A New Battle Command Architecture for Multi-Domain Operations

The MITRE Center for Technology & National Security

A NEW BATTLE COMMAND ARCHITECTURE FOR MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

Countering Peer Adversary Power Projection

By Eliahu Niewood, Greg Grant, and Tyler Lewis

1 MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

A New Battle Command Architecture Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets for Multi-Domain Operations as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability Countering Peer Adversary Power Projection problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will Joint Force Not Joint Enough operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

reality, it must decide on some guiding core leaders to possess the breadth and depth of Interoperability enabled by “loose couplers.” more efficient and effective resource task pairing. tenets, which can then be used as a basis for knowledge needed to understand when and where Instantiating JADC2 relies on rapidly and Those ML algorithms need large data sets of experimentation and prototyping. capabilities can be most effectively employed. One dynamically communicating between numerous decisions and their outcomes for model training and way to help address these challenges, and to enable dissimilar capabilities and platforms. Today, testing purposes. The performance estimates Organization around function. A commander who the brokering described above, is to dynamically however, many of the relevant systems cannot be described above could be used as an input to a ML wants to destroy a target should be able to rapidly develop estimates of unit, capability, or platform connected across Services and security levels or or AI system. The outcome of the scenario could be consider all available capabilities in order to determine performance against potential tasks. This would help with partner and allied systems. MITRE proposes used as the feedback mechanism to drive training of which would be most effective. For example, the to isolate the need at the operational level of decision “loose couplers” as an information design approach the ML network. MITRE is currently experimenting commander must know whether Army long-range making, these estimates would help isolate the need to enable widespread interoperability in a lightweight with the concept of task brokering, and there is fires or Navy sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles for first-hand understanding of how well a particular way. These loose couplers would be derived by convincing evidence that introducing AI into this are the right tool for a specific target set. To achieve asset might perform a given task from the determining the needs for task brokering and process will lead to significantly enhanced this type of optimization, operational-level C2 might be decision-making process. performance assessments described above. effectiveness. organized around a dynamic set of critical warfighting missions, such as ground surveillance, fires, offensive Determining mission performance estimates might As opposed to universal or complete interoperability, Context-based displays for situational space control, etc., rather than around be done by the tactical systems themselves or by loose coupling involves exchanging a minimal understanding. As the complexity of the decision domain-specific component commanders or their command elements. In cases where the amount of structured, high-impact information space for operational level C2 increases, and as the Service-oriented operations. More importantly, to tactical layer cannot provide an assessment for a across a diverse set of users. Such an approach is role of the machine in enabling better decisions operate at speed, those operational-level C2 elements large number of tasks, say for an Army ground unit ideal for distributed networks in which there are a grows, the need for intuitive decision-making need to have the authority to task any and all assets too busy with combat to be answering task variety of heterogeneous participants, each of which displays and interfaces grows as well. New displays relevant to performing their associated function as performance queries, a specialized system sitting can benefit in some way from the core data in the will be needed to allow an operator to rapidly determined by the Joint Force Commander – between the tactical and operational levels could be coupling messages. What this approach gives up in analyze different options and courses of action irrespective of the Service or domain from which that used to provide rough estimates. data richness it makes up for in flexibility and (COAs), select and modify a COA, and track capability is drawn from. efficiency; it has the potential to connect the widest execution of the COA so they can intervene as By automating the process of continually estimating number of possible systems. needed. The operator must be able to compare Operational “task brokering.” One approach to and updating expected mission performance, machine-developed plans to a set of lower efficiency enabling these “mission function” -based estimates from a wide range of systems and Under this approach, data from different domains, alternatives considered and not selected by the operational decision makers is “task brokering.” capabilities can be combined and presented in a Services, or security levels can be fused together in machine. They will also need to be able to modify To respond to real-time opportunities and exploit way that allows decision makers to make informed combinations relevant for operational C2, minimizing those plans for themselves, seeing how individual new information, operational-level C2 elements choices. In this way, Army or Air Force officers could the burden on data transport systems. Moreover, choices might affect the rest of the plan and the might allocate tactical capabilities via a dynamic intelligently create plans relying on Navy systems loose coupling allows non-kinetic capabilities to be chances for success of the mission, set of missions, marketplace. A complete set of “mission function” and capabilities and vice versa. represented by the same set of performance or even the overall campaign. units or capabilities would act as “sellers,” offering messages, improving their integration into the system the effects they are able to produce at Using these performance estimates may also allow for conventional operations. Operators will also need the ability to dive deep into any given time. The full set of tasks to be assigned systems at different security levels to be coupled the automated decision-making process when by that operational-level C2 element would then together. The details of the classified system performing Artificial intelligence for operational decision needed, helping build trust and confidence when “buy” these capabilities, optimizing for variables the mission do not need to be made available to making. Adopting an approach using performance they are forced to operate without those deep dives. such as time, opportunity cost, probability of incorporate the classified system into the plan. The estimation and task brokering may enable the use of These new displays should have the ability to be success, survivability, etc. performance estimate could be expressed at a lower AI for operational decision making. If modeling and preconfigured based on the role of the operator, but security level than the information used to generate it. simulation can be used to rapidly run conflict they must also have the built in flexibility to be Task performance assessments. JADC2 will increase Alternatively, estimates could be completely decoupled scenarios over and over again, it may be possible to reconfigured to meet the desires of the individual. the complexity of decision making, challenging from the systems with which they are associated. generate data to train ML algorithms capable of

These core tenets, technical and organizational, must be addressed to enable progress toward making JADC2 a reality. MITRE is working to make Dr. Eliahu Niewood advances in all of them. Other areas, such as Dr. Eliahu Niewood is a technical director of incorporating larger strategic objectives into MITRE’s Cross-Cutting Urgent Innovation Cell and theater-level and operational decision making, leads MITRE’s Priority Area for Joint Lethality in MITRE launched the Center for Technology and coordination of multi-domain effects at the tactical Contested Environments. He also serves as one of National Security (CTNS) to provide national level, and better control of the electromagnetic the Priority Area leads for MITRE’s work in security leaders with the data-driven analysis and spectrum also need to be addressed. Multi-Domain Command, Control, and technologically informed insights needed to succeed Communications; for Advanced Autonomous in today’s hyper-competitive strategic environment. Systems; and for Emerging Technology. The Center aims to help policymakers better navigate a dynamic, rapidly evolving technology Developing, fielding, and operating effective JADC2 Greg Grant landscape in order to advance U.S. interests and will require robust experimentation and concept Greg Grant is director of MITRE’s Center for strengthen national security. As a part of the development at a variety of levels across both users Technology and National Security and is the senior not-for-profit, non-partisan MITRE Corporation, and developers. Such experimentation should help principal of integration and plans for MITRE’s CTNS is built on the experience and expertise of identify the changes in authorities and organizational National Security Sector. Prior to joining MITRE, he thousands of our nation’s most respected scientific structures needed to execute JADC2. And was senior director of strategy at Defense Innovation and engineering minds. The Center brings together experiments must include perspectives from industry, Unit Experimental (DIUx). During his tenure with the experts and leading authorities from government, Combatant Commands, Service Components, DoD, he also served as special assistant to Deputy academia, industry, media, and policy institutes warfighter schools, and doctrine developers. Secretary of Defense Robert Work, helping to to drive informed discussion in this era of develop the “Third Offset Strategy.” unprecedented technological change. But user experimentation with the limited C2 technology and systems available today will not by Tyler Lewis MITRE’s mission-driven teams are dedicated to itself drive change. Making real progress will require Tyler Lewis is director for strategic development for solving problems for a safer world. Through our DoD to adopt an initial set of core tenets for MITRE’s Center for Technology and National federally funded R&D centers and public-private experimentation and prototyping. The department Security as well as program manager for the MITRE partnerships, we work across government to tackle must then use those core tenets to unify activities National Security Sector Military Fellowship. Tyler challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of across the national security enterprise. joined MITRE after a distinguished military career our nation. where he most recently served as the Military Finally, an initial focus on specific mission Assistant to the 24th Secretary of the Air Force. © 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. challenges will help accelerate progress. Finding During Tyler’s Air Force tenure, he also served as an Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. # 19-3703 and engaging high-value, relocatable ground F-16 evaluator pilot, Olmsted Scholar, foreign policy systems within the rapid time lines needed for analyst, and speechwriter to the 18th Chairman of success is a critical challenge in many operational the Joint Chiefs of Staff. scenarios and fertile ground for making progress to develop and field JADC2.

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity Experimentation, Concept and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to Development, and domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. Technology Enablers targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

These core tenets, technical and organizational, About the Authors must be addressed to enable progress toward making JADC2 a reality. MITRE is working to make Dr. Eliahu Niewood advances in all of them. Other areas, such as Dr. Eliahu Niewood is a technical director of incorporating larger strategic objectives into MITRE’s Cross-Cutting Urgent Innovation Cell and theater-level and operational decision making, leads MITRE’s Priority Area for Joint Lethality in MITRE launched the Center for Technology and coordination of multi-domain effects at the tactical Contested Environments. He also serves as one of National Security (CTNS) to provide national level, and better control of the electromagnetic the Priority Area leads for MITRE’s work in security leaders with the data-driven analysis and spectrum also need to be addressed. Multi-Domain Command, Control, and technologically informed insights needed to succeed Communications; for Advanced Autonomous in today’s hyper-competitive strategic environment. Path Forward Systems; and for Emerging Technology. The Center aims to help policymakers better navigate a dynamic, rapidly evolving technology Developing, fielding, and operating effective JADC2 Greg Grant landscape in order to advance U.S. interests and will require robust experimentation and concept Greg Grant is director of MITRE’s Center for strengthen national security. As a part of the development at a variety of levels across both users Technology and National Security and is the senior not-for-profit, non-partisan MITRE Corporation, and developers. Such experimentation should help principal of integration and plans for MITRE’s CTNS is built on the experience and expertise of identify the changes in authorities and organizational National Security Sector. Prior to joining MITRE, he thousands of our nation’s most respected scientific structures needed to execute JADC2. And was senior director of strategy at Defense Innovation and engineering minds. The Center brings together experiments must include perspectives from industry, Unit Experimental (DIUx). During his tenure with the experts and leading authorities from government, Combatant Commands, Service Components, DoD, he also served as special assistant to Deputy academia, industry, media, and policy institutes warfighter schools, and doctrine developers. Secretary of Defense Robert Work, helping to to drive informed discussion in this era of develop the “Third Offset Strategy.” unprecedented technological change. But user experimentation with the limited C2 technology and systems available today will not by Tyler Lewis MITRE’s mission-driven teams are dedicated to itself drive change. Making real progress will require Tyler Lewis is director for strategic development for solving problems for a safer world. Through our DoD to adopt an initial set of core tenets for MITRE’s Center for Technology and National federally funded R&D centers and public-private experimentation and prototyping. The department Security as well as program manager for the MITRE partnerships, we work across government to tackle must then use those core tenets to unify activities National Security Sector Military Fellowship. Tyler challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of across the national security enterprise. joined MITRE after a distinguished military career our nation. where he most recently served as the Military Finally, an initial focus on specific mission Assistant to the 24th Secretary of the Air Force. © 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. challenges will help accelerate progress. Finding During Tyler’s Air Force tenure, he also served as an Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. # 19-3703 and engaging high-value, relocatable ground F-16 evaluator pilot, Olmsted Scholar, foreign policy systems within the rapid time lines needed for analyst, and speechwriter to the 18th Chairman of success is a critical challenge in many operational the Joint Chiefs of Staff. scenarios and fertile ground for making progress to develop and field JADC2.

Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019

These core tenets, technical and organizational, About the Center for must be addressed to enable progress toward making JADC2 a reality. MITRE is working to make Dr. Eliahu Niewood Technology & National advances in all of them. Other areas, such as Dr. Eliahu Niewood is a technical director of Security incorporating larger strategic objectives into MITRE’s Cross-Cutting Urgent Innovation Cell and theater-level and operational decision making, leads MITRE’s Priority Area for Joint Lethality in MITRE launched the Center for Technology and coordination of multi-domain effects at the tactical Contested Environments. He also serves as one of National Security (CTNS) to provide national level, and better control of the electromagnetic the Priority Area leads for MITRE’s work in security leaders with the data-driven analysis and spectrum also need to be addressed. Multi-Domain Command, Control, and technologically informed insights needed to succeed Communications; for Advanced Autonomous in today’s hyper-competitive strategic environment. Systems; and for Emerging Technology. The Center aims to help policymakers better navigate a dynamic, rapidly evolving technology Developing, fielding, and operating effective JADC2 Greg Grant landscape in order to advance U.S. interests and will require robust experimentation and concept Greg Grant is director of MITRE’s Center for strengthen national security. As a part of the development at a variety of levels across both users Technology and National Security and is the senior not-for-profit, non-partisan MITRE Corporation, and developers. Such experimentation should help principal of integration and plans for MITRE’s CTNS is built on the experience and expertise of identify the changes in authorities and organizational National Security Sector. Prior to joining MITRE, he thousands of our nation’s most respected scientific structures needed to execute JADC2. And was senior director of strategy at Defense Innovation and engineering minds. The Center brings together experiments must include perspectives from industry, Unit Experimental (DIUx). During his tenure with the experts and leading authorities from government, Combatant Commands, Service Components, DoD, he also served as special assistant to Deputy academia, industry, media, and policy institutes warfighter schools, and doctrine developers. Secretary of Defense Robert Work, helping to to drive informed discussion in this era of develop the “Third Offset Strategy.” unprecedented technological change. But user experimentation with the limited C2 technology and systems available today will not by Tyler Lewis MITRE’s mission-driven teams are dedicated to itself drive change. Making real progress will require Tyler Lewis is director for strategic development for solving problems for a safer world. Through our DoD to adopt an initial set of core tenets for MITRE’s Center for Technology and National federally funded R&D centers and public-private experimentation and prototyping. The department Security as well as program manager for the MITRE partnerships, we work across government to tackle must then use those core tenets to unify activities National Security Sector Military Fellowship. Tyler challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of across the national security enterprise. joined MITRE after a distinguished military career our nation. where he most recently served as the Military Finally, an initial focus on specific mission Assistant to the 24th Secretary of the Air Force. © 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. challenges will help accelerate progress. Finding During Tyler’s Air Force tenure, he also served as an Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. # 19-3703 and engaging high-value, relocatable ground F-16 evaluator pilot, Olmsted Scholar, foreign policy systems within the rapid time lines needed for analyst, and speechwriter to the 18th Chairman of success is a critical challenge in many operational the Joint Chiefs of Staff. scenarios and fertile ground for making progress to develop and field JADC2.

MITRE Center for Technology and National Security