N Swedish interventions in the tragedy J of the Jews of Slovakia
Denisa Nešťáková and Eduard Nižňanský
Abstract • This article describes a largely unknown Swedish effort to intervene in deportations of Jews of Slovakia between 1942 and 1944. Swedish officials and religious leaders used their diplo- matic correspondence with the Slovak government to extract some Jewish individuals and later on the whole Jewish community of Slovakia from deportations by their government and eventually by German officials. Despite the efforts of the Swedish Royal Consulate in Bratislava, the Swedish archbishop, Erling Eidem, and the Slovak consul, Bohumil Pissko, in Stockholm, and despite the acts taken by some Slovak ministries, the Slovak officials, including the president of the Slovak Republic, Jozef Tiso, revoked further negotiations in the autumn of 1944. However, the negotiations between Slovakia and Sweden created a scope for actions to protect some Jewish individuals which were doomed to failure because of the political situation. Nevertheless, this plan and the previous diplomatic interventions are significant for a description of the almost unknown Swedish and Slovak efforts to save the Jews of Slovakia. Repeated Swedish offers to take in Jewish individuals and later the whole community could well have prepared the way for larger rescues. These never occurred, given the Slovak interest in deporting their own Jewish citizens and later the German occupation of Slovakia.
Research on Sweden’s attempts the ‘opening’ of the archives in some post- to assist Jews communist countries and new scholars tak- In view of the abundance of studies of the ing up this particular topic have significantly Holocaust, the absence of major scholarly improved research opportunities. works offering comprehensive investigations The rescue of Danish Jews, and Raoul of the Swedish attempts at rescuing Slovak Wallenberg’s rescue of Jews from Budapest Jews is somewhat surprising. However, fol- during the Holocaust have justifiably received lowing Hilberg’s narrative (1961), which much attention from scholars, students details the step-wise escalation from persecu- and laymen alike. Scholars such as Richard tion to mass murder in National Socialist pol- Breitman also investigated American rescue icy and practice, the rescue actions have been activities in Sweden and their impact on fur- pushed to the periphery. Nevertheless, some ther Swedish involvement in providing refuge of the Swedish attempts to assist European to European Jews (Breitman 1993). The Jewry have been well researched. Swedish substantial works of Steven Koblik (1989) rescue efforts related to the Jewish commu- provide us with a detailed view of different nities in Norway, Denmark and Hungary phases of Swedish attempts to help European during the Holocaust are well known. The Jews. The most recent research of Simo Muir first scholarly works on Sweden’s attempts to (2016) exemplifies the cooperation within assist European Jews were published in the the Finnish and Swedish Jewish leadership early 1980s. Since then, the establishment of after Germany’s takeover of Hungary and the the Raoul Wallenberg Committee in 1981, appearance of potential danger for Finnish
22 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 Jewry. Yet the Swedish rescue efforts were various materials have been held not only in not limited to aid in Denmark or Finland or Slovakia, but also in Israel and Sweden. to Raoul Wallenberg and Hungarian Jewry. Although some of the Swedish efforts Scholars of the Holocaust in Slovakia can be described as attempts by individuals, have also regarded the Swedish intervention a deeper investigation of available sources in the case of the Jews of Slovakia as minor reveals that these attempts cannot be char- in the historiography of the Holocaust. acterised so simply. This study incorpor Despite the publication of the correspond- ates the voices of the representatives of the ence between the Swedish archbishop Eidem Slovak–Swedish communication via offi- and the Catholic priest Tiso as early as 1992 cial documents and diplomatic or private (Kamenec 1992: 221–2), there has been no correspondence. further research elaborating on the docu- ments more thoroughly. The same texts reap- Swedish attempts to assist the Jews peared in 2005, in a collection of documents of Slovakia titled The Holocaust in Slovakia IV (Nižňanský 2003: 287–9), including also comments and It is not generally known that before and documents of the German authorities and after the rescue of Danish Jews and the Jews their attitude towards the correspondence of Budapest, Sweden tried to offer a safe between Eidem and Tiso. In the seminal haven to Jewish individuals and later to the work of Ján Hlavinka and Eduard Nižňanský remaining Jewish community in Slovakia readers must look to the footnotes of the through diplomatic interventions. The story work to learn about the ‘personal interven- of Swedish efforts to shelter a selected group tion of a protestant archbishop from Uppsala’ of Jews from the Holocaust nonetheless helps (Hlavinka and Nižňanský 2009: 131). These to supply part of the context for the historiog- works introduced the Swedish involvement raphy of the Holocaust. Thanks to the latest in the fate of Jews of Slovakia to scholarly research on the Holocaust in Slovakia, previ- research. Yet Bohumil Pissko – a key actor ously unknown and unpublished documents in the rescue attempts – or cases of rescuing has brought to light evidence of Swedish individuals do not appear. Furthermore, none intervention in the tragedy of the Jews of of these crucial works recognises Swedish Slovakia. By examining Swedish interven- attempts to assist the Jews of Slovakia in tions in Slovakia, we seek not only to enrich depth. As a result, it leaves little room for dis- our perception of Swedish rescue efforts in cussion of Swedish interventions in the trag- general but also to understand more thor- edy of the Jews of Slovakia. oughly the significance of those efforts and It is important to note that the lack of complex conditions and situation in which attention to Swedish interventions does not these efforts were made. seem to stem from a paucity of source mate- This article undertakes a critical analy- rials. Investigated sources, which consist sis of accounts found in official documents of diplomatic and official correspondence and diplomatic correspondence to arrive at a between Slovakia and Sweden, are avail- more comprehensive and nuanced depiction able in the Slovak National Archives, the of Swedish attempts to intervene in the trag- State Archives of Nitra and Yad Vashem. edy of the Jews of Slovakia. In doing so, it Not only have scholars had access to official sheds light on the Slovak consul in Sweden, documents, which we have investigated, but who is relatively absent from Holocaust
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 23 historiography, and whose activities invite chapter describes the rescue-related activities an investigation of Swedish intervention acts of Soviet citizens of Jewish origin in Slovakia against the antisemitic policy in Slovakia and in 1942. In the following phase we discuss the deportations of Jews from Slovakia in par- the rescue-related activities related to indi- ticular. Drawing upon previously unknown vidual cases of Slovak Jews between 1942 primary sources, we develop this argument and 1944. In the last phase Swedish rescue- in three parts. First, we demonstrate how the related activities relating to the remaining ‘final solution’ was implemented in Slovakia. Jewish community as a whole took place in Next, we examine the stages of Swedish 1944 and 1945. intervention, notably how the Swedish Royal Consulate in Bratislava tried to intervene and The ‘final solution’ in Slovakia how different Slovak ministries reacted, and especially how the Slovak consul in Sweden, The Munich Accords of 1938 represented an Bohumil Pissko, and the Swedish archbishop, important change in the geopolitical situation Erling Eidem, cooperated on the plan to res- in Europe and recognition of the dominance cue Slovak Jewry. We include in our analy- of Nazi Germany over Central Europe. The sis the Slovak governmental representatives’ Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSPP) – a communication exchange with the Swedish conservative right-wing political party with authorities as well as the interactions between strong Christian and nationalist orientation the president of the Slovak Republic and the with antisemitic, anti-Czech, anti-Hun- Swedish archbishop, Eidem. Finally, we dis- garian elements led by the Catholic priest cuss the post-war silence over the Swedish Jozef Tiso – exploited the weakening of the rescue attempts in Slovakia. Following three Republic of Czechoslovakia and declared the different phases of Swedish intervention we autonomy of Slovakia in Žilina on 6 October discuss the intervention accordingly. The first 1938. In the Manifesto of the Slovak Nation,
Jozef Tiso meeting Adolf Hitler in Salzburg in July 1940. Archive of ČTK.
24 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 the new HSPP’s elite declared their anti ciples, implementing elements of fascism. The semitic orientation: ‘We shall persist on the regime was replaced to better match the Nazi side of nations fighting against the Marxist- ideology and politics. Conditions for imple- Jewish ideology of dominance and violence’ menting the ‘final solution’ for the ‘Jewish (Slovenská Pravda, 8.10.1938). The constitu- question’ in Slovakia were a result of the inter- tion of the later Slovak Republic created a national politics of Germany in combination one-party political system with the HSPP as with autochthonous anti-Jewish tenden- the governing party. Thus, the HSPP ruled cies within Slovak society and their imple- the country during the first Slovak Republic mentation in antisemitic laws introduced by (1939–45) when the deportations of Slovak Slovak political institutions – government, Jews took place. Therefore, the HSPP can be parliament, the state council and Jozef Tiso, regarded as a major agent in the deportations. a Catholic priest, and a leading politician of The tragedy of the Jews of Slovakia is con- the HSPP, who was the country’s president nected not only with the Nazi German ‘final from 1939 to 1945, and who was convicted solution’ plan but also with local Slovak anti- and hanged for treason in 1947. Thus, accord- semitic politics. The Slovak Republic, founded ing to documents from the Wannsee confer- on 14 March 1939, ‘was established in the ence, ‘the Nazi leaders … expected no obsta- atmosphere of a deep European political and cles from the Slovak regime to the murder of moral crisis as a side product of Nazi aggres- the Jews’ (Bauer 2001: 176). Slovak Jews fell sion towards Czechoslovakia’ (Kamenec victim to an antisemitic motivation within 2011: 96). Hannah Arendt’s description of the majority of the Slovak population, rep- ‘an invention of the German Foreign Office’ resented by HSPP and its militia, the Hlinka (Arendt 1963: 184) aptly summed up the Guard. They eventually contributed to the creation of the republic. Nazi Germany had Holocaust out of self-interest in solving the several different plans for Czechoslovakia. ‘Jewish question’ in Slovakia. Initially the Initially, Adolf Hitler had planned a total Slovak government and the parliament used war of destruction in Czechoslovakia with laws and governmental decrees signed by the help of Poland and Hungary but later he pre- president, Jozef Tiso, while the most exten- ferred to destroy the country from the inside sive was the governmental decree 198/1941 (Nižňanský and Tulkisová 2014: 37–55). The from 9 September 1941 – the so-called Jewish Protection Treaty between Germany and Codex – containing 270 articles based on a Slovakia of 18 March 1939 included German racial definition of Jews, aimed at eliminating coordination of the military and interna- Jews from the political, social and economic tional policy of the Slovak Republic as well life, and which relegated Jews to second-class as economic subordination to Nazi Germany citizens. These laws can be seen as a Slovak (e.g. Mičev 2009: 125–37; Dieckmann et al. version of the Nuremberg laws from 1935. 2003: 25–31). Germany took over the protec- These laws also included the presidential tion of the political sovereignty of the Slovak exceptions, which protected approximately state and the integrity of its territory. Thus 1,000 people and their families from depor- the independence of Slovakia was radically tation. The previous Slovak antisemitic poli- limited. tics of Aryanisation (First Aryanisation Act, By spring 1939 the country with its decree 113/1940; Second Aryanisation Act, approximately 89,000 Jews had introduced 303/1940) legalised the liquidation of Jewish a political system built on authoritarian prin- businesses and companies, and banned Jews
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 25 from carrying out professions, leading to massive impoverish- ment in the Jewish community. Thus, in the autumn of 1941, the ‘Jewish question’ became a social question. The manufac- tured mass impoverishment of the Jewish community reached a ‘logical’ conclusion: the aim was to deport the Jews from the territory of Slovakia. Slovak–German rela- tions included several agree- ments, among them one from 8 December 1939 obliging the Slovak government to send workers to Germany. After Deportation of Jews from Žilina. In 1942 all deportation trains Germany’s request for 20,000 from Slovakia crossed the train station in Žilina. Archive of young Slovak men capable of Museum of SNP. working in the Reich, the rep- resentatives of the Slovak gov- ernment realised that in view of the lack of was just temporary until the capacity of con- manpower in Slovakia this would create eco- centration camps allowed larger number of nomic risks for the republic. Thus the Slovaks victims. Slovakia was required to pay Nazi suggested sending 20,000 young Jews to Germany 500 Reichsmark per head for each Germany (Hradská 1999: 40). The head of Jew deported from Slovakia. the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) sub- The deportations from Slovakia started department IV-B4, overseeing Jewish affairs from Poprad on 25 March 1942. The first and evacuation, SS-Obersturmbannführer transport consisted of 1,000 girls and young Adolf Eichmann, agreed to accept these women aged sixteen and up. In 1942, 57 Jews, who could be used to ‘build, after proper transports left Slovakia, 19 of them being selection, the death and concentration camps sent to Auschwitz and 38 to the Lublin area at Auschwitz and Birkenau’ (Bauer 1994: (SNA, F. 209, C. 864–1). The rumours started 66). According to the advisor for Jewish spreading while the Jews from Slovakia were affairs in Slovakia, and later one of the most being transported. It was said that Jews were important men in charge of deportations of not going to work in Poland, but instead they Jews from Macedonia, Greece and Hungary, were being sent off to be killed there. The SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny’s most important information came from a testimony in the Nuremberg trial conducted Slovak Jew, Dionyz Lenard, who managed to on 3 January 1946, ‘the Slovak government escape from Majdanek concentration camp in further asked whether the families of these Lublin in June 1942. He gave one of the first workers could not be taken to Poland too’ reports about the situation in Poland and the (Testimony of Dieter Wisliceny 1946). At need for the Jewish Centre (Hlavinka 2015: first Eichmann declined the request, but it 43; Hradská 2006: 32). The Jewish Centre was
26 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 a Slovak version of Judenrat, established to be to establish official relations with Slovakia responsible for the implementation of Nazi (Slovák, 2.8.1939: 1). On 10 August 1941, and Slovak policy against Jews in Slovakia. In Emil Stodola Jr became the official rep- October 1942 the Working Group, an under- resentative of Sweden in Slovakia (Petruf ground group established within the Jewish 2014: 107–21). The interests of the Slovak Centre, whose members tried to negoti- Republic in Sweden were represented by ate with Slovak and German authorities to the consul general Bohumil Pissko,1 who halt deportations not only from Slovakia but took office in October 1943 and aimed to from the whole of Europe through bribery ‘secure and establish closer relations with (Büchler 2007: 103–90; Fatranová 2007: the Swedish Kingdom and build the base 46–85; Bauer 1994: 167–85), also received to their development, mainly when it comes reports with ‘information about the horrible to the mutual exchange of goods’ (Slovák, conditions of Jews who lived’ (Büchler 2002: 7.10.1943: 8). On 10 November 1943, he 125–52) in ghettos in the Lublin district. reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Together with the first pieces of infor- ‘I visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, mation about the Jewish deportees from Christian Günther, who welcomed me very Slovakia to Poland the first attempts to act kindly and with a great understanding. … It against deportations were initiated. There is undoubtedly a difficult disadvantage that were some attempts to interfere in the pitiful the office was – according to local opinion – situations of Slovak Jewry, for example by the established five minutes before twelve’ (SNA, Slovak Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant F. MZV, C.965). According to Pissko’s Churches and even the Vatican (Kamenec report, Swedish journalists did not forget 1992). According to Gila Fatranová (2007: to ask some mocking questions relating to 229) several Slovak high officers (the gov- the length of the planned stay of the Slovak ernor of the National Bank, Imrich Karvaš; Consulate. Pissko, as a consul general, was the secretary of the Central Association of constantly reporting the latest news about Slovak Industry, Peter Zaťko) demonstrated Slovakia in the Swedish press and forwarded their lack of support for further deportations. the attitudes expressed by the Swedish public When the international climate changed after Germany’s defeat in Stalingrad, several 1 Bohumil Pissko (1908–1979) studied Ger- other international powers tried to inter- man Studies, Latin and Greek at Univer- vene. Among them were Switzerland and sity in Bratislava. He was awarded to study also world Jewry, who were cooperating with in Copenhagen and later in Uppsala. Since the Jewish community in Slovakia. Among 1933 he had worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague – the Intelligence the international voices against the deporta- Department. After the establishment of tions from Slovakia was also Sweden, with its the Slovak Republic he started to work for attempt to save Jews from deportation. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Ferdninad Ďurčanský, who gave him the freedom to start to organize the adminis- Swedish intervention in Slovakia tration of the Ministry in Bratislava. Later Slovak–Swedish diplomatic relations he became an official consul in Warsaw and Berlin. Since 1940 he was a consul in Sweden had formally recognised the Slovak Sofia, Bulgaria, where he remained until Republic on 26 July 1939, which made 10 September 1943. In autumn 1943 he became a General Consul in Stockholm Sweden the first northern European state and remained there till 20 April 1945.
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 27 to Slovakia. On 9 October 1944 Pissko sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the programmes in foreign languages broadcast by the Slovak radio: ‘If you want to get sympathy from the Swedish press, it should – if possible – avoid insulting Jews on broadcast programmes’ (SNA, F. MZV, C. 967). Pissko and his diplomatic relations with Swedish elites later became very important in the Swedish interventions in the Slovak Republic.
Rescue-related activities: Soviet citizens
The first Swedish attempt to intervene in the fate of Slovak Jewry did not occur under favourable circumstances. It took place in May 1942, at a time when the deportations from Slovakia had already been going on for Berta Kotscherchinski was one of the Soviet citizens in Slovakia who were under the three months, and was connected with the protection of Sweden. Yad Vashem, The Central international position of Sweden and the Database of Shoah Victims' Names. fact that the Slovak Republic was involved in the war against the Soviet Union. On on behalf of two Soviet Jewish citizens, Isaj 27 June 1941, Sweden, via an official note, and Berta Korscherschinski, who lived in the made an offer to the Slovak Ministry of Slovak town of Bardejov and who were going Foreign Affairs which announced Swedish to be deported from Slovakia. The Swedish protection of Slovak state citizens and Slovak Consulate protested, arguing that ‘this pro- properties in the USSR in view of the Slovak cess is not only against international law, participation on the war against the USSR. but also against local regulations, because The Sloval Republic agreed on the Swedish denominations were removed in the USSR, proposal of undertaking the responsibility therefore they could not be considered Jewish’ for Slovak citizens and Slovak properties in (SNA, F. MZV, C, 142). The Ministry of the USSR.The same note announced that Foreign Affairs contacted the responsible the Swedish Royal Government complied offices and developed active exchanges in with the request of the government of the order to find and protect these Jewish indi- USSR to protect state citizens of the USSR viduals. However, the last information docu- and properties of the USSR in Slovakia mented from 16 February 1943 says ‘Mr and (SNA, F. MZV, C. 181). As a result of this Mrs Kotscherchinski were not transported … note, two attempts by Sweden to protect Jews they left the state from Bardejov to the village from the USSR who lived in Slovakia from Konská Vola in the General Government on deportation were made by the Swedish Royal May 17, 1942’ (ibid.). In the Central Database Consulate in Bratislava. of Shoah Victims’ Names it is stated con- On 19 May 1942 the Swedish Consulate cerning the Kotscherchinski (here spelled contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kocerzinki) couple: ‘Isai Kocerzinki was from
28 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 Kiev, Ukraine – murdered in the Shoah, his information, ‘I am sure that the Gutniks, if wife Berta from Dvinsk, Latvia – transported we are speaking about those who are men- to Naleczow, Pulawy in Lublin, Poland on 18 tioned by the Swedish Consulate, did not May 1942, murdered’. register themselves as Soviet state citizens Swedish attempts to protect Soviet citi- and therefore they were transported’ (ibid.). zens of Jewish origin living in Slovakia did Rachel Gutnik (spelled Gutnig, The Central not end with a single case but affected a larger Database of Shoah Victims’ Names) was number of Jewish individuals. Another inter- transported from Bratislava to Sobibor on vention of the Swedish Royal Consulate dates 7 June 1942. Documents about her husband from 10 June 1942, when Sweden undertook Rubin have not been discovered. His fate, protection of USSR interests in the Slovak however, was presumably similar to that of Republic once again. The note tells us about his wife. two other Soviet citizens named Rubin and Why these two aforementioned couples, Rachel Gutnik, living in Bratislava, aged 86 who were citizens of the Soviet Union living and 76, who were transported to the transit in Slovakia, were the only ones that became camp in Žilina, Slovakia, on 5 June 1942. objects of Swedish interest is not clear. Most Sweden protested against this process and probably there had been ongoing commu- demanded rectification. The institutions in nications between Swedish institutions and Žilina were asked to wait, without proceed- some institutions or individuals in Sweden ing further in this case until the potential or the USSR that brought about the recog- final decision had been made. The Swedish nition of these individuals. At this stage of Royal Consulate also added a demand to the research, sources from the USSR, which let the Gutniks come back to Bratislava and could help to clarify further research ques- remain there until the whole case was solved. tions, are not known to us. Surprisingly, the (SNA, F. MZV, C. 142) internal communication between the Slovak The Ministry of Foreign Affairs immedi ministries documents the importance of the ately contacted the responsible Slovak offices. Swedish requests, that were treated as a mat- It also informed the Slovak Ministry of the ter of urgency. In consequence of Sweden’s Interior that ‘the prime minister said that interest in protecting Soviet citizens and Soviet citizens of Jewish race are not to be properties, the Slovak authorities had to transported, as is done with Slovak state satisfy Swedish requirements instead of citizens. However, in accordance with valid risking damaging diplomatic relations with international laws, as dangerous foreign- Sweden by ignoring their requests altogether. ers, whose homeland is our war enemy, they are to be detained’ (SNA, F. MZV, C. 142). Rescue-related activities: The Slovak ministries followed the Swedish individual cases of Slovak Jews requests, and the available documents dem- onstrate repeated correspondence between Sweden’s attempt to intervene in Slovakia did the two countries’ officials, and they also doc- not stop with the two cases of Soviet citizens. ument sincere investigations by Slovakia and Almost at the same time as the attempts to willingness to meet Swedish requirements. protect the Soviet citizens of Jewish ori- The investigations and search for the Gutniks gin occurred, the first of Sweden’s requests was stopped on 16 February 1943 when regarding individual cases of Slovak Jews the Ministry of the Interior gave the latest was forwarded to the Slovak authorities. On
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 29 19 May 1942, the Swedish Royal Consulate Ministry also announced that these individu- asked permission for some Jewish individu- als would not be deported until 31 October als not in possession of travel documents to 1942, which was the deadline for obtaining be able to emigrate to Sweden. These three credible documents to legally emigrate to Jewish persons were Samuel and Hermína Sweden. The main issue for the Ministry of Engel, citizens of Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, the Interior was to find the Jewish individu- and Heimann, a citizen of Nitra, Slovakia als, so they had to ask the county councils for (SNA, F. MV, C. 241). However, according to help. On 9 October 1942 the county council in the order of 14 September 1940 Jews had lost Nitra stated ‘the Jew Heimann from Nitra … the right to own passports (Kamenec 1991: was deported with his wife from Nitra on 18 101). The Swedish note did not only ask to June 1942. This makes the issue of Heimann issue travel documents but also to protect and pointless’ (ibid.). Even though there is another not deport these individuals until they could document with a different date of transpor- leave Slovakia for Sweden (SNA, F. MV, C. tation, namely 15 April 1942, it does not 241). The Swedish note also indicated that change the fact that Heimann was deported, the families of Samuel and Hermína Engel so the immigration became impossible. and Heimann were resident in Sweden and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the asked the Swedish authorities for help. So case of Engels and Heimann several times. far, it is neither clear who the relatives were, Moreover, the application deadline for the nor has their interaction with the Swedish passports was postponed several times owing authorities been fully uncovered. to multiple requests from the Swedish Royal Documents that could give some further Consulate. The deadline was extended from insight into their interaction may exist in 31 October 1942 to 30 November 1942, and Sweden. The Slovak National Archives does finally to 28 February 1943. Heimann had not possess any letters written by the afore- been transported most probably before the mentioned families. They do not seem to Swedish Consulate started the communi- be associated with the Jewish elites or lead- cation with the Slovak authorities. He was ers in Slovakia. Nevertheless, their case was killed on 20 September 1942 (SNA, F. MV, discussed at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign C. 227; SA Nitra, District Office Nitra, C. Affairs and the Slovak Ministry of the Interior 468; Yad Vashem, Majdanek Death Book). as well as within county offices. According to The postponing of the passport deadline, and communications between the ministries it hence the ban on further deportation, applied seems that this particular case was important to Samuel and Hermína Engel, whose fate, for Sweden as the Swedish Royal Consulate it seems, unfolded differently from the tragic in Bratislava was pressuring to solve it (SNA, case of Heimann. Samuel Engel with his F. MV, C. 241). Again, the Ministry of wife Hermína were living in 1942 in Banská Foreign Affairs pushed the Ministry of the Bystrica, and apparently survived. According Interior to treat the issue with urgency. On to the census from 1943, at least Samuel 17 September 1942, the Ministry of the Engel was baptised soon enough to be spared Interior reported to the Ministry of Foreign deportation (SNA, F. MV, C. 182, C. 396). Affairs, ‘in general the Ministry of the Interior Yet their ultimate fate is not known. has no objection against the legal resettle- It made a considerable difference that the ment/emigration of Jews, Slovak citizens, interventions were related to Jewish individu- who live in the Slovak Republic’ (ibid.). The als originally from Slovakia and not from the
30 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 USSR. Even though these Swedish requests were related to Slovakia’s own Jewish citizens, the Slovak official institutions followed these requests. These documents also prove that the Slovak authorities were willing to bypass the ‘legal’ directions which ordered them to trans- port these Jewish individuals. The readiness to satisfy these Swedish requests proves not only the importance of Swedish interventions but also that the Slovak authorities were willing to protect a few specific Jews from Slovakia until they could emigrate. This may be seen as an act of subordination of Slovakia to the stronger partner, Sweden, and as an act of permission to save some Jews from deportation as long as they left Slovakia. As the action of deport- ing Slovak Jews was already in full swing, Rabbi Samuel David Ungar who was a subject it seemed impossible to intervene through of Slovak-Swedish diplomatic correspondence diplomatic correspondence. Nevertheless, in 1944. Yeshiva of Nitra. the Swedish intervention helped to protect Samuel and Hermína Engel. These attempts to intervene in the fate 30 September 1944 and 31 March 1945. of the aforementioned Jews who lived in the Approximately 11,500 Jews were deported Slovak Republic occurred during the period (e.g. Hlavinka 2009: 119–25; Hlavinka and between May 1942 and February 1943, a Nižňanský 2010: 50–80; Hradská 2006: time which encompasses the first phase of the 463) and about 10,000 of them were killed deportation of Jews from Slovakia. Between or died owing to the conditions in the Nazi March and October 1942 approximately camps. Jews and non-Jews were also killed in 58,000 Jews from Slovakia were deported. Slovakia by the Einsatzgruppe H together Between October 1942 and September 1944 with the emergency division of the Hlinka there were no deportations from Slovakia. Guard and the military group, the German Therefore, the remaining Jews in Slovakia Party in Slovakia, Freiwillige Schutztaffeln. lived in relative safety but always with the In this violent atmosphere Sweden’s danger of deportations being resumed. The attempt to save Ungar had started. Unlike the following case of the Slovak rabbi Samuel individuals of the previous cases of Swedish David Ungar occurred between October 1944 attempts, Rabbi Samuel David Ungar was and January 1945, during the last phase of the related to two of the most influential people ‘solution of the Jewish question’ in Slovakia. of the Jewish leadership in Slovakia. He was a Germany occupied Slovakia after the Slovak first cousin of Gisi Fleischmann, a member of national uprising, which started on 29 August the Jewish Center in Slovakia and a leader of 1944. This initiated a new phase of deporta- resistance within the Working Group together tion. The renewed deportations, known also as with rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel, who the second phase of deportations, took place was married to Ungar’s daughter. Ungar was under the German administration between also one of the few Jews who had received the
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 31 presidential exceptions. Moreover, the major- escape the German occupation of Norway ity of Slovak Jews identified with Jewish in April 1940. Rabbi Jacobson was the spir- Orthodoxy, and according to Yehuda Bauer itual leader of the restored Heinrich-Barth- ‘the social authority was the Rabbi of Nitra, Strasse synagogue until his death in 1955 Shmuel David Halevi Ungar’ (Bauer 1994: (Berlinger 2016). Hence, Rabbi Jacobson may 64). Based on his higher position in the hier- have been a rabbi from Stockholm but he had archy of the Jewish community in Slovakia never been a rabbi of Stockholm, as Pissko’s more information on his fate can be pro- letter intimates. Moreover, there was no vided. Two days after the suppression of the such organization as the British Chief Rabbi Slovak National Uprising the only operating Council. Since we have no relevant informa- yeshiva within the regions of Slovakia as well tion or documents about Rabbi Jacobson nor as in Central and Eastern Europe – Yeshiva of about his correspondence with the so-called Nitra – led by Ungar and officially abolished British Chief Rabbi Council, we can only on 5 September 1944 (Polakovič 2012: 21). guess why these mistakes were present in Soon after the closing down of the Yeshiva of Pissko’s letter. Did Pissko lack correct infor- Nitra the deportations of Jews from Nitra and mation about Rabbi Jacobson and about the vicinity to Auschwitz started, and Ungar’s fel- existence of the British Chief Rabbi Council? low believers from Nitra were amongst the Or did he rather prettify his letter with ‘big’ deportees. Ungar was saved together with names in order to emphasise the importance his sons by Slovak residents who led them of the case and the significance of Rabbi to hiding at a guerilla encampment in the Ungar? Did Pissko lie to his superordinate mountains. Later, they went a trip to Banská in order to try to save Rabbi Ungar? If this Bystrica accompanying the troops, but had to is true, why would he do so? In the absence remain in mountain refuge. of documents and evidence from Sweden and On 25 October 1944, a confidential England, further research is required to solve note arrived at the Ministry of Foreign these questions. Affairs in the name of the Slovak consul in On 26 October 1944 Štefan Tiso, the Sweden, Pissko: ‘Via Rabbi of Stockholm cousin of President Tiso, who became Prime A. I. Jacobson the British Chief Rabbi Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of Council addressed me to step in in the case of Justice of the Slovak Republic after the sup- Rabbi of Nitra Samuel David Ungar. … With pression of the Slovak national uprising on respect to the intervention of the Swedish 3 September 1944, commanded the Minister king on the matter of the Jewish question in of National Defence, Štefan Haššík, to Hungary, it will be in our interest if the case ‘immediately find out and announce to the has a positive result’ (SNA, F. MZV, C. 142). Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the Rabbi In addition Pissko wrote that Ungar and his of Nitra, Samuel David Ungar, with his fam- family were to be given the highest protec- ily currently are’ (SNA, F. MZV, C. 142). The tion from persecution or potential deporta- Minister of National Defence announced tion. Moreover, Pissko mentioned that Ungar that the family of David Samuel Ungar of and his family were advised to contact the Nitra should have been interned in the labour Swedish Royal Consulate in Bratislava. At camp for Jews in Sereď in September 1944. this point the case of Rabbi Ungar seems The minister assumed that the rabbi and his to be confusing. Firstly, A. I. Jacobson came family were arrested during the deportations to Stockholm from Trondheim in order to from Nitra. Alongside many changes that
32 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 had happened since the suppression of the primarily or secondarily, for Ungar’s death. Slovak national uprising, the labour camp in Furthermore the political and military situ Sereď, which had previously been under the ation of Germany in 1944 caused an immense Slovak administration, was taken over by the reconsideration of politics and regimes German Security Police (Sicherheitsdienst). among the Germany allies. Most import Therefore, the minister suggested he ‘con- antly Sweden pressured the Slovak govern- tact directly the Chief of the Security Police ment to take a more active role in finding in Bratislava, who will be able to give you not only Ungar but also all Jewish individu- an explanation of where the Jewish rabbi in als who had previously been the subjects of question and his family are’ (SNA, F. MZV, Slovak–Swedish diplomatic communication. C. 142). Subsequently, on 17 January 1945 Sweden’s energetic role in the efforts to save the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the these particular Jewish persons activated the Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Bratislava to ask Slovak authorities as well. Unfortunately in ‘if David Samuel Ungar and his family is in almost all cases the rescue attempts failed. the labour camp of Sereď or anywhere else, Nonetheless, the Swedish efforts did not hoping to enable him and his family to emi- lose any of their significance. Interestingly, grate to Sweden’ (ibid.). Any response frp, the the Slovak authorities themselves, who had Deutsche Gesandtschaft cannot be provided offered their own Jewish citizens for deporta in the current state of research. During the tion to Germany, did not mind removing diplomatic negotiations and investigation some Jewish individuals from deportation on of the Slovak authorities, Rabbi Ungar was the grounds that they had Sweden’s promise hiding in the mountains, where he refused that the Jews would leave the country. to eat non-kosher food, whereby, according to Daniel Polakovič (2012: 27), his ‘medical Rescue-related activities: state eventually rapidly deteriorated, lead- the remaining Jewish community ing to a death caused by malnutrition on 21 February 1945’. The greatest of Swedish attempts to assist the The Swedish intervention in the case Jewish community, which amounted now to of Rabbi Ungar of Nitra was not successful approximately 11,500 individuals, started dur- owing to a combination of several factors. It ing the second phase of deportation of Jews made a considerable difference that the inter- from Slovakia on the impetus of the Swedish vention started during the German occupa- archbishop of Uppsala, Erling Eidem. The tion of Slovakia when the Slovak author archbishop turned to President Tiso via the ities had no power over the Jewish question. Slovak consul in Sweden, Bohumil Pissko, Once the solution of the ‘Jewish question’ in on 11 November 1944, which marks the Slovakia was held by the German directive beginning of the effort to save the remaining any Swedish intervention became ineffec- Jews in Slovakia. However, important corre- tive. Even though it proves that the Slovak spondence between Eidem and Pissko pre- authorities were willing to cooperate with ceded the letter addressed to President Tiso. the Swedish state, it must be said that pre- Eidem, in the name of ‘Hjälp Krigets Offer! venting the arrest or deportation of the rabbi Kristnasamfunds och organisationers insam- was a ‘good deed’ in a situation that was to ling’ (‘Help the Victims of War! A Union of a large extent caused by the same authorit Christian Communities and Organizations’) ies. The same authorities were responsible, addressed the Slovak consul general, Pissko,
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 33 on 27 November 1944. He requested Pissko the legal status of Slovak Jews and expressed to ‘please note all the efforts that were taken a wish to address the president of Slovakia to rescue the remnants of Jewish ethnicity with a personal letter, which Pissko event in Slovakia, and we hope that you, Sir, will ually sent as an attachment to President Tiso. do everything in your power for this cause’ Pissko explained further Eidem’s close over- (SNA, F. MZV, C. 967). seas relations, which he described as ‘very This announcement from Eidem to beneficial for our interest’. The technical Pissko included the letter from Eidem aspect of the transportation of the Jews from addressed to Tiso and started the main Slovakia should have been carried out with intervention, which began on 28 November the help of financial support from American 1944, when Pissko forwarded the letter from institutions that had confirmed their own Eidem and added his own letter to Tiso. desire to take care of the financial issue in Pissko provided his analysis of the – in his cooperation with a neutral partner, such as words – hostile, or non-objective, attitude of the Red Cross. Moreover, Pissko expressed the majority of the Swedish press towards how his American colleague considered the Slovakia, which he described as the result of issue as highly important and was willing to official Slovak actions over the ‘Jewish ques- make any financial sacrifice needed. Pissko tion’. Furthermore, Pissko mentioned the also noted that they would ‘highly appreciate intervention of the Swedish king, Gustav V, every positive result, even a hardly noticeable in the case of Hungarian Jews and further one’ (SNA, F. MZV, C. 967). This letter from activities of governmental, religious and social Pissko to President Tiso was accompanied by organisations. He stressed that these actions the aforementioned letter of Eidem, dated 11 were supported by all the political parties in November 1944. President Tiso did receive Sweden, except for the pro-German group, a letter from Eidem, where the archbishop which received only 3,500 votes in the elec- intervened ‘for the poor Jewish brothers’ and tion. Explaining the position of Sweden in asked the Slovak president to permit the relo- the matter of the Jewish question, he tried cation of Jews to a neutral area: to engineer a suitable moment to accommo- date the Swedish attempt to save the remain- Our poor Jewish brothers, here in Europe, ing Jewish community in Slovakia. Pissko have suffered tremendously in the last reported the conversation between him and decade. In some countries of the continent Archbishop Eidem, describing the latter as they have become almost exterminated. the head of the State Protestant Church in Since there is still a remarkable number Sweden, respected in Protestant countries, of Jews in Slovakia, located in disparate especially overseas countries, and successor localities, I would like to address you with of famous theologian Dr Nathan Söderblom, an ardent demand – to kindly take charge who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize of these endangered people. I do not dare for his international work for peace and phil to suggest to you … steps that should be anthropy. Furthermore, Eidem was described taken. However, with regards to the actual as somebody who enjoyed immense respect political situation of your fatherland, I must and favour from the royal family, and also ask you to think if it is eligible to transfer from the religiously indifferent governmen- Jews of your country to other areas in order tal social-democratic elites. According to to make their rescue possible. (SNA, F. this conversation Eidem asked Pissko about KPR 405, C. 8)
34 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 The lack of independence granted to considered as a euphemism. It is true that the Slovak Republic and subordination to some Jews could keep their previous occu- Germany led the new prime minister, Štefan pations according to the certificate awarded. Tiso, to show Eidem’s letter to the German However, these certificates protected only ambassador in Slovakia, Hans Ludin, who about 5,000 Jews. Other Jews were placed in passed the letter on further. Apparently this labour camps for Jews in Slovakia – in Nováky, letter was important enough to be forwarded Sereď and Vyhne (Nižňanský 2002: 325–35), directly to the Reich’s Main Security Office which had been established for forced labour- (RSHA), in the person of Adolf Eichmann ers, and which later served as transit camps on 6 January 1945. German Office Inland II, for the concentration camps. Slovak guards represented by Eberhard von Thadden, briefly were often tremendously cruel in these labour described Eidem’s letter and announced that camps. Most importantly Tiso did not men- Prime Minister Tiso had shown the letter, and tion the deportations of 1942, when approxi- he added the remark, ‘What are these indi- mately 58,000 Jews were removed from viduals thinking?’ (Yad Vashem, Auswärtiges Slovakia to Nazi camps (mostly to Auschwitz Amt, Inland II, JM 2218/AA). The arrogant and Majdanek). According to Tiso, on 28 remark of Prime Minister Tiso only con- August 1944, a partisan revolt against the firmed the wide scale of collaboration of the Slovak state began, involving a high number Slovak regime with Nazi Germany. Prime of nationalities. Slovak Jews joined the revolt: Minister Tiso obviously did not have to show ‘they left their camps and went to the moun- the letter but he decided to forward it to the tains with weapons in their hands and with German authorities. Even though the prime even bigger financial resources and they sup- minister informed the German authorities, ported the revolt against the state’ (SNA, F. President Tiso responded to Archbishop KPR 405, C. 8). The information Tiso gave to Eidem in a letter from 8 January 1945. The Eidem is also very doubtful. Jews barely had Presidential Office addressed the Consulate any financial resources, especially those in the General in Stockholm with a demand to camps, after the process of Aryanisation. The deliver the attached letter to the archbishop only true information provided in Tiso’s let- from Uppsala. The letter for Eidem carries the ter is the fact that when the ‘German army date of 4 January 1945. The German attitude force stepped in, they … imprisoned Jews in towards Eidem’s letter was most probably concentration camps, as well as Slovaks and discussed within official circles. President members of other nationalities who took Tiso may have been informed about the part in the uprising. These camps were under desired response he had to give to Eidem. German authority’ (ibid.). Hence any fur- Nevertheless, the only document available is ther attempts to secure or protect the Jews of Tiso’s answer, which demonstrates his help- Slovakia were impossible. Pissko’s reaction to lessness in this situation: ‘It is a pity that the the interaction between President Tiso and interest expressed was not shown before 28 Eidem was sent to Eidem in the letter from August 1944. Until that date, Jews had been 19 February 1945. It was marked as confi- placed, in accordance with Slovak laws, in dential, and says: well-organised labour camps or had been left in their previous occupations according to the You have – with your appeal – made it certificate awarded’ (SNA, F. KPR405 , C. 8). easier for me to interfere in the situation of Therefore, Tiso’s statement must be terribly persecuted Jewry … I feel very dis-
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 35 appointed at the reaction of my president not been concluded. Nonetheless, it helps to … To see that my country has been swal- supply part of the context for the historiog lowed up by the Nazis so that the president raphy of the Holocaust. could not even give a promise to try to act according to your demand is a terrible Post-war silence tragedy. (SNA, F. MZV, C. 967) The common perception in academic circles The letter does not show any evidence has been that the Jewish community in that it was sent in the name of the Slovak Slovakia was never part of the diplomatic Consulate in Stockholm. It rather seems that negotiation between Slovakia and Sweden. Pissko sent it to Eidem as a private person. However, the new evidence of Swedish Eidem responded within two days, express- attempts to help the Jews of Slovakia is ing sympathy and grief but not regret that remarkable. Nonetheless, there has been no he had delivered the letter to Tiso (SNA, F. research on Sweden’s involvement in helping MZV, C. 967). Judging from Pissko’s words the Slovak Jews in spite of the great number ‘you have – with your appeal – made it easier of sources available and of new researchers for me to interfere in the situation’, it seems dealing with Jewish communities in Europe that it was actually Pissko that had been the during the Holocaust. Thus questions still trigger for this intervention in the fate of the remain. As a result of the authors’ focus on remaining Jews in Slovakia; according to the the new documents available in the Slovak correspondence between Pissko and Eidem archives, this article cannot offer any hypoth- it appears that Pissko was the one to ask eses regarding lack of research in Sweden, the help from Eidem to intervene in the trag- United States and the former USSR. Several edy of the Slovak Jews. Thus we may witness hypotheses could explain the lack of research the cooperation between the Slovak consul, on Swedish attempts to assist Slovak Jewry: Pissko, in Sweden, who acted from personal motivation, using his diplomatic position, 1. The research of the Holocaust in and the Swedish archbishop, Eidem, whose Slovakia was limited or almost non- motivation might be religious or simply existent during the period 1948–89. human. In comparison with the more politic Once the archives in Czechoslovakia ally sensitive proposals of Eidem involving (later Slovakia) were ‘opened’, research- massive Jewish emigration from Slovakia ers focused on material research and on with the help of the United States, the earlier more dominant and important topics requests of the Swedish Royal Consulate to which, led many scholars to leave ‘sub contact Slovak officials in the case of several ordinated’ topics aside. Jewish individuals were relatively simple. The 2. One of the main actors in the Slovak– involvement of the American side empha- Swedish negotiations – the Slovak sised the importance of Swedish efforts even Consul in Stockholm, Bohumil Pissko more strongly. The connection with American – remained silent. He emigrated from institutions in this particular case of Swedish Czechoslovakia shortly after the Second intervention in Slovakia could be a topic for World War, most probably because he further research. The story of Swedish efforts could be persecuted by his own state to shelter a select group of Jews from the as an eminent diplomat in the Slovak Holocaust has merely been opened but has Republic during the war.
36 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 3. Possibly there are no survivors who were Jews of Slovakia. Thus we invite scholars to saved thanks to these acts, or if there fill the gap in research on this topic within a were any survivors, they have never found Swedish or European context. a public voice and have never been heard or simply remained silent. Conclusion 4. While the success of Swedish aid during the Holocaust has been well The evidence adduced in this article does documented, the unfortunate story of not speak against existing research but rather Swedish attempts to help the Slovak contributes to a challenging discussion and Jewish community was not successful, acts as an appeal for further research. The which may explain why this story has archival material based on diplomatic cor- remained untold for so long. respondence and communication within the Slovak ministries offers information that in As Leni Yahil has noted, the case of part confirms our knowledge of Sweden’s Denmark is usually seen as ‘evidence of attempts to assist European Jewry. More humanity’ (Yahil 1990: 574). Obviously, the importantly, this material expands the knowl- rescue of Denmark’s Jews and of the Jews of edge of the Holocaust in general. The com- Budapest needs to be a successful story to be mon perception in Slovakia is that Sweden able to stand as evidence of human goodness. had no specific connection with Slovakia What about those rescue plans which did not on the matter of the Jewish community. succeed? Are they not ‘good’ enough to show Moreover, the general knowledge about the humanitarian effort? These questions could Slovak diplomat, Bohumil Pissko, is defi- be answered only by scholarly discussion and cient in every sense. A general assumption further research on the topic. The evidence has been that Sweden never approached the in this article speaks against the customary Slovak government to exclude some Jews liv- assumption of Sweden’s non-involvement in ing in Slovakia from the deportations or to the situation of Jews in Slovakia. Moreover, request a halt to the deportation of Jews in the difficulties of complicated conditions of Slovakia in general, most probably because post-war memory in Slovakia removed the there has been no testimony from any sur relevant Slovak diplomat from the narratives. vivors of these negotiations. Furthermore, Pissko was unable to take part The Swedish rescue attempts represented in the national post-war narrative. The story by Swedish diplomacy, particularly in the per- of Pissko and Sweden was not attractive or son of Archbishop Eidem thanks to his con- required by the official Czechoslovak socialist tact to the Slovak diplomat Pissko, challenge historiography. The forty-year-long ideology a Swedish Holocaust historiography in which of socialism silenced many historians, and Sweden is regarded as at best minimally active witnesses such as Pissko. The exceptional- in rescue attempts aimed at Slovak Jewry. At ity of the Swedish attempts, assisted by the the same time Slovak Holocaust historiog- acts of the Slovak diplomat to save the Jewish raphy is challenged by the untold story of community in Slovakia during a time of war, Pissko who played an enormous role in the was less predetermined than Slovak national plan of saving the remaining Jewish com- memory expected after the war. We believe munity in Slovakia. Finally, the documents of we have at least helped to open up the topic the Slovak ministries suggest that Slovakia, of Swedish intervention in the tragedy of the after obtaining requests from Sweden, started
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 37 a major investigation to find and protect those Denisa Nešťáková MA is a PhD candidate in general Jews who were to be transferred to Sweden. history at the Faculty of Another finding from the official documents Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava, where her exchanged between Sweden and Slovakia is research is focused on Arab– the large-scale Swedish plan to transfer the Jewish relations in Palestine remaining Jewish community from Slovakia during the British mandate. She completed her second in 1944. MA in Jewish civilisations at the Hochschule für Had the military and political situation jüdische Studien in Heidelberg. Her academic focus has also been upon the experience of developed in a different direction, a full res- Jewish women during the Second World War. cue operation would have become possible. For the last three years she has been a chair It can remain only an assumption that the of the Committee of Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism at the annual Muslim–Jewish changing fortunes of war and the situation Conference. She is also involved in several in Slovakia dissipated the chance to save the programmes promoting interfaith dialogue, tolerance and cooperation. remaining Jewish community and caused the planned actions to be abandoned. The excep- Prof. Eduard Nižňanský C.Sc. is a professor at the tionality of the Slovak–Swedish intervention Department of General in the deportations of the Jewish commu- History, Faculty of Arts, nity is startling for both Swedish and Slovak Comenius University, Bratislava. He is a scholar of national memory but also for Holocaust the Slovak and European ■ historiography. Holocaust and a specialist in the history of twentieth- century Germany. He has lectured in Austria, Acknowledgements Germany, Italy, France, England, Romania, Belgium, Poland, Israel, Czechia and Japan. He is a member of the Slovak–German Committee Special thanks to the Paideia Folkhögskola, of Historians, as well as a councilman of the the first Jewish Cultural College in Scandi Academic Council of Military Institute in Bratislava and a chairman of the editorial board navia, which initiated this article, inviting of Acta Historica Posoniensia – Judaica et us to present parts of the research for the Holocaustica. Paideia Alumni Conference in Prague, and its participants, for commenting on it at an References early stage and for the critical discussion. Archive sources Among them, many thanks to Ulf Lindgren, Slovak National Archives (SNA) who helped us with translation of sources in Archive of the Ministry of the Interior (MV) Swedish. We would also like to thank Verena Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV) Meier, and Helen Turner, whose careful and Archive of the National Court (LS) engaged reviews helped clarify our argument. Archive of the Office of the President of the Finally, cordial thanks to Christian Lotz, who Republic (KPR) read and critiqued different versions of this State Archives Nitra (SA Nitra) Archive of the District Office of Nitra article and provided us with enlightening Yad Vashem comments. Auswärtiges Amt, Inland II Majdaned Death Book Literature Arendt, Hannah, 1963. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, The Viking Press)
38 Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies | Vol. 27, No. 2 Bauer, Yehuda, 1994. Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Kamenec, Ivan, 1991. Po stopách tragédie Negotiations, 1933–1945 (New Haven, Yale (Bratislava, Archa) University Press) ——(ed.), 1992. Vatikán a Slovenská republika —2001. Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven, (1939–1945). Dokumenty (Bratislava, Slovak Yale University Press) Academic Press) Berlinger, Salomo, 2016. ‘The history of a Kamenec, Ivan, 2011. ‘Fenomén korupcie synagogue’,
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