Insurgency in Minnesota the Defeat of James A

Mr. Wyman, who holds degrees from Rutgers University and the University of Wisconsin, is on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin Center System, teaching at the Racine and Kenosha campuses. Insurgency in Minnesota The Defeat of James A. Tawney in 1910 ROGER E. WYMAN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY was in seri phase of the widespread progressive move ous trouble in the summer of 1910.^ The ment which permeated many aspects of eruption of bitter internal warfare threat American life in the early 1900s. ened an end to the control of both branches The defection of progressive Republican of the federal government and most state congressmen centered around the autocra governments which the Republicans had tic domination of the House by its colorful enjoyed for a decade and a half. A Demo and irascible speaker, Joseph G. Cannon. cratic victory in the 1910 congressional elec The insurgents attacked Cannon's arbitrary tions seemed imminent, and party leaders exercise of his powers to block, delay, and worried about Republican chances in the water down progressive legislation. By the 1912 presidential contest. spring of 1910, the strength of the rebel The internecine strife which split the party lious group, composed mostly of Midwest- into two warring factions was essentially erners, had grown considerably. They a power struggle between the Old Guard attacked the legislative program which Pres conservatives, or "standpatters," who domi ident William Howard Taft presented in nated Republican congressional leadership, January; after bitter and protracted strug and the progressive "insurgents" who chal gles, they forced the regulars to accept lenged that leadership. The progressives their amendments to several administra charged that the Old Guard ruled the party tion bills. Their most notable achievement, and the nation for the welfare of vested however, was their victory in an epochal interests rather than for the people as a three-day battle to amend the House rules whole. The insurgent revolt in the Sixty- and strip the speaker of some of his powers.^ first Congress of 1909-10 was an integral As summer approached, both factions marshalled forces for the coming primary ^ The author is extremely grateful to Miss Vicki elections. With Taft's quiet but active sup D. Sherwin for technical assistance and for help in preparing the manuscript of this article. port, the regulars engaged in a massive ef '•' By combining with the Democrats, the insur fort to purge the insurgent congressmen, gents passed an amendment making the rules com while local progressive groups prepared to mittee subject to election by the whole House and prohibiting the speaker from serving on it. A good replace prominent standpatters. The insur account of the insurgent movement and the legisla gents' patronage was curtailed and support tive battles of 1910 may be found in Kenneth W. from the national campaign committee was Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era (New York, 1940). denied them; indeed, the administration Fall 1967 317 most influential standpatter to be unseated in 1910, and progressives around the nation rejoiced at this devastating blow to the Can non organization. Tawney's defeat for re- nomination by a young political novice was regarded as proof of the nation's progres sive temper and the rejection by Republican voters of "Cannonism" and rule by special interests. The victory over Tawney registered the high-water mark of the insurgent revolt. But when progressives described his defeat as a vindication of their principles and a re turn to true representative government, they allowed political rhetoric to cloud the realities of the situation. Although the ideological factor was probably the most important one, Tawney's defeat might not have been accomplished except for a com bination of fortuitous local circumstances: quirks in the Minnesota primary law, wide spread participation by Democrats, and the ethnic attraction of his opponent. James A. Tawney backed standpat elements in the insurgents' TAWNEY HAD BEEN a regular Repubfi- own home districts. Party regularity and al can since his entry into Congress in 1893. legiance to President Taft was the basis Throughout the insurgent revolt he reso of the conservatives' campaign.^ Insurgent lutely stuck by Cannon and the House congressmen relied on progressive elements leadership except for a brief and unsuc in their home states and a growing pro cessful fight for free lumber in the 1909 gressive temper across the nation. tariff debates. Extremely able and indus trious, Tawney had risen quickly within the A series of primary battles took place ranks of the party, reaching the chairman throughout the spring and summer, begin ship of the committee on appropriations in ning in Ohio during May and ending in 1905. This post made him a key figure in Minnesota on September 20. After a few the federal government; he was regarded minor victories by each faction, national as second only to Cannon in the power he progressive sentiment surged in late sum wielded in the House. Since Cannon had mer. One by one, the progressives scored aided Tawney's career, the Minnesotan impressive gains in August and September. stood by him faithfully. Altogether, insurgent challengers unseated twenty regulars, many of them committee chairmen, while only one progressive in ' George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 98, 107, 113 (Madison, Wis cumbent met defeat. In the Midwest, ten consin, 1946); William P. Hepburn to George D. standpatters were retired from Congress.* Perkins, February 21, March 2, 1910, George D. By far the greatest progressive triumph Perkins Papers, in the State Department of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa. was the final one—the defeat of James A. ''For a detailed account of the events of the Tawney, representative from Minnesota's summer and the midwestern primaries, see Roger E. first district and chairman of the powerful Wyman, "Insurgency and the Elections of 1910 in the Middle West," unpublished master's thesis. Uni appropriations committee. Tawney was the versity of Wisconsin, 1964. 318 MINNESOTA History Tawney was supreme in the realm of gov field of conservation was regarded by con ernmental expenditures. A diligent guardian servatives like Tawney as another example of the public treasury, he never ceased to of executive usurpation. One of the presi scrutinize appropriation bills to eliminate dent's more important contributions in this waste and to keep expenditures minimal; area was the creation by executive order at the same time he was willing to vote of the Conservation, Inland Waterways, considerable amounts for purposes he felt and Country Life commissions. Just before necessary, as, for example, a scientific tariff Roosevelt left office, Tawney secured an commission. amendment to an appropriations bill pro Tawney was also a steadfast believer in hibiting the use of money by any agency the supremacy of the legislative branch. The not created by Congress, thus effectively combination of his talent, strong beliefs, and halting the operations of these valuable but powerful position made him a formidable extralegal commissions.^ opponent, as President Theodore Roosevelt Tawney's diligence was apparent in elec discovered during his final years in the White toral politics as well as in congressional House when Congress jealously sought to matters. He seemed secure from defeat, maintain its ascendancy over the executive. if not invincible, in the ten counties of In 1908-09 Tawney became a chief source southeastern Minnesota which made up the of the president's bitterness. A large and first congressional district. Over the years powerful navy had always been one of Tawney had created an extensive and loyal Roosevelt's fondest hopes, and he persist political organization that provided him ently wrangled with Congress over naval with huge victory margins. He never faced appropriations. In 1908 Congress withheld primary opposition until 1908. In that year two of the four battleships he requested, he lost two counties but polled 57.4 per cent and Tawney sought to have the number cut of the district's vote; in November his usual to one. After Roosevelt used the secret margin slipped somewhat but remained a service to investigate land frauds, some of comfortable 2,756 votes.** which involved congressmen, Tawney had Tav^mey's formidable machine ran on the agency's appropriations cut in 1908 federal patronage. He used the ingenious and limited its functions to deterring device of appointing publishers as post counterfeiting and protecting the presi masters, which gave him virtual control over dent; the Rough Rider fulminated against the district's press and assured him of its this more than any other action of Con loyalty at election time. This was perhaps gress. Roosevelt's pioneering work in the his greatest political asset and was so rec ognized by the opposition; the few dis ^ Congressional Record, 60 Congress, 1 session, senting newspapers repeatedly denounced 4806, 4614-4616, 5554-5559; 2 session, 3118-3120. the Tawney "postoffice press." ^ Postmasters Cannon later told Taft he believed tire source of dis affection between Tawney and Roosevelt lay in and other appointees also formed vital links Tawney's opposition to naval construction. Archie in Tawney's campaign organization. In Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of deed, it proved so efficient that Tawney Archie Butt, Military Aide, 1:304 (Garden City, New York, 1930). rarely campaigned actively himself; he "Tawney won 53.6 per cent of the 38,172 votes made only one major speech in the 1908 cast. See tables, p. 326, 327. Except where otherwise primary. noted, all Minnesota election returns cited in this paper are from the Legislative Manual for the year Patronage distribution was not Tawney's following the election. only strategy for continuing electoral suc ' La Crosse (Wisconsin) Tribune, August 24, 1910; Minnesota, Legislative Manual, 1911, p.

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