The MITRE Center for Technology & National Security A NEW BATTLE COMMAND ARCHITECTURE FOR MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS Countering Peer Adversary Power Projection By Eliahu Niewood, Greg Grant, and Tyler Lewis ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Approved for Public Release. Distribution unlimited. Case number 19-3703 This page intentionally left blank. 1 MITRE Center for Technology and National Security | December 2019 A New Battle Command Architecture Joint C2 capabilities. No mechanism currently exists Many users and systems would be simply within DoD for creating and implementing the Joint overwhelmed by the vast quantity of data. There capabilities needed by the Combatant Commands, must be some framework to determine who gets for Multi-Domain Operations as each Service designs to a different high-end what information. While enhancing interoperability Countering Peer Adversary Power Projection problem unique to its domain. In the absence of a and connectivity across systems is a critical enabler common force design, each Service focuses largely for JADC2, it is not a complete solution to the C2 on its own specific needs as it develops various challenges themselves. C2 is not just about The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifts strategic compelling example of this challenge is meeting the elements of a path forward for JADC2. situational awareness, it is about how and by whom focus to preparing for high-end conflict against peer rapid time lines required for finding, fixing, and decisions are made. Developing new technologies adversaries – specifically Russia and China – where engaging the relocatable systems on which Platform-centric acquisition. DoD’s acquisition and fielding new capabilities will not be enough to the Joint Force will face acute time, distance, and competitors increasingly rely as a means to project system is optimized to develop and field exquisite enable JADC2; changes in concepts of operation, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operational power and create robust A2/AD defensive networks. platforms, and industry is incentivized to pursue authorities, and organizational constructs will also challenges. Halting Russian or Chinese aggression large procurement contracts with lengthy life cycle be needed. and degrading emplaced A2/AD networks will Joint Force Not Joint Enough operations and maintenance tails. Developing the require the United States and its allies to rapidly plan communications networks and enabling connectivity and execute operations using capabilities from all Employing sensors and effectors in domain- and between platforms and the C2 capabilities needed to domains, Services, and allies in a synchronized, Service-agnostic ways could dramatically shorten effectively leverage those platforms is not always cooperative, and efficient manner. the time it takes to engage multiple relocatable seen as lucrative from an industry perspective. targets. Solving the time problem enables the Joint Moreover, it can be difficult for advocates in Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will Force to attack and maneuver faster than Red can Congress to back ethereal “connections” and “data” New concepts and approaches to enable JADC2 require a new approach to battle management and operate. This acceleration is one of the central over more tangible and energizing platforms. must focus on operating in new ways that bring the the supporting command and control (C2) animating ideas behind joint all domain command Joint Force’s suite of capabilities together from architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish and control (JADC2). Yet, despite multiple years of Service-based authorities and operations. Simply across all domains in a coherent and effective large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such focused energy and attention on this problem, DoD put, the individual Service components are averse to manner. They must describe how the Joint Force synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. has made far too little progress developing and loosening control over their own capabilities. can organize more effectively to perform the Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 fielding the capabilities needed to make JADC2 a Handing control of assets from one domain to a necessary C2. They must describe the roles of systems impeded by multiple barriers, including reality. But JADC2 is more than just new equipment. commander from another is alien to their way of theater, operational, and tactical-level commanders those between domains, classification levels, the Moving toward true “multi-domain operations” will operating. Existing organizational structures in the and decision makers in performing their duties. And Services themselves, and our allies. of necessity drive development of a new approach to various Combatant Commands reinforce this they must describe what capabilities and enablers C2, as the existing approach is still a “system of Service-based approach to operations. will come from the Services, national authorities, the Such barriers exist for both sense-making and deconfliction” rather than a “system of integration.” IC, and partner nations. Obviously, new concepts decision-making processes. For sense making, Insufficient focus on C2 and technological myopia. will need to be developed and improved through the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Developing and operating robust and truly There is a common belief that JADC2 is about experiments designed to help determine which Joint Community (IC) are unable to easily combine integrated C2 systems will require overcoming a bringing all the data together, labeling it, and C2 tactics, techniques, and procedures are most disparate data sets to improve situational awareness or number of significant obstacles. These include: applying artificial intelligence (AI) via an agile effective for employing specific capabilities during to provide better information to strategic, operational, software approach. This approach will neither work rapid and dynamically adaptive operations. and tactical decision makers. For decision making, Lack of common force design. One of the most nor provide the needed capability; it is unlikely there effectors are divided by Service or domain with limited significant challenges is that the current will be enough bandwidth in contested or denied Experimentation cannot proceed unless there are ability to understand the full range of capabilities Service-based model for development and environments to move all the data to every system both new concepts and technology to experiment available to achieve desired effects. One particularly acquisition is not conducive to developing or fielding and platform involved in high-end operations. with. MITRE believes that before DoD can make Moreover, most data is not relevant to most users. real progress on turning JADC2 into an operational 2 reality, it must decide on some guiding core leaders to possess the breadth and depth of Interoperability enabled by “loose couplers.” more efficient and effective resource task pairing. tenets, which can then be used as a basis for knowledge needed to understand when and where Instantiating JADC2 relies on rapidly and Those ML algorithms need large data sets of experimentation and prototyping. capabilities can be most effectively employed. One dynamically communicating between numerous decisions and their outcomes for model training and way to help address these challenges, and to enable dissimilar capabilities and platforms. Today, testing purposes. The performance estimates Organization around function. A commander who the brokering described above, is to dynamically however, many of the relevant systems cannot be described above could be used as an input to a ML wants to destroy a target should be able to rapidly develop estimates of unit, capability, or platform connected across Services and security levels or or AI system. The outcome of the scenario could be consider all available capabilities in order to determine performance against potential tasks. This would help with partner and allied systems. MITRE proposes used as the feedback mechanism to drive training of which would be most effective. For example, the to isolate the need at the operational level of decision “loose couplers” as an information design approach the ML network. MITRE is currently experimenting commander must know whether Army long-range making, these estimates would help isolate the need to enable widespread interoperability in a lightweight with the concept of task brokering, and there is fires or Navy sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles for first-hand understanding of how well a particular way. These loose couplers would be derived by convincing evidence that introducing AI into this are the right tool for a specific target set. To achieve asset might perform a given task from the determining the needs for task brokering and process will lead to significantly enhanced this type of optimization, operational-level C2 might be decision-making process. performance assessments described above. effectiveness. organized around a dynamic set of critical warfighting missions, such as ground surveillance, fires, offensive Determining mission performance estimates might As opposed to universal or complete interoperability, Context-based displays for situational space control, etc., rather than around be done by the tactical systems themselves or by loose coupling involves exchanging a minimal understanding. As the complexity of the decision domain-specific