Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula Rebecca K
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University African Social Science Review Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 6 May 2013 Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations: Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula Rebecca K. LeFebvre Kennesaw State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr Recommended Citation LeFebvre, Rebecca K. (2013) "Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations: Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula," African Social Science Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol6/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in African Social Science Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LeFebvre: Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations African Social Science Review Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2013 Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations: Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula Rebecca K. LeFebvre Kennesaw State University Abstract: For close to fifty years, the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon continued over the region along their border known as the Bakassi peninsula. The dispute almost led to war in the mid-1990s, was settled by the International Court of Justice in 2002, and resulted in hand-off of the territory by Nigeria to Cameroon in 2008. Content analysis of newspapers from Nigeria and Cameroon for the year 2010 revealed underlying identity-based needs that had been left largely unaddressed. Analysis of Nigerian newspapers showed a prevalent discussion of unfulfilled identity needs and an unresolved identity-conflict potential. Analysis of Cameroonian newspapers revealed the fulfilling of a new identity as the Bakassi region was proactively populated with Cameroonian citizens, culture, and connectivity to the rest of the country. The Bakassi dispute resolution was heralded as a success by state leadership, but it was not perceived in the same way by the general population as evidenced in the content analysis. Public opinions expressed in the media were less reflective of a cooperative result and more reflective of a zero-sum negotiation result with a clear winner and a clear loser. Keywords: Bakassi peninsula, border dispute, conflict resolution, group identity, peace negotiations Introduction For close to fifty years, the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon continued over the region along their border known as the Bakassi peninsula. The dispute almost led to war in the mid-1990s, was settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002, and resulted in hand- off of the territory by Nigeria to Cameroon in 2008. The peaceful resolution to this historic conflict has been heralded as a successful example of negotiated settlements to territorial disputes. However, the locals in the Bakassi region, 90 percent of whom are Nigerian, have been unhappy with the settlement. The result has been hostility, unrest, and a move for secession of the region that persists even several years after the final official hand-off. This raises the primary research question of this analysis: Did the Bakassi peninsula dispute resolution neglect the identity-based aspects of the situation leaving an underlying conflict unresolved? This article examines the history of the Bakassi peninsula conflict and the impact of the negotiated settlement on the people of Nigeria and Cameroon. The processes of negotiation and implementation are analyzed from an interests-based framework as well an identities-based perspective looking for gaps that may have occurred. Content analysis is performed on newspaper articles from Nigeria and Cameroon on the topic of the Bakassi peninsula for the year 2010 in an effort to answer the research question regarding the lingering effects of the agreement on the stakeholders in the region. Key findings show evidence of identity-based issues in the region such as loss of community and cultural way of life as well as unfulfilled needs for autonomy. 83 Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2013 1 African Social Science Review, Vol. 6 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6 African Social Science Review Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2013 Background of the Dispute The Bakassi Peninsula is a six-hundred square mile area of swampland rich in fish that juts out into the Gulf of Guinea. The region lies along the border of two African countries, with Nigeria to the west and Cameroon to the east. The population on the peninsula is around 300,000 comprised mostly of fishermen and their families (The Economist 2008). The region lacks much modern infrastructure, such as potable water, electricity, and roads, but what the region does have is more than ten billion barrels of crude oil, first discovered in the late 1950s (Anyu 2007). Ownership of the territory was claimed by both Nigeria and Cameroon for many years with the escalation of the dispute most noticeable after the discovery of oil in the region. The dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula can be traced back to the arbitrary process used to create borders in Africa during times of colonialism. Britain signed a treaty in 1884 with the kings and chiefs of the Kingdom of Old Calabar that had occupied the peninsula since the mid- 1400s (Anyu 2007). In the early 1900s, Germany and Britain signed a series of agreements that created the border between what is now Nigeria and Cameroon. In a key treaty of 1913, Great Britain ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany, which had been governing Cameroon. Cameroon finally won its independence in 1960, and Southern Cameroon merged with it in 1961 bringing the boundary question into the spotlight, particularly because oil was being discovered at this same time. In 1974, the Kano Agreement was signed by heads of state of both countries, putting Bakassi on Cameroon‘s side of the border. In 1975, after the overthrow of the ruling military regime in Nigeria, the post-coup regime claimed that the Kano agreement was invalid. A series of attempts to resolve the boundary issue occurred after that, with mediation by Britain, France, and Togo, but no peaceful resolution was reached. The conflict escalated further in the 1980s and early 1990s with several skirmishes resulting in the deaths of some soldiers followed by a massive military build-up in the peninsula by the armies of both Nigeria and Cameroon. In 1994, in an effort to avoid going to war, Cameroon filed a suit with the ICJ asking them to resolve the border dispute. The military forces continued to clash in the region until 1996 when a cease-fire was signed. The ICJ decided in 1998 that it did have the jurisdiction to hear the case. The ICJ, under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan, invited representatives from both countries to the negotiation process and heard arguments from both sides. Nigeria‘s claim to the Bakassi Peninsula was based on four main points. First, they pointed to the original title in the 1884 treaty with the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar. Second, they claimed effective occupation of the region, and in fact, wanted the region‘s sovereignty to be determined by vote of the 300,000 people living there (Tarlebbea and Baroni 2010). Third, they claimed long and uninterrupted administration of the region. Fourth, they asserted that the Cameroons had acquiesced over many years by default giving up claim to the region (Anyu 2007). Unfortunately, Nigeria‘s argument was weakened by the lack of seriousness displayed by the Nigerian leadership over time, as they failed to protest the 1913 treaty and then signed agreements during the pre-coup regimes of the 1970s that they later claimed to be invalid. Cameroon‘s claim to the peninsula was based primarily on the 1913 treaty in which Britain ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany. They produced a 1971 agreement signed by the heads of state of Nigeria and Cameroon that they claimed was meant to affirm the borders as defined in the English-German treaty of 1913. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) seemed to agree with Cameroon‘s argument and appreciated the consistency in documentation produced. Based largely on the 1913 English-German treaty, the ICJ ruled in favor of Cameroon in September of 2002. As part of the settlement, Nigeria was expected to quickly and 84 https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol6/iss1/6 2 LeFebvre: Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations African Social Science Review Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2013 unconditionally remove its administrative and military forces from the Bakassi Peninsula. The ICJ‘s verdict was communicated privately weeks before it was made public. Kofi Annan invited the presidents of both Nigeria and Cameroon to a meeting in Paris to discuss the ICJ‘s ruling. During the meeting, both presidents agreed to abide by the ICJ‘s ruling and to work together to implement the ruling with the help of the UN. Afterwards, Nigeria appeared ready to back out, and it required continued involvement of the UN to keep Nigeria on track to opt for the negotiated settlement (Baye 2010). In the months following the verdict, Kofi Annan facilitated the formation of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission made up of representatives of both countries. The commission had the responsibility to oversee demarcation of land boundaries, withdrawal of troops from the peninsula, and recommendation of confidence-building measures. The Mixed Commission‘s work culminated in a 2006 meeting at the Green Tree Estate in New York facilitated by Kofi Annan where the Green Tree Agreement was signed with key deadlines and terms for Nigeria‘s withdrawal. Kofi Annan praised the effectiveness of the Mixed Commission, pointing out that the commission had no peacekeeping force and cost only $5 million per year as compared to the $200 million annual cost of the UN‘s Ethiopia-Eritrea peacekeeping mission.