On János Esterházy, in the Spirit of Central European Dialogue

ON JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY, IN THE SPIRIT OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

ŅIVÉ PODZOBORIE – ÉLŐ ZOBORALJA – LIVING ZOBOR REGION

Original title: Esterházy Jánosról a közép-európai dialógus jegyében – O Jánosovi Esterházym v duchu stredoeurópskeho dialógu

Editor: Zilizi Zoltán, PhD

Reviewers: Prof. PaedDr. Ńtefan Ńutaj, DrSc., doc. PaedDr. Peter Andruńka, PhD. Language editor: Ildikó Haraszti, Mgr.

Translation into English by: Lucia Faltin, MA

ON JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY, IN THE SPIRIT OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

ŅIVÉ PODZOBORIE – ÉLŐ ZOBORALJA – LIVING ZOBOR REGION, 2017

A program a Szovjetunióba hurcolt politikai foglyok és kényszermunkások emlékéve alkalmából az Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériumának az Emberi Erőforrás Támogatáskezelő útján nyújtott támogatásával valósul meg.

Program realizovaný v rámci pamätného roka politických väzňov a občanov násilne odvlečených na nútené práce do Sovietskeho zväzu Správcom dotácií ľudských zdrojov Ministerstva ľudských zdrojov Maćarska.

The programme is supported by the Ministry of Human Resources of Hungary through the Human Resources Fund Administrator within the framework of the Memorial Year of Political Prisoners and People Violently Deported to Forced Labour in the Soviet Union.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

On János Esterházy – in the Spirit of Central European Dialogue – Conference and Round Table Discussion in Nitra – Zoltán Zilizi ...... 7

OPENING REMARKS

Csaba Gy. Kiss ...... 8

Csaba Balogh ...... 9

Frantińek Miklońko ...... 10

Jan Rydel ...... 11

Attila Komzsík ...... 13

STUDIES

János Esterházy – A Central European Politician The Polish Perspective – Arkadiusz Adamczyk, Paulina Bąkowicz ...... 15

Political Alternatives for Esterházy János before the First Vienna Award – László Szarka ...... 26

János Esterházy, the Bedrock of Slovak–Hungarian Reconciliation – Imre Molnár ...... 37

János Esterházy in the Political Life of Slovakia in 1938–1945 – Ondrej Podolec ...... 47 Mediation Activities of János Esterházy between the Slovak and Hungarian Government in the

Period of 1939–1942 with Particular Emphasis on Jewish Question – István Janek ...... 57

Minority Policy of Horthy´s Hungary in the Context of Attitudes of János Esterházy – Ján Mitáč ...... 77

János Esterházy in Archival Documents of the First Czechoslovak Republic– Andrej Tóth ...... 85

The Fate of Political Élites in Central and Eastern Europe in Soviet Gulags – Case Studies (János Esterházy, gen. Johan Laidoner and Jan Stanisław Jankowski)– Dariusz Rogut ...... 95

The Role of Vavro Ńrobár in the Pardon of János Esterházy (Hitherto Unknown Documents – Letters by Elżbieta and Lujza Esterházy to V. Ńrobár of 2 June 1949) – Ferdinand Vrábel ...... 100

DISCUSSION

Ondrej Podolec ...... 107

Tomasz Chłoń ...... 107

Imre Lebovits ...... 108

Arkadiusz Adamczyk ...... 109

László Szarka ...... 110

Imre Molnár ...... 111

ROUND TABLE ...... 112

IN CONCLUSION – Imre Polyák ...... 122

IMAGES ...... 123

CONFERENCE AND ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY –IN THE SPIRIT OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN DIALOGUE NITRA

Hungarians living in Slovakia have always considered it important to broker cooperation between theirmother country and Slovak society. Also the conference about János Esterházy held on 5 March 2014 in Nitra and convened by the Civic Association Living Zobor Region with support from the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity should contribute to these efforts. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that Esterházy is a worshipped figure in Hungarian historical memory. Nonetheless, it is no secret either that views on him differ across Central Europe. The peoples in the region have different accounts of his social action. Indeed, the difference in perspectives held by the Hungarians and Slovaks is quite marked. The conference was an attempt to bring closer the two historical perspectives. We intended to contribute to the convergence of opinions on János Esterházy through dialogue and discussion.Therefore, as a sign of mutual respect, in addition to the Hungarian context, we gave space to even diametrically opposing specialist accounts from Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. When planning the conference, we deemed this important also to give the residents in the region of Nitra, and Hungarian and Slovak students in Nitra an opportunity to familiarise themselves with different accounts on Esterházy. The space for specialist discussions was provided by the Faculty of Central European Studies of Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. The packed auditorium is an evidence of interest. We consider it an important step forward that the conference on Esterházy held on 5 March 2014 was the first since his passing that enabled professional assessment of his personality at the Slovak state university, as well as in his native country. The academics who kindly accepted our invitation to serve as academic board of the conference are Csaba Gy. Kiss, Professor at the University of Warsawand Academic Director of the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity, and Professor Jan Rydel, Chairman of the Management Committee of the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity. In addition to Csaba Balogh, at the time of the conference the Ambassador of Hungary to Slovakia, we had the pleasure of the presence of Tomasz Chłoń, Polish Ambassador toSlovakia and of Vladimír Belovič, Director General of the Department of International Cooperation and European Affairs of the Slovak Ministry of Education. We were also delighted to have with us students from three Hungarian secondary schools in Slovakia (Ńahy,Dolné Obdokovce, Galanta) to explore a subject that is certainly not on the top of the pops among the youth. In addition to the participants and supporters, I wish to convey special gratitude to FrantińekMiklońko as a representative of the public for his willingness to represent it in a dialogue on the subject. Hungarian and Slovak readers of the Conference Proceedings will no doubt note the different accounts on János Esterházy. It was a pleasure to have an opportunity to become acquainted with them, thus extending our knowledge that benefits from the different perspectives. To further this aim and the debates that might ensure, the present publication is available in a number of languages that might be a means to an end. Zoltán Zilizi,Civic Association Living Zobor Region

CSABA GY. KISS

European Network Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS), Chairman of Academic Board, Professor of Warsaw University

This event is an opportunity to share Visegrad spirit. Hence it is appropriate to greet you in a manner appropriate to Visegrad: Serdecznie witam Państwa! Zdravímvás srdečně! Isten hozta Önöket! Pozdravujem vás srdečne! In connection with the conference I recall an initiative from several years ago called My Hero, Your Enemy. We see in it a paradigmatic view of our shared past. The spirit of nationalism on one hand, and the opposition to the spirit of nationalism on the other hand. The logic of who is going to win resembles the inevitable Manichean ambiguity. Such thinking was imposed on us also during Communism. The history of national narratives runs along the same track. Politicalélites, however, may abuse it as a means to arbitrarily transform friends to enemies and vice versa. They may determine how we think about the past. How can academics fight this knowing that there is no history that would be objective and fair to everyone? Are they to find some transnational pulpit from where they will try to look the so often disappointing Central European reality? I do not think it would be realistic, though the prophets of globalisation like to proclaim that the progresscan bring us to the universal man without national identity. I do not think that some kind ofVisegrad identity can replace national consciousness. Rather, there would be need for some sort of complementary dialogue-based approach. When I began to work with Slovak culture, I have to admit that I could not forgiveĽudovít Ńtúr for having plotted the armed uprising against the legitimately elected Hungarian government (which, incidentally, was also supported by a significant portion of Slovaks). I needed some time to understand,what it means for the Slovaks – his massive effort to develop a linguistic standard, to launch Slovak press and literature. For that he deserves a worthy place in Central European pantheon. In 2009 at an international forum I recommended to create a pantheon of our giants, where Ńtúr would stand next to, for example,Lajos Kossuth, Frantińek Palacký and Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. We do need to abandon the my-hero-your-enemy scheme. Not to abandon the national narratives, but to open them instead to our neighbours, help to create the much-needed platform of common Central European fate. Not that we would have that many treat until today as suspicious. We are too well aware, however that the false tones of Hungarian–Slovak relationship can be the weak link in the Visegrad Four. For this greater understanding is so needed. May I close my address borrowing the words of István Széchenyi: ―Patience is born out of patience".I call here for a fruitful dialogue, expertise and the spirit of mutual understanding.

CSABA BALOGH

Ambassador of Hungary in Bratislava

Allow me to first greet all conference participants and express my gratitude for being here to exchange views on János Esterházy and the time, in which he lived and worked, as well as on Hungarian–Slovak relations. After all, this is the underlying theme of our deliberations. By convening here to exchange views on such issues, on which Hungarians and Slovaks, and more broadly Central Europeans do not always agree, I believe we make the first step in addressing the challenge which we are bound to solve. For the nations of Central Europe their 20th century history is filled with traumas. We are merely starting to touch the tip of the iceberg. What we face is a challenge of the extent to which we ought to address these traumas, conflicts, and to what extent we have to resolve them through dialogue worthy of the 21st century, documenting the events that took place hundreds of miles away. All that within a context of some politicians who believe that the conflicts between peoples can be also solved by other means than dialogue and negotiations. I consider that what is happening in Ukraine and the Crimea, to be the exact opposite of our Central European dialogue and cooperation. It alerts us again about the fact that the tragedy of Central Europe and its nations arises when they divide and turn against each other. I do not think that we will stand up from the table today knowing that we agreed on all points. I do believe, however, that mutual empathy, openness of arguments will keep on increasing. It will be in this spirit that we shall be able to move forward. That, after all, will be great victory in every respect.

FRANTIŃEK MIKLOŃKO

Former Speaker of the Slovak National Council

Political Taboo in Modern Slovak History

What was the nature of the struggle against totalitarian power in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1989? To put it succinctly, it was about breaking taboos posed in the words and deeds by the Communist régime. Between 1948 and 1968,though later as well, thousands of people ended up in jail for breaking the taboos. Breaking taboos meant, inter alia, dissidents writing letter, people endorsing, with their signatures campaigns for freedom of faith,publishing the ecological manifesto of the eponymous movement Bratislava Aloud, attending the Candle Demonstration in 1988. All this and more had written history of Slovakia throughout the era of Communism. In this context I understand a taboo to be a theme that can hardly be discussed, let alone to differ in opinion. Right after November 1989, in the capacity of the political post which I have been entrusted with, I advocated freedom of discourse and the search for truth for many traumatic topics of our modern history. At the Slovak National Council we thus adopted a resolution by which we expressed apology to our Jewish compatriots for the deportations in Slovakia during the Second World War. We further adopted a resolution in connection with the expulsion of Slovak Germans, condemning the principle of collective guilt. At the parliamentary level we were also exploring the avenues to facilitate Slovak–Hungarian understanding. Let me also highlight an academic conference convened in conjunction with the Slovak parliament to address the Slovak President Jozef Tiso. One of the taboos in Slovakia remains János Esterházy, politician and a Hungarian living in Slovakia. I first wrote about Esterházy in samizdat Voice of Slovakia in August 1988 under the pen name Marek Bohúň. I offered an account of the imprisonment of János Esterházy in Russia and in Czechoslovakia, drawing from testimony by his cellmate, the Roman Catholic priest JánMastiliak. In March 1991, when his daughter Alice visited Bratislava for the first time, I repeated the testimony at St. Martin‘s Cathedral. This might have been why the Hungarian Parliament awarded me the János Esterházy Commemorative Medal on his centenary in March 2001. After 1918 János Esterházy was the key Hungarian politician in Czechoslovakia. He cannot be placed in the void of history of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia. A few historical and press articles were written about him after November 1989. Discussions about Esterházy are often heated. I have merely conveyed oral testimony about him which suggested that, in the harsh prison conditions, he acted as a man of deep faith and died there with the repute of holiness. Naturally, there were points when political context of his life could not be omitted. Hence I wish to greet this international conference at the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, the city, near which János Esterházylived and in which, anticipating his death in prison, he also wanted to die. This academic conference is a witness to democracy, humanity, breaking taboos. It evidences the readiness to explore the historical truth about the life and activities of János Esterházy in Czechoslovakia. It is only in such atmosphere of a dialogue that one can build genuine democratic society. I trust that we in Slovakia all desire it. I do look forward to the papers we are about to be presented.

JAN RYDEL

European Network Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS) Chairman of Management Committee

May I take the opportunity to thank you right away, at the start of the conference. On behalf of the Eu- ropean Network Remembrance and Solidarity I wish to thank you for having devoted the proceedings to the contentious theme of the Count János Esterházy, a phenomenon that unites and, at the same time divides Slovaks and Hungarians. Esterházy as a phenomenon links the history of your nations in a clear manner. He spent most of his active life as Hungarian public figure in Slovakia. He proves to be a divisive figure: a number of arguments prevented him as a Hungarian to accept Czechoslovakia and Slovakia as such, though he lived and worked there. Yet he certainly was not an a priori opponent of Slovak statehood. To some Esterházy is a hero and martyr, to others he is an enemy who received due sentence. Among all the neighbouring nations, which over the centuries mixed and greatly influenced each other, we can certainly find similar figures who connectand, at the same time divide and antagonise these nations. History of Poland and its neighbours – that I can easily talk about – offers many such examples. The great Lithuanian Duke and Polish King, Ladislaus Jagiello, the founder of Poland as the late mediaeval superpower and the founder of Jagiellonian dynasty: in the eyes of Poles he is naturally one of the key and most respected rulers; to a considerable number of Lithuanians, he was de facto a traitor who subordinated his country to Poland and opened the gate to its Polonisation. Within the range of such figures the heaviest of fates is no doubt that of Bohdan Khmelnitzky, the Cossack governor and the founding father of modern Ukrainian statehood. To Ukrainians, who today offer impressive evidence of yearning for freedom and democracy, Khmelnitzky is, I believe, the key figure in their national pantheon. For Poles, on the other hand, he is the major traitor in modern history and the first gravedigger of the then Poland. His black, demoniclegend was refined to perfection by the Polish Nobel Prize laureate, Henryk Sienkiewicz, in his novel With Fire and Sword. Hitler‘s intended assassin and one of the commanders of the 20 July 1944 coup, the Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, is seen as a hero in the now democratic Germany. The Poles, however, cannot forget his enthusiasm as he embarked, in 1939, on the war with Poland and looked up to the Führer. Whenever the Germans highlight his heroism, the Poles begin to crunch their teeth. The fate of Archduke Karl Albrecht Habsburg, landlord of large settlements in Zywci (Seibusch) and the surrounding area offers an interesting case. Despite the cruelty with which the independent Poland treated his family, Karl Albrecht felt very much part of Poland. When it fell under German occupation during the Second World War, he flatly refused to sign the Deutsche Volksliste – the declaration of his German- identity. German authorities considered it to be gross betrayal and he was soon imprisoned, tortured, to end up in a concentration camp. He left the camp with broken health and died in 1951. Though János Esterházy was half-Pole, his figure in Polish history is unprecedented. The Archduke Karl Albrecht was not publicly active. Neither the Polish minority in the neighbouring countries, nor other national minorities in Poland in the first half of the 20th century had such an outstanding figure, which him. Perhaps the rapid and radical developments in Poland in the given period prevented its figures to reach the standing of Esterházy. When I used the word standing, I wish to draw your attention to the tragic fate ofJános Esterházy. The word tragedy here is not a light and mal-calculated, but a term that should be understood in literally terms as constitutive feature of ancient tragedy. After all, suffering and death, which was a result of dubious judgements, and the cruelty which he did not deserve, were not the only pieces in the puzzle of the leitmotif of our proceedings. The story of Esterházy includes what is an essential element of ancient tragedy, namely the conflict of motives of action of hero and the motives of his opponents. The general motivation of any aspect of the tragedy that destroyed Esterházy was not illegitimate and not at all brazen. Fate is the culprit in this tragedy, similarly to the case of Aeschylus or Euripides;

11 theirrefutable workings of forces that an individual is unable to grasp and control, be it in ancient Greece, Slovakia or even in Hungary in mid-20th century. Ladies and gentlemen, I wholeheartedly wish us, the participants at the conference to deepen our knowledge of the story of János Esterházy and the history of the then Slovakia and Hungary. I also trust that, knowing already the destiny of this man and his homelands, in harmony with the deep meaning of the tragedy, we experience catharsis, the cleansing required to ensure that we digest the many dramas of the past century, what would make us better people.

ATTILA KOMZSÍK

Dean Faculty of Central European Studies, Constantine the PhilosopherUniversity in Nitra

When the historian Zoltán Zilizi contacted us with a request to hold a conference on János Esterházy at our Faculty, he also enquired whether we would have the courage to accept the role of host. The enquiry suggested that success of the event was, as yet, unclear. I am convinced that the essential mission of universities and faculties is to help facilitate specialist dialogue particularly on matters where interpretation of a theme is ambiguous. The interpretation of János Esterházy and his personality remains indeed open-ended on both the Hungarian as well as Slovak side. Furthermore, there are the Polish and Czech perspectives that will be explored in the following papers. As a host, we had one proviso in that the dialogue would claim to be academic, thus shedding light on the theme from multiple perspectives. The agenda suggests that what is ahead is not a one-sided affair. Esterházy is bound to be in explored through a range of accounts. I am convinced that the conference will not close with embraces and consensus. If we just listen to each other, will be, I believe, a fine first step in the right direction.

STUDIES

Arkadiusz ADAMCZYK, Paulina BĄKOWICZ

Jan Kochanowski University, Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY – A CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICIAN THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Europe needs visible signs, witnesses and symbols. The message from John Paul II certainly is as timely as ever. The contemporary financial crisis may lead to assumptions that the idea of the single market as the key glue for the old continent has failed the test of the time. We may also run a risk with the proposition that the united Europe, more than ever before, needs a different kind of glue in regional and global terms. At the point where the financial foundations collapse, we more often refer to cultural roots and seek to find a common historical space or personal patterns. Politicians, political scientists and historians tend to reject the patterns usual in times of the post–Yalta Conference because of the stamp of the Communist system and their experience with the alien rule imposed on Central European countries. That also is why, regardless of the occasionally surfacing political need, the centres of science consistently deny the state or national nature of the Poland of Bolesław Bierut and Władysław Gomułka, the Czechoslovakia of Klement Gottwald and Gustáv Husák and also the Hungary of László Rajk and János Kádár. The Communist-time heroes have to make room for figures associated with the sovereign era such as Józef Piłsudski, Edvard Beneń and Miklós Horthy, even against the full awareness of the anti-democratic episodes that can be identified in the political biographies of these persons.1 The aforementioned persons do meet all conditions required from national heroes, yet caution has to be taken in attempts to promote certain individuals to symbols of Europe in continental or regional terms.2 This results in the specific need to shift the search for a universal figure to more distant times and refer to the ―golden‖ 16th and 17th centuries or to the period of romanticism or post–romanticism.3That, however, yields a very imperfect outcome. On one hand, in studying the distant past one can avoid numerous controversial topics that provoke political and social passions. On the other hand, it is impossible then to ―crack‖ numerous timely issues that should represent a visible and comprehensible signum temporis and moreover, crack also the excuse of using historical arguments in political debates. It seems that János Esterházy (1901–1957)4 may be one of numerous figures fit to be a symbol for Central Europe.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN ROOTS

Looking at János Esterházy in Central European categories and from the Polish point of view, his Polish origins seem to be one of the crucial facts. János was half-Polish, the son of Elżbieta Tarnowski and the grandson of Stanisław Tarnowski, reputed rector of Jagiellonian University and the President of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow.5 Family ties with the Tarnowski family of the Leliwa herald automatically meant that Esterházy was a relative of grand and famous Polish families such as Branicki, Czacki, Czartoryski, Jabłonowski, Małachowski, Męciński, Mokronowski, Mycielski, Potocki, Raczyński, Sanguszkowi and Strojnowski.6 In the context of Central European symbolism Esterházy‘s place of birth, life and death are of importance. They, as a matter of fact, are the foundation for the proposition of his supranational status. He was born in Nyitraújlak (now Veľké Záluņie) in the territory of the Austro–Hungarian Empire. Following the changes that occurred after introduction of the Versailles–Washington system and especially after the Trianon Treaty (4 June 1920), he automatically became a citizen of Czechoslovakia. He linked his entire political career with the state of Tomáń G. Masaryk and Edvard Beneń throughout the existence of the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks; first in the League of Hungarian Appurtenance in

Czechoslovakia [Csehszlovákiai Magyar Népközösségi Liga(CSMNL)], followed by his position as the chair of the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party [Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt(OKSZP)] and the United Hungarian Party [Egyesült Magyar Párt(EMP)], and finally as a parliamentarian in Prague since 1935. His activities focused on issues of the Hungarian minority in the Czechoslovak state and he certainly was a tough and consistent politician in that respect. This, however, did not mean that he was not sensitive to problems of the Czechs and Slovaks. His activities between the world wars also include moments such as expressing support to Beneń at the point of his election for president of the republic and support for Slovakia‘s autonomy. It is obvious that controversial issues between Esterházy and his Czech and Slovak partners resulted primarily from a different perception of the political situation and in most instances the developments confirmed the arguments presented by the representative of the Hungarian minority.7 János Esterházy remained primarily a Hungarian, a representative of a family whose roots went back to early Middle Ages. He came from the Csesznek line that was founded by count Daniel Esterházy, who died in 1645. The seat of the Esterházy family in Csesznek near Veszprém (Slovak: Česnek, German: Zeßnegg, Croatian: Česneg) was owned by the family till 1945.8

POLITICAL BELIEFS OF JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY

There is need to emphasize that János Esterházy ranked among those Central European politicians who were aware of the weight of comprehensive regional solutions. In that respect he needs to be considered as the heir to the way of thinking that was presented by thinkers such as Oszkár Jászi and Miklós Makay in the 1920s. The former is known as the author of the proposition of the regional association called The Danube United States that were envisioned to include five sovereign states, namely Hungary, Austria, the Czech lands, Poland and Illyria.9Makay had a similar perception of the possible ―regulation‖ of the area and he took account of the economic criteria and advanced tightening the regional relations to compete with the western countries in their internal markets. This goal was envisioned to be underpinned with the establishment of the so-called Agrarian Block associating Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.10The characteristic feature of both concepts was the belief that Poland had to be taken account of in the effort to give Central European politics a new form. Apparently, this also was the view of János Esterházy who perceived Poland as the guarantor of the new order in Central and Eastern Europe. Just the same, it has to be pointed out that Esterházy‘s political opinion was shaped under the influence of three factors in the thirties, namely: 1) a belief of the wrong foundations of Czechoslovak politics that was underestimating factors jeopardizing its own existence (The Third Reich) and had too much confidence in associations based on strengthening the post-Versailles and post-Trianon order (France); 2) the assumption that there was need to persuade Poland (the largest country in the region) about the necessity of changes in the Central Eastern European region (despite the awareness of the political reality in Poland that was commanding the Polish people to cut their ties off from the changes in the Versailles–Washington system); and 3) belief that the situation within the Hungarian population in the Czechoslovak state could not be changed unless radical solutions related to the entire region happened. The most preferred solution by János Esterházy was the vision of a return of the Felvidék(Upper Hungary) to the Hungarian homeland meaning subjecting Slovakia to Hungary and granting the Slovaks the right for full autonomy (Esterházy was, a priori,excluding having a Hungarian deputy appointed by Budapest in Slovakia) in the form of a determinate parliament, surrogate government institutions, a permanent representative of the Slovak government in the Hungarian government, its own budget and an independent army operationally subordinated to the Hungarian army commander. Esterházy alone probably had no illusions of the poor chances (including chances of support from the Slovaks or Poles themselves) for implementation of the idea. That also was why the political reality (knowing that Budapest was not planning to grant Slovaks that extensive scope of powers11even if the idea of annexing Slovakia to Hungary

16 came true) commanded giving up the maximalist Hungarian effort to resolve the issue of Czechoslovakia in line with the conservative pre-Trianon solutions. That was most likely the reason why Esterházy‘s political opinion at the end of the 1930s underwent significant evolution and he became the advocate of the so-called ―horizontal axis‖ meaning his vision of a Polish–Hungarian–Southern Slavs–Italian association.12 The concept, introduced alongside the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, has to be mentioned for several reasons. First of all, it deserves attention because it was the rather unknown attempt by Hungary to dismantle the Steel Pact and guide Italy away from close cooperation with the Third Reich. Moreover, even though Jan Szembek‘s Diariusz clearly pointed out that Esterházy was inspired directly by Gian Galeazzo Ciano‘s idea, who was imagining Budapest–Belgrade–Warsaw–Rome as a counterweight to the German–Italian truce; hence Esterházy‘s view was clearly in line with the Polish attempts of federalization of Central and Eastern Europe or with the concepts that were pointing out the necessity of Polish action in arranging the sub-regional relations.13 The Hungarian concept had a big chance to be accepted by Poland as it had already been mentioned by Beck in the discussion with Pierre Laval. When the issue of Poland joining the grouping of the Danube states was raised at the negotiating table during the visit by the head of French diplomacy in Warsaw in 1935, Beck stated that in principle he did not see any reservations against Poland‘s participation in the project, yet he conditioned the participation with demands made by the Hungarian government. Finalisation of the Hungarian and Polish effort and obtaining a common border of both countries could have presented a prelude to materialization of Esterházy‘s project. There was an accord of views in principle but nevertheless the diversity of goals between the two countries has to be emphasized. Joining the Danube federation would have been a means to acquire a demographic and military counterweight to Germany and the Soviet Union, countries that were not concealing their hegemonic effort. To Hungarians the federation presented a chance to recover its own position in the region.14That did not mean controversial goals and an anti-Czechnature of the proposed association in the contemporary situation, as well as in connection with the then apparent and definite position held by the Slovaks; it was more supportive to the idea than hampering it.15 Anyway, Esterházy, with his way of thinking of Central Europe, joined the family of thinkers such as Ignacy Matuszewski, Władysław Studnicki, Włodzimierz Wakar and Wojciech Wasiutyński.16

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY‘S RELATIONS WITH POLAND

Besides the family ties, Esterházy was one of a few Central European politicians who stayed in ongoing touch with Poles. His family relation to Polish nobility certainly made his access to Polish politicians easier who, at last in the beginning of developing relations, did not display any special attention to him.17 Immediate cooperation with the Polish officials was recorded in the context of visible decline of the Versailles system in the pre-Munich period in 1938 and alongside the Polish–Hungarian attempts to have a common border that were completed when the goal was achieved in 1939.18 On 4 March 1938 in vice minister J. Szembek‘s Diariusz,the first record appeared of the person of the representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The Director of the Eastern Division of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Tadeusz Kobylański, considered as Beck‘s close collaborator, informed Szembek about the Czechoslovak issues and pointed out the opportunity to strengthen the government in Prague by including the representatives of the Slovak and Hungarian minorities in it. The Czech proposals allegedly were favourably received by Count Esterházy who, as the representative of the Hungarian minority would, under certain circumstances, be inclined to join the cabinet.19 In the contemporary political situation within the Polish–Czech conflict over the Cieszyn area (Polish: Cieszyn Silesia, Czech: Těńínské Slezsko) and the preponderance of Czech politics to Communist infiltration, both diplomats arrived at the conclusion that strengthening Beneń‘s position was not serving the Polish interests. That also is why both politicians acknowledged that it was necessary to personally influence Esterházy to discourage him from joining the

17 cabinet.20In a discussion with Beck, Szembek proposed that this mission be accomplished by a close relative of Esterházy, diplomat Kazimierz Mycielski.21 It indicates from the Szembek‘s Diariusz that the first meeting of Esterházy with the leading Polish officials took place as late as 18 June 1938 when the Hungarian politician was received by Minister Józef Beck. The visit at the Polish Foreign Affairs Ministry followed two days after an opinions‘ exchange between Esterházy and Szembek. The meeting was arranged as a ―family breakfast‖ by the Polish cousin, Count Artur Potocki. It is worth pointing out from the direct description of the Szembek–Esterházy meeting that the discussions in Warsaw were purely of a recognisance nature. The primary goal of Esterházy‘s visit was finding out how much interested the Polish politicians were in activities aimed at arrangement or modification of the regional relations and whether there was willingness to support the Hungarian effort. Esterházy foresaw that a Hungarian–Slovak agreement could be concluded in the future and in that instance Poland was explicitly pre-assigned to play the role of a guarantor.22 It seems impossible that Esterházy was not aware of the Polish belief, especially in the country‘s military circles, that there was need to have a common border with Hungary. From this assumption also the clearly formulated conclusion of the discussion was derived that the territorial scope of autonomy that had been granted to the Slovaks did not apply to southern lands that were populated by―exclusively Hungarian peoples, and the Trans–Carpathian Ruthenia whose western border will have to be defined first and which Budapest would want to push as much to the west as possible‖.23The meeting with Beck confirmed that the Hungarian position could rely on an understanding, if not more, in Warsaw.24 The Polish minister did not exclude the possibility of Poland assuming the role of a guarantor for the agreement but conditioned it with both parties raising the issue to the government in Warsaw. It has to be emphasized at this point that in the Polish literature one can find excessively extensive statements as if Beck had granted consent to the annexation of Slovakia by Hungary that he was conditioning with acquisition of Cieszyn Silesia and modification of the border in the Carpathians.25 The preserved Polish resources claim that Beck‘s stance added new impulse to Esterházy‘s actions and plans such as the records of the diplomatic contacts of Vice Minister Szembek and the Hungarian ambassador to Warsaw András Hory, Esterházy was clearly directing his activities towards approximation of Hungarian–Slovak relations and to a certain degree reinforced the position of the Hungarians. This is attested, inter alia, by information provided by Hory that Esterházy conditioned the talks with Prague on arrangements for minorities with fulfilling the propositions of the Hungarian minority.26 The policy pursued by the leader of the Hungarian minority allegedly was negatively received by the Czech officials. That claim was underpinned with an apparently desperate effort by Milan Hodņa to neutralize Esterházy‘s activities. The Czech Prime Minister directly approached Esterházy and tried to persuade him about the illusionary Polish support when he claimed: ―Regardless of how much they have told you in Warsaw, our situation is getting better every day. Germany does not want to start war, and cannot anyway. At the moment they are discussing an agreement with England and it is not to our detriment. The allies fully support us.‖27 It can be assumed that these kinds of statements would not impress Esterházy, who had up- to-date information right from Budapest, Berlin, Rome and Warsaw. The leader of the Hungarian minority was clearly aware that the issue of the existence of Czechoslovakia had been decided upon at least after May 1938. That also was why he focused his activities exclusively to assure the best possible conditions for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In August 1938 Esterházy made more steps for which he was inspired by Polish instances. At the beginning of the months the Hungarian and Polish diplomats were planning to use the count as an envoy whose role was to win support for the Polish and Hungarian plans from the British aristocracy. The access to English ―saloons‖ for Esterházy was supposed to be ensured by his Polish relative, the Polish ambassador to London, Edward Raczyński.28 It also is known that thanks specifically to Esterházy the Polish party got information that Kánya was able to win Hitler‘s support for the territorial aspirations of Budapest during his trip to Berlin.29 The situation moved on again in September 1938 when the Hungarian foreign affairs minister offered autonomy to the Slovaks under international guarantee, meaning Warsaw and Budapest.30 As indicated from the Polish diplomatic correspondence, the Hungarian initiative hit

18 against a sudden opposite action by Berlin. Esterházy alone did inform Poland that Budapest‘s proposal was presented ―in an incorrect form and tone‖ and ―provoked unwillingness in the Slovaks‖31, but the offer from the Hungarians could not be compared with the German offer for an independent Slovakia. In that regard it has to be pointed out that Esterházy was not against Slovakia‘s sovereignty but his approval depended on the approach to the Hungarian minority. The Vienna arbitration of 2 November 1938 allowed satisfying the demands that the Hungarians had at that time but the Polish sources claim that Esterházy was not happy with the mediation done by Germany and Italy. In the presence of the Poles in particular, he did not try to conceal his disappointment over the fact that Hungary‘s territorial wins were achieved at the price of consent to German supremacy over the Czech lands and Slovakia.32 As a matter of fact, passiveness of the Hungarian officials was going to contribute, in later prospects, to worsening conditions of living for the ethnic Hungarian population in independent Slovakia. The absence of strong action from Budapest is attested by the fact that the vital issue of a common border for Poland and Hungary required an energetic initiative from Poland.33 The fact that Slovak statehood was not relying on Polish and Hungarian guarantees prepared to stop Hitler‘s expansion in the Danube region was allegedly considered as a personal offence by Esterházy. Regardless, the brave visions and readiness to materialize them won Esterházy respect from the Poles. Esterházy‘s activities for the benefit of Poles deserve even greater recognition. The records, made by Szembek, report on Poles who, having trusted the excessive campaign of 1939, crossed the frontier of Poland and were interned in Hungary. The extent of Esterházy‘s involvement is really impressive. He participated in organizing committees to assist Poles, he organized provisions and housing for soldiers and Polish civilians, he was involved in depositing Polish art works in vaults of the National Museum in Budapest and reserves of the Polish bank in treasuries and vaults of the Hungarian Credit Bank. Esterházy‘s activities in assisting the Polish people who were interned in 1939 is poorly known because the Hungarian authors whose works were translated into Polish did not record them.34 In that regard a somewhat marginal episode in Esterházy‘s life that is connected with assistance provided to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski who, following the lost defensive war in 1939 transited Hungary on his way to France. Sosnkowski received support, civilian clothes and money35 that allowed him to reach Paris. Esterházy also played a role in seeing that Sosnkowski was given the honour to be the successor of the Polish president (at the moment when the office was vacant Sosnkowski would have automatically become the head of state) and a minister of the exile government that had a significant influence on the action of the Polish government in emigration.

EPITOME OF RESISTANCE AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM

A characteristic feature of Esterházy was his almost physical aversion to new forms of a system based on violence or disrespect of human dignity that, to his surprise and manifested disgust, were winning applause from certain European peoples. He was very openly manifesting his concern over the growing strength of the Reich (making him, as said above, distinct from other politicians in Czechoslovakia) and his disagreement with Adolf Hitler‘s actions. There was no secret about the German leader‘s paying that disgust back in the same way and not even trying to conceal that from third countries.36 The resistance against national socialism was growing stronger during World War II37 and it had direct effects on, inter alia, relations with the official from the German minority in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin. The Hungarian politician did not accept the positions of his German counterpart especially with regard to Slavs, Roma and Jews living in Slovakia. He spoke against those positions multiple times in his public appearances and statements. Esterházy‘s condemnation of the Holocaust was characteristic of his beliefs and had two aspects, the political and the humanitarian ones. On 15 May 1942 the Slovak Parliament was deliberating adoption of Act No. 68 allowing deportations of the Jewish minority (actually passing Jews on to the Nazis) and Esterházy was the only parliamentarian who voted against the new act, stating: ―As the representative of

19 the local Hungarians I proclaim, and please take notice of it, that I am not voting in favour of the draft act but I am voting against it because as a Hungarian and Christian and Catholic at the same time, I consider the draft act cruel and inhumane‖.38 Esterházy, more than anyone else, was realizing what the Slovak Jews deported to Poland were to expect. Information on this issue was provided to him by his Polish relatives and he was passing it on to Slovak figures. He was also actively helping not only the Slovak but also the Polish Jews. For his personal involvement in rescuing them he was granted the Jan Karski Courage to Care Award by the New York Anti-Defamation League in 2011.39 An eloquent evidence of Esterházy‘s disagreement with the totalitarian regime imported from the East alongside with the arrival of the Red Army to Europe was a series of charges that were to become the foundation for accusation of the official of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. The count‘s biographer wrote that according to officials from Communist Slovakia, Esterházy allegedly: 1) significantly contributed to the collapse of Czechoslovakia in 1938; 2) was supporting Nazi Germany and Horthy‘s Hungary in harming the USSR; 3) had influence on the declaration of war against the Soviet Union; and 4) was serving the Fascist regime. The accusations, and especially underscoring his negative position to USSR, were envisioned to suffice for pronouncing Esterházy guilty of collaborating with the Nazis.40 According to the Russians, Esterházy was a committed enemy of the Soviet government, he was engaging in an active fight against the Soviet state and inciting (...) fights against the Red Army in the territory of Czechoslovakia that was liberated from Germany.41 No wonder then that Esterházy, as a professed enemy of the system, was destroyed by the same system. He was imprisoned in Slovakia and deported to the USSR. There, following a short stay in the infamous Butyrka prison, he was condemned to 10 years in a gulag in the Komi Republic. In 1949, gravely ill, he was repatriated to his homeland to die in the Communist prison in Mírov on 8 March 1957. According to Hungarian data, even at the time when he was physically ruined by his stay in Russia, he maintained his dignity as a person, believing that loyalty to the values he had been professing was more important than human existence.

IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION

János Esterházy was an extraordinary person whose greatness was acknowledged not just by the Hungarians. A clear sign of respect are the post-mortem awards from Poland (including the Polonia Restituta order) and memorials erected in Poland.42 Apparently in other Central European countries (in the Czech lands and in Slovakia) the up until now negative evaluations of Esterházy that has been expressed through absence thus far of his official rehabilitation or his stereotypic perception is a result of how he was conducting politics rather than of a true evaluation of Esterházy‘s activities during the pre-war and war times. The post-war chapter of Esterházy‘s biography presents an invitation to compare the fates of the representatives of political or intellectual elites in those Central European countries that found themselves in the Soviet zone of influence following the outcome of the Yalta Conference. The description of his detention, sentencing and imprisonment and what followed43 strongly resembles the fate of the representatives of the Polish underground state who were sued in the so-called ―Process of the Sixteen‖ and also individual tragic lives of Polish patriots who were deprived of their lives or freedom by the ―justice‖ machinery serving the Soviet totalitarian regime. For the people of Poland there is certain value associated with one of the charges talking about Esterházy‘s responsibility for dissemination of the truth about Katyn.44 It is correct on this occasion to recall the fate of the Polish Puņak and Lipiński, the Hungarian Esterházy and Mindszenty, Romanian Mani and Bulgarian Petko communities that are a part of the common European heritage and this should be emphasized more to bring these facts to the awareness of intellectual and political elites in Western Europe. It would be correct if János Esterházy, Hungarian on his father‘s and Polish on his mother‘s side, and a citizen of Czechoslovakia upon his own decision, became a figure that would get attention of peoples coexisting in the geopolitical area called the Visegrad Four or Central Europe. In line with statements made by his biographer: ―it is important, especially at our time

20 suffering from a crisis of values. The example of János Esterházy as a man and politician can at this time of crisis of values present in all of Central Europe, can serve as an orientation point to us‖.45

NOTES

1 Bencsik, G.: Horthy Miklós. A kormányzó és kora. Budapest, 1991; Csonkaréti, K.: Horthy a tengerész. Budapest, 1993; Garlicki, A.: Przewrót majowy. Warsaw, 1987, Gosztonyi, P.: A kormányzó Horthy Miklós. Budapest, 1990; Holzer, J.: Dwa czeskie autorytaryzmy. In: Europa Środkowowschodnia między totalitaryzmem, autorytaryzmem a demokracją. Adamczyk, A.–Biniecka, P.–Kaźmierczak, K. (eds): Piotrków Trybunalski, 2011, pp 179–198; Paruch, W.: Po jednej stronie konfliktu suprapolitycznego: Kształtowanie się obozu piłsudczykowskiego w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej po zamachu majowym. In: Niepodległość, 2011, t. LX, 36–55; Sakmyster, T.: The Hungary’s Admiral Horseback. Nicolaus Horthy 1919–1944. New York, 1993; Suleja, W.: Józef Piłsudski. Wrocław, 1995.

2 For example to Józef Piłsudski, who is presented as the liberator of the old continent and who halted the progress of the Bolsheviks in 1920, was concerned over the good for Poland and its people. The fact that on that occasion he prevented Lenin from materialization of his continental goals is primarily owing to the geographical position of Poland and not to the thinking in European categories of the head of the Polish state.

3 To illustrate the regional and supra-regional interconnection and active role of the Central European commanders, the Polish literature generally presents the plans of the Jagiellonians to build a universal monarchy and the years under the rule of Stephen Báthory in Poland. On the other hand, in the context of the universal fight for freedom of countries and nations in Europe that have disappeared from the map of Europe as a result of the post-Vienna decisions of 1815, the figure of General Józef Bem is a standard example.

4 The most extensive publication in Polish on the issue of Esterházy is: Molnár, I.: Zdradzony bohater. János Esterházy (1901–1957). Warsaw, 2004; see also: Epilog życia Jánosa Esterházy’ego. Wpływ systemu represji na losy przedstawiciela elity politycznej Europy Środkowowschodniej.In: Represje sowieckie wobec narodów Europy 1944– 1956, Rogut, D.–Adamczyk, A., Zelów (eds), 2005, pp 255–278. Criticism of Esterházy has become a foundation for a broad discussion in the press: Górny, G.: Spór o hrabiego. In: Przewodnik Katolicki. 2005, Issue 5, 12; Kaczorowski, A.: Bohater czy zdrajca.In: Gazeta Wyborcza, Issue 171 (26.7.2001), pp 14–15; Molnár, I.: Polski Książe Esterházy. In: Polityka, Issue 13 (25.3.2000), pp 86–88; Olszański, T.: Bohater czy zdrajca In: Gazeta Wyborcza, Issue 171 (26.7.2001), pp 14–15; Valenta, J.: Polski Książe. In:Polityka, Issue 16 (15.4.2000), p. 89.

5 Stanisław Tarnowski (1837–1917), Kraków 1999; Hoesick, Por. F.: Stanisław Tarnowski (1837–1917). Rys życia i prac. Kraków, 1906; Pietrusiewiczowa, J.: Literatura Polska od średniowiecza do pozytywizmu. Warsaw, 1974, 681. And also: Kutrzeba, S.: Polska Akademia Umiejętności. Kraków, 1939, p. 51.

6 Reference to genealogy of J. Esterházy http://www.sejm–wielki.pl/b/cz. I022432 (accessed: 6. 5.2012).

7 There is a very eloquent description of Esterházy‘s meeting with President Beneń in Topoľčianky on 11 September 1936, as presented by Imre Molnár. There is no reason not to believe the authenticity of the reconstruction of the meeting of the two politicians and we can clearly see how short-sighted the Czech statesman was. Beneń‘s belief (nota bene, at the time when Hitler also had power and was bluntly violating the Versailles Treaty) that there is no need to worry about war and the rule of the Führer would not last long, and he was hundred percent sure that France would fall into an internal revolution (Molnár, I.: Zdradzony..., 51 and on), show a really poor image of Beneń as a politician and statesman. One can get a similar impression from another description of Esterházy‘s discussion with Beneń, this time in 1937, when the Czech leader was presenting Czechoslovakia as the most consolidated state in Central Eastern Europe (Ibid., 70). Beneń allegedly was making a blind eye to Esterházy‘s arguments that there was need to integrate the citizens of Czechoslovakia by granting equal rights to all minorities, especially the Slovaks, and also to Hungarians and Germans. The biographer of the representative of the Hungarian minority considered Beneń‘s unwillingness to open the country to the issue of nationality as the key cause of Esterházy‘s resilience to his policy for which rejecting the Hungarians became a symbol present in the republic‘s government. Esterházy‘s perception of the Czech statesman in the inter-war period was in principle identical with the notes Beneń was getting from the Polish diplomacy. It can be assumed that Esterházy did not change his opinion at the time of war when the Polish opinion was developing in dependence on the position adopted by the Czechs.

8 The Polish literature also includes information about involvement of other members of the Esterházy family in 20th century politics, inter alia Miklós (1869–1920), presented as a politician who, together with the Primate János Csernoch achieved (13 November 1918) the abdication of the Austrian emperor Charles I (as Hungarian king Charles IV) from the Hungarian crown and Mór (1869–1920), the 1917 prime minister of Hungary for a short time (15 June–20 August) and minister without portfolio in 1918. Kochanowski, J.: Od ugody do ugody 1867–1990. Warsaw, 1997, pp 44, 48, 202. Felczak, W.: Historia Węgier. Wrocław, 1983, p. 306.

9 The Hungarian theoretician used the term Illyria for association of the Southern Slav Balkan peoples with a dominating role held by Croatia. Litván, G.: Oszkár Jászi’s Danube Federation Theories. In: Geopolitics in the Danube Region. Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts 1848–1998. Király, B. K.– Romsics, I. (eds), Budapest, 1999, pp 230–233. Demands

formulated this way were unfeasible and for that reason Jászi minimized his concept later. He eliminated the Slav countries from the original association and at the end of the 1920s he transformed his original idea to a program called the ―Danube Patriotism‖. He assumed boosting the ―natural‖ relation of Hungary, Austria and Romania.

10 The project that was refusing the postulate of a revision of the post-Trianon arrangement as a matter of principle did not have much chance to get into the awareness of the Hungarians. Gyarmati, G.: Conceptual Changes in Central European Integration in Hungarian Political Thinking 1920–1948.In: Geopolitics in the Danube Region..., op. cit., pp 202–203.

11 Batowski, H.: Europa zmierza ku przepaści. Poznań, 1977, p. 67.

12 Molnár, I.: Zdradzony..., op. cit., p. 75.

13 Eberhardt, P.: Twórcy polskiej geopolityki. Kraków, 2006, pp 87, 114.

14 Gyarmati, G.: Conceptual Changes in Central European Integration in Hungarian Political Thinking 1920–1948. In: Geopolitics in the Danube Region..., op. cit., pp 201–220.

15 Esterházy‘s view can be studied also as a counterweight to the plan proposed by M. Hodņa and recorded in the Polish literature. It was establishing organizations of economic unity of the Little Entente countries extended by Hungary and Austria. Pułaski, M.: Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko–czechosłowacko–niemieckie od roku 1933 do wiosny 1938. Poznań, 1967, p. 157.

16 Eberhardt, P.: Twórcy polskiej geopolityki. Kraków, 2006, pp 83–96, 105–120, 152–161, 224–234.

17 In the most important source including the record of close cooperation of Count Esterházy with the Polish Foreign Ministry, namely in the Diariusz by the Deputy Minister Jan Szembek, its author does not have a favourable opinion of Esterházy. Szembek, János‘s uncle in private terms, a relative of Esterházy through bonds with the Tarnowski family, did not consider him as an ―excellent political mind‖ (Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka, adapted byZarański, J., London, 1972, p. 177). This, undoubtedly personal opinion, was influenced primarily by the ―family‖ opinion of János as an uncompromising person whose political activities were founded on absolute loyalty to ideal principles. That was profoundly in conflict with Szembek‘s pragmatic approach to doing politics (Report by Piotr Mycielski, nephew of J. Esterházy of 21 February 2007). As the deputy minister‘s notes show, this is how he introduced J. Esterházy as a person to Minister J. Beck.

18 In the Polish specialized literature coming from the Communist period J. Esterházy, alongside Géza Szüllő, is presented as a representative of the Hungarian minority who, together with Sudeten Germans of K. Henlein established a joint front to ensure the broadest possible national liberties for the minorities in Czechoslovakia. Batowski, H.: Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie (jesień 1938 – wiosna 1939). Warsaw, 1962, p. 75.

19 Kobylański‘s formulation of the proposition of alleged preparedness of Esterházy to accept the ministerial office was founded on a note by the official from Poland in Prague, Kazimierz Pappée, that was drawing exclusively just from gossip originating in Slovak sources supporting the Hungarians. Pappée wrote: ―in my opinion, the worst role in all this[in the process of building a government with wide background – A.A.] is played by the Hungarian minority whose leading official Esterházy has confidentially told the Slovaks that he will not hesitate to join the cabinet that was under reorganization, if Hodņa makes that proposal‖. Landau, Z.–Tomaszewski, J.: Monachium 1938. Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne. Warsaw, 1985, 43. Pismo K. Pappéego do T. Kobylańskiego (?) z 3 III 1938 r. w sprawie rozpoczęcia dyplomatycznej akcji antykomunistycznej w Pradze. See professional literature, Stanisławska, S.: Wielka i mała polityka Józefa Becka (marzec–maj 1938). Warsaw, 1962, p. 85.

20 Zarański, J.: Diariusz i teki..., op. cit., p. 54.

21 Ibid.,56. It seems that the role Mycielski was facing was useless in the context of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia and the meeting most likely never took place. Esterházy‘s biographer rejects that the Prague government would have formulated that kind of far-reaching proposal addressed at the Hungarians in Slovakia and that Esterházy was considering his participation in the cabinet. To the contrary, Imre Molnár claims that the role Beneń reserved for the Hungarian minority was just the role of a bridge between Prague and Budapest and he informed Esterházy about that in a personal discussion. (Molnár, I.: Zdradzony..., op. cit., p. 72). Esterházy alone gave a similar characteristic of the position of the Czechs in his discussion with Beck. He claimed that the Czech government asked them [i.e. Hungarians – A.A.] ―to express their wishes and the talks that started this way did not continue and failed to bring results― (Zarański, J.: Diariusz i teki..., op. cit., p. 192). In the Polish literature opinion can be found that the attempts of Czechs to reach an agreement with the minorities living in Czechoslovakia arrived too late. Batowski, H.: Zdrada monachijska. Sprawa Czechosłowacji i dyplomacja europejska w roku 1938. Poznań, 1973, p. 53.

22 Encouragement in favour of Warsaw‘s involvement in the Budapest issue were to be German decisions. Esterházy during his meeting with Szembek gave the Polish deputy minister a report on his visit with Ciano in Rome. He mentioned details of a discussion that was attended by him and also by the Italian Foreign Minister and Hitler and Mussolini. The representative of the Hungarian minority had to answer questions about eventual assistance of his party in taking over Slovakia. The Italian and German partners did not conceal the fact of the existence of final solutions for Czechoslovakia but they deemed inappropriate to present them to Esterházy or notify him the time of their implementation. Yet, as mentioned by Esterházy, the talk was about portions of Silesia that were supposed to be given to Poland. It concerned an

area with more than 50 villages. The actors were emphasizing the necessity of reaching an agreement between Hungary and Poland on the issue of Slovakia. Zarański, J.: Dariusz i teki..., op. cit., p. 191.

23 Ibid., 189.

24 The head of the Polish foreign ministry was persuading Esterházy that ―he always took account of the Hungarian interest in his policy‖, but he blamed the Hungarian diplomacy for the absence of closer ties between both states. The evidence allegedly was the person of the Foreign Affairs Minister, Kálmán Kánya. According to Beck, ―when he met with Minister Kánya for the first time in Geneva and presented him his position, he got an answer that he was taking notice of it but the pro-Hungarian feelings of Poland were of a purely platonic nature‖ (Ibid.,193). The minister‘s position could in a way also have influenced the choice of the Hungarian representative with the Polish government. András Hory, proposed by Kánya, is described in the Polish literature as ―an eager supporter of Polish–Hungarian cooperation when the issue was anti-Czech action but otherwise he avowed to the principle of revisionism over Hungarian–Polish friendship and he believed in Germany‘s invincibility‖. Batowski, H.: Agonia pokoju i początek wojny. Poznaň, 1984, p. 32.

25 Skrzypek, A.: W kręgu koncepcji Międzymorza i taktyki balansowania (maj 1935 – wrzesień 1938). In: Historia dyplomacji polskiej, t. IV (1918–1939). Łossowski, P. (eds), Warsaw, 1995, p. 561.

26 Zarański, J.: Diariusz i teki…, op. cit., p. 221.

27 Landau, Z.–Tomaszewski, J.: Monachium 1938..., op. cit., p. 222. Report from K. Pappée dated 21 July 1938 about the talks that M. Hodņa held with representatives of ethnic minorities about the status of ethnic minorities.

28 Zarański, J.: Diariusz i teki…, op. cit., p. 251.

29 Landau, Z.–Tomaszewski, J.: Monachium 1938..., op. cit., p. 262. Telegram by K. Pappée of 31.8.1938 about the outcome of the trip by Hungarian politicians to Berlin.

30 Ibid., 322. Telefonogram K. Pappée of 19.9.1938 about the proposals presented by K. Kánya to the Slovaks.

31 Ibid., 492. Telegram K. Pappée of 31.8.1938 about the outcome of the trip by Hungarian politicians to Berlin.

32 Esterházy‘s opinions were supported by the Polish historian who claimed that ―the Hungarian demands were only partially satisfied but Germany won the gratitude from Slovaks‖. Batowski, H.: Między dwiema wojnami 1919– 1939.Zarys historii dyplomatycznej. Kraków, 2001, p. 326.

33 See: Samuś, P.–Badziak, K.–Matwiejew G.: Akcja „Łom”. Polskie działania dywersyjne na Rusi Zakarpackiej w świetle dokumentów Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP. Warsaw, 1998; Dąbrowski, D.: Rzeczpospolita Polska wobec kwestii Rusi Zakarpackiej (Podkarpackiej) 1938–1939. Toruń, 2007.

34 Csorba, H. & T.: Ziemia węgierska azylem Polaków 1939–1945. Warsaw, 1985; Lagzi, I.: Droga żołnierza polskiegoprzez węgierską granicę w latach 1939–1941. Poznań, 1987; see also: Uchodźcy polscy na Węgrzech w latach drugiej wojny światowej. Warsaw, 1980. Similarly, Esterházy‘s involvement is not mentioned by the Polish author either: Ostoja, M.–Mitkiewicz: „Wojna jest grzechem”. Przykłady braterstwa polsko–węgierskiego w okresie II wojny

światowej. Warsaw, 2001.

35 Archiwum Studium Polski Podziemnej w Londynie, Kolekcja płk. Franciszka Demela, sygn. 11/1. Wspomnienia (6–15 X 1939); Mycielski, Z.: Dziennik 1950–1959. Warsaw, 1999, pp 265–269. Cf. Molnár, I.: Zdradzony..., op. cit., p. 138; see also: Wojewódzki, I.: Kazimierz Sosnkowski – minister stanu rządu na emigracji. In: Kazimierz Sosnkowski, żołnierz, humanista, mąż stanu w 120. rocznicę śmierci. Głowiński, T.–Kirszak, J. (eds), Wrocław, 2005, p. 106.

36 Hitler allegedly said in the presence of a Polish diplomat that ―the Hungarian politicians are unable to finally replace an aristocratic representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and elect someone else for his office‖. Molnár, I.: Zdradzony..., op. cit., p. 78.

37 Esterházy‘s statement ―Hungarians do not need (...) new ideas but reviving our own traditions” became well known. Ibid., 203.

38 Ibid., 211.

39 http://www.adl.org/main_Holocaust/Janos_Esterhazy_Courage_to_Care.htm (access: 2012–05–07); Assistance granted to Polish Jews by the Esterházy family was one of the arguments in favour of the post-mortem award to János Esterházy of the Komandérski cross of the Polonia Restituta order for excellent merit in favour of the Republic of Poland that was granted by the Polish President Lech Kaczyński on 23 March 2009. http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum– aktualnosci/rok–2009/art,48,43, posmiertne–odznaczenie–wegierskiego–bohatera.html.

40 Molnár, I.: Zdradzony…, op. cit., p. 262.

41 Ibid., 256.

42 http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/polska/x43059/odslonieto–pomnik–wegierskiego–patrioty/ (accessed: 9.5.2012).

43 Molnár, I.: Epilog..., op. cit., pp 255–278.

44 As written by Esterházy‘s biographer: In a separate paragraph of the indictment it reads that upon Esterházy‘s recommendation the Hungarian press was ―disseminating provocative materials about the so-called Katyń Massacre (...) in which the assassinations of Polish officers carried out by Germany are attributed to the Soviet power...‖I. Molnár, Zdradzony..., op. cit., p. 256.

45 Ibid.,307.

LÁSZLÓ SZARKA

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Historical Institute, Budapest J. Selye University, Komárno

POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY BEFORE THE FIRST VIENNA AWARD1

Hitler‘s Germany occupied Austria without any resistance on 12 March 1938. This was the first instance when Hitler‘s Third Reich occupied and annexed a sovereign state. The situation in Central Europe turned tense after the Anschluss and all states in that region were facing the threat that under the aggressive plans of the national socialist Germany they will end up like Austria. The events one year later that resulted in cessation of the interwar Czechoslovak Republic progressed fast. The Sudeten German Party, led by Henlein, upon commands from Berlin, kept toughening its demands on the Prague government on a monthly basis. National and land autonomy demanded by Hlinka‘s Slovak People‘s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, hereafter HSPP) since 1918, alongside the autonomy of Ruthenia, have come to the forefront. Hungary and Poland sought to join Germany in making territorial claims against Czechoslovakia, and Warsaw and Budapest were demanding also support from the French and British governments. All those developments had strong effect on the stability of the Czechoslovak Republic and on arrangements for the Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian ethnic minorities. Alternative ideas and the ongoing Czech–Slovak discussions on the issues of the Slovak and Ruthenian autonomy were an important component of the ideas of the Hungarian revisionist foreign policy. The Hungarian government and its closely cooperating Hungarian party policy in Slovakia tried to influence the content and development of the Slovak strive for autonomy. Yet, after the beginning of 1920, the distance between the policy of the Slovak People‘s Party and the minority Hungarian policy was visibly growing. The reason for this primarily was that the alternative meaning Slovakia‘s autonomy within Hungary would partially mean admitting the failure on the part of HSPP in 1918 which was only supported, and merely temporarily, by Vojtech Tuka. On the other hand, in the second half of the 1930s it was obvious that the ideas of the Hungarian foreign policy, in line with the then European reality, the alternative of nationality revision was increasingly coming to the forefront. The Hungarian revisionist plan raised concerns among Slovak and Ruthenian politicians who were striving for their own autonomy as the plan was directly threatening their territorial integrity and political stability. In analysing the positions of the mother country and the Hungarian minority policy with regard to Slovak autonomy, their mutual relations and interaction, it is worth to specifically examine what proposals were designed by János Esterházy and what dilemmas he was facing at the time when he had a strong mandate from the Budapest government. Professional literature generally acknowledges in that regard that the leadership of the United Hungarian Party (President Andor Jaross, Executive Chair János Esterházy and Géza Szüllő who had the strongest say in foreign policy issues) had just very limited manoeuvring space in 1935–1938. In light of the results of research conducted in the past two decades it can be clearly stated that the final decisions on important issues were certainly made in Budapest in the 1920s. It is true that the officials from the United Hungarian Party (UHP) were invited to be present in preparations of decisions on substantial issues and they managed quite often to make use of the circumstances to pursue their own positions.2 Paradoxically, with regard to the Hungarian revisionist foreign policy (the crucial issue was Slovakia‘s autonomy and shaping Hungarian–Slovak relations) the officials of the Hungarian minority party had perhaps the largest manoeuvring space. The way the Budapest-based Hungarian foreign policy was made, had the features of certain helplessness in assessing the dynamic shifts within the Czechoslovak party policy, including that of the Slovak ruling and opposition parties. The Hungarian revisionist policy was, from the very beginning, considering two or three alternatives. With regard to Slovaks, Budapest was expecting Czech–Slovak conflicts and aggravation of the Czech–Slovak–German contradictions that was

24 considered as a trend for Hungary‘s benefit. Therefore, Budapest, in contrast with the Polish diplomacy, did not deem necessary to uplift the Hungarian–Slovak relations to a direct inter-governmental level. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian government officials understood that with the threat of the Little Entente, they had to avoid potential armed conflict with Czechoslovakia. On 29 March 1938 Jozef Tiso made a proclamation in the Prague parliament and urged the government to announce Slovakia‘s autonomy as soon as possible. The proclamation and all other official positions and declarations that were submitted by HSPP in 1938 with regard to the demand for autonomous Slovakia were made within Czechoslovakia, paradoxically, for the sake of stronger internal stability of the republic. Jozef Tiso consulted his address first with Esterházy and other minority politicians. Tiso dedicated a special chapter to the issue of ethnic groups in Slovakia. Yet, Esterházy perceived Tiso‘s willingness and promises with caution. He saw that ―minority cooperation‖ served just as a pretext to HSPP to boost the significance of the Slovak issue in font of Hodņa and Beneń.3 The HSPP statement in parliamentary discussion was supported by Géza Szüllő, honorary president of the United Hungarian Party; Leon Wolf, Polish deputy who was elected under the ―autonomist block‖ nominees that was initiated by Tiso, and Ernst Kundt, deputy and spokesperson of the Sudeten German Party.4 Géza Szüllő, in a heated debate in the Prague parliament on 29 March 1939, without reservations, supported autonomy for Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. According to him, the key cause of the weaker republic was that Slovakia‘s autonomy, envisioned back in the Pittsburgh Agreement, and the Carpathian Ruthenia‘s autonomy, prescribed in the Czechoslovak minority treaty of Saint Germain, did not materialise. ‖The government needs to understand that it will succeed only if, in terms of full legal equity, it provides to every nation living here what belongs to them under God‘s and people‘s laws. (...) We, the Hungarians, alongside our Slovak brothers, demand that every nation in the republic can manage their destiny in their territory independently.‖5The rightfulness of inter-relating the Slovak and Hungarian minority autonomies is also underpinned with the published Slovak and Czech documents. Nonetheless, it is true that the national and ideological specificities of the past decades often covered and made unseen to the Slovak and Czech analysts the differences in opinions and positions between the mother countries and the minorities.6 The Hungarian activities (the acting of the Hungarian revisionist foreign policy and of the United Hungarian Party) related to the Slovak‘s effort for autonomy that had not entirely separate but still partially different goals and methods can be best understood through the Hungarian positions to the Slovak alternatives. In 1938, the crisis year for Czechoslovakia, there seemed to be three plausible alternative solutions to the Slovak issue, namely an internal Czech–Slovak agreement, annexation to Poland or Hungary, two neighbour countries, or establishment of an independent state in line with Hitler‘s idea of Europe. A year after the Anschluss the Czechoslovak Republic found itself in lethal grip by Germany. The first reactions from the Slovak autonomist policy of March–April indicated that HSPP soon abandoned its moderate position. Hlinka‘s party and Tiso‘s supporters wanted to use the jubilee year of 1938 (anniversary of establishment of the republic and signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement) to step up their demands and strengthen their movement. Along that line, abandoning the up until then caution, they reconsidered the concept of German–Hungarian–Slovak ―minority‖ cooperation and identified untapped potential. The United Hungarian Party politicians also considered as important to disprove and disturb the foundations of the republic‘s state doctrine of Czech–Slovak unity. In May–July 1938, when the Czechoslovak–German and Czechoslovak–Sudeten German relations were growing increasingly tense, President Beneń and the Czechoslovak government were vacillating between the alternative of an active resistance and that of agreement recommended by their western allies. Hodņa drafted nationality statute and designed an agreement with the Hungarian and Sudeten German parties to bridge the political divide that was a result of the appeasement policy and loss of confidence in the policy of the western allies. There was a short period of close cooperation between Milan Hodņa and Edvard Beneń when the request of Slovak autonomy was somewhat left behind the more pressing German issue and partially developed independently from the minority issue. August marked the onset of a growing issue of an international, superpower-related crisis. As a result, the nature of the nationality policy reform that, in Hodņa‘s view was

25 of a preventative nature, changed radically and launched the defence of the republic and raised doubt over the government‘s initiatives. At the time of an aggravated Czechoslovak crisis, August and September 1938, it became obvious that an internal agreement on the German, Polish and Hungarian issues was not possible any more. Beneń and the Czechoslovak government made an attempt to reach an agreement on Slovak autonomy at least with the HSPP officials through adoption of the British–French ultimatum of 18 September. The nationality issue in Czechoslovakia (ČSR), just like the disintegration of multi-ethnic Hungary in 1918, was not just an internal policy issue any more. Beneń therefore did not try to do after Munich what was done by Károlyi‘s government at that time, namely to document its effort to reach an agreement at least in front of the international public and the future. The last version of the statute that was envisioned to allow transformation of the pre-war republic into a Swiss model of self-governing nationality-based system was not implemented. He did so several months earlier through a memorandum that informed the British and French governments about the restoration of the Czechoslovak nationality policy. Soon it became obvious that this had very little effect. The nationality statute (including far-reaching concessions) as well as different versions of a Czechoslovak agreement that were drafted by Milan Hodņa, Edvard Beneń and Ivan Dérer, the Justice Minister, at the time of the most difficult crisis, were unable to address the accumulated problems. Moreover, account has to be taken of rather significant differences between the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian historiographies in viewing the post-Munich and to lesser degree the post-Vienna Award situation that opened up an opportunity to address the Czech–Slovak relations and regulate the Ruthenian issue, namely autonomy statuses for Slovakia and the Trans-Carpathian region.7 The issues of Hungary and Poland were didn‘t have to wait long for solution and were resolved, co a large degree by the application of ethnic revision principle and Munich principle. The major ethno–political challenge facing the second republic was to introduce an autonomous Czech–Slovak–Ruthenian system and make it work as well as address the conflicts arising along the new frontiers. The alternatives, choices and decisions available to the Hungarian minority were reduced towards the end of this extremely complex six-month period. In the event that the superpowers didn‘t address exclusively the Czech–German issue through the frontier modification, the time would come for most ethnic Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia to ―return back home‖. Another solution would have been autonomous Slovakia and within that the opportunity for Hungarian cultural or regional autonomy. The possibility of Hungarian and Polish arrangement specified in the complementary minutes from the Munich Treaty and proclamation of autonomous Slovakia of 6 October within a week brought to surface irreconcilable conflict between the Hungarian ethnic revision and Slovak autonomy that the United Hungarian Party as well as János Esterházy had to face.

INFLUENCING THE IDEAS OF SLOVAK AUTONOMY

How did Esterházy and the leaders of the United Hungarian Party (UHP), chaired by Andor Jaross, and its parliamentary faction use the events of 1938 for which they had been waiting for the past 20 years to happen, for the purposes of their agenda? To what extent could it satisfy the mandate they received from Budapest to address the Slovak issue? The Hungarian minority representation preferred instructions from the Hungarian revisionist policy till the very end but from time to time they referred to their own minority experience and sought to offer the Hungarian diplomacy alternatives through which they tried to approximate the revisionist doctrine to the real situation and possibilities. It also has to be seen that specifically in the light of the codified effort for Slovak autonomy under the second Czechoslovak Republic there was need to address and cope with the idea and illusion of the so-called integral revision meaning the annexation of all Slovakia. That was particularly hard for Esterházy who believed that with the help of Hungarian–Polish cooperation Slovak autonomy can become true within the Hungarian Kingdom and create a territorially

26 inter-connected potential Polish–Slovak–Hungarian axis to counterbalance the imminent threat of the Hitler‘s Neuordnung. That was unrealistic also because the leading officials from all concerned nations had expected an improvement of their positions from an agreement with Hitler in 1933–1938. That is also why it is worth noting that Esterházy, based on the Polish diplomacy resources, attributed the Hungarian failure to succeed in the issue of Slovakia‘s autonomy to aggressive behaviour of the Hungarian delegation at the Hungarian–Czech–Slovak meeting in Komárno and also to the way how the frontiers were drawn in Vienna.8 In reality he must have seen very well that with respect to Slovakia‘s autonomy and extension of powers of the minorities the Hungarian government viewed as plausible almost exclusively only the solutions outlined by Germany and that was the reason why Budapest was just passively watching the developments of the Slovak policy for independence with Czechoslovak orientation. Esterházy also was confronted with no approximation within Hungarian–Slovak relations over 20 years and absence of alternatives for arrangements including autonomy of Slovakia within Hungary. On both sides there was an absence of specific internal and partisan reasons, as well as those of historical and psychological nature. Both the Hungarians and the Slovaks perceived the situation of 1938 as if it was the situation that they had to face after the split of 1918. The Hungarian public opinion was hoping for a global, historical revision. For Slovakia, in turn, any alternative other than going back under the state of ―Saint Stephen‖ was more acceptable. The Slovaks tested out their own political, cultural and societal strength over the past 20 years in Czechoslovakia and they were also aware of the pros and cons of the common state with the Czechs. There was a major consensus in the political public opinion in Slovakia (in contrast with all Budapest‘s assumptions and expectations) that the Czechoslovak Republic progressed significantly in comparison with the status in 1918. In vast majority of the Hungarian society, in contrast, as if the time has stopped after Trianon. The attempts by the Hungarian minority intelligentsia to start cooperating with the neighbours and Hungary were futile and one can hardly talk about inter-connection between the old and the new worlds. For that reason, it was important that the Budapest government realized its limitations and also in the instance of János Esterházy, Executive President of the United Hungarian Party, and in line with the still effective division of labour drafted at the end of the government of István Bethlen, entrusted the personal discussions with the Slovaks fully to the leaders of the Hungarian minority politicians.9 In this context it is worth realising what internal and external issues, hurdles and concerns were related to the weakness of the revisionist strategy of the contemporary Hungarian diplomacy that was unable (in contrast with Poland) to present in 1930–1938 a clear and comprehensible Hungarian position on the Slovak issue that reflected the goals and ideas of Budapest. In spring 1938, typically, the Polish diplomacy lead by the Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck had to keep encouraging Budapest to try to contact directly the opposition Slovak political elites striving for autonomy and explain to the Slovak and international diplomacy the differences between Slovakia‘s status in Czechoslovak arrangement as opposed to 10 Hungarian–Slovak arrangement. In that regard, especially from the beginning of spring 1938, owing to activities of Kazimierz Papée, Polish Ambassador to Prague, and András Hory, Hungarian Ambassador to Warsaw, it was the Warsaw‘s initiative that the Hungarian Foreign Ministry lead by Kálmán Kánya, had to respond to. Warsaw that was involved in what was seen by Slovaks as satisfactory solution of the Slovak issue, used diplomatic line to push Budapest to present the Hungarian government‘s idea of addressing two key issues of the Czechoslovak crisis, namely autonomy of Slovakia and that of the Trans-Carpathian region. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry, in response to the Polish questions of 3 May 1938, summarised Hungary‘s negotiating positions in three points. They claimed, and reiterated it in a later statement, that the officials of the United Hungarian Party were responsible for the Hungarian–Slovak relations on behalf of Hungary. According to Budapest the negotiations were developing in the right direction although there was no qualitative shift in May 1938. The spokesperson of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry announced that ―taking account of delicate nature of the negotiations‖the Hungarian government engaged in no negotiations with Slovaks before May 1938 but soon they will be held.11

János Esterházy, who had a Polish mother and spoke the language, had numerous contacts and was supporting appurtenance in central Europe in contrast with the German idea of the living space, appeared as the right person to accelerate the Slovak–Hungarian dialogue.12 On behalf of the Hungarian party he summarised the overlapping opinions between the UHP and HSPP in the Prague parliament, the parties of the Slovak ―ancient population‖, Czechoslovak minorities and parties supporting autonomy. His role was to persuade the Slovak leaders about the benefits of a Hungary-oriented autonomy. This was mentioned in the Prague and Warsaw embassy reports and instructions several times.

MINORITY HUNGARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF SLOVAK AUTONOMY

The Slovak autonomy-oriented efforts were increasingly distant from the Hungarian government and Hungarian minority ideas and were applying a separated, independent line and were essentially casting doubt over the ―ancient population concept‖ as the sense of the pro-Hungarian autonomy program. Esterházy himself for a while believed that sooner or later HSPP will be willing to revisit the common anti- Czech policy of the ―ancient population of Slovakia‖.13 Esterházy as the President of the Provincial Christian Socialist Party believed his primordial role was focusing on the issue of autonomy: ―I will fight for autonomy. I refer especially to the self-confidence of the Slovak brothers because underestimating the local ancient population, as done by the Prague ruling circles claiming that we are not developed enough to be able to rule on our own, is inacceptable‖.14Esterházy complained several time that the negotiations on Slovakia‘s autonomy are slow for several reasons. One reason was that that the HSPP‘s presidency lead by Hlinka was dominated by a majority who were unable to separate the mediating role of the UHP‘s president from the main revisionist strategic line of the party that was also reinforced by the ―let‘s wait and see‖ policy of the Hungarian government and simultaneously was pushing through Slovakia‘s dependency on Hungary. The other source of opposing ideas between Slovakia and Hungary were the haunting memories of the historical assimilation effort and this also showed at the meeting of Andrej Hlinka, Jozef Tiso, Jozef Buday and János Esterházy and László Aixinger in January 1935 in Vienna, where the issue of excluding possible mutual assimilation was tabled.15 HSPP was very cautious in establishing relations with the Hungarian parties in the 1930s. Partially because in Hlinka‘s circles they believed in presence of revisionist commitments and also because the ―realistic‖ group lead by Vice-President Jozef Tiso within the party was growing stronger and was considering maintenance of the Czechoslovak state and settlement with the Czechs as the best alternative. The radical national group of the people‘s party was even less supportive of approximation with the Hungarians and having experienced a refusal of the proposed autonomy by the Prague parliament, it did not view the solution of the issue within Czechoslovakia as feasible and for that reason was asking the party leaders to pursue Slovakia‘s independence with growing fervor.16 The autonomy-oriented effort by Slovaks before autumn 1938 was increasingly stronger in favour of a new state arrangement within Czechoslovakia. What was the UHP‘s and János Esterházy‘s view of Slovakia‘s autonomy and how did they try to align the Hungarian revisionist policy with legal protection of the Hungarian ethnic minority? Esterházy presented his official position that was intended for the public at several levels including the Prague parliament, Hungarian minority and the Slovak press. The official position was underpinned with two kinds of arguments. Esterházy‘s idea of Slovakia‘s autonomy was partially leaning on the benefits of the ―concept of the ancient population of Slovakia‖ (in contrast with the Czech idea) and on independence from Prague and he believed that the only way to accomplish consolidation was through Slovakia‘s full and complete political, legislative and economic self-government. Esterházy understood that autonomy for Slovakia would have implications for a multitude of Czech and ―Czechoslovak‖ economic and particular interests. Thus, during negotiations with Beneń in Topoľčianky he noted that from Prague‘s point of view there is almost non-existent solution to the Slovak issue. Another cardinal point of his official position on autonomy was the idea of autonomy under Slovak leadership but

28 one that would embrace all nationalities in Slovakia, meaning a multi-ethnic autonomy in modern terms. He acknowledged the leading position of Slovaks in the future public administration but, as he said in Slovák, the central daily of HSPP, he hoped that HSPP ―would not fall into the same error as the one committed by centralist parties and in the Hungarian-populated areas of Slovakia the Hungarians will enjoy 17 the same rights as Slovaks in the Slovak areas‖. Esterházy viewed autonomy covering the entire area of Slovakia in the light of his own political strategy; yet in negotiations he viewed it in much broader setting. After a longer break, in autumn 1937, he contacted Karol Sidor, Hlinka‘s personal confidante and a People‘s Party deputy who had good relations with Poles, in order to re-establish the autonomy-supporting block that ceased to exist at the 1935 election time. In a report on the negotiations submitted to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Esterházy included interesting observations concerning difficulties of the Slovak autonomy oriented at Hungary. In Sidor‘s instance, Esterházy noted, his restraint concerning the orientation at Hungary was based on his concern over his potential to act alongside the UHP that might easily bring him into isolation from the anti-Hungarian majority within HSPP. The President of the UHP, in establishing contact with the autonomy supporters, had another opportunity to prove, with strong assistance from the Slovak activists, that ―the Czechoslovak unity does not exist‖. Esterházy considered this as especially important in the ―jubilee year‖ and anniversary of the establishment of the republic when the Prague circles were planning to present the Czechoslovak national state as an absolute success. Preventing Slovaks from being part of Hodņa‘s 18 government was inter-connected with important Hungarian interests. The Hungarian revisionist alternative of Slovakia‘s autonomy was preserved within the HSPP policy only for the event of a complete cessation of Czechoslovakia, up until September 1938, as the most likely scenario and alternative.19 When Hitler got to power, shifts occurred within the Czechoslovak minority policy and instead of Slovakia‘s autonomy, the alternative of separation and independence of Slovakia as a state started graining strength. The core of representation of the Hungarian nationality group shifted entirely into the centre of UHP lead by Esterházy and Jaross after the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis. There was an opportunity to get ready for revisionist alterations without any hysteria and with management from a single centre, while the Budapest government was seeking to omit the leading parties from the first line of political conflicts. The UHP leaders tried to respond adequately firmly and clearly to the fast-track negotiations on the so-called Hodņa‘s nationality statute outlined in spring and summer 1938. A new set of demands was drafted and several deliberations were held with the prime minister as well as with Lord Runciman who arrived to Prague to play the role of a mediator between the parties in the Czechoslovak crisis.20 The UHP was under enormous pressure to align all their actions with the Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein but the effort failed to result in any major cooperation other than a handful of formal talks. Nothing was happening following the Prague meeting of 11 May 1937 until November 1937 when Kálmán Darányi and Kálmán Kánya were assigned the task to revitalize the German–Hungarian minority cooperation in Czechoslovakia. In the period following the Budapest negotiations of February 1938, regardless of the agreement at the time of Czechoslovak crisis, the parties were unable to engage in substantial political cooperation. Hence no positive outcome could be expected from German–Slovak– Hungarian negotiations held upon initiative of the Sudeten Germans on 15 September 1938 in Prague where the Henlein circle would have welcomed a resolution on tight cooperation between the three nations. Esterházy, acting on behalf of UHP, avoided an agreement and referred to the negotiations in progress with Hodņa.21 The UHP leaders, in line with the until then pursued line, kept supporting Slovakia‘s effort for autonomy, although the concerned effort was turning into a major problem facing the Czechoslovak state during the crisis months and was also among the circumstances that accelerated the disintegration of the state. Esterházy made the deputies of the ruling parties in the Czechoslovak Parliament upset when he openly spoke in favour of autonomy and moreover, considered the autonomy offered by Hungarians (also in terms of Hungarian demands) as more beneficial than the proposed Czechoslovak arrangements.22

Tensions over Slovak autonomy attracted attention of not just the Hungarian government but also of Hitler and the German government. In one of his April 1938 reports to Budapest Esterházy pointed out the importance of Hodņa and his circle‘s attempt to use the issue of autonomy to stabilize the Czechoslovak state. The policy of the Hungarian minority seeking to ―destroy‖ Czechoslovakia, in his opinion wished to prove that ―Czechoslovak unity does not exist in internal or external terms‖.23At that time several persons of the Hungarian party noticed the quickly spreading radical anti-Hungarian attitude in the young members of the People‘s Party. Budapest was seeking to avoid an armed conflict with Czechoslovakia at all costs. UHP‘s call of 17 September requesting a plebiscite in the territories populated by Hungarians was the response to the strong Hitler‘s call for a speedy implementation of the radical Hungarian revision in Czechoslovakia or the engagement of the western allies. ―The Hungarian people living in Czechoslovakia want to manage their future on their own and to accomplish that it is necessary to give them guarantees for the right of self– government that was acknowledged only to certain nations.‖The party wanted to use the plebiscite as evidence that they do not want to follow the example of Sudeten German armed provocations but instead, it was in favour of legal, democratic means to address its own situation and, reckoning with a possible Czech–Slovak agreement, it did not want to proceed jointly with the Slovaks but it had its own goal, namely Hungarian territorial autonomy.24That position resonated also in the tense weeks following the Munich Agreement when the Hungarian National Council was established in the territory of Slovakia under leadership of UHP on 7 October 1938 and where public order was maintained in the territory mostly populated by Hungarians till the First Vienna Award but at that time Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were 25 already hoping to address their situation through modification of the frontiers. After the Munich agreement of four powers the issue of the Slovak autonomy was addressed within Czecho–Slovakia and the Hungarian government and also UHP had to take notice of it. Regardless of Tiso‘s negotiations in Budapest and his ambiguous promises given in May 1938, the anti-Hungarian line was winning within the Slovak Peoples‘ Party and that, of course, did not escape the attention of Hitler who was engaging in parallel negotiations with the proxies of the Hungarian and Slovak governments. After October 1938 the Slovak autonomy ceased to be a tool for Hungarian revision but it was in the focus of 26 Hitler‘s policy striving to completely break up Czechoslovakia. Summing up the Hungarian positions and ways of approximation with regard to the Slovak autonomy, it can be noted that till the very end the Budapest government was pursuing its preferred revisionist alternative and for that reason it neglected clarification of the Slovak national, territorial autonomy and failed to present an alternative that would have been lucrative also to the Slovaks. The Hungarian government, following the German–Hungarian summit in Kiel in August 1938, was facing military risks associated with Hitler‘s offer to annex all Slovakia to Hungary and effectively chose to use the ―wait and see‖ strategy and tried to influence the decision about an ethnic revision. The UHP leaders did not publicly commit to support the revisionist solution till September 1938. Beneń just like Hodņa knew that UHP‘s cooperation with the Hungarian government was clearly subjected to the revisionist idea at the end of the 1930s. The ideal solution for Budapest as well as Esterházy would have been uniting all Slovakia and Sub- Carpathia with Hungary. During the months of the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis, regardless of the end of the developments that overpowered all previous scenarios, Esterházy‘s primordial goal was to see and implement an optimum form of autonomy for the Slovaks and the minority Hungarians within the Prague– Budapest–Bratislava triangle. When the Czech–Slovak variant appeared in the finish area instead of the dragging talks of Tiso and the Hungarian government, Esterházy‘s mediating role was left with alternatives that were being pushed through by the superpowers. Following the failure of the alternative including a full ―return‖ of Slovakia, he personally got involved in preparations of an international revision of frontiers that was most favourable for Hungary, although he knew and soon actually experienced that that solution could not bring satisfaction and appeasement to the Hungarian–Slovak situation.

NOTES

1 The study was produced within the framework of the research project The Czechoslovak Republic and Hungarian Minority in Slovakia (1930–1938) c. VEGA MŃVVaŃ SR and SAV No. 2/0023/12 VEGA. 2 Angyal, Béla: Advocacy of Interests and Self-Organisation. Chapters in the History of Hungarian Party Policy in Czechoslovakia 1918–1938. [Érdekvédelem és önszerveződés. Fejezetek a csehszlovákiai magyar pártpolitika történetéből 1918–1938.] Somorja–Dunaszerdahely, Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet–Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó, 2002; Simon, Attila: Chronicle of a Short Year. Hungarians in Slovakia in 1938. [Egy rövid esztendő krónikája. A szlovákiai magyarok 1938- ban.]Somorja, Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2010. Also: The Nationality Statute of 1938 and the Hungarian Minority. [Az 1938-as nemzetiségi statútum és a magyar kisebbség.] In:Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle, (12) 2010/3, pp 29– 51. Tóth, Andrej: Provincial Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia under Leadership by Count János Esterházy in 1933–1935. [Zemská křesťansko-socialistická strana v Československu pod vedením hraběte Jánose Esterházyho v letech 1933—1935.] In: Moderní dějiny, (19) 1/2011, pp 67–103. Also: Count János Esterházy Assuming the Leadership of the Provincial Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia at the End of 1932. [Nástup hraběte Jánosa Esterházyho do čela Zemské křesťansko-socialistické strany v Československu na sklonku roku 1932.] In: Moderní dějiny, (18) 1/2010. pp 77– 101. Also: Hungarian Minority Political Parties in Czechoslovakia and Election of Masaryk’s Successor for the Office of the President of the Republic in December 1935. I.–II. vol. [Maćarské menńinové politické strany v Československu a volba Masarykova nástupce do úřadu prezidenta republiky v prosinci 1935. I—II. díl.] In: Moderní dějiny, 1/2012, pp 157–202 and 2/2012, pp 83–137. 3 Esterházy‘s impression from Tiso: ―... now, at this moment, he is fighting bravely and is not afraid even of threats from the government. For how long he can endure and when he may choose to enter different political waters, I do not know, of course. I can therefore offer no guarantees. In my opinion, the only thing we can do is making sure that we alone are all right and make sure that they will not defect, and we will, if possible, expose them as much as possible in front of Prague‖. Hungarian National Archives (MNL) K–64, file 79, 1938, item 65. 4 The text in the log of the Prague Parliament clearly shows that the four nationality parties were pursuing their particular interests, and phrase-based cooperation with nationalities in the declaration presented by Tiso. Chamber of Deputies – Stenographic records, 29 March 1938. Common Czechoslovak Parliamentary Digital Library. 5 Ibid. 6 The later sources include the publication by Ladislav Deák. Deák, Ladislav: Slovakia in the Policy of Hungary [Slovensko v politike Maćarska 1938 – 1939]. Bratislava, Veda, 1990. Also: Slovakia on the Cards. Slovakia in Policiesof Hungary and Poland in 1933–1939 [Hra o Slovensko. Slovensko v politike Maćarska a Poľska v rokoch 1933–1939].Bratislava, Veda, 1991. The most recent resources include abundant material covered by Arpáń, Róbert: Autonomy: Win or Loss? Culmination of HSPP’s Political Struggle for Slovakia’s Autonomy [Autonómia: víťazstvo alebo prehra? Vyvrcholenie politického zápasu HSĽS o autonómiu Slovenska].Bratislava, Veda, 2011. Bystrický, Valerián: From Autonomy to Independent State [Od autonómie k vzniku Slovenského ńtátu]. Bratislava, Prodama, 2008. Vańń, Martin: The Slovak Issue in the First CSR (1918–1938) [Slovenská otázka v I. ČSR (1918–1938)]. Martin, Matica slovenská, 2011. The most recent Czech historiography covering minority and diplomatic and historical matters includes: Tóth, Andrej–Novotný, Lukáń– Stehlík, Michal: Ethnic Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918–1938. From Nation State to Nationality State? [Národnostní menńiny v Československu 1918–1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu?] Prague, Charles University, Faculty of Philosophy, TOGGA publ., 2012. Kuklík, Jan–Němeček, Jan: From Nation State to Nationality State. Nationality Statute and Attempts to Address Nationality Issues in Czechoslovakia in 1938 [Od národního státu ke státu národnostního. Národnostní statut a snahy o řeńení národnostní otázky v Československu v roce 1938]. Prague, Karolinum, 2013. International historiography includes relevant paper on the Slovak issue in the period concerned: Hoensch, K. Jörg: Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik: Hlinkas Slowakische Volkspartei zwischen Autonomie und Separation 1938/1939. Graz– Köln, Bohlau, 1965. The book was also translated into Slovak: Hoensch, K. Jörg: Slovakia and Hitler’s Eastern Policy: Hlinka’s People’s Party and Between Autonomy and Separatism [Slovensko a Hitlerova východná politika. Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana a medzi autonómiou a separatizmom 1938–1939]. Bratislava, VEDA, 2002. 7 Simon, Attila: Nationality Statute of 1938 and Hungarian Minority [Národnostný ńtatút z roku 1938 a maćarská menńina]. In: Fórum spoločenskovedná revue, 5/2010, pp 99–115. Bystrický, Valerián: Milan Hodža and Czech–Slovak Relations at the End of the 1930s [Milan Hodņa a česko–slovenské vzťahy koncom 30. rokov]. In: Bystrický, Valerián: From autonomy..., op. cit., pp 156–157. 8 In a meeting (Warsaw, 17 June 1938) with Jan Szembek, Foreign Ministry State Secretary, Esterházy noted the he had ―no illusions about a friendly atmosphere in Slovakia for Hungarians. There are too many old memories and also the expectations from establishment of CSR were excessive. Only the irresponsible, centralistic policy exerted by Prague

(reads the Polish record) caused rise of anti-Czech mood and these developments have recently brought opportunities to lay foundations for pro-Hungarian mood. The forms of moods cannot be considered as stabilized and unchanging yet and for that reason the Hungarian officials have to seek to break the lack of trust that exists in Slovakia against Hungary‖.Segeń, Duńan–Hertel, Maroń–Bystrický, Valerián (eds.): Slovakia and the Slovak Issue in Polish and Hungarian Documents of 1938–1939 [Slovensko a slovenská otázka v poľských a maćarských dokumentoch v rokoch 1938–1939]. Bratislava, Spoločnosť Pro Historia, 2012, pp 233–236. 9 More details are in Szarka, László: Minorities Protection, Autonomy and Revision. The Role of János Esterházy in Policy Shaping of Ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. [Kisebbségvédelem, autonómia és revízió. Esterházy János szerepe a csehszlovákiai magyar politika alakításában 1932–1938.] In: Történelmi Szemle, 2013. 3. pp 431–432. 10 Segeń, Duńan–Hertel, Maroń–Bystrický, Valerián (eds.): Slovakia and the Slovak Issue..., op. cit., pp 152–158. 11 HSPP was in regular contact not only with Prague but primarily also with the Polish government. Warsaw, on one hand, sought to assure the Slovak autonomists of their support and on the other hand, it sought to keep distance in line with the Polish perception of Hungarian involvement in the issues of Slovaks. Thus the Polish diplomacy kept eliciting information about the developments in the Hungarian–Slovak situation. 12 There are major differences between the Hungarian and Slovak or Czech historical evaluation and assessment of Esterházy‘s contact in Poland. According to Imre Molnár, Esterházy as a private person assumed the role of a Polish mediator only when ―the awful threat of Hitler‘s independent Slovakia as a puppet state appeared in the political skies‖.In contrast, on the Slovak side the assumption of the role of a mediator is generally viewed as the first evidence of his anti- Czech behaviour. See Molnár, Imre: Life and Martyr’s Death of János Esterházy [Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála.] Budapeńť, Méry Ratio, 2012, pp 91–97. Deák, Ladislav: Slovakia on the Cards, op. cit., pp 100–101. Arpáń, Róbert: Autonomy..., op. cit.,pp 102–103. 13 In the ideas of the ―Catholic block‖ or the ―minority block‖ that were expected to replace the concept of the ancient population, there was a decisive interest platform not of Hungarian, but of Czech and Sudeten German Catholics. Discussions on the context of the domestic and foreign policy of the autonomist effort, the content focus, modifications of the state and law concept can be found for example in Bystrický, Valerián: From Autonomy..., op. cit., pp 84–99. Rychlík, Ján: Czechs and Slovaks, op. cit.,pp 132–140. Arpáń, Róbert: Autonomy..., op. cit. pp 92–105. Simon, Attila: Chronicle..., op. cit.,pp 94–95. 14 Esterházy: ―Our main task is to empower our national and Christian self-awareness‖ [Fő feladatunk nemzeti öntudatunk s a keresztény felfogás erősítése.]In: Prágai Magyar Hírlap, 16 December 1932. Published by: Angyal, Béla (ed.): Documents on the History of the Provincial Christian Socialist Party. [Dokumentumok az Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt történetéhez 1919–1936.] Somorja–Dunaszerdahely, Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet – Lilium Aurum, 2004. p. 426. 15 Ibid., pp 435–437. 16 Controversies within the party deepened particularly at the annual congress in Pieńťany in 1935, as well as during the election of the country‘s President in December 1935. Tiso managed to win Parliamentary support for Beneń as Masaryk had resigned due to illness. Hence the party unanimously showed its commitment to the preservation of the unified Czechoslovak state. Arpáń, Róbert: Autonómia..., op. cit., pp 39–52. 17 Esterházy‘s file that appeared severely censored and was entitled 'Three Nations about the Slovak Peoples'[Tri národy o slovenskom národe], is quoted by Imre Molnár (Slovák, 1938, 48, p. 2). Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit., p. 98. Concerning this overture by the Chairman of the United Hungarian Party (EMP) towards the Slovak public see also report by Gyula Petrovich, the Council in Bratislava. Hungarian National Archives (HNA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), reserved files, K-64, 1938, file 79, item 65. 18 A letter from the Council in Bratislava, Gyula Petrovich containing a letter by ―Tamás‖ (Esterházy) about talks with MPs from the Hlinka´s Slovak People´s Party (HSĽS). HNA, MFA, K-64, file 79, 1938, item 65. 19 The context of the emergence of Hitler‘s position on the Slovak issue and the German concept is analysed by Hermann on the basis of Goebbels‘ diary, contemporary German diplomatic sources and the German analysis of Hungarian–Slovak controversies in the newly emerging situation – to use the autonomous Slovak Republic to dissolve Czechoslovakia and to enhance their own position within the central Danubian region; see Hermann, Angela: Instrumentalisation of the Idea of Slovak Autonomy by the National–Socialist Régime [Inńtrumentalizácia myńlienky slovenskej autonómie nacionálno- socialistickým reņimom]. In: Bystrický, Valerián–Michela, Miroslav–Schwartz, Michal et al: Rozbitie alebo rozpad, op. cit., pp 192–209. 20 For details on the Hungarian attitude towards the negotiations about the status and the Runciman mission, see Simon, Attila: Chronicle..., op. cit., pp 129–150. Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit., pp 99–107. 21 The alliance between the two minority parties has become more organised after a talks in Budapest in 1937, having thus overcome its ad-hoc character. It was particularly manifested by the rejection of the plans for the ethnic status. The controversies between the two parties of the Carpathian Germans and the Hungarian Germans remained unresolved until

the very end. The EMP leadership, with a couple of exceptions, considered the Nazi ideology openly subscribed to by the Sudeten Germans to be unacceptable. HNA, 1937-7-299. res. Pol. 22 Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit., p. 100. 23 HNA, K-64, 1938-7-179. res. pol. Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit., pp 108–109. Simon, Attila: Chronicle...,op. cit., pp 141–147. 24 The position by the members of the national diet and regional councils from the EMP from 17 September in Bratislava, based on sources in the Slovak National Archive is quoted by Simon, Attila: Chronicle..., op. cit., 173. Cf.: Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit. pp 109. 25 Declaration of the Hungarian National Council, manuscripts archives of the Széchényi National Library, fund Szüllő, 7 October 1938. The declaration is analysed in detail by Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János, op. cit. pp 110–111. About the revisionist change of attitude within the EMP see in detail Simon, Attila: Chronicle..., op. cit. pp 169–174. 26 About the German interpretation of the ethnic Hungarian issue and/or autonomy of Slovakia see Hoensch, K. Jörg: Slovakia and Hitler’s Eastern Policy, op. cit., pp 245–261. Szarka, László: The Role of Germany in the Preparation of the First Vienna Award[Németország szerepe az első bécsi döntés előkészítésében.]In: Simon, Attila (ed.): Return or Occupation. Perspectives on the Interpretation of the First Vienna Award [Visszacsatolás vagy megszállás. Szempontok az első bécsi döntés értelmezéséhez.]Balassagyarmat, Nógrád Megyei Levéltár–J. Selye University, 2010. pp 21–41.

IMRE MOLNÁR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY, THE BEDROCK OF SLOVAK–HUNGARIAN RECONCILIATION

The attitude of János Esterházy to Slovaks, apart from his fundamental values ingrained in his Christianity which he received from his Polish mother, was determined by his native village of Újlak inhabited mostly by ethnic Slovaks. He learned Slovak in childhood and was familiar with the centuries- long atmosphere of respect and tolerance of coexistence between Slovaks and Hungarians. According to testimonies of the local residents, the massive wrought-iron gate of the Esterházy manor was always open and anyone in need was welcome. ―They were very humanistic and didn‘t wish to convert the village to Magyar culture,‖ recall the locals who loved and honoured The Esterházys as if they were their own kin. The local people had also much to be grateful to them for.1 To set the theme of this paper, the following section addresses the key aspects of Esterházy‘s political activities vis-à-vis the Slovaks. János Esterházy had always considered the region of Nitra, Podzoborie, to be his native land. In 1932 he became the Chairman of the Provincial ChristianSocialist Party (Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt; hereafter OKSZP, or the Party). After the 1920 parliamentary elections the OKSZP became the strongest ethnic Hungarian party. In addition to the Hungarian section, it also included Slovak and German sections. After his election, Esterházy not only supported, but further enhanced the Slovak and German sections, having appointed their leaders Deputy Party Chairmen until the Party would operate as an autonomous political unit.The agenda of the Party anchored the achievement of autonomy for Slovakia. On 27 June 1933, during the OKSZP meeting that was customarily held in Starý Smokovec, Esterházy stated in his agenda speech that ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia should, in solidarity with the endeavours of the Slovak peoples and ―within the existing law‖, keep on calling for the right to self-determination.2 The political agenda was underpinned by the ―common destiny‖ of ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks and by frequent emphasis on Central European ―interdependence within the Danubian Basin‖.3 In the interwar period the Hungarian parties, even the most competent of them, the OKSZP failed to establish closer cooperation with Slovak parties within the autonomist camp. The Slovak Peoples‘ Party (hereafter SPP), in part out of concern about the response by the government in Budapest, closed itself to cooperation. On the other hand, the SPP considered the Slovak section within the OKSZP to be a competitor to its own electoral group and did its utmost to isolate it. The main barrier to cooperation, however, was the influence of the Czech government that used all its political tools to prevent Slovak and Hungarian political parties from joining forces.4 It is illustrated by Czechoslovak censorship that was responding with chagrin to Esterházy´s documents in which he envisaged the Hungarian–Slovak alliance as a potential source of success in the face of the Czech power domination. The Bratislava police directorate ordered, on 19 January 1929, to search the Esterházy manor and discovered ―a number of documents on similar topic‖. It confiscated them ―for further examination‖.5Notwithstanding, Esterházy after 1935 when elected Member of the Parliament for Końice, also drew attention in the National Assembly in Prague to the territories populated by Slovaks that faced similar, if not more adverse economic situation than the Hungarian territories. He used to close his speeches by suggesting: ―The government should finally grant Slovakia and Ruthenia the promised autonomy so that, upon agreement with our Slovak brethren, we can decide ourselves upon the fate of Slovakia‖.6 During the Czechoslovak crisis Esterházy hoped to engage Poland as mediator in resolving the open issues related to Hungarian–Czechoslovak and later Hungarian–Slovak relations. He was destined for the role given his background and close contacts with Polish administration. For instance, Jan Szembek, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was his close Polish relative. Esterházy thus repeatedly travelled to Krakow and later also to Warsaw to speak with a number of Polish government officials. The talks raised an alternative of a Catholic Central European bloc, the Polish–Slovak–Hungarian axis that was also close to

34 the established geopolitical perspective held by Polish politicians. Slovak backing to his Warsaw talks came from the Catholic (Polonophile) wing of the SPP led by Karol Sidor. The group had been practically long involved in the approximation to Poles as the counterweight to the growing German influence. On the basis of the existing link between Sidor and Esterházy it is likely that the former had agreed for the Poles to appear as a sponsor of Hungarian–Slovak rapprochement, something that was still conceivable at the time. The ultimate outcome of the endeavour would have been that, within the federal state, Slovakia would join again Hungary with the proviso that Hungary would award Slovakia all rights (including full autonomy) that Czech politics had not been able to secure. The Polish sponsorship would have served as a guarantee in introducing and implementing the rights. Esterházy entered the talks as a private person. Though the present study doesn‘t intend to engage in an in-depth examination of the matter, suffice it to say that the participating Polish politicians noted his repeated defence of Slovaks. Esterházy stated and made it clear to Hungarian leaders that he was only willing to continue the mediation if Budapest refrained from the previous mistakes on the part of the Hungarian administration vis-à-vis the Slovaks.7 Jan Szembek mentions in his memoir that when, on 18 June 1938 the Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck assured Esterházy of his will to receive him on these matters anytime, Esterházy stated: ―… if Budapest doesn‘t accept the concept of the Polish sponsorship, he would then deem his engagement in the Slovak issue to be ended on his part‖.8According to the memoir, Esterházy repeatedly pointed out that neither him nor the Hungarian government ever, under any circumstances had been inclined towards armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, in spite of the Germans having encouraged the Hungarian political establishment to take such course of action. According to Szembek, Hungarians were repeatedly criticised for their reserved attitude, yet Esterházy retained his position to the end. The same argument was presented by the Hungarian Ambassador to Poland, András Hory. He had complained, inter alia, that pressing the Hungarian–Slovak rapprochement by Esterházy made the Hungarian position quite difficult.9 He spoke similarly to the representatives of the Sudeten Germans: ―Hungarian minority as well as Hungary would benefit more when they are not given the revision that would be forced at the cost of a second world war‖.10 That earned him reputation among the Sudeten German politicians of a pacifist. On 9 October 1938 talks opened in Komárno about the settlement of Hungarian–Czechoslovak border as set out by the Munich Accord. Esterházy with three other MPs sent a letter to Hungarian and Czechoslovak delegations asking to allow him to represent the demands of ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.11 Their request wasn‘t accepted and Esterházy had thus been unable to influence the proceedings. Contrary to arguments presented by Slovak historians, the Vienna Award didn‘t draw from arguments and data supplied by Esterházy but from preparatory works and explanatory studies that had been drafted for years at the Budapest-based National Academic (Minority) Institute. On a number of occasions Esterházy tried to alleviate the tense atmosphere of the talks between the Hungarian and Slovak delegations and, in hope for an agreement to be reached, he invited them to his mansion in Nyitraújlak. Nonetheless that never happened. András Hory, the Hungarian Ambassador to Poland recalls: ―Esterházy tried to release Kánya‘s rigid conduct and suggested to hold a luncheon for the Hungarian and Slovak delegation outside the programme, in his nearby mansion where they would be able to talk freely and in a more relaxed atmosphere to set the grounds for a compromise agreement. Kánya‘s uptight attitude prevented this from happening‖.12 Esterházy didn‘t consider it satisfactory that the talks ended with the Vienna Award. He thought that it could have been prevented by an acceptable compromise vis-à-vis the Slovaks. He was upset that two conflicting parties had left the negotiating table, even though ―with appropriate tactfulness and good will‖ the talks in Komárno might have predestined the historic Hungarian–Slovak reconciliation.13 After the Vienna Award on 11 November 1938, the Regent Miklós Horthy was welcome with festivities as he marched into Końice. Slovak historians accuse Esterházy that, by welcoming Horthy, he had given the city into his hands. In fact, it wasn‘t Esterházy, for the city didn‘t belong to him. It was the Vienna Award that had decided to whom the city was to belong. In his capacity of an elected Member of Parliament for the city Esterházy was among the speakers. To everyone‘s surprise he announced that, on one hand – having declined to take up a seat in the upper chamber of the Hungarian Parliament – he would not leave the

35 country. On the other hand, he addressed Horthy and asked him in public: ―We, the Hungarians who have remained here, promise that we shall offer our hand to our Slovak brethren and will work with them for the better future. I ask the Hungarians who live here to hold in highest esteem the national sentiments of the Slovaks who had been annexed here and to allow them to live the way that would be similar to what we ask for there, on the other side, for ourselves‖.14 His plea on behalf of the Slovaks who ended up within Hungary, was raised publicly in face of a crowd of many thousands, in front of Miklós Horthy and the Hungarian government officials. It is hard to think of a more appropriate moment to draw attention to open issues faced by the Slovak minority in Hungary. In truth, by having demanded for them to be allowed ―to live the way that would be similar to what we ask for ourselves there, on the other side,‖ Esterházy was well aware that minority issues couldn‘t be dealt with unilaterally. By accepting the Hungarian Parliamentary seat, he would have chosen for himself a brilliant career in Hungarian politics. He, however, opted for a more difficult path. He remained in Slovakia at the time when the country was on its way to independence, toward uncertain and fateful future, illegible political situation. He accepted the role of a representative of some 70,000 ethnic Hungarians as the minority in Slovakia. Esterházy had hoped that, in the autonomous and eventually independent Slovakia conditions would be better for politics, for they would have to find common ground with those ―with whom he had fought jointly, using honourable means for 20 years‖ for autonomy of Slovakia. Even the core of his Party‘s first programme manifesto published on 1 January 1939 in Új Hírek showed that the Hungarian Party along with the entire Hungarian community trusted in the implementation of the SPP proposal regarding autonomy, and that the ―Hungarian community in Slovakia would enjoy the equality that had been promised to all by the new Slovak government‖.15Karol Sidor pointed out in his memoirs the degree to which Esterházy, contrary to other ethnic Hungarian MPs, believed in Slovak autonomy. The leftist Hungarian MP, István Kosík sharply opposed Esterházy‘s optimism in the Prague Parliament: ―The Slovaks had never, not even by a word, assured the Hungarians of recognising their rights within autonomy. Quite on the contrary, their slogans: »Slovak speech in Slovakia« and »Slovakia for the Slovaks«16 showed that there was no place for Hungarians in their own homeland. Esterházy calls for such autonomy in which the Hungarians would have no rights‖.17Esterházy – perhaps aware of all those risks – still stated in his manifesto that he believed that in Slovak politics led largely by Catholic clergy, there would also be place for ―Hungarian–Slovak handshake‖.18 Alas, his expectation didn‘t materialise. The attitude of Slovak politicians towards Hungarians is best reflected in later historic account by SPP politician Ferdinand Ćurčanský: ―Slovaks were afraid that the Hungarians would understand the endeavour for autonomy as a return to Hungary. All that had been said and written about the cooperation with Hungarians could have been considered on our part merely as pressure vis-à-vis Czechoslovak politics‖.19 In order to balance such attitude, Esterházy wrote his thoughts on Christmas 1938. He encouraged his Hungarian readers towards peace, hope and to remain in their homeland within ―realistic‖ foundations: ―We had always and shall continue to deem the Slovak peoples with whom we have now found ourselves in closer public and legal tie, to be our brethren. (...) The Slovak peoples are as small a nation as we are; they have similarly fought for their independence, freedom, recognition and self-realisation as we have. We shall give God what is Divine, and to the Slovak State what belongs to it‖.20In his piece published on the first day of 1939 addressed to a handful of Hungarians who had remained in Slovakia, again proclaiming their faith in ―Hungarian–Slovak brotherhood‖, he wrote: ―I continue to openly stand for Hungarian– Slovak brotherhood, I recognise its needs and accept responsibility for setting out this goal, in the interest of which I shall wholeheartedly suffer accusations arising from any side‖.21Esterházy considered it important for the Hungarian minority, by making the most out of little, to be able to live with an awareness of mutual interdependence. He appealed to the Hungarians living in Slovakia to offer a helping hand to the Slovak peoples whenever needed.22 The idea of Hungarian–Slovak reconciliation was, however, soon overshadowed by such events as the Hungarian police actions in Ńurany and Komjatice and/or the armed incident in Ruthenia that also affected Slovakia. In such confusing and incomprehensible situations Esterházy had always been open about his view in face of relevant authorities. As the leader of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, he refrained from

36 criticising Hungarian politics in his public statements: he was aware that they might be used against the Hungarian political establishment. His sister Lujza Esterházy did so instead. She denounced the events in a sharp article for Esti Újság, the periodical that her brother owned.23 Esterházy‘s parliamentary position represents a separate chapter in his life. Here, in a gloomy position, as of a ―single-man Opposition‖, he served as member of the Slovak legislature. He assumed here fundamentally critical stance on many bills tabled by the Slovaks. Yet he thought it important to point out that ―my criticism is never directed against the Slovak peoples. I should merely like to avoid those methods, injustice and legitimate claims that pose a barrier to our peaceful coexistence‖.24In a gesture towards the Slovaks he stated his intention to promote the legitimate demands of the Slovak minority assigned to Hungary, similarly to how he had previously intervened on their behalf. Some issues, however, had always been unacceptable to him. He was unwilling to compromise on them. They included ideological Slovak–German identification. In his interview to Új Hírek in April 1939 he resolutely pointed out: ―We don‘t have and shall not have anything in common with the national-socialist agenda‖. He explained why the Hungarian Party had never been transformed into a national-socialist one as follows: ―National Socialism is a German product which, as its foundersand promoters claim, is not export goods; it can only be an agenda and existential philosophy for the Germans‖.25A sentence from the address by Jozef Tiso in December 1938 in Prievidza explains well the difficult situation in which the Hungarian minority in Slovakia found itself, also with Esterházy‘s participation that remained principled: ―Hungarians who live in Slovakia envy the Germans that we have awarded them so many rights. My answer is: Come along with us as the Germans do. Then you shall be given as many rights‖.26Esterházy was quick to respond: ―We have never and shall never envy the Germans for having, as a minority, achieved some success. We merely point out that the Hungarians have not, as yet, been awarded the rights that the Germans now enjoy, and not even those that the Slovak government will have to award us in compliance with the Vienna Award‖.27 Following on his earlier ideas about Slovak–Hungarian relations, in his Easter 1939 article Esterházy stated that reconciliation was a matter of Central European security. He added that the prerequisite had already been set by the Hungarian minority, for the Hungarian community had always constructively treated the independent Slovak state. Prosperity and success of Slovakia, however, depends on all nations and ethnicities on its territory enjoying their existence and ―equal rights and responsibilities‖. ―Artificially incited adverse attitudes towards the Hungarian community have to end‖, wrote Esterházy. If that depended on the conduct of the Hungarian minority, he continued, then let ―there be fortitude, patience, honesty‖ amidst the Hungarians. In conclusion he placed the fate of Hungarian minority and of the Hungarian peoples altogether into the hands of justice of Jesus Christ.28 In order to end the adverse attitude towards the Hungarians, he was repeatedly highlighting mutual interdependence. At the session of the United Hungarian Party he stated: ―On behalf of the Hungarian community I instantly, openly and honestly identified with constructive cooperation. Alas, it seems that our goodwill has not been understood or was misunderstood by some officials. Otherwise I cannot comprehend why, since March, our situation has deteriorated in every respect‖. Esterházy was aware of the negative effect of chauvinism on both sides. He therefore openly stated: ―If here, on the territory of Slovakia an ultra-chauvinistic Slovak wishes to serve his independent homeland by pulling off the Party badge worn by a Hungarian in Nitra, Bratislava or Preńov, or provocatively offends his national sentiments, then such ultra-chauvinistic Slovak equally harms his homeland as does an ultra-chauvinistic Hungarian in Hungary who, in word or deed, tries to prevent and pose a barrier to Slovaks in Hungary from enjoying their national life‖.29 At the session of the leaders of the United Hungarian Party on 12 May 1939 (i.e. not a Slovak event), he spoke, inter alia, to the hearts of his fellow Party members and called upon them: ―I insist unreservedly that we have grown together with Slovaks from the same soil. It wasn‘t governmental powers but those of nature, economy, geopolitics and such that have drawn us, the Hungarians and them together in a single community. The spirit of Hungarian and Slovak people can be brought to unison. That is indeed what has to be done, for we have a lot of common mental features. When a Hungarian and Slovak turn against each

37 other, it would be detrimental to both. It is against nature; therefore, any attempt to break apart the spiritual and economic community of the peoples that live on the Carpathian foothills is destined to extinction. This also concerns relations between Hungarians and Slovaks‖.30 This paper wasn‘t to examine Esterházy‘s activities in the Slovak Parliament. The preceding section was to merely note that Esterházy did critically stand against some legislation or practical political steps. Though he did so in the interest of a minority, his statements had universal validity. The decisions which he subjected to criticism, such as concentration camps, opening of the propaganda office, cult of personality, and unlawful police measures, didn‘t only affect the Hungarians, but also Slovak, German and other ethnic groups. ―As I have already mentioned, the physical and property attacks that, sadly, are mostly carried out under the cover of the Hlinka Guard are deeply offensive and threatening to the Hungarians.‖ He stated in face of the entire Parliament. He didn‘t claim that it was the Slovaks, but the Hlinka Guard to be guilty. Everyone knew that it wasn‘t only the Hungarians to be vulnerable to the brutalities committed by the Hlinka Guard.31 ―In no case can it be the mission of the Guard that some of its members throw stones into the windows of unsuspecting people. I should like to believe that those are merely temporary phenomena that will soon give way to sober politics drawing from the »Leben und leben lassen« principle[author‘s note: live-and-let-live]‖, said Esterházy at the time of pogroms against Jews. His positions in which he criticised the attempts to introduce a new order of the estates shouldn‘t be seen merely in connection with the Hungarians in Slovakia: ―This idea also suggests that it is impossible to introduce constitutionally an order or system that would be in conflict – be it Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans or the Ruthenians – with mental processes of the local ethnicities that have been, for centuries, ingrained and transformed into traditions, or those that would oppose the geopolitical situation we all face‖.32 Yet he still considered it his prime mission to advocate and protect ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. He often included in Hungarian–Slovak context injustices against Hungarians, for instance in his criticism of reciprocity: ―It is with deep pain that I perceive the treatment of us, the Hungarians, that is palpable across the country, (...) instead divides the Hungarian and Slovak community‖. If the Hungarian government also responded to the negative steps taken by its Slovak counterpart on the basis of reciprocity, ―it would be possible to forever escalate [such conduct]. Alas, it would bring exactly the opposite of everything we all hope for, which is for the two peoples coexisting amicably and for the ethnic groups in both countries be content‖.33 It wasn‘t threat or blackmail on his part. He shed light on the distorted logic used in the matters of reciprocity. His subsequent statement wasn‘t merely addressed to the architects of Slovak political life: ―Continuing some work won‘t secure that its foundations would be laid on constant escalation that is detrimental to others, but only when it is precipitated with work on behalf of all and by the love to the near ones. We, the Hungarians, act upon the conviction that, when we set out the aims for our future, we are not guided by a belief in «anything against anyone«. We trust in «everything on behalf of everyone« with whom we share the same fate in the Danubian Basin‖.34 Esterházy hoped from the long-anticipated registration of the Hungarian Party that the nature of Slovak politics would take turn for the better: ―This land is our common fatherland, in order for it to also become our common home, we have to put our hand in, shoulder-by-shoulder, given that God has given us place on Earth next to each other and assigned us common destiny; we have to strive for both the Slovak and Hungarian side to bring the common fate to fruition. Future development takes us in this direction and it is the only way for us to achieve peace, gratification and common happiness of the peoples that live here‖.35 Slovak historians also recognise Esterházy as mediator on matters related to Slovaks who found themselves in Hungary. He deserves recognition for the foundation of the Slovak Roman Catholic Society of St. Vojtech [St. Adalbert] in Budapest (along with the publishing house), the publication of the weekly that was later transformed into daily Slovenská jednota [Slovak Unity], re-employment of Slovak professionals who were previously discharged (their numbers ranged from several dozens to several hundreds), the official recognition of a Slovak political party in Hungary, and similar cases. Slovak historians attribute Esterházy‘s motivation behind his actions to political scheming. They suggest that he

38 had presented the bill for the concessions achieved in Budapest on behalf of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary, as a call for similar solutions for the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. It is unfortunate that the historians seem to have missed Esterházy‘s address to the Slovak Parliament on 7 May 1940, according to which he had, from the outset of his political activity, promoted and served friendship with Slovaks. As he further argued, it was with that intention that he also strove, to the best of his knowledge, to remedy injustices against ethnic Slovaks in Hungary after the Vienna Award. ―I did that, evading any attention and without any intention to gain political assets for myself, but because of my utterly spontaneous and genuinely friendly attitude that I have for Slovaks and with a sense for truth. When I successfully spoke on behalf of the railroad workers or other civil servants, a settler whose ethnicity was uncertain to be Slovak, I never mentioned that to anyone and thought it natural, as I simply fulfilled my human duty when I wanted to intervene on behalf of an individual or a group.‖36 Such approach is also illustrated by his letter of December 1940 to István Csáky, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Esterházy states, inter alia: ―I can prove that, in the area of Końice, the secretary of the corps for public enlightenment with the assistance of gendarmerie, confiscated from Slovak school textbooks that were distributed on request by the Hungarian government and published by the Society of St. Stephen. I can point out a number of similar cases. Such policeman, notary or servant don‘t see to the tip of their nose, failing to notice the danger to which they can bring the country by such conduct‖.37Esterházy here speaks of Hungary, its honour, not about his own interests. In reality he adopted the role of acting as a bridge between the Hungarian and Slovak governments. In his editorial in Új Hírek Esterházy greeted Slovenská jednota, the periodical of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary which, due to him from that point onwards ―served as a daily in the matters and interests of Slovaks in Hungary‖.38 He was the only one who, on 15 May 1938, didn‘t vote in Slovak Parliament for the adoption of Act 68 on deportation of Jews. Prior to rejecting the bill (that was to amend the Constitution) which contained all hitherto anti-Jewish decrees and measures (and was the first, after Germany, to enable mass deportations of Jews), he explained his positions first verbally at the Slovak Parliament, then in a letter to the Hungarian Prime Minister: ―I know that the draft bill doesn‘t suit many of my fellow Parliamentarians, but my Party discipline prevents me from voting on its behalf. Contrary to that, as representative of the Hungarian community I emphasise and ask to take into consideration that the reason why I don‘t vote on behalf of the bill, but against it, is because, as Hungarian, Christian and Catholic, I consider the bill godless and inhuman‖.39 Esterházy demonstrated his religious identification and denouncement of the Jewish Act, by deeds, too. Together with his relatives he did his utmost to offer refuge to individuals and groups who were persecuted by the Nazi régime, regardless of them being Hungarians, Slovaks, Jews or Poles. In August 1942 Esterházy spoke at the Summer University in Debrecen. In conclusion of his lecture he called upon the Hungarian youth by asking them: ―I ask the Hungarian youth to learn the languages of ethnic groups in Hungary; to deal with issues and difficulties faced by the local ethnicities. It is only through language that one can get to know our ethnic groups. Let this be one of the major responsibilities of Hungarian youth, for it will best serve the Hungarian future that is based on the foundations of the tradition of St. Stephen‖.40 It is quite remarkable that, in its report from the lecture, Slovenská jednota failed to quote this passage, even though the lecture was well received by the contemporary Hungarian spiritual progressive circles. In February 1944 Esterházy lectured in Kolozsvár on invitation by the representatives of Transylvanian Hungarians. He dedicated a substantial part of his talk to the analysis of Slovak–Hungarian relations. He stated matter-of-factly that ―a number of Slovak officials think today that the only barrier to Slovakia‘s development is the Hungarian community as the only one to jeopardise its prosperity. In line with the tradition of St. Stephen they see no other than imperialist endeavours with the only objective to conquer the ethnic groups within the Danubian Basin. Such is the motivation of the anti-Hungarian propaganda which we constantly encounter in Slovak press, magazines and books. It is a major mistake and, in part, also a sign of weakness‖.41 The post-war reconstruction of Central Europe is only conceivable in the atmosphere

39 of peace, and not by inciting mutual hatred and hostility among the local peoples. In such process, the Hungarian community in Slovakia ―along with the everyday work required for survival, strives for understanding between the Hungarians and Slovaks and shall do nothing that would prove detrimental to Slovaks in building the state or offend Slovak national autonomy. [...] Should the Slovak peoples wish to retain independence, they can only do so, I believe, in concord with the Hungarian community, and not in persistent enmity with them.42 Rezső Peéry recalls that many Slovak and Hungarian anti-Fascists were joining Esterházy‘s Party until the end of the war to find there protection and refuge. Even in such trying times Esterházy tried to sensitively serve the betterment of Slovak–Hungarian relations, knowing that in the diplomatic and power struggle for supremacy in Eastern Europe, the Slovak peoples faced the same threat as did the Hungarians. Thus, he thought, they also had to fight together against the danger.43 Amidst his concern about lives of others and their rescue he forgot about the major danger he himself faced. At the time of German retreat, Lujza Esterházy tried to convince her brother to escape. He replied: ―As far as I am concerned, I shall not leave the country. I don‘t want to join in the Nazis. I don‘t want to save my neck with the help of Hitlerites. As I have already told you, my roots here are too deep in my native land for me to leave it!‖ Lujza also offered him to join the Hungarian movement in exile. Recalling moral reasons, he rejected this option as well: ―My roots tie me too closely to this place for me to be able to live abroad. I would be dying of longing for home; I would lose my moral compass to a point that I would be unable to serve the Hungarian community. I can only be useful if I stay here. [...] Let‘s trust in divine providence‖. He had to decide and choose between freedom and serfdom that was awaiting him soon. Yet he again opted for a more difficult path. He chose to be faithful, accepting all consequences arising from such decision, thus also the possibility of losing the freedom that meant so much to him.44 It was with that resolve that he sought out, in April 1945, the Home Affairs Commissioner Gustáv Husák. Esterházy intended to appeal to Husák, referring to his hitherto advocacy of the Slovaks and on behalf of the improvement of the fate of Hungarian minority. The visit that was to demonstrate goodwill, ended up with Esterházy‘s arrest and subsequent deportation to gulag in the Soviet Union. On return he was to face death sentence in 1947. At that time his relatives and friends again offered him an opportunity to escape, which they had planned under strictly secret measures. A family friend at the British Consulate in Bratislava would have taken the Count in a diplomatic car to Vienna. Esterházy again refused the detailed plan, in part not to put those who would remain at home into difficulties; and, in part, because he kept on repeating his earlier argument that ―he didn‘t commit any sin, didn‘t harm anyone, he belongs here and has nothing to escape from.‖It was ―merely‖ the suspended death sentence that hung over his head as the sword of Damocles. Esterházy thus accepted the decision as the final question of his life, i.e. the choice between life and death, being aware that only a miracle would have helped him to freedom. Having chosen to remain proves again his faith.45 In 1944 which was the last year of his political activity, one of his final articles appeared in Magyar Néplap. The piece can be regarded as his spiritual testament. Esterházy wrote: ―Slovak–Hungarian understanding, reconciliation, handshake is not a matter of mood, not a voice of siren echoing the aims of imperialists, as some suggest. For a politician who grew from this soil, it is a natural command, a command of the country, its rivers and spirit. In spite of the confused atmosphere at the moment, it sounds pure and calls for understanding. Indeed, I dare say that Slovak–Hungarian understanding here, under the Carpathian rocks is a matter of inevitability. (...) Perhaps in conclusion: only the one aptly builds the future who, taking into account the givens, doesn‘t build barriers and dividing walls, but contributes to solving misunderstandings and helps set conditions for peaceful coexistence‖.46 János Esterházy fought on behalf of the interests of ethnic Hungarians; he loved his homeland and also identified with the wider Central Europe. Accepting responsibility for interests above and beyond the framework of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and for the future fate of Central Europe, he offered ideas, many of which remain pertinent for Hungarian–Slovak coexistence. All that suggests that Esterházy‘s momentous approach to Hungarian interests has never made him an enemy of the Slovak peoples. Quite on the contrary, it can be suggested with clean conscience that, among his contemporaries amid Hungarian

40 politicians, he stood out with his empathy and solidarity with the Slovak peoples. By rejecting the hand he had offered, our Slovak neighbours would lose one of the most noble friends. That is a major pity and irretrievable loss to us all.

NOTES

1 Forgon, S. Szilvia: He had genuinely loved the peoples [Őszintén szerette ezt a népet].In: Vasárnap, 13 April 1993. p. 4. 2 Prágai Magyar Hírlap (PMH), 29 June 1933, p. 3. 3 Esterházy János: Common faith beneath the Carpathians [Sorsközösség a Kárpátok alatt]. In: Magyar hétköznapok, Toldy-kör, Bratislava, 1942, p. 8. 4 During the 1920 Parliamentary elections, for instance, the Czechoslovak People´s Party (operating under Czech leadership), agreed on electoral cooperation with the Slovak People´s Party. One of the paragraphs of the agreement excluded any possibility of cooperation with the OKSZP. 5 János Esterházy reported on the event to Gyula Hegedűs. In: National Széchenyi Library (OSZK), Fund 279/34. 6 PMH, 3 December 1936, pp 3–4. 7 Zarański, J.: Diary and Papers of Jan Szembek [Diarius i teki Jana Szembeka 1935–1945]. London, Sikorski Museum, 1972, p. 138. 8 Ibid., p. 192. 9 Hory, András: From Bucharest to Warsaw [Bukaresttől Varsóig]. Budapest, Gondolat, 1987, p. 202. 10 Esterházy, Lujza: HeartsAgainst the Tide [Szívek az ár ellen]. Budapest, Püski, 1991, 87. 11 Hungarian National Archives (MOL), Fund K 64 – 1938/7–65. 12 Hory, András: Bukaresttől..., op. cit., p. 406. 13 Zarański, J.: Diarius i teki..., op. cit., p. 391. 14 Magyar Nemzet, 12 November 1938, p. 2. 15 Új Hírek, 23 May 1934, p. 3. 16 Slovak language in Slovakia! [―Na Slovensku po slovensky!]”, Slovakia for the Slovaks! [―Slovensko Slovákom!”]. 17 Sidor, Karol: Slovak Politics in the Prague Assembly [Slovenská politika na pôde praņského snemu] vol. II. Bratislava, 1943, pp 296–297. 18 Esterházy, János: The Life of Hungarian Families in Slovakia since the Second Historical Turning Point [A szlovákiai magyar család élete a második sorsforduló óta].In: The Life of Hungarians in Slovakia 1938–1942[A szlovákiai magyarság élete 1938–1942]. Budapest, Athenaeum, 1942, p. 12. 19 Ćurčanský, Ferdinand: A Look at on the Slovak Political Past[Pohľad na slovenskú politickú minulosť]. Bratislava, 1943, p. 205. 20 Új Hírek, 1938, Christmas issue, p. 1. 21 Új Hírek, 1 January 1939, pp 1–2. 22 Ibid. 23 Janek, István: The Forgotten War. The Hungarian–Slovak “Small War” in March 1939 [Egy elfelejtett háború. Magyar– szlovák ―kis háború‖ 1939 márciusában]In: Rubicon, 4/2008, pp 33–36. 24 Új Hírek, 19 January 1939, p. 2. 25 Új Hírek, 6 April 1939, pp 2–3. 26 Szalatnai, Rezső: Hungarians in Czechoslovakia Between 1938 and 1945 [A csehszlovákiai magyarok 1938 és 1945 között] In:Regio, 1990, 3/2. p. 165. 27 Új Hírek, 14 December 1938, p. 2. 28 Új Hírek, 9 April 1939. p. 1. 29 Esti Újság, 14 May 1939, pp 1–2. 30 Ibid. 31 Stenographic report from the 34th session of the Assembly of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 7 May 1940, pp 22–26. 32 Stenographic report from the 6th session of the Assembly of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 21 July 1939, p. 9. 33 Új Hírek, 1940, New Year issue, p. 1. 34 Új Hírek, 4 January 1940, p. 3. 35 Új Hírek, 10 November 1940, p.1. 36 Stenographic report from the 34th session of the Assembly of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 7 May 1940, pp 22–26.

37 National Archives of Hungary (MOL) – Fund K 64–1941–65–5. 38 Új Hírek, 24 May 1941, p. 1. 39 Molnár, Imre: The Life and Martyr’s Death of János Esterházy [Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála]. Budapest, Méry Ratio, 2010. 40 Magyar Hírlap, 7 August 1942, II. 3, 2. 41 Ellenzék, Cluj, 3 February 1944, p. 2. 42 Ibid. 43 Peéry, Rezső: The Two Esterházy Siblings [A két Esterházy]. In: In Between Two Millstones [Malomkövek között]. Bern, Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem, 1977, p. 55. 44 Molnár, Imre: The Life and Martyr’s Death of János Esterházy [Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála].Budapest, Méry Ratio, 2010. 45 Molnár, Imre: Life Sentence Pardon. Documents on the History of Suffering of János Esterházy Based on the Records by Mária Mycielski-Esterházy [Kegyelem életfogytig. Esterházy János szenvedéstörténetének dokumentumai Mycielskiné Esterházy Mária feljegyzései alapján].Szeged, METEM, 2009. 46 Magyar Hírlap, 26 March 1944, p. 5.

ONDREJ PODOLEC Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law Nation‘s Memory Institute, Bratislava

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SLOVAKIA IN 1938–19451

János Esterházy entered so-called high politics in 1932, when he was elected chairman of the Provincial Christian Socialist Party.2 After the next parliamentary elections in 1935, he also became Member of the Czechoslovak Parliament – the Chamber of Deputies of the National Assembly. The end of the 1930s, characterised among other things by the political offensive of two totalitarian European dictatorships, brought intensifying pressure that destabilised the Central European region. To irredentist politicians – Esterházy being among their chief representatives – this development held out the promiseof revising the shape of Europe as it had been settled in Versailles. The first prerequisite for creating a viable politics for the Hungarian minority in an approaching period of radical political transformation was establishing a unified Hungarian party. The integration process, set into motion by joint successin the elections, was completed at a unifyingcongress in Nové Zámky in 1936.3 Afterwards, at a recommendation of the Hungarian government, Esterházy was chosen to be the executive chairman of the new United Hungarian Party [Egyesült Magyar Párt – EMP]. A second strategic objective was to rally political parties in the opposition, around the common cause of collective pressure against the Czechoslovak state. Collaboration with Henlein‘s Sudeten German Party was likely to pose no difficulties, because of the similarity of theiraims. For Esterházy, Henlein was also a valuable source of information about the intentions and planned course of actionof Hitler‘s Germany in its advance against the Czechoslovak Republic, which allowed him to coordinate and time political projects of his own. However, due to Esterházy‘s conservatism, pacifism and political prudence, the collaboration did not unfold quite as the Germans had imagined it.4 Closer cooperation with the strongest Slovak political party – Hlinka‘s Slovak People‘s Party [Hlinkova slovenská ľudová stana – HSĽS] – did not take place, despite Esterházy‘s efforts. Although demands for an autonomous Slovakia grew ever more radical, the relevant members of this opposition party kept with a position of maintaining a common Czech–Slovak state. The first attempt to establish contact with the HSĽS was made before the 1935 elections, the second in the spring of 1938.5 Another important condition for successfully opposingthe Czechoslovak state was close coordination with the politics of Horthy‘s Hungary, connected with obtaining intelligence mainly about domestic political and military issues and rendering it to the Hungarian government at visits to Budapest or by means of diplomatic channels.6 Esterházy himself appears under various codenames in the documentation, for instance: Agent Tamás, Mátyás, 221.7 The mentioned strategic political steps too were directly controlled by the Hungarian government – it reserved 15,000 crowns for allaying the conflicts and power ambitions of the newly unified party functionaries, and as much as 100,000 crowns for corrupting leading politicians in theHSĽS.8 During police interrogation in 1945, Esterházy estimated Hungarian financial support to have totalled at approximately 2.5 million crowns per year.9 Esterházy played a peculiar role during the preparation of the First Vienna Award, signed on 2 November 1938. At first on the diplomatic field, where as deputy of the Hungarian national minority commissioned by the Hungarian government, he led talks in Rome with the Italian foreign affairs minister, Galeazzo Ciano. Esterházy wanted to offer Ciano the base for arguments in support of Hungary during the talks with Joachim von Ribbentrop. It is worth noting that Esterházy arrived in Vienna from Rome with Italian delegation. His personal engagement shaped the results of the arbitration of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and in that sense contributed to the territorial curtailmentof Slovakia. Esterházy, spurred by the

43 prospect of redrawn borders, thus played an active part in the Nazi intrusion into Central Europe, which culminated in a breach of the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak state and later its complete elimination. Already in August 1938, he confided his impatience with the issue to the British military attaché, when ―he could not at all understand why Mr Hitler, while he made the Austrian Anschluss, could not have followed through, when he could have surprised the Czechs by invading Sudetenland‖.10 He also expressed a similar opinion in Warsaw, where he is reported to have said that ―he is alarmed by a certain German slackness in solving the Czech question. Could this perhaps mean that Berlin is deliberately and wilfully putting off the whole action?‖11 Esterházy later also confirmed the important role he had played in the First Vienna Arbitration by a symbolic act in public, when he bid ceremonial welcome to the Hungarian head of state, Regent Miklós Horthy, on November 11 on behalf of the city of Końice. Whether deliberately or not, he left an impression in Slovak historical consciousness as a live symbol of the occupation of southern Slovakia in November 1938. Direct efforts at revising the border arrangement did not end with the signature of the Nazi-fascist decree; in several areas that remained part of Slovakia, Esterházy‘s party members organised secret signature campaigns in favour of their annexation to Hungary.12 Because his hereditary property remained on Slovak soil, he decided to relinquish his mandate for the city of Końice13 and remain in Slovak politics as a ‗protector of Hungarian interests‘.14 He was then directly authorisedby the Hungarian government to coordinate Hungarian politics in the post-arbitrational territories of Slovakia.15 The establishment of the Slovak State on 14 March 1939, which meant the disappearance of a hated political body – Czechoslovakia – caught Esterházy in Budapest, where he was celebrating his 38th birthday. On the one hand, he welcomed the fall of the Czechoslovak state; on the other, Slovak autonomy under German patronage also ruined all prospects of annexing the whole of Slovakia to the Hungarian state, at least in the foreseeable future. He affirmed his loyalty, however, by a public gesture, when he joined an assembly convened by Hlinka‘s Guard to celebrate the autonomy a mere four days later on Bratislava‘s Hviezdoslav Square.16 He entered the new state as Member of Parliament – of the Slovak Diet (later renamed by the new constitution to the Assembly of the Slovak Republic) – and as official representative of the Hungarian national minority, whose proportional share in the population of Slovakia dropped sharply after the Vienna Award. The minority consisted of 67,502 citizens who mostly resided in so-called population enclaves(districts in which they made up more than 10% of the population), mainly in the districts of Nitra and Zlaté Moravce, but also in Bratislava.17 The institutional basis of Esterházy‘s leading political position was his holding the office of chairman of the United Hungarian Party (later the Hungarian Party in Slovakia), which was counted on as part of the authoritative system of government entrenched in the Slovak Constitution of 1939. His inclusion on the united list of candidates already during the period of Slovak autonomy and in the second Czechoslovak Republic was taken as an accommodating gesture in pursuinga declared principle of reciprocity. The Slovak party expected the Hungarian state to proceed in a similar manner in the issue of its Slovak parliamentary representation, where the minority was several times as large. Esterházy accepted the offered candidate‘s post without reservations, as an expression of sympathy for Slovak emancipatory efforts, which were fully in accord with the strategic aims of his political programme.18 His indisputable position as the head of the community, his long-term political agenda as well as the reciprocity principle were the three main factors that secured Esterházy the post of a specific political mediator between Bratislava and Budapest. Even if he always respected the basic lines of Hungarian state politics, its austereminority policy against the country‘s Slovak national minority, which was a sensitive issue for the Slovak public, frustrated his political conception of a voluntary return of Slovaks to (the Kingdom of) Hungary without the use of violent means. Esterházy was apparently better aware of the actual moods in Slovak society than the Hungarian government, because he had been familiar with the psychology of Slovak–Hungarian relations since his childhood. He likely also expected a positive turn in the Slovak public regard for Hungary to result from an obliging gesture which he proposed to the

Hungarian government. It would consist in ceding the region between Ńurany and Palárikovo (then Slovenský Meder), whose inhabitants were at any rate mostly Slovak.19 A crucial factor in Slovak politics concerning the Hungarian minority was the principle of reciprocity, explicitly anchored in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic from 1939 as a general rule limiting national policy.20 The Slovak governing powers of the day took it to be the only effective means of holding Hungarian state institutions in check, which latter were persecuting the Slovak national minority in various ways, especially on occupied territories. Esterházy thus stood at the front of a community that was practically made hostage, and the confrontation threatened to escalate.21 In practice, employing the reciprocity principle meant that at every official request made by the Hungarian minority, the Slovak Embassy in Budapest was asked to investigate whether the claimed right was enjoyed by Slovaks in Hungary.22 Already in November 1938, Esterházy tried to secure a whole bulk of rights for the Slovak minority, on behalf of the community he represented – without success. The Hungarian side‘s unwillingness to commit to reciprocal actions was also a stumbling block for the Slovak government‘s plan to create the function of the state secretary for the Hungarian minority – according to the original promise of Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Tiso, the post was supposed to have been given precisely to Esterházy (similarly to how Franz Karmasin was to be appointed to an analogous post for the German minority).23 Esterházy also openly spoke of his interventions in Budapest in the national assembly, where he was reproached for his allegedly too frequent visits to the Hungarian capital: ―I openly and boldly confess to the thesis, according to which we Hungarians and Slovaks must seek what brings us closer rather than what drives us further apart. With a clear conscience I stand here before Slovak Parliament, because I have confessed to, served and proclaimed friendship with Slovaks since the beginning of my political career. By frequent interventions, I have tried to make good overt wrongs committed on Slovaks who ended up in Hungary after the Vienna Arbitration. I have done so while avoiding all conspicuousness, not in order to mine from it any political capital, but simply for the sake of my utterly spontaneous friendship with the Slovaks and for my sense of justice. When I intervened in the matter of unauthorised Slovak railwaymen, or other state employees, colonists, and often with success, I mentioned nothing to anyone, I considered it natural, because I fulfil my duty as a human being when I intervene, whether in the interests of one or many. (…) Yes, I do travel to Pest. I travel when I sense that some difficulty requires my help. I also admit that during my visits to Pest, I also meet Mr Hungarian Prime Minister and Mr Foreign Affairs Minister. I do admit this, because I do not act all important – we do not discuss great political questions and we do not negotiate the shape of Europe after the war with these gentlemen. But indeed, I come for the sake of unauthorised Slovak railwaymen and mailmen and for similar matters, and if there is anyone who would dare to challenge my words, I will produce written testimony about the number of Slovak civil servants who have been given back their bread through my interventions‖.24 The lack of success of many of his efforts can doubtless also be attributed to the cold relations between the government in Budapest and Hungarian representatives from annexed territories, who had been raised in the liberal political climate of inter-war Czechoslovakia, and who had difficulties adapting to Hungarian politics.25 Esterházy refused to condemn publically the bloody events which occurred in Ńurany on Christmas of 1938, arguing that doing so would harm Hungary‘s international reputation. (―One must not pillory one‘s mother in public, even if she were guilty.‖)26 There were instances, however, in which the reciprocity principle was seen to have been genuinely effective from the point of view of the Slovak government: for example, the case of the Hungarian cultural society SZMKE, whose existence was made conditional upon an authorisation of the Society of St. Vojtech in Hungary, a matter that was in fact negotiated at competent institutions in Budapest by Esterházy himself;27 or an analogous procedure that was followedin connection with the registration of the Hungarian Party in Slovakia and the Slovak National Unity Party in Hungary.28 The complexity of Slovak–Hungarian interstate relations left its most notable mark on the amount of time it took for Εsterházy‘s Hungarian Party in Slovakia to attain definitive legal entrenchment. The general mechanism controllingthe political representation of national minorities in the highest institutions of the Slovak Republic only took shape gradually. The constitution‘s framework legislation presupposed,

45 alongside a working state party, whose existence was meant to secure that members of the majority (state- constituting) nation would ―take part in political power‖, the existence of political parties representing national minorities.29 Their establishment and functioning was regulatedby a specific law (n. 121/1940 of the Slovak Code) from May 15, 1940, to which the constitution referred. On its basis, the executive power – here the Interior Ministry – granted permission to the activities of a given minority party by the act of registration.30 By its character, the regulation fit with the system of an authoritarian political regime, which formed in the course of several weeks following the Munich Agreement. It ruled out the possibility of political pluralism – in general as well as among minority representatives. It thus barred ―uncontrollable‖ association and political activity, which could endanger the exclusive rule of a single party, when the registration of a new political party was connected with an obligatory erasure of the previous minority party from the register.31 The administrative process preceding the establishment of a minority party was immensely complex. The registration itself was done by the Interior Ministry on the basis of a government decree. An application could not be guaranteed to succeed even if all the conditions were met – it ultimately depended on the decision of government, which was final, because the law blocked the possibility of conventional recourse – filing a complaint to the Supreme Court. In order for the application to be duly considered by government, it would have had to contain a number of requisites. Among these were the signatures of the leading official of the party and of at least 500 members of the national minority who had reached the age of 21 and were Slovak state citizens. It was required that the application be submitted with an attached copy of the party‘s foundational statute, as well as with proof of the problematic fact that it fulfilled the conditions of §59 of the Constitution, i.e. that, in view of the estimated number of members and the founding statute, the party could be considered the ―vehicle of the political will of the entire minority group‖.32 Another peculiar condition for registration followed from the reciprocity principle. The act conferred a right upon government to react to developments in relations with the minority‘s ‗mother state‘. The act also allowed government to intervene in the party‘s activities even after it was successfully registered. On the basis of law as well as political practice, minority parties, like the HSĽS, were charged with various tasks in administering the state. The most important among these was delegation to administrative bodies – to posts reserved by law for minority representatives. Among the highest state institutions, these were primarily the State Council,33 and among regional administrative units, regional and district councils. At the level of municipal administration, minority parties were involved in appointing government commissioners, who were empowered to act instead of elected bodies when exceptional measures in municipal administration were necessary. This factual state was confirmed and completely legalised only by a municipal administration reform from the turn of 1943/1944. Act n. 171/1943 from 22. 12. 1943 on changes in municipal autonomy set down a precise mechanism for appointing municipal officials by political parties, including the division of mandates in nationally mixed municipalities.34 After the adoption of Act n. 121/1940, the leadership of the Hungarian party adjusted its statutes to the new legal regulations, and from June 1940, it carried a new name – the Hungarian Party in Slovakia. It was officially registered only in November 1941, after the activities of the Slovak National Unity Party were authorised in Hungary – until then, the activities of the latter were limited by the Hungarian government, who tried to replace its real Slovak minority representatives with supporters of the government politics of the day (such as Viktor Dvorcsák or Michal Kalčok). These tendencies were entirely absent on the Slovak side – Esterházy was respected as a representative of the Hungarian minority and elected Member of Parliament on the candidates‘ list of the ruling party. The regional organisation of Esterházy‘s party, including all the necessary official permits, was only accomplished in April 1942. Notable progress in the question of legalising minority parties in Hungary and Slovakia was also owed to German diplomatic intervention.35 Esterházy‘s first speech addressed to the Slovak legislative assembly (then still the regional parliament – the Slovak Diet) was presented during a discussion on the program declaration of the first autonomous government, headed by Jozef Tiso, at the second meeting on February 22, 1939. He stated: ―As the sole representative of Hungarians in Slovakia, I assume my office in the Slovak Parliament, whose

46 establishment also saw Hungarian support‖. He expressed his resolve to guard the rights of his nation as jealously as ever. In contrast to the exalting speeches presented by other Members of Parliament, which were rather celebratory (this was the program of the first Slovak government in history, after all), the addresses of the two minority parliamentarians (Karmasin and Esterházy) were pervaded by a relatively critical tone, lacked grandiose expressions of loyalty, and contained more or less covert warnings. Esterházy called the Vienna Award the ―Hungarian Magna Carta‖, reminded the new Slovak regime of the ill fate that met the former Czechoslovak state as a result of its national minority politics and urged them not to risk ruining the new state body by the same mistakes. Esterházy‘s rhetoric became more moderate after the state declared independence; it was characterised by numerous expressions of loyalty, forcefully presented in contrast with his irreconcilable feelings about former Czechoslovakia. The topic of minority rights was, alongside criticisms of social conditions, one of the few tolerated topics of critique in the politically homogenous parliament. The parliamentary speeches of János Esterházy, coupled with the speeches of union leader Rudolf Čavojský or with some of the more radically charged appearances of Alexander Mach, brought a certain enlivenment to the rather languid atmosphere of a parliament that was elected on a united candidates‘ list and that functioned without a political opposition. They were often accompanied by cries from the audience, which confronted his critique of the situation of Hungarian nationals in Slovakia with the incomparably worse situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Besides the parliamentarians, the debates and endless polemics were frequently stepped inby members of government, when draft bills, budget calculations and program speeches were delivered. His messages to the assembly sometimes even provoked the reaction of President Jozef Tiso.36 Esterházy delivered all of his speeches in Hungarian, as the tolerant rules of procedure allowed minority representatives to address Parliament in their mother tongue.37 The Committee of Technology and Transport, in which Esterházy sat, dealt with laws that were not of much political significance.38 One of the recurring themes of most of Esterházy‘s parliamentary addresses were criticisms of the abovementioned principle of reciprocity, which he rejected. Arguments against its application sometimes even grew into open threats, such as when he declared that he fears the moment when the Hungarian public loses its patience and dismisses a Slovak railwayman for every Hungarian railwayman dismissed in Slovakia, and that the conflict might escalate to the extreme. One characteristic feature of his speeches was that any criticism of social conditions on his part was often paired with issues concerning the Hungarian minority or with the particular case of some of its members. Examples include his critique of limiting the freedom of the press, which he connected with a ban on a certain Hungarian periodical, or with limiting the import of Hungarian press. (―I admit that limiting the freedom of the press may be justified now and then. We observe this on many sides in our own times, but this nevertheless must not grow into silencing objective assessment, because that would mean the end of the true mission of the press. Press products, magazines and books from Hungary can only reach us in most limited amounts. A real spiritual barrier is erected against Hungary.‖39) His comments on restrictions of the freedom to associate were in turn connected with authorising Hungarian societies (mainly SZMKE). He rejected the stratifiedsystem of government laid down in the constitution (which was in fact never put to practice), because the new social structure ran across nationalities.40 He mostly criticised the new system of territorial government, because its units (zhupa) resembled the Czechoslovak county rather than the Hungarian higher regional unit.41 Esterházy basically paid no attention to the rights of other minorities, and in the case of Jews even verbally supported their oppression, when, for instance, during a debate on the expropriation of the Pieńťany Baths he expressed, on the one hand, satisfaction with the exclusion of Jews from public and commercial life – in this case, with official cancellation of their rental contracts – but on the other hand, he objected to expropriating the Erdődy noble family at official prices.42 Another characteristic element that resonated in nearly every speech of Esterházy were declarations of his positive attitude towards the Slovak State and its regime, which were contrasted with his attitude to former democratic Czechoslovakia. ―I think we have proven in the former Czechoslovak era that we are capable of opposition politics, and we have also proven that we do not fear the persecution that follows

47 opposition behaviour. We Hungarians have always looked upon the Czechoslovak Republic as a misbegotten hodgepodge of human spite and ignorance, and we knew very well that this ramshackle freak of nature called a state has got no right to exist. I have frequently had the opportunity to speak up in Parliament in Prague and I think that many of the Slovak members–colleagues sitting here will remember the storms that were roused by one of my speeches or another. Then, as a Hungarian representative in the Prague Parliament, I wanted to destroy – destroy something that I detested from the depths of my heart and whose trail brought no good to the world. Today, in Parliament in Bratislava, the same man takes the floor, and I think that every reasonable person, whether he be of this nationality or that, must admit that my current tone is not the same as the former one, it is no longer destructive, filled with hate, but indeed, the tone in which I am heard here in Slovak Parliament, on behalf of all Hungarians, is a tone of understanding.‖43 In many of his speeches, Esterházy expressed his personal admiration of Vojtech Tuka, praising his ‗martyrdom‘. He also showed appreciation for the military campaigns of the Nazi and fascist powers, when he declared that ―Germany and Italy are fighting their gigantic struggle to secure a better future for Europe and perpetual peace‖.44 A regular theme of Esterházy‘s speeches (irrespective of the topic that held sway in session) were references to specific complaints made by members of the Hungarian minority. These included, for instance, difficulties in obtaining trade licenses (―I know of no other explanation for the fact that when, for example, a Hungarian sole trader applies for a trade license, the police is asked for a personal assessment, and this assessment is usually that because the man is this Hungarian citizen or another, he cannot be considered entirely faultless with respect to the interests of state.‖). He also complained of difficulties encountered by Hungarian societies: ―Restrictions on the freedom to form societies and to associate are not, in the case of Hungarians, a symptom of the time, but a constant phenomenon. I admit that exceptional circumstances may warrant even such restrictions, but if it tendentiously affects only one part of the population, the suspicion may be justified that these restrictions were not born of general, state-wide, but narrower political interests. When a Slovak or a German can organise a parade and assemblies, why should a Hungarian not be able to do so? (…) Our regional cultural and educational society, SZMKE, was outlawed in April, and in vain do we beg and hasten the party to authorise the Hungarian Scout Union and the Children‘s Protection Society. All three of these societies are far from having political tendencies‖.45 Perhaps most contradictory was his position on persecuting Jewish citizens. Even during the period of Slovak autonomy, in January 1939, he cynically advised the Hungarian government to not let itself be outrun by the Slovak government in adopting a Jewish law or a more drastic legal measure. He wished that ―Tiso‘s followers (…) would be late with the draft of a Jewish law, and when they present it, that it should be rather moderate. That could perhaps achieve that Berlin would turn away from them entirely, and we would be better off. If Berlin wanted to solve the Czechoslovak question once and for all‖.46 Esterházy supported most of Parliament‘s measures connected with the intensifying persecution of Jews both in word and in casting his votes. For example, he voted for a constitutional law which empowered the government to pass legislation in this area, at the expense of Parliament.47 He voiced direct support for anti-Jewish regulations in several of his parliamentary speeches, because he thought ―Hungarians have suffered (in the past) by the hand of Jews just as much as Slovaks‖, which is why ―they are as far from Jewish ideology‖ and why he strongly objected to the idea that ―Hungarians should come to harm in the justified battle against the Jews‖.48 An opinion that warrants the label of controversial was Esterházy‘s stance in the voting procedure on the constitutional law for Jewish expatriation, which the Slovak Diet voted on on May 15, 1942. While several Members of Parliament managed to avoid the vote by leaving the assembly hall, Esterházy was the only person courageous enough to express his disagreement in the open.49 The controversial nature of this step, however, mostly lied in the motivation which he later explained to have justified it. He explained his reasons in a letter to the Chairman of the Slovak Diet, Martin Sokol, which he also forwarded to the Hungarian government. At its beginning, Esterházy notes: ―Since my earliest years, I have always insisted on an anti-Jewish position and I will continue doing so‖. As a minority representative, however, he declares that he ―cannot support a law that gives the majority a right to displace a minority‖, which could (as a matter of precedent) threaten the community whose interests he defended. He called the

48 proposed legislation ―terrible and inhumane‖, inappropriate in the eyes of many of his colleagues– parliamentarians, who, ―because of party discipline, did not have the courage to vote against it‖.50 A separate chapter in Esterházy‘s career as parliamentarian revolved around the issue of political immunity. With German minority representative Franz Karmasin, he led in the number of requests to be extradited for criminal prosecution. In most cases, these had to do with violations of traffic regulations, and permission to prosecute was not given in either. One exception was a violation of the law on criminal acts against the state, which Esterházy was accused of committing on 22 October 1943, at the railway station in Poprad. The incident took place while he was boarding the Tatra Express, an elite train of the Slovak Railway Company. Instead of a malfunctioning luxurious express car, the company delivered a regular motor train. The baffled politician was recorded to have cried six times: ―Pray tell, what is this – you call this regular third-class car the Tatra Express? This is a fraud, just like everything else in this state!‖,51 which was supposed to have ―particularly scandalised‖ the bystanders. The Main Prosecutor‘s Office in Preńov filed a request to the Slovak Diet on October 23, 1943 for permission to prosecute according to §18, s. 1 of Act n. 320/1940 for the crime of defaming the state in public. The immunity board, ―considering the gravity of the offence‖, advised the Diet to allow prosecution. On the basis of this recommendation, a vote in the assembly then deprived Esterházy of his immunity.52 After the incident he only appeared in Parliament twice – for the last time in February 1944. The focal point of Esterházy‘s political activities were: defending the rights and interests of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and later in Slovakia, attempts to restore the Hungarian state (however, exclusively by peaceful means), and a Christian–conservative ideological orientation. He was the leading official of the Hungarian Party in Slovakia – an integral component of the political system of the Slovak Republic between 1939 and 1945. The overall situation on the fronts and reflections about the post- war development led him, like most members of this political group, to political passivity. In the following years, his life acquired tragic dimensions. After the end of the war, he was trialled both in the USSR and in Slovakia and spent the rest of his life in prison, where he also died. In a show trialheld in the communist Soviet Union, he was sentenced to 10 years of forced labour on the basis of a false confession. In Bratislava – like all representatives of the political regime of 1938–1945 – he was brought to trial on retributive justice, which was a Europe-wide phenomenon. For his political activities as well as for taking part in aggression against the Czechoslovak state between 1938 and 1939, he was sentenced to death. By a pardon granted by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Klement Gottwald, his sentence was later changed to life imprisonment.53

NOTES

This study was written as part of the project Legal Continuity and Discontinuity in 20th Century Slovakia and Its Effect on the Legal Order of the Slovak Republic, supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, under contract n. APVV-0607-10. 2 Zelenák, P.: Provincial Christian Socialist Party [Krajinská kresťansko-socialistická strana].In: Political Parties in Slovakia 1860–1989 [Politické strany na Slovensku 1860 – 1989].Ed.: Lipták, Ľ., Bratislava, 1992, 157–158, see also: Zelenák, P.: Hungarian National Party [Maćarská národná strana].In: Politické strany na Slovensku 1860 – 1989. Ed.: Lipták, Ľ., Bratislava, 1992, pp 158–166. 3 Zelenák, P.: United Provincial Christian Socialist Party and Hungarian National Party [Zjednotená krajinská kresťansko- socialistická strana a Maćarská národná strana].In: Politické strany na Slovensku 1860 – 1989. Ed.: Lipták, Ľ., Bratislava 1992, pp 213–218. 4 Janek, I.: János Esterházy and Slovak–Hungarian Diplomatic Relations in 1938–1941 [János Esterházy a slovensko- maćarské diplomatické vzťahy v rokoch 1938–1941].In: Slovakia in the Times of Oppression 1938–1989 II. Familiar and Unfamiliar Figures[Slovensko v rokoch neslobody 1938–1989 II. Osobnosti známe – neznáme].Hruboň, A.–Lepiń, J.– Tokárová, Z. (eds), Bratislava 2014, p. 62. 5 Deák, L.: The Political Portrait of János Esterházy[Politický profil Jánosa Esterházyho]. Bratislava, 1996, p. 7. 6 National Archives of Hungary (hereinafter MOL), kept political documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter KRS) 1938-65–179.

7 Deák, L.: Politický profil…, op. cit., p. 7. 8 MOL, KRS, 1936-7-36. 9 Deák, L.: Politický profil…, op. cit., p. 7. 10 Public Record Office London, FO 371/21567. 11 Zarański, J.: Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka, 1935–1945, IV. vol., 1938, London, 1972, p. 193. 12 Hetényi, M.: (United) Hungarian Party in Slovakia 1939–1945. Political Situation of the Hungarian Minority After the Vienna Award as Reflected in the Agenda of the Slovak State Apparatus[(Zjednotená) Maćarská strana na Slovensku 1939 – 1945. Politické pomery maćarskej menńiny po Viedenskej arbitráņi v zrkadle agendy slovenského ńtátneho aparátu].Nitra, 2011, p. 57. 13 Members of the Prague Parliament coming from regions annexed to Hungary were formally requested to apply to the Hungarian Parliament, but in fact only Hungarian nationals were expected to participate (see: Deák, L.: Politický profil…, op. cit., p. 10; Tilkovszky, L.: Južné Slovensko v rokoch 1938 – 1945. Bratislava, 1972, p. 150; see also: Slovak National Archives (hereinafter SNA), MV, f. 3). 14 SNA, Interior Ministry (hereinafter MV), f. 3. 15 Hetényi, M.: (Zjednotená) Maďarská..., op. cit., p. 56.; cf.: Simon, A.: The Influence of Constitutional and Political Changes of the Late 1938 Early 1939 on the Status of the Hungarian Minority (with particular emphasis on the Hungarians in Bratislava)[Vplyv ńtátoprávnych a politických zmien z konca roka 1938 a zo začiatku roka 1939 na postavenie maćarskej menńiny (so zvláńtnym zreteľom na bratislavských Maćarov)]. In: Bystrický, V.–Michela, M.– Schvarc, M. et al.: A Breakup or Disintegration? Historical Reflections of the Dissolution of Czecho–Slovakia [Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historické reflexie zániku Česko-Slovenska].Bratislava, 2010, p. 316. 16 Simon, A.: Vplyv..., op. cit., p. 320. 17 The number comes from a census in 1938. Of this number, 17,510 people were Hungarian state citizens. According to a census from 1940, 53,128 people reported Hungarian nationality of which merely 45,880 were Slovak state citizens (See: Hetényi, M.: (Zjednotená) Maďarská…, op. cit., p. 27.). 18 Stenographic Reports of the Assembly of the Slovak Republic, www.nrsr.sk (hereinafter TS SSR), 35. Session (15. 5. 1940) 19 Janek, I.: János Esterházy..., op. cit., p. 66. 20 Slovak Code, y. 1939, Constitutional law n. 185/1939 21 TS SSR, 6. Session (21. 7. 1939) 22 Archive of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Prague, Political Reports, f. 255. 23 Simon, A.: Vplyv..., op. cit., p. 317. 24 TS SSR, 34. Session (7. 5. 1940) 25 SNA, MV, f. 3. 26 Esterházy, L.: Szívek az ár ellen. Budapest, 1991, p. 98. 27 TS SSR, 45. Session (24. 9. 1940) 28 TS SSR, 35. Session (15. 5. 1940), 67. Session (22. 7. 1941), 73. Session (12. 11. 1941), see also: Lipták, Ľ.: The Party of Slovak National Unity[Strana slovenskej národnej jednoty]. In: Politické strany na Slovensku 1860–1989. Ed.: Lipták, Ľ., Bratislava, 1992, p. 248. 29 Slovak Code, y. 1939, Constitutional law n. 185/1939 30 Slovak Code, y. 1940, Act n. 121/1940 31 Printed records from the Slovak Diet, n. 167, www.nrsr.sk. 32 Slovak Code, y. 1939, Constitutional law n. 185/1939 33 J. Esterházy did not sit in the State Council, although he originally appointed himself member as a representative of his party (see: Kamenec, I.: The State Council in the Political System of the Slovak State in 1939–1945 [Ńtátna rada v politickom systéme slovenského ńtátu v rokoch 1939–1945]. In: Historický časopis, 44, 2, 1996, p. 225. 34 See: Podolec, O.: The Status of Municipal Self-Governments in Slovakia in 1938–1945 [Postavenie obecnej samosprávy na Slovensku v rokoch 1938–1945].In: Historický časopis, 51, 4, 2003, p. 663. 35 Hetényi, M.: (Zjednotená) Maďarská..., op. cit., p. 108., see also: Mitáč, J.: The Party of Slovak National Unity in the Occupied Territory of Southern Slovakia in 1941–1944 [Strana slovenskej národnej jednoty na okupovanom území juņného Slovenska v rokoch 1941–1944]. In: Pamäť národa, y. IV., 2010, i. 3, pp 4–18. 36 SNA, fund Assembly of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter SSR), f. 1–15. 37 Slovak Code, y. 1941, Act n. 248. 38 SNA, SSR, f. 54. 39 TS SSR, 16. Session (28. 11. 1939) 40 TS SSR, 6. Session (21. 7. 1939) 41 TS SSR, 7. Session (25. 7. 1939) 42 TS SSR, 46. Session (8. 10. 1940) 43 TS SSR, 51. Session (26. 11. 1940)

44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Tilkovszky, L.: Južné..., op. cit., p. 147. 47 TS SSR, 43. Session (3. 9. 1940) 48 TS SSR, 46. Session (8. 10. 1940) 49 TS SSR, 87. Session (15. 5. 1942), see also: Kamenec, I.: Tracing the Tragedy [Po stopách tragédie]. Bratislava 1991, p. 187. 50 História, 1994, issue 3, p. 26, see also: Deák, L.: Politický..., op. cit., pp 18, 19. 51 „Mi ez kérem, egy közönséges harmadosztályú kocsi és erre mondják, hogy Tátra expressz. Ez egy közönséges svindli, mint minden ebben az országban.‖ ―Pray and tell, what is this – you call this regular third-class car the Tatra Express? This is a fraud, just like everything else in this state!‖ (SNA, SSR, 41). 52 SNA, SSR, f. 40. 53 Molnár, I.: Pardoned to Death. Documents about the Suffering of János Esterházy Based on Records by Mária Esterházy- Mycielska [Omilostený na smrť. Dokumenty utrpenia Jánosa Esterházyho na základe záznamov Márie Esterházy- Mycielskej]. Budapest, 2010.

ISTVÁN JANEK Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Historic Institute, Budapest

MEDIATION ACTIVITIES OF JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY BETWEEN THE SLOVAK AND HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PERIOD OF 1939–1942 WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON JEWISH QUESTION

This study explores mediation activities of János Esterházy in bilateral relations between Slovakia and Hungary. Without claiming to be exhaustive – given the extent of the topic and space available, it shall focus on one or two cases. In 1939 Slovakia had three neighbours: Germany, Hungary and (until September 1939) Poland. The size of the country with 2.6 million inhabitants was 30,000 square kilometres. Germany assigned Slovakia a role of model state to aid its propaganda voiced across Central and South–Eastern Europe. A model state, according to the Nazi design, meant that submission to German desires earned the country a chance for political and constitutional self-determination and survival. Jozef Tiso became the head of state. Contemporary ethnic profile of Slovakia consisted of Slovaks, representing 85% of the population, and of ethnic minorities – Hungarians, Germans, Ruthenians, and others.1Slovak administration initially tried to create a public illusion that, in relations to Germany, Hungary and Poland, it could play a role similar to Switzerland. Reality, however, was different. Slovakia had lost its independence almost instantly after declaring autonomy. On 23 March 1939 Slovakia and Germany signed the Schutzvertrag defence accord, under which the Reich guarantied Slovakia twenty-five years of independence. Slovakia undertook to implement its foreign policy in close conjunction with the German government, to operate its armed forces to act as a joint defence force with Germany, and also agreed to the opening of Schutzzone2 that took up some 5% of its territory. In addition to these stipulations, the accord gave Germany an opportunity to gradually assume control of national economy and to interfere in internal political affairs. It was during these trying times that János Esterházy entered politics to become one of the key liaison figures for Slovakia and Hungary. In 1939, as well as during the later wartime, the governments of Slovakia and Hungary tried to solve minority issues on strictly internal understanding. They considered any proposals and critical views from outside to be interference in their sovereignty. In contrast, or rather in parallel, they hoped to secure multilateral and massive support from their ethnic expatriates. The key feature of Slovak–Hungarian relations was mutual distrust and, given the minorities, tension. The tension kept on rising also because the status of Slovaks in the territories incorporated in Hungary kept deteriorating, and vice versa, the Hungarians in Slovakia encountered similar fate. The Slovaks considered the ever-increasing emphasis on Hungarian language and culture in schooling, as well as suppression of Slovak national movement, to be signs of injustice.3In turn, Hungarians in Slovakia complained about the gradual restriction of their minority rights. The minorities issue contributed to the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary between 1939 and 1942 to a point that Hungarian government contemplated, in 1941, cessation of diplomatic relations. That, however, was prevented by Germany.4The relations between the two neighbouring countries thus substantially differed from those between the allied standard friendly relations. After the first Vienna Award the Hungarians tried to instigate in Germans distrust of Slovaks, and the latter did the same against Hungarians. The primary aim of Slovak foreign policy after the First Vienna Award was to regain its territory attributed to Hungary. Hungary, on the other hand, considered it to be the prime aim of its foreign policy to retain the territory. The minority issue came only secondary. A specific feature in Slovak–Hungarian relations was that, though they had opposing political and economic interests, they were still part of the same allied system. Slovakia as well as Hungary were forced to keep taking in regard their acceptance by

Germany: it was important to avoid conflicts between individual countries, within the allied camp even if they failed to avoid them in bilateral relations. The declaration of independence on the part of Slovakia and the foundation of virtually ethnically homogenous nation state became the celebration of Slovak national self-determination. The Vienna Award, however, proved to be a shock for Slovak intelligentsia, something which could be compared to the earthquake that Trianon caused to their Hungarian counterparts. Together with the territorial annexation by Hungary, several hundreds of thousands of Slovaks found themselves in Hungary. Their Magyarisation was presented in Bratislava as major bogey, this having promptly led to the idea of revisionism. To Slovaks the outcome of the Vienna Award meant disappointment and sobering. Slovak government immediately resorted to reciprocity.5It monitored activities of Hungarian diplomacy with relentless attention, trying to gather evidence against the Hungarians in order to win German favour. It was in this stuffy atmosphere that János Esterházy had to act as mediator between the two governments. János Esterházy considered it his prime mission to weld the Hungarian minority together, envisaging the life of the community as that of a large family. As the Chairman of an ethnic Hungarian party he regularly toured cities and villages with Hungarian population, trying to deal with their grievances. He was further entrusted with a major task to aid progress of bilateral and diplomatic relations between 1939 and 1944. Slovak and Hungarian politicians and diplomats kept seeking his opinion on all major issues, plus he also led mediation talks between the two countries. He enjoyed good relations in the top echelons of both states, and kept regular personal contact with foreign diplomats accredited in Bratislava. He held weekly meetings with staff at the German and Hungarian Embassies to whom he reported on the situation among the Slovak Hungarians, pleading for assistance and/or mediation. He also regularly travelled to Budapest where he acted as advocate of interests of Hungarians in Slovakia, and, reciprocally, of the interests of Slovaks in Hungary. In terms of Slovak–Hungarian relations, his activities in this period were indispensable, although he was merely a tolerated member of the Slovak judiciary.6Esterházy repeatedly addressed the Slovak Parliament on behalf of the Hungarian side, highlighting the issues that could not have appeared in the press or were ignored by the Slovak government. He thus spoke of injustice against the Hungarians in the Parliament: as he once put it, given the censorship of his speeches, there was no other forum to do so. It was not rare for Hungarian language periodicals published in Slovakia to be printed with half page blank as censors struck out the content at the very last moment. Esterházy as the Chairman of an ethnic Hungarian party and Member of Slovak Parliament was among the leading figures in political and public life. He was unafraid to express his views more openly. He was sometimes called the voice of the bad conscience of the Slovak administration, as he commented on everything that the government tried to conceal. Esterházy repeatedly spoke on behalf of Hungarians in Slovakia. For example, in his address to the Parliament on 21 July 1939, he listed the shortfalls in the Constitution. He critically pointed out that the Constitution didn‘t secure that ―the Slovak peoples [...] wouldn‘t, under any circumstances, consider us, the Hungarians, inferior and unable to do anything in the interest of our equal status. [...] The founding father has to bear in mind that the state shouldn‘t be a matter of organic development, but an entity to last for centuries―.7In his Parliamentary capacity, Esterházy repeatedly addressed the legislature pointing out injustices caused by Slovak authorities. He accentuated Hungarian–Slovak interdependence and tried to help ease the tension. The following example illustrates Esterházy‘s struggle for bilateral mediation. Early April 1939 brought the dawn of anti-Hungarian propaganda in Slovakia. It was manifested by the statements from the Slovak administration, as well as in public information the spirit of which was aggravated by anti-Hungarian sentiments. It was fuelled by territorial claims of the Slovaks, demanding restitution of national borders valid prior to the Vienna Award.8Against the idea of the state of St. Stephen promoted by Hungary, they placed the idea of great Slovakia and the Great Moravian Empire.9As early as on 10 April 1939 the Slovak side started to massage public opinion. Hungarians in Slovakia had been initially attacked merely on the radio and in press, what later penetrated political speeches. ―The press called the Hungarians murderers, blood-thirsty beats.‖10In connection with the earlier military clashes (the so called Small War) it shocked Slovak public mind.11Referring to reciprocity, the Slovak government objected that, in Hungary, authorities insulted a number of ethnic Slovak activists. It was a

53 reaction to Slovak authorities having arrested a number of leaders of Hungarian intelligentsia. At the time reciprocity had become the foundation of the bilateral relations. Esterházy tried to promote Christian and humanistic ideals, and denounced the politics of reciprocity and power blunders. ―When here, on the territory of Slovakia, an ultra-chauvinistic Slovak wishes to serve his autonomous country by tearing off party badge worn by a Hungarian who lives either in Nitra, Bratislava, Preńov or Banská Bystrica, or provocatively offends his national sentiment, then such ultra-chauvinistic Slovak also undoubtedly harms his own country in a manner similar to an ultra-chauvinistic Hungarian harming Hungary when he tries, in word or deed to prevent and halt the national development of Slovaks living in Hungary.‖12In his address to the Party meeting on 12 May 1939 in Bratislava, Esterházy appealed to his Party members to refrain from provocations. He also subjected the activities of the government in Budapest to criticism for having restricted the functioning and social activities of Slovaks in Hungary.13Esterházy repeatedly highlighted mutual dependence of both peoples, as is shown in one of his speeches of 21 December 1939: ―I believe that small nations that live in the Danubian basin have to, particularly now, in the atmosphere of war, find way to each other in order to secure life in peace in the Danubian – or, if you wish – Carpathian basin, whilst preserving their autonomy. [...] I have never kept my opinion secret about the ethnic issue, arguing that every nation or ethnic group has the right to live to the full. That also applies in the case such group cannot live in its own independent country. As a natural consequence of this belief I stand by the principle that Slovaks living in Hungary have to be given all to which they, as ethnic group, are entitled by their God-given right.‖14He further stated that he couldn‘t give up on the rights of the Hungarian minority, as it had secured them at the cost of harsh struggle in Czechoslovakia and had brought them to the Slovak state. Esterházy‘s activities related to the relations of the two countries focused particularly on Hungarian– Slovak rapprochement. It was indeed the objective which he strove to achieve in talks with Budapest and Bratislava. The following event is illustrative of his effort. In early July 1939 Esterházy called on President Tiso. During the conversation he raised, inter alia, the complaint raised by the Hungarian government about its Slovak counterpart having failed to take any legal steps since the Vienna Award to alleviate the situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia. Still, Esterházy remained open to continuing the talks in the interest of closer alliance between the two countries. He argued that Hungarian government should approach the negotiations, if Tiso informed them in advance via Esterházy about the expectations of his administration, and of its intentions in regard to the improvement of the status of Hungarians in Slovakia. Esterházy assured Tiso that Hungary had no territorial claims against Slovakia.15The President was pleased to hear the statement and said that he would be personally glad to see friendly relations emerge between the two states. He also stated that, had he known beforehand about the extent of territorial changes, he would have agreed with the Hungarian government when meeting in Komárno the size of the territory subject to the handover.16The President expressed an assumption, that, had the situation evolved as stated, the two countries would have been able to sign economic, cultural and political accords with Hungary in early 1939. ―I did err here,‖ said Tiso.17He nevertheless criticised the Hungarian government for having failed to treat, after the Vienna Award, the Slovaks in Hungary in a manner promised by the Regent Miklós Horthy in his address in Końice.18The atrocities that occurred between November 1938 and July 1939 turned Slovak public opinion against Hungarians. Tiso therefore didn‘t wish to personally initiate rapprochement between the two countries. By that he seemed to have predestined his own downfall. He proposed to Esterházy that the two governments launched economic talks that would also include secret discussions, and would enable reaching such cultural and political agreements which would remain unknown to Germans. He further offered a guarantee that the Slovak minority would not raise excessive demands and that the Slovak administration would only demand for the Slovak minority in Hungary as much as the Hungarian side would be prepared to willingly provide. In conclusion Esterházy promised Tiso to fully inform the Hungarian ministry of Foreign Affairs about the matters raised.19Even though 1939 didn‘t bring any political and minority agreement between Hungary and Slovakia, the two countries did reach agreement of smaller trade transactions. Esterházy‘s mediation role thus wasn‘t to no avail, though it failed to bring any actual breakthrough.

The Slovak side criticised Esterházy also in connection with his mediation activities: in Slovak Parliament Konńtantín Čulen, MP, attacked the Hungarian foreign policy towards Slovakia, hence also Esterházy. He countered the criticism of visiting Budapest too often in his address to the Parliament on 7 May 1940. He admitted that he had indeed regularly travelled to Hungary and kept meeting with the Hungarian President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He commented it: ―I travel there when I feel a need to try and help a matter. I also make it no secret that, during my trips to Budapest, I also call on the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I say this, because I do not wish to attach any importance to myself and we don‘t discuss the design of the map of Europe after the war. Indeed, though, I travel there in the interest of Slovak railroad workers and postmen, and on similar matters. Should anyone dare to doubt my words, I am prepared to present written evidence about how many Slovak civil servants were given back their bread as a result of my intervention.‖20He stated that, ever since the launch of his political career, he had been a proponent and spokesman of friendly relations with Slovaks.21―[...] I wish to believe that such positions are merely temporary and give way to sober politics that subscribes to the live- 22 and-let-live principle.‖ Esterházy discussed the status of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia in Slovak Parliament on 22 July 1941 during a debate on the opening of propaganda office. ―I am convinced that, since we live in such difficult times, it is not appropriate for a minority to publicly deal with all its grievances and to address injustice. We presented our desires and grievances to relevant government officials and I am convinced that they would deal with them in good faith. I therefore wouldn‘t wish to prejudice the fate of the memorandum presented to the government.‖ ―[...] why the need for the authorities to seal, of all radios, those owned by the Hungarians, and/or setting them in a way that prevents them from listening to Budapest?‖ In his speech that kept being interrupted by shouts from the auditorium, Esterházy referred to such measures petty. He also considered questionable the claim that minorities were being treated similarly to Slovaks: ―[...] on our part we fulfil our civic duties, but in turn expect to be properly appreciated. We won‘t allow any petty bureaucrat to treat us by whim‖.Esterházy went on to criticise manifestations of Slovak propaganda against Hungarians and Hungary that, he claimed, only fuelled the tension instead of trying to solve contradictions between the two countries, ―for, no matter what happens, we have to live side-by-side on this territory‖.23On 31 July 1941 he received a reply from the Presidium of the Slovak government to his letter addressed to Tiso and in reference to his speech at the Parliament. They accepted some of his grievances, whilst refuting others, referring to paragraph 96 of the Constitution related to the act on reciprocity. The Slovaks passed on the memorandum to the German Embassy.24Esterházy presented his grievances to the Hungarian government that also handed them to Germany. The officials at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed with Esterházy and promised to intervene. On 7 August 1941, the Slovak Ambassador in Berlin Matúń Černák informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava that the German government wanted Slovak press to end anti-Hungarian polemics as such debate could give the enemy camps an impression that the anti-Bolshevik front led by Germany wasn‘t united. The German warning, however, had the opposite effect. The Slovaks were quick to produce counter-argument suggesting that the Hungarian press also kept on attacking them. They tried to collect articles published in press, and showed them to Berlin trying to prove that it was the Hungarians to ―breach the rules‖. This further illustrates the challenges that Esterházy faced in his mediation effort and that it was the German foreign policy to have the final word. Esterházy didn‘t give up his struggle for the improvement of the status of both minorities, as shall now be shown. In April 1942 in Bratislava, Emanuel Böhm, Chairman of the Slovak party in Hungary, met with the Minister of Interior Alexander Mach to report on the improvement of the status of Slovak minority. He asked for compassionate attitude towards the Hungarian minority which would have a positive effect on the status of Slovaks in Hungary.25Esterházy had earlier repeatedly spoken with Böhm. Mach responded to the plea and, in April 1942, received Esterházy to discuss with him all issues pertaining to the Hungarians. Subsequently, the pressure exerted on the Hungarians in Slovakia was temporarily reduced and the status of Slovaks in Hungary improved as well. Following the meeting, the Slovak press voiced a more conciliatory tone and reported on the improvement of the situation of Slovak minority in Hungary. Mach and Esterházy

55 meanwhile frequently consulted the settlement of situation of Hungarians in Slovakia and, vice versa, of Slovaks in Hungary. A major milestone that brought relief was that the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Kállay issued a permit for Slovenská jednota to be published from 24 May 1942 as a daily. Esterházy‘s contribution to this measure was significant.26Esterházy was aware of the end of the era of nationalist spirit in ethnic politics. On many occasions he advocated interests of Slovaks living in Hungary, thus also helping the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia. Esterházy and his Party were the liaison between the two countries. They played a positive role in dealing with contradictions between the two ethnic groups. On 24 July 1942 Esterházy again called on Mach to request a review of some government decisions that proved unjust to Hungarians in Slovakia. Mach responded that, though he would wish to be of assistance, he personally couldn‘t do anything, because the Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka had requested him not to make any substantial decisions on matters concerning the Hungarians without prior consultation with him. Mach reminded Esterházy that the Hungarian administration in the neighbourhood of Końice prevented the local Slovaks from getting politically organised, moreover preventing them to hold cultural events. Tuka himself ordered the Slovak Ambassador to Budapest Ján Spińiak to closely monitor similar events and, once aware of any inappropriate measure being taken, to promptly protest to the Hungarian administration and report to Bratislava on their response and attitude. Tuka insisted on dealing with desires and grievance 27 of the Hungarian minority on the principle of reciprocity. Esterházy verified the grievances of the Slovak minority and confirmed that the Hungarian administration in the neighbourhood of Końice had indeed treated the local Slovak minority adversely and with rebuff. He was well aware that such treatment was unacceptable and essentially harmful to the Hungarians in Slovakia. He therefore aimed to facilitate swift solution.28The following day he wrote a letter to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking to send an investigation commission to Końice. His personal experience confirmed that the administration in the Końice area had been staffed also with people unaware of mentality of the local residents and with negative attitude towards Slovaks. He argued that it was impossible and impermissible to take Slovak grievances lightly, and asked to take into account possible grounds for the complaints. He therefore recommended to set up an investigation commission and asked for the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Tibor Pataky to oversee the investigation.29 Ambassador Spińiak in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, dated 26 August 1942, stated that, because of Esterházy‘s intervention, Hungarian press voiced less criticism of Slovak politics and revisionist propaganda had also ceased, what he deemed to be a positive sign.30 Esterházy at the time negotiated with Ńtefan Semián, Slovak Ministerial Advisor, who informed him in confidence that the strict approach by the Slovak administration towards the Hungarian minority was a consequence of the advice from the Slovak Ambassador to Budapest Ján Spińiak. It was through the very pressure on the Hungarian minority that Spińiak hoped to achieve more positive treatment of Slovak minority in Hungary on the part of Hungarian administration. Virtually throughout the war Esterházy dedicated his efforts to the improvement of the situation of minorities. He had indeed seen some results, though even he didn‘t manage to achieve any significant rapprochement between the two countries. Minority politics of the Hungarian administration didn‘t depend on him. He advocated that Slovaks in Hungary had to be given their ethnic rights. Nevertheless, he argued, the principle of reciprocity kept the two peoples apart and prevented them from amicable coexistence. It is also with regard to the interdependence that historic need arises for the past sins to be mutually forgiven.

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY AND THE JEWISH ISSUE

This is an issue that, given the degree of its politicisation, is very difficult to grasp. The following part takes into account academic perspectives and attempts to objectively present the issue. Both Slovak and Hungarian historians are pressurised to assume a stance of the theme. In Hungarian academic literature János Esterházy is portrayed particularly as the critic of totalitarian solutions. Hungarian historiography views him positively. Based on his positions, Esterházy can be defined as man in opposition. On the Hungarian side he has become a symbol, hero and martyr. As any symbol, he

56 is hard to grasp and is subject to different interpretations. In Hungary he epitomises someone who had suffered as a result of the Beneń Decrees, which is today a sore point for Hungarians in Slovakia. Nonetheless, Esterházy could have escaped in 1945, but he did stay for he felt no guilt. The hero myth is also based on the fact that Esterházy didn‘t vote in support of the Jewish deportations and dared to openly express his position. In spite of that the Hungarian side failed to convince Yad Vashem to award him the Righteous Among Nations. Slovakia has not even opened the possibility of Esterházy rehabilitation or to the dismissal of the collective guilt of Hungarians in Slovakia. After the war, Esterházy was sentenced to death as war criminal – an act that thus also sentenced the entire Hungarian community (living in Slovakia). His fate became strong evidence that Czechoslovakia had applied on the Hungarians the principle of collective guilt. In Czechoslovakia, which was intended to be turned into nation state after WW2, Hungarians were found publicly guilty as a community. Yet there was an evident desire to find an individual who would to embody the guilt be punished as the main criminal. Hence Esterházy became a model figure to the Hungarians in Slovakia. To Slovaks, Esterházy epitomises Hungarian irredentism. Moreover, he was seen as war criminal, collaborator, fascist politician who cannot be rehabilitated. If he were acquitted, the Slovak public and historians would have to recognise that everything that Slovaks did to the Hungarians after World War II was altogether illegal and unsubstantiated. Slovak and Hungarian historiography generally hold opposing views on Esterházy‘s role. When exploring matters related to the Jewish question, the task becomes more challenging also because no comprehensive analysis has yet been conducted and the study requires additional in-depth research into primary sources. On the Hungarian side, Imre Molnár addresses the issue in a number of publications and additional historians do so in their studies. Slovak historians who study the Jewish issue in greater detail include Ladislav Deák, Ivan Kamenec and Eduard Niņňanský, with the first two also addressing Esterházy. Slovak historiography lacks a monograph on Esterházy that would draw from sources and/or his later career. Russian, Czech, Israeli and German archives might contain some, though as yet, unpublished documents.

SOLUTIONS OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SLOVAKIA

The first anti-Jewish laws were adopted as early as in the second half of 1939. They introduced the requirement for Jews to wear the yellow Star of David. This was further followed by resettlements and transports to rural labour camps.31 The process of Arisation involved closure of nearly 10,000 Jewish shops and businesses, or their handover to non-Jewish Slovaks.32 Everyone of Jewish faith, as well as the Jews who converted to Roman Catholicism after 1918, or were either married to a Jew or had at least one of the parents of Jewish descent, was declared Jew in 1939. Numerus clausus was applied to a number of professions which capped the numbers of Jews in those professions. Once the legislation came into force, c. 6,000 people lost their jobs. According to German assessment, Slovakia promptly and effectively approached the expulsion of Jewish population. In time, however, the German administration concluded that the initial enthusiasm had ceased, judging by the fact that the resettlement of Jews had been launched some time previously, though many of them had still remained in their homes.33 The German Ambassador to Bratislava, Hans Bernard shared the view. In his memorandum of 22 July 1940 he noted that the ―solution‖ of the Jewish question is still waiting for implementation and that the Slovaks continued to consider Jews, i.e. the enemies of the Germans, to be invaluable and indispensable. To investigate the issue, he requested Berlin to send in advisers.34 Slovak leaders repeatedly negotiated with their German counterparts about further fate of Slovak Jews, yet no agreement had been reached at the time. It is curious in this context that Slovaks had contributed to the deportations of Jews from Germany on 2 December 1941 and made claims to their assets.35 Having thus helped the deportations, the Slovaks were just a step away from being expected by Germans to carry out deportations of Jews in Slovakia too. Alexander Mach and Jozef Tuka were the main masterminds of anti-Jewish measures in Slovakia. The Jewish Code came into force as Act 198/1941 on 9 September 1941. Aimed to achieve the ―final solution‖ of the Jewish issue, the

Code was drafted to the blueprint of the Nurnberg Laws.36 It meant stripping Jews of human and civil rights. The Code bound Jews to declare their valuables and assets exceeding the value of 5,000 Slovak Crowns and imposed 20% property tax on them. Jewish large estates were expropriated. In addition, their typewriters were seized. Jews had to provide winter clothing for the troops on the frontline. The 1,888 seized Jewish enterprises were handed to non-Jewish Slovak nationals and collaborators. Arisation and confiscation of personal property from 54, 667 people raised the amount of 4,322,239 Slovak Crowns.37 October 1941 saw the start of the displacement of Jews from Bratislava. Of the local c. 15,000 people, some 6,000 were sent to rural forced labour in camps.38 Others were meanwhile given a reprieve, as it turned out that, given the specialism of many of them, their deportation would be highly detrimental to Slovak economy. Slovaks wanted to be ―top pupils‖ in the eyes of German administration. They did their utmost to free themselves of Jewish. The desire might have been further exacerbated by the fact that a proportion of Jews in Slovakia had Hungarian sentiments. After the Trianon, a significant portion of Jewry that lived on the territories of Slovakia that had been taken over from Hungary, identified with Hungarian language and culture. Some of them retained the identification in 1942.39 One of the motivations among Slovaks might have also been their concern that, in the case of referendum, a portion of Jewry might support the return of the territories to Hungary that would have been detrimental to the Slovak side. From the second half of 1941 the German government continuously aimed to have all Jews deported from Slovakia. Negotiations were held with Hitler on 23 and 24 October 1941 in presence of Tiso, Tuka and Mach. Hitler felt that the Slovak government ―is unable to solve this issue by itself‖.40According to Mach‘s account, Hitler stated that Germany needed the Slovak Jewish labour force. Heinrich Himmler, the SS commander, argued, however, that Slovak Jews were to be deported to the camps in Poland where they were to work. According to one of the historical testimonies, Hitler at yet another meeting with the Slovak side held in early May 1942, threatened the Slovak government:41―If Slovakia rejects [the deportations of Jews], it ought to be prepared for the worst on my part.‖42The frightened Slovak Parliament presented, on 15 May 1942, a bill on the deportations of Jews. The Slovak Ministry of Interior thus officially identified Jews as the enemy of the Slovak peoples. Slovak administration had thus tried to create an impression of legality of the deportations. The bill, associated with the Minister of Interior Mach, was entitled the Constitutional Act on the Eviction of Jews. It consisted of four paragraphs. The first read that Jews were to be evicted from the territory of the Republic; the second stripped Jews of their Slovak nationality; the third contained provisions concerning Jewish assets; and the fourth stipulated that the Act would come into force on the day of its proclamation. Mach stated that, by the adoption of the Act, Slovakia would free itself of all Jews. He suggested that the Act merely presented framework legislation. Foreseeing possible difficulties, he asked to be authorised to adopt regulations required to implement the first two paragraphs. In response to the concerns raised by some MPs about the estimated cost of the evictions, Mach stated that it would be covered from Jewish assets.43 The Slovak Ministry of Interior set up for the Jews a number of ―temporary camps‖ in Bratislava, Sereć, Poprad and Ņilina. The commanders in the camps were requested to arrange transports to Germany. The gathering of the Jews was carried out by the Hlinka Guard on behalf of the government. The first transport left Poprad on 25 March 1942, having crossed the Slovak–German border in the morning of 26 March.44 Thus Slovakia was the first country after Germany to enable the deportations of Jews. The anti-Jewish directives affected 4% of the population, i.e. some 89 thousand people.45 Jews lost all their income and assets and soon, in the Spring of 1942, they were deported to the extermination camps in Poland.46 The deportations began under the command of Dieter Wisliceny, SS captain and envoy of Adolf Eichmann.47 It is noteworthy that Slovak Jews were even previously sent to the camps in the Reich, though those actions weren‘t required by law. Therefore, a legislation was required to legalise the deportations. That materialised in Article 68 of the Act of 1942 what met with protests also from the Vatican.48 Secretary of State of the Holy See, the Cardinal Domenico Tardini, mentioned in one of his letters on the matter: ―It is unfortunate that the President of Slovakia is a priest. Everyone understands that the Holy See cannot stop Hitler. But who would understand that it couldn‘t control a single priest?‖49

A proportion of Slovak Jews were eventually arrested and placed in a ghetto to be subsequently put in cattle carts and deported to the German concentration camps.50 It was the Slovak State to benefit most from the Arisation process.51 On 5 October 1942 German Embassy in Bratislava requested the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to supply information about the numbers of the deported Slovak Jews. The reply suggested that 57,628 people had been deported.52 Lajos Kuhl, Hungarian Ambassador in Bratislava believed that the number was 60,000.53 The remaining Slovak Jews were exempted from the deportations in part because of the measures taken by Jozef Tiso.54 September 1942 brought opening of talks between Tuka and Hans Elard Ludin, Slovak Ambassador to Germany – or rather it was under their guidance that the 10- day long negotiations were held concerning the fate of the Jews. The parties agreed that Slovakia would pay Germany 500 Reich Marks per each deported Jew in compensation for the cost incurred.55 Within Europe it were also the Croats who had to pay for the Jewish deportations; the amount being 30 Reich Marks per person.56 The per capita fee was based, on one hand, on the cost the state would have to incur to cover the cost of retaining the Jews. On the other hand, Arisation brought Slovaks vast fortune from the Jewish assets that were divided among those who had played a role in the process or among those deemed to be worthy the booty, particularly people close to the Hlinka Guard. Ludin calmed Tuka who had feared the solution of the Jewish question, arguing that he supported a complete solution of the matter in Slovakia.57 The frequency of deportations declined in early September 1942, until they ended altogether. By that time virtually everyone who didn‘t have the affidavit of exemption had been deported.58 The Jews who remained in Slovakia, about 20 thousand people, were placed in ―Jewish labour camps‖ that were built earlier. Based on the exemption, they were allowed to continue in their jobs. They remained in the camps until the Slovak National Uprising broke out on 29 August 1944. Some Jews joined the Uprising. The German military command reported that Jews had played a decisive role in the Uprising and had to be deported. Heinrich Himmler saw it as evidence that, wherever the Jews remained, uprising arose. He therefore travelled to Bratislava to persuade the Slovak administration to immediately deport the remaining Jews.59 When the Uprising broke out, SS units captured Jews and deported them to concentration camps. 13 thousand people were estimated to be deported. It is estimated that 70 thousand Slovak Jews between 1942 and 1944 died.60 It ought to be noted that, in Slovakia, both the anti-Jewish laws and the deportations were solely the work of the Slovak government and administration. The latter didn‘t even attempt to buy time. As suggested above, Tiso‘s administration faithfully followed Hitler‘s policies in matters of the Jewish question. That made the period the most tragic chapter in the history of modern Slovakia.61

ESTERHÁZY‘S VOTE AGAINST THE JEWISH ACT

János Esterházy was the only one to vote against the Jewish Act on 15 May 1942.62 Prior to the voting he had informed the Speaker of the Parliament Martin Sokol that he would vote against the expulsion of Jews and that he hoped to convince his fellow parliamentarians to either withdraw the bill or postpone its adoption. He explained his decision not to support the Act to Sokol and the Slovak Government: ―[...] From my early childhood I firmly held anti-Jewish sentiments and I shall retain them. It, however, doesn‘t mean that I would vote in support of the adoption of an Act that steps on all divine and human rights. Slovaks don‘t want to expel Jews on the basis of faith, but on that of race. That is yet another reason why I oppose the bill. Hungarian identity in Slovakia represents ethnic minority and therefore it is altogether impossible to adopt and identify with a legislation that awards the majority a right to expel a minority. For over a millennium, we, the Hungarians, have been living and acting in the spirit of St. Stephen. The best evidence of that is that we have never expelled from the territory of Hungary anyone, be it an individual or a group‖.63Esterházy‘s critics use this quote to point out his anti-Jewish sentiments. Yet the zeitgeist and contemporary situation have to also be taken into account. At the time of persecutions of Jews, when anyone helping them or sympathising with them faced imminent danger, Esterházy could have hardly stated that ―I had always been a friend of Jews‖. Such public statement would have instantly triggered public rejection and would have convinced no one that the Act was detrimental. The administration expected Esterházy to say publicly anything that suited them. With his anti-Jewish statement Esterházy was merely distracting enemy attention, as he was aware of the need to act in a manner that wouldn‘t make him accused of friendship with Jews. His above statement is relevant in terms of tactics, but not in light of his overall conduct, in which he engaged despite the danger. His intention was to make it clear to the Slovak administration that even anti-Jewish attitude couldn‘t be the reason to support the passing of the bill. Slovak government embarked on a dangerous journey – he kept warning – for it had thus approved the legality of simply expelling a minority from the country.64 Esterházy unreservedly dismissed the adoption of the Jewish Act: ―It is shameful that a government, with Prime Minister and President who claim to be fine Catholics, deport their Jewish population to Germany, to Hitler‘s concentration camps. It is also reprehensible that the same government is opening concentration camps in Slovakia where Jews and Czechs are kept in captivity without trial‖.65In his refusal to vote in support of the Act, Esterházy was guided by his set of values, his Catholic faith, social feelings and Hungarian minority conscience. He was a man of firm morals who didn‘t give up his beliefs and principles. He considered his life and deeds to be a vocation. He set it his life mission to advocate the interest of the Hungarians who had remained in Slovakia and to help the persecuted, i.e. also the Jews. Voting in the Slovak Parliament was at the time conducted by raised hand. Remedy was used only when an obvious majority didn‘t vote in support of a bill. During the voting everyone saw that Esterházy didn‘t raise his hand and, since no remedy was requested, he left the chamber in protest. It was not desired in the Slovak Parliament to allow Esterházy to also verbally name his reasons against supporting the passing of the bill. It should, however, be also borne in mind that, prior to the voting, few Slovak MPs had left the chamber allegedly not to have to vote. This particularly concerned a handful of MPs around Pavol Čarnogurský who remained in the cafeteria or in gentlemen‘s room.66 That, however, is very difficult to prove ex post for there are no written records of the event. During the voting, Kálmán Kéri sat, as the representative of Hungary, in the diplomatic loge. He was eyewitness to Esterházy leaving the chamber. He recalls that it was followed by major buzz and speeches. Sokol had to exert major effort to restore order.67 The Slovak-based Hungarian writer Rezső Peéry describes Esterházy‘s position as follows: ―with unprecedented courage, rare for national representation in totalitarian context, face-to-face the humbled 'yes' expressed by all others‖68it was only Esterházy‘s hand that didn‘t shoot up. Rezső Szalatnay, Hungarian writer and literary historian in Slovakia, also recalled the event: ―I saw, I heard how, in the great hall of the County House in Bratislava turned into the National Assembly, bravely protesting, he didn‘t vote for the Jewish Act, thus standing up to the opening of gates wide to inhumanity that followed. I saw when, in the same place, he stood up to Franz Karmasin,69 the leader of Slovak Germans, who hated him

60 and would have liked to slay him together with his Party‖.70The Hlinka Guard periodical Gardista published in Bratislava noted: ―[...] everyone voted in favour with one exception‖.71Gardista further informed that a rumour circulated among Slovak parliamentarians that Esterházy wouldn‘t vote in support of the expulsions of Jews. Members of the Hlinka Guards in Nitra sought the publishing house as they had won a bet that Esterházy wouldn‘t vote for the expulsion of Jews.72 Esterházy‘s conduct was, under the given circumstances, a demonstration of him having embarked on an open struggle with the then still winning Nazi ideology and with Hitlerites. His merit is in that he had set the example to his contemporaries and to the future generations. The following day Esterházy told his family: ―It was appalling!73 The National Assembly sentenced the Jews living here to deportation. Worst of all, the horror was that the chamber was full of black cassocks.74 And they, fearing Hitler‘s revenge, voted in support of this atrocious Act. Thus deeply was Hitler‘s tyranny able to humiliate the leaders of small nations – even the priests – and all that conduct was out of fear that Slovakia might face similar destiny as Poland‖.75Lujza Esterházy recalled that, among the Wehrmacht officers serving in Bratislava, there were some who admired Esterházy‘s stance. They thought him to be ―the bravest man in Central Europe‖.76In contrast, German propaganda as well as the Slovak press denounced his act. The Bratislava Grenzboterun a mocking title to report on the parliamentary voting: ―Only the Count didn‘t vote in support‖.77Gardistawent even further. It interpreted Esterházy‘s conduct not as a matter of internal or foreign politics, but as friendly attitude towards Jews with whom he had been linked through personal interests, arguing that his estates had been managed by Jews.78 Gestapo headquarters and Slovak police were contemplating to arrest Esterházy for having voted the way he did. They only dropped the idea after the recommendation of the German Ambassador to Bratislava. Esterházy‘s arrest would have caused major diplomatic and political outrage between Slovakia and Hungary. It was something neither party wished to risk. Germans were aware of Esterházy‘s popularity in Hungary and were concerned that the arrest would incite strong anti-German sentiments. Esterházy‘s protective activities towards Jews later became an issue also for the Hungarian government. The Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy was pressed by the Germans to resolutely stop the Count from acting and or/mediating on behalf of Jews.79 Esterházy wasn‘t troubled by this and continued in his activities. In her memoir, his daughter Alice Esterházy recalls her father bringing a suitcase full of passports from Hungary which he then passed to Jews and other refugees.80

SLOVAK HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ASSESSMENT OF ESTERHÁZY‘S PARLIAMENTARY VOTING

No one in the Slovak Parliament openly followed the example set by Esterházy. It is regrettable that some Slovak historians interpret Esterházy‘s role and activity as negative. The main direction in this approach has been set by the recently deceased Slovak historian Ladislav Deák. His works on the subject are altogether negative and continue to determine attitudes among some Slovak historians.81 Deák argued that Esterházy had voted against the Jewish Act, because it didn‘t identify Jews on the basis of faith, but on racial grounds. He had therefore sensed potential danger for the Hungarians in Slovakia. Further argument presented by Deák was that, as early as in 1942, Esterházy had been well aware that Hungarians fighting on the side of Germany would lose the war and he therefore hoped to score good points for post-war era.82 In connection with the vote, a significant number of Slovak historians argue that he had been motivated by alibi.83 Slovak historians, including Ivan Kamenec, criticise Esterházy for having previously supported the adoption ofanti-Jewish legislation and, since he had actively participated in the legislative work, he had been himself part of the process. Kamenec argues that Esterházy only acted out of self-preservation, fearing that, after the deportation of Jews, it would be the Hungarians to become the target. Kamenec mentions alibism as well.84 The Slovak position is that Esterházy had hoped to protect himself in the case of subsequent settling of accounts. Slovak historiography attributes Esterházy different sides. The historian Ondrej Podolec concludes that Esterházy was the only one to dare to go against the set direction in the Slovak Parliament.85 Meanwhile, however, he also notes that in his written argumentation presented to Sokol, Esterházy didn‘t avoid expressing anti-Jewish statements.86 The young historian Ján Mitáč considers Esterházy‘s act to be a distinct sign of alibi for he had previously voted in support of anti-Jewish legislation. Moreover, in 1938 as Member of Czechoslovak Parliament, Mitáč argues, Esterházy permitted the annexation of Końice and thus also played his part in the dissolution of the country. He had thus deprived himself of the opportunity to act as the defender of democracy and human rights regardless the differentiation on racial grounds.87 Mitáč accepts Esterházy‘s stance in the Parliament, whilst he also notes that ―it was a strong moral gesture, yet it was of no significance in the given period, for Esterházy had previously supported the adoption of everyanti-Jewish law.‖ Esterházy‘s conduct, Mitáč argues, can be interpreted as high treason what cannot be altered by ―his noble conduct [that] simply didn‘t permit him to raise hand for such a dirty act that stripped Jews of all civil rights‖.88Martin Lacko is also member of the young generation of Slovak historians. His account of Esterházy suggests that his act was evidence of his industriousness and of ―great personal courage‖ regardless the motive. He also subjects Slovak politicians of the time to criticism, arguing that no other politician was found in the Christian country to openly denounce the deportations.89 Lacko lists the names of the four additional MPs who were absent from the parliamentary chamber at the time.90 Yet he doesn‘t acquit Esterházy of guilt either. The void between the official account on the part of Slovak and Hungarian historians is well illustrated by the view presented by the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Science in 2011, which offers a negative account of Esterházy.91 It does recognise him for voting against the deportations, but criticises him for having had previously voted for all anti-Jewish laws and, in his capacity of Member of Parliament, having assisted the instalment of the totalitarian régime. His moral gesture, by which he took the side of Jews, the argument goes, is to be commended. His subsequent tragic fate has to also be taken into account. Yet the interpretation of his political activities cannot take it as the fundamental criterion.92 It is a sad fact that the Slovak MPs didn‘t have enough courage to follow openly the example set by the Count. If only more similarly ―alibist‖ MPs sat in the chamber and had the courage to speak up. His vote, however, did mean a confrontation with the collective attitude and mind. Arguments about his vote out of necessity or being driven by alibi means nothing else than subsequent account of historians which changes nothing about the fact that he did stand up and refused to vote for the Act.

ESTERHÁZY‘S ACTIVITIES TO SAVE JEWS

Esterházy was also assisting the persecuted Slovak Jews practically. He managed to achieve secretly that the Hungarian Interior Minister, Ferenc Keresztes–Fischer, issued a permit for the Jews who had managed to escape from Slovakia to Hungary, not to be deported and harmed. In the case they didn‘t have passport or visa, they would be awarded refugee status in Hungary.93 Esterházy did all he could to help Slovak Jews escape to Hungary. The information comes from Ilona Edelsheim Gyulai, wife of István Horthy.94 According to the material from the Hungarian Ministry of Interior, over 20 thousand Jews escaped from Slovakia to Hungary.95 The figure is likely to be exaggerated. Nonetheless, since the primary sources have not yet been opened, it is impossible to ascertain the number of Jews who had escaped to Hungary. One of the Slovak sources of the time estimates the number at 10 thousand. This figure is probably more realistic.96 It was with unease that the Slovak administration watched the steps taken by Keresztes–Fischer and Esterházy.97 The Slovak Ministry of Interior sent, on 26 June 1942, a letter to the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, filing a complaint about the matter and asking to prevent illegal departure of Jews to Hungary.98 The Hungarian government wasn‘t initially excessively concerned about the Slovak protest. When, however, the German Embassy in Budapest responded more strongly, Hungarians strengthened border control. Yet, Jews in Hungary faced no existential danger until the occupation by Germany. Some Slovak politicians intended to simultaneously solve the Hungarian along with the Jewish question. For instance, the leader of Slovak Germans, Franz Karmasin, had not only vehemently opposed the settlement of Slovak–Hungarian relations, but – referring to inferiority of race – he argued that all Jews, Gypsies, Magyars and other undesirable persons should be deported from Slovakia to give way to the hundred thousand German families that would arrive.99 Since Esterházy used to travel to Poland, as he had relatives there, he was probably aware of what was happening to the Jews there. That is also confirmed by the memoirs by Lujza Esterházy. The Countess called the Minister of Interior Mach to ask for help the case of a Jew who had been deported despite the Presidential exemption. After a long telephone call Mach informed her that there was nothing he could do. ―But, Minister, this deportation took place despite the permission the man had received from you,‖ said the Countess to the Minister and continued: ―For God‘s sake save the man from the death camp!‖ Mach denied the existence of death camps and was keen to know where she heard of them. She responded by saying that she was aware of Jews being executed in the camps. Mach replied, hurt: ―Are we hangmen? We would have never permitted the deportations of Jews had we known that they went to death! It is true that we wanted to get rid of them, but with the proviso that they would go to Palestine and would only remain in the German labour camps until the end of the war. We would have never consented to them being murdered‖. ―I trust that you have no knowledge that they are being exterminated in the Nazi camps,‖ replied the Countess, and went on: ―The Gestapo probably didn‘t confess this to you. Yet anyone who, like me, visited the occupied Poland, knows for certain that Jews end up in death camps‖. ―You must have fallen prey to anti-Hitler propaganda of the London radio,‖ replied Mach. The Countess countered that by saying that Mach, in turn, fell prey to the Nazi propaganda. Mach eventually promised her to have her protégé brought back from Auschwitz. He never kept his word. Esterházy‘s defence of Jews wasn‘t only manifested by his refusal to support the adoption of the Jewish Act. It has been evident that he had saved concrete families and individuals. Testimonies after the war were given by Felix Schlesinger and his wife Katalin Weithamer, formerly tenants at the Esterházy estate. He had helped them escape to Hungary. In their testimony they stated: ―we do know that, by his mediation, he had helped a number of people of Jewish ethnicity in the Budapest headquarters and these people have never been deported by the Germans. In Budapest he rescued a number of Jews from the local camps.‖101 Ágnes Wertheinger was hiding for two months in Záluņie and she, too, managed to escape to Hungary with her parents, with the help by Esterházy. She also confirms that, apart from her, Esterházy helped with the passport additional people to get to Hungary.102 Esterházy and his family were hiding other people in their manor and its vicinity, including Veronika Dubnická–Schlesingerová and her family.103 Esterházy also saved 200 Jews from the labour camp by their transport wasn‘t required as there was plenty of work within the country. He managed to convince the commander as well. He provided them with

63 clothing and food thus saving their lives as they had been able to remain in Slovakia and work in better conditions.104 Esterházy further helped a number of Jewish public figures, such as the writer Viktor Egri, the attorney Dr. Árpád Balogh–Dénes, Uncle Lőwy – one of the owners of a print shop in Nitra, as well as Dr. Hőnigberg and his family whose daughter he saved from the Budapest ghetto in 1944.105 Esterházy was behind the Jewish rescue as part of which the Reformed Church Minister in Zvolen István Puskás, the Reformed Church Minister in Nitra László Sedivy and the Preńov-based Reformed Church Minister Sándor Brányik baptised 1,000 people of Jewish faith to thus help them escape the worst clauses of the Jewish law. The first two Ministers were arrested for the action by Slovak police in 1942 and placed in prison in Ilava, to be released upon intervention by Esterházy.106 In connection with Esterházy‘s activities concerning the Jewish question, it is worth noting that, in the period from 1942 to 1944, Magyar Hírlap,the daily of the Hungarian party, which Esterházy oversaw, published very few articles about the Jewish issue. It did publish news from the Slovak Press Agency, though without commentaries. It didn‘t publish subjective views or defamatory material. Esterházy‘s articles contain no vitriolic remarks addressed to Jews, even though doing otherwise would have earned him political bonus. Until 1944 his Party was helping its Jewish members. For a time, the Hungarian ID card served as safety net from their deportations. We do know that the Party was providing its members with financial aid, such as in the case of Dr. Marcell Szilárd who, in 1940, had lost in Bratislava his position of attorney. He was receiving 5,500 Crowns a month from the Party.107 When Slovak administration requested Esterházy to review the membership base of his Party in 1942, he didn‘t hand in data on the Party members and continued to accept to the Party both Germans and Jews without ever stripping them of Party membership.108―I won‘t suddenly oust from the Party those who had been hitherto always good Hungarians‖, said Esterházy.109 The leaders of the Party kept two membership lists, one for the state administration in case of inspection, and one for their own purposes with accurate data.110 It was upon the call by Esterházy that the Party and the Hungarian minority refused to take part in the process of Arisation. Except got the few comments, it refused, as a community, to loot Jewish properties. Only eleven of the Hungarians living in Slovakia acquired more significant Jewish assets, though they, too, proceeded in line with previous agreement with the Jewish owners.111 A question therefore rightly arises whether Esterházy was antisemite. It is hard to answer, though it is likely that he did have some prejudice characteristic of the time. Yet it should also be accepted that he didn‘t subscribe to and did reject the idea of race, as is evidenced by a number of his statements.112 The answer to this comes from Irén Rujder, Holocaust survivor who was rescued by Esterházy: ―In the 1940s everyone in Bratislava knew that Esterházy was a friend of Jews, for which he was often mocked that he was a Jew himself. He also faced the threat of deportation, yet, wherever he could, he helped. [...] János Esterházy doesn‘t deserve obloquy that precipitates what is written about him today. Those of us who had lived in Slovakia at the time know the facts. That is why he was handed over to the Soviets: had he been put to trial in Bratislava, every Jew would have testified on his behalf. Such twisting of the truth hurts. Esterházy does deserve the tree of the righteous in Israel. [...] I can‘t name anyone else who has done as much for Jews as he had. His entire family was known for their willingness to help. It wasn‘t just us whom he helped. I do know that he had given out many Hungarian passports to save the people‖.113 At the end of April 1949 two Jews, Emil Prisender and the Secretary General of the Jewish community, Dr. Adler (whose first name has not been discovered) called on the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava to ask Endre Fodor, the Consular officer on duty, to help them prevent sentencing János Esterházy. They said, inter alia, that they had wanted the Hungarian Consul to help renew the trial on the basis of democratic principles and by giving floor to defence witnesses as that had been previously ignored by the Czechoslovak administration. They told him that they represented the Bratislava Jewish community and, by speaking out, they ―[...] would like to express the gratitude of Czechoslovak Jewry to Esterházy for having saved the lives of several thousands of Jews during the times of hardship, when there was no one else in the Slovak Parliament to vote against the deportaitons‖.114Prisender reported that he, along with a number of others, was hiding in the cellars of the Esterházy manor and later joined the guerrilla fighters [transl. note: on the side of the Slovak National Uprising]. The Hungarian Consulate and its head, József Vándor,

64 avoided taking a position and recommended Prisender and Adler to address their plea to the leaders of Czechoslovak Hungarians such as Zoltán Fábry, Kálmán Kertész and others. The two did follow his advice.115 Esterházy‘s effort on behalf of the Jewish rescue is best evidenced by a contemporary document sent to his superiors by the Hungarian Consul in Bratislava on 15 May 1949: ―The suspension of the execution of the sentence was, I believe, particularly the result of the intervention from the Czechoslovak Jewish circles, though the Left-wing oriented public figures (Zoltán Fábry) intervened powerfully as well‖.116The intervention on behalf of Esterházy by Fábry and the Bratislava-based Jewry would have been no doubt unimaginable had they not considered his deeds righteous. It is inconceivable even in connection with Esterházy, that one is born a rescuer. Long path is required to become one under the pressure of events. The examination of his historic role on the part of Hungarians is not problematic, unlike the case of their Slovak counterparts where it remains an issue. His involvement in the Jewish question cannot be contested. He did not vote for the expulsion of Jews, which was a public admission that he would stand by the Jews in the more challenging times as well. Even the Slovak historians agree that, during one of the darkest periods of their country in the 20th century, Esterházy was brave enough to protest against the Holocaust at the highest national levels. By not having supported the adoption of the bill, he opposed the Reich and thus, isolated, he stood against the Nazis. One of the witnesses that experienced the persecutions of Jews said about Esterházy: ―I, too, survived the Holocaust and therefore am aware of how much even the slightest support meant. The Count Esterházy not only helped the Jews, but he stood by them in the harshest of times when they faced death‖.117Esterházy‘s attitude to the rescue of Jews wasn‘t, however, taken into consideration in passing the sentence in Czechoslovakia in 1947, even though, according to the then Slovak laws it should have been considered as mitigating circumstance. The documents presented had not been accepted.118 Esterházy was tried in absentia and was sentenced without having been heard. His condemnation was unjust and disproportionate: in Czechoslovakia he was first sentenced to death, then for life. He eventually died in prison.119 Alexander Mach, the Minister of Interior who was the mastermind of the deportations of Jews in Slovakia, was first sentenced to death, then to 25 years in prison, to be eventually released in amnesty. Had the Slovak side approached Esterházy by having taken into account his activities related to the Jewish question, it might have been the vantage point for his rehabilitation and a positive gesture that would facilitate coming to terms with the shared past.

NOTES

1 Ethnic composition of population: 2,260,000 (85.11 %) Slovaks, 128,347 (4.84 %) Germans, 77, 488 (2.92 %) Czechs, 69, 106 (2.6 %) Ruthenians, 57,897 (2.18 %) Hungarians, 28,763 (1.08 %), Jews, 26,265 (0.99 %) Roma, 3,848 (0.14 %) Poles, others 0,14 %. 2 Schutzzone was demarcated in front of the border of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, from the Polish border all the way to that with Austria. It was 30–40 kilometres wide all along Slovakia. Only German guards and German-built fortifications were allowed here. 3 Čierna–Lantayová, Dagmar: The Faces of Czech–Slovak–Hungarian Relations, 1938–1949 [Podoby česko–slovensko– maćarského vzťahu, 1938–1949]. Bratislava, Veda, 1992, pp 12–13. 4 On this, see: Janek, István: Diplomatic battles in the Hungarian–Slovak relations in 1940–1941 [Diplomáciai csatározások a magyar–szlovák kapcsolatokban 1940–41 között]. In: Kutatási Füzetek 12. Ünnepi szám Ormos Mária 75. születésnapjára. Pécs, 2005, pp 165–179. 5 Vietor, Martin: The History of Occupation of South Slovakia 1938–1945 [Dejiny okupácie juņného Slovenska 1938– 1945]. Bratislava, Slovenská akadémia vied, 1968, pp 53–55; Hetényi, Martin: The United Hungarian Party in Slovakia 1939–1945 [Zjednotená maćarská strana na Slovensku 1939–1945]. Nitra, 2011, p. 231. 6 Slovak administration drew on the fact that when they gave one parliamentary seat to a representative of a Hungarian minority, the Hungarians would, in time, give one Slovak a seat in the Parliament in Budapest. Throughout the war the Hungarian administration failed to give the Slovak minority that seat. Therefore, Esterházy between 1939 and 1944 was only able to exploit his ever-declining powers and influence. In time he had become merely a tolerated presence in Slovak parliament. Attempts had been made repeatedly, using various pretexts, to strip him of the right to security protection. See: Molnár, Imre: „Sem gyűlölettel, sem erőszakkal…” Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála. Komárno, 2008, pp 197– 198.

7 Molnár, Imre, ed.: János Esterházy: A kisebbségi kérdés. Válogatott írások, beszédek, interjúk. Budapest, Ister, 2000, pp 146–147. 8 The Slovak state rejected from the outset the first Vienna Award and the thus demarcated borders. Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János. Dunajská Streda, Nap, 1997, p. 86. 9 They envisioned to include in the great Slovakia the territories taken away by the first Vienna Award, as well as the territory in Moravia settled by Slovaks. They would have removed from the territory Jews, Hungarians, Czechs and the Roma. Nonetheless, they would have brought back the Slovaks living in the US, thus creating a populous, ethnically homogenous Slovak territory that would be able to stand to both Czech and Hungarian power exertions. They also found answers to the references to the millennial history and cultural supremacy voiced by the Hungarian propaganda. According to the Slovak account, the Empire of the Prince Pribina enjoyed advanced culture when the barbarian Magyars still in the steppes of Asia were ripening meat under their saddles. ―What are they showing off with St. Stephen. Cyril and Methodius were greater than him‖, claimed Slovak propaganda. Some Slovak leaders called for the acquisition of the cities of Vác, Esztergom, Miskolc. 10 Hungarian National Archives (hereafter HNA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MFA), K–63, 456. file 51/pol. No. 1939 (Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Bratislava). 11 For events related to the ―Small War‖, see: Janek, István: The Forgotten War [Az elfelejtett háború]. In: Történelmi Szemle, 43,2001/3–4. pp 299–313. 12 Esti Újság, 14 May 1939,pp 1–2. 13 Slovak National Archives (hereafter SNA), Ministry of Interior, box 15, 5499/1939. 14 SNA, The Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Annex to stenographic report from the 21st session of the Assembly of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava on 21 December 1939, p. 46. 15 HNA, K–64, MFA, 89. file 1940–65. pol. Not dated. 16 For the Komárno talks, see: Sallay, Gergely: The First Vienna Award [Az első bécsi döntés]. Budapest, 2002, pp 82–103. 17 Ibid. 18 Miklós Horthy entered Końice on 11 November 1938 and also gave a speech in Slovaks with Croat accent in which he greeted the Slovaks in their new homeland. His speech was also broadcasted by the Hungarian radio. He promised the Slovaks living in Hungary to enjoy equal status with the Hungarians. 19 HNA, K–64, MFA, file 89, 1940 – 65. pol. Unnumbered file 6 July 1939. HNA, K–63, MFA, file 459 (Esterházy´s speech to the Slovak Parliament), 7 May 1940. 21 Új Hírek, 9 May 1940, pp 1–2. 22 SNA, The Assembly of the Slovak Republic, Stenographic record of the 34th session of the Slovak Assembly, 7 May 1940, pp 22–26. 23 SNA, The Assembly of the Slovak Republic, Stenographic record of the 67th session of the Slovak Assembly, 22 July 1941, pp 19–20. 24 SNA, MFA, box 130, 555/41. 25 HNA, MFA, K–63, file 462, 68/1942. (24 April 1942). 26 For sources about the circumstances related to the publishing of Slovenská jednota and what had been allowed to appear in the periodical, see: Spińiak, Ján: Memoirs from Budapest 1939–1944 [Spomienky z Budapeńti 1939–1944]. Bratislava, 2010, pp 269–272. 27 HNA, K–28, Government Presidium (hereafter GP), vol 6, 128/pol. 1942. (24 July 1942). 28 Ibid. 29 HNA, K–28, vol. 200, file 379. E–23638 (25 July 1942). 30 SNA, MFA, box 124, 9671/1942. (Report by Ján Spińiak to the Slovak MFA.) 31 Kováč, Duńan: Bratislava 1939–1945. 2006, p. 172. 32 On the process of Arisation in Slovakia, see: Graziano, Ingrid–Eördögh, István: Jozef Tiso és a szlovákiai holokauszt. Budapest, 2006, pp 51–93. 33 Lipták, Ľubomír: Preparation and the Proceedings of the Salzburg Talks in 1940 between the Representatives of Germany and the Slovak State [Príprava a priebeh Salzburských rokovaní roku 1940 medzi predstaviteľmi Nemecka a Slovenského ńtátu]. In: Historický časopis, 13, 1965/3, p. 359. 34 Kaiser, Johann: Die Politik des Dritten Reiches gegenuber der Slowakei. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der nationalsocialistischen Satellitenpolitik. Bochum, 1969, p. 600. 35 SNA, fund MFA, box 594, unnumbered. See also: Niņňanský, Eduard: Holocaust in Slovakia [Holokaust na Slovensku]. Vol. 4., Bratislava, 2003. 27th doc., pp 111–112. 36 Molnár, Imre: Sem gyűlölettel...,op. cit.,p. 177. 37 Lipták, Ľubomír: Slovakia in the 20th Century [Slovensko v 20. storočí]. Bratislava, Kalligram, 1998. p. 208. 38 SNA, Police Directorate fund, box 2228, 21457-4. 39 Braham, Randolph L.: A Post-Mortem of the Holocaust in Hungary. A Probing Interpretation of the Causes [A magyarországi holokauszt bonctani vizsgálata: az okok egy lehetséges magyarázatra]. In: Randolph L. Braham (ed.): Studies on the Holocaust [Tanulmányok a holokausztról]. Vol. IV, Budapest, 2014, p. 364. 40 SNA, The National Court, box 53, 41/782. 41 The source draws from the memoir, though the Germans were indeed able to exert pressure on the Slovaks. It is, however, difficult to prove whether the visit to Hitler took place and, if so, when. Niņňanský, Eduard: Nazism, Holocaust, The Slovak State [Nacizmus, holokaust, slovenský ńtát]. Bratislava, Kalligram, 2010,p. 111. 42 Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts Against the Tide. Collision of Peoples. Central European Experiences[Szívek az ár ellen. Népekütközése. Közép-európai tapasztalatok]. Budapest, 1991, p. 121. 43 SNA, fund The Assembly of the Slovak Republic, box 180, 370/1943. 44 Niņňanský, Eduard: Nazism ..., op. cit., p. 119.

45 The deportations of Jews began in Slovakia as early as in March 1942 and lasted until the end of that year. 46 Kamenec, Ivan: The Slovak State (1939–1945) [Slovenský ńtát (1939–1945)]. Prague, Anomal, 1992, pp 107–108. 47 Hradská, Katarína: The Dieter Wisliceny Case. Nazi Advisers and the Jewish Question in Slovakia [Prípad Dieter Wisliceny. Nacistickí poradcovia a ņidovská otázka na Slovensku]. Bratislava, Academic Electronic Press, 1999, p. 30; see also: Tonsmeyer, Tatjana: Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939–1945. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn. Munich, Vienna, Schoningh, Paderborn, 2006, pp 137–138. 48 On 14 March 1942 the Vatican presented a protest to the Slovak Ambassador to the Holy See Karol Sidor against the deportations of Jews and limitations imposed on their living. Kamenec, Ivan–Prečan, Vilém–Ńkorvánek, Stanislav (eds): The Vatican and the Slovak Republic (1939–1945). Documents [Vatikán a Slovenská republika (1939–1945). Dokumenty]. Bratislava, Slovak Academic Press, 1992, pp 72–92. 49 Kováč, Duńan: Szlovákia története. Bratislava, Kalligram, 2001, pp 218–219. 50 Kamenec, Ivan–Prečan, Vilém–Ńkorvánek, Stanislav (eds): The Vatican ..., op. cit., pp 97–98. 51 Gaucsík, István: Attrition of a Minority [Lemorzsolódó kisebbség]. Bratislava, Kalligram, 2013, p. 59. 52 SNA, Ministry of Interior, inv. No 152, box 262, 12361/42. 53 HNA, MFA, K–63, pol. 1943/65, 147/pol, 4 August 1943. 54 Tiso saved c. 5,000–9,000 Jews from the deportation (the precise figure remains unknown). The affidavits of exemptions were issued by the Slovak government asking high amounts of money for the document, depending on the economic status of an applicant. 55 The material from the Slovak MFA contains an undated memorandum written probably at the end of 1943. It mentions the possibility of reducing the amount of 500 Reich Marks to 300, as the Slovak National Bank transferred, in December 1943, 200 million Slovak Crowns to Germany, which was then exchanged to Reich Marks. SNA, Ministry of Interior, box 262, 12683/42, see also: SNA, MFA, box 142, 1. 56 Niņňanský, Eduard: Nazism ..., op. cit., p. 231. 57 SNA, Files of the People‘s Court (Ludin‘s material), inv. No 49/45, box 22. 58 The cessation of deportations in Slovakia can be explained through different arguments. First, in late 1942 Slovak leaders intended to visit the new ―Jewish settlements in the East‖. Had that happened, it might have been the proof of what was actually going on there. Second, it might have been the pressure exerted by the Vatican or that the leaders of the Slovak Jewry managed to bribe a number of high-ranking leaders of the Hlinka Guard, as well as Dieter Wisliceny who oversaw the deportations. It became apparent that, though he took the bribes, he didn‘t stop the deportations. Braham, Randolph L. (ed.): Studies..., op. cit., p. 371. 59 Hradská, Katarína: The Dieter..., op. cit., p. 70–71. 60 After the Vienna Award, 39 thousand Jews were deported between May and June 1944 from the territory that was handed over to Hungary. Of the 136 thousand Jews who lived on the territory of the present-day Slovakia, c. 108 thousand were deported. Ńpitzer, Juraj: Despair and Hope. Essays and Studies[Kétség és remény. Esszék és tanulmányok]. Bratislava, Kalligram, 1994, p. 11. 61 Kováč, Duńan: Szlovákia..., op. cit., pp 219–220. 62 The accounts of Slovak and Hungarian historians of the activities of Esterházy are, generally, the opposite. The Slovaks consider him a collaborator. Hungarian academic sources present him particularly as the critic of totalitarian decisions. Hungarian historians write about him with recognition. Based on his statements, Esterházy can definitely be seen as a man of opposition. 63 Molnár, Imre: János Esterházy and the Minority Question [Esterházy János és a kisebbségi kérdés]. Budapest, Ister, 2000. pp 215–216. 64 Ibid. 65 Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts..., op. cit., p. 125. 66 Podolec, Ondrej: Slovak–Hungarian Conflicts and their Reflection in the Slovak Diet [Slovensko–maćarské konflikty a ich odraz na pôde slovenského snemu]. In: Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20. storočí. Zborník referátov z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 15. – 16. októbra 2002. Ed.: Ńtefanský, Michal–Purdek, Imrich, Bratislava, Vojenský historický ústav, 2003, p. 190.; see also: Kamenec, Ivan–Prečan, Vilém–Ńkorvánek, Stanislav (eds): The Vatican..., op. cit. 1992, p. 112. 67 Molnár, Imre: Sem gyűlölettel…, op. cit., p. 179. 68 Peéry, Rezső: In Between Two Millstones. Meetings with Contemporaries. Notes, Reports, Sketches[Malomkövek között. Találkozások kortársakkal, Feljegyzések, beszámolók, karcolatok]. Stuttgart, Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem, 1977, p. 54. 69 Esterházy‘s relationship with Franz Karmasin was even tight, primarily because of the Germans in the region of Spiń who leaned towards the United Hungarian Party instead of the Deutsche Partei. 70 Stelczer, Elemér: Life and Career of János Esterházy [Esterházy János élete és munkássága]. In: Kapu, 5, 1992/8., p. 47. 71 Gardista, 17 May 1942, p. 3. 72 Ibid. 73 Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts...,op. cit., p. 122. 74 A number of priests were MPs for the Slovak Peoples‘ Party. 75 Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts..., op. cit., p. 122. 76 Edelsheim Gyulai, Ilona: Honour and Duty [Becsület és kötelesség].1. vol 1918–1944. Budapest, Európa, 2000, pp 108– 109. 77 Grenzbote (Bratislava), 19 May 1942, pp 1–2. 78 Esterházy–Malfatti, Alice–Török, Bálint (ed.): Memory Book of János Esterházy [Esterházy János emlékkönyv]. Budapest, Századvég, 2001, p. 30. 79 Molnár, Imre: Esterházy János (1901–1957). Dunajská Streda, Nap, 1997, p. 190.

80 Molnár, Imre: Sem gyűlölettel…, op. cit., p. 217. 81 Deák, Ladislav: The Political Portrait of János Esterházy [Politický profil Jánosa Esterházyho]. Bratislava, Kubko–Goral, 1996. 82 Ibid. 83 According to Ivan Kamenec, Esterházy was forced by the circumstances and motivated by alibi to vote the way he did. Kamenec, Ivan: Tracing the Tragedy [Po stopách tragédie]. Bratislava, Archa, Kamenec, 1991, p. 189. 84 Kamenec, Ivan: Po stopách..., op. cit., p. 189. 85 Podolec, Ondrej: Slovak–Hungarian Conflicts..., op. cit., p. 190. 86 Ibid., p. 191. 87 Mitáč, Ján: The János Esterházy Case. A perspective of Slovak and Hungarian historian. János Esterházy and his place in Slovak history [Kauza Jánosa Esterházyho, pohľad slovenského a maćarského historika. János Esterházy a jeho miesto v slovenských dejinách]. In Historická revue. 2012/2, pp 41–42. 88 Ibid. 89 Lacko, Martin: The Slovak Republic 1939–1945 [Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945]. Bratislava, Perfekt, 2008, pp 73–78. 90 Pavol Čarnogurský, Ján Ferenčík, Jozef Filkorn, Emil Boleslav Lukáč. Ibid., p. 73. 91 Relying on later Slovak analyses, he claims false and mistaken the positions of accounts of Esterházy, according to which ―he wasn‘t only a relentless fighter for the rights of the Hungarian minority, but also a convinced democrat and humanist, selfless advocate of persecuted people and misread promoter of Slovak–Hungarian friendship and cooperation‖. They don‘t recognise this and argue, contrary to the historic facts. According to their interpretation, it was already during the era of the Czechoslovak Republic that he strove to dismantle its democratic system. ―For that purpose he carried on his subversive activities, cooperating not only with Budapest, but also with the German Nazis.‖ Full text: http://www.history.sav.sk/esterhazy.htm 92 Ibid. 93 Edelsheim Gyulai, Ilona: Becsület... vol I, op. cit., p. 108. 94 Ibid. 95 Kállay, Miklós: Magyarország miniszterelnöke voltam 1942–1944. Egy nemzet küzdelme a második világháborúban. Budapest, Európa–História, 1991, vol II, pp 79–80. Ivan Kamenec and his team estimate that, in 1942, 5,000–6,000 Jews escaped to Hungary. Kamenec, Ivan–Prečan, Vilém–Ńkorvánek, Stanislav (eds): The Vatican..., op. cit., p. 98. 96 SNA, files from the People‘s Court, arch. No 45, box 97, microfilm I. A–1010, 198/97. 97 At the end of March 1942 Mach sought out Ján Spińiak to ask him to inform the Hungarian government: they should return the Jews who are Slovak nationals who had escaped to Hungary by 15 July 1942. Mach informed him that, should they fail to do so, they had to be aware that. Past the deadline, the Jews concerned would lose their Slovak nationality. He also authorised him to enquire about the fate of the Jews who were Hungarian nationals and still remained in Slovakia. In other words, whether they were to be deported or returned to Hungarians. More on this, see: Niņňanský, Eduard: Holocaust in Slovakia. 6. Deportations in 1942 [Holokaust na Slovensku. 6. Deportácie v roku 1942]. Zvolen, 2005, p. 213. 98 SNA, MFA, box 142, 1300/42. 99 Balassa, Zoltán: Pilóta a viharban. Gróf Esterházy János és kora. Budapest, Magyar Honvédség Oktatási és Kulturális Anyagellátó Központ, 1994, pp 75–76. 100 Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., pp 126–127. 101 SNA, National Court 19/47, microfilm II. A 951. Minutes from 31 May 1948. 102 A letter from Ágnes Wertheimer to Elemér Stelzer. In: Esterházy–Malfatti, Alice–Török, Bálint: Esterházy János emlékkönyv, op. cit., p. 215. 103 On hiding the Jews in Veľké Záluņie, see Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., p.135. 104 Molnár, Imre: Sem gyűlölettel…, op. cit., p.182. 105 Ibid., p. 184. 106 Ibid., p. 184. 107 Ibid., p. 181. 108 Ádám, Magda: Esterházy János koncepciós pere, 1947. In: História. 2008/8, p. 14; Hetényi, Martin: (Zjednotená)..., op. cit. p. 123. Molnár, Imre: Ani nenávisťou..., op. cit., p. 140. 109 Szent-Iványi, Gábor: Graf János Esterházy. Vienna, Bohlau Verlag, 1995, p. 183. 110 Hetényi, Martin: (Zjednotená)...,op. cit., pp 234–235. 111 Szalatnai, Rezső: A csehszlovákiai magyarok 1938 és 1945 között.Part II. In: Regio, 1, 1990/3, p. 178. 112 One example of many: As the Chairman of his Party, he disseminated a circular note to prohibit opening a fascist wing within the Party. Between 1944 and 1945 he did his utmost for his Party not to become a lackey to the Germans or the Nyilases. Perhaps the best evidence is offered by Esterházy‘s contemporary Peéry Rezső who wrote about the Party led by Esterházy: ―For those who had been unwilling to become Germans and Guardists [transl. note: members of the Hlinka Guard], those who were hiding from the fascist presence and from the world in that community, the only defining sign was the rejection of National Socialism‖. Rezső, Peéry: Védőbeszéd a szlovákiai magyarok perében. In: Gondolatok a tehervagonban. Bratislava, Kalligram, 1993. p. 66. 113 Esterházy–Malfatti, Alice–Török, Bálint: Esterházy..., op. cit., p. 214. 114 Popély, Árpád: A magyar diplomácia és a csehszlovákiai magyarság (1948–1956). In: Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle, 2012/4, p. 98. 115 Zoltán Fábry also sent a letter to the Czechoslovak leaders, stating: ―I feel obliged to raise my voice on his behalf. Esterházy, whom I am defending, deserves clemency. Do pardon him! If for no other reasons, then in order to create a futile martyr what would make more complex the present effort towards Czechoslovak–Hungarian reconciliation. You know all too well that I had always only stood by a matter, the veracity of which I never doubted. When I am now raising

my voice on behalf of someone sentenced to death, I listen to my conscience. I have to do this. If I remain silent, I would despise myself. I beg for the clemency!‖ Ibid., p. 99. 116 Ibid., p. 97. 117 Esterházy–Malfatti, Alice: Ki volt Esterházy János? Budapest, Jövendő Kiadó, 2007, 10, containing a letter from the historian Magda Ádám. 118 Doleņal, Bohumil: Esterházy János esete. In: Valóság, 1995/12. p. 83. 119 Esterházy was sentenced in Czechoslovakia with reference to the decree of the Slovak National Council. According to the prosecution, Esterházy was accused that the party which he chaired, in February 1938 went into agreement with the Sudeten German and Hlinka parties, that they would table such demands to Czechoslovakia that would lead to its dismantling. He thus actively contributed to the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of its democracy. By having become the Party Chairman and Member of Parliament, he identified with the German political orientation and supported the ―activities of the fascist occupiers and traitors‖, for which he deserved death penalty. SNA, National Court, 19/47. Microfilm II. A 951. János Esterházy. Doc. 19/47/10.

JÁN MITÁČ

Nation‘s Memory Institute, Bratislava

MINORITY POLICY OF HORTHY’S HUNGARY IN THE CONTEXT OF ATTITUDES OF JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY

The Vienna Award in November 1938 that decided the fate of the population of southern Slovakia, brought substantial change in their daily lives. Miklós Horthy as the Head of the Hungarian Kingdom, welcomed Slovaks after the occupation of Końice with open arms and promised them further undisturbed life in the new state. Alas, the reality was quite different.1When the Hungarian army became the de facto holder of the occupied territory, it launched actions against the Slovak and Czech population. One of the first interventions was to reduce the value of money, increase tax burdens and discriminatory national economy and social policies.2The policy of Magyarisation implemented in each direction of civic life made it particularly difficult for the Slovaks, who came under Hungarian administration, which was reminiscent of semi-feudal conditions in the Hungarian Kingdom before 1918.3The leader of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, János Esterházy also spoke in Końice, and asked Horthy to lovingly welcome all Slovaks who got to Hungary, and provide them with equal rights which ethnic Hungarians claim in Slovakia. At the beginning of his speech he did not forget to thank Horthy and all Hungarian governments for having fought against the ―unjust‖ Trianon.4 Already from the speeches of the two speakers in Końice, where they addressed Slovaks and advocated on behalf of Slovaks, it is clear that ethnic principles were violated when identifying new boundary after the Vienna Award. Hungarian politicians have claimed that the boundaries would be finally fair, which ultimately proved untrue.5The statements of that period tend to be also repeated by Hungarian historians and writers. As an example, we can use the words of the historian, Attila Simon. ―And so the days before the birth of the First Vienna Award passed in the region in a tense atmosphere, but without violence. Hungarian population of southern Slovakia accepted the Vienna Award demarking the new border on 6 ethnic basis with satisfaction and great joy.‖ If we want to find out the motives for the words of János Esterházy, we need to understand the attitudes and actions that he made in the critical period of 1938, but also later during the period of Slovak state.7 Since the attitude towards the issues concerning Slovak minority on the part of Esterházy was determined by official politics of the Budapest government, in what did they agree and where he had already developed his ideas about minority policy? First of all, it should be noted that the Hungarian government through its minority department was in charge of not only the minorities who lived in the Hungarian Kingdom, but also of ethnic Hungarian minorities abroad. Representatives of the minority had financial link to the Hungarian Government, which generously supported various, often even illegal activites.8In Czechoslovakia these were activities of the United Hungarian Party (UHP), the executive chairman of which became János Esterházy in 1936. The leaders of the minority department at the Presidium of the Hungarian Government were State Secretary 9 Tibor Pataky and Minister Counsellor Pál Balla, who had close contacts with the UHP representatives. This is mentioned in memoires the then Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the First Slovak Republic (SR) in Budapest, Ján Spińiak: ―The leadership of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (...) was actually in the hands of the guardian of the sources of funds intended for this minority, i. e. in the hands of the State Secretary Pataky...‖.10 Spińiak, based on information collected on the minority department at the Government Presidium, suggested that similar body be also established in Slovakia, to be in charge of both minorities living in the First Slovak Republic and also minorities living outside Slovakia, in this case thinking mainly of the ethnic Slovaks in Hungary. According to Spińiak‘s findings, it was the minority department that took care of the revisionist policy, and managed the work of various public and semi-public

(revisionist) institutions. ―It funds, finances and spiritually leads the Hungarian minorities abroad and at home then making minority policy it brings together under its auspices all minority issues coming from all departments. Any request from a member of ethnic minority must pass through the second department of 11 the Ministerial Presidency, which can recommend or reject it.‖ Did Esterházy agree with the politics of the Hungarian Government also in connection with the problems of Slovak minority in Hungary? And how did he act, if the Hungarian power used inadequate means of power against Slovaks on the territory assigned by the Vienna Award? This question can be answered through an event that took place on a Christmas Day in 1938 in Ńurany. Slovaks, dissatisfied with their position in Horthy´s Hungary, have decided to protest in front of the church in Ńurany. Subsequently, quarrels broke out, culminating in shooting into the crowd. An 18-year-old deaf girl, Mária Kokońová fell victim of this shooting and a number of other residents of Ńurany were injured. After the incident, Hungarian gendarmes arrested more than 40 inhabitants of Ńurany, whom they attempted to accuse of rebellion and connection to Slovak circles, by which they allegedly were supported both financially and materially. That, however, was never proved. Hearings led by the Hungarian gendarmes, were characterised by drastic methods of interrogations. The Slovak Government and public sharply reacted to 12 this incident and condemned the crackdown by the Hungarian gendarmes. In that period Esterházy publicly did not stand for the rights of Slovaks and Czechs expelled from the territory of southern Slovakia, and did not distance himself from the murders that took place in these rages at the end of 1938. In her memoirs his sister Lujza recalled that, in connection with the shooting into the crowd in Ńurany at Christmas 1938, she asked János to publicly condemn the brutal action.13 He refused on the grounds that it would harm the Hungarian state and the enemies could use it against Hungary. Finally, he promised that he would at least unofficially protest at the Hungarian Government. When talking to his sister, Esterházy spoke about the practices of Hungarian armed forces against Slovaks, and she recorded his words: ―Our gendarmes have destroyed everything I have tried to build for years, so I might win the sympathy of Slovaks against Hungary. Many times I told them that, if Slovaks come under Hungarian sovereignty, they would gain all their rights, including autonomy. Instead, now they are beaten by 14 gendarmes with sticks when wearing national insignia or sing their national anthem‖. The Slovak Government reacted on the rampage of the Hungarian authorities by introducing the principle of reciprocity. It was legislatively enshrined in the Constitution15as an effective instrument for achieving the rights of Slovaks in Hungary. In practice, this meant that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia will be granted the same extent of rights as the Slovaks actually would enjoy in Hungary. Seemingly, when applying reciprocity, the Hungarian party was favoured. In Bratislava, however, they had come to quickly face the sensitivity of Hungarian policy and public opinion. From the reciprocity principle gradually an entire component of mutual state relations developed, from the Slovak side managed, in addition to the relevant ministries, also by a special liaison body at the Government Presidency. Its application had both serious and amusing sides; one cannot forget that it was about the fate of people, their employment, education, fundamental rights. It was applied with the roughness characteristic to the circumstances of the time. For imprisoned national officials on one side, selected members of the relevant minority on the other side went to prison or labour camp. For one closed school, another one was closed, for dismissed rail workers, relevant number faced the same fate on the other side.16 Esterházy has become, in line with the position of the Hungarian Government, a strong critic of reciprocity, because he, as the representative of the Hungarian minority got into a hostage situation in the Slovak–Hungarian disputes. He considered this to be undemocratic and discriminatoryin relation to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.17 It should be noted that it was the Hungarian party which largely started with expelling non-Hungarian inhabitants by the military and later also civilian authorities, which administered the occupied territory of southern Slovakia after the Vienna Award. If, in this case, we begin with the causal relationship – one affair or process triggers the next one (consequence or effect), it is important to look at these events in historical context: how effectively was the Slovak Government able to protect Slovaks in Hungary, and what scope of rights it recovered by applying the reciprocity principle. At the time, that proved to be the most likely and only effective means to alleviate atrocities on the Award

71 territory of southern Slovakia. Without reciprocity the Slovaks would not had their own press, associations, schools, political representation in the Party of Slovak National Unity (SSNJ), and, in particular, these actions limited the expulsions of non-Hungarian population from the territory of southern Hungary, which 18 was first of all against all principles of democracy and humanity. The principle of reciprocity really forced Esterházy several times to react to the adverse position of Slovaks in Hungary. In a letter to the Foreign Minister, István Csáky, in 1940 he called for a decisive action in relation to addressing the claims of the Slovak minority in Hungary, as the Hungarian government policy was making the situation of his party in Slovakia extremely difficult. Esterházy offered political analysis and an overview of Slovak–Hungarian relations, where he claimed that the Slovak political circles nourished hope in Hungarian Slovaks in the spirit of the all-back-policy. He stressed to Csáky that he supported the legitimate demands of Slovaks in Hungary, if the Slovaks do not kindle irredentism and demand return to Slovakia, otherwise they couldn‘t count on his help. Esterházy also criticised the rhetoric of the daily Slovak Unity. According to him, had the editors of Hungarian minority dailies written in such 19 fashion, they would have found themselves in a concentration camp long ago. His understanding of ―peaceful coexistence‖ of Slovaks and Hungarians is frequently mentioned in his lecture at a Summer University in Debrecen in 1942. ―We, the Hungarians, live in this territory together with the Slovaks, but we did not come as guests, nor have we been invited as aliens. This territory was conquered by our ancestors in the past and with their state-formative power and abilities they transformed it to an organic part of the Hungarian state.‖ He also stated that ―this state during its 1,000 years of history was Hungarian, Hungarians ruled there and Hungarian element determined its political and social order and 20 nature‖. The representatives of the Slovak minority were trying to protect Slovaks in Hungary from rages of Hungarian government authorities. They collected data on grievances against the deeds committed by Hungarian authorities on the Slovak population. They submitted the data in form of a memorandum to Hungarian government to take corrective action in specific cases. One of the main points of each memorandum was a request for establishment of a political party.21In response to the memorandum by János Esterházy, which he submitted to the Prime Minister of the First Slovak Republic, Vojtech Tuka, the representatives of the Slovak minority, led by Emanuel Böhm, decided on 15 July 1941 to submit a memorandum to the Hungarian Prime Minister, László Bárdossy. The memorandum was signed by Böhm 22 as ―the leader of the Slovak national group in Hungary‖. This was a manifestation of new tactics, which aimed, in the spirit of reciprocity, to closely mirror every action taken by the representatives of UHP in Slovakia. They submitted the same complaints, calls, memoranda and newspaper articles as did Esterházy in Slovakia. Esterházy thus met with Böhm at an informal meeting in Budapest and they exchanged the memoranda submitted to the governments: ―Esterházy, when studying our memorandum was in awe. He could not stop making loud comments, such as »az lehetetlen« (that is impossible), »hihetetlen« (unbelievable). After mutual explanations and clarifications of texts we parted with that Esterházy would contact the Prime Minister Bárdossy and would then inform me about the result of his intervention. Esterházy did phone me on the eve of the day saying that Bárdossy expected my application for permitting a political party, and he had a positive view on this‖. Böhm in his memoirs described his feelings of meeting with Esterházy. In his opinion, Esterházy, in dealing with him, proceeded in line with the position of the Prime Minister and the head of the minorities 23 department, and doubted sincerity of his words. An important milestone in the approach of Hungarian authorities to Emanuel Böhm, as the senior representative of the Slovak minority, was an article ―Based on our rights‖ that was to be published in the press. Böhm was inspired by Esterházy‘s speech delivered on 20 October 1942 at the meeting of the Presidency of the Hungarian party in Slovakia and used it as an illustration to characterise the position of the Slovak minority in Hungary. He presented the paraphrase of Esterházy‘s speech to Hungarian censoring authority as an editorial for the newspaper ―Slovak Unity‖.24In its article he sharply criticised, or even attacked the Hungarian authorities that they do not respect the regulations and laws intended to protect ethnic minorities in Hungary. ―Failure is only one and that is until the written laws are stored in the

72 archives of various state buildings and only serve to promote modern jurisprudence and to blind those who listen to our complaints... (...) and the truth today is also (...) that these laws have not been and are not applied, as the minority groups entitled to it, are calling for them.‖ He further pointed at missteps of authorities and at grievances that are caused by this to the Slovak minority, ―that humiliates human dignity, full of hatred and in any case encourage our cultural, social and economic requirements‖. The article concludes that the period was over when the Slovak minority defended itself. ―The weapons cannot be different, then adequate to those weapons used to attack us. Chivalry, the nature of dove spirit would be a weakness. Good upbringing and forgiveness, gracious pardon would be a sin. (...) In this fight we do not 25 want to remain on the bottom, and, in terms of manly attitude, we will be forced to return every hit.‖ Hungarian censor authorities forwarded the article to higher places. Then they summoned Böhm on 14 November 1942 to the department at the Presidium of the Government, where they conveyed the decision that, who writes such articles, certainly also directs his party in similar manner. Therefore, they no longer considered him to be a suitable representative of Slovaks and ended any contacts with him.26The Slovak Ambassador in Budapest, Ján Spińiak, reacted to the measure taken by Hungarian side and compared Esterházy‘s speech and Böhm‘s article in order to inform the Slovak Government about the matter: ―...I found that on one hand there are sections in Böhm‘s article, which are not found in Esterházy‘s speech, while some of the Böhm‘s statements are quite complaining. But on the other hand there are quite strong terms in Esterházy‘s speech, which can be considered a similar lack of loyalty, which in turn was presented by Dr. Böhm in a much milder way‖. Spińiak in his report suggested that also in this case reciprocal measures should be introduced, which in practice meant that Esterházy will not have access to competent authorities in Slovakia, which had the responsibility of dealing with the issues of Hungarian minority in 27 Slovakia. Recruitment in the Hungarian army became an effective tool for the removal of representatives of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Recruits went to the Eastern front, from where they often did not return. In the period 1942 and 1943 the Hungarian army was recruiting mainly SSNJ confidants. There are several records describing procedures of military authorities against party officials. Július Grobon, secretary of SSNJ in Końice, in his report stated that recently several party officials were drafted for the Eastern front, where they were put in penal units. In some cases, they had to join the army even when they were officially 28 deemed incapable of military service on medical grounds. In a similar manner, the Hungarian authorities wanted to remove the chairman of SSNJ, Emanuel Böhm. They even resorted to solutions such as an effort to remove him altogether from the politics in November 1941. For the third time he received draft summons to the army, in Szerencs, at the dispatch station Bekecs. From there he was supposed to be sent directly to the Russian front. Böhm decided to bet everything on one card. He sent an urgent letter through the Slovak Embassy in Budapest directly to the Minister of Defence, Ferdinand Čatloń, in which he asked him to reciprocally draft for the Russian front the leader of Slovak Hungarians, János Esterházy. He suggested drafting Esterházy and deploying him to the front without any training and with full kit. His tactics worked promptly, Esterházy got frightened and requested the highest military circles in Hungary to release Böhm immediately. His request was ultimately met.29In a letter Böhm informed the Minister about the harsh conditions he experienced in the training centre, where he described his mental and physical exhaustion from constant drill and attacks on the part of Hungarian officers: ―They hound me like a dog on the practice ground. (...) I sleep on straw in the barn upon the order by the lieutenant, although as a draftee I have the right to my own bed. I was assigned to a machine gun squadron as carrier of ammunition‖. He blamed the second (minority) department at the Presidium of the Hungarian government for his situation, whose representatives had allegedly issued orders for continuous harassment 30 and elimination of his person. The situation was much more serious, because one of the officers, Lieutenant Béla Kapcsó, tried to provoke Böhm to a thoughtless action so that he can definitely punish him. It happened just before Böhm was leaving home from the drill.31―On 3 December 1941 Lieutenant Béla Kapcsó offended and provoked me in a scandalous manner. He found something to get his teeth into, that I did not salute him during marching by, turning away my head. Kapcsó was yelling at me brutally. »Böhm, you beast, you cannot

73 look to the right?! Böhm, you hovädo, get off!« As soon as the regiment marched away, in the parade ground it was only two of us. Kapcsó approached within three steps of me. With a furious voice he repeated what he shouted at me during the parade. My heart was pounding... Fully conscious of my innocence, I answered loud »Sir, Lieutenant, dutifully, I was looking right!« We stood, facing each other as rivals... With cane stick, which he was nervously bending all the time, he suddenly released his left hand and he was about to hit. At that moment I swiftly took off the rifle from my shoulder and pointed it at him. Had he hit me, I would have stabbed him in self-defence. Kapcsó probably did not expect my reaction. He stepped back and, with hoarse voice of a defeated, he commanded me to return to quarters, which I did. During the evening warrant I learned that I was released.‖32Böhm, with the help of the Slovak Government, finally managed to endure the difficult military training and later was again involved in the activities of SSNJ. Even though southern Slovakia was ruled from 1938 to 1945 by a régime that was undemocratic, authoritarian and, when it comes to relations with the minorities, greatly intolerant, thanks to its representatives the Slovak minority achieved success, particularly in the cultural and social areas. This was also aided by the reciprocity principle, which affected the life in both countries. János Esterházy as the representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was directly affected by the reciprocity. In 1938, Esterházy showed by his activities that he clearly stood for the secession of southern Slovakia, while Hungary was also given the areas populated mainly by ethnic Slovaks around Nové Zámky and Vráble, Jelńava and also Końice. After brutal interventions by the Hungarian power in the life of Slovaks within the Vienna-assigned territory, Esterházy repeatedly defended the Slovaks and asked the Hungarian government to alleviate the pressure. He feared retaliation by the Slovak government that often relentlessly reacted to Hungary‘s attitudes towards Slovaks and made it clear to Esterházy that he would have to bear the responsibility for it. Esterházy, however, dealt with the consequences and not the cause of the issue that arose in the autumn of 1938, when he clearly sided with the Hungarian revisionist interests.

NOTES

1 The Regent Miklós Horthy, on 11 November 1938, after the occupation of Końice addressed the Slovaks: ―I greet you with love, you who are now returning to your millennial homeland. Together with us you transformed this homeland, which offers bread, to a fertile land, and you also defended it with us. Be confident that responsive love of the entire Hungarian nation will not only increase your standard of living, but also full freedom of the Slovak language and culture‖. Schvarc, Michal–Holák, Martin–Schriffl, David (eds): “The Third Reich” and the Foundation of the Slovak State. Documents I [“Tretia ríńa” a vznik Slovenského ńtátu. Dokumenty I.]Bratislava, Nation‘s Memory Institute, 2008, document 114, p.355. 2 See, e.g. the situation in the town of Komárno in a recent study on the issue of affiliation of the territory of southern Slovakia after Vienna Award. Hruboň, Anton–Ristveyová, Katarína: Socio-political Developments in Komárno in 1938– 1945 (Part I): From the Revision to Stabilisation of the New Régime [Spoločensko–politický vývoj Komárna v rokoch

1938 – 1945 (1. časť): Od revízie po stabilizovanie nového reņimu]. In: Historický zborník, 23, 1/2013, pp 95–114. 3 Tilkovszky, Loránt: Southern Slovakia in 1938–1945 [Juņné Slovensko v rokoch 1938–1945]. Bratislava, Slovak Academy of Sciences Publishers, 1972, p. 38. 4 Vrábel, Ferdinand: János Esterházy – Review of the Theme and Essential Bibliographic Sources [János Esterházy – prehľad problematiky a základnej literatúry]. http://www.druhasvetova.sk/2013/12/12/János–Esterházy–prehlad–problematiky–a–zakladnej–literatury/ (11 April 2014) 5 This is confirmed also by the Slovak historian, Martin Hetényi: ―The proclaimed ethnic principle was violated vis-à-vis Slovakia by subtracting 62 Slovak villages with 76,000 inhabitants around Nové Zámky, Vráble and Hurbanovo, the loss of territory with four thousand Slovaks around Jelńava and, finally, by determining the boundary line in the area of Końice, where the 79 detached villages had, along with 17,000 ethnic Hungarians, also 85,000 Slovak residents‖. Hetényi, Martin: Slovak–Hungarian Borderlands in 1938–1945 [Slovensko–maćarské pomedzie v rokoch 1938–1945].Nitra, Constantine the Philosopher University, Faculty of Philosophy, 2008, pp 15–16. 6 Simon, Attila: Chronicle of a Short Year. Hungarians in Slovakia in 1938[Egy rövid esztendő krónikája. A szlovákiai magyarok 1938-ban.] Ńamorín, Forum Minority Research Institute, 2010, p. 316. 7 Esterházy‘s advocates are trying until today to exonerate this minority politician. Archive documents, however, clearly show his responsibility, for example, when breaking Czechoslovakia. Such an approach was chosen also by Hungarian historian, Gyula Popély: ―Count János Esterházy, as a politician, always stood throughout his activities on the foundations

of the strictest legality. Although he always boldly fought for the rights of the Hungarian minority, enshrined also in international treaties, however, he definitely opposed any confrontational action and never abandoned the path of legality. He emphasised the importance of this principle in almost every speech or article, considering it to be the only viable way for the entire minority policy‖.Popély, Gyula: Expert Testimony about the Activity of János Esterházy and his Political and Moral Profile [Znalecký posudok o činnosti grófa Jánosa Esterházyho a o jeho politickom a morálnom profile.] Copy in the archive of the author. Popély wrote the testimony in 1991 for a district court in Bratislava. 8 The obvious anti-state activities by the UHP members are described in Hetényi, Martin: The(United) Hungarian Party in Slovakia 1939–1945 [(Zjednotená) Maćarská strana na Slovensku 1939–1945]. Nitra, Constantine the Philosopher University, Faculty of Arts, 2011, p. 230. 9 Spannenger, Norbert: The Role of Politics of Ethnicity during the Czecho–Slovak Crisis [Úloha národnostnej politiky počas česko–slovenskej krízy]. In: Bystrický, Valerián–Michela, Miroslav–Schvarc, Michal (eds.): Breakup or Disintegration? Historic Reflections about the Dissolution of Czecho Slovakia [Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historické reflexie zániku Česko–Slovenska]. Bratislava, Veda, 2010, p. 280. 10 Spińiak, Ján: Memoirs from Budapest 1939–1945 [Spomienky z Budapeńti 1939–1945]. Bratislava, Slovak Academic Press, 2010, p. 69. 11 Slovak National Archives (SNA), fund Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 1939–1945, box 122, No 8433/1942, report from the Slovak Embassy in Budapest dated 25 November 1942. 12 For more about the shooting in Ńurany see: Mitáč, Ján: The Bloody Incident in Ńurany on Christmas 1938 in Memoirs of the Residents of the Town of Ńurany[Krvavý incident v Ńuranoch na Vianoce 1938 v spomienkach obyvateľov mesta Ńurany]. In: Mitáč, Ján (ed.): South of Slovakia after the Vienna Award 1938–1945[Juh Slovenska po viedenskej arbitráņi 1938–1945]. Bratislava, Nation‘s Memory Institute, 2011, pp 136–148. 13 Lujza Esterházy eventually rejected the conduct of the Hungarian gendarmerie in one of her newspaper articles. Esterházy, Lujza: The Tragedy in Ńurany from the Minority Point of View[A surányi tragédia kisebbségi szemszögből.] In: Esti Újság, 11 January 1939. 14 Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts Against the Tide. Collision of Peoples. Central European Experiences[Szívek az ár ellen. Népek ütközése. Közép-európai tapasztalatok]. Budapest, Püski, 1991, pp 98–99. 15 M. Hetényi in his publication describes specific cases of reciprocal measures, as the records of Hungarians suitable for eviction were compiled, which was a preparation for their realization. When the Hungarian government has not ceased expelling Slovaks from its territory and the Slovak party exhausted all its diplomatic possibilities, reciprocally started with expulsion of tens of Hungarians. Despite of the small number of expelled Hungarians, the effect of this action was significant in Hungarian government circles. Since 1940 immigration from Hungary was only rare. Hetényi, Martin: Slovak–Hungarian Borderlands..., op. cit., pp 111, 185. 16 Lipták, Ľubomír: Hungary in the politics of the Slovak State in 1939–1943 [Maćarsko v politike Slovenského ńtátu v rokoch 1939–1943]. In: Historický časopis, XV, 2/1967, pp 16–17. 17 The influential Slovak historian, Branislav Varsik, stated, drawing from his own experience, that the reciprocity principle was the only possible means to achieve mitigation of persecutions against the Slovak population in southern Slovakia by Hungarian authorities. See further: Varsik, Branislav: What the Archives Are Silent About [O čom mlčia archívy]. Bratislava, Slovenský spisovateľ, 1987, p. 151. 18 Vietor, Martin: The History of Occupation of Southern Slovakia 1938–1945 [Dejiny okupácie juņného Slovenska 1938– 1945]. Bratislava, Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1972, pp 50, 92–94. 19 Molnár, Imre: The Life and Martyr Death of János Esterházy [Ņivot a martýrska smrť Jánosa Esterházyho]. Ńamorín, Méry Ratio, 2012, p. 188. 20 Esterházy, János: The Attitude of Ethnic Minorities to the State Power [A nemzetiségek viszonya az államhatalomhoz.] Lecture at the Summer University in Debrecen in 1942. Debrecen, City Records, 1942. 21 In this matter, Vojtech Tuka, the Prime Minister of the First SR, called Esterházy. They had a conversation about permitting a Slovak party in Hungary. Tuka strongly suggested that if in the short time the Slovaks in Hungary would not have permission for their own political party, then he will dissolve all Hungarian organizations in Slovakia. Tilkovszky,

Loránt: Southern Slovakia..., op. cit., p. 163. 22 Vietor, Martin: The History of Occupation..., op. cit., pp 194–196. 23 Böhm, Emanuel: Six Years in Captivity (Memoirs on 1938–1945)[V ńesťročnom zajatí (Spomienky na roky 1938– 1945)].Martin, Matica slovenská, 1994, p. 163. 24 Tilkovszky, Loránt: Southern Slovakia..., op. cit., pp 182–183. 25 SNA, f. Strana slovenskej národnej jednoty (SSNJ), box 20, sign. Dr. E. Böhm – Lectures and Articles 1940–1946. [Prednáńky a články 1940–1946], inv. No 70, Not numbered, article 'On the Basis of Law' (1942). 26 Tilkovszky, Loránt: Southern Slovakia..., op. cit., p. 183. 27 SNA, fund MFA 1939–1945, box 122, not numbered, aide-mémoire. 28 SNA, fund SSNJ, box. 4, sign. General Secretariat Budapest – Documentary material on the status of Slovaks in Hungary 1938–1945, inv. No 9, No 691/1943, report from the SSNJ district secretariat in Końice dated 7 May 1943.

29 Böhm, E.: Six Years in Captivity..., op. cit., pp 195–199. 30 SNA, fund. MFA 1939–1945, box 498 A, not numbered, a letter from Emanuel Böhm to Ferdinand Ćurčanský dated 30 November 1941. 31 Harsh physical punishments in the Hungarian army were delivered on daily basis; the most common punishment was tying up soldiers for disobeying orders, as testified by witness memoirs from the occupied territories (author‘s note). 32 Böhm, E.: Six Years in Captivity..., op. cit., pp 195–199.

ANDREJ TÓTH Salesian University in Opava Economics College, Prague

JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY IN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC

The following essay summarises the potential of archived documents for further study of the Count János Esterházy, one of the leading political representatives of the Hungarian minority during the first Czechoslovak Republic. János Esterházy has earned public recognition in the early 1930s. Until then he was politically inactive, having instead dedicated his hitherto efforts to managing his family estate. 1931 proved to be a milestone for Esterházy in terms of career perspective. He first drew more marked attention by his public address at the National ChristianSocialist Party (Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt; OKSZP) in the town of Tvrdońovce, Slovakia in the summer of 1931. In the autumn of 1931 he unexpectedly became hot candidate of the new government establishment in Budapest for the post of the Chairman of Hungarian Christian Socialists. It was one of the two opposition Parliamentary parties representing Hungarian minority during the first Republic. In the summer of 1932 he drew further attention, by then internationally. He represented the Czechoslovak Hungarian League (Csehszlovákiai Magyar Népközösségi Liga) at the League of Nations in Vienna. The previous year he presided over the League and to now subject the Geneva-based League of Nations to crushing criticism. In December 1932 he was elected OKSZP leader. János Esterházy swiftly rose to prominence among the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia (hereafter ethnic Hungarians) during the 1930s. In the Parliamentary elections held in May 1935 he was also elected to the Chamber of Deputies at the National Assembly. On Parliamentary soil Esterházy was among the active orators advocating the interests of ethnic Hungarians. He was always among the first to register his address and regularly triggered lively response from fellow MPs. In the Parliament he particularly actively promoted the utmost guarantee of the conditions required for the preservation of cultural identity of the minority of ethnic Hungarians (though not exclusively), and the free use and development of Hungarian language in all walks of public and political life, including a guarantee of schooling in Hungarian at the widest possible territory inhabited by ethnic Hungarians in the then Czechoslovakia. He also focused on economic and social issues of Slovakia and Ruthenia and, in line with the policy of opposition to the Hungarian political scene, he called in his Parliamentary addresses for the recognition of autonomous status of Slovakia and for the completion of full-fledged autonomy for Ruthenia. He served on four Parliamentary committees: Budgetary, Constitutional and Legal, Foreign 1 Affairs, and Agricultural.

POLICE REPORT – SLOVAK NATIONAL ARCHIVES IN BRATISLAVA AND THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES IN PRAGUE

The main archival sources related to the first Czechoslovak Republic that contain the greatest volume of references to János Esterházy are police report summaries compiled from regional police reports particularly in Slovakia. The local reports came mostly from the Police Directorate in Bratislava. They were designated for the National and/or Regional Authority in Bratislava and the Prague-based Ministry of Interior and/or its Presidium. The material largely covers police reporting on developments on the ethnic Hungarian political stage. Selected files were also passed on to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the 2nd (political) Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That was one of the key units within the Ministry and dealt with the entire political agenda. The reports present today the most complete collection in the archival funds of the Police Directorate kept at the Slovak National Archives in Bratislava. Major proportion of them is also in the fund of the Presidium of the Ministry of Interior kept in the Czech National Archives. Special reports concerning specific persons were then also requested by, for instance,

77 the Office of the President of Czechoslovakia either directly from regional police authorities, i.e. without the mediation of the Ministry of Interior. Some party materials of the ethnic Hungarian political parties that were submitted to the government departments, where Esterházy appears either as author or one of the signatories, are kept in the fund of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers at the National Archives in Prague. These police reports are quite unique, not merely in terms of the activities of ethnic Hungarian politicians, but also in terms of the activities of other ethnic minorities, particularly the German (in the case this naturally involves essentially reports from police authorities in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia). The police reports largely detailed the activities within the political parties, particularly proceedings of party meetings and conventions that were mostly held in different places in Slovakia and Ruthenia. They also included all developments and tensions within party structures, relations between their leaders, their international liaisons, etc. The sources enable highly detailed mapping of public gatherings of the political parties representing ethnic Hungarians. The required presence of police at each such event, whether held in major urban centres or the most remote villages with Hungarian speaking residents gave rise to very detailed police reports. Similar detail is characteristic of police reports on meetings of Hungarian Parliamentary fractions that were often held outside Prague in different places within the eastern parts of Czechoslovakia. Many cases contain irrelevant information about the developments within ethnic Hungarian parties. That was probably because of the presumed network of well-paid informers. Often, when equivalent reports are found on a given event in Hungarian archives, it becomes clear that those reports were surprisingly accurate and quite illustrative of the situation within a party. Vast majority of sources on these subjects have framework validity. With the help of additional sources, particularly contemporary press, they serve as the basis for the reconstruction of the situation in ethnic Hungarian politics, and the activities of and relations between individual political players. Police directorate and the Ministry of Interior always worked in detail with those reports, as is evidenced by the coloured highlights indicating the particular issue explored in the text. From the early 1930s the reports also offer detailed information about Esterházy. As soon as throughout 1932 the documents of the Czechoslovak police authorities frequently mention the rocket rise of Esterházy‘s political career as supported by Budapest, a phenomenon that is still not fully understood. For instance, one of the police reports from the Presidium of the Regional Directorate in Bratislava suggests that the Esterházy nomination for the leader of the most influential ethnic Hungarian political party in Czechoslovakia was especially supported by the Hungarian legitimist and/or aristocratic circles led by the Count Móric Esterházy, and the people connected to the then Minister of Defence and the future Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös.2 The degree to which the supreme state authorities had an overview of ethnic Hungarian politics and their leaders is also illustrated by detailed records of departures and arrivals of the monitored politicians to and from the country, i.e. their crossing the national borders, detailing the time and means of their crossing. Those reports were then filed to the higher authorities. The records include the description of entries in Esterházy‘s passport, for instance from 1934, that is kept in the fund of the Presidium of the Ministry of Interior, now in the National Archives in Prague. It shows, inter alia, that Esterházy at the time was in possession of passport No 4471–32–06121 issued on 20 March 1934 by the local authority in Nitra and valid until 23 January 1937, enabling him to travel to all countries except Russia. The copy of the passport contains visa to Hungary valid for eleven months, issued on 21 March 1934 by the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava under reg. No 35.618. valid until 20 February 1935. The documents show that, in the Spring of 1934,3Esterházy travelled especially to Hungary, but had also visited Austria, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 4 and Italy. Another document, from the Presidium of the Country Office in Bratislava, informs that the MPs ―Gejza Szüllő and János Esterházy, the leading representatives of the National Christian Socialist Party, attended, on 18 December 1935, the session of the National Assembly that elected President of the Republic‖. This shows how, against the backdrop of the event, the Country Office had informed the Presidium of the

Ministry of Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that ―both MPs travelled to Prague on 16 December directly from Budapest‖ to attend the session of the legislature. It is intriguing that both departments, the Presidium of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were only informed three days after the election of the President, on 21 December 1935. As if Prague wished to verify ex post the possibility of the electoral visit to Budapest by both leading representatives of ethnic Hungarians and their possible consolation with the government circles in Budapest. Not all police reports, however, are relevant in terms of information value. This is illustrated by a report from the District Police Chief in Zlaté Moravce, dated 15 September 1936. He reported to Prague that Esterházy didn‘t enjoy popularity in the Nitra region and the local public didn‘t respect him. The value of Esterházy for the National Christian Socialist Party, the Police Chief argued, was thus in that Esterházy was ―his highness the count‖ to the public and Roman Catholic clergy in the southern and eastern regions of Slovakia. On the other hand, this very information shouldn‘t be altogether dismissed as irrelevant. What makes the document interesting is that the report was requested by the Chancellor to the President. It is, however, unclear whether that was upon the request by President Beneń. As evidenced by a note on the document, Beneń did read the report. It is noteworthy that a meeting was held on 11 September 1936 between Beneń and the then Executive Chairman of the United Hungarian Party (Egyesült Magyar Párt) founded in June 1936 through a merger of both opposition parties of the ethnic Hungarian minority, the Hungarian National Party (Magyar Nemzeti Párt) and the OKSZP. The meeting was held in Topoľčianky where Beneń even offered Esterházy the post of the minister without portfolio. The latter, however, rejected the offer. Though both parties to the meeting agreed (upon the initiative by Beneń) to keep the meeting confidential, Esterházy reported shortly afterwards to the Office of the President that Hungarian press had found out about it (for more on this, see below). It was in the very connection with the investigation of the information leak that the aforementioned document was drafted upon request by the Office of the President. From the report from the Office Chief in Zlaté Moravce Beneń was further able to learn trivial information about Esterházy such as that his was a light-hearted nature, he enjoyed parties, but got drunk very easily and, when under influence, he caused a lot of mischief, as well as that, prior to the launch of his career, he frequented local bars in Nitra where is a known presence. Such is also a side of some of contemporary 5 police reports.

DOCUMENTS IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The earliest archival documents pertaining to the first Czechoslovak Republic that contain reference to Esterházy are in the Archives of the Office of the President. The first mention of Esterházy here dates to 1924 in connection with the arrest of his sister Lujza Esterházy. She was sentenced on 15 December 1924 to one year in prison and a fine of 20 thousand Crowns for conspiring against the Republic, or rather for her relationship that she had between 1922 and 1923 with the Hungarian lieutenant colonel Gyula Ostenburg with the intention to separate Slovakia from Czechoslovakia. For that purpose, Lujza Esterházy was alleged to also seek contacts in Poland in 1923. That is when the family becomes, for the first time, visible to the political circles in Prague. The crime that Lujza Esterházy committed was allegedly inspired by lowly and dishonest motives, according to the report by the Minister of Justice addressed to the Castle. Lujza Esterházy was to start serving her sentence on 28 August 1925. In order to get her released and plead clemency, Julian Zachariewicz from Lviv, the pupil and friend of the Count Stanisław Tarnowsky, Lujza‘s grandfather, approached Tomáń Masaryk. He also addressed the President as an academic, referring to the international recognition that Tarnowsky enjoyed as fellow academic and to the possible personal contact between the two, as presumed by Zachariewicz. Interestingly, the Office of the President did support the amnesty, but referred to the need of consultations with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneń. He didn‘t oppose the amnesty, though with a note that the decision would encounter adverse response in Slovakia. The Poles were alleged to intervene about the matter with Beneń, as shown by the archived document.6

Curiously, János Esterházy approached the Office of the President for the first time in May 1924, not yet in his capacity of a politician, but as private person. The document further shows that it was the first time that Esterházy called on the office in person. He protested against the refusal to issue him a passport to Hungary because he shared his household with his arrested sister, thus being deemed to be someone not to be trusted. Esterházy asked for a permit to travel for just a few days to Hungary to visit his Hungarian 7 estate and get engaged with the Countess Lívia Serényi whom he eventually married in October 1924. That, however, wasn‘t the last time that Esterházy addressed the Office of the President in private matters. In February 1926 he cabled the Office of the President to protest against arbitrary and illegal occupation of his land by the residents of Veľké Záluņie where he permanently resided (in his family estate together with his sisters). The occupation was initiated by an unspecified person. He was demanding decisive intervention from relevant authorities in the interest of public peace, national security and private civil rights.8 In August 1927 Esterházy, together with his sisters, approached Masaryk in the matter concerning the intended further division of his estate to increase the national land fund by an additional 500 hectares. The Esterházy siblings pointed out that the c. 1,727 hectares of land that the three had inherited in shared inheritance from their mother, was a single legal set, of which mere c. 354 hectares of land have remained with the family following the land reform. There referred to the law that allowed to exempt up to 500 hectares of land per landlord from the land division, whilst in their case it was the matter of raising the land size to the 500 hectares not per single person, but to the three. The document clearly illustrates the grim economic situation of the family and their estate at the time. The Esterházys pleaded financial distress of the family: the need to pay 1.8 million Czechoslovak Crowns in property tax, and further 750,000 Crowns in debt in taxes and public fees.9 Additional documents from the Archives of the Office of the President enable a reconstruction of Esterházy‘s audience with the President and his contacts with the highest governmental circles.10It is particularly noteworthy that Esterházy‘s ticket to the top echelons of the national politics was the calling 11 card from Jan Jiří Rückl , one of the main actors in behind-the-scenes politics linked to the Castle and 12 President Beneń. Another document from the Archives of the Office of the President illustrates Esterházy‘s dismay over the approach by the administration of Prime Minister Milan Hodņa and/or directly the Prime Minister‘s attitude towards the Hungarian minority in 1938 during the drafting of the nationality status that was to fully reconstitute the status of ethnic minorities.13Esterházy here also voiced his disagreement with the government contacts with the representatives of Hungarian activists, namely with Ignác Schultz, Head of the Section of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats (who served, between 1931 and 1935 as Editor-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak Social Democrat daily (Csehszlovákiai Népszava). Schultz represented Social Democrats in the Parliament during the fourth electoral term. Esterházy‘s point here is particularly noteworthy: ―The only one who had shown understanding towards them [author‘s note: the Hungarian opposition], is the President and Esterházy wishes to kindly ask the President to receive him again and 14 discuss all matters with him‖. (!) The Archives of the Office of the President contains quite interesting information on the above meeting between Esterházy and Beneń held on 11 September 1936 in Topoľčianky. It was the first time that the two politicians spoke since their meeting on the eve of the Presidential election on 17 December 1935 (see below). The meeting was significant in terms of the aforementioned fact that Beneń had offered the Hungarian minority a place in the government. It was for the second time in the history of the first Republic since the previous short-lived and unsuccessful post-electoral coalition of the Hungarian National Party and the Sudetenland‘s party Bund der Landwirte after the 1925 elections (which were the second Parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia since the Great War). At the time the ethnic Hungarians stood at the gate of the Green Lobby of the Kollowrat Palace in Prague‘s Malá Strana, the seat of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. This, however, was the very first time that they had an opportunity to actually serve in the government.15

The documents in the Archives of the Office of the President contain evidence on the Beneń – Esterházy meeting held upon request by Esterházy. It was to be kept confidential from the press and the public. Nonetheless, the documents filed in the above Archives show that, on 13 September 1936, three Hungarian journalists called on Esterházy to enquire about the veracity of the information that he had met with Beneń. They had allegedly learned about the meeting from a police inspector in Topoľčianky. Esterházy denied having met with Beneń. Since it was Beneń who didn‘t desire releasing the information about the meeting, Esterházy immediately notified the Office of the President (probably the staff at the President‘s summer residence in Topoľčianky), in order to refute the news about the meeting, should they appear in the press. The investigation that followed among the clandestine security guards of who might have leaked the information showed that it was inspector Josef Chvojka, the head of security in Topoľčianky. The header of the report contains measures related to the cases when the Secretary of the Office of the President gives a particular notification, the household staff, i.e. the guards of the buildings, the Castle guard, police and clandestine security officers should not be given the names of callers received in an audience. An intriguing instruction from the times prior to the investigation of the leak concerning the Beneń – Esterházy meeting in Topoľčianky suggests that, in the case the interrogation of the security staff would fail to identify the source of the leak, the matter should be discontinued in terms of interrogating either Esterházy or the journalists.16 The documents of the Office of the President also show that Esterházy, at the end of Summer 1936, proposed to the President, within the framework of the ―extraordinary‖ contacts with the Head of the State following the Presidential election in December 1935 (see below), to promote the support for the journalist and essayist Pál Szvatkó, Head of the culture column in the daily Prágai Magyar Hírlap and one of the key figures in the periodical, as the candidate for the Chair of Hungarian Language and Literature at Charles University in Prague. The Office of the President promptly responded by starting to gather information on Szvatkó, as he had been hitherto unknown. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was only able to provide general data, briefly informing the Office of the President that Szvatkó: ―is a Hungarian, born in Slovakia, studied in Prague and Paris, speaking fluent Czech‖.17 The attention that the ethnic Hungarian leaders paid to the teaching of Hungarian language and literature in Prague and Bratislava arose especially after 1933 in connection with the passing of Pavol Bujnák, extraordinary professor of Hungarian philology at the Faculty of Philosophy at Charles University and, at the same time, permanent professor of Hungarian philology at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Comenius University in Bratislava. He had been long the heart and soul of Hungarian seminars at both Universities. The seminars then remained understaffed for a long time. The opposition Hungarian politicians had therefore demanded to adequately fill the vacancy by an academic who would be a native Hungarian speaker.

THE MASARYK INSTITUTE AND THE ARCHIVES OF THE CZECH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

In addition to the Archives of the Office of the President, further collection of worthwhile documents related to János Esterházy is kept in the archival funds of the Masaryk Institute, that are part of the Institute and the Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences. The documents relate to the election of the President in December of 1935 when the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneń replaced Tomáń Masaryk who had previously resigned. The 1935 Presidential election was a major milestone in Esterházy‘s political career as well as in the entire history of the ethnic Hungarian opposition politics in the first Republic. Until then the Hungarian opposition parties used to submit blank ballots in Presidential elections. Beneń, as the Presidential candidate approached, from among all the leading Hungarian minority politicians, Esterházy as the OKSZP Chairman about negotiations to win their support. Interestingly enough, Beneń was particularly keen to talk with the representatives of the Christian Socialists, rather than those of the Hungarian National Party. It was despite the fact that it was actually the Hungarian National Party to be the closest to political activism in the second half of the 1920s, as has been discussed earlier. That was largely due to its leader József Szent-Ivány.

In spite of the anticipated smooth path to Presidency that was ahead of Beneń, quite a powerful opposition emerged soon. It was called the civic or December bloc. Is proponents didn‘t wish to see Beneń at the Castle. They had their own candidate, Bohumil Němec, nominated by the Agrarians. Němec was university professor, former National Democrat MP and Senator. Having accepted his nomination on 6 December, it was officially announced to the coalition on 7 December 1935. This unexpected change in the balance of forces made it clear that a single Presidential candidate couldn‘t rely on the required three-fifths majority of votes either in the first or the second round of the election. It even seemed that none of the candidates would gain the simple majority to suffice for them to pass to the second round. It became obvious then that, in order to win, Beneń had to engage in political negotiations also with the opposition. As the Presidential candidate, Beneń also approached Esterházy via Jan Jiří Rückl, the behind-the-scenes negotiator of support to Beneń for the Presidency. The archival sources within the ―Edvard Beneń‖ Fund at the Masaryk Institute show that Rückl had contacted the Chairman of the Hungarian Christian Socialists from the Alcron hotel in Prague where he had long been renting an apartment. He established the contact on 13 December 1935 via the Countess Lujza Esterházy. He cabled her, asking to promptly contact her brother to inform him that they needed to meet at the earliest occasion. Therefore, he wrote, would Esterházy telephone him as soon as he reached Prague.18Lujza Esterházy cabled back the next day, informing Rückl that, though her brother wasn‘t there, she did pass him the message on the telephone. She also convened to Rückl the assurance from her brother that he would contact him directly.19Less than three hours later Lujza Esterházy sent another cable to Rückl that her brother would find him at the Alcron hotel the following day.20The Chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democrats was, at the time, in Budapest on his own initiative to probably discuss the forthcoming Presidential elections and the difficulties on the Czechoslovak political stage as a result of the politics of the Agrarians, the main coalition party. Esterházy visited Budapest already on 13 December 1935 where he was to meet, on noon, Tibor Pataky at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Pataky chaired there the Department for the Affairs of Hungarians 21 Abroad. The above archival sources also show that Rückl, in his plea for support to the Beneń candidacy, also approached the Cannon in Końice, Mons. Miklós Pfeiffer. In his letter to him, Rückl highlighted the positive stance of the Roman Catholic Church to the candidacy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was apparently seen among the ecclesiastical circles ―as the sole warrant of peace and cross-national justice in the country‖. Rückl asked the Końice Cannon to try to exert his influence within the ethnic Hungarian politics. The idea was that, in the case they would find it impossible to vote in support of Beneń, they would at least remain neutral and not vote against him. Each vote, as Rückl pointed out, would be decisive in the forthcoming election.22The documents at the Masaryk Institute show that Beneń as the Presidential candidate was content with the talks with ethnic Hungarians. After his first meeting with Esterházy, on 16 December 1935, Rückl informed Masaryk: ―we managed to draw the matter to a most successful end with the Hungarian Christian Socialists – as the result of the negotiations held by the Minister and also mine with him[author‘s note: meaning with Esterházy]proved to be very good‖.23Even though Beneń‘ position improved significantly on the night of the 17 December (with the 18th being the election date) as the ethnic German candidate stepped down and Beneń no longer had to rely on the support by ethnic Hungarians. Yet, he still kept on trying to secure votes from the Hungarian MPs from both parties, particularly in an effort to gain utmost political mandate to operate as the President, especially in light of the international status of Czechoslovakia. Prior to the electoral convention of both chambers of the Parliament, Beneń sent a message to the Hungarian legislators via Rückl and Esterházy: ―The Minister Dr. Edvard Beneń has entrusted me to convey to you a message that the coalition had come to an agreement on him as the sole candidate, taking into account that the Minister had discussed the matter with Your Highness. He retains everything that you had discussed together as valid during the elections and also throughout the future. In order to assure you of this, the Minister insists on all that you had discussed and that he would retain continual contact with you in the future‖.24 For the first time in the history of the Presidential elections in the first Republic, on 18 December 1935 in the Ladislaus‘ Hall the Hungarian MPs did not indeed submit blank ballots. They thus didn‘t manifest

82 their negative and negativist attitude to the constitutional shape of the Czechoslovak state. Unlike their ethnic German counterparts, they assumed a constructive approach by having unexpectedly supported Beneń. Even the newly elected President had recognised the constructive approach by the ethnic Hungarian political parties. Via his personal secretary he thanked the Hungarian parties for their ―chivalry, honesty and straightforward attitude prior to, as well as throughout the Presidential election‖. The secretary was to convey the message from Beneń to the Hungarian electors in the afternoon by telephone.25 The collection of the archival documents pertaining to the first Republic has a major information potential, as has been shown by the above selection of documents. Together with the archival sources in the Hungarian National Archives in Budapest they contain invaluable information not only on political activities of János Esterházy on the ethnic Hungarian stage of the first Republic, but equally on the major events related to the political life of Esterházy himself, as well as to the ethnic Hungarian political opposition and its representatives. Contemporary press is a vital source as well, as it completes the picture of the activities of any politicians or political party during the first Republic. It is an integral part of the study of the era in terms of the stenograph records from the sessions of both chambers of the Parliament. Nonetheless, historic research would benefit from documents on the activities of ethnic Hungarian MPs. Records from the proceedings of the Parliamentary committees that included ethnic Hungarian MPs have not been preserved. Otherwise the archives of the Hungarian parties would shed further light on the context. Alas, those remain unavailable. Still, the aforementioned collections of archival documents provide plenty of interesting and valuable information on János Esterházy and his political activities in the 1930s.

NOTES

1 For the beginnings of János Esterházy‘s political career in the first half of 1930s see the comprehensive study by Tóth, Andrej: The Rise of the Count János Esterházy to the Top of the Hungarian National Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia in the late 1932 [Nástup hraběte Jánose Esterházyho do čela maćarské Zemské křesťansko-socialistické strany v Československu na sklonku roku 1932].In: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, HÚ AV ČR, 18/ 1 (2010), pp 77–101; Tóth, A.: National Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of the Count János Esterházy in 1933–1935 [Zemská křesťansko-socialistická strana v Československu pod vedením hraběte Jánose Esterházyho v letech 1933 – 1935]. In: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, HÚ AV ČR, 19/1 (2011), pp 67–103. 2 Cf. Slovak National Archives, Police Directorate fund, box No 239, docs No 16955/31 and 10510/31. We do now that it was the Budapest political circles that were behind Esterházy‘s political career. It is still unclear, however, why Budapest supported Esterházy. Three possible explanations arise: 1. A belief that Esterházy‘s noble origin and him being part of the ancient Hungarian aristocratic family could warrant stability within the Hungarian Christian Socialist Party and the reconciliation between its clerical and lay fractions, as the clerical group opposed the Esterházy nomination. What might have been at stake here was the traditionally close ties between nobility and clergy that bore the potential to pacify the developments within the party. 2. It could have also been the guarantee of continuation of the Szüllő political line that tended towards closer cooperation of both major ethnic Hungarian political parties that could have had greater potential for timely emergence of a united political party to represent ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. 3. Within the context of politics and the desires in Budapest in political developments in Hungary, it seems quite likely that the support to Esterházy was particularly rooted in the interest in Budapest to achieve a united political front of the Hungarian autonomist parties with the Hlinka´s Slovak Peoples‘ Party in the 1935 Parliamentary elections. Meanwhile it is likely that the long-term interest in Budapest in unifying the Hungarian opposition politics in Czechoslovakia also played a role here. 3 The copy must have been made sometime in the first half of June or throughout June 1934 as it only records his travels until 6 June, which is the last date of him crossing the borders as recorded in the copy. 4 National Archives, fund of the Ministry of Interior – Presidium, sign. 225-1090-16. 5 Archives of the Office of the President (hereafter AOP), fund Chancellor to the President (CP), protocol S (secret), sign. T 584/36, reg. No T 1678/36 and 1685/36, box 184. 6 AOP, Ibid., rec. No 2504, sign. 116855/53, reg. No R 23736/25, box 654. 7 Ibid., reg. No R 12443/24, box 654. 8 Ibid., reg. No D 1436/26, D 1082/26, D 1695/26, box 654. 9 Ibid., reg. No R 19323/27, box 654. 10 Cf. ibid. reg. No A 1657/36, A 571/37, A 232/38, box 654. 11 Jan Jiří Rückl, JD was a conservative and deeply religious democrat, and pacifist from a noble family of glassmakers. His original, estate, education and connections with the leaders within the political and economic realm led him to the top echelons of public life in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. He was ardent conservative politician in its original sense – the advocate of tested values that laid the foundations of the democratic constitution. He was convinced that the main pillar of

democracy in Czechoslovakia was the Castle group, Masaryk and Beneń. He developed his political activities within the Peoples‘ Party where he served in the 1930s as member of the Presidium. His main role model among Czechoslovak politicians was Beneń with whom he kept close in the 1930s. His extensive personal links thus placed him in the very centre of decision-making. In 1935 the merely 35-year-old Rückl cashed on his contacts network in political and ecclesiastical circles as the chief ―manager‖ of Beneń‘ election to Presidency. Rückl approached the 1935 Presidential election as a decisive milestone in the struggle for the preservation of Czechoslovak democracy. He therefore saw no other candidate than Beneń, the long-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the occasion of the 1935 Presidential elections Rückl mediated talks between the Hungarian opposition leader and the Presidential candidate Beneń. [For more on Jan Jiří Rückl cf. Jančík, Drahomír: ―A diplomat from the Alcron hotel. Common networks and interactions of Czech economic élites presented through the case of Jan Jiří Rückl‖ [Diplomat z hotelu Alcron. Společenské sítě a interakce českých hospodářských elit na příkladu Jana Jiřího Rückla]. In: Jíńová, Kateřina (ed.): In Palace Chambers and on the Streets. Festschrift Dedicated to Václav Ledvinka on His Sixtieth Anniversary [V komnatách paláců – v ulicích měst. Sborník příspěvků věnovaných Václavu Ledvinkovi k ńedesátým narozeninám], pp 205–229; and Klimek, Antonín: Papal Valet Jan Jiří Rückl as Politician [Papeņský komoří Jan Jiří Rückl jako politik].In: Traditio et cultus. Miscelanea historica Bohemica Miloslao Vlk archiepiscopo Pragensi ab eius collegis amicusque ad annum sexagesimum dedicata. Prague, 1993, pp 219–228. 12 AOP, f. OP, protocol S (secret), reg. No 116855/53, rec. No D 4015/37, box 654. 13 For the project on the national status and attitude of ethnic minorities towards the new politics on minorities within the Czechoslovak government see the comprehensive study by Tóth, Andrej–Novotný, Lukáń–Stehlík, Michal: Ethnic Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918–1938. From the National to Ethnic State?[Národnostní menńiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu?]Prague, Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Philosophy – TOGGA, 2012, pp 352–580. 14 Ibid. 15 For the talks in Topoľčianky see Esterházy‘s 12-page summary report. In: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (National Archives of Hungary; hereafter MNL–OL), K (Külügyminisztérium – Ministry of Foreign Affairs) pp 64–70. file (hereafter ―cs―) – 1937 – item 7 – 128/res. pol./1937, resp. 606/res. pol./1937, Esterházy‘s minutes from the talks with President Beneń in Topoľčianky on 11 September 1936 (606/res. pol./1936 dated 15 September 1936) are part of the report by the Head of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava, the Vice-Consul Gyula Petravich, dated 15 February 1937, addressed to the Head of the Political Section at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Baron György Bakach- Bessenyey, recorded under 128/res. pol. Re: ―Mátyás látogatása Benesnél és tárgyalásai Sramekkel‖ – Esterházy is identified here under the cover name ―Mátyás―. 16 AOP, f. OP, protocol S (secret), sign. T 584/36, rec. No T 1685/36, box 184. 17 AOP, Ibid. rec. No T 1657/36, box 184. 18 Masaryk Institute and the Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences (hereafter MÚ AAV ČR), f. Edvard Beneń, part I (hereafter EB I), box 45, inv. No R/124/2 (R 94), Internal Affairs. 1935 Presidential election, cable by Rückl to Lujza Esterházy in Újlak by Nitra (Veľké Záluņie), in French, dated 13 December 1935, fol. 62–63. Rückl informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs Beneń about him being contacted by the OKSZP Chairman via his sister Lujza, having forwarded the cable to Beneń. (Cf. ibid. Rückl‘s handwritten note to Beneń, dated 14 December 1935). 19 Ibid. the original of the cable by Lujza Esterházy to Rückl, in French, dated 14 December 1935, 2:30 pm. 20 Ibid. the original of the cable by Lujza Esterházy to Rückl, in French, dated 14 December 1935, 5:30 pm (precisely 5:21 pm). 21 MNL–OL, Külügyminisztérium (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 74 (Számjelosztály 1918–1944; Cipher Department 1918– 1944), I. Bejövő számjeltáviratok (Received ciphered cables), 4. cs.– 1935 – Prága (Prague), a cable from the Hungarian envoy Wettstein to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kánya, dated 12 December 1935, No 42. 22 MÚ AAV ČR, f. Edvard Beneń I (EB), box 45, Ibid., Rückl‘s typewritten letter to Miklós Pfeiffer, in French, dated 13 December 1935, sent from the Alcron hotel in Prague. 23 MÚ AAV ČR, ibid., inv. No R/1340/136, Slovakia–Photocopies – 1930–1938 (hereafter SK–FTK/‘30–‘38), a photocopy of Rückl‘s 2-paged typewritten letter to Přemysl Ńámal, Chancellor to the President, dated 16 December 1935, from the Office of the President (T. 1002/35 – signature of the Office of the President). 24 Ibid., A copy of Rückl‘s letter dated 18 December 1935, FAO Chairman Esterházy. 25 Esti Újság, 3/294, 20 December 1935, pp 1–2, and/or 1, Benes köztársasági elnök… – Benes elnök üzenete a választás után. Cf.Slovák 17/288, 20 December 1935, 2, President Dr. Beneń and Our Hungarians.What was going on behind the scenes prior to the elections [Prezident dr. Beneń a nańi Maćari. Čo sa dialo v zákulisí pred voľbou]. On the attitude of Hungarian opposition parties to the Presidential election of December 1935, see the comprehensive study by Tóth, Andrej: Hungarian Minority Political Parties in Czechoslovakia and the Elections of the Successor to Masaryk to Presidency in December 1935 [Maćarské menńinové politické strany v Československu a volba Masarykova nástupce do úřadu prezidenta republiky v prosinci 1935]. Vol I and II. In: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, HÚ AV ČR, 20/ 1 and 2 (2012), pp 157–201 and 83–137.

DARIUSZ ROGUT

History Institute, The Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce Detached branch in Piotrkow Trybunalski

THE FATE OF POLITICAL ÉLITES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN SOVIET GULAGS – CASE STUDIES (JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY, GEN. JOHAN LAIDONER AND JAN STANISŁAW JANKOWSKI)

The German–Soviet pact known as the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, signed on 23 August 1939 in Moscow, not only lead to repeated division of Poland, but also launched the Second World War. Two years later the former allies turned into fierce enemies. Their pitiless conflict cost millions of lives. The Hitlerite machinery was only defeated in May 1945. Europe was liberated from fascism, though the political consent on the part of the United States and Great Britain with the political intensions of the Soviet dictator Stalin ended in the split of the old continent in two zones. The part of Europe that fell under the Soviet dominion 1 faced a dawn of a new era, that of the Communist dictatorship. Communism that was introduced by the Soviets across the countries they had subjected, was initially rooted almost exclusively in the terror by NKVD. The repressions began with mass arrests and deportations to the USSR of anyone who represented moral or political authority and an independent context that didn‘t give in to the Communists. These people were thus deemed to be threat to the new ―peoples‖ power. It concerned vast ranks of people: teachers, lawyers, politicians, even farmers and industrial workers. The repressions first affected independent political circles that enjoyed major public support. The political élites had thus been eliminated. The scenario was repeated in each of the countries that fell under the Communist spell. A question arises what brings together a Hungarian, an Estonian and a Pole. It can be argued that the fate of the Count János Esterházy, General Johan Laidoner and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Stanisław Jankowski is linked through symbolic elements. They differ in history, social background, public posts they served, and political positions they held. Their paths are nonetheless linked by destiny and history. Who, then, were Esterházy and Laidoner, and what could they had in common with Jankowski? Following is their brief portrait. János Esterházy was born on 14 March 1901 to a noble Polish–Hungarian family. He was grandson of the illustrious academic, professor Stanisław Tarnowski, the Rector of the Jagiellonian University.2Esterházy grew up in the historic region of Upper Hungary which, after the Great War, became part of the newly founded Czechoslovakia. Early on Esterházy became engaged in politics and, by 1932, he was the Chairman of the National Christian Socialist Party. From 1939 he was, as the Chairman of a Hungarian party, the only ethnic Hungarian to represent the Hungarian minority in the Parliament in Bratislava. He has repeatedly manifested his long, highly positive attitude to the Poles. After September 1939 he assisted the transfer of the Polish troops to the West, fearless of the existing threats. He provided major support to many, including General Kazimierz Sosnkowski: it was because of Esterházy‘s assistance that he managed to reach London. Over 300 Jews found refuge in his estate. After 1942 he was the only MP in the Slovak parliament to stand up to the deportations of Jews to concentration camps and had criticised the fascist policies of the Slovak administration. He was arrested in 1945 by the Slovak security forces. Two months later he was handed to the Russians and deported to Moscow.3 Gen. Johan Laidoner, the Estonian national hero, was born on 12 February 1884. As son of a peasant he opted for military career. In the imperial army he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During the Bolshevik coup in 1917 he returned to Estonia. In January 1918 he stood at the head of the national army and managed to push the Bolsheviks from Narva all the way to the Latvian Riga. As an exceptionally talented and able general he became the commander-in-chief of the Estonian army.4Meanwhile he launched his political career. He joined forces with the political centre-right supported by wealthy farmers and bourgeoisie. He soon reached the top political echelons.5 Gen. Laidoner promoted close political ties with Poland. His belief was not only rooted his marriage to a Pole, but he saw Poland as an ally. His conviction was further enhanced by the sense of real threat emanating from the Bolshevik Russia.6 As politician he also earned recognition internationally and participated in a number of mediation missions of the League of Nations. Since he enjoyed public political support and authority, in March 1934, together with Konstantin Päts, he carried out a military coup. Laidoner stood at the head of the army and, until the end of the

85 independent state, he played one of the key roles in the country. After Estonia fell in the Soviet zone in 1939, in the state of crisis he signed in June 1940 on behalf of his homeland an accord with the USSR. That led to the stationing of 90,000 Red Army troupes on the territory of Estonia. That was the beginning of actual occupation of Estonia. Even though gen. Laidoner decided not to take up any political post anymore, he presented major threat to the new Communist power controlled by the Soviets. Thus, on 18 July 1940, together with his wife (Maria Kwiatkowska) he was deported to Penza and, on 26 June 1941 he was officially arrested by NKVD.7 Fate also linked Jan Stanisław Jankowski with the Soviet Union. Jankowski was born on 16 May 1882 and was involved in politics in his youth. In 1905 he joined the National Workers‘ Union to later become the leader of the National Workers‘ Party. During the Great War he served as soldier in the Polish legions led by Józef Piłsudski. As trained agricultural engineer he was the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs from 1921 to 1926. Between 1928 and 1935 he was member of the lower chamber of the Polish parliament for the National Workers‘ Party. In 1937 he joined forces with Christian Democrats within the Labour Party. During the German occupation he was actively involved in underground activities. He was part of the Government Delegation to the Country (Delegatura Rządu na Kraj), clandestine body of the administrative power in the occupied Poland that was controlled by the legal Polish government in London. The Representation was part of the Polish Underground State, as clandestine organisation with over 250 thousand troops.8 From May 1943 to March 1945 Jankowski served as the Government Deputy for the Country and Deputy Prime Minister. Of the exiled government.9 In March 1945, he was invited, together with a group of representatives of the underground Polish Parliament for political talks with the Soviets near Warsaw. He was tricked and arrested by the NKVD to be deported to Moscow.10What does then link together politicians with such different fate? It is the Soviet repressions. They were linked by unsubstantiated arrests, false accusations and show political trials based on forced testimonies that had been exerted through interrogation that lasted hours. Gen. Johan Laidoner was the first of the three politicians to be accused and sentenced in 1941. He ended up in the cruel prison Butyrka in Moscow. The construed political trial with Jankowski and other representatives of the Polish Underground State was held between 18 and 21 June 1945 in Moscow. The file containing the charges lists, inter alia, the illegal nature of the Country Army, the ―terrorist and diversion‖ and ―espionage‖ acts against the Red Army, the use of radio transmitters to contact the government in exile, and military cooperation with Germany against the Soviet Union (sic!).11Jankowski, together with gen. Leopold Okulicki, was accused of jointly leading the ungrounded activities of the Country Army and the activity of the underground government, the Council of Ministers. During the trials talks were held in Moscow about establishing a government in Poland in line with the decisions of the winning powers adopted at Yalta. The sentences of the USSR Military College were announced on 21 June 1945, on the very day that the Temporary Government of National Unity was established. That was particularly humiliating for the Poles.12Western allies didn‘t protest against these developments. It can be argued that János Esterházy was treated similarly to Jankowski. His trial was held a little later, though it was also a show trial based on false accusations. According to the charges, Esterházy came across as ―zealous Fascist, relentless enemy of the Soviet power who had long waged war against the Soviet land. He was inciting and tried to accelerate the war against the Soviet Union, relocated his people to underground operations, funded them, as well as printing equipment, radio connection required for anti- Soviet canvassing and arms in order to continue the war against the Red Army on the territory of Czechoslovakia occupied by Germany‖.13Furthermore, he was blamed of having falsely accused the Soviet Union of the responsibility for the Katyń massacre, disseminating false information in the press about the 14 execution of the Polish officers and of claiming that the executions were carried out by the NKVD. Both – Jankowski, who led the activities of the Polish Underground State ever since the beginning of the fight against the German occupation, and Esterházy, who was rescuing Slovak Jews, stood up to the spread of Fascism in Slovakia and was persecuted by Gestapo – faced virtually the same charges. According to the Soviets, they engaged in illegal political activities, cooperated with the Germans and attempted to wage armed struggle against the Soviet Union. They were thus the ―traitors of the nation‖ and Fascist! Gen. Laidoner was treated slightly differently. What, then, were the grounds for their sentencing? It seems that their fate was again symbolically linked. First, all three went through Lubyanka, one of the heaviest Soviet prisons. Second, though sentenced in separate periods, the decisions followed the wording of the infamous article 58–4 of the Soviet Criminal Code, accusing them of ―having assisted the international bourgeoisie to wage enemy activity against the Soviet Union‖: he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.15Jan Stanisław Jankowski was accused of ―terror against the representatives of the Soviet power or the workers and peasants acting in revolutionary

86 organisations‖(Article 58 para. 8), of ―diversion activities‖ (Article 58–9) and of ―counter–revolutionary activity‖ (Article 58–11). He was sentenced to eight years in prison. Similarly to gen. Laidoner, Esterházy was accused of ―having assisted international bourgeoisie in engaging in enemy activity against the Soviet Union‖(Article 58–4) and of ―counter-revolutionary activity‖ (Article 58–11). The sentence was announced in June 1946. Esterházy was sentenced for ten years in labour camp. Destinies of the other ―counter-revolutionaries‖ followed similar pattern. Gen. Laidoner first served time in prison in Moscow, then in Ivanov and, in 1952, being ill, he was transferred to a prison in Vladimír. On 13 July 1946 Esterházy taken from the Moscow prison Lubyanka north to the camps on the territory of the Republic of Komi.16In March 1948, being severely ill, he was transferred to the labour camp Sangradok– Protok and handed over to Czechoslovakia the following year. By then his state of health was very poor. The final years of Esterházy, Laidoner and Jankowski were again link by symbolism. Alas, tragic one. After the years in Soviet prisons, ill, stripped of contacts with relatives, they were dying in captivity. Jankowski died on 13 March 1953, a fortnight before his sentence was to be over. Gen. Laidoner died on the very same day. The victorious Estonian leader was buried in an unidentified grave together with the Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish government. Did they manage to meet, talk and discuss their fate before they died? We shall never know. The ill Count Esterházy was handed over by the Russians to the Czechoslovak government. Despite his frail condition the government didn‘t release him from prison. He died in prison in Mírov on 8 March 1957. His grave has never been found, though it is known that he was buried among the Polish patriots shot by the Germans. There is symbolism again: they ended up far from their relatives, without appropriate medical assistance, buried in mass graves. March became the month of their passing. Who then were Esterházy, Laidoner a Jankowski? Were they ―counter-revolutionaries and traitors‖ of their peoples? Quite on the contrary. They were politicians who, until the end of their days and even under tragic circumstances remained faithful to the recognised principles and views. Despite unfair accusations, lies and misleading propaganda, they never gave in. They lived with honour to the end. The trials in which they were accused were a clear breach of international law. They presented false accusations without any evidence. The three were sentenced exclusively on political grounds. In Soviet prisons, far away from their homelands and relatives, they didn‘t let their families to lose hope in their return. In spite of incurable illness, János Esterházy did not lose his high spirits and was filled with spiritual peace. His sister, after their last encounter, wrote: ―there was such unearthly shine in his eyes and 17 such a majestic peace in his words which I cannot describe. I saw in him the victory of spirit over matter.‖ Could the Communist propaganda defeat such people? Could history forget them; could they have lost their place in the pantheon of national heroes? Despite the fifty years of totalitarian régime in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the tampering history, Communist propaganda that destroyed patriotic values, despite the Communists having sentenced them to oblivion, they did earn their rightful place. In the free, democratic countries the honour of each was restored. Gen. Johan Laidoner was again the one who ―degraded the Bolsheviks‖, János Esterházy is not ―Hungarian Fascist‖ and Jan Stanisław Jankowski is not ―illegal Deputy Prime Minister cooperating with Germany.‖ They carry on in the memory of future generations.

NOTES

1 The article was published in Piotrkowskie Zeszyty Historyczne, 10/2009, pp 181–188. It has been recently amended with the latest bibliographic sources. 2 Family ties acquired through his sister‘s husband linked him also to another Polish family, that of The Mycielskys. Górny, G.: A Quarrel over the Count [Spór o hrabiego]In: Przewodnik Katolicki, 5/20055. 3 Molnar, I.: A Betrayed Knight.János Esterházy (1901–1957) [Zdradzony bohater. János Esterházy (1901–1957)]. Fronda, Warsaw, 2004, 184 ff. 4 Darski, J.: Estonia – history, modernity, national conflicts[Estonia: historia, współczesność, konflikty narodowe]. Instytut Polityczny, Warsaw, 1995, pp 18–19. 5 Lewandowski, J.: The History of Estonia [Historia Estonii]. Ossolineum, Wrocław – Warsaw – Kraków, 2002, p. 183. 6 Gen. Laidoner served as Honorary President of the Polish national organisation Estonian–Polish Union (Eesti-Poola Ühing), founded in 1930. He was also laureate of a number of Polish awards, inter alia, the 5th degree Cross of the Order Virtuti Militari, the Order Polonia Restituta and the Grand cross of the Order of White Eagle. Lewandowski, J.: Estonia. Warsaw, 2001, 83 – ff., http://www.esm.ee (15.3.2014). 7 Zubiński, T.: The Sword and Pride of the Republic – General Johan Laidoner [Miecz i duma republiki – Generał Johan Laidoner]. In: Nasz Czas, 2/652 (27– 9 February 2005), p. 9.

8 The Polish Underground State as constitutional formation was unique worldwide. It had its own parliament in form of the Council of National Unity and the government in form of the Representation of the Government for the Country that was structured similarly to the parallel ministry in London, and armed forces – the National Army. The Polish Underground Republic was an organisation that succeeded to bring together most Poles and political fractions in the struggle for independence. The Communists refused to become part of the independent structures and were considered to be Soviet collaborators. See, e.g. Strzembosz, T.: The Underground Republic [Rzeczpospolita podziemna]. Krupski i S-ka,Warsaw, 2000. 9 For more see: Grabowski, W.: The Delegation of the Polish Government in Exile [Delegatura Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Kraj]. Pax, Warsaw, 1995; Polish Secret Civil Administration [Polska tajna administracja cywilna 1940– 1945]. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, Warsaw, 2003; see also: The Polish Underground State: The Civil Structure of the Polish Underground State in the Warsaw Uprising [Państwo polskie wychodzi z podziemi: cywilne struktury Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego w Powstaniu Warszawskim].Warsaw, 2007; Occupied Europe. Similarities and Differences [Okupowana Europa. Podobieństwa i różnice]. ed. Grabowski, W., Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw, 2014. 10 Soviet repressions aimed against the Poles began as early as in mid-July 1944. Arrests began of soldiers from the National Army in Vilnius and Lviv, and subsequently in other Polish regions. Estimated data suggest that, from January 1940 until the end of 1940s some 80 to 95 thousand Poles were deported to the camps (that number has to be amended with the Polish nationals of other than Polish ethnicity). Arrests, internment, sentencing (following the Soviet legislation) and mass deportations were a breach of international law. For many Poles it was the dawn of the era of occupation, then by the Soviets. They had been deported to the control-internment camps, camps for war and interned prisoners and to labour camps. See: Rogut, D.: Poles from Vilnius Region in Soviet Camps. The "Saratov route" (1944–1949) [Polacy z Wileńszczyzny w obozach sowieckich „saratowskiego szlaku‖(1944–1949)]. Toruń, 2003;Poles and Polish Nationals in the Camps of NKWD–MWD USSR 1944–1956 [Polacy i obywatele polscy w obozach NKWD–MWD ZSRR 1944– 1956].In: Rogut, D.–Adamczyk, A. (eds): Soviet Repression Against the Peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, 1944– 1956 [Represje sowieckie wobec narodów Europy Środkowo–Wschodniej1944–1956]. Zelów, 2005, pp 69–97; Rogut, D.: Poles in the Soviet Control and Filtration Camps (1944 –1956) [Polacy w sowieckich obozach kontrolno–filtracyjnych (1944–1946)]. In: Dzieje Najnowsze, 4/2004, pp 85–108; Poles in the Camps for Prisoners of War and Those Interned NKVD–MVD USSR after 1944 [Polacy w obozach dla jeńców wojennych i internowanych NKWD–MWD ZSRR po 1944 r]. In: Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny, 2007, vol. 30, pp 33–60; Army Soldiers Escape from the NKVD–MVD Camp No 178–454 in Ryazan (1945–1946) [Ucieczki żołnierzy Armii Krajowej z obozu NKWD–MWD č. 178–454 w Riazaniu (1945–1946)]. Dzieje Najnowsze, 3/2008, pp 79–93; Poles in the NKVD–MVD control and filter camp No 283 in Stalinogorsk (1945–1947) [Polacy w obozie kontrolno-filtracyjnym č. 283 NKWD–MWD w Stalinogorsku (1945–1947)] In: From Russia to the Middle East. Historical Studies of the Twentieth Century[Od Rosji po Bliski Wschód. Studia historyczne z XX w.], ed. Rogut, D., Instytut Historii PAN, Zelów 2010, pp 175–208; Army Officers Interned in the Soviet POW camp No 150 Griazovets in 1947–1948 [Internowani oficerowie Armii Krajowej w sowieckim obozie jenieckim č. 150 w Griazowcu w latach 1947–1948]. In: Bednarek, J. (ed.): The Soviet System of Camps and Prisons. Examples of Selected Countries[Sowiecki system obozów i więzień. Przykłady wybranych państw]. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Łódź, 2013, pp 75–110. 11 Stypułkowski, Z.: An Invitation to Moscow[Zaproszenie do Moskwy]. Editions Spotkania, Warsawa, 1991, pp 399–402. 12 Sentences against additional Poles: the commander of the National Army gen. L. Okulicki – 10 years in camps, ministers of the Government Delegate: Adam Bień and Stanisław Jasiukowicz 5 years each, Speaker of the underground parliament Kazimierz Pużak 1,5 year, other officials from 4 to 18 months, four acquitted, one sentenced during a separate trial. Gen. Okulicki and S. Jasiukowicz did not survive the Soviet prison Lubyanka. Przemyski, A.: The Last Commander. General Leopold Okulicki [Ostatni Komendant. Generał Leopold Okulicki]. Wydawnictwo Lubelskie,Lublin, 1990; Chmietarz, A.–Kunert, A. K.–Piontek, E.: The Moscow Trial of the Leaders of the Polish Underground State. Rytm, Warsawa, 2000. 13 Molnar, I.: The Epilogue to the Life of János Esterházy. The Effect of the Repression on the Life of a Representative of Political Élite of Central Europe [Epilog życia Jánosa Esterházy‘ego. Wpływ systemu represji na życie przedstawiciela elity politycznej Europy Środkowej]. In: Rogut, D.–Adamczyk, A. (eds.): Repression against the Soviet Societies of Central and Eastern Europe from 1944 to 1956 [Represje sowieckie wobec społeczeństw Europy Środkowo–Wschodniej 1944–1956]. Atena, Zelów, 2005, p. 259. István Bethlen, the then Hungarian Prime Minister was also kept in the Butyrka prison where he died in 1946. 14 Ibid. Today we have a documented fact that it was the NKVD that murdered the officers. It was a strictly political decision made by Stalin and the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKPb] of 5 March 1940. Almost 22 thousand Poles, of whom 15 thousand officers were shot in the head from behind as ―counter-revolutionary elements‖. That represented 45% of the officer corps of the ground forces. It meant the elimination of the command, intellectual and professional élite. It was a mass murder which the Russian Federation doesn‘t confess having committed. Głowacki, A.: The Soviets against Poles in the Lands of the East Second Republic 1939–1941 [Sowieci wobec Polaków na ziemiach Wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej 1939–1941]. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź, 1998, pp 208–210, 260–264; Knorowski, A.: The Paragraphs of Discord [Paragrafy niezgody]. Neriton, Warsaw, 2002, pp 235–241. 15 http: www.laidoner.ee (15.3.2014). 16 Count Esterházy ended up, on 15 August 1946 in the Rakpas camp. It was a typical correctional labour camp. In addition to political prisoners it included criminals who terrorised their fellow inmates. The camp was very diverse also in terms of ethnicities. Apart from the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians and even Chinese, it included the Poles – the soldiers from the National Army. One of them remembered Count Esterházy well. Bolesław Rutkowski, the ―Barret‖ recalled: ―some [Author‘s note: inmates] differed in intellect and high culture, including the Hungarian Count Esterházy (...) – tall, slim man with noble face. He spoke fluent Polish. He worked behind the camp zone in the pottery

guild.‖Rutkowski, B.: [Okruchy wspomnień z wileńskiego ruchu oporu oraz zasłania „na nieludzką ziemię‖]. Towarzystwo Miłośników Wilna i Ziemi Wileńskiej (TMWiZW), Bydgoszcz, 1998, p. 117. 17 Molnar, I.: The Betrayed Hero … [Zdradzony bohater…], op. cit., p. 283.

FERDINAND VRÁBEL

Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava

THE ROLE OF VAVRO ŠROBÁR IN THE PARDON OF JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY (HITHERTO UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS – LETTERS BY ELŻBIETA AND LUJZA ESTERHÁZY TO V. ŠROBÁR OF 2 JUNE 1949)

The lives of Vavro Ńrobár and János Esterházy – these two very dissimilarfigures – shortly crossed paths in 1949, when Esterházy‘s family (his younger sister, Mária Mycielski-Esterházy) approached Ńrobár, in order to obtain pardon for her brother in his capacities as minister. It is intriguing to see how differently the figures of Ńrobár and Esterházy are understood in the discussions of Slovak and Hungarian historians. A major period in Ńrobár‘s political career is viewed positively on the Slovak side– after all, he played a pivotal role in the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he led the first Slovak government in history – the so-called Provisional Government in Skalica, which tried to take over administration in Slovakia from 6 November 1918, with limited resources, and faced immense difficulties in the process. Besides that, Ńrobár was later also appointed Minister of Healthcare by the Central Czechoslovak Government and Minister Plenipotentiary for the Administration of Slovakia, where his most important tasks in the first half-year of 1919 were securing the territory for Czechoslovak authoritiesand organising armed encounters with Hungarian troops – first those affiliated with Károlyi‘s democratic government, and later with troops from Béla Kun‘s Red Army. It was precisely for this period of activity that Ńrobár earned the starkest condemnation and most unfavourable image with Hungarian politicians and journalists, and the image lives on even in the publications of contemporary Hungarian historians. A few lines from the pen of Judit Mayer suffice to illustrate: ―Minister Dr. Vavro Ńrobár – ‗the old man‘, as Mária Esterházy calls him in her diaries – caused a great deal of surprise among those Hungarians who could still recall his activities after the First World War, when Ńrobár was made plenipotentiary by the Czechoslovak government and dealt rather unkindly with Hungarian nationals and Hungarian institutions located on Slovak territories‖.1 Of course, what I lack here is some sort of context for or explanation why Ńrobár acted thus, and most importantly, a reminder that he did not act thus against all Hungarian nationals, but only against those citizens who responded to the new state authorities with hostility. That, however, was their own choice, not Ńrobár‘s. So far, I am not even familiar with an attempt on the part of Hungarian historians to understand Ńrobár‘s background in Hungary (his being expelled from schools, his departure to Bohemia, his return to Ruņomberok and his activities there, his imprisonment long before the war and his internment after May 1, 1918). Ńrobár is flatly seen as an enemy of the Hungarian nation, as a dictator after October 1918, and literally as a ‗devourer of Hungarians‘ (magyarfaló).2 I think that such a one-sided view of Ńrobár is partial and to a certain degree unjust; after all, Ńrobár characterised his position on the Hungarian trauma in Trianon by saying that ―Trianon is a work of historical justice. Every nation possesses the right to rule itself. We Slovaks acknowledge the Hungarians‘ right to do so, and soon Hungarians will also acknowledge ours‖.3 Once again, Ńrobár cannot be held responsible for the fact that this did not happen. All Hungarian and a portion of Czech and Slovak historians also generally portray the final stretchof Ńrobár‘s activity between 1944 and 1950 in a negative light. In the first instance, this covers his taking part in the Slovak National Uprising, and later his share in oppressingthe Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, first as President of the Slovak National Council (which had two Presidents, the second being Karol Ńmidke) and later as Finance Minister under the government of Zdeněk Fierlinger (1945– 1946). Another circumstance that counts against Ńrobár after February 1948 isthat he was appointed Minister for Legal Unification under Gottwald‘s reconstructed government (1948–1950).

Perhaps a more accurate picture of Ńrobár‘s personality can be gleaned from the following extract from one of his pre-coup articles, titled ‗The Book‘: ―Man‘s life flows like the wave of a river: once rising, once descending. It emerges and disappears. The upward motion of the wave could stand for our successes and joys, its descent for our sufferings, losses and grief. Everyone says there is much more grief than joy. Often we feel in such desperate straits that we would rather not live our lives at all. Then we think that all the misfortunes in the world have come to swarm us and that we must perish under their attacks. But there are other moments in which man suddenly desires something higher, nobler, exalted; he feels that his spirit desires nourishment other than the everyday, but one of a different sort, new, better than mundane life could provide. And fortunate is the man who experiences such moments and is able to attain true spiritual fulfilment in such rare episodes!‖4 The figure of János Esterházy, on the other hand, is viewed very differently above all in Hungarian but also in Slovak historiography. While Hungarian historiography (excepting that of the older partisankind5) mainly surveys Esterházy‘s activities connected with protecting Hungarian minority rights in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia,6 some Czech and Slovak historians are interested primarily in understanding Esterházy‘s share in bringing about the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and his activities as Member of Parliament in the Slovak Diet.7 The general problematic was summarised from the Slovak point of view by Pavel Martinický in 2001.8 In the mentioned period, János Esterházy was something like Ńrobár‘s counter-pole. Whether as a member of his class or as a Hungarian national, Esterházy could not have regarded Czechoslovakia as a turn for the better; to the contrary, he staunchly opposed this ‗unnatural state‘ and ‗freak of nature‘, which he thought had no right to exist, from the very beginning.9 Esterházy was an advocate of the right to self- determination for the Hungarian minority, but by maintaining this position he in effect denied the very same right to Czechs and Slovaks. Presumably, he did not think it excessiveor partial. I do not intend to repeat here some of his more biting statements from the Slovak Diet, because they are well known and because they are not the topic of the present contribution. It is entirely legitimate that Esterházy‘s political activities were directed at overturning the situation that took shape in Central Europe after the First World War, and because Ńrobár was, to the contrary, interested in petrifying this situation, they were bound to be political opponents during the First Czechoslovak Republic. But they remained political opponents even during the period of the wartime Slovak Republic, because while Ńrobár stayed in retreat and later joined the illegal resistance movement (which intensified especially after the signature of the Christmas Agreement and the creation of the Slovak National Council in 1943), Esterházy, as a member of the Slovak Diet, was very much part of the establishment of the ‗parish republic‘, to put it in the words of writer Dominik Tatarka. As Hungarian expert in the area József Kiss notes in an unpublished manuscript to which I have access, we have no proof that Ńrobár and Esterházy met personally or were involved in direct political confrontation, either in the inter-war or post-war period.10 The trajectories of Ńrobár and Esterházy only intersected at one point, in April–May of 1949, when Soviet authorities delivered Esterházy to Slovakia and when he faced the prospect of execution,to which he had been sentenced by the National Court in Bratislava in 1947. At that moment – according to several witnesses, and according to two documents which I will introduce shortly – Ńrobár was involved in shapingEsterházy‘s fate. It is unclear whose initiative brought János Esterházy back to Czechoslovakia. While some authors claim he was extradited by Czechoslovak authorities in order to carry out the death sentence, his elder sister Lujza Esterházy personally demanded Czechoslovak authorities to request Esterházy‘s delivery from the Soviet Union so that he may defend himself in court. In her memoirs, she also describes her visit to then Deputy of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Vladimír Clementis, at the Piazza-Athénée Hotel in Paris in February 1947, when she interceded on Esterházy‘s behalf at the authorities. Clementis is reported to have said that ―We are not interested in the case of János Esterházy at all!‖ He also added that Esterházy would never come back from the Soviet Union, because the Czechoslovak government would not request his return.11 According to the recollections of Catholic priest Karol Körper-Zrínsky (1894–1969), the issue of

Esterházy‘s return to Czechoslovakia was even stepped in by the Soviet dictator Stalin, through the intercession of Hungarian communist Árpád Szakasits.12 In a book of documents published by Imre Molnár for the year 1949, he notes: ―Soviet authorities will deliver him [i.e. Esterházy] to Czechoslovak authorities for execution of judgment‖.13 The same source mentions the matter of his pardon: ―At the intercession of his family and friends, the President of the Republic will suspend the execution of his death sentence and, ex gratia, change his penalty to life imprisonment‖.14 Not a single mention is made of Ńrobár and his intervention. According the diaries of Mária Mycielski-Esterházy, Esterházy‘s family members learned of his return (in late April 1949) to Czechoslovakia on 2 May 1949.15 The news were brought by Franek (Franciszek Mycielski), the husband of Esterházy‘s younger sister Mária. He, in turn, was told of Esterházy‘s return from the Soviet Union by Emil Prisender16 at 1 a.m. in the Carlton Hotel, where Mycielski spent the night before a planned journey to Krakow, cancelled upon receiving the news. E. Prisender and F. Mycielski visited Esterházy on the next day, May 2, in prison in Bratislava‘s Palace of Justice, and Mycielski then set off for Újlak, in order to inform his family of Esterházy‘s arrival.17 On the night between May 2 and 3, Prisender and Mária Mycielski travelled to Prague. On the same day, they met with Minister Ńrobár, who promised he would help and talk it over ‗with the government‘. The hopes are very slim, Mycielski then noted down, that the matter will succeed. But at five o‘clock in the afternoon (a few lines further down, Mycielski writes that already at half past four), they received a phone call from Ńrobár: He was pardoned! Mycielski noted down the words which Ńrobár spoke to Emil Prisender over the phone: ―All is well, tell the lady that her family will not be disgraced, she can go home‖.18 It is uncertain when the family actually learnt of the grant of pardon, because Mycielski only made a record of the matter on May 6, 1950. Lujza Esterházy recalls in her memoirs that she received a telegram from ‗Mariska‘ on May 10, 1949, which read as follows: ―János was sent back to Czechoslovakia. He is in the Justice Palace prison in Bratislava. Ferenc has already met him. He is not in danger‖.19 Mária Mycielski–Esterházy described the events to her elder sister – Esterházy‘s return, Franciszek Mycielski‘s and Emil Prisender‘s visit to the Palace of Justice in Bratislava, the trip to Prague and the visit to Minister Ńrobár – in greater detail in a letter which Lujza received some days later. There are significant variances between the descriptions of the visit to Ńrobár that were written down by Lujza Esterházy and Mária Mycielski–Esterházy, but that is not the concern of this study. These could be inaccuracies that crept in over time, or they are simply proofs of the unreliability of human memory. Karol Körper-Zrínsky writes the following of Esterházy‘s pardon in his memoirs: ―In the meantime, Esterházy‘s sister Lujza, who had settled in Paris, did all she could in order to obtain him back. Help was given by the leader of the Hungarian communist party, Szakasits, whom Esterházy once hid in his house in Budapest, during the White Terror. The former interceded at Stalin. Then an order came to deliver the prisoner back to Slovakia. Esterházy had already spent four years in Siberia and he was physically bottomed out. But an order is an order, especially when it comes from Moscow. The dear ‗patient‘ was immediately taken out of the mine, fed and treated. It took more than a month until he could travel. His unfortunate companions bid him a jealous farewell. He promised them help. ‗It pains me, I regret,‘ he told me ‗that I could do nothing for them. They will die there.‘ When he reached Moscow, he was so exhausted from the way that it took another month until he was prepared for transport to Slovakia. Finally, he arrived in Bratislava, with severe tuberculosis. They treated him here at the infection ward. He had been sentenced to death in Bratislava; he did not know why. He was not a friend to Slovaks, because the latter were angry with the Hungarians for mutilating the country. But he was neither a friend to Germans, although he collaborated with them, like everyone else in Slovakia: he breathed the same air. But the gallows awaited him. Because of Stalin‘s intervention, they changed his sentence, as a favour,from a death penalty to lifelong death‖.20 According to records from the Archive of the President‘s Office in Prague,21 the pardon was only formally completed in March–April of 1950, meaning almost a year after Mária Mycielski–Esterházy and Emil Prisender paid a visit to Minister Ńrobár. An account of the Esterházy‘s and their family friend‘s Dr. Emil Prisender‘s visit is provided by Lujza Esterházy in her famous memoirs. She adds, quoting an unknown source, that Ńrobár attended a

92 government meeting that day, where he is supposed to have said the following: ―If János Esterházy is executed, it will be a case of murder; he was sentenced to death without the possibility of defence, the accusations raised against him are false. Do you want to witness the murder of a man whom we all know to have been the only among 63 Members of Parliament who did not vote for the Jewish law in 1941, who helped Czechs flee from Germans through Hungary? That would be a sin. So let us all support the request sent by the defendant‘s sister to the President‖.22 This report is interestingly supplemented by letters sent by Esterházy‘s mother, Countess Elżbieta Tarnowski–Esterházy, and his elder sister Lujza Esterházy to Vavro Ńrobár from French exile. The letters are dated 2 June 1949, and both ladies wrote them in Montrésore, in the department of Indre-et-Loire.

ADDENDA Because these documents have been unknown among Ńrobár‘s correspondence until now, I reproduce them here in full, in their original spelling.

Letters to Minister Vavro Šrobár to Trenčianske Teplice by the mother (Elżbieta) and sister (Louise) of János Esterházy from 2 June 1949.23

DOCUMENT 1 – LETTER BY MOTHER ELŻBIETA ESTERHÁZY TO MINISTER VAVRO ŃROBÁR: Montrésor (Indre et Loire) 2. VI. 1949

Your Excellency, dear Mr Minister! Do not be angry with me that I write You in such an informal manner, but please forgive me – I cannot do otherwise after all that You have done for my son and for us all. May God Almighty bless You, dear Mr Minister, and Your dear family – may he give You his greatest and best graces and gifts – may he help You in Your whole life, and save You from everything difficult and grievous. Dear Mr Minister, I cannot find words of thanks – so deeply am I moved by Your goodness and generosity, that You have saved my son‘s life twice – once in Prague, and another time now, when he is in that excellent hospital thanks to you. I cannot do anything else but pray for You, dear Mr Minister, and for your entire dear family as our helpers – may God be gracious for all the good that You have done and repay you with his blessing. Please accept, Mr Minister, along with Your dear Mrs, my most sincere salutations and also most heartfelt thanks. I regret that we do not know each other and hope that we will meet one another. I regret that we, my daughter Lujza and I, cannot thank You in person, and please be assured of our most sincere gratitude. Lujza will write you on her own, and I ask You dear Mr Minister to be so kind and convey my regards to Your Berta, Your dear, kind daughter whom I have seen once or twice at the dear Emils, and also her husband whom we have met there several times; and also Your dear grandson – whose name I cannot recall now – but I congratulate You on that adorableand smartboy, may God grant him all the best in life, that he may always be the joy of his Grandparents and parents. Elņbeta Esterházy

P. S. We have also sent thanks by telegraph to Mr President Gottwald for his great favour!

DOCUMENT 2 – LETTER BY THE SISTER OF ESTERHÁZY, LOUISE ESTERHÁZY, TO MINISTER VAVRO ŃROBÁR: Montrésor, Indre et Loire, France, Chez Madame Braniere (?) June 2, 1949

Your Excellency, Dear Minister, Kindly allow me to join most sincerely the letter of my mother, because I too feel inexpressible gratitude towards You, for all that You have done to save my brother. The greatness of Your compassionate goodness fills me with emotionand admiration, and I am happy to be given the opportunity to know the whole loftiness of Your feelingin my own experience. From the day I have learnt of your interventions to rescue my brother, You have become for me as unto a personification of the heart of Your nation, which I have loved long and which I will love even more now, because it gave me the life of my brother. I would be unspeakably happy if I could tell You in person of all that I feel for You, but unfortunately this is not possible, and so I only return to dear Slovakia to You Mr Minister in my thoughts, in order to express my gratitude for all that You have done to save the life of my brother and to gladden the woebegone heart of our poor Mother, who is now filled with joyous hope and bliss thanks to You. For the unexpected act of charity, I ask You Mr Minister to accept for Yourself, for Your Mrs and for all whom You love, my heartfelt, warmestwishes that good God may bless You in everything and at every time Yours forever grateful, Louise Esterházy

NOTES

Mayer, Judit: Epilogue. Forgotten Years... [Utószó. Elfelejtett évek...]In: Molnár, Imre (ed.): Pardon for Life. Documentson the History of the Suffering of János Esterházy Based on the Notes of Mária Mycielski–Esterházy[Kegyelem életfogytig. Esterházy János szenvedéstörténetének dokumentumai Mycielskiné Esterházy Mária feljegyzései alapján]. Budapest, METEM, 2008, pp 167–170, 169. 2 The words of Gyula Popély 3 Deák, Ladislav (et al.): Contemporaries on Trianon [Súčasníci o Trianone]. Bratislava, Kubko Goral, 1996, p. 4. 4 Ńrobár, Vavro: The Book. Our Flag [Kniha. Nańa zástava], year II, 1910, i. 1, Collected in: Ńrobár, Vavro: A Struggle for New Life [Boj o nový ņivot]. Ruņomberok, self-published, 1920, p. 230. 5 For instance, Gy. Ránki, L. Tilkovszki. 6 For instance, I. Képessy, Gy. Sallai, A. Simon, I. Molnár, etc. 7 As examples, I could cite L. Deák, I. Kamenec or J. Valenta. 8 Martinický, Pavel: Celebration of the Centenary of János Esterházy in Budapest [Oslava 100. výročia narodenia Jánosa Esterházyho v Budapeńti]. In: Historic and National Conscience of Slovak Intelligentsia. International Conference, Nitra, 29 June 2001, Conference-related volume [Historické a národné povedomie inteligencie Slovenska. Medzinárodná konferencia, Nitra, 29. júna 2001. Zborník príspevkov].Nitra, Dom Matice slovenskej, 2001, pp 132–138. 9 On how the Esterházy family perceived the end of the First World War, the establishment of Czechoslovakia and integration of Slovakia, see the memoirs of Lujza Esterházy. Esterházy, Lujza: Hearts against the Tide. Collision of Peoples. Central European Experiences [Szívek az ár ellen, Népek ütközése. Közép-európai tapasztalatok]. Budapest, Püski, 1991, pp 36–44, 47–49. 10 Kiss, József: Vavro Ńrobár and the Hungarians after 1945 [Vavro Ńrobár a Maćari po roku 1945]. Undated manuscript from 2011–2013. For giving me to access the manuscript, I thank the Institute of Political Science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, for whom Kiss prepared but never completed the material. 11 Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., p. 200. 12 Szakasits Árpád (1888–1965), Hungarian journalist, member of the social democratic (communist) workers‘ movement, representative of the Hungarian Bolshevik government, in 1919 head of department at the Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Hungarian Republic of Councils and commander of the III. Army, after the Second World War the second Hungarian president, later served in other offices; he was not the president of the Hungarian communist party, contrary to what Körper writes. Another dubious claim of Körper‘s is that Szakasits could intercede for Esterházy at Stalin himself, but could not protect his younger brother Antal from fabricated allegations in the 1950s. Körper-Zrínsky, Karol: My Life [Môj ņivot]. Bratislava, Lúč, 1993, pp 228–229. 13 Molnár, Imre (ed.): Kegyelem..., op. cit., p. 146.

14 Ibid. 15 Molnár, Imre (ed.): Kegyelem..., op. cit., p. 29. 16 Lujza Esterházy spells his surname ‗Priesender‘. Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., p. 213. 17 Molnár, Imre (ed.): Kegyelem..., op. cit., pp 30–31. 18 Ibid., pp 31–35. 19 Molnár, Imre (ed.): Kegyelem..., op. cit., p. 35, Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., p. 214. 20 Körper-Zrínsky, Karol: Môj..., op. cit., pp 228–229. 21 The file on J. Esterházy‘s pardon is marked Č. j. T 2442/56, Archive of the Office of the President of the Republic, Prague. The Minister‘s proposal is numbered: 86.021/1949-III/4. 22 Esterházy, Lujza: Szívek..., op. cit., pp 214–215. This testimony of Lujza Esterházy contains two errors: for one thing, the law which Esterházy did not vote for was not from 1941, but 1942. Lujza Esterházy also has an incorrect dating on pp 121–122. 23 Both letters are kept in the Literary Archive of the Slovak National Library in Martin, signature 173B8.

DISCUSSION

ONDREJ PODOLEC Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law Nation‘s Memory Institute, Bratislava

Regarding the Esterházy´s anti-Semitism, in my contribution I only quoted his own statement. The discussion should not be led only about the vote on the constitutional law on expulsion of Jews. There were further anti-Jewish norms, in support of which he voted and verbally supported. Concerning the remark that his criticism of the régime was interpreted even more broadly: I do not deprive anyone of the license to interpret wider his speeches, but in his address to the parliament he always associated it exclusively with the issue of Hungarian minority. When it comes to Pieńťany, he expressly said that, if taken from the Jewish tenant, then it is OK (and thus approves the exclusion of Jews from economic life), but denounces the fact that property was taken from Erdődy.

TOMASZ CHŁOŃ Polish Ambassador in Bratislava

I admit that, before I decided to attend this conference, I had a conversation, in which I was recommended that it would be better, if I do not participate. I replied that it was nonsense. The role of diplomacy is not to have conversations on the beauties of Lake Balaton, the Tatra Mountains or Mazury Lakes, but much more to talk about difficult topics. My presence here is important not only from the post of an Ambassador, but – in terms of my academic background – also from the post of an expert on Hungarian studies. I remember that, at the University, despite the open atmosphere, in the 1980s the person of Esterházy, along with many others – using the words of Frantińek Miklońko – was a taboo. When we hear the name Esterházy we tend to think about the writer, Peter Esterházy, the acceptance of whom was also not easy. I do not know, if, at the end of the conference – as was pointed out by Professor Csaba Gy. Kiss –we get from the motto ―My hero, your enemy‖ to ―My hero, your friend‖. Through it all I find it natural that there are such historical figures who are perceived differently even within a single nation. Therefore, it is first necessary to have bilateral exchange of views in order to understand the arguments of the other party. Csaba Kiss talked about Visegrad identification. I consider it important that this identification grows and develops in the countries of the region. To do this, it is essential that we talk openly about our common history. As an example looking into the future, let me mention the Polish–German exploration of the common Polish–German history, the buffer zones of the two nations, which are being addressed by the common work by German and Polish historians and are expected to be published in 2014. Is it conceivable for similar project appearing here in the Hungarian–Slovak version? Thank you!

IMRE LEBOVITS Holocaust survivor, Budapest

I am a retired Associate Professor at the Technical University in Budapest. I am Holocaust survivor, having survived ―the final solution‖ under Horthy‘s political system. I speak right at the outset, because I really missed at these proceedings even a word that, after the intervention of the deputy Margita Slachta, Pope Pius XII ordered to seven Slovak bishops to end deportations, not to deport the 20 thousand Jews, who were still living in Slovakia. There was no word about this. Naturally, it can be argued whether Count Esterházy was an antisemite or not. As a Jew I know exactly that they do not adore us in the world, don‘t like us. And I think that the phrase heard from the Count Esterházy: “Our symbol is the cross, not the swastika―, illustrates his standpoint. In contrast, your President – at the unveiling of one statue of Esterházy – said that Count Esterházy was a supporter of Hitler and a Fascist. In my opinion this is not true. I then wrote a letter to President Ivan Gańparovič, to which I received a reply from the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. I am not going to deal with what they claimed, what they refuted, what is the truth. There is one thing I can say: Count Esterházy rescued Jews. This is clearly confirmed by a letter of Moshe Bejszky, the Chairman of the Righteous Among Nations, as well as letter by Simon Wiesenthal. In addition to those, whom he personally rescued, approximately 8–10 thousand Slovak Jews could flee to Hungary, as he received support from the Minister of Interior, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer. Unfortunately, when in 1944 the regent Miklós Horthy gave free reign to the Prime Minister Döme Sztojay in solving the Jewish issue, their fate, too, was sealed. In the course of six weeks Hungarian countryside was stripped of Jews. Once again I would revisit the issue whether Count Esterházy was an antisemite. So what! Let me give a few examples, when such people rescued Jews nevertheless. Schindler was a member of the Nazi party and saved 1,200 Jews. Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was a defender of race and, after 1942, he called upon the Parliament to withdraw the anti-Jewish laws. I think that Count János Esterházy was such a humanist that, according to Christian faith, he felt obliged to rescue Jews. One Slovak Jew living in Israel testified on 1 November 2000 at Yad Vashem on how János Esterházy saved his entire family. There are more similar cases. I would not wish to exaggerate this issue; it is not a Jewish issue, but an issue of humanity. Even in Hungary, looking at the past is rather incomplete. Yet based on what has been said, I have a feeling that also here there is some work to do. Do excuse me, if I was too strict. Finally, I would like to say that the reason why I approached President Gańparovič was that it would be good to consider – with regard to János Esterházy, whom they rehabilitated even in the Soviet Union – the Slovak state being generous and taking the necessary steps. As an example I would mention that during the Fascist government they did not deport the Minister of Interior Alexander Mach, did not sell him to the Soviets. He only spent several years in prison and died in bed, although he organised deportations of 80 thousand Jews to the Nazi Germany – the Slovak government even paid to them for it. Let the Slovak government be human. Let Count János Esterházy finally rest in peace. This is a recommendation from one Jew to you. Thank you.

ARKADIUSZ ADAMCZYK The Jan Kochanowsky University, Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland

Let me add yet another aspect to the note by Professor Podolec, whether Esterházy was an antisemite or not. Such contradictions do not apply only to the Hungarian and Slovak history. In Poland there are countless similar figures who made antisemitic statements between the two wars. Just to mention one familiar name, Father Maximilian Kolbe. Such a figure was, for example, his father Francis. Moreover, Maximilian Kolbe said in 1936 that a crime committed against Jews is not a sin. In every human life the time of test arrives when it comes to light what is hidden behind the spoken word and what are the actual deeds. Today nobody remembers the statement made by Father Kolbe in 1936, which he also noted in his notebook. What history will remember is that, when the time for test came in Auschwitz, he shared his bread with his Jewish inmate and offered his life for the life of another inmate. The claims made by Professors Podolec and Mitac that János Esterházy was an equal participant in breaking Czechoslovakia along with Germany, Italy, Poland, is based on grave misunderstanding. This period was the time of tests, many small states and their leaders were desperately trying to save autonomy and independence of their country. Others have also tried desperately to establish their own independent state, while yet others had sought to promote and protect from the large and powerful countries. The main error was that they did not take seriously international treaties that were in effect at that time. For example, no one took into account Wilson‘s self-government principles calling for the rights of ethnic territories to decide where they would belong, as was guaranteed by international treaties. We look for errors in public figures, their downsides, even if they were mere victims of the time. It is not them whom to start to dissect, but the period, which produced such conditions that such convoluted, intertwined historical events could arise making people stand against each other and affect the course of history.

LÁSZLÓ SZARKA

Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest The J. Selye University, Komárno

Let me respond to the question about the relationships between Esterházy and the Vienna Award or revisionism. Revisionism and Hungarian foreign doctrine were based on three principles. One was the sequence and achieving the utmost in the interest of returning the territory within the context of available possibilities. In the first round the ethnic revision, in the second the return of historic territories through plebiscite or other form, and in the third revision of integration with the nations that in the meantime have grown into a nation, would be given broad autonomy within Hungary. This doctrine was mere utopia, since in the region the German will ruled from 1933. In Kiel in August 1938 the Hitlerite Germany offered Miklós Horthy and Hungary the whole Slovakia and the sub- Carpathian region under the proviso that Hungary would be the first to invade Czechoslovakia. Horthy and his Chief of Staff Rudolf Andorka, did not accept this proposal in 1938. The Hungarian revisionist doctrine also stated that the revisions should, where possible, proceed peacefully. Hungary tried to win the support of superpowers, addressed in most unfortunate manner in an addendum to the Munich Agreement. Here the role of János Esterházy is merely an episodic one of someone working just in the opposite logic to that which actually guided the world. He did not desire ethnic revision, but, based on the Hungarian–Slovak settlement, he wished for a return of Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary. For him, what happened, was a loss. This is what he frequently spoke about, especially in front of Polish diplomacy. He said that the Hungarian diplomacy played a negative role in that it was unable to offer such a proposal to the Slovak side, not to negotiate with Prague, but instead with Budapest. From this perspective I think we are victims of fatal judgement that sentenced Esterházy to death as war criminal. Once we are going to assess the role of Esterházy truly on sources, and not on the basis of the 1947 ruling of the National Court, we find a way to start a meaningful dialogue to resolve this issue. Similarly, in matters related to his role in the Jewish issue: meaningful dialogue can be expected when we start with Yad Vashem. No one in considering this issue would be under pressure that it has to do with a person considered a war criminal. We can say that historians now have enough time, because no change can be expected any time soon. Thus they can dedicate their time to explore archival sources. Hungarian historians are currently unwilling to take János Esterházy as war criminal: they take him as an active politician. Their Slovak colleagues cannot afford this, because in Slovakia they must present this with logic of war crimes, as this is the valid legal opinion of the state. I would like to stress again that this debate is not as barren as it looks. Such debate is continuous, and there are colleagues both in Hungarian and in the Slovak historiography, who have already gotten closer to each other on several issues. And yet there are those, who are still going further apart. We must not succumb to the conclusion that Slovaks and Hungarians would never come to an agreement on this issue. Symbolic roles taken up by Mr Miklońko, but also others, are very important, because they encourage public opinion towards dialogue and debate.

100

IMRE MOLNÁR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest

Allow me to thank my colleagues, Slovak historians that they came to this conference even though Professor Podolec opened his lecture by saying that János Esterházy does not belong to the mainstream of Slovak historiography. These positions have not only expressed markedly Slovak opinion, but we also heard a large number of positive opinions with respect to János Esterházy, which the Slovak side has not yet widely accepted. For example, his role as a mediator in the interest of Slovaks living in Hungary. When Prof. Podolec analysed Esterházy‘s addresses given to the Parliament when, as he suggests, Esterházy spoke solely in the interest of Hungarians living in Slovakia to protect their rights, then, on the part of the Slovaks it can be understood that he was a deputy of Hungarians in Slovakia. Yet when we realise that the issues he addressed included criticism of Slovak concentration camps and the fact that they were ever set up, where ―innocent, anyone could be imprisoned‖,that a cult of personality would be formed along with all the consequences, that a Ministry of Propaganda would be established, that social classes would be erased to give way to racial division, did these issues affect Hungarians only? Were it only the Hungarians to end up in concentration camps? First, Esterházy often responded to the functioning of Slovak society and legislature so that he encapsulated it into a Hungarian issue. For example, in connection with the Hlinka Guard he said: ―the exploits that deeply offend the Hungarians and threaten their health and property, alas mostly happen under the cover of the Hlinka Guard. In any case it cannot be the mission of the Guard that some of its members threw stones into the windows of unsuspecting sleeping people at night. I would like to believe that such symptoms are merely temporary and sober politics prevail‖.This is what he then said about the Hlinka Guard, during the pogrom on Jews. Who wanted to, could understand what János Esterházy wanted to say; who did not want to understand, did not understand. Second, Esterházy is considered in Slovakia to be a representative of Nazism. That overlooks what Imre Lebovits said in connection with the cross and swastika: how many times he publicly distanced himself from National Socialism, from its ideas. It didn‘t even appear in the Minutes from Pieńťany, whilst the owner was actually the Erdődy family, the property was confiscated from a Jewish tenant, Mr Winter. I certainly know this, he was originally from Ńahy, my home region. The following also comes from Esterházy: ―Unjustly they confiscate possessions of people, illegally and unjustly!‖Through one example he highlights a general phenomenon. Even if these aspects would fit into the research within Slovak historiography, we may have reached our goal. It is not our objective to arrive at a common platform, but at least to find such points that unite us. I do not believe that we would be unable to find ones that acceptable by both Hungarian and Slovak side.

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ROUND TABLE

Moderator: Zoltán Zilizi

Participants:

CSP: Pál Csáky (politician, writer, Bratislava) KI: István Kollai (Hungarian Institute in Bratislava) LI: Imre Lebovits (Holocaust survivor, Budapest) MH: Martin Hetényi (University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra) MI: Imre Molnár (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest) OP: Ondrej Podolec (Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law and Nation‘s Memory Institute, Bratislava) VJ: Viliam Jablonický (SC PEN, Bratislava)

ZZ: I welcome the participants of this round table, thank you for accepting the invitation! In his introductory greeting Professor Csaba Gy. Kiss quoted István Széchenyi: “Patience is born of patience.”I use the same as the leitmotif for this Round Table. Let this debate take place in a patient, friendly atmosphere, willing to mutually accept different views. Nation is a community of memory. I would like us to start by outlining, briefly summarising the role played by János Esterházy in Hungarian national identity. MI: I do not know what role János Esterházy plays in Hungarian national identity, since he was silenced even in Hungary, he was removed from Hungarian history and historiography. It wasn‘t until the system change that his name was allowed to be mentioned, it was possible to rediscover his role, the details of his political career. Yet I would try to summarise in three points the role that Esterházy has in Hungarian identity in Slovakia. All three are linked to his political activity. First, Magyars in Slovakia, strengthened by his mission, political activity, saw the mediation activity which Esterházy emphasized by himself in Slovak and Hungarian politics, Slovak–Hungarian understanding. During his life, the Hungarians in Slovakia received plenty of feedback on the implementation of this task. Second, there is a struggle for justice. In the fight for minority rights there can be a career option, such political role model, which can be looked up to. János Esterházy can be the role model. He never claimed that his achievements of a minority politician would mean the final status. On the contrary, with the leader of Slovaks in Hungary, Emanuel Böhm, he engaged in controversy, when Böhm lamented the situation of Slovaks in Hungary. Esterházy responded that minority politicisation required continuous struggle. Results cannot be achieved overnight, hence it is all the more necessary to continue the relentless struggle. In minority politics one ought to demonstrate perseverance even when results are not visible. Throughout his life Esterházy strengthened Hungarian identity in Slovakia. The third point concerns fidelity to homeland. Esterházy had an opportunity to leave his homeland three times, to choose an easier path, to flee the country, to opt for a better fate. Nonetheless, choosing the hard way, he was able to strengthen the most important point of Hungarian identity in Slovakia: loyalty to homeland and the nation, and loyalty to the role our Creator has given us. ZZ: In Hungarian historical memory Esterházy has a different place than in Slovakia. OP: Regarding the view of János Esterházy: in terms of Slovak historiography it is a marginal topic and far from being seen with such emotions as on the Hungarian side. Especially in recent years, Slovak historiography only reacts to the stimuli from the Hungarian side. In terms of Slovak politics, it was a minority politician outside the mainstream. If you ask on the street, who was János Esterházy (especially in the Northern regions of Slovakia), perhaps 10% of people – and I was maybe too optimistic – would know who it was. He left a mark in historical consciousness as a living symbol of the Vienna Award mainly as it was him, who welcomed the Regent Horthy in Końice. Even in the interwar period he was seen as a representative of the irredentist policy. Minority politics can also be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand, it may be a legitimate fight for minority rights in the existing state. Yet on the other hand it is a little different view, if someone sets as his goal eradication of state, in which he operates as minority politician. Between 1939 and 1945, in a

102 special political arena of an independent Slovak state, Esterházy enjoyed certain respect as the undisputed representative of Hungarian minority. It is not easy to say how J. Esterházy is seen in historical consciousness – the picture is not black and white. Apparently, Hungarian national identity and regional identity have been mixing with the attachment to hereditary land that belonged to the noble ancestry. MH: Let me respond to Ondrej Podolec and add some information. Slovak historiography used in relation to János Esterházy offers several postulates. At the outset I shall say that, if Slovak historiography in the perception of the first Czechoslovak Republic, as well as the first Slovak Republic is not united, on the issue of János Esterházy, paradoxically, it is able to unite in principle. Slovak historiography works with a certain set of sources, in which János Esterházy acts primarily as a symbol of breaking the Republic and partly also as a symbol of the Vienna Award. On arbitration it can be added that, in the minds of Slovak society, the Vienna Award maybe does not resonate so much, but rather the events that happened on the territory after the arbitration. Slovak historiography claims that János Esterházy collaborated with the ruling powers in Budapest and their intelligence, by sharing confidential information even of military nature. In his own words he was in opposition to a democratic system, to democracy, thus he participated in curtailing democracy. Some works suggest that he had a negative attitude to the ideology of National Socialism. If we compare, for example, the Deutsche Partei or its leader, Franz Karmasin with Esterházy or if we internally look at the structure of the Hungarian party in Slovakia, we could certainly prove it. On the other hand, historians, such as Ivan Kamenec or Michal Schvarc, accentuate his contribution to the deepening of totalitarian régimes. A characteristic postulate is also a vote for anti-democratic laws, and several anti-Jewish norms. This means that it was also in word that he supported antisemitic policy of the government. Certain historians accuse him that it was an alibi on his part when he publicly refused to vote for the constitutional law on expulsion of Jews. There are also claims that, in defending the rights of the Hungarian minority, Esterházy proceeded with ―pragmatic cynicism.‖ Such discussion can only be welcomed. As Prof. Szarka said, soon there could appear an edition of sources, perhaps also new documents that would move research and interpretation of János Esterházy further. By finding new documents that can refute traditional allegations of Slovak historiography, it is important for each historian to engage in self-reflexion. MI: In connection with Esterházy there is often a question of agent, in a sense of him being allegedly an agent of the Hungarian government. László Szarka pointed out that a regulation of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in the interim war period. It directed Hungarian Embassies that, in relation to persons belonging to minorities, with whom they were in contact with, they should assign code names for reporting purposes, and not to use their real names to prevent them from being detected by the enemy. And, vice versa, also left letters, reports and orders were sent from Hungary with code names. Thus, the fact that someone had a code name used in the diplomatic file didn‘t mean that he was an agent. Bohumil Doleņal in Prague wrote in one of his related articles that, in order to be able to call someone an agent, it is necessary to have the dossier about recruiting him as an agent, with the signature and other related evidence, for example, agent file, or related remuneration. In case of János Esterházy there is no such evidence. ZZ: Turning to Mr Podolec, a couple of years ago the Nation’s Memory Institute hosted a discussion about János Esterházy with the participation of Messrs Deák, Vrábel, Mikloško, but the Hungarian expert was not present. What was the purpose of this meeting or what was its outcome? OP: Always there was an effort to reach the widest possible range of views,and whether this was always technically achieved (and met with the willingness of those contacted), that is a different question. We held several discussions on the Vienna Award, which were attended, for example, by Attila Simon. I do not remember full details. ZZ: Mr Kollai, the publication Split history [Meghasadt múlt] published by the Terra Recognita foundation tried to send towards the Slovak society certain Hungarian opinion on the contentious points of Hungarian–Slovak common past. To what extent is the present Slovak public opinion open to a Hungarian view that is different from the established perspective? KI: There have been several projects or initiatives since under the Hungarian Institute, where we tried and are still trying to include the Slovak side either as partners or audience. There is an active group interested in history in general and this is perhaps interested in Hungarian view. To what extent they accept it, it is difficult to say, but we certainly cannot speak about ground-breaking success. A concern or rather a challenge is to extend the range of stakeholders. I think it is difficult to achieve this in 21st century, the century of globalisation, when masses speak and proclaim that they are not interested in history, but they have an opinion on it. Thus it is quite difficult to reach those people, whether high school

103 or university students, who have some opinion on historical actions of Hungarians, but they do not care enough to engage in a deeper discussion, common thinking. Not necessarily because of the rejection of Hungarians, but simply because of the lack of internal interest. It is this interest we are trying to awaken, which, of course can take several forms. Our publications, as we hope, can also help or that we reach the largest possible audience. Much depends on the format we choose, or whether we come across a friendly community. Perhaps the most fruitful idea is to move in the circles of university students, future history teachers. I will return to that part of the question, to what extent they are open: listening to the other side is not the same as accepting its opinion, and this is difficult, so to say, a test. For me, however, that is also an achievement, if we manage to make them aware of our opinion. ZZ: More specifically: is it possible to lead a meaningful dialogue between Hungarians and Slovaks on Hungarian revisionist efforts between the two wars? KI: I believe so, if a meaningful dialogue means that we can pass central ideas of Hungarian historical consciousness to Slovaks. For example, such is the question of the ethnic boundaries. Several similar ideas have been ingrained in Slovak historiography and historical consciousness during writing history textbooks, which I think deserve criticism and a response from Hungarian side. One of them is, for example, that a fair demarcation of boundaries was not possible, or that the ethnic boundaries were blurred. Yet even data from the Czechoslovak census show that the ethno–linguistic boundaries between Hungarians and Slovaks were relatively unambiguous. We try to present publicly ethnic maps related to this issue in the aforementioned book and on online fora. Until recently such maps weren‘t included in Slovak textbooks. An ethnic map, the so called ―red map‖ (ed. note: a map linked to Pál Teleki, which represents ethnic composition prior to the shift of borders under Trianon) is a very active element of Hungarian historical consciousness. I think would be good for the map to find an adequate place also in Slovak historical consciousness, because it gives answers to many Hungarian political and social developments. ZZ: Slovak historians, with a few exceptions, even those deeds by Esterházy, for which the Hungarians give him a hero worship, are against him. For example, we can talk that he sided with the Slovaks, who ended up in the enlarged territory of Hungary in 1938 or his May 1942 abstention. These actions by him are trivialised by the Slovak side, accusing him of alibi. Won’t the actions speak for themselves? VJ: I cannot speak for the whole historiography and for certain interpretations and positions or interpretation performance. For example, I flipped through the last few Slovak encyclopaedias. There is continuity also since the normalisation historiography, also in terms of Esterházy, and also in the later encyclopaedic work. Naturally, we consider encyclopaedias to be a summary and simplification of facts. There are minor differences. Yet the main issue that also concerns Slovak politics, spirituality and culture in connection with Esterházy, is concept review. Whether the politician, minority, or other from a certain ethnic group, nation, can speak out certain state-political concept on behalf of others, although not having any moral or other authorization. It is a vision, which also Mr Szarka analysed, vision of politics: for this I take an example from Slovak history. The vision of young Ńtúr in a way, has established itself after one hundred and fifty years. The vision, which then could seem unreal, marginal and minority-related. Conversely, Esterházy‘s vision of integration of Slovakia, that is also the vision of Hungarian politics, was based on the trauma of Trianon, a trauma that strongly affected Esterházy both individually, and in a certain way represented a broader trauma. I think he was unable, other than emotionally, to deal with it rationally. That vision broke to pieces. This is, of course, an interpretational and relational dilemma, Slovak–Hungarian – wider and also minority-wise. This is that fundamental conflict. Here I would also argue with the view already expressed that the Slovak historiography did not write enough texts on this subject. In the context of Esterházy, Award, Treaty of Trianon, I would like to mention the basic text of Ladislav Deák about the political profile of Esterházy and the book Slovakia on the Cards (Hra o Slovensko), in which he explored many of these relational things and has a principled critical stance in terms of political and politico–historical, that of development, also of Central Europe and Czechoslovakia, as well as the future vision of history. Of course, there are other considerations how to approach Esterházy and to accept him in a way. For example, maybe there is a concept of universal Christian–conservative policy. For certain politicians it can be a matter of agenda. Yet when it already pervades minority-related Slovak–Hungarian relations, it faces very serious problems that are insurmountable in its own way. I would like to highlight an essay by László Szigeti from 2013 that appeared in the book From Where to Where – 20 years of Independence. Szigeti as a liberal Hungarian expresses the opinion on Esterházy as

104 controversial and tragic figure, with the concept of revision of whom he cannot agree with. Esterházy was proposed for an award at the times of Czechoslovakia. Havel rejected it as a matter of principle. There is thus one variety of differentiated positions also on the Hungarian minority scene, where Szigeti rejects the concept of Miklós Duray; he admits that it is for his revisionism that it is an unacceptable concept. So also Szigeti refused János Esterházy to be placed, in the context of contemporary right-wing politics in Slovakia, on a pedestal. Then there are about ten main symbols of identity, but also of a political line, political retrospective, the concept of revision, such as the statues in southern Slovakia. Let them be and keep. On the other hand, there should be also the dark side of Esterházy‘s tragic concept. The concept was not fulfilled, perhaps in its vision it could not be fulfilled, as it would have been against the meaning, development and the concept of Slovak politics for maturing nation. It was formulated and conceived to statehood and development in a polite and emancipatory form of coexistence of nations not only in Central Europe, but in Europe as a whole. However, if there are no other documents, then some things cannot be made objective. In particular, however, we have to accept what is not related to the concept of revisionism in different forms, as he realised it, and that Esterházy did also some odd jobs for his minority. Perhaps it is more complicated how he entered international politics using various diplomatic and political means, and of course that he could not see the context of catastrophic development in Europe. Although in a small scale, but he still contributed to it. OP: Regarding the interwar irredentism, one side of the issue can be a legitimate defence of minority rights. On the other hand, a question arises, whether these activities attack the integrity of the state. While on the Czechoslovak scene within the German minority spectrum, certain (and not insignificant) role was played also by activist parties that have been for some time a part of the ruling coalition, in terms of Hungarian political minority political spectrum these forces have not developed. It is an interesting issue that has not yet been fully explored. CSP: I would like to express my gratitude to the convenors for the opportunity to be here. Such dialogues are needed. I think that everyone in this room already starts to feel that we are not talking primarily about János Esterházy, but whether we are able to look in our own eyes. We, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Hungarians and Slovaks mutually. I am not a historian, nor do I want to interfere with the work of historians, but I would still wish to raise three comments. First, also in connection with Esterházy and with Hungarian politics between the two world wars and after the Versailles Peace Treaty it has often been said here that Esterházy was a revisionist. Let‘s admit that the world‘s history does not begin in 1918. Hence we cannot pretend that, at the end of 1918, there was one Versailles peace system. That Versailles peace system was wrong, plunged Europe into the bloody World War II and into the very ugly 20th century. This is reported in literature. When someone suggests after 1918–1920 that we should somehow revisit it, is he now a revisionist, bad, negative, and the only good is what emerged after 1918–1920?! Let the Czech and Slovak historians look at it in context. Second, with the writer hat on it is strange for me to hear (I say deliberately, as I hear), that Esterházy is a ―controversial figure.‖ Could someone quote from the world history any such figure that wouldn‘t be at least somewhat controversial? Just name someone, who was not controversial in the unforgiving period of 1935–1955 in Europe or worldwide. We can start by looking at Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman. Those were terrible times; it is impossible to just label someone as being controversial. Of course Esterházy was controversial. Third, it is understood that, in historical debates, we can get somewhere, but there are limits, which we cannot cross: to do so we should be looking for other means. I will return to that it is very good that such debates are held, we need to look into our own eyes, we, Hungarians. I think that our dear friend, Mr Lebovits, Holocaust survivor, will tell us, what we, the Hungarians, need to clarify in our own history. In his previous contribution he already said that also our Slovak friends must look at their own history, even the period between 1939 and 1945. After all, we cannot progress on the topic of Esterházy, because Esterházy is a symbol. Historians certainly know the publication The Trial of Dr Jozef Tiso. Journalists still, in 1991, found among the living the Public Prosecutor in the lawsuit with Tiso, and also his defence counsel. In the bizarre twist of fate, the same prosecutor who served in the Tiso trial also served at the one with Esterházy. The latter was sentenced by the National Court under the same law as the former. The Prosecutor said that, when in the first round, Esterházy was sentenced to death, he asked the judge to explain the decision, as he had not demanded death sentence, as recorded in the book. The judge replied with a counter question:

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―Why are you upset? He is only a Magyar!‖ This should also be taken into account when exploring the issue. This matter has two dimensions. I highly respect Professor Szarka, though I do disagree with him in that Slovak historians have in their hands the court ruling and they have to adapt to it. This certainly has some historical dimension, but also a legal one. Esterházy should be given the right to fair trial (I am deliberately not suggesting rehabilitation, as it embraces bias). What I am suggesting is something similar to the case of Imre Nagy, the former prime minister of Hungary. My colleague, Ernő Rózsa initiated the proceedings in the 1990s responding to a request by Esterházy‘s daughter. This effort, however, was in vain, as the penultimate paragraph by the National Court said that there may never be any appeal against the ruling. In 1999 we first entered the government: from the Slovak political spectrum I know two people, whose attitude to Esterházy is honest and fair: Frantińek Miklońko and Ján Čarnogurský who was, at the time, Minister of Justice. From the position of the Deputy Prime Minister I asked him to look jointly at what could be done in the case of Esterházy. I have an analysis by the Slovak Ministry of Justice suggesting that the issue could be somehow solved, if we tried. Esterházy would have to be automatically rehabilitated, because, though adverse anyway, the law was violated at least in three points by the National Court. Finally, Esterházy needs to be brought home. He cannot be left in the Czech Republic forever. I think that the Supreme Court should renegotiate his trial. Once a new image emerges about Esterházy, we would certainly not share the same opinion. As historical phenomenon, Esterházy is the subject of work for historians, but we should not permit the litigation to defame his honour. OP: Allow me a short comment on the Slovak trial with János Esterházy. In contrast with the one in Moscow, this was a retributive process. Retribution was a European phenomenon and affected the entire political establishment of the Slovak State. I am unaware of any cases in Europe of a revision of retributive processes. Distinction must be made: Imre Nagy was mentioned here. Retribution trials cannot be compared with Communist trials. As a lawyer I deal with retributions. Retribution was a child of the revolutionary period, and so nearly none of those retribution trials would comply with contemporary criteria for lawsuits. The idea of its creation is, however, a higher principle. I would therefore be quite cautious about opening this issue. MH: I am also glad that such discussions are taking place and offer increasingly variegated image of János Esterházy. We are moving a little step forward, to another level, the black and white perception is – I believe – already behind us. The task for the future is to focus on micro research; new sources, which may be available, could move us somewhere into other spheres. I would like to respond to Mr Csáky. He rightly suggested that it is very easy today to give anyone a label ―controversial‖. It is then hard to refute it. Either we have sufficient evidence about the positive or negative side of a particular figure, or we know a minimum source and are unable to define the person well, so we define them as controversial. Then you can hardly move forward. I am, however, optimistic when learning more about the figure of János Esterházy. Still, I want to mention a colleague, who is not present, but I really respect him: Attila Simon. In my opinion he is one of the Hungarian historians who really contribute to a good atmosphere and to smoothing the edges in the argumentation of the Slovak–Hungarian historiography. First, he alerted me to the fact that it is not entirely appropriate and correct to use the term ―fair border‖ also in the context of the Vienna Award. In a self-reflexion I perceive it, and I also reflect to his statement on Trianon, in which he said that the Hungarian public has the right to perceive Trianon negatively. I would add that also the people in Slovakia are entitled not to accept automatically, without deeper knowledge, positively any figure related to their history. This does not only apply to János Esterházy. Glorification of anyone in any given period, even of Slovak nationality, is not healthy without knowing the background. ZZ: I would like to draw attention to the Slovak Jewry. The Bill from May 1942, from the adoption of which János Esterházy demonstratively abstained, in my opinion it could also be taken as a kind of summary of the so called Slovak Jewish laws. Based on this, if Esterházy previously supported the adoption of the bills concerning the sanctioning of Jews, wouldn’t such demonstrative abstention change the view of him? LI: Naturally, I have my own opinion, but not only me, also the entire Jewry have their opinion. Before I voice it, might I, as a non-historian, suggest that it would be good for the historical circles here and elsewhere, to examine the facts? Esterházy‘s defence counsel was Dr Čikvanová, Czech lawyer based in Bratislava. She received his file five days prior to the start of the trial. She asked for extra time to study the file thoroughly, but the court rejected her request. In her closing address she stated: ―Neither point of the charges has been proven. It was

106 not János Esterházy who divided Czechoslovakia; it was President Tiso who had asked Hitler for Slovakia to be an independent state. As evidence there is the indisputable fact that the Count Esterházy was not present at the adoption of the Ņilina decision on 6 October 1938, which declared autonomy of Slovakia. He did not attend the meeting of the Council of the Slovak State on 14 March 1939 in Bratislava, where secession of Slovakia from the Czech lands was agreed and an independent State was declared. In contrast, a statement by the Count Esterházy can be quoted from the time of crisis in 1938 which he provided to the daily Slovák, published by the Hlinka party, where he definitely and clearly stated that ―Czechoslovak ethnic Hungarians try to fully exercise their minority rights within the Czechoslovak Republic.‖ Yet there was a word about Minister Ńrobár. At the cabinet meeting he said: ―If János Esterházy is executed, it will be an act of murder. He was sentenced to death without a fair trial and the charges brought against him are false. Do you want to kill this man, of whom we all know that, in 1942 he did not vote for the anti-Jewish laws, who helped the Czechs flee the Germans via Hungary? It would be a sin. That is why we should all support his sister‘s appeal to the President of the Republic.‖ I would like to highlight a few things: Let me quote from the letter by Moshe Bejszky, the President of Righteous Among Nations, addressed to Alice Esterházy–Malfatti: At Yad Vashem, the Office to commemorate the Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes, we received testimonies and documents relating to your father, the late János Esterházy, when during WW2 Nazi authorities persecuted and eliminated Jews. (…) Your father, as chairman of a political party, and as member of the Slovak Parliament showed understanding of unjustly persecuted Jews, and boldly and publicly criticised the Nazi actions. That, in those days, was very rare phenomenon.‖ Simon Wiesenthal, the reputed Nazi hunter, in his letter of 1993 requested Slovak authorities to rehabilitate János Esterházy as soon as possible. Esterházy was nominated for an award, the Masaryk Order, founded by President Václav Havel. The Slovak National Council adopted the proposal in 1991, giving it the second highest number of votes. Yet after the protests from the Slovak Academy of Sciences, President Havel removed Esterházy from the list of nominees. The office of the Attorney General of the Russian Federation on 21 January 1993 rehabilitated János Esterházy, who was sentenced in the USSR in 1946 to ten years in prison. There are still many facts that no one ever examined. One of the points of the Hungarian–Slovak reconciliation may be also that the Esterházy issue be order of the day. I do not know what one renowned professor was getting at when he said that, contrary to Hungary, here in Slovakia, they would not examine the issue on an emotional basis. It is also a fact that the foundations of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia were laid by the Tiso administration. I only ask to put some things aside. Who can say that János Esterházy did not make any mistake? And who can say that others have done him any wrong? It would be good, if this topic is put to rest in Slovak public opinion with the support of the Slovak academic community. ZZ: Thanks to Mr Lebovits for his contribution. All the more that Esterházy’s rescue operation is also the subject of dispute between the Hungarian and Slovak public opinion. According to Slovaks, he just saved his servants. In this context I can think of a film by Előd Vörös and Attila Vörös, where living witnesses testify that it was thanks to János Esterházy that they managed to escape or survive this period. In connection with the sentencing of János Esterházy I wonder why such severe sentence was given to a single opposition MP though all members of the Slovak parliament who were there during the Tiso administration, could have been sentenced? MI: Judgements were born; also members of the Slovak parliament were sentenced. The difference is ―only‖ that the Slovak MPs, except for a few government officials, were given one to two years in prison, I think three years was the longest sentence. Pál Csáky already answered why Esterházy was given such sentence. I think that the main question is worded differently. Esterházy was sentenced at the time, when ethnic Hungarians as an entity were identified to bear a collective guilt and, as war criminals, stripped of all rights. In fact, only the Paris peace conference which decided that the Hungarians could remain in Czechoslovakia and would not be collectively expelled to Hungary as war criminals. The fate of János Esterházy is thus linked with the fate of the group of which he was a leader. OP: One more comment on the retribution litigations: I do not have exact data, but when it comes to the entire political establishment of the Slovak Republic in the period of 1939–1945, there were several death sentences. The range of sentences was wide, that is: from liberation, rebuke or several months in prison, to death penalties. It should be noted that the core of most of the retribution processes was not racial persecution. The core of retribution processes, especially in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, were rather

107 such allegations as breaking up the state or assisting foreign (super)power in breaking up the state, etc. These were the key paragraphs. MH: What was happening with János Esterházy after 1945, can really be viewed as a massive tragedy for him personally and also for his family. Only the stay in Moscow, the prison, gulag, the return to prison to Moravia, in the Czech Republic, such a harsh punishment is something terrible from the human point of view. That does not mean, however, that we should not, of course, look at his biography prior to 1945. I have never looked at the sources, which would examine the relationship between János Esterházy and Jews. I examined in detail the system of the United Hungarian Party, or the Hungarian party in Slovakia since 1938, and his contribution to the activities of the party in relation to the state apparatus in Slovakia. I can also perceive his national, Christian, human attitudes, a relationship with his own ethnicity. I think there he had done incredibly much; he was also probably an honest Christian, but this aspect has nothing to do with historical research or professional perspective. ZZ: I would come back to the charge of treason. According to the Roman proverb ubi bene, ibi patria, meaning “home is where one feels good”.What was the political atmosphere in which the Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia lived in the interwar period between, to what degree have their language and cultural rights been exercised, could have the Hungarian community detached itself from its mother country to feel at home in Czechoslovakia? KI: This is also such an important topic that deserves an analysis within the Slovak–Hungarian dialogue. A moment ago our Slovak colleague suggested that Attila Simon said that Hungarians have the right to view Trianon negatively, so the Slovaks have the same right related to Esterházy. This idea is cumbersome in that the Slovak narrative against Esterházy or the antipathy seems to provoke questions about the sentiments and reflections of Slovak Hungarians. Theirs was a new minority community; it can be called a community of coercion. In such sense it cannot be seen similarly as the Czech Germans. These are reasons that have been frequently voiced in similar debates. It still needs to be repeated, because there is a feeling (let the Slovak colleagues refute it), as if these sentiments or their validity evoked doubts. There is a danger of us seeing our mutual sentiments as illegitimate or criminalising them. This can trigger adverse response on both sides, moving the Hungarian–Slovak dialogue into the spiral that induces mistrust. Everyone wants to protect the honour to a point that it leaves no room for standard dialogue. It is obvious that the answer to the question of Hungarian interwar history in Slovakia doesn‘t depend on any future discovery of new documents concerning Esterházy. This doesn‘t even affect the issue of their rights today. They are independent of what critical research into Esterházy can arise in the future. Looking at it through the Hungarian lens, such rigour against Esterházy can be distracting. To some extent it can be so. Though, in parallel, it may be limping a bit (but parallels are probably good to bring fresh wind into debates): as if we introduced in Hungary a law or regulation against Andrej Hlinka, or officially condemned him. It is obvious that he was also a difficult politician in difficult and controversial times. Slovaks put him on their banknote. Any criminalisation, however, is not elegant and is even harmful. Also given that there are many Hungarians living in Slovakia, this could undermine the prestige of the local Hungarian community. CSP: The question was how the Hungarian community lived in this situation. Let‘s say it openly: it was a shock! Nobody believed it, Wilsonian principles were a big scam. Let us hold fast, but there is one golden sentence, that the Versailles Peace Treaty was ―Peace Robbery‖.I quoted Comrade Lenin. Neither the Parliament in USSR, the US Congress ratified it, several members of the British delegation withdrew – Paul Johnson writes about all this in his History of the 20th Century. I always wondered how the Germans could accept it. They went to negotiate, and it turned out to be a dictate. In quotes I note that in the large Versailles Palace, when the Germans were to sign the peace treaty, the leader of the German delegation remained seated. Clemenceau reproached him that it was arrogance. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, said: ―When I see that a person is in a difficult situation, then I do not look at him, and therefore I did not even notice that he remained seated‖.Well, such varying opinions were there. Let‘s not narrow this topic to that only us, the Hungarians, only Esterházy or only a few Upper Hungarians to think it wrong. Even before and also after signing the treaty diverging opinions emerged. For example, the economist John Maynard Keynes was member of the British delegation and he resigned. He said, as quoted by Paul Johnson – and do forgive the expression, – that he is not going to take part in such filth, I think that the treaty was not correct, let‘s face it. It dragged us into the Second World War and the many horrific moments of the 20th century. As for the retribution processes, I am not an expert, but I can only quote again the book The Trial of Dr Jozef Tiso. There are also numbers referring to ethnic affiliations. If I am not mistaken, the ratio of Hungarians who have been convicted under the laws of retribution is five to six times higher than the

108 proportion of Slovaks (I am talking about percentages). The ratio of Germans, oddly enough, is only half that of the Slovaks. The author explains that while the Germans were expelled, the Hungarians remained in Slovakia in large numbers, and thus fell under the law. OP: Regarding the interwar period, I think that it would not make much sense to open now a discussion – it would probably be a very long one. Concerning retributions, national aspect undoubtedly played a major role along with other, especially the political aspects. On the lowest levels, the People‘s Courts often became a means of personal vengeance. In short, retribution justice clearly had also some contentious elements. MH: There is quite a volume of literature on the position of Hungarian minority during the First Czechoslovak Republic. Very briefly: southern Slovakia, inhabited largely by ethnic Hungarians, faced a range of major problems – economic as well as social, a lack of infrastructure and medical facilities. Naturally, the land reform played its role as well. However, as far as criminalisation is concerned, I would distinguish between this word and substantive criticism. I think that we are here today at a very good forum, as we discuss things substantively. Any criminalization of a person would be extreme and adverse. ZZ: My last question goes to Mr Jablonický. The Martin Memorandum from 1861, as well as the Martin Declaration from 1918 called for a revision of a valid order that was in place for several hundred years. When contrasted with Esterházy’s revisionist policy, how does it stand in terms of human values? VJ: We didn‘t discuss here the continuity of Central European history, the Habsburg Monarchy, the Austro–Hungarian settlement, the situation of minorities in Greater Hungary that weren‘t accepted. In a way these were legitimate efforts to pursue their rights within the Greater Hungary either autonomously and sovereignty, i.e. their identity. Actually, it was in the developmental arc, as the concept of federalisation of Greater Hungary emerged in the late 18th century. Political leaders and other intellectuals from Slovakia or Upper Hungary (J. Hajnóczy and others) significantly contributed to this concept. It never came to fruition and was replaced by a different, more realistic model that was implemented, which also involved in some way violent promotion of a concept of a single, exclusive and dominant nation. That is where the problem arose, anchoring the disintegration of Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. Regardless of the WorldWar. Although it probably could have been avoided and the international circumstances were as they were. There are surely broader contexts, but over time a whole chain of developments emerged: monarchical principles, annexation, conflicts in the Balkans, etc. From this point of view it was an utterly natural autonomous movement of representatives of nations and nationalities in Greater Hungary to create their space for self-determination, and of course, through the Upper Hungarian Slovak Environs (Okolie) and in other program matters and endeavours. The politicians in the times around 1900 we quite removed from the more in-depth, though largely centralist or Greater Hungarian perception. Though orphaned in the Hungarian Parliament, Milan Hodņa, Pavel Blaho or Ferdinand Juriga talked about the rights (of Slovaks) for self-determination. Greater Hungary was conceived as a Hungarian state not only with a single political nation, but there was also an attempt to create a mono-ethnic Hungarian nation just as a dominant one. Probably this was the key to the core of the problem that arose from the implementation of the model. Similar processes emerged elsewhere in Europe – Prussia thus expanded inward towards its minorities or others, as did Russia in a similar way, etc. Yet the developments came to a point also as a result of efforts described by Robert William Seton-Watson in his balance of political trials held here. Seton-Watson draws from Slovak politicians (Anton Ńtefánek, Blaho). There was nothing else in this concept, only to emancipate, somehow to achieve universal equality within the state. Greater Hungary wanted to create a nation state also with the contribution of nations and nationalities, which were significantly more numerous. The concept of the Czechoslovak nation was certainly problematic. It was also Professor Ńtefánek, sociologist and political scientist, one of the best critical analysts of Hungarian politics prior to 1918, moved from the originally Slovak position to assume a Czechoslovak stance. The development is of course complex, but the point is that, in the vision of Greater Hungary prior to 1918 there was an ambition to build a nation-state. Yet, the de facto nation-state emerged ethnically and politically only after 1918, paradoxically, after Trianon. Here again arises a contradiction in the assessment of Hungarian and non- Hungarian nations. For some, the disputed border passes through the ethnic line. Yet again: nothing was said about the analysis of the critical status of minorities. A large number of Slovaks remained in Hungary. Many, judging from the 1910 census, and accordingly the historian, Július Mésároń, concluded that there was practically a slight difference between Slovaks the in newly created Hungary and the Hungarians (in Slovakia). It is interpretative controversy among both Slovak and Hungarian historians.

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Thus the legitimacy of the concept of revision, the ―legitimacy‖ which some pointed out in the case of Esterházy, suggesting that he merely desired it to be achieved peacefully and by no other means, is quite questionable in this respect: it thus de facto created major Central European and European confrontation. Though seemingly marginal, minority politician, Esterházy applied his fine talents in his diplomatic, political and other complex activities. So his is entirely and essentially different position that that of the Slovak political representatives. They simply wanted to find their place within the right to self- determination (of a nation). That stands in contrast to Esterházy, who wanted a restoration, a revision in various forms, when it had not been possible. This is a different concept of history, of justice, and thus solutions for the future. Ńtefan Osuský, who was expelled from Hungary being prevented from working and studying, signed the Treaty of Trianon together with Edvard Beneń on behalf of Czechoslovakia, as a settlement of historical justice also between Hungarians and Slovaks. So there are differences, they are principal and in a way insurmountable. OP: I would come back to the core of the question. It is difficult to say whether these situations are comparable. Perhaps the question is slightly misleading, because comparing the right of a nation for self- determination and right of a national minority to self-determination may prove questionable. These are very different questions. From 1861 to 1918 the limit for the Slovak state and legal ambitions was the creation of some form of autonomy. I guess I would not compare it with the interwar period with no marked ambition to create some special Hungarian autonomy. This concept was more pronounced in the politics and appeared only in the 1890s. KI: Is this debate about talking to each other just to say something, or to the outside world? We have a reason to talk about each other. I have not seen the word Slovak in secondary school history books until 1918: I often saw the word Tót, but never the word Slovak. This obviously is not historical knowledge to build on. I think that it also applies also vice versa. Hence the need for debates such as ours. Yet vis-à-vis third countries I doubt they are useful. The period of the Second World War is not one to be deemed a success by any of the parties concerned; neither party can be proud of anything. We can try hard to claim ―but we would do it better‖, or ―we have tried, but only by a coincidence we stumbled, slipped on a banana peel‖etc. Fundamentally, this is not a period, which we could be proud of and I do not think it is necessary to prove it to the world. It is useless to drive ourselves into it. We need to talk about us and to us.

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IN CONCLUSION

Who was János Esterházy? War criminal, traitor or a victim and dedicated politician? The presented studies have shown that the perspective on his life and activities differs across nations. The major differences are between the accounts of Hungarian and Slovak and/or Czech historians. To us, ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, the view of the majority population, the Slovaks, on Esterházy matters significantly, as he was among the first and few to have undertaken to advocate the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and subsequently in Slovakia. We therefore deemed it important for the historians to convene again, exchange arguments and, within the conference setting, seek points for rapprochement. In conclusion we might ask what the conference achieved, whether we managed to move forward and draw our positions closer. All this is, as yet, difficult to answer. Yet I trust that those who took part in the presentations and round table discussion won‘t be disappointed. They might be able to say that they attended a conference on János Esterházy, with a discussion at the core. Individual papers offered altogether different perspectives on his life and work. The round table participants engaged in polemics. It all was held in collegial atmosphere, instead of heated passions. At the end people shook hands and parted. If this were the only outcome of the event, it was worth it, for we made an important step towards each other. Should the presenters reflect on the different arguments and reach a compromise, we can then say that it was well worth meeting and make some progress in the assessment of the life and contribution of János Esterházy. I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Professor Csaba Gy. Kiss for having accepted our invitation to be the patron of the conference as well as His Excellency, Ambassador Csaba Balogh and Mr Frantińek Miklońko under whose auspices it was held. May I also thank the speakers and round-table discussants for having honoured the conference with their presence. My gratitude also goes to the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra and the Faculty of Central European Studies for having hosted us, and our main sponsor and fellow convenor, the European Network Remembranceand Solidarity, along with additional sponsors and partners, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, the Foundation Pro Renovanda Cultura Hungariae, the Hungarian Institute in Bratislava, the local council in Kolíňany, and the Juhász Gyula Youth Club.

Last but not least, I should like to convey our gratitude to the Civic Association Living Zobor Region and Mr Zoltán Zilizi who proved instrumental to the event and its preparation.

Imre Polyák President, Civic Association Living Zobor Region

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ON JÁNOS ESTERHÁZY IN THE SPIRIT OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

IMAGES

János Esterházy Sr. in 1897

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János Esterházy SR with relatives in early 1905; the last common photograph

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Funeral of János Esterházy Sr. in Újlak, on 2 September 1905

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Sublings Lujza, János and Mária, in 1908

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Family photo: Alņbeta Tarnowska-Esterházy with her children Lujza, János and Mária in 1913

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János Esterházy in 1918

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On the terrace in Újlak in 1922

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Wedding of János Esterházy and Lívia Serényi in Budapest on 15 October 1924

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The Esterházy manor in Újlak in 1930

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János Esterházy with wife Lívia and their son János at the wedding of his sister Mária in Krakow on 2 June 1931

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János Jr., the son of János Esterházy in folk suit at the wedding in Krakow on 2 June 1931

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János Esterházy with wife Lívia Serényi-Esterházy and their children János and Alica in 1932

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János Esterházy with relatives in 1933

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János Esterházy with son János and daughter Alica in 1934

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János Esterházy at the wedding of his sister Mária in company of his wife, mother and sister Lujza

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János Esterházy as Member of Parliament in Podzoborie

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At the rail station in Końice

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János Esterházy as Member of Parliament

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Éva Samarjay (tutor to János Jr.), Mária Mycielska, János‘ daughter Alica, Lujza Esterházy, Alņbeta Tarnowska-Esterházy, János‘ son János Jr. in 1940

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Countess Alņbeta (mother), daughter Lujza, tutor Éva Samarjay, daughter Mária with husband Franciszek Mycielski at the terrace in Újlak

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The Esterházy manor in Veľké Záluņie in 1960

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János‘ son János Esterházy Jr. in Hong Kong in 1969

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János Esterházy‘s daughter Alice with husband Gioacchino Malfatti on 25 January 1970 in Vega, Italy

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The grave of János Esterházy‘s father in Veľké Záluņie: the double cross is symbolic in memory of János

FOTOGRAPHS FROM THE ARCHIVE OF CYPRIÁN BÍRO, VEĽKÉ ZÁLUŅIE

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ON JÁNOSESTERHÁZY, IN THE SPIRIT OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

First edition Responsible publisher: Zoltán Zilizi, PhD. Responsible editor: Gábor Csanda Published by: Living Zobor Region C.A., 2017

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