse outcomes, possibly including extensive damage to oil facilities in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, use of weapons of mass destruction, a massive attack on Israel and significant Israeli retaliation, and significant and successful terrorist attacks.

The oil panel concluded there would be a spike in oil prices in the quarter following the outbreak of war in all three scenarios, followed by declines though 2004, the end ofthe simulation periodo The oil price spike would be progressively greater in the intermediate and worse case scenarios, and oil prices, while declining, would remain elevated relative to the no-war and benign scenarios in the intermediate and worse case scenarios through 2004.

The economic simulations took into account the increase in oil prices, the effect on govemment spending associated with the cost ofthe war, the intemational feedbacks from the effect ofthe war on other countries, the response ofmonetary policy in the U.S. and elsewhere, and the psychological effects ofthe war on financial markets and consumer confidence. 2

In the benign scenario, the macro modelers concluded that war would result in stronger growth this year than in the no-war case. That conclusion reflects the interpretation of the no-war case. In the no-war case we assumed that uncertainty about whether or not there would be a war would linger for a period and then gradually dissipate. A quick and decisive victory in a war with Iraq more quickly removes the uncertainty that has been weighing on the economy. Equity prices rebound and consumer confidence improves quickly in the benign case, resulting in about Yí percentage point faster growth than in the no-war case.

The economy grows more slowly in the no-war case and in the intermediate case and the U.S. and global economies are thrown into recessions in the worse case scenario. In the intermediate case, economic growth slows by 1% percentage points over 2003, compared to the no-war case; and in the worse case scenario economic growth slows by 4Yí percentage points, with the unemployment rate rising to 7% - 7Yí% in the U.S.

In both the intermediate and worse case scenarios the Fed is assumed to ease interest rates to cushion the effect on growth and the associated rise in the unemployment rateo

Developments since the Conference Oil markets There have been a number of important developments in oil markets, reflected in a rise in crude oil prices by about $12 since the time ofthe conference. While I take responsibility for the analysis of oil markets below, it has, fortunately, been informed by my discussion with Larry Goldstein, President of the Petroleum Industry Research Association, who chaired the oil panel at the CSIS conference.

First, global oil inventories are significantIy lower than at the time of the conference. This is due principally to the strike in Venezuela. Venezuelan oil production was about 3.1 million barreIs a day (MBD) before the strike. It fell to a low ofO.6 mbd in January and has now rebounded to about 1.6 mbd. The oil markets have cumulatively lost more than 100 million barreIs of oil as a result of the strike in Venezuela, contributing to the further depletion of oil inventories. In addition, it is expected that there will be a permanent loss ofVenezuelan productive capacity, as a result ofthe strike, of about 500,000 barrels a day.

Second, Saudi Arabia increased its oil production to offset the loss of Venezue1an output, resulting in a decline in the amount of excess capacity among oil producing countries, compared to the situation at the time ofthe CSIS conference. Excess capacity (principal1y located in Saudi Arabia) has declined from about 2Yí - 3 mbd at the time of the conference to as litt1e as 1 mbd or even 1ess today.

Third, while the panel believed that there was no-war premium at the time of the conference, there is likely a small war premium today. The premium, while highly 3

volatile, depending on perceptions about the imminent risk ofwar, may have averaged recently in the range of $2 - $3 per barrel.

Fourth, seasonal factors first increased the demand for crude through January and February and now have eased the demando

Fifth, the increase in Saudi production earlier in the year, intended to offset the decline in Venezue1an production, should be arriving at consumer countries, including the U.S., within one to three weeks.

Vulnerability ofthe U.S. and global economy The U.S. and global economies are weaker today than we expected at the time ofthe conference. In general, an economy is more vulnerable to a recession (defined as an outright decline in output) when there is a smaller cushion of growth. In addition, the lower inventories and more limited excess capacity among oil producers means that oil markets are more vulnerable to a spike in oil prices ifIraqi oil is removed from the market for a period, or if there is damage to other oil facilities in the region, but this is offset by the seasonal easing in demand for crude and the step-up in Saudi production.

Fiscal "Insurance" The Bush administration, since the conference, has proposed a package of tax cuts that could provide incremental stimulus for the economy, if approved. This could provide sorne protection for the economy in the event of an adverse outcome to the war. This does not alter the incremental effects in the war scenarios, but it would result in stronger growth in boththe war and no-war scenarios.

Timing of the war At the time of the conference, we assumed the war would begin on January 1, 2003. It now appears that the war may begin within days, even by tonight, March 17.

Geopolitical uncertainty and escalating war anxieties At the conference, we assumed that there would be sorne adverse effects in advance of the war. We also assumed that there would be sorne additional adverse effects on the economy at the outset of the war, including a further decline in equity prices, erosion of consumer confidence, and higher risk spreads in the capital markets. Still, we did not, at least in my view, anticipate the degree to which war anxieties would escalate and weigh importantly in the economy in the period leading up to the war. There is sorne disagreement about the degree to which the soft spot that emerged in the second half of 2002 and the apparent further weakening in the expansion refiected in the February employment report are in fact due to escalating war anxieties. But it is reasonable to conclude that geopolitical uncertainty re1ated to the possibility of a war with Iraq has played a significant role in the persistence and intensification of the soft spot.

The fact that sorne ofthe adverse effects of a possible war have already occurred could diminish any incremental adverse effects that accompany the onset of the war, or even result in rallies in financial markets and declines in oil prices, especially if it appears that 4

the benign scenario is playing out. Interestingly, the financial markets are ral1ying as we approach the brink ofwar. This situation is reminiscent ofthe GulfWar. The adverse effects related to the war - the rise in oil prices and decline in consumer confidence ­ occurred immediately fol1owing the invasion of Kuwait. At the onset of the shooting war itself, there was a quick reversal of at least sorne ofthe earlier negative impacts. In the current crisis it is possible that we have already experienced the adverse economic "shocks" associated with the lead up to war, and there remains the possibility that the onset ofthe war, at least in the benign scenario, willlead to a quick reversal ofthe earlier declines in consumer confidence and erosion in equity prices. Keep in mind that, even if the benign scenario is unfolding, there willlikely be "bad" days along the way, unexpected adverse events, and corresponding setbacks in the market. And we should not lose sight of the potential for outcomes less benign than the "benign" scenario.

Implications of the developments since the conference I believe the qualitative stories associated with the three war scenarios continue to provide a plausible picture ofthe range ofpossible outcomes associated with a war with lraq. The key conclusions we reached remain, in my view, intacto First, the benign war outcome could al10w the economy to quickly accelerate as uncertainty is removed and confidence rebounds. Second, there are non-trivial probabilities associated with more adverse outcomes, with the intermediate and worse case providing useful benchmarks. Nevertheless, the developments since the conference do have sorne implications for the economic consequences of an attack on Iraq.

First, while lower crude oil inventories and diminished excess capacity point to the possibility of a sharper initial spike in oil prices, this is significantly offset by the seasonal easing of the demand for crude. Oil prices, which peaked at $38 per barrel (WTI) in the benign scenario in the conference study, reached those levels earlier this month, though they have now backed offto around $35. There willlikely be a short­ lived spike once war begins, even in the benign case, but it now appears unlikely that oil prices in the benign scenario would increase $8 as a quarterly average, as assumed in the CSIS study. The speed with which oil prices decline willlikely be affected by the actions ofSaudi Arabia, the U.S. government in relation to the SPR, and ofthe lEA in relation to oil reserves outside the U.S, in addition, of course, to the military outcomes and extent of damage to oil fields andJor distribution facilities. At the conference, we assumed there would be an immediate announcement that the SPR would be tapped, but that, in the benign case, no drawdown would actual1y be made. It is difficult to read the intentions with respect to the use of the SPR and related international reserves, but announcements that they would be used would obviously contribute to a quicker decline in oil prices.

Second, oil prices in the no-war scenario have been marked up from $20 a barrel in 2004 to $25 a barrel, as a result of the permanent decline in Venezuelan production and the elevated demand expected for a period as oil inventories are rebuilt. This does not affect the incremental effect on oil prices associated with the three war scenarios, but it does mean that the path of oil prices in absolute terms is higher in al1 the war scenarios. This contributes to weaker demand in the U.S. and global economy over the forecast period in the war and no-war scenarios. 5

Third, the fact that war anxieties have already depressed equity prices and consumer confidence by more than we anticipated at the time of the conference suggests that the effects of the outbreak of the war may be smaller than otherwise would have been the case. Indeed, financial markets are rallying as we move to the brink ofwar.

Fourth, the fact that the war is likely to begin later means that war anxieties leading up to the war have weighed on the economy longer in 2003 than earlier expected and that there will be less time for the rebound from the war in the benign case to be reflected in stronger growth this calendar year. The later start to the war therefore probably means a weaker economy over 2003, but a slightly stronger economy over 2004. CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 (To comment: [email protected] For Updates see CSIS.ORG, "Military Balance")

Saddam's Last Circle: Tbe Core Forces Likely to Protect Saddam in tbe "Battle of Bagbdad"

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies

March 18, 2003

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, aH rights reserved. Saddam's Last Core Defenders 3/18/2003 Page 11

Table of Contents CREATING A "LOYAL" COMMAND STRUCTURE 1

THE LOYALTY OF THE lRAQI MANPOWER BASE 2

THE REGULAR ARMY AND REPUBLICAN GUARDS 2

IRAQI MAJOR COMBAT UNIT STRENGTH .' 3 THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS 3

THE REGULAR ARMY 3 Regular Army Forces in Northern Iraq 3 Regular Army Forces in Eastern Iraq 4 Regular Army Forces in Southern Iraq 4

THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS 4 THE SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARDS OR AL-HARIS AL-JAMHURI AL-KHAS 5

THE FIRST BRIGADE IS HEADQUARTERED AT HAYY AL-QADISIYEH IN BAGHDAD 5 THE SECOND BRIGADE IS HEADQUARTERED AT THE AL RASHID MILITARY BASE 6 THE THIRD BRIGADE IS HEADQUARTERED AT TAJI.. 6 THE FOURTH BRIGADE IS MOTORIZED AND IS LOCATED AT AL HARITHIYEH AND AL QUADISIYEH ...... 6 THE ARMOR COMMAND (FOURTH ARMORED BRIGADE) 7 AIR DEFENSE COMMAND 7 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY FORCES 7

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (MIS), OR AL ESTIKHBARATAL ASKARIYYA 7

THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, OR AL AMN AL ASKARIYYA (ASKARI) 8 lRAQ'S CAPABILITY FOR POPULAR MOBILIZATION 8

FEDAYEEN SADDAM (SADDAM'S MEN OF SACRIFICE) 8 JERUSALEM OR AL QUDS BRIGADES 9 LIONS OF SADDAM (ESHBAL OR ASHBAL SADDAM 9

NATIONAL DEFENSE BATTALIONS 9

YOUTH (CIVIL DEFENSE) FORCE 9

GREAT RETALIATION FORCE 9

OTHER FORCES 10 National Police 10

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Frontier Guard 10 SECURITY SERVICES THAT MIGHT SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES AND HELP TO ENSURE THEIR LOYALTY 10

THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT: 10 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (AL-MAJLISAL-AMN AL-QAWNI): 10

SPECIAL SECURITY COMMITTEE 11 THE SPECIAL PROTECTION AppARATUS OR JIHAZ AL-HAly[A YA AL-KHAS: (HlMA YA) 11

SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SSS), SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (SSO) OR AMN AL KHASS 13

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GID) OR lRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IID) OR MUKHABARAT 14 Key Functions 01the Mukhabarat 15 Organization olthe Mukhabarat 16 THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICES (GSS) OR GENERAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE (GSD) OR AL­ AMN AL-AMM 17 AL RADI PROJECT OR PROJECT 858 18

MURAFAQIN OR COMPANIONS OF SADDAM (ALSO CALLED THE SPECIAL PROTECTION APPARATUS (JIHAZ AL-RIMAy A AL-KHASA IN OTHER SOURCES) 18

THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION 18 THE BA'ATH PARTY OR SOCIALIST ARAB RESURRECTION PARTY ORRIZB AL-BA'ATH AL-' ARAB AL-ISHTIRAKI 18 EMERGENCY FORCE OF THE GOVERNATES 18 NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OR MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MKO OR MEK) 19

THE TRIBAL CHIEF'S BUREAU ORMAKTAB AL-SHUYUKH 19 RIGHER COMMITTEE FOR MONITORING THE INSPECTION TEAMS 19 THE LOYALTY OF THE lRAQI ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY SERVICES 19

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, aH rights reserved. Creating a "Loyal" Command Structure It seems likely that Saddam will try to put up at least sorne resistance throughout the country, but it is c1ear that his main defense will come in the Baghdad area, and that there are serious questions about the willingness of the regular arrny to fight a last battle of attrition, and even requiring the loyalty ofsorne e1ements ofthe Republican Guard. Neverthe1ess, Saddam has powerful tool to use in ensuring that he has sorne sort of final circ1e to defend him. Saddam Hussein is the Supreme arrned forces Commander. The Special Republic Guard reports directly to him through his younger son, as does the President's Special Security Committee. He chairs Defense Council of key loyalists, inc1uding the Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, ando Armed Forces Commander. The Chief of the General Staff is head of the arrned forces headquarters and combined service staff. Each of the four service headquarters are located in Baghdad, as is the headquarters of the military intelligence elements and each reports upwards through the Combined service Staff. Armed Forces Cornmander and Minister of Defense. Iraqi forces are under the command of loyalists to the regime. These inc1ude General Sultan Hashim al-Ubaydi, the Minister of Defense, and General Ibrahim Abd AI-Satter Muhammad al­ Tikriti, the Chief of Staff. While this command structure is highly centralized, Saddam set up four regional commands at the time of Desert Fox in 1998, each of which was placed under one of his most dedicated supporters. These regional commands are like1y to reappear in sorne forrn in the course of any US-British attack. They inc1uded: • The Southern Region, which inc1uded the govemates of Basra, Dhikar, Misan, and Waset under Saddam's cousin General Ali Hassabn al Majid. • The Northern Region, which was under Qusay, and covered the three Kurdish govemates of Sulaimaniya, Arbil, and Dohuk plus the northem govemate of Mosu1. • The Central Euphrates Region, which was large1y Shi'ite and inc1uded Kerbala, Babylon, Najaf, Quadisiya, and Muthanna. It was cornmanded by Muhammed Hamza al Zubeidi, an RCC member and Deputy Prime Minister. • The Central Region inc1uding Baghdad, Saladin, Anbar, and Diyala, under Defense Minister Ahmed Sultan. Saddam not only is likely to create similar regional cornmands in the event of war, he is likely to use the civil inte11igence and security forces to attempt to hold on to each major urban area and region as we11 as create a core defense in Baghdad. Saddam must know that even limited local resistance could he1p force the US to disperse its forces, while successful urban resistance in a number of areas could confront the US with much more serious problems in urban warfare. He also must know that large e1ements of the Iraqi Arrny might not be loyal if he did not maintain control over the key regions and towns and cities as long as possible.

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The Loyalty oC the Iraqi Manpower Base The loyalty of Iraq's overal1 manpoiwer pool will clearly be a problem. Iraq has considerable potential for popular mobilization. Iraq has a reserve pool of sorne 650,000, and a large pool of annual conscripts. The CIA estmates Iraq's population at over 24 million, with over 5 million males of ages 14 years or less, and 6.1 million males between 15 and 49, ofwhich 3.4 mil1ion are fit for military service. Sorne 274,000 males enter military service each year. It has the ability to include over 100,000 men from the security services and police forces in sorne military or paramilitary roles, and has at least lightly arrnored combat elements in each of its three main civilian security and intel1igence services. It also has a popular force called Saddam's Fedayeen, and a youth corp that receives sorne forrn ofmilitary training. Serious questions do exist, however, about the effectiveness of any such mobilization. Iraq has small arrns enough to equip several hundred thousand men for light infrantry warfare, and to play a limited role in urban warfare. It does not, however, have enough heavy weapons to properly equip its pre-build-up forces. It is also far from clear how motivated any Iraqi reserve and popular forces will be. Saddam Hussein has spent the last decade dealing with repeated problems in his arrned forces, and has had to become more selective in the recruitment and promotion of the men in the regular arrny heavy divisions and Republican Guard. Iraq also has deep ethnic divisions. The CIA estimates that Iraq's current population has major ethnic divisions: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5% . It also has major religious divisions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%. The fact that a relatively small Sunni Arab elite rules oppressively over a majority of Shi'ites and Kurds (58%-76% ofthe total population) has long led to ehtnic clashes with hostile Kurdish and Sh'ite elements. Even the Sunni Arab part ofthe population is divided, and Saddam's main loyalists have a rural tribal rather than urban character, in a country where even "loyal" tribal elements have sometimes turned against Saddam. It is important to note that Saddam Hussein's Popular Arrny was essentially worthless during the Iraqn-Iraq War, as were units called up out of Ba'ath Cadres from the civilian elements of the government. Saddam has also faced serious Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings after the Gulf War. Sorne 12%-15% of Iraq's population is now in the Kurdish security zone, and Saddam still has major problems in parts of the Shi'ite south. At the same time, no major Shi'ite or Kurdish conscript element ofthe regular arrny defected during the Iran-Iraq or GulfWars. A number of experts have also suggested that Saddam will put large cadres of intelligence, security, and Republican Guard personnel into urban areas in civilian dress and interrningle them with popular forces to both ensure that the popular forces will fight and make it impossible for US and British forces The Regular Army and Republican Guards The International Institute of Stategic Studies and Jane's estimate that the Iraqi arrny could still can deploy sorne 350,000 to 375,000 men, organized into seven corps, with two Republican Guards corps and five regular arrny corps in mid 2002. It since seems to have mobilized additional reservists, while removing sorne suspect manpower. Details, however, are not available.

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Saddam's Last Core Defenders 3/18/2003 Page 3

Iraqi Major Combat Unit Strength

These forces include: • Six Republican Guards divisions (3 armored, 1 mechanized, and 2 infantry) • Four Special Republican Guards brigades as part of a complex 14 battalion force structure designed to protect Saddam and the regime. • A regular army with sorne 16 divisions, (whíle 11 are re1ative1y low-grade infantry divisions, 3 are armored divisions and 3 are mechanized divisions. • The regular army also has five commando and two special forces brigades. • A five wing army aviaition component with 2 fixed-wing and 21 helicopter squadrons. The Deployment oC Army and Security Elements

Iraq is carrying out redeployments in response to the US and British buíld-up, but US experts indicate that Iraqi land forces have a total of thirteen divisions in the north and northeast, four divisions in central Iraq, and six divisions south of An Najaf. There are also four independent brigades: the 65th Special Forces Brigade, the 66th Special Forces Brigade, the 68th Special Forces Brigade, the 440 th Marine Brigade. The Republican Guards had a total of three armored divisions deployed in the vicinity of Baghdad-one near Taji, one near Baghdad, and one near As Suwayrah. i A11 Republican Guards divisions are located aboye the 32-degree lineo Several additional Republican Guards divisions are located around Baghdad to playa major role in internal security. Several more Republican Guards divisions were located north of Baghdad closer to the Kurdish areaY The Regular Army

The Chief of Staff ofthe regulararmy is general Abd al Waheed Shenan al Robatt. The regular army has the fo11owing force structure and normal deployments. Its infantry divisions are of low quality and may we11 either be paralyzed or even defecto Its regular heavy divisions, however, have fought we11 in the past, proved loyal during the Iran-Iraq War, and many units retreated effective1y during the Gulf War and uprisings that fo11owed.

So far, the regular army has not carried out the same degree of systematic dispersals as the Republican Guards and security forces, but e1ements of the heavy regular forces might we11 retreat successfu11y into the Baghdad area unless US airpower was able to cut them off from road access. Sorne might also be willíng to fight urban warfare in Saddam's "final circle. It is pure speculation at this point as to what elements might do this and they are far more likely to be individual brigades, regiments, and battalions towards the end, rather than whole divisions. Nevertheless, sorne role for elements ofthe regular army units shown in bold italics is possible. Regular Army Forces in Northern Iraq • The 1st Corps is headquartered at Kirkuk and the 5th Corps at Mosul. They guard the Turkish border area and deploy on the edge of the Kurdish enclave, and guard the

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, a11 rights reserved. Saddam's Last Core Defenders 3/18/2003 Page 4

oilfields in the north. They have a total of 8 divisions, but only two are heavy mechanized divisions. • The 1st Corps has its headquarters at Khaleed Camp (al Rashid Command Center) in Kirkuk City. It includes the 2nd Infantry Division headquartered at Alrabee, the 5th Mechanized division headquartered at Shuwan, the 8th Infantry Division headquartered at Shuwan, and the 38th Infantry Division headquartered at Quader Karam. • The 5th Corps has its headquarters at AIsalamia Camp (Amouria Command Center) in Mosul. It has units defending the border area with Syria and Turkey as well as covering other parts of the north. It includes the pt Mechanized Division headquartered at Makhmur, the 4th Infantry Division headquartered at Bashiqa Maonten, the i h Infantry Division headquartered at Alton Kopri Castle, and the 16th Infantry Division headquartered near the Saddam Dam and Mosul. Regular Army Forces in Eastern Iraq • The 2nd Corps is headquartered at the Mansouria Alabal Camp (Al Yarmouk Command Center) in Deyala, and is deployed east of Baghdad to defend against Iran or any attack by Iranian-backed Iraqi opposition forces. It includes the 3rd Armored Division headquartered at Jalawia, the 15th Infantry Division headquartered at Amerli, and the 34th Infantry Division headquartered near Khanaqin Regular Army Forces in Southern Iraq The Arrny has two corps that playa major role in securing Shi'ite areas and suppressing Shi'ite dissidents. They have a total of six divisions and two are heavy armored divisions: • The 3rd Corps is headquartered in the Nasseria area, and is positioned near the Kuwaiti border. It includes the 6th Armored Division headquartered near Majnoon and Al Nashwa, the 11th Infantry Division headquartered at Al Naserria, and the 5pt Mechanized Division headquartered at Zubair. These forces might retreat into the so-called Sunni triangle in the Baghdad area in the event of a US-British attack • The 4th Corps is headquartered at Al Amara, and defends the border with Iran. It includes the ](Ih Armored Division headquartered near Al Teab and Al Amarra, the 14th Infantry Division headquartered south of Al Amara, and the 18th Infantry Division headquartered near Al Amara and Al Musharah. The Republican Guards

The Republican Guard has sorne 60,000 to 70,000 meno It is under the supervision of Qusay Hussein and is commanded by Staff General Ibrahim Abdel Satter Muhammed al Tikriti. Once again, significant elements could be defeated or paralyzed before they can retreat into the greater Baghdad defenses. Sorne elements could defect, and it is more likely that those willing to fight in Saddam's final circle will be individual brigades, regiments, and battalions rather than entire divisions. The units most likely to contribute to such a battle are shown in bold italics, but this is even more speculative than the unit identifications should for the regular arrny.

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• The Northern or pI Corps ofthe Repuhlican Guards can act to defend against Iran and Turkey, operate against the Kurds, and defend the greater Baghdad area and Tikrit. It is headquartered in Tikrit and in the Al Rasbedia area of Baghdad (allah Akbar Command Center). • The Northem Corps ineludes, the Al Nida (Al Nedaa) Armored Division near Baguhah, the 2nd Baghdad Infantry Division at Maqloob Maontin-Mosul, and the Al Abed (Al Abid) Infantry Division at Kirkuk-Khalid Campo • The pI Adnan Mechanized Division has heen moved south from Mosul to a screening position in the center located north ofTikrit. • The Southern or 2nd Corps Ofthe Repuhlican Guards is beadquartered at Al Hafreia (Alsuwera Camp) and the Al Fateh al Mubin Command Center. It helps defend against Iran in the south, as well as any US-led attack, and acts as a deterrent force to suppress any Shi'ite uprising. It is commanded by Major General Mahmoud Ali al Lihaiby. • The al Madina al Munawara Armored Division is located at as-Suwayrah and plays a key role in defending the outer Baghdad area. It has tbree brigades: 2nd and 10th Armored and 14th Mechanized. It is the Special Republican Guards, however, that provide protection and defense within the city. • Its other forces inelude the Nehuchadnezzer (Nahu Khuth Nusser) Infantry Division at Al Husseinia-al Kutt, the Hamurahi Mechanized Division in the al-Taji area. The Special Republican Guards or AI-Haris al-Jarnhuri al-Khas The hard core of organized, trained combat strength in Saddam's final cirele is likely to be the Special Republican Guards. They bave four brigades, which are located largely within the Baghdad are organized to defend the regime. The Special Republican Guard has four infantry/motorized brigades with 14 battalions, an armored brigade, and an air defense command with elements to secure Baghdad's ground-based air defenses against any coup attempt. The Special Republican Guard is headed by Qusay Hussein, and its formal commander is Major general Kheir-Allah Wahees Ornar al-Nassiri. Major General Namiq Hassan coordinates operations between the specia1 Republican Guards and Republican Guards. The main headquarters is at Al-Nisoor square in Baghdad. It serves as a praetorian guard, protecting Presidential sites and escorting Saddam Hussein on travels within Iraq. It has a total active strength of about 12,000 to 15,000, but sorne sources elaim it can mobilize to 20,000 to 25,000. It is the only force stationed in central Baghdad and in the Republican Palace, although these are also brigades of tbe Special Security Service (SSO), the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and secret police in tbe city. British intelligence reports that it has played a role in securing WMD warheads and maintains control of a few launchers. The First Brigade is headquartered at Hayy AI-Qadisiyeh in Baghdad

It has five battalions, ineluding ones stationed in the Republican palace and at Saddam Intemational Airport. Additional battalions, ineluding plain-elothes units, are assigned to protect

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Saddam while he is in transit, and are assigned to guard other palaces and facilities. According to Jane's: • The First Battalion protects Saddam in movement. • The Second Battalion deploys men on foot to guard Saddam's farms and places near Baghdad's Saddam Intemational Airport. • The Fifth Battalion is based inside the Republican Palace and guards it and the National Assembly. It guards the Presidential House in the palace compound and has training from the SSO. Elements travel with Saddam at aH times and is commanded by fríends and re1atives of Saddam. • The Seventh Battalion provides plain c10ths bodyguards and protects Saddam's private residences in Baghdad, Basra, Mosu1. Falojua, Jebel Makhool, and other locatíons. • The Eíghth Battalion protects Baghdad's Saddam Intemational Airport. The Second Brigade is headquartered at the Al Rashid Military Base

It has combat-experience elements outsíde Baghdad and in the Mosul area.

• The Fourth Battalíon is a sígnificant combat unit that protects Saddam's Saddam's palace in Makhool in the Beíji area that is north ofBaghdad. • The Sixth Battalíon protects the palaces in the Mosul area. • . The Eleventh Battalion guards the approaches to Baghdad from the direction ofTaji. • The Fourteenth Battalion guards the approaches to Baghdad from the direction of Salam Pak and Kut. • The Fifteenth Battalion is part ofthe westem defenses of Baghdad. The Third Brigade is headquartered at Taji

It has four combat battalions to defend Taji and the approaches to Baghdad. • The Thírd Battalion is a rapid reaction combat force. • The Ninth Battalíon protects the palaces and road approaches in the Tharthar area. • The Tenth Battalion is a combat unit in Taji that protects Baghdad from the direction ofthe north and northwest. • The Twelfth Battalion reinforces the defense of Baghdad in the direction of Taji. The Fourth Brigade is motorized and is located at Al Harithiyeh and Al Quadisiyeh

It defends the southem outskirts of Baghdad. It has two regiments with T-72 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored fighting vehic1es.

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The ArmorCommand (Fourth Armored Brigade)

This unit has T-72s, BMP-1 and BMP-2s, and has two armored regiments. The First (Adnan) Regiment is located at the Abu-Ghraib Camp, and the Second Regiment is located near the Al­ Makasib village. They provide armored forces to defend the major entrance points to the city. There is also an intelligence bureau and a, Air Defense Command

It has two regiments and three independent batteries; The First Regiment defends the International Airport and has elements near Tharthar Lake and Radwaniyah. The Second Regiment defends key locations in Baghdad. The batteries cover key locations near Door, Tikrit, and Kirkuk. Military Intelligence and Security Forces Iraq has extensive military intelligence and internal security forces, and they are designed to force military units to be loyal to Saddam to the last. Thier success may be marginal in many areas, but sorne ofthese forces have combat elements, and many may feel their survival is tied to that ofthe regime and be willing to fight for the last. They include" The Military Intelligence Service (MIS), or Al Estikhbarat al Askariyya

This force has a 3,000-6,000-man element with a major complex in the Aladhamia area of Baghdad. It also has a base at the Al Rashid Camp, and sectoral commands in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basra, plus a special regional command for Baghdad. • The Special Branch of the MIS is organized to carry out covert operations, infiltrate opposition movements, and provide internal security operations within the military. Its Unit 999 penetrates deeply into the Kurdish enclave. • There is an Opposition Battalion organized to operate in various elements of the Iraqi opposition. The First Battalion covers Iran, the Second covers Saudi Arabia, the Third covers Israel, the Fourth covers Turkey, and the Fifth is a specialized unit for riverine and mine operations. British intelligence reports that its main functions are ensuring the loyalty of the army's officer corps and gathering military intelligence from abroad. But it is also involved in foreign operations, including assassinations. The heads of AI-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya have not been immediate relatives of Saddam. Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head during the 1991 GulfWar. After the GulfWar he was replaced by Wafiq Jasim al-Samarrai. After Samarrai, Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti headed AI-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya in early 1992 then in late 1992 Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti was appointed to this post. These shifting appointments are part of Saddam's policy of balancing security positions. By constantly shifting the directors of these agencies, no one can establish a base in a security organization for a substantial period of time. No one becomes powerful enough to challenge the President .

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The Military Security Service, or al Amo al Askariyya (Askari)

This is a 6,000-man force that operates throughout the armed forces and, reports directIy to the Presidential Palace, and deals with subversion within the military forces. The MIS runs parallel internal security operations. British intelligence reports that it was established as an independent entity in 1992, its function is to detect disturbances in the military. The Amn was initially headquartered in the Bataween district of Baghdad. In 1990 Amn moved to a new headquarters in the Al Baladiat area ofthe city, with the Bataween building becoming the agency's main prison. The Secret Police also has a number of additional facilities and office buildings. Amn maintains a presence in every town and village, with personnel stationed in civilian police stations across Iraq -- normally the "ordinary" police are on the ground floor and the Secret Police on the second floor. The Security branch is responsible for monitoring and countering dissent within Amn, and the Military Brigade provides rapid intervention para-military capabilities - the Brigade commander was executed in August 1996 for alleged involvement in a coup attempt. Amn is currently headed by Staff Major General Taha al Ahbabi, who previously headed the Military Security Service and served as the head of the secret service section of the Mukhabarat. As with many other senior Iraqi leaders, he is a native of Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. Iraq's Capability for Popular Mobilization It is unlikely that Iraq can mobilize the Iraqi people in mass, even in "loya!" areas, but Iraq probably can mobilize significant elements to supplement its military forces, and it may be able to use them to create serious problems in terms ofurban warfare. These popular forces include an unknown number of Ba'ath Party loyalists. Almost all of these loyalists and officials are required to receive reserve military training, and many have had annual field training for sorne time. Saddam has a significant tribal base, including his own al-Bu Nasser tribe, and citizens from the towns of Tikrit, Dur, Sharqat, Huwayja, Bayji, Samarra and Ramadi. They are located in what Ibrahim al-Marashi calls the Sunni Arab Triangle. üther major Sunni tribes and families that have a record of loyalty to the regime, and which playa key role in the intelligence and security forces, include the Dulaym, the Jubur (mixed Shi'a/Sunni) and the 'Ubayd tribes. There are also loyalist factions in the Duri and Samarrai families. Sorne tribes, like the Jubur (Juburi) seem to have received arms and there are convincing reports of rising gun sales. Many of these tribal elements now live in Iraqi cities. In addition, there are a number of popular forces that the regime might use: Fedayeeo Saddam (Saddam's Meo oC Sacrifice)

A force ofup to 30,000-40,000 men, which was formed by Uday in 1995. Most are young men who border on a youth gang, with thugs of age 16 and up, but they are placed under a real Lt. General. All are urban and the force is centered in Baghdad. British intelligence reports that Saddam's Martyrs are composed of young militia press ganged from regions known to be loyal to Saddam. It was founded by Saddam's son Uday in 1995, and started out as a force of sorne 10,000-15,000. In September 1996 Uday was removed from command of the Fedayeen. Uday's removal may have stemmed from an incident in March 1996 when Uday transferred sophisticated weapons

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from Republican Guards to the Saddam Fedayeen without Saddam's knowledge. Control passed to Qusay, further consolidating his responsibility for the Iraqi security apparatus. According to reports, control of Saddam Hussein's personal militia was later passed back to his eldest son, Uday. The deputy commander is Staff Lieutenant General Mezahem Saab Al Hassan AI-Tikriti. The unit reports directly to the Presidential Palace, rather than through the arrny command, and is responsible for patrol of borders and contro1ling or facilitating smuggling. They are supposed to he1p protect the President and Uday, and carry out much of the police's dirty work. The Fedayeen Saddam inc1ude a special unit known as the death squadron, whose masked members perforrn certain executions, inc1uding in victims' homes. The Fedayeen operate complete1y outside the law, aboye and outside political and legal structures. Jerusalem or Al Quds Brigades

This is the Popular Anny and intended to be a mass volunteer force, and has female as we1l as male units. Iraq c1aims as many as 7 million members, but even a nominal 1 million may be unrealistic. It is usua1ly dismissed as a showpiece force used for propaganda purposes, but may have youth and other elements that would be loyal to Saddam in sorne areas. At least sorne of its members have been given ritles, mortars, RPGs, and light automatic weapons in large1y Sunni areas. Lions of Saddam (Eshbal or Ashbal Saddam

A Hitler Youth-like paramilitary training structure for ages 10-16. No one knows how real this force is, or what role it might play in combat, but it cannot be tota1ly dismissed. Young men are ofien loyal and a1l have Saddam as the leader during their entire lives. National Defense Battalions

(Kurdish Jash or Militia Forces): Although it is scarce1y a loyal force, there are still e1ements of what used to be a massive force of sorne 100,000 men in 250 battalions. There are still 1,000 man elements from two tribes with ties to Saddam, and which may have much to fear if the other Kurds take over: the Zibar and Herki. A few might tlee to Baghdad and fight for Saddam, feeling they will be killed by a new regime. Youth (Civil Defense) Force

There are reports t a so-ca1led youth arrny was forrned in 1999 to defend the cities, supposedly out of youths ages 12-17. It is unc1ear that such a force exists that is separate from the Lions of Saddam and Fedayeen Saddam, but Iraqi media coverage does show youths and adults being training and possibly arrned for such a role. . Great Retaliation Force

The force is c1ear1y far more a matter of propaganda than real. It was supposedly forrned in November 1999 under Qusay to deal with the problem of the Kurdish threat and to limit any entry into non-Kurdish areas, but many reports indicate that this is a military contingency force using regular arrny units and Republican Guards, and has only limited arrned popular forces ­

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inc1uding sorne Christian Arabs. A few might flee to Baghdad and fight for Saddam, feeling they will be killed by a new regime Other Forces

There are other popular forces like the various tribal militias. These are less disciplined and well­ structured, but they cannot be ignored, both in terms of urban warfare and rear area security. It is at least possible that sorne men might also join in the last defense from the paramilitary forces. These inc1ude:

National Police Sorne 40,000 personnel that have elements of paramilitary forces with light weapons and light armored vehic1es. Frontier Guard 30,000-man mobile force, largely equipped with cross-country trucks.

Security Services that Might Support the Armed Forces and Help to Ensure Their Loyalty It is dangerous to assume that US and British forces can count on uprisings, defections, and being treated as liberators. This may well happen in sorne areas, but Iraq has a 100,000-man security service and a 40,000-man police force which can help maintain loyalty and be used both to fight on their own and compel Iraqi civilians to do so. The Presidential Secretariat:

The Presidential Secretariat has around 100 staff, which are drawn from the security agencies. The Secretariat is responsible for Saddam's personal security, as well as defense, security and intelligence issues. It is overseen by Saddam's personal secretary, Lieutenant General Abid Hamid Mahmud. Mahmud is Saddam's distant cousin and is the sheikh of both the AI-Bu-Nasir and AI-Khattab tribes. Mahmud is regarded by sorne as the real number two figure in the Iraqi leadership. He contro1s all access to Saddam - possibly with the exception of Qusay and Uday Hussein - and has the ability to override govemment decisions. The National Security Council (Al-Majlis Al-Amn Al-Qawni):

Is headed by Saddam Hussein but usually chaired by his son Qusay Hussein, it oversees the work of all other security agencies. Membership in Majlis AI-Amn AI-Qawni inc1udes chosen people from the; . • Iraqi Arrny • Special Security Service • General Intelligence Directorate • Military Intelligence

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• General Security Service • Office of the Presidential Palace The Majlis Al-Arnn Al-Qawni, is headquartered at the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, and meets on a weekly basis. It has a Special Operations Room in the Presidential Palace, and sorne reports indicate it controls a small brigade that works c10sely with the Special Republican Guard or has direct control over an element of the Special Republican Guard. Special Security Cornrnittee

Qusay Hussein is the deputy chairman of the Special Security Committee of the Iraqi National Security Council that was created in 1996 as part of the President's office. The Committee membership inc1udes: • Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, the director of the Public Security Directorate • Dahham al-Tikriti, Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service -Al Mukhabarat • Abid Hamid Mahmud, the president's personal secretary. • Faris 'Abd-al-Hamid al-'Ani, the director general ofthe Presidential office This special body also inc1udes representatives of the Republican Guard. The Committee is supported by over 2,000 staff. The staff is drawn from the Republican Guard, or the Special Guard, and the intelligence services. Their main task is preventing the United Nations inspectors from uncovering information, documents, and equipment connected with weapons of mass destruction. They are recruited for this specific mission and chosen from the most efficient and loyal units. The work is divided between two sections, each of which has a staff of about 1,000: • The first section focuses on the daily work of the UN monitoring commission, inc1uding sites to be visit and inspected, escorting UN inspectors, preventing them from carrying out their mission effectively. • The second section conceals documents, equipment, and materials and moves them about from one location to another. Several facilities have been especially built for collecting and hiding such se1ected material. This section is responsible for material that is imported through "special channels" as part of the program of rebuilding the strategic military arsenal, inc1uding chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles and associated technology. The Special Protection Apparatus or Jihaz al-Hamaya al-Khas: (Himaya)

This is a small unit charged with protecting Presidential Offices, Council of Ministers and the Regional and National Commands ofthe Ba'ath Party. It is the only organization responsible for providing bodyguards to the very top of the regime. Approximately 40 personal bodyguards are responsible for Saddam's immediate security. It is commanded by 2-5 men who are "companions" of Saddam or "murafiqin." One e1ement protects Saddam's palaces and homes another protects Saddam's movements. Most are Tikritis or from Saddam's tribe.

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The exact role of this group relative to the Special Republican Guard and other security services in unc1ear. Saddam does, however, have a very sophisticated protection system. There are several factors to be considered: • Saddam is always under deep cover. He moves constant1y, has a wide range of shelters and facilities, and ofien conceals himself in buildings or facilities outside palace compounds. • Saddam is the center of such security measures, but his key advisors and supporters also have such protection. So do both his sonso These measures have been tightened up and made more sophisticated since the attempt on Uday's life. • While Saddam heads the government, there is a large, she1tered power structure and there are mixed chains of command with shelters, landline and optical fiber systems, and dispersal shelters and facilities. Going deep goes far beyond Saddam. • Reports Saddam has gone into hiding, and only his younger son Qusay will communicate with him, would be complete1y different· from any previous wartime command procedures used by Saddam, and are probably based on half facts at best. Saddam norma11y has operated out of a variety of shelters with a sma11 coterie of advisors, and visiting officials and military have gone to secondary centers that Saddam moves to or out of at wi1l. Saddam regular1y holds command reviews in sheltered areas, just as Hitler did. • Qusay's role tends to be misunderstood because he runs the National Security Council on a day-to-day basis. This is not a body like our NSC. It is a group staffed by the SSO that coordinate inte11igence, security, and the Special Republican Guards. Military command moves through a separate channel. • It is important that Saddam has set up four regional cornmands to devolve power in wartime, but this is only part of the story. Each of the 15 governates not under Kurdish control, and each major city also has limited authority to function if Baghdad looses control. Landlines and optical fiber systems give communications back up that do not emit signals that can be detected and targeted. • Saddam sometimes uses doubles, and his bodyguard and the Special Republican Guards create false movement patterns, convoys, and locations -- trying to make Saddam appear where he isn't with false signal and communication. • While the media focuses on Iraqi palace compounds and main headquarters buildings, there are sorne 23 ministries with facilities in Baghdad, civil facilities that almost certainly have shelters, and sorne four major inte11igence centers. • The Special Republican Guards alone have seven major facilities and sorne 40-70 buildings and dispersallocations. No one can be sure which ones might high Saddam. • Iraq has been building shelters and covert facilities with considerable fervor even since the Israeli attacks on Osirak. More than 20 years. They are now spread broad1y over Baghdad and environs, and many seem to be connected by tunnels. • Iraq learned in the late 1970s to build the she11 and roofs ofbuildings to conceal the depth oftheir basements and nature ofthe structure from sate11ites.

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• Iraq went to the former Yugoslavia for shelter techniques because Warsaw Pact shelters were known to be much better than NATO ones, and the Yugoslav defense strategy was based on building even better concealed dispersed shelters to ride out a Russian attack. • Iraq has long used landlínes to avoid giving signals that intelligence can trace and began to make extensive use of optical fiber communications years ago. Complex nets exist in Baghdad. • Desert Fox (1998) showed the Iraqis the US could hit almost anything precisely, but it also showed the US that it often hit empty buildings and could not locate Iraqi dispersal facilities. It is unc1ear how much Iraq and the US have leamed since that time.

Special Security Service (SSS), Special Security Organization (SSO) or Amn al Khass

Controlled by Saddam's son, Qusay, who supervises the Special Bureau, the Polítical Bureau and the Administration Bureau, the agency's own military brigade, and the Special Republican Guard. It is an ultra loyal force that has grown from a cadre of around 500 to a force of about 2,000­ 5,000 men that was established in the mid-1980s. It is recruited from loyal tribes around Tikrit, Hawuija, and Samarra, such as Saddam's own tribe, the Abu Nasr. It is headquartered in Palestine Street in Baghdad. According to most reports, it is the key security force and plays a major role in controlling the actions of the Republican Guard and particularIy the Special Republican Guard. It is also reported to be in charge of the surveillance of General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Military Security, and General Security. It is the most critical and powerful security agency. Its Security Bureau has a Special Office, to assure loyalty in the SSS, and there is an Office of Presidential Facilities that guards such facilities through the Jihaz al-Hamaya al-Khas (The Special Protection Apparatus). It is responsible for guarding the Presidential Offices, Council of Ministers, National Council, and Ba'ath Party Regional and National Command of the Ba'ath Party, and provides bodyguards for Iraq's leaders. The British White Paper ofFebruary 3, 2000 stated that the SSO is responsible for • The security of the President and of presidential facilities; • Supervising and checking the loyalty of other security services; • Monitoring govemment ministries; • Supervising operations against Iraqi Kurds and Shias; and • Securing Iraq's most important military industries, inc1uding WMD. It also stated that the AI-Amn al-Khas is nebulous and highly secretive and operates on a functional, rather than a geographical basis., Its military brigade serves as a rapid response unit independent of the military establishment or Special Republican Guard. In the event of a coup attempt from within the regular military or Republican Guard, Special Security can easily can up

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the Specia1 Republican Guard for reinforcements as this unit is a1so under its control. There are two key bureaus:

o The Security Bureau: The Security Bureau is divided into a Specia1 Office, which monitors the Specia1 Security agency itse1f to assure 10ya1ty among its members. If necessary, it conducts operations against suspect members. The Office of Presidential Facilities, another unit of the Security Bureau, guards these places through Jihaz al­ Hamaya al-Khas (The Special Protection Apparatus). It is charged with protecting the Presidential Offices, Council of Ministers, National Council, and the Regional and National Command of the Ba'ath Party, and is the only unit responsible for providing bodyguards to leaders.

o The Political Bureau: The Political Bureau collects and analyses intelligence and prepares operations against "enemies ofthe state." This unit keeps an extensive file on all Iraqi dissidents or subversives. Under the Politica1 Bureau, the Operations Office implements operations against these "enemies," including arrests, interrogations and executions. Another division is the Public Opinion Office, responsible for collecting and disseminating rumours on behalf ofthe state. The operations of Special Security are numerous, particu1arly in suppressing domestic opposition to the regime. After its creation in 1984, Special Security thwarted a plot of disgruntled army officers, who objected to Saddam's management ofthe Iran-Iraq War. It pre-empted other coups such as the January 1990 attempt by members ofthe Jubur tribe to assassinate him. It played an active role in crushing the March 1991 Shi'a rebellion in the south of Iraq. Along with General Intelligence, Special Security agents infiltrated the Kurdish enclave in the north of Iraq in August 1996, to hunt down operatives of the Iraqi opposition. It serves as the central co-coordinating body between Military-Industrial Commission, Military Intelligence, General Intelligence, and the military in the covert procurement of the necessary components for Iraq's weapons ofmass destruction. During the 1991 Gulf War, it was put in charge of concealing SCUD missiles and afterwards in moving and hiding documents from UNSCOM inspections, relating to Iraq's weapons programs. It is a1so thought that Special Security is responsible for commercial trade conducted covertly in violation of UN sanctions. It seems to be responsible for arms and WMD component smuggling from abroad and for concealing Iraq's WMD efforts. It was a key target in Desert Fox, is believed to control the weapons of the Chemical Corps, manages recruiting for the Republican Guard, and manages key secure aspects of Iraq's military industries. It staffs and runs the National Security Councilor al-Majlis al-Amn al-Qawmi. General Intelligence Directorate (GID) or Iraqi Intelligence Service (lID) or Mukhabarat

This is the organization Saddam used to take control over the Ba'ath Party and eventualIy the Iraqi state. It is currently directed by Tahir 'Abd al-Jalil a1-Habbush. It provides security in the Ba'ath Party, monitors all organizations, monitors foreign embassies and studies, has counter­ espionage elements, and has heavily infiltrated most Iraqi opposition groups. It also conducts

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operations against Syria, Iran, Kuwait, lordan, and other states, and could be a key source of operations against US and British forces or direct or proxy covert attacks on the US and Britain. It has sorne 4,000 to 8,000 men, according to source. They are carefully screened to be ultra­ loyalists, and now with strong ties to Qusay and a series of internal security Directorates plus Directorate 14 which is in charge of covert operations overseas and might organize any CBRN or "terrorist" attack outside Iraq. They are, however, likely to fight for Saddam in significant numbers in Baghdad, and act as stiffeners that try to force ordinary Iraqis and popular forces to fight for Saddam. Key Functions ofthe Mukhabarat British intelligence reports that Al-Mukhabarat is roughly divided into a department responsible for internal operations, coordinated through provincial offices, and another responsible for international operations, conducted from various Iraqi embassies. Its internal activities include: • Spying within the Ba'ath Party, as well as other political parties; • Suppressing Shi'a, Kurdish and other opposition; • Counter-espionage; • Targeting threatening individuals and groups inside Iraq; • Spying on foreign embassies in Iraq and foreigners in Iraq; • Maintaining an internal network of informants. Its external activities include • Spying on Iraqi diplomats abroad; • Collecting overseas intelligence; • Supporting terrorist organizations in hostile regimes; • Conducting sabotage, subversion, and terrorist operations against neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran; • Murder of opposition elements outside of Iraq; • Infiltrating Iraqi opposition groups abroad; • Providing disinformation and exploitation of Arab and other media; • Maintaining an international network of informants, using popular organizations as well such as the Union of Iraqi Students. British intelligence reports that Al-Mukhabarat uses intelligence to target Iraqis .It forces Iraqis living abroad to work for Saddam by threatening dire consequences for relatives still inside Iraq. It is reported that an Iraqi cannot work for a foreign firm inside Iraq without also working for Al­ Mukhabarat directly or as an informant. This includes those allowed to work with foreign media organizations. All Iraqis working with foreigners have to have a special permit that is not granted unless they work for AI-Mukhabarat. They carry out tests that include approaches to Iraqi officials with false information to see whether they report it to Baghdad or foreigners

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Al-Mukhabarat rnanages Iraqi support of the coordinating operations with the Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq and National Liberation Arrny elernents based in Iraq. It was the key service to infiltrate the INA and defeat CIA efforts to use it in a coup, and worked with Mas 'ud Barzani's Kurdish Dernocratic Party in p1anning the Iraqi Arrny advance into the Kurdish areas in 1996 and its purge ofthe PUK and INC elernents in the Kurdish security zone. It tracks and sornetirnes kills students and exi1es abroad, and rnanipulates journalists. It is blarned for the April 1993 Iraqi atternpt on President George Bush's life. Its role in assassinations is the reason its headquarters were struck by US cruise rnissiles in June 1993. Organization olthe Mukhabarat There are district cornrnands in Basra (South), Mosul (north), Rarnadi (West), Karbala (East). It has a light brigade with light armor and heavy weapons. The details of the internal structure of the GID are uncertain. According to work by Ibrahirn al-Marashi and Jane's Periscope, it is organized so that the following directorates rnight have an irnpact in ensuring popular loyalty or play sorne role in wartirne in the last ditch defense of Baghdad or in sorne kind of act of covert attack or terrorisrn as Saddarn nears his fall: • Directorate 3: Surveillance directs the surveillance of suspected traitors and key personneL • Directorate 4: Secret Service: Places .agents throughout the governrnent in various agencies and is present in virtually every Iraqi ernbassy and rnany cover firms overseas. Has offices that deal with each rnajor country in the world. Ana1yzes signal intelligence frorn the Al Hadi Project (See below). • Directorate 5: Counterintelligence: Focuses on foreign intelligence operations like the US and Israel, but a1so on neighboring countries like Syria. • Directorate 6: GID security: Hand1es internal security in the GID. • Directorate 7: Detention and interrogation. • Directorate 8: Forensics. • Directorate 14: Special Operations: The unit is located near Salman Pak, about 20 kilorneters south of Baghdad. It is responsible for covert operations abroad and is one of the largest elernents of the GID. Agents are highly trained, with language and cultural training, and given training in cover attacks ranging frorn the use of bornbs to assassination. Is believed to carry out joint operations against Iran with elernents of the People's Mujahideen. • Directorate 18: Iranian Affairs. • Directorates 21 through 26 are responsible for rnonitoring various regional districts in Iraq. • Directorate 21, the residency located in Baghdad, is in charge of security issues in the capital as well as issuing residence permits to foreigners in Iraq. • Directorate 23, the Southern District based in Basra, conducts operations in the south of Iraq.

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• Directorate 24, the Northem District, does the same in northem Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Based in Mosul, with an office in Kirkuk, it is responsible for infiltrating the opposition in Iraqi Kurdistan. • Directorate 25, the Westem District, is located in Ramadi and maintains a network of informants in Syria and lordan. • Directorate 26, the Eastem District, operates in the Karbala Govemate. • Directorate 28: MIO Security: Located at Palestine Street and responsible for the security of the Military Industrial Organization, and overseas security for both the overt operations of the MIO and individuals involved in covert purchasing and probable sorne aspects ofIraq's WMD programs. It has shown itcan enforce loyalty in various urban areas with consummate ruthlessness. The General Security Services (GSS) or General Security Directorate (GSD) or al-Amn al-Amm

This is the oldest security service in the country and used to be part of the Ministry of Interior but now is an independent agency that reports directIy to the Presidential Palace. It has about 8,000 men who monitor daily life in every town and village and has elements in every police station. It is headquartered in the al Baladiat area of Baghdad, and seems to be under the command ofMajor Mu'tamad Nima al-Tikriti. It is the key force monitoring the day-to-day activities and 10yalty of ordinary Iraqis. It is also a key force in terms of wiretapping, surveillance, tracking families and foreigners, and watching UN inspectors and virtually aH press movements. It hires countIess informants, and any media in Iraq will become acquainted with the GSS, either under the cloak ofthe Ministry ofInformation, as a helper, or often as a translator or apparent dissident. Many hotels used by foreigners have both GID and GSS staff. It has, however, played an active paramilitary and covert role in helping to enforce security and run inteHigence operations in Kurdish areas, and seems to have played a role in hiding WMD and missile components. The Al-Amn Al-Aam supports the domestic counter-intelligence work of other agencies. As a policy, Saddam staffs key positions in Al-Amn Al-Aam with his re1atives or other close members ofhis regime. In 1980, Saddam appointed 'Ali Hassan al-Majid, who would later be the architect of the regime's anti-Kurdish campaign, as its director to instill the ideology of the Ba'ath Party into the agency. Al-Amn al-Aam was given more political intelligence responsibilities during the Iran-Iraq War. When Majid was put in charge of repressing the Kurdish insurrection in 1987, General 'Abdul Rahman al-Duri replaced him until 1991 when Saddam Hussein's half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti, (who had served as its deputy director prior to 1991) then became head ofthis agency. In 1991, Saddam Hussein provided it with a paramilitary wing, Quwat al-Tawari, to reinforce law and order, although these units are ultimate1y under Al Amn al-Khas control. After the 1991 Gulf War, Quwat al-Tawari units were believed to be responsible for hiding Iraqi baHistic missile components. It also operates the notorious Abu Ghuraib prison outside of Baghdad, where many of Iraq's political prisoners are held.

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Each neighborhood, every office and school every hotel and coffee shop has an officer assigned to cover it and one or more agents in it who report what is said and what is seen. Al-Amn Al­ Aam runs a program of provocation where their agent in a coffee house or work place will voice dissident views and report on anyone who agrees with those views. An Al-Amn Al-Aam agent or officer will sometimes approach an Iraqi official pretending to recruit him for sorne opposition or espionage purpose and then arrest him if he does not report it. They also look for foreigners who might be breaking Iraqi law or seeking to stir up anti-regime feelings among native Iraqis. Technically, it is illegal for an Iraqi official or military officer to talk to a foreigner without permission from a security officer. Al Hadi Project or Project 858

The Al Hadi Project is the organization responsible for collecting, processing, exploiting and disseminating signals, communications and electronic intelligence. It is a small agency of about 800 that is unlikely to be actively involved in military operations, but which will monitor cell phones, and particularIy any signals activity throughout Iraq. Though it reports directly to the Office of the Presidential Palace, Al Hadi is not represented on the National Security Council, and the intelligence it collects is passed on to other agencies for their use . MuraCaqin or Companions oC Saddam (also calIed the Special Protection Apparatus (Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa in other sources)

• A small, tribal, elite group of bodyguards at the Presidential Palace, most of who have sorne kind of family relationship. Most are members of Saddam's tribe, the al-Bu Nasir. The Special Location Group protects Saddam in all of his homes and his family. The Salih or Mobile Group protects him while moving. Will probably die for Saddam The Ministry oC InCormation

Its operations are fully integrated into Iraqi intelligence operations, including all contacts with the foreign media and press. It has many trained agents that appear in front of TV cameras or are trained to act like independent or semi-opposition voices in dealing with foreign reporters. Combat capability is likely to be non-existent. The Ba'ath Party or Socialist Arab Resurrection Party or Hizb al-Ba'ath al-'Arab al-Ishtiraki

This is not a security service as such but uses its large group of members who hold positions in government, the military, virtually every profession imd throughout the legal profession, and in communities and most educational institutions to monitor Iraqis, carry out propaganda activities, and use various benefits to tie Iraqis to the regime. It has a security e1ement called the Amn al­ Hizb (Party Security), to maintain party loyalty. Sorne might die to defend Saddam. Emergency Force oC the Governates

Each of the 15 governates still under Saddam's control is reported to have its own light brigade of roughly 1,000 men for internal security missions. It is conceivable that sorne might flee to Baghdad, believing there survival is a stake.

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National Liberation Army or Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO or MEK)

A force of Iranians based in Iraq under the command of the People's Mujahideen, which in the past was a violent left-wing Marxist movement in Iran and assassinated US personnel and officers. Its strength is unc1ear, but it has sorne 4,000-8,000 personnel, and Iraq has trained and equipped it to use sorne 250 T-54/T-55, and Chieftain tanks, other armored vehic1es, and artillery. The Tribal Chief's Bureau or Maktab al-Shuyukh

British intelligence reports that this bureau was created after the Gulf war as a vehic1e for paying tribal leaders to control their people, spy on possible dissidents and provide arms to loyal tribesmen to suppress opposition.. It is conceivable that sorne might flee to Baghdad, be1ieving there survival is a stake. Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams

There is considerable doubt as to who might control Iraq's weapons of mass destruction during the fighting. Most expert feel it will be the SSO and Special republican Guards, but it is possible that the group supposedly in change of disarmament could play at least a limited role. Secretary Powell stated on February 5, 2003 that Iraq had has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs. The committee reports direct1y to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members inc1ude Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay. This committee also inc1udes Lieutenant General Amir al-Sadi, an advisor to Saddam. General Sadi has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. General Sadi public1y pledged in the fall of 2001 that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. However, Iraq's security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussein's own office, have been directed to hide aH correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Saddam's son, Qusay, is known to have ordered the removal of aH prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have since hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. Secretary Powell has stated that, "Sadi's job is not to cooperate; it is to deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing. This committee must also have the function of trying to manage concealment from the UN and the world in any transition to war." The Loyalty oí the Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services All of these forces have significant limitations. The army and internal security forces have lost many of their personnel with combat experience, in the decade since the gulf war, Iraqi forces have had limited exercise training, and have never mastered combined arms and joint operations by Western standards.

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Saddam's Last Core Defenders 3/18/2003 Page 20

Saddam Hussein's regime has always given internal security against coup's a much higher priority than military effectiveness pers se. There were exceptions during the most threatening periods in the Iran-Iraq war, but many of the best officers were the retired or shoved aside into positions of limited importance, and sorne suffered suspicious fatal accidents. Political control has not only affected independence and initiative, but has extended to the point of limiting or preventing the use of ammunition in live fire exercises, the scale of maneuver exercises, and forward stockage of ammunition and supplies that might be used in a coup. Iraqi forces have, however, had ongoing low-level combat experience against the Shi'ite opposition in southem Iraq, and deploy to positions opposite Iran and the Kurdish security zone. They do conduct static fire training and limited manuever training, and the Special Republican Guards, Republican Guards, and security forces are trained for urban warfare and to put down uprisings. The Republican Guards units never broke during the GulfWar, and the arrny's regular arrnored, mechanized, and commando/special forces units have generally fought with considerable deterrnination when ordered to do so. Iraq has other problems. Saddam exercises tight central control in his self-appointed role as field marshall, and innovation and initiative are ofien discouraged. Saddam's rotation, and sometimes violent purges of commanders to ensure their loyalty, promotion for loyalty or because of tribal origin, the ruthlessness of the security services, and tensions between the regular forces, Republican Guards, Special Republican Guards, and various security services create additional problems. While a number of seemingly convincing reports of security, problems, defections, and coup attempts have proved false, at least sorne seem to be correct and it is far from c1ear that the situation has improved in spite of Iraq's increasing oil income and the regime's ability to manipulate oil-for-food deliveries. Professional security services cannot challenge regular arrned forces and rarely succeed in suppressing large-scale popular revolts. Large unprofessional security services have limited value. Saddam has tried on several occasions in the past, to create a parallel popular force that would act as a further check upon the regular forces. Such forces failed dismally during the Iran-Iraq War. The latest such effort is the so-called Jerusalem Arrny, which has been created since the start of the Second Intifada and is under General Iyad Futayyih Khalifa al-Rawi, a forrner Republican Guards commander. This force is reported to have a goal of 21-divisions, but Iraq lacks the experienced cadres,.equipment, supplies, and manpower input to build up anything like such a force except at the cost ofits other land-force units.iii

i Based on interviews.

ii USCENTCOM briefing by "senior military official".

iii Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Arrned Forces and Security Apparatus," Conflict Securitv Development, Centre for Defense Studies, King's College London, 2001, pp. 113-123.

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The War's First Day: Did We Blow Our Best Chance To Get Saddam?

Brookings Daily War Report, March 20, 2003

Michael E. Q'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies

First in a series 01daily analyses by Brookings scholars 01new developments in the Iraq war.

The first day of the war against Iraq has been full of surprises. The attempted decapitation of Saddam's regime by cruise missiles and F-117 fighters, prior to anyattacks against the dense air defenses around Baghdad, was not what had been advertised by those who anticipated a massive "shock and awe" salvo to mark the war's opening. And Iraq's use of conventionally­ armed warheads on ballistic missiles against U.S. troops in Kuwait has been no more than a nuisance, at least up until this hour. These are probably the two most significant events ofthe war's opening 18 hours.

Consider first the missile issue. It is hardly surprising that Saddam possesses or would use his ballistic missiles. It may be somewhat surprising that he has apparentIy chosen to use them against American forces in the field-a relatively dispersed and relatively well protected target. Less surprising, since Saddam has not been able to test his missile force very much since 1991, its capacity for delivering chemical or biological agents probably remains mediocre, which may explain why he has reportedly used conventional explosives rather than weapons of mass destruction atop the missiles. Ballistic missiles need special submunitions to deliver chemical or biological agent effectively, and those submunitions need good fuses to release the agent at the proper altitude for covering a broad region. Finally, it is possible that the improved version of the Patriot missile defense system-actually, in most ways a whole new system-has intercepted sorne of the incoming missiles.

But the big question is the attempted decapitation. In principIe it was a sound idea. It was probably made possible by a new kind of intelligence-CIA operatives on the ground, for example, or unmanned aerial vehicles overf1ying Baghdad and taking continuous high­ resolution video photos-because it seems doubtful that Saddam would use satellite phones or otherwise leave himself vulnerable to traditional intelligence tools. The big issue, however, is why did it take almost six hours from the time we learned of Saddam's whereabouts to the moment when bombs struck targets? This type of opportunity should have been foreseen and foreseeable, with procedures already in place to expedite rapid decisionmaking on whether to attack. (The main issue would be whether our chance of getting Saddam was great enough to warrant revealing something about our new intelligence sources and methods?) The F-117s could have been sortied almost as soon as eIA Director George Tenet had the intelligence; President Bush, having thought about this type of scenario in advance, could have then quickly made a decision to let them strike the targets. By then, aircraft would have been approaching Baghdad. It might have been necessary to use more planes-four, eight, even a dozen-since cruise missiles would not be appropriate for this mission (given their longer time to target and inability to be recalled). But we certainly have enough airplanes in Kuwait to generate that type of force. The entire procedure might have taken 1 or 1 ~ hours under those circumstances, probably with a rnuch greater chance of success. Bornbs would have begun to fall before the formal expiration of the 48-hour deadline President Bush gave Saddam on Monday night, but as we were all told all week, that deadline was crafted in such a way as to becorne irrelevant once Saddam refused it-as he already hado

This debate could ultirnately be as big as the debate over how we let Osarna bin Laden get awayat Tora Bora in Decernber 2001. 1 hope it will not be. Indeed, it is surely possible that sorne of the initial public information about what happened yesterday is wrong, in which case the aboye critique rnay be unfounded. But if the war drags on and we do not get a second chance to strike at Saddarn, this in retrospect will have been abad first day. A Brookings Iraq Series Briefing

THE POWER AND PERIL OF HIGH-SPEED WARFARE Will an Attack on Iraq be Clean and Quick -­ or a Series of Nasty Surprises?

The Brookings Institution Falk Auditorium March 20, 2003

Moderator:

JAMES B. STEINBERG Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings

Panelists:

MARTIN S. INDYK Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings

KENNETH M. POLLACK Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and Director ofResearch, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings

REAR ADMlRAL JOHN SIGLER, U.S. NAVY Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing (801) 942-7044 THIS IS AN UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT.

MR. JAMES B. STEINBERG: Good moming and welcome to our weekly briefing.

It was not a matter ofhaving inside information that we scheduled our briefing this moming to talk about sorne of the military as well as the diplomatic dimensions of the current crisis, but 1 think it was fairly obvious as the timetable has gone along that we would be close if not in the middle ofmilitary operations as we start the day today. Obviously the nature ofthe start is itself a matter of great interest and we'll have a chance to talk about that this moming and the kind ofoperation that has already taken place, what we're likely to be seeing in the days ahead, what the choices are and what the likely implications are going to be.

With us this moming we have two distinguished members of the leadership ofour Saban Center, Martin Indyk, the Director of the Saban Center and a Senior Fellow here at Brookings, and Ken Pollack, the Director ofResearch at the Saban Center, also a Senior Fellow at Brookings. And we're also delighted to welcome Rear Admiral 10hn Sigler here this moming.

Admiral Sigler had an extraordinary career in the Navy. He is a graduate ofthe Naval Academy and also Stanford University and the Naval War College. But he served during his career in every U.S. theater of operation. And perhaps most significant of all during his final tour, Admiral Sigler was the 15, the plans and policy officer for Central Command which gives him a unique perspective on the issues that we're going to talk about today.

What I'd like to do is begin by asking Admiral Sigler to talk a little bit about the unfolding military operation and what we can expect, how we should understand the bombing attack that took place last night and the broader campaign that's about to begin. Then Ken will look at the problem from the Iraqi side and how the Iraqis are going to be trying to respond to this. Then finally Martin will talk about the Israeli and Palestinian dimensions and the broader diplomatic issues that the United States and the intemational community are going to be facing in the days and weeks ahead.

Without further ado, let me -- Let me say by the way, we hoped perhaps that General Nash will be able to join us earlier, but he is detained. 1 don't think he's been called up to active duty, but as you can imagine there are great demands on everybody these days.

So Admiral Sigler.

RADM JOHN SIGLER: Thank you.

When Ken called me and told me what the timing was, I've stayed reasonably current with what the plans look like and 1 was wondering at that point whether we were going to talk about the events to unfold or the events as they unfold, and obviously it's the latter.

He also asked me to talk about sorne things that perhaps would add a dimension or two

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that had not already been discussed either on the television or in the newspapers, and I've tried to keep current on a11 ofthat. There rea11y isn't a lot that hasn't been written about on this operation. I think that's one ofthe remarkable parts about it. We a11 have a pretty good idea in general of what this plan looks like at this point.

I thought I would taIk to my own personal strength which is planning and put perhaps sorne background information on planning and how it's unfolding so that helps you put your artic1es in perspective.

I'd like to start with this mantra that you hear over and over again that no plan survives contact with the enemy. In this case it appears that this plan didn't even survive no contact with the enemy. [Laughter] Hut actua11y, I'd like to debunk that mantra a little bit because it's not quite true.

In fact good plans are written with a lot ofbuilt-in flexibility. Particular1y in our planning system they a110w for very rapid change. They have multiple branches that take into account the what ifs, and they try to reduce to the minimum the amount of ad hocism that takes place in a war, that inevitably takes place in a war so that you can concentrate on those things that you haven't though about and not worry so much about the ones that you have.

The major parts of a plan, there are major parts of a11 plans that have to be very we11 mapped out in great detail and genera11y do survive almost completely intacto 1'11 give you a couple of examples.

As you know, we had two major theater war plans. One was in Central Command, the other was in Central Command, the other in Pacific Command -- one for Korea, one for Iraq. We only have so many resources, so how do you apportion these constrained resources? That's part of the deliberate planning process.

The deployment plan that has to take place. How do you get the people and the material to flow in a sequenced way into a theater given that you only have so much lift? That's part of the plan that almost always survives intacto Although that can change and 1'11 te11 you how it changes.

y ou have to make assumptions as you start the planning. One of the assumptions about this particular conflict is are you going to see ear1y use of chemical!biological weapons or are you not? That affects what kind of medical things you flow into theater, and ofcourse those medical things compete with warfighters and ammunition and those kinds of things for this limited lift. So you have to make those kind of assumptions.

If something happens that wasn't in your initial assumption you have to have a plan that's

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flexible enough so you can change that rapidly. That's one of our transfonnations, by the way, and 1'11 talk a little bit more about that in my closing remarks.

The communications plans. There are, as you might imagine, a thousand circuits including voice circuits and datalinks. You have to deal with bandwidth and a11 those things. That cornmunication plan has to be very detailed and has to accommodate when one circuit goes down what the backups are and so forth. That has to be laid out.

And there's something ca11ed the pre-ATO, the pre-Air Tasking Order which is basica11y the first three days ofbombing and that's laid out in great detail before any conflict begins. That also can be changed.

What are the reasons that plans change? I'd like to take a slight1y different view ofthis than most people do. You've got an enemy who's trying to mess up your plans, but again going back, we have to make assumptions and sometimes our assumptions are not entirely correct. That causes a change in the plans.

Each plan as you might imagine has thousands upon thousands of variables and with respect to those variables the world is the stochastic world. In other words, things happen with sorne probability. And 1'd like to just for a moment say there's a big difference between good decisions and good outcomes. You can make perfect decisions and have very bad outcomes. 1'11 give you a weather analogy to this. Your weathennan says there's a 20 percent chance ofrain tomorrow. You decide to go have a picnic and it does rain. That was a good decision based on what you knew but it was abad outcome. The same thing in far more serious tenns can happen during combat. So you have to be aware that there are no absolutes.

The outcome of this particular war is going to be somewhere along a continuum of possible outcomes. The best case is a capitulation within days and then we quickly achieve stability after that and you move no to a transfonnation ofthe government and the country.

The worst case at the other end of this continuum is we underestimated the resolve ofthe Republican Guard, we have a bloody urban combat that could last months, we have humanitarian problems and ongoing instability after combat.

The actual case, what will actua11y happen is somewhere in between those two. A rea11y good plan drives the outcome toward the best case. It won't get to the best case but it will drive it toward the best case ifyou've written a good plan, and 1 believe they have.

Let's talk about this plan a little bit. This is a combination ofone ofthe two major theater war plans that 1 mentioned earlier that was written after 1991, after Desert Stonn, and has been continuously updated since then. And, 1 say it's a combination, it's a combination of that and a

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branch plan that was written in early 1999.1t was ca11ed Desert Crossing. 1'11 ta1k about that name in a second. But it had two parts to it, this branch plan to the major war plan. One was how to change the regime and the other was what to do afterwards. The reason it had two parts to it was that that regime change could happen because Saddam got hit by a bus or had an internal insurrection or we were ordered to do that, any number ofreasons, so we wanted to know how do you stabilize Iraq afterwards.

We're probably right now on the 10th or 20th variation ofthat original plan that was written in 1999. Why did we write that plan in 1999? Then Secretary Albright said we can no longer live with this guy in a speech, and based on that speech which was in late 1998 we decided we better figure out what we have to do ifwe're not living with this guy.

Desert Crossing was picked because in Arabic, and I've forgotten the translation, but in Arabic Desert Crossing actua11y has a meaning that means a complete change of life. So it had a real meaning.

The reason I mention this is because I was up in New York last night and somebody asked me how do these operations get named. In general it's just a random name generator, but in this case we had a specific reason for it.

Let me move very quickly to execution since we are in execution. I'm going to talk a little bit about sorne things that have already been written about but I want to talk a little bit more in detail about sorne ofthem.

U.S. force advantages in this war. One that's obvious but that you may not know sorne of the details about are superior training. Our forces have superior training. I don't think, I wouldn't take the tact that we're any smarter or dumber or inte11ectua11y, you know, stronger or any of those things but we are far more better trained than our adversary.

Our training is better at every leve!. At the individuallevel we have used in our military the latest techniques in education including distance learning and aH ofthose kinds ofthings. We have exce11ent unit level training. Our services, it's a continuum, take the unit level training, combine it into for example in the Navy f1eet leve! training, in the Arrny corps level training, and we do it in a combined arms way which is within a service, and Marine Corps is a great example ofthis. They bring aH the arms to bear on whatever the problem is. Then we take it to the next leve!. Joint Forces Command has done a rea11y goodjob ofthis over the last few years ofour joint training where aH the services operate together in a very synchronized way.

This is the level you're probably not aware of. We are also including a U.S. military training, what we caH interagency training. This is how do we synchronize military operations with the political decisions that must be made that overlay what we're doing.

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Next leve! up, multinationallevel operations, operating with our allies and coalition partners, and both at the military and politicallevel. We've even included in our most recent exercises operating with NGOs and how we synchronize what we're doing. They're not particularly interested in getting into our planning loop or being subject to us, but we want to know how to operate with them in these very complex operations.

The second advantage we have is superior equipment. 1 won't go into that. You've seen much about that in recent writing and media.

The third one is one that's not as well covered and that's we have very superior doctrine. We are in a transformation. The Secretary talks about transforming the military. We are well into a transformation.

The Iraqis still base their operations on the old rather ponderous Soviet system and there are two parts of that that are a tremendous disadvantage for them. One is centralized command and control; and the other is, and it kind of goes along with the same thing, it's individual initiative is highly discouraged in their system. It's discouraged through sorne draconian ways. As a flag officer, 1 never would have wanted to be a flag officer in Saddam's military and gotten the message Saddam would like to have a meeting with you. [Laughter]

On the other hand, the United States has given -- and it traditionally has done this but we've even now taken it a step further. We have given a great deal ofinitiative right down to the non-commissioned officer level. One ofthe strengths ofU.S. military forces that is not shared around the world, is shared with many of our allies but not around the world, is the strength, training and initiative of our non-cornmissioned officers, the senior enlisted people.

The second one is that we have built through our transformation a great deal of flexibility and agility into our doctrine. Flexibility is given a change in what you're dealing with how far can you swing, and agility is how fast can you make that change. Both of those have improved dramatically since '91.

Finally, our way of doing business these days is based on what we call effects-based synchronized operations. We're looking for the effect as opposed to what caused the effect. So if a 2,000 pound bomb is the right way to do it, fine, let's use a 2,000 pound bombo But ifhacking into a computer achieves the effect we're looking for, let's do it that way.

Finally, all ofthese advantages have been enhanced by this ongoing transformation. We have far greater visibility on the battiefield than we've ever had before. There is still fog of war, but that fog has been reduced greatly, by probably an order ofmagnitude since '91, and we share that cornmon picture among aH of our forces even down to the individual soldier on the

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing (801) 942-7044 THE POWER AND PERIL OF HIGH-SPEED WARFARE - 3/20/03 6

battlefield and among our allies as well.

One that you're probably not aware ofbut is a major change in the way we do business these days is greatly reduced decision cycles. Ifyou looked at decision cycles in World War 11 they were probably on the order of a week or so. Desert Storm, it was one to three days, depending on what you were talking about. The Marine Corps has written tremendous doctrine that a:llowed them to get their decision cycle from the time they were given a mission to executing it, six hours. We are down today to minutes. And it looks to the enemy like continuous decision cycles as opposed to stop, wait and see what you did and then move on.

How do we do that? Our decisionmakers are all netted via datalinks -- computers. It's a self-repairing net. If one node of that net is taken out for sorne reason, lose cornmunications or a battle damage, it self heals and the battle moves on.

We also have a capability that's coming on-line rapidly called near real time simulation. This gives us the ability to actually say okay, we've got to change this plan slightIy. Let's see how it's going to play out. We run it very quickly in ten times real time and we can actually see what the computer says the results of our change in plans might be.

Then it gets into the mundane but very important areas. For example, logistics which you've all heard is the long pole in any military operation. We've gone since '91, you may recall that a lot of material arrived at the wrong, we got it all there but it arrived at the wrong place and didn't match up with the right units. We've gone to cornmercial style inventory and tracking systems, the same thing that UPS and FedEx use. And we now have a much better ability to make sure that the right item gets to the right person at the right time.

It's these kinds of things that give us this tremendous advantage and during the question and answer period I'd be glad to answer more specific questions about any of theses items.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you. Let me just ask in terms of this flexibility and decision cycles, now that the war began differentIy than the plan had foreseen, what kinds of things will the pkmners be thinking about now? How will this early start, as it were, different kind of start, affect their calculations? What will be running through their minds?

RADM SIGLER: I think this early start is really a good example of what I'm talking about right now. They had the ability to make a very rapid assessment and change to the major plan, the way this would unfold, rapidly. Right now, to answer the specific question -- So they had what's being called a target of opportunity. They were able to take advantage of that target of opportunity by this rapid, very tight decision cycle that we have, that is synchronized with the political decisions that need to be made.

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Right now what they're doing is saying given what just happened, how does this change the first three days of our operation? My suspicion is that it doesn't. We never were going to achieve strategic surprise in this campaign. We were going to achieve operational surprise. In other words, they're not surprised that we're coming and the general timeframe of when we're coming. They're going to be surprised by what they're going to see.

MR. STEINBERG: Ken, we've heard about the Soviet style rigid cornmand and control Iraqi military. Is it hopeless for them? Are they just going to, are they waiting to be taken? How do the Iraqis think about that? They know a lot of the things that the Admiral talked about.

MR. KENNETH M. POLLACK: 1'11 start by saying I hope it is hopeless for them, and I think that they've rea11y got their work cut out for them. But I think there's no question that Saddam does have a strategy. First let me start by caveating everything I say by of course saying that I don't have Saddam's plans in front of me and I'm not certain that Saddam even has his plans in front of him. A lot of this may just be in his head, how he thinks he's going to do a lot of this stuff.

But as best we understand it there does seem to be a cohesive strategy evolving. I think the place to start is actua11y back in 1991 with what Saddam seems to have leamed and not leamed from the GulfWar.

I think the two big things that are out there that Saddam seems to have leamed from the GulfWar that is playing into how he's handling things now is one, he does now understand that his forces cannot beat our forces in the open field. In the open field his forces are going to get obliterated, and that happened time and again during the GulfWar.

The second thing he seems to have figured out is it is very difficult for him to move his forces under our air attack over long distances.

There are two other things out there that he is clinging to, that he belies are critical elements ofwhat are going to a110w him to actua11y win in sorne reasonable fashion. 1'11 talk about what I think wining means for Saddam.

Those two assumptions are one, he still believes that the United States can't take casualties and that if he can present the United States with a scenario in which we are likely to take large numbers of casualties we will pull our punch, and that is really the key to how he thinks he is going to prevail in this war as best we can tell.

The second one is that even though he knows he can't move his forces over long distances because of our air power, he still seems to believe that he can move them over short distances. Again, the experience of the Gulf War actually is enough to confirm that suspicion.

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Our air power in the GulfWar was the rnost powerful we had ever seen in any war. But it's not true that we prevented all Iraqi rnovernent. That's a rnyth that's out there. In point of fact the Iraqis did a lot ofrnoving during the GulfWar and in fact they were able to rnove several divisions, reset a defensive line and do sorne pretty arnazing things even under U.S. air power.

Now clearly our air capabilities have gotten better even since 1991, but Saddarn is still operating under the assurnption that within a confined space he will be able to rnove his forces around short distances as he needs to confront the U.S. threat.

What he seerns to have done, and you've heard at least parts of this out there, what he seerns to have concluded, that the fight for hirn is going to be about Baghdad. He has deployed his regular arrny out in the periphery and he's done that for two reasons. First, he doesn't trust thern. Ifhe pulls thern back by Baghdad hels pretty convinced that sorneone will try to rnove against thern so hels trying to keep thern as far away frorn Baghdad as he possibly can.

Second, he also doesn't trust thern to put up rnuch of a fight against uso He knows, as we do, that the regular arrny is deeply dernoralized, they aren't as good in terrns of cornbat capabilities as even his Republican Guard. And as all of you are well aware, 1991 pointed out that even the Republican Guard isn't very good cornpared to our forces and the British forces that are deployed out there. But the regular arrny has even less capability. It's better therefore to keep thern out ofthe periphery. It's clear what he's going to try to do with the regular arrny is to slow us as best he can, attrit us as best he can. If he can slow the operation down, if he can inflict sorne casualties on us using the regular arrny so rnuch the better. It's gravy for hirn. But he's not counting on the regular arrny to win the war for hirn.

He expects that we will overrun the regular arrny and we will be able to get up to Baghdad. But what he's counting on is that when we get to Baghdad what we're going to see there is going to cause us to think twice about continuing the war. His hope is that he can create what I keep calling a Mesopotarnian Stalingrad. The vision of horrible street-to-street fighting in Baghdad with chernical weapons going off, with his best troops surrounding hirn and willing to fight to the death, and hoping that we will believe that it will take 10,000 or more casualties to reduce Baghdad, we won't be willing to pay that price and therefore we won't go through with the operation at all.

I will day, and John can add to this as well, I donlt think that it will take 10,000 casualties to take down Baghdad. My guess is it won't take anything near that. But nevertheless, this is Saddarn's expectation.

What he's done is he's concentrated his four best Republican Guard divisions in the Baghdad area and also at Takrit, his horne town. He's concentrated his Special Republican Guard

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing (801) 942-7044 THE POWER AND PERIL OF HIGH-SPEED WARFARE - 3/20/03 9

there. They've been building defenses around the city, multiple rings. Somewhat similar to what they did when they defended the city of Basra against the Iranians in 1982 and 1987. Those were successful battles for the Iraqis. They were hard bloody fights, but the Iraqis did prevent the Iranians from gaining control over Basra. Again, our troops are not going to fight anywhere near the way the Iranians did, both in terms of quality and as JoOO pointed out, in terms ofour actual operation. But again, this is how the Iraqis know how to defend a city and reaUy what they're going for is a psychological victory.

Saddam doesn't want to get into a situation where he is actuaUy battling us in the streets ofBaghdad. He'U take it ifhe has to, but his preference clearly seems to be to confront us with this threat of horrible street fighting and instead deter us from ever coming in. The hope is, his hope seems to be that once that happens he will be able to then negotiate his way out of the situation. That we will be forced to negotiate our way out ofthe situation because ifyou don't hold Baghdad you can't hold Iraq. That's very clear.

Now this strategy has sorne very important ramifications and implications for what other things we can expect to see from Saddam. The first one, the point's already been made. The likelihood that Saddam was going to mount a preemptive attack was extremely low. As you've seen, he didn't choose to mount a preemptive attack. That was because, again, he is playing for a political victory and he's playing for the victory to be won at the gates of Baghdad. Saddam seems to understand that the worst thing he could possibly do is to take action that would hand the political high ground to the United States. The goal ofthis is to get us to Baghdad, confront us with this threat ofthis horrible battle in the city, and also simultaneously maximize the intemational pressure on the United States.

That means probably holding off on doing a lot of the things that would be worse for us, but would also be worse for him in terms of intemational public opinion. It's why I think it is, and I don't want to say it's not possible, but I think that it is somewhat unlikely that Saddam will use weapons of mass destruction before we get to Baghdad.

First of aU, we've actuaUy been seeing this. AU of the intelligence is suggesting that he is distributing chemical munitions to the guard units around Baghdad. There's no evidence out there yet that he's distributed them to units beyond Baghdad. As I said, he might. It's entirely possible. But it runs very much counter to his strategy, and Saddam is capable of doing things that completely undermine his own strategy but what we've seen in the past is when he's got a strategy he does try to stick with it by and large. My guess is he'U try to stick with this this time around.

Ifhe doesn't use weapons ofmass destruction before we get to Baghdad we will have covered 500 kilometers ofIraq and not gotten hit by weapons ofmass destruction. What Saddam is hoping is that this will create tremendous pressure on the United States. y ou will have the

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intemational peace movement and all the govemments who opposed the war saying see, you've gone 500 kilometers into Iraq and you haven't gotten hit by weapons of mass destruction. He doesn't have them. The war is unjust. You have to stop.

In addition there's also a very important psychological issue out there for Saddam which is the Iraqis are well aware, and we've had conversations with them over the last 11 years about their weapons programs. They are well aware about the limitations on their weapons of mass destruction capability. They know that they don't have the kind of capability that they'd like. They also seem to be aware that we've got pretty good defensive capabilities.

So the issue for Saddam is also one ofif1use the weapons ofmass destruction before the Americans get to Baghdad, what kind of an impact will it have on them? There is a very real risk for him that it won't have much of an impact. First, it's going to be regular army units using the weapons of mass destruction. They're not good at what they do. They probably can't follow up on the use ofWMD, therefore they won't be maximizing the advantage ofit. And our troops are very well protected. So ifhe starts using weapons of mass destruction right from the get-go, it may not do very much damage to uso If that's the case he has taken away a very important aspect ofthe deterrent ofthe Baghdad battle. Much better I think from his perspective, and it seems that he also agrees with this, to letus get to Baghdad having never suffered through the WMD attack so that the threat is stilllooming large in our minds, so that we haven't gone through a WMD attack only to find that it didn't do much damage. Because if that happens it really detracts from that psychological impact.

That's why I think more likely than not, we probably won't see WMD used until we get to Baghdad. I could be wrong, and I get very nervous. My old boss at the CIA, JoOO Halgorsen once said, we will not predict what Saddam Hussein will not do. 1 get very nervous when I'm predicting what Saddam will not do.

Let me make another one along those lines. The issue of Israel, and Martin is going to talk about it. Here there's also a tough calculation for Saddam Hussein. He's got two things to weigh.

One is the only way he can get to Israel is by using his SCUD missiles. His Al Samouds, as best we can tell, can't reach Israel. He's got a small number of SCUDs, and what's more, to use SCUDs against Israel he's got to have control of Iraq's westem deserto He's got to be able to launch the missiles from the westem deserto And he knows, because he's been reading all the news reports and all the leaks out there, that we're planning to take the westem desert away from him early on in the campaign. So he's got to ask himself the question, is this a use it or lose it capability? If1don't use the SCUDs against Israel early am I never going to be able to do so? So that's going to be pressing him in one direction.

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On the other hand, he's got to weigh how that will work in terms ofhis overall strategy. If he starts popping off SCUDs at Israel it makes clear hels got SCUDs. It belies all of those claims. It will shift all ofthe weight ofintemational opinion behind the United States, at least in his mind. It takes away from his ability to implement that strategy ofwhen they get to Baghdad I'm going to make it incredibly difficult for them, I'm going to win this war politically.

In addition, hels got another problem out there which is in 1991 he used conventional SCUDs against Israel and it didnlt bring Israel into the war. This time around he might make the calculation well there's Ariel Sharon, maybe he would. But he does know that. Conventional SCUDs against Israel did not do him any good. This time around if the conventional SCUDs don't do the job for him all they do is really undermine his strategy of how he wins the war.

In addition, hels got the issue of well, maybe I can start popping chemical or biologically armed SCUDs at Israel. He's got two problems there. One, as best we understand, the warheads that he has for his chemical and biological SCUDs are terrible. What the inspectors found out from the Iraqi scientists after the war is that they knew the warheads were terrible and totally wouldnlt do much damage.

Second, he also believed during the war, as best we can tell, that ifhe did use chemical and biological warheads against Israel, Israeli might respond with a nuclear weapon, and that clearly is a loss for Saddam Hussein. A nuclear weapon landing on Baghdad is game over for Saddam. There is no way he comes out ofthat with any kind ofa victory.

So hels got to ask himself ifI launch my conventional warheads, conventionally armed SCUDs at Israel it may not do the jobo In fact it probably won't. The only thing that may really do the job is using the unconventional warheads against Israel and that may provoke the one thing that really takes me out of it and makes it impossible for me to win a victory.

So I think for Saddam there is a real tough call there. Again, my guess -- I donlt put an overwhelming probability on it, but my guess is he will also totally wait on Israel. Because the underlying theme for him, at least in the conventional sense -- terrorism is a completely different issue and I think he actually will go after Israel in terms of terrorism and try to get Israel into the war, get Israel to over-react by terrorist operations, but I think that it's more likely than not that even on terms ofmissile launches against Israel, he probably will try to wait. The key question there is, can we create that use it or lose it situation and take away from him the option of going against Israel until the very end, until he does realize that his strategy has failed, and make it so that he does realize when his strategy has failed he doesn't have options left to do what we all think is likely, at least all the Iraq experts think is likely, which is exercise what we keep calling the Sampson option and try to pull the temple down around him, lash out as best we can, and there of course we know that Israel will probably be his first target if he does decide that the game is over, he has nothing left to lose, hels going down with the ship.

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Because you remember in 1991, right after the Gulf War, what the inspectors round out was that Saddam had created a special unit of SCUDs manned by his SSO, the most loyal security service to him, armed with chemical and biological warheads, and told ifBaghdad goes either through an American nuclear strike or because the Americans march on the capital, you don't wait for my orders. You launch everything you've got at Israel as my finallast act of vengeance.

MR. STEINBERG: I'm looking forward to asking Martin under what circumstances Israel would launch a nuclear weapon against Iraq. But before Ido, the one other piece that you alluded to was the Iraqi terrorist threat. I just wondered as you're in the non-predictive mode here -- [Laughter] -- we've seen reports of efforts by the U.S. intelligence cornmunity to ramp up Iraqi intelligence activities overseas. How much capability do you think they still have and how great a risk do you think there is that even if Saddam up until now has not shared WMD with al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, that now, although he may be deterred from using it for the reasons you said, he may have a greater incentive to pass it along?

MR. POLLACK: To start with the first part ofyour question, I think Iraq's own terrorist capabilities is one ofthe great unknowns out there. We've. seen Iraqi terrorist operations in the past and been amazed at how poor they have been by and large. In 1991 they mounted a number ofterrorist attacks as part oftheir GulfWar strategy and they were unbelievably incompetent. We rolled them up easi1y.

In 1993 when they tried to assassinate George Bush, the same thing. You had Iraqi agents in Kuwait calling back to the Muhabarat and talking over open lines about the operation. Just unbelievably incompetent operation.

What no one knows is if the Iraqis have gotten better since then. We obviously have been watching their intelligence operations and CIA and for that matter Mussad also are still pretty comfortable that they haven't seen a dramatic improvement in Iraq's own intelligence and terrorist capabilities, but no one's certain. I think there is a real question in people's minds of have the Iraqis actually made a 10t ofprogress and successfully hidden it from us? It's one of the few things that the Iraqis are really good at is hiding things like that from us so you can't be certain about it.

I think for me the bigger concern, and this gets to the second part of your question, is the al Qaeda operation. I think there's no question the Iraqis are going to try to mount terrorist attacks against uso Just no question. There's no real downside for them. They've said they're going to strike us everywhere in the world, everyone knows they've got these kind of capabilities. I think their expectation is that in the Arab world these kind of operations are considered perfectly legitimate. What's more, in most cases unless we do roll up the operation

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immediately the Iraqis will have sorne degree ofplausible deniability. They will probably want people to believe, in fact they'l1 probably phone in messages that the terrorist attack didn't come from the Muhabarat, it carne from the Front for Justice in Iraq or something like that. These groups that we've never heard of before but the Iraqis will try to make them out to be Arab groups who are showing their solidarity with Iraq by lashing out. So there will be sorne element of plausible deniability.

I think the bigger issue out there is al Qaeda which I think would love to be able to take advantage of this to score sorne huge successes with uso You heard, those of you who were here, you heard Dan Byman up here a few weeks ago who made the point that one of the things about al Qaeda that in sorne ways may be reassuring is that they're actual1y quite patient. If they see the target alert and defended, they might choose to hold offon the operation. So al Qaeda may or may not actual1y go ahead with attacks they've planned now, depending on the operational circumstances. But al Qaeda real1y knows what it's doing. They know how to inflict real casualties on us in a way we've never actual1y seen the Iraqis do it before.

Just to come to your final question in terms of weapons of mass destruction, going back to Saddam's strategy and assuming that Saddam's strategy is as I described it. Again, we may find out after the war that he had something completely different in mind, but what we're seeing is absolutely consistent with what I laid out for YOU. I think under those circumstances as wel1, Saddam is probably going to be reticent to tum over weapons ofmass destruction to al Qaeda until he real1y believes that the jig is up for him.

He may have set up systems whereby he can try to do it because there, as wel1, it may be a case where he is worried that it will be a use it or lose it capability. That once we get to Baghdad it will be hard for him to get weapons of mass destruction into the hands of his own operatives or into the hands of al Qaeda and we can't rule out the possibility that he hasn't prepositioned stuff outside of Iraq already. We've not seen indications of it. I know the intel1igence community has seen indications of Iraqi intel1igence officers going out into the world and doing surveil1ance for terrorist operations and other things like that. We've not, as far as I know, seen indications that the Iraqis have already started to preposition weapons of mass destruction. Again, that's a problematic one for him. Because if it is ever found out, if we catch them and it's tied to Saddam, then he loses that intemational support which does seem to be a key element ofthis political victory he's seeking. But I think certainly at the end, when the end comes, once he decides that the jig is up, then I think that there's no question he will try to get those weapons into everyone's hands and the question for us is when that happens, have we put him in a position where he can't do that.

MR. STEINBERG: Martin, under what circumstances wil1 the Israelis use nuclear weapons?

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MR. MARTIN S. INDYK: I think that Ken has highlighted the critical question of whether the Israelis will have to face this issue. That is when Saddam turns from playing the victim to playing Sampson. That is likely to happen. It's a question of when.

This morning, 12:30 this morning for those ofyou who were still up, Saddam gave a speech. It was an improvised one. I don't know whether you saw it. He was reading from text, if indeed it was him, with his glasses on which I've never seen before. I don't know whether Ken, you've looked at it, but it struck me that he's likely to get to the Sampson role quicker than we might suspect. It's pretty blood curdling stuff.

"Unsheathe your sword without fear, without hesitation. Unsheathe your sword and let Satan bear witness. Unsheathe your sword, the enemy is smoldering. Saddle the horses and unleash them, for in their wedding there is hope."

I'm not sure what you'd make ofthat.

But just to back up your point about his strategy, he says "We will figl1t the invaders and drive them, God willing." Not drive them out, but drive them "to lose their patience and lose their way." Which is interesting. Maybe he figures we don't have a map of downtown Baghdad, but I think it actually is more indicative ofwhat his strategy is as Ken has laid it out.

In this context, and the reason why I really bring this up is that at the end of his performance, he invoked Palestine in two respects. First of all he said that "The evil will be hit," "the evil American Zionist criminal alliance will be hit." Then he said, "Long live Iraq and Palestine" and repeated it.

The invoking ofPalestine again may be, to the extent that we read the tea leaves correctly, an indication that he's more focused on the benefit he would get from hitting Israel sooner rather than latero Maybe.

ane of the obvious benefits in his costibenefit calculation is the belief that he can stir up the Arab world, Arab street, by doing so which is an important part of his calculation, to counter the calculation about playing the victim, he can win international support. We can't tell which way he goes.

But to answer Jim's question, how will Israel respond? I think that the critical issue here is whether Saddam uses his chemical and biological weapons against Israel, and whether he succeeds in getting through the layered defense that Israel and the United States have established. First ofall, I assume already by now our forces are in the western part ofIraq trying to shut down that SCUD box where he has to tire from in order to hit Israel. Secondly, you have the Israeli Arrow defense system. Thirdly, you have the Patriot system that actually appears to

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have broader success in shooting down sorne of his shorter range missiles this moming.

So there's a good chance that even if he does this, it won't get through. Certainly the Israelis are confident, the guys who developed the Arrow actually are hoping that he will try it so they can prove their system works. And the Israelis certainly are saying, reassuring their public, that it's a very low probability.

The first 48 hours are critical in their minds because that's what it will take to get the forces on the ground in westem Iraq and to shut down that operation if there is to be one. Yet they sent children to school with their gas masks today which suggests a level of confidence that he's not going to do it. If he does and he succeeds in using chemical or biological weapons and causes significant casualties, that is the only scenario in which 1 believe Israel will be hard­ pressed to sit quietly. All the scenarios short ofthat 1believe Israel will stay out ofthe war such as they did last time. Because for them it's of much greater benefit not to complicate our prosecution of the war and not to interfere with our efforts to take out Saddam Hussein.

But the problem, and we can call it the gap that arises, between what we would do if Israel were hit with chemical and biological weapons that caused significant casualties and what Israel would do. The gap arises because Israel, living in a neighborhood in which man of its potential adversaries have chemical weapons and SCUD missiles, particular1y the Syrians, but there's also concem about the Iranians, must for deterrent purposes demonstrate that ifthey get hit by chemical or biological weapons that there is "a devastating consequence" for such an attack. That is exactly the same doctrine that we have enunciated ifwe get hit by chemical or biological weapons. So it's not surprising that they would want to implement such a doctrine.

The gap arises because they cannot be certain that we would respond with devastating consequences if they get hit by chemical and biological weapons. The reason for that is that we don't want to devastate Iraq, we want to rebuild it; whereas for deterrent purposes they will need to devastate sorne place, whether it's Takrit or Baghdad. And God forbid it should come to that, but ifit does come to that, significant casualties as the result ofa chemical or biological attack, and it could be through terrorism rather than trough missiles, then the Israelis will feel that they have to respondo Especially if we do not act in a way that makes it c1ear that there is a huge price to pay for attacking the Jewish state in this way.

But having laid out this kind of doom and gloom scenario 1 wanted to focus for a short moment on something a little more hopeful that's been happening in this arena that is important to our prosecution of the war. That is the appointment by Yasser Arafat ofan empowered Prime Minister.

It's typical ofthe nature of the Middle East that just when you least expect it, something happens. In this case regime change has already taken place but not in Baghdad, in effect, in

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Palestine. Yasser Arafat has been forced to devolve a significant amount of his power to a Prime Minister. This, by the way, I think is unprecedented in Arab politics. I can't think historical1y of a situation where an Arab leader has been forced by his legislature, which in al1 cases are rather stamp legislatures, to give up power to a Prime Minister. He tried, and again I don't expect any ofyou would have had a chance to follow this because it barely got reported here in the last few days, but Arafat tried to prevent the legislative council from giving the Prime Minster the power to appoint his own cabinet. He tried to reserve that power for himself, and he failed. He not only failed in the legislative council, he failed within his own Fattah Central Cornmittee where he has always been able to prevail when he wanted too This sends a signal to aH of the Palestinians that Arafat has in fact lost power. Notjust in the formal sense ofthe powers given to the Prime Minister, but in that much more important psychological sense that he could not hold on to power when his people wanted him to give it up.

That presents a hopeful signo [Abumazan], the new Prime Minister, who just accepted the job yesterday evening, is aman who does not have blood on his hands like Arafat. He's aman who has come out forceful1y against the Intafada and against terrorismo He is aman who Ariel Sharon has said for the last two years he wants to make a deal with.

If, and here is the rub of course, if [Abumazan] is able to establish an effective cabinet and deal with the security situation, confront Hammas, first in Gaza and stop the terrorism and the firing ofrockets from Gaza, then Sharon will be put in a situation where he will have to respondo

We know that left to their own devices the Israelis and the Palestinians cannot get themselves out ofthis situation, and here comes the connection with Iraq. On the way into this war the President had an epiphany in the Rose Garden. He carne out and made a personal commitment to the roadmap which is a series ofreciprocal steps that the Israelís and Palestinians would take to get out of this crisis. And his personal commitment to that is exactly what is needed to take advantage of the opportunity that has now been opened up by the appointment of [Abumazan]. It comes at a time when there is exhaustion on both sides, Israelis and Palestinians; when the Israeli economy is in serious straits and the government has to take action to deal with that situation, and the Prime Minister has repeatedly said we need a polítical initiative to solve our economic crisis. The missing ingredient is U.S. engagement by the President in a sustained and effective way.

For the United States to do that has obvious benefits, not just because it will help Tony Blair, which is the reason why the President said it last week, but rather because it fits into a broader diplomatic strategy which we urgently need to develop. Now. Not after the war, but right now.

The reason for that is, as you're aH aware, we blew the diplomatic ramp-up to this conflict

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and the division in the Security Council represents much more, I would argue, than just the failure ofthe Security Council or the perfidy ofthe French. It rather could well serve to be the harbinger ofthe development of, in effect, two blocks -- a pro-American block and an anti­ American block. And we can laugh and we can express our anger at the French, but a block that consists of the French, the Russians, the Chinese and the Germans for starters is not in our interest. It's not in our interest for how we deal with the situation after Saddam Hussein is gone when we will need intemationallegitimacy for our post-Saddam efforts to rebuild Iraq. Ifwe do not secure intemationallegitimacy for that operation, it will be established as a military occupation. Illegitimate in the eyes of much of the world. That will make our task much more difficult, not to speak of the need for intemational support which we discussed at length a couple of weeks ago, the essential need for broader support for the reconstruction of Iraq, for the feeding ofthe Iraqi people who have taken care ofthe humanitarian problem, etc., etc.

But we will be establishing a trusteeship in Iraq and we need intemationallegitimacy for that whole operation. So in addition to trying to avoid this development of two blocks, we need to repair the damage in a way that can secure us intemationallegitimacy. One ofthe ways in which we can do this is by pursuing the opportunity that has actually opened up to achieve progress in the Israeli-Palestinian arena because that is something that the intemational community cares about.

The last point in this regard, how to do it. The reason, sorne ofyou may have heard me expound on this a couple of weeks ago. The reason that we lost in the Security Council was not because of the French. We knew exact1y what the French were going to do, or we should have known what the French were going to do. And it wasn't because we couldn't shift Mexico and Chile which in itself is an astounding cornmentary. It was because we ignored Russia. Russia in the 1990s, Ken and I and Mo Ziegler had to deal with Iraq. Russia had a strategic commitment to Iraq. Not just a commercial rationale but a strategic rationale. You may remember those were the days ofthe [Afghani] Primakov and the efforts to stop our expansion ofNATO and supporting Iraq was seen in the strategic interest of the Ye1tsin govemment.

Vladmir Putin changed that concept. He developed a strategic concept of partnership with the United States. Therefore we could have had Russia on board with uso We would have had to pay not so much in promises of contracts -- we did that anyway. We would have had to pay in terms of time and benchmark kinds ofthings in the Security Council, but we could have won Russian support. If we had Russian support the Chinese would have been with us, the French would have been isolated, all ofthe undecided non-permanent members would have had cover, and we would have had the intemationallegitimacy we needed.

So it was then, so it will be now. Ifwe bring the Russians around, we can secure the intemationallegitimacy we need. We can isolate the French and thereby establish this objective that I have suggested. And we need to do it.

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What you're hearing at the moment from the Russians is station identification. Putin carne out with a very strong statement against us today. Last week, 1 don't know whether you saw it, it was kind of pathetic. The Russian Ambassador, when aH the UN Ambassadors were going out in front ofthe microphones last Friday at the height ofthe diplomatic negotiations for the resolution, Lavrov said 1 don't know what diplomacy is going on. Nobody's talked to me for six hours. That 1 think captures exactIy the problem. Why the heH are we ignoring the Russians? Vladmir Putin was a friend of the President. It was represented that the President's greatest act of personal diplomacy was to bring Putin around. And ifwe try and line up the Russians now 1 believe that combined with an effort to move forward on the Israeli-Palestinian front could do much to repair the damage and prepare us for the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's demise.

Thankyou.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Martin.

[Applause]

MR. STEINBERG: y ou've got sorne fans here.

MORE TO FOLLOW

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing (801) 942-7044 Doubts about Administration's Nuclear Evidence on Iraq

In a letter to President Bush, Rep. Waxman writes that a key part of the u.s. case against Iraq - evidenee that indieated . that Iraq sought to obtain nuclear materials Presld~nt from the Afriean eountry of Niger - was not Bu~h clte~ the regarded as eredible by the CIA. Despite eVldence In th CIA . .. P·d t B h ·t d hjs 2003 State e mlsglvlngs, resl en us el e af the Unjan the evidenee, whieh has now been proved address. to be fake, in his 2003 State of the Union and the State Department relied heavily on the evidenee in responding to Iraq's weapons deelaration. (Mar. 17) TOM OAVIS. VIRGINIA. HENRY A. WAXMAN. CALIFORNIA. CHAIRMAN RANKING MINDRITY MEMBER DAN BURTON. INDIANA ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS TOM LANTOS. CALIFORNIA CHRISTOPHER SHAYS. CONNECTICUT MAJOR R. OWENS. NEW YORK ILEANA ROS·LEHTINEN, FLORIDA EDOlPHUS TOWNS, NEW YORK JOHN M. MCHUGH. NEW YORK PAUL E. KANJORSKI. PENNSYlVANIA JOHN L. MICA. FLORIDA ~tate5 CAROlYN B. MALONEY. NEW YORK MARK E. SOUOER. INDIANA ((ongre55 oI tbe liníteb ELlJAH E. CUMMINGS. MARYLANO STEVEN C. LÁTOURETTE. OHIO OENNIS J. KUCINICH. OH10 OOUG OSE. CALIFORNIA OANNY K. OAVIS. ILLlNOIS RON LEWIS, KENTUCKY j!}ouf5e oí lL\epref5entatíbef5 JOHN F. T1ERNEY. MAS5ACHUSETTS JO ANN OAVI5. VIRGINIA WM. LACY CLAVo MISSOURI TODO RUSSELl PLATTS, PENNSYLVANIA DlANE E. WATSON. CALIFORNIA CHRIS CANNON. UTAH COMMIHEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM STEPHEN F. lYNCH. MAS5ACHUSETTS AOAM H. PUTNAM, FLORIDA CHRIS VAN HOlLEN. MARYlANO LINDA T. SANCHEZ. CALIFORNIA EOWARO L. SCHROCK, VIRGINIA JOHNJ. DUNCAN, JR.. TENNESSEE 2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING C.A. OUTCH RUPPERSBERGER. JOHN SULLlVAN, OKLAHOMA MARYLANO ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON. NATHAN DEAL, GEORGIA WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143 CANDlCE MILLER, MICHIGAN OISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TIM MURPHY, PENNSYLVANIA JIM CooPER, TENNESSEE MAJOAITY (202) 225-5074 CHRIS BELL, TEXAS MICHAEL R. TURNER. OH10 FACSIMllE (202) 225-3974 JOHN R. CARTER, TEXAS MINOAITY (202) 225-5051 WILLlAM J. JANKLOW. SOUTH DAKOTA TTY (202) 225-ffi52 MARSHA BLACKBURN, TENNESSE E www.house.gov/reform BERNARD SANDER5, VERMONT. INDEPENDENT

March 17,2003

The President The White House Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

1am writing regarding a matter of grave concem. Upon your order, our armed forces will soon initiate the first preemptive war in our nation's history. The most persuasive justification for this war is that we must act to prevent Iraq from deve10ping nuclear weapons.

In the 1ast ten days, however, it has become incontrovertibly c1ear that a key piece of evidence you and other Administration officials have cited regarding Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons is a hoax. What's more, the Central Intelligence Agency questioned the veracity of-the evidence at the same time you and other Administration officials were citing it in public statements. This is a breach ofthe highest order, and the American peop1e are entitled to know how it happened.

As you know, 1voted for the congressiona1 resolution condemning Iraq and authorizing the use offorce. Despite serious misgivings, 1supported the resolution because 1believed congressional approval would significantly improve the likelihood ofeffective U.N. action. Equally important, 1believed that you had access to reliab1e intelligence infonnation that merited deference.

Like many other members, 1was particu1arly influenced by your views about Iraq's nuclear intentions. A1though chemica1 and biological weapons can inflict casualties, no argument for attacking Iraq is as compelling as the possibility of Saddam Hussein brandishing nuclear bombs. That, obviously, is why the evidence in this area is so crucial, and why so many have looked to you for honest and credíble information on Iraq's nuClear capability.

The evidence in question is correspondence that indicates that Iraq sought to obtain nuclear material from an African country, Niger. For several months, this evidence has been a central part ofthe U.S. case against Iraq. On December 19, the State Department filed a response ------_.....-

The President March 17,2003 Page2

to Iraq's disannament deelaration to the U.N. Security Council. The State Department response stated: "The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger." A month later, in your State ofthe Union address, you stated: "The British government has leamed that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities ofuranium from Africa." Defense Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently cited the evidence in briefing reporters.

It has now been conceded that this evidence was a forgery. On March 7, the Director General ofthe Intemational Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, reported that the evidence that Iraq sought nuelear materials from Niger was "not authentic." As subsequent media accounts indicated, the evidence contained "crude errors," such as a "childlike signature" and the use of stationary from a military government in Niger that has been out ofpower for over a decade.

Even more troubling, however, the CIA, which has been aware ofthis information since 2001, has never regarded the evidence as reliable. The implications ofthis fact are profound: it means that a key part ofthe case you have been building against Iraq is evidence that your own intelligence experts at the Central Intelligence Agency do not believe is credible.

It is hard to imagine how this situation could have developed. The two most obvious explanations - knowing deception or unfathomable incompetence - both have irnmediate and serious implications. It is thus imperative that you address this matter without delay and provide an altemative explanation, ifthere is one.

The rest ofthis letter wilI explain my concems in detail.

Use of tbe Evidence by U.S. Officials

The evidence that Iraq sought to purchase uranium from an African country was first revealed by the British government on September 24, 2002, when Prime Minister Tony Blair released a 50-page report on Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons ofmass destruction. As the New York Times reported in a front-page artiele, one ofthe two "chiefnew elements" in the report was the claim that Iraq had "sought to acquire uranium in Africa that could be used to make nuclear weapons.,,1

This evidence subsequently became a significant part ofthe U.S. case against Iraq. On December 7, Iraq filed its weapons declaration with the United Nations Security Council. The U.S. response relied heavily on the evidence that Iraq had sought to obtain uranium trom Africa.

IBlair Says lraqis Could Launch Chemical Warheads in Minutes, New York Times (Sept. 25,2002). The President March 17, 2003 Page 3

For example, this is how the New York Times began its front-page article on December 13 describing the U.S. response:

American intelligence agencies have reached a preliminary conclusion that Iraq's 12,000 page declaration of its weapons program fails to account for chemical and biological agents missing when inspectors left Iraq four years ago, American officials and United Nations diplomats said today.

In addition, Iraq's declaration on its nuclear program, they say, leaves open a host of questions. Among them is why Irag was seeking to buy uranium in Africa in recent years. 2

The official U.S. response was provided on December 19, when Secretary ofState Colin Powell appeared before the Security Council. As the Los Angeles Times reported, "A one-page State Department fact sheet ... lists what Washington considers the key omissions and deceptions in Baghdad's Dec. 7 weapons declaration."3 One ofthe eight "key omissions and deceptions" was the failure to explain Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.

Specifically, the State Department fact sheet contains the following points under the heading "Nuclear Weapons": "The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?" A copy ofthis fact sheet is enclosed with this letter.

The Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa were deemed significant enough to be included in your State ofthe Union address to Congress. You stated: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant guantities ofuranium from Africa.,,4 As the Washington Post reported the next day, "the president seemed quite specific as he ticked off the allegations last night, including the news that Iraq had secured uranium from Africa for the purpose ofmaking nuclear bombs.,,5

2Threats and Responses: Report by lraq, lraq Arms Report Has Big Omissions, u.s. Officials Say, New York Times (Dec. 13,2002) (emphasis added).

3u.S. lssues a List olthe Shortcomings ín lraqi Arms Declaration, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 20, 2002) (emphasis added).

4The President, State olthe Uníon Address (Jan. 28, 2003) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0l/20030128-19.html) (emphasis added).

sA War Cry Tempered by Eloquence, Washington Post (Jan. 29,2003). The President March 17,2003 Page4

A day later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters at a news briefing that Iraq "recently was discovered seeking significant guantities ofuranium from Africa.,,6

KnowJedge of tbe UnreJjabiJity of tbe Evidence

The world first learned that the evidence linking Iraq to attempts to purchase uranium from Afiica was forged .from the Director General ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei. On March 7, Director ElBaradei reported to the U.N. Security Council:

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence ofoutside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for reports ofrecent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.7

Recent accounts in the news media have provided additional details. According to the Washington Post, the faked evidence included "a series of letters between Iraqi agents and officials in the central Afiican nation ofNiger.,,8 The article stated that the forgers "made relatively crude errors that eventually gave them away - including names and titles that did not match up with the individuals who held office at the time the letters were purportedly written.,,9 CNN reported:

one ofthe documents purports to be a letter signed by Tandjia Mamadou, the president of Niger, talking about the uranium deal with Iraq. On it [is] a childlike signature that is clearly not his. Another, written on paper .from a 1980s military government in Niger,

6Press Conference with Donald Rumsleld, General Richard Myers, Cable News Network (Jan. 29, 2003) (emphasis added).

7IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, The Status 01Nuclear Inspections in lraq: An Update (Mar. 7,2002) (online at www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/ 2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml).

8Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake; u.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on Purchases Were Forged, Washington Post (Mar. 8,2003). 9Id. The President ,March 17,2003 Page 5

bears the date of October 2000 and the signature of aman who by then had not been foreign minister ofNiger for 14 years. 1O

U.S. intelligence officials had doubts about the veracity ofthe evidence long before Director ElBaradei's reporto The Los Angeles Times reported on March 15 that "the CIA first heard allegations that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger in late 2001" when "the existence of the documents was reported to [the CIA] second- or third-hand." The Los Angeles Times quotes one CIA official as saying: "We inc1uded that in sorne of our reporting, although it was all caveated because we had concems about the accuracy ofthat information."ll The Washington Post reported on March 13: "The CIA ... had questions about 'whether they were accurate,' said one intelligence official, and it decided not to include them in its file on Iraq's program to procure weapons ofmass destruction.,,12

There have been suggestions by sorne Administration officials that there may be other evidence besides the forged documents that shows Iraq tried to obtain uranium from an African country. For instance, CIA officials recently stated that "U.S. concems regarding a possible uranium agreement between Niger and Iraq were not based solely on the documents which are now known to be fraudulent." The CIA provided this other information to the IAEA along with the forged documents. After reviewing this complete body of evidence, the IAEA stated: "we have found to date no evidence or plausible indication ofthe revival of a nuc1ear weapons programme in Irag."13 Ultimately, the IAEA conc1uded that "these specific allegations are unfounded. ,,14

Questions

These facts raise troubling questions. It appears that at the same time that you, Secretary Rumsfeld, and State Department officials were citing Iraq's efforts to obtain uraniwn from Africa

JOu.N. Saying Documents Were Faked, CNN American Moming with Paula Zahn (Mar. 14,2003).

I lIta/y May Have Been Misled by Fake lraq Arms Papers, U.S. Says, Los Angeles Times (Mar. 15,2003).

12FBI Probes Fake Evidence ofIraqi Nuclear P/ans, Washington Post (Mar. 13,2003).

13IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, supra note 7 (emphasis added).

l41d. (emphasis added). The President March 17, 2003 Page 6

as a crucial part ofthe case against lraq, U.S. intelligence officials regarded this very same evidence as unreliable. Iftrue, this is deeply disturbing: it would mean that your Administration asked the U.N. Security Counci1, the Congress, and the American people to rely on information that your own experts knew was not credible.

Your statement to Congress during the State ofthe Union, in particular, raises a host of questions. The statement is worded in a way that suggests it was carefully crafted to be both literally true and deliberately misleading at the same time. The statement itself- "The British government has leamed that Saddam Hussein recentIy sought significant quantities ofuranium from Africa" - may be technically accurate, since this appears to be the British position. But given what the CIA knew at the time, the implication you intended - that there was credible evidence that lraq sought uranium from Africa - was simply falseo

To date, the White House has avoided explaining why the Administration relied on this forged evidence in building its case against lraq. The first Administration response, which was provided to the Washington Post, was "we fell for it."15 But this is no longer credible in light of the information from the CIA. Your spokesman, Ari Fleischer, was asked about this issue at a White House news briefing on March 14, but as the following transcript reveals, he claimed ignorance and avoided the question:

Q: Ari, as the president said in his State ofthe Union address, the British government has leamed that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities ofuranium from Africa. And since then, the JABA said that those were forged documents -

Mr. Fleischer: I'm sorry, whose statement was that?

Q: The President, in his State ofthe Union address. Since then, the IAEA has said those were forged documents. Was the administration aware ofany doubts about these documents. the authenticity ofthe documents. from any government agency or department before it was submitted to the IAEA?

Mr. Fleisher: These are matters that are always reviewed with an eye toward the various information that comes in and is analyzed by a variety ofdifferent people. The President's concems about lraq come from multiple places, involving multiple threats that lraq can possess, and these are matters that remain discussed.

15Sorne Evidence on lraq Called Fake, supra note 8. The President March 17, 2003 Page 7

Thank you [end of briefing]. 18

Plainly, more explanation is needed. 1urge you to provide to me and to the relevant committees of Congress a full accounting ofwhat you knew about the reliability of the evidence linking Iraq to uranium in Africa, when you knew this, and why you and senior officials in the Administration presented the evidence to the U.N. Security Council, the Congress, and the American people without disclosing the doubts of the CIA. In particular, 1urge you to address:

1. Whether CIA officials cornmunicated their doubts about the credibility ofthe forged evidence to other Administration officials, including officials in the Department of State, the Department ofDefense, the National Security Council, and the White House;

2. Whether the CIA had any input into the "Fact Sheet" distributed by the State Department on December 19, 2002; and

3. Whether the CIA reviewed your statement in the State ofthe Union address regarding Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium from Africa and, ifso, what the CIA said about the statement.

Given the urgency ofthe situation, 1would appreciate an expeditious response to these questions. ¡::~b Ranking Minority Member

Enclosure

18The White House, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Mar. 14,2003) (online at www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030314-12.html) (emphasis added). ------

Fact Sheet Office 01 the Spokesman Washington, OC Oecember 19, 2002

IlIustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council

Anthrax and Other Undeclared BiologicaJ Agents • The UN Special Commissíon concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a mínimum, 2160kg of growth media. • This is enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax - 3 times the amount Iraq declared; 1200 Iiters of botulinum toxin; and, 5500 Iiters of clostridium perfrigens - 16 times the amount Iraq declared. • Why does the Iraqi declaration ignore these dangerous agents in its tal/y? Ballistic Missiles • Iraq has disclosed manufacturing new energetic fuels suited only to a class of missile to which it does not admit. Iraq c1aims that flight-testing of a larger diameter missile falls within Ihe 150km Iimit. This c1aim is not credible. • Why is the Iraqi regime manufacturing fuels for missiles it says it does not have? Nuclear Weapons • The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. • Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement? VX • In 1999, UN Special Commission and inlernational experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible information about VX production. • The declaration provides no information to address these concerns. • What is the Iraqi regime trying fo hide by not providing this information? Chemical and Biological Weapons Munitions • In January 1999, the UN Special Commission reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shelis and 400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had been lost or destroyed. • The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors. • Again, what is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information? Empty ChemicaJ Munitions • There is no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty munitions that could be filled wilh chemical agents. • Where are these munitions? Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs • Iraq denies any connection between UAV programs and chemical or bíological agent dispersar. Yet, Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was to carry a biological weapon spray system. • Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into bombs and how to disperse biological agenl using aircraf! or unmanned aerial vehicles. • Why do they deny what they have already admitted? Why has the Iraqi regime acquired the range and auto-flight capabilities to spray biological weapons? Mobile Biological Weapon Agent Facilities • The Iraqi declaration provides no information about i1s mobile biological weapon agent facilities. Instead it insists that these are "refrigeration vehicles and foOO testing 'aboratories." • What is the Iraqi regime trying to hide about their mobile biological weapon facilities? 5ummary

None of these holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration are mere accidents, editing oversights or technical mistakes: they are material omissions.

http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2002/16118pfhtm _~ngtm~t

Calibrated War Makes Comeback

By Thomas E. Ricks Washington Post StaffWriter Friday, March 21,2003; Page A01

The war that the US. military has launched in Iraq isn't the kind it has been told by Colin Powell and his peers that it should be ready to fight.

Since the American policy of gradual "escalation" of military force ended in failure in Vietnam, a generation of officers has been shaped by the notion that when the nation goes to war, it must use its overwhelming power to decisively defeat enemies. But the opening phase of the latest Persian Gulf war has been marked instead by a few sharp, narrowly focused blows aimed at bringing down the government of Saddam Hussein without having to resort to a conventional, all-out attack.

Since yesterday, US. and British forces have launched about 60 cruise missiles at a few key "leadership" targets, dropped a handful of bombs, and sent Special Operations forces to reconnoiter key targets. Then they accelerated the timing of the ground war, sending several thousand troops across the border from Kuwait. Perhaps most importantly, the United States intensified a months-Iong psychological operations campaign aimed at turning the loyalties of the Iraqi arrny, or at least persuading it that resistance is futile. According to a senior Bush administration official, surrender negotiations were underway yesterday between US. officials and a number of Iraqi unit commanders.

"What they're trying to do right now is to punish the regime and give forces a chance to capitulate," this insider said. "11's a selective use of force to see if you can separate the people from the regime."

If this last chance to oust Hussein does not work, he added, "this is a force that has a plan to annihilate the Iraqi military, if it has to." He was referring to the relentless, "shock and awe" bombing campaign that sorne Pentagon officials had predicted might begin the war.

Another defense official agreed with that description of the war plan, saying that the first dayof strikes -- which also have targeted sorne headquarters buildings of the Republican Guard, sorne of Hussein's most loyal troops -- have been intended lito see if we can try to tip things, first. 11

But this official warned that time is running out, and that the plan calls for escalating soon to extensive bombing raids.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld summarized this carrot-and-stick approach at a Pentagon briefing yesterday. "We continue to feel that there's no need for a broader conf1ict if the Iraqi leaders act to save themselves," he said. But, he continued, "what will follow will not be a repeat of any other conf1ict. It will be ofa force and scope and scale that has been beyond what has been seen before." But for the moment, large-scale bombing remains just a plan. The first day of the war showed a probing, even constrained use of force, a tactic that, despite the widespread chatter about "shock and awe," is in keeping with the actual war plan, said defense officials familiar with it. "Except for the attack [on Hussein and his aides] last night, it was always meant to look like this," a senior defense official said. "The idea is to continue the confusion and chaos among them."

In the days and weeks to come, Pentagon officials promise, the U.S. military will demonstrate a mindset that is more flexible, more integrated in ground and air operations, and more willing to take risks than it was during the first Persian Gulf War 12 years ago. Special Operations troops, almost ignored during that war, have been operating inside Iraq for weeks, and are expected to take a central role in coming days.

Ground and air forces will operate simultaneously as U.S. armored units charge with almost unprecedented speed toward Baghdad. US. ground commanders also showed flexibility yesterday when they accelerated their plans to invade Iraq -- sorne by just a few hours, sorne by as much as a ful1 day. Their movement came after just one day of limited bombing, in contrast to the five weeks of airstrikes that preceded the U.S. ground war in 1991. The total American and British force invading Iraq is about a third the size of the ground force that was gathered to liberate the far smal1er nation of Kuwait back then.

"If this is successful it will open up more flexibility in future operations," said Duke University political scientist Peter Feaver, an expert on the political implications ofthe use of force. "It would certainly be existence of a proof that other approaches do not lead to certain disaster."

If the war does indeed go as planned, much of the credit is likely to be given to Rumsfeld, who by several accounts over the last year has pushed Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the military commander of the war, to come up with a more innovative and daring plan for attacking Iraq than Franks original1y proposed.

Rumsfeld has made "transforming" the military -- making it discard Cold War-era approaches and leap into the Information Age -- the centerpiece of his stewardship at the Pentagon. But it appears at times that the effect of his approach has been to dismantle Powel1's twin legacies at the Pentagon: a powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the so-cal1ed Powel1 Doctrine.

Now secretary of state, Powel1 was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs to take office under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that reorganized the Pentagon. When he became the nation's top military officer in 1989, he capitalized on sorne of the provisions of that law to make the chairmanship far more influential than it had been. He also helped transform the staff of the Joint Chiefs from a relative backwater into a powerhouse that at times drove defense policy.

At the same time, he came to be closely associated with a new approach to the exercise of military power. Somewhat simplified, it maintains that when the United States goes to war, it should always go in with overwhelming force, pursue clear and limited objectives, and disengage as soon as possible through what came to be cal1ed an "exit strategy." This formulation, sorne sorne 15 years after Vietnam, helped Americans to once again be comfortable with the use of military force. Over the last two years, however, Rumsfeld has challenged both those positions. Inside the Pentagon, he has imposed more civilian control over the Joint Staff, sometimes stepping on the toes ofgenerals in the process. By sorne accounts, he also has diminished the power ofthe chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs.

Meanwhile, the war strategy now unfolding in Iraq, which Rumsfeld played a major role in shaping, begins with a restrained use of force, followed by the escalation of bombing as needed, and eventually, afier the combat ends, the occupation of another country for an indeterminate time. If the plan works, the Powell Doctrine effectively will have been discarded.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company •••

2003.03.18/21:09 Situation with Iraq Jlcflccts \Vcstcrn Crisis Russian macro-economy specialist says that America has its future

Nothing is new in this world. The humanity is on the edge of another large-scale war, like it happened tends, hundreds, and thousands years ago. People waged wars for so many reasons! Predatory raids, religious crusades, sea exit wars, natural resources wars, civil wars and liberating wars - the history knows them all. Their reasons have always been different, although the color of the human blood always remained the same.

Nowadays, the symbol of death can be found on the land of ancient Mesopotamia - the so­ called cradle of the human civilization. Hundreds, thousands and millions of people have to face danger again. The ground is ready to turn red with blood again too. Df course, one may say that a human being is an imperfect, albeit reasonable, creature. This would be the easiest thing to do. People have always killed each other, since the moment of the very first bloodshed. This is not going to stop, until the end of time. However, the situation does not look that hopeless. At the end ofthe day, humans managed to refuse from eating raw meat, from bloody rituals, from slavery, as well as from a lot ofother vestiges of dark ages. Probably, the human civilization has reached the point of its spiritual and cultural development, when it is ready to refuse from wars as well.

The refusal from bloody sacrifices is definitely a moot question to talk about. As a matter of fact, a war is a mass bloody sacrifice too, when a lot of innocent people are sacrificed to the Altar of Insanity for certain ideas and goals. Isn't it time Horno Sapiens should finally come to the realization of the fact that there are no ideas or goals, for the sake of which people can be sacrificed? Isn't it time one should stop the fratricide and start looking for other formulae of life, new cultural and philosophical doctrines that would allow to live without any bloodshed?

Let us get back to the Iraqi issue. If we cast aside things like "axis of evil" or "the struggle against the international terrorism," we will see that it is virtually a common war for natural resources. This is the war for oil. America can be compared to a drug addict here, for it suffers from the absence of another dose, trying to reach out for the Iraqi oil as soon as possible. America shakes with its hunger for oil. So do stock indexes and quotations. However, since the majority of Americans go to churches at weekends to pray, the USA definitely can not attack Iraq without a cover ofthe second UN resolution. So faro There will be no restraining factors left, when the oil hunger grows unbearable.

It is possible to talk about the deep crisis ofthe Western system ofvalues. Eternal values ofthe Western civilization - freedom, justice, brotherhood - have faded. They have been changed with other values: power, wealth, pleasures. Power is the aspiration to rule the world, while Wealth is the result of excessive consumption and saving, Pleasure is the point ofan individual's existence. New cults have been implanted in the Western culture, especially in the American one: the Cult of Consumption and the Cult of Saving. Those phenomena obtained the most open, hypertrophied and disgusting character in the American society. American companies had to corrupt common Americans with the cult of consumption, for companies chased after the constant need to increase their sales. America became a hostage ofits own nation's growing demando 1ndeed, Americans managed to establish a very strong economic system. Indeed, the United States became the richest country in the world. However, the price that the USA had to pay for it was too high: never-ending, permanent feeling ofconsuming hunger that is typical both for every citizen and for the whole nation.

1t is time the world community should get concemed about a way to help the USA to cure it from its dependence on natural resources. Is there a way to help Americans to defeat their excessive instinct of consumption? It is not ruled out that the USA might become a complete blunderer with its up-to-date defense technologies. Today, American people have nothing to fuel their jeeps with - the government is determined to seize the 1raqi oi!. Tomorrow Americans might experience the lack ofmetal that is used for the production ofthose jeeps. Who is going to become the next target to hit? In the future, America might experience the lack of other resources too - timber or gas, for example. What's going to be next? Will the American government continue searching for terrorists in the countries that are rich with natural resources? As a matter offact, planet Earth is not meant for Americans only, it is meant for everyone.

History proved that deve10ped market re1ations cannot cast aH troubles aside. America is an obvious case ofthe fact that one should be afraid ofthe usurpation ofpower in the hands of a smaH group ofbusiness oligarchs, or transcontinental corporations. It was proved that it was even worse than the concentration ofpower in the hands of officials. Both oligarchs and officials are capable ofleading a country into a dead end. Both officials and oligarchs are dangerous to a state!

America has definite1y found itse1f in a dead end. Suppressing the rest ofthe world is surely not a way out ofthe situation. A good diet is a way out ofthat. Let's take China, for example. The population ofthis country is five times as large as opposed to the American population. The vast majority ofChinese people ride bicycles, not cars. However, theyare so fiHed with optimism, they so believe in their bright future. Here is another example - India. The density ofthe Indian population is similar to the Chinese one. Almost every Indian citizen lives in tiny apartments, not in big mansions. Yet, there can be so much joy of living seen in the eyes of an Indian. Is it possible to say the same about common Americans? Are American people sure oftomorrow? The Buddhism ideology says: ifyou have everything, you are not happy, but you are happy, when you need nothing.

America is a disgrace for the Westem Christian culture. Furthermore, it generates nutrition for pseudo-fighters for freedom such as Bin Laden. Such a state ofthings is reaHy depressing. There is a good thing about it too: the Westem community did not back up the idea ofthe American aggression against Iraq unanimously. Germany did not succumb to the USA's pressure, which gives a hope to be1ieve that the West has not lost aH ofits chances. There is a shot that the West will soon re-estimate its values. The West does not experience a need in permanently growing sales or stock prices. The Westem community needs renewed directions ofits living, especiaHy the renewed world outlook. It is the renewed system of values, which excludes violence and wars, that will be capable of extricating the West from the spiritual devastation. The USA will be able to carry the bright light ofcivilization and prosperity, America has its future. If it fails to do that - it will be the beginning ofthe end for the States. Russia is not supposed to keep aloof from that. It is Russia that is supposed to search for new ways of development, for Russia is known for its global and universal way of thinking. There are no doubts that the combination ofthe Westem and European cultures is to take place in Russia. This will be the unique combination ofthe rationalism ofthe Westem mind and the glory of the spiritual development of the East. This combination will demolish the insatiable altar of war. It will put the humanity on a new way of its development.

Sergey Khodnev Macroeconorny specialist

PRAVDA.Ru

Translated by Dmitry Sudakov EConomist.oom GLOBAL AGENDA

Pushing towards Baghdad Mar 21 sr 2003 Frorn 'rhcEconornist Global Agenda

American and British troops have begun the invasion of Iraq without the ferocious "shock and awe" strikes that had been expected. The hope is that Saddam Hussein will give up before they become necessary

AFTER intense pounding by heavy artillery, American and British troops have advanced into Iraq. Marines from both countries raced towards southem Iraqi cities, including the key port of Basra. By the moming of Friday March 21 st, America's Seventh Cavalry was pushing north towards Baghdad, its armoured vehicles and tanks escorted by helicopters. Earlier, the Iraqi capital had suffered a second wave of selective air strikes. Yet this was not the massively shocking start to war many had been led to expect. That option has been put on hold while American defence officials try to determine if the Iraqi command structure has been thrown into disarray-or is preparing for the mother of aH battles.

It is now widely accepted that Saddam Hussein survived the opportunist strike at an Iraqi leadership compound carried out by stealth fighters and cruise missiles on Thursday morning, less than two hours after the expiry of President George Bush's ultimatum for him to leave Iraq. There was suspicion it was a double who appeared later on television to declare that "the criminal little Bush" was a threat to humanity. The Washington Post quoted senior Bush administration officials saying Saddam was almost certainly in the compound when the missile struck, and may have been injured.

The air strikes, artillery barrages and constant threats of far worse to come may have been enough to persuade sorne of Iraq's armed forces not to fight back. Donald Rumsfeld, America's defence secretary, told a press conference on Thursday that he has a "great deal of evidence" that Iraqi soldiers would be prepared to surrender and he is giving them every opportunity to do so. Mr Rumsfeld urged Iraqi troops and cornmanders not to obey orders to fight, not to deploy chemical or biological weapons and not to destroy oil wells and other infrastructure. "See those orders for what they are--the last desperate gasp of a dying regime," he added.

Sorne Iraqi military units, however, have been fighting back. One British division was forced to retreat from a firefight after crossing the Kuwait-Iraq border, but later advanced again. Geoff Roon, Britain's defence secretary, said that coalition forces had encountered "stern resistance" in trying to capture Urnm Qasr, a port in south-eastern Iraq (see map below). Saddam's forces fired a number of missiles with conventional warheads, among them banned Scuds, into northern Kuwait. British sources said up to 30 Iraqi oil wells had been set on fire. American special forces were fighting to secure the large oilfields around Kirkuk in the north.

Originally, America's stated strategy had been to launch a rapid advance in the wake of an unprecedented blitz of smart bombs and missiles, shocking ordinary Iraqi soldiers into surrendering. But any battle plan should be flexible enough to take account of opportunities that present themselves, Mr Rumsfeld said-hence the selective strikes based on fresh intelligence about the whereabouts of senior Iraqi officials.

If Saddam's grip on his country is loosening, it could come as a result of rebellion from within his own ranks. American defence officials believe this is one way the war could end quickly and they have been in direct contact with sorne members of Iraq's armed forces to seek surrender agreements. But Saddam is cornered anddangerous. Re has concentrated his elite troops in and around Baghdad, where the most intense fighting is likely to take place, perhaps involving bloody, protracted house-to-house fighting. Until the military planners know if the dictator's command-and-control structure remains intact or not, the "shock and awe" option will be kept in reserve.

That said, it is clear that the attacks on Baghdad have grown in intensity since the conflict began. The cruise-missile strike on the city on Thursday evening was heavier than the one several hours earlier. A number of buildings were set ablaze, including one housing an office used by Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister. Smoke was also seen in the vicinity of the foreign ministry and the planning ministry.

Mr Bush has continued to try to broaden the coalition he is building. America has said more than 35 countries support its attack on Iraq. They range from Italy and Poland to Japan and Albania. Sorne may lend little more than moral support, by allowing American jets to fly through their airspace, for instance; according to American officials, a number do not want to be identified. Australia and Poland have cornmitted troops. So far, about 280,000 troops have massed in the region, along with sorne 1,000 aircraft, including those operating from six aircraft carriers, The invasion force is small compared with the 500,000 or so allied troops that fought in the 1991 Gulf war. In that campaign, the ground war began after 39 days of aerial bombing. fhé (oaLition ofthe Willing Seled;ed cou ntnes supporti ng American inV

After weeks of delay, on March 20th Turkey also joined the list of countries co-operating with the invasion. Its parliament approved a motion aIlowing American warplanes to fly over its territory, though America failed in its longstanding request to use Turkey as a northem front for ground troops-and on Friday the two countries were still arguing about the exact terms of the overflight rights. The parliament also cleared the way for thousands of Turkish troops to be deployed across the border in northem Iraq-something viewed with deep reservations by both the United States and Iraqi Kurds in the area.

Many countries remain vehemently opposed to war. After the air strikes began, China caIled the attack illegal and said it should be halted irnmediately. France said it hoped the conflict would end swiftly and urged countries in the region not to make things worse. Jacques Chirac, the French president, has accused America of a reckless use of power that endangers world security. The war also drew condemnation from countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia.

Despite the reports of oil weIls on tire, fears that an attack on Iraq would massively destabilise oil markets have, so far, proved unfounded. On Thursday, oil prices feIl to three­ month lows. This represents a massive bet by traders that war wiIl end quickly without widespread damage to oil instaIlations, and that Iraqi oil production will soon rise. Exports from Iraq ground to a near-halt on March 17th after the UN evacuated staff overseeing its oil­ for-food prograrnme. AbduIlah al-Attiyah, president of the OPEC oil cartel, said the faIl in prices showed that, far from being in short supply, there is more oil available than the market can absorbo The Intemational Energy Agency said it saw no reason to release emergency stocks. Economist.com GLOBAL AGENDA

Re-ordering the world Mar 21st 2003 From ,!'hcEconomist (ílobal Agenda

It is already clear that whatever the outcome of the war in Iraq, relations between the world's most powerful countries have shifted significantly. How far-reaching will the post-war changes in international relations be?

IT IS always easy, at times of great intemational turmoil, to spot a tuming point that is not there. For many people, the war in Iraq, and the anxious months leading up to it, seem to represent the most dangerous period in their lifetimes. For those young enough to have only vague memories, if any, of the Gulf war of 1991 or the cold war, let alone the Cuban missile crisis of more than 40 years ago or the Korean war of the early 1950s, their perception might be right. But set Iraq in the context of even relatively recent world history, and it is clear that it is much too soon to gauge what sort of tuming point, if any, the current war will be. Is a new world order taking shape? And ifit is, what will it look like?

For now, nobody can be certain of the answers. But it is possible to see what issues will determine the shape of intemational relations in the war's aftermath. Most important will be the United Nations. America, Britain and others blame the UN Security Council-and especial1y French intransigence-for its failure to endorse an invasion of Iraq to disarm Saddam Hussein. Those countries that wanted to avoid war argue that America simply wanted backing for actions it planned to take whatever the UN said. There is talk that the Ul'\l might now be a busted flush, just in the way the League ofNations was after its failure to stop Italy invading Abyssinia in 1935. That is possible, but does not yet seem probable. Crucial to the UN's future will be the way that transatlantic relations develop after the bitter recriminations that have characterised the dialogue in Washington, Paris, Berlin and London in recent months. Will both sides bear grudges, or seek to repair bruised relationships? Bridges will need rebuilding amongst Europeans, too, of course-relations between Britain and France in particular are as frosty as even grey-haired diplomats can remember. For now, the idea of a common European Union defence and foreign policy is hard to take seriously, as even its most ardent supporters glumly realise.

Sorne of those anxious about American intentions worry that Iraq is simply the start of a prolonged American campaign against countries which President George Bush has dec1ared to be part of an axis of evil, and that he will tum his attention to Iran or North Korea next. There is no evidence for this yet; it is certainly hard to see Mr Bush winning much European support for such a strategy. If Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, were to continue to support America in such circumstances, relations among member states within the EU would deteriorate still further.

Much hinges on the progress of the war itse1f. A short, successful and relatively bloodless conflict that resulted in regime change in Iraq, replacing Saddam Hussein with something resembling democratic govemment, would strengthen the case for intervention put forward by America and its allies. So too would a readiness to put the UN at the centre of efforts to reconstruct Iraq. This is something that aH EU members, including Britain, are keen to see. American reluctance to relinquish tight control at the transitional stage could exacerbate instead of ease tensions.

A prolonged and bloody war would have very different consequences. For a start, both Mr Bush and Mr Blair would find themselves, at best, in a very uncomfortable political position at home. Mr Bush faces re-election next year and the outcome of war could have a big influence on his prospects. Mr Blair has already seen a large number ofhis own backbenchers oppose the war. He could find himself vulnerable if the military operation proves far more difficult than anticipated. In such circumstances, though, emollient words between countries which have long been allies would be even more important. The prospect of an isolationist American superpower, which European countries fear, would have far-reaching consequences.

Ultimately, of course, intemational relations are about power, and it is America's unrivalled power which troubles sorne Europeans.. Even before Iraq, sorne had doubts about what they saw as the Bush administration's unilateralist approach: the refusal to sign up to the Kyoto treaty on c1imate change and the Intemational Criminal Court are frequently cited examples. France is perhaps the most enthusiastic supporter of a common European foreign policy because of the counterweight which the French believe Europe could then exercise in the face of American power. But the divisions over Iraq make that seem a utopian ambition. Long ago, Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon's secretary of state, used to complain that when he picked up the telephone to Europe he never knew who to callo Even Mr Kissinger might be thrown by the bittemess that has split Europe's leaders. And Javier Solana, the EU's foreign-policy representative, who should in theory at least be the first port of call, has been almost invisible during the Iraq crisis. He is aman with a job title but, apparentIy, no jobo

European impotence derives in part from its inability to shape a common world view, but it also reflects economic weakness. Germany, for instance, once the dominant economy in Europe, is in a mess: on the brink of yet another recession and, sorne think, deflation-and with the present government of Gerhard Schroder apparently incapable of delivering radical economic reforms. Far from progressing towards its aim of being the most competitive region on the planet by 2010, Europe is returning to the sclerosis of the 1970s. With Japan in apparently terminal decline, America remains the dominant world economic power.

Is reconciliation impossible, whatever happens in Iraq? Probably not. Since the conflict started, America has made much ofthe fact that more than 35 countries are involved, in sorne way, in what Mr Bush calls the coalition ofthe willing (though the war's stauncher opponents have dubbed it the coalition of the bullied). Even France, not a member of this coalition, has allowed British and American planes to use its airspace. It is always possible to repair relationships if those involved want to: and, for once, linkage might prove useful in rebuilding transatlantic bridges. Were the Europeans to table a more acceptable proposal on farm trade in the Doha round of trade negotiations, America-along with Australia and many developing countries-might start to take a more charitable view of Europe. On this issue, though, time is short. The Doha timetable has set a deadline of March 31 st for establishing a negotiating framework on agricultural trade.

Equally, an American readiness to involve the UN in the postwar reconstruction process would ease fears that it was no longer prepared to invest effort in multilateral diplomacy. The signs are mixed. "In a post-Saddam Iraq," said Mr Bush after the Azores summit on March 16th, "the UN will definitely need to have a role." In that, though, the relief agencies are likely to 100m larger than the Security Council, which was probably the institution he had in mind when he said, more ominously: "We hope tomorrow the UN will do itsjob. Ifnot, all of us need to step back and try to figure out how to make the UN work better." It is the result of those calculations that will ultimately determine the future of intemational relations.