South China Sea Intelligence Briefngs Weekly Briefing: February 28th

At The Open Source Briefing, we remain committed to providing the public with ongoing developments around the globe.

United States Author: Kevin O’Connell ​ ​

Courtesy of USNI News

th February 24 ​ saw the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54) conduct a routine transit of ​ the Strait.[1] Transits of the Taiwan Strait by ​ ​ have been a regular occurrence of late and are intended as a clear indication of resolve towards ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.

nd th February 22 -26​ ​ saw the United States and participate in the bilateral ​ ​ Resilient Shield 2021 exercise. Resilient Shield 2021 is a “computer-based Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J) exercise focused on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), designed to test U.S. Naval tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) against potential regional threats while ensuring Japanese and U.S. forces are well-rehearsed in executing those TTPs.”[2] The exercise involved more than 77 Japanese and American ​ ​

The Open Source Briefing 1 ​ commands including USS Barry (DDG-52) and possibly a RC-135S Cobra Ball which nd th made flights out of Kadena AFB on the 23 ​ and 26 .​ [3][4][5] Ballistic missile defense ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ continues to be an important part of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific due to increasingly capable North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile capabilities.

Courtesy of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Separate from Resilient Shield 2021, the United States Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard engaged in a bilateral exercise in the vicinity of the Ogasawara Islands on th February 25 .​ The exercise involved USCGC Kimball (WMSL-756) and Japan Coast ​ Guard (JCG) Akitsushima (PLH-32). While United States Coast Guard international deployments are standard operational procedure, these joint exercises may be connected with the recently announced tri-service maritime strategy that calls for an increased role for the service in the Indo-Pacific including the South China Sea.[6] ​ Finally, there has been quite a bit of airborne and naval activity over and on the South China Sea this week. Of note at sea was an encounter between Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) 3004 and USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) which appeared to cross paths

The Open Source Briefing 2 ​ nd in relatively close proximity on February 22 .​ [7] The CCG has been known to harass ​ ​ ​ ​ commercial and naval ships in the South China Sea, but there is no indication at this rd time that this interaction was anything less than professional. February 23 ​ saw the ​ USNS Effective (T-AGOS-21) arrive in , while the USNS Guam (T-HST-1) re-entered the SCS.[8][9] ​ ​

MQ-4C Courtesy of @is_keelu RC-135U Courtesy of @is_keelu ​ ​

rd Of note in the air was a February 23 ​ MQ-4C Triton flight that appears to have ​ diverted from its straight-line flight path to circle a particular point at sea twice, just South of Taiwan. It is unclear what if anything was present at this location but the flight plan was off pattern. A second off pattern flight-path was recorded by a RC-135U th Combat Scent on February 26 .​ The RC-135U made a northerly diversion from its ​ generally westbound flight path which brought it unusually close to the southern coast of Taiwan before it turned back west and flew over the southern portions of the Taiwan Strait.[10] Again, there is no indication of why the RC-135U followed this flightpath, but it ​ ​ is noteworthy and worth monitoring due to its break from past observations.

The Open Source Briefing 3 ​ China and Taiwan Author: Tad Unruh ​ ​

The South China Sea is becoming crowded with the navies of multiple western nations, as increasingly more countries are pushing back against Chinese claims in the region. In February alone, the French have sent an attack submarine and naval support ship, with plans for another transit by an amphibious assault ship and ;1 the Royal Canadian Navy sailed near the SCS in January, a British strike group is in the area, and the Australian navy has been conducting exercises with the Japanese and US navies.2

The SCS is continuing its reputation as a hotbed of proxy concerns for China’s worrying expansionism in the region. China is repeatedly using gray-zone warfare to counteract this pressure from what it sees as meddling western influence. Included in the gray zone warfare is China’s continuation of incursions into Taiwanese airspace. There have been 16 individual incidents as of February 23rd, where one or more Chinese planes have breached Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. Next week’s brief will comment more on the total flights, incidents, and political ramifications of the entire month of February.

It recently came to light that Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have been conducting drive-by’s of ’s oil and gas platforms at Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea (not in the Spratly or Paracel Island chains).3 This CCG campaign began just days after Beijing’s new law came into effect in late January. This law allows CCG vessels to elect for the use of force if unfriendly vessels do not heed warnings. According to Radio Free Asia, Malaysian ships have challenged the CCG on its new law, by sailing close to a CCG vessel that has been lingering at the Malaysian-claimed Luconia Shoals twice since mid-January.4

February 24th Wednesday, things heated up considerably in both the SCS and Cross-strait conflicts. China and Singapore announced and begun joint naval drills, including search and rescue, communication exercises. Where they were: Included in the exercises on the Chinese side were the Guiyang and guided-missile frigate Zaozhuang, part of the 36th Escort Taskforce, and the Formidable-class stealth frigate, RSS Intrepid, and the Independence-class littoral mission vessel, RSS Sovereignty for the Singaporeans.5 Chinese state media organ CCTV announced that over 10 bombers, mostly H6J and

The Open Source Briefing 4 ​ H-6G types, affiliated with the PLA Southern Theater Command executed maritime assault and strike exercises in an undisclosed part of the SCS.6 Concurrently on Wednesday, the USs Arleigh-Burke-class guided-missile USS Curtis Wilbur transited the Taiwan Strait in a freedom of navigation operation.7

February 28th It came to light on Sunday that the USNS Impeccable, a naval surveillance ship, had been trawling around in the Paracel Islands since February 23rd.8 In response, the PLA staged live-fire drills with the guided-missile destroyer Yinchuan, guided-missile frigate Hengyang, the amphibious dock landing ship Wuzhishan, and the support ship Chagan Hu.9 on the last day of the month China also announced that it would enact military exercises for the entirety of March, possibly in response to the ongoing international presence bearing down on the SCS and the US’s continued approach. According to a China Maritime Safety Administration notice, “Military exercises will be held in a circular zone with a radius of five kilometers in the South China Sea, west of the Leizhou Peninsula, from Monday to March 31, and the entry of other vessels is prohibited.”10

Philippines Author: Bang Tongco ​ During the week, the (PN) received its latest Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigate in Manila, with the PN Chief stating that the Service does not have a dedicated port to handle its large ships. Meanwhile, the nascent Philippine

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Space Agency (PSA) and the Department of Science and Technology’s Advanced Science and Technology Institute (DOST-ASTI) upgraded its Ground Receiving Station (GRS) in Davao City to receive data from AIS monitoring satellites which cover the Manila-claimed West Philippine Sea (WPS).

The BRP Antonio Luna on 26 February docked in South Harbor, Manila, and was received by PN Flag Officer-in-Command VAdm Giovanni Bacordo and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Mark Villar [1]. Bacordo hailed the arrival of the Luna as a landmark moment for the PN’s ongoing modernization. However, Bacordo admitted that the PN has yet to operate its own port which is capable of maintaining its large vessels [2]. Bacordo disclosed that none of its large vessels--to include its two Tarlac-class Landing Helicopter Docks and two Jose Rizal-class --are docked in PN ports, rather, all four vessels use civilian facilities in South Harbor, Subic, and other similar ports around the . Bacordo revealed that the PN remains interested in using the now-defunct South Korean-operated Hanjin Heavy Industries Shipyard in Subic Bay, adding that the area’s deep and protected harbor was ideal for the Navy’s large ships [2]. Villar, for his part, reaffirmed the DPWH’s support for the PN’s program to build its own ports and upgrade existing ones [2].

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The BRP Antonio Luna in South Harbor, Manila. In the background is the PN research ship BRP Gregorio Velasquez and in the far left is the Presidential Yacht BRP Ang Pangulo (the President). Image courtesy of the PN.

The DOST-ASTI on 25 February reported that it was upgrading its Davao GRS to receive data from the NovaSAR-1 satellite in a bid to enhance Manila’s disaster response and maritime domain awareness [3]. DOST Secretary Fortunato de la Pena said that the GRS would enable scientists to obtain timely data to aid in disaster response. The DOST-ASTI recalled that the NovaSAR-1 satellite is equipped with a synthetic aperture radar made by Airbus UK and an AIS receiver produced by Honeywell Aerospace, allowing the satellite to monitor weather and to collect ship information across the Philippine EEZ, respectively [3]. The DOST-ASTI in 2019 disclosed that the NovaSAR-1 satellite’s “Synthetic Aperture Radar with AIS” program will be used by the National Security Council (NSC), National Coast Watch Center (NCWC), Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) [4].

Contributor’s Analysis

The lack of suitable facilities to support large modern vessels reveals the glacial pace of the PN’s modernization program. The lack of deep and protected ports and shipyards may affect the PN’s acquisition of submarines and guided-missile under the “Horizon 2 (2018-2022)” and “Horizon 3 (2023-2028” Modernization Programs, respectively [5]. While the PN’s modernization programs are moving forward, albeit slowly, the stop-and-go and seemingly piecemeal progression of Horizon 2 and 3

The Open Source Briefing 7 ​ and the chronic shortage of suitable infrastructure for new ships may further delay submarine and acquisitions. The absence of suitable ports may affect the PN’s possible purchase of conventional Scorpene-class submarines produced by France’s Naval Group, which previously announced plans to open a Manila Office in 2021 [6][7]. Relatedly, the PN’s reliance in the now-defunct Hanjin Shipyard in Subic underscores its strategic importance as a naval facility and may require greater investment from the Philippine government to ensure its viability and to preserve the skills of its workers. To recall, the Hanjin Shipyard was mired in controversy in 2019 when Chinese state-owned firms expressed interest in acquiring the facility [8].

The operationalization of the NovaSAR-1 satellite system could help Manila in disaster response during typhoon season and maritime incidents. However, it is not yet known how often the NovaSAR-1 can be used for imaging and maritime domain awareness missions over the Manila-claimed WPS. The availability of the satellite for tasking by concerned Philippine agencies may be linked to the DOST-ASTI’s percent share in the program. Regardless, the participation of the aforementioned agencies indicates that the satellite will be used for vessel monitoring and maritime incident response. Notably, the four identified offices are part of the inter-agency National Task Force for the WPS, which implies that NovaSAR-1 may be used over the SCS [9].

Vietnam Author: Giulia Croce Butler Earlier this month we reported that a satellite image seemed to disclose the construction of a new surface-to-air missile base that China was building only 12 miles from its border with Vietnam.Since then, the image was further investigated and the claims were finally confirmed [1] this week. ​ The picture revealed not only surface-to-air missiles, but also radars and at least six ​ launchers placed along a military runway. It is clear that Vietnam is not the only country trying to reinforce its overall defense capabilities. While Vietnam has been strengthening its bases in the Spratlys, China has been focused on fortifying its border. This rush to improve defenses shows that both countries are preparing for a potential conflict. Alexander Vuving, professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, confirmed that “It’s a sign that China is preparing for war, maybe not today, not tomorrow but in the long term.” The new Chinese missile base could also serve as a deterrent for PetroVietnam’s upcoming natural gas exploration projects in the South China Sea, as maritime security researcher Collin Koh believes. Nonetheless, these actions are prompting Vietnam to expand its military capabilities.

The Open Source Briefing 8 ​ This week, Vietnam has also pleaded with its neighbors to maintain peace in the East Sea as US warships passed through the Paracels and Spratlys in an effort to challenge Beijing’s claims.[2] ​

North Island in the Paracel Archipelago. Photo by Planet Labs/Handout via Reuters

At a press meet on Thursday, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hang emphasized that it is necessary to remain true to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by enforcing stability and order, following the law, observing freedom of navigation and overflight, and respecting other nations’ sovereignty.

For what concerns business updates, it is interesting to note that West Virginia has just recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Vietnam that is aimed at promoting trade [3] cooperation. ​ The document was signed by Governor Justice and Vice Minister or Industry and ​ Trade Hai, who agreed to keep it operational for three years, with the possibility of extending it for another three. The context behind this agreement is found in the coal and natural gas industries, with West Virginia exporting almost $20 million worth of products to Vietnam last year alone. Some noteworthy goals of the memorandum are to speed up investment in energy, the economy, and trade, while also prioritizing information sharing on policies, regulations, and investment opportunities. The signatories also pledged to take part in training opportunities, such as workshops, seminaries, and conferences. Additionally, a joint working group will be

The Open Source Briefing 9 ​ established between the two governments in order to better develop plans and assist in their implementation, ultimately achieving the memorandum’s purpose.

Japan In last week’s briefing, the ramifications of a new Chinese law allowing for the use of force by the Chinese Coast Guard was discussed. With this in mind, Thursday’s meeting between Japanese Government officials produced a rather stunning response with ruling party officials stating that, upon a change of interpretation of law, the Japanese Coast Guard is permitted to fire upon ships who attempt to land on contested islands in the East China Sea.[1] On Sunday, 21 February, two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels entered around the Senkakus in the East China Sea. Nikkei Asia reports the vessels “pointed their bows towards a Japanese fishing boat and made a move to approach it”[2]. This ship was reported to have an autocannon as well. In what appears to be a coordinated response between the U.S and Japan, both nation’s respective Coast Guards held joint training exercises near the Islands of Chichijima and Hahajima on Sunday, 21 February. [3] Cooperation between the two coast guards may be an indication of future U.S Naval assistance in the Okinawan Area, however, will have to wait to see how the Japanese government decides to respond and whether or not they decide to increase asset total in and/or near the contested areas. The discussion of asset allocation is an important one. According to Brad Lendon at CNN Hong Kong, a sign of growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S has been most evident in the growing number of asset protection missions carried out by the JSDF. In 2020, Japan conducted 25 asset protection missions in defense of U.S ships and aircraft. [5] In the event of a conflict, JSDF asset protection vessels and aircraft will be fully expected to respond with appropriate counter-measures. It will clearly be a role in which U.S forces focus on offense while JSDF forces focus on defense.

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U.S and Japanese Coast Guard conducting joint drills earlier this week. Photo courtesy of U.S Indo-Pacific Command

In the past few weeks, analysts at the Open Source Briefing have noticed the deployment of KC-135 Cobra Ball Ballistic Missile Detection aircraft in the Pacific Region. It was speculated that, with a new administration settling into the White House, North Korea may have a ballistic missile test launch planned as a welcoming gift. This week, further hints have been given that this may be indeed a real possibility as the U.S and Japan hold Resilient Shield 2021 in which both parties will utilize “computer-based Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J)” to rehearse defense against ballistic missile threats.[4] Japan is no stranger to these type of threats as North Korea launched a ballistic missile in 2017 that landed between South Korea and mainland Japan, startling millions of residents who received emergency messages through televisions and smart - phones.

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Images of the Senkaku Islands. Courtesy of Google Earth

Aircraft Monitoring

PLAAF Y-8 02/22 - Southwest Taiwan [1] 02/23 - Southwest Taiwan [6] 02/28 - Southwest Taiwan [14] 02/28 - Over Philippines [15] 02/27 - South China Sea [17]

Shaanxi Y-8 Surveillance Aircraft: Has many variants that include anti- submarine warfare, ISR, cargo, troop transport.

P-8 02/23 - South China Sea [5] 02/27 - South China Sea [18]

Anti-submarine and anti-surface maritime/wartime patrol aircraft. Its sensitive instruments can pick up enemy ground and ship movement in addition to also carrying armaments.

The Open Source Briefing 12 ​ P3-C Orion 02/25 - South China Sea [11] 02/27 - South China Sea [16]

P3-C Orion: Provides advanced threat detection for both surface surveillance on both land and sea.

Ep-3E Aries II 02/23 - South China Sea [2] 02/23 - East China Sea [7] 02/25 - South China Sea [10] 02/27 - South China Sea [17]

“The EP-3E Aries II is a land-based Multi-Intelligence reconnaissance aircraft based on the P-3 Orion airframe. The EP-3E ARIES II was recently upgraded from SIGINT to Multi-Intelligence and is the Navy's only land-based reconnaissance aircraft.”

RC-135 02/25 - South China Sea [9] 02/26 - South China Sea [13]

RC-135W Rivet Joint: Provides real-time detection capabilities for military personnel. Range is 1,500 miles.

The Open Source Briefing 13 ​ RC- 135S Cobra Ball 02/23 - Kadena Air Base, Japan [3]

The RC-135S Cobra Ball is a rapidly deployable aircraft, which flies Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed missions of national priority to collect optical and electronic data on ballistic targets.

C-17 Globemaster III 02/26 - Coast of China [12]

“The C-17 is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or directly to forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can transport litters and ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations.”

02/23 - South China Sea [4] 02/25 - South China Sea [8]

MQ-4C Triton: Supports ISR and signals intelligence operations. Northrop Gruman capabilities: “The aircraft can fly over 24 hours at a time, at altitudes higher than 10 miles, with an operational range of 8,200 nautical miles.”

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United States

[1] https://twitter.com/INDOPACOM/status/1364827110292905984

[2] https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2510083/us-forces-japan-maritime- self-defense-force-participate-in-resilient-shield-2021/#.YDNI-XQlfnI.twitter

[3] https://twitter.com/INDOPACOM/status/1364753228450041859

[4] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364357315739197442

[5] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365469037204025347

[6] https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/TRISERVICESTRATEGY. PDF

[7] https://twitter.com/duandang/status/1364377130298081283

[8] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1364339599179399170

[9] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1364340950647115779

[10] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365467338053681152

China and Taiwan 1. Wang, A. (2021, February 27). How the French Navy is charting its course between China and the US. Retrieved February 27, 2021, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3123341/south-china-sea-how-fren ch-navy-charting-its-own-course

2. Jennings, R. (2021, February 22). Western countries send ships to South China Sea IN pushback AGAINST Beijing. Retrieved February 27, 2021, from

The Open Source Briefing 15 ​ https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/western-countries-send-shi ps-south-china-sea-pushback-against 3. https://twitter.com/TheSCSCI/status/1364145501155680259

4. Haver, Z. (2021, February 22). China faces Pushback after adoption of controversial Coast GUARD LAW. Retrieved February 27, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/coastguard-law-02222021194942.html

5. Yuandan, G. (2021, February 25). China and Singapore conduct joint naval exercise in South China Sea to 'address risks'. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1216628.shtml

6. Xuanzun, L. (2021, February 24). PLA bombers PRACTICE maritime strike amid foreign provocations in S. China Sea. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1216427.shtml

7. Ng, T. (2021, February 25). China responds to US escalation in South China sea with Bomber exercises. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3123076/chinese-bombers-strike-exer cises-after-us-escalation-south

8. Wong, C. (2021, February 28). South China Sea: PLA in LIVE-FIRE missile drill, US Navy ON paracels patrol. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3123437/south-china-sea-pla-stag es-live-fire-missile-drill-us-navy

9. Ibid

10. Xuanzun, L. (2021, February 28). China to hold Month-long military drills in South China Sea. Retrieved March 01, 2021, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1216821.shtml

______Vietnam

[1] Jennings, Ralph. “China Said to be Installing Missile Base Near Border with Vietnam.” VOA News, Feb 26, 2021 https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-said-be-installing-missile-base-near-b order-vietnam [2] Anh, Vu. “US Warships in the South China Sea, Vietnam Appeals for Peace.” VnExpress International, Feb 25, 2021

The Open Source Briefing 16 ​ https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/us-warships-in-south-china-sea-vietnam-appeals-for- peace-4240333.html [3] Arnold, Tyler. “West Virginia, Vietnam Sign Document to Promote Trade Cooperation.” The Center Square, Feb 26, 2021 https://www.thecentersquare.com/west_virginia/west-virginia-vietnam-sign-document-to- promote-trade-cooperation/article_c3bb0caa-785a-11eb-b0d7-7bcb54852e1a.html

Japan [1] ---. “Japan Can Shoot at Foreign Government Vessels Attempting to Land on Senkakus, LDP Official Says.” The Japan Times, 25 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/25/national/senkakus-east-china-sea-japan-coast- guard-defense/. Accessed 1 Mar. 2021.

[2] “China Coast Guard Vessels Re-Enter Japanese Waters near the Senkakus.” The Japan Times, 21 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp Accessed 1 Mar. 2021.

[3] ---. “Japan and U.S. Coast Guards Hold Rare Joint Drills near Ogasawara Islets.” The Japan Times, 22 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/22/national/japan-us-coast-guard-exercise/. Accessed 1 Mar. 2021.

[4] https://twitter.com/USPacificFleet/status/1364340841003720705?s=20

[5] CNN, Brad Lendon. “Japan Increases Protection for US Military amid ‘Severe Security Environment.’” CNN, 24 Feb. 2021, edition.cnn.com/2021/02/24/asia/japan-us-mutual-defense-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed 1 Mar. 2021.

Philippines [1] Nepomuceno, Priam. “PH Navy welcomes 2nd missile frigate BRP Antonio Luna”. Philippine News Agency. 26 February 2021https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1131975 Accessed 26 Feb 2021.

The Open Source Briefing 17 ​ [2] Mangosing, Frances. “Big PH Navy ships need home -Bacordo”. Inquirer.net. 26 February 2021. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1400489/big-ph-navy-ships-need-home-bacordo Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[3] Luci-Atienza, Charisssa. “DOST-ASTI upgrades Davao Ground Receiving Station to directly receive space-borne data from NovaSAR-1”. Manila Bulletin. 25 February 2021. https://mb.com.ph/2021/02/25/dost-asti-upgrades-davao-ground-receiving-station-to-dir ectly-receive-space-borne-data-from-novasar-1/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[4] Tabanggay, Lianne. “DOST-ASTI, SSTL sign capacity-sharing agreement for NovaSAR-1 satellite”. DOST-ASTI. 12 November 2019. https://asti.dost.gov.ph/communications/news-articles/dost-asti-sstl-sign-capacity-sharin g-agreement-for-novasar-1-satellite/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[5] Mangosing, Frances. “PH military trudges on a long road to credible defense capacity”. Inquirer.net. 29 December 2020. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1377113/ph-military-trudges-on-a-long-road-to-credible-def ense-capacity Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[6] Naval Group Press Release. “Defense leader Naval Group opens Manila Office”. Naval Group. 26 November 2020. https://www.naval-group.com/en/defense-leader-naval-group-opens-manila-office-833 Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[7] Vavasseur, Xavier. “Naval Group Opens Office In Philippines With Submarine Deal In Sight”. Naval News. 26 November 2020. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/naval-group-opens-office-in-philippine s-with-submarine-deal-in-sight/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

[8] Reuters. “Philippines says won’t bar Chinese proposals for shipyard takeover”. Reuters. 25 April 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/philippines-hanjin-china/philippines-says-wont-bar-chine se-proposals-for-shipyard-takeover-idUKL3N2270QB Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

The Open Source Briefing 18 ​ [10] Rappler. “Aquino creates West Philippine Sea task force”. Rappler. 23 March 2016. https://www.rappler.com/nation/aquino-creates-task-force-west-philippine-sea Accessed 28 Feb 2021.

Aircraft Monitoring [1] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1363855034077773824?s=20 [2] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364373533443383296?s=20 [3] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364357315739197442?s=20 [4] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364329445117542404?s=20 [5] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364225759078875146?s=20 [6] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1364217117663391745?s=20 [7] https://twitter.com/air_intel/status/1364164605753360385?s=20 [8] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1364930924849344524 [9] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1364834602297221120 [10] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365104765563269120?s=20 [11] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365128414005497858 [12] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365292154294312962 [13] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365467338053681152 [14] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1366033679881920516 [15] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1366013373553520645 [16] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365861380935532546 [17] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365861380935532546 [18] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1365861380935532546

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