Universal Party Primaries and General Election Outcomes: the Case of Uruguay (1999–2009)
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Downloaded from http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/ at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile on September 30, 2013 gss010 / pa Ranney, / ). Kenney and doi:10.1093 ., 1995 et al Lengle ; , p. 257). Third, after intense primaries, Stone, 1986 ; ). There are several reasons for this relationship. Atkeson (1998 , 834–855 66 lica de Chile, Santiago, Chile Hacker, 1965 Polsby, 1983 ´ * ). Second, primary campaigns sometimes allow the venting of internal differ- What would happen if all partieshold competing in open, the binding, electoral concurrent game were andLoser forced obligatory to Law’? primaries constrained The bybecause a answer there ‘Sore is to onlymore this one than democracy once: question in Uruguay. This has theof country the world hypotheses not offers that developed a by been has the fertileeses literature. applied ground explored, This that such for research (i) supports perhaps rules testing candidates the some hypoth- selecteddate in are primary likely elections to with becloser more the to than ones the one located party’s constituents candi- farthest andness away (ii) in from there primaries, the is beyond median an which voter,the optimal either but level higher party of or in competitive- lower the competitionhave corresponding can relevant general damage bearing on elections. critical The questions thatreformers implications academics, regularly politicians of ask and this political about study primaries, not only in the UK, but also elsewhere. The Author [2012]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society; all rights reserved. Corresponding author: [email protected] * # For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] ences that concomitantlygeneral undermine election parties’ ( collective action efforts for the The American literature suggestsprimaries that have intense a disputesgeneral negative among election leaders effect ( in on party First, the voters party’s in performance primariesthose in are not the voting the following in sameselect as primaries the those are voting most in morethat ideologically general person driven elections; representative is by leaders1968 not partisanship. of the Parties the closest tend party, to and to the usually median voter of the citizenry ( David Altman Pontificia Universidad Cato Outcomes: The Case of Uruguay (1999–2009) Universal Party Primaries and General Election Parliamentary Affairs (2013) Advance Access Publication 4 May 2012 Rice argue ‘whenparty’s one nominee is party essentiallyaffected has uncontested, in a the November’ divided divisive party primary will season be while adversely the other Universal Party Primaries and General Election Outcomes 835 parties will arrive exhausted at the general elections (Buquet and Chasquetti, 2008). Thus, it is normally accepted that those parties that keep internal conflict in check (among legislative or executive candidates) do better in general elections. Of course, all these arguments, as expected, are contested theoretically and empirically, not only within the American literature, but also from a comparative perspective (Ralph-Telford, 1965; Ware, 1979). In light of these concerns about primaries’ effects, cross-national research on primary elections regularly addresses two related questions: (i) whether extremist leaders are normally elected and (ii) whether there is an optimal level of compe- tition. Studying the Uruguayan primaries offers fertile ground on which to test many of the hypotheses discussed above.1 The Uruguayan case provides unprece- dented leverage in responding to these apprehensions, as the primary is simultan- eous for all parties and across all regions, and is constrained by the sore loser provision.2 As there cannot be strategic responses from one district to the other or from one party to the other as in the USA, Uruguayan primaries push us to a completely new arena of intraparty competition and dynamics. Primaries in Uruguay solve some of the coordination problems of other primaries, but create new problems of their own. It has been argued that in the USA there is no equity in the political leverage states have in so far as the first states’ primaries signal the whole game. No matter how big ‘SuperTuesday’ is, the results of primaries in the last states voting risk irrelevance in that they often cannot change the power relationship among can- didates within parties’ national conventions. The question is whether, when all parties face primaries at the same time and place, the hypotheses advanced by the literature can be sustained. Whatever the answer to this question, it has direct implications for pundits’ electoral advice. This paper fills the existing lacuna in our knowledge of the effects party primaries have on general elections when all parties are obliged to participate. The paper is structured as follows. The first section develops the theoretical bases for the working hypotheses of the paper. The second section describes the legal apparatus and practices of internal elections in Uruguay. Due to space limitations, this paper omits the reasons for the constitutional change of 1996, 1Primary elections much like those current in Uruguay were held in Argentina on 14 August 2011. Unlike in Uruguay, however, the vote was compulsory rather than voluntary. Participation reached 81.4 per cent of the citizenry. Despite the Argentinean primaries’ similar institutional architecture, the fact that such primaries have so far only occurred once in Argentina limits their usefulness for purposes of the present analysis. 2The Sore Loser provision prevents candidates from changing parties in the middle of an electoral cycle. 836 Parliamentary Affairs which can be found elsewhere.3 The third section empirically tackles the advanced hypotheses. Conclusions are provided in the final section. 1. Leadership extremism and optimal level of political competition: two hypotheses Research on party primaries in Latin America remains limited to a handful of exceptions. Alca´ntara Sa´ez (2002); Freidenberg (2003) and Zovatto and Freidenberg (2006) provide useful cross-national descriptions of primaries and how they operate (in cases where they are held, of course), but neither study hypothesises about their consequences. In contrast, Colomer (2003) studies four cases of primaries held before national elections (Argentina 1999, Chile 1999–2000, Mexico 2000 and Uruguay 1999) and concludes that ‘internal democracy can reduce the support of a party in the general elector- ate’, and that primaries select weaker candidates than do less inclusive selection procedures (Hazan, 1997; Hopkin, 2001; De Luca et al., 2002; Barnea and Rahat, 2007). Along the same lines, Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006, 2008) study whether primary elections are more useful than other methods for selecting stronger candidates for general elections. Three internal elections have transpired in Uruguay since the constitutional reform of 1996. As expected, parties have chosen different strategies for dealing with the new primary system, and each party dealt with the situation differently in 2009, 2004 and 1999, in part because of a learning process and in part due to different political environments. As expected by the literature, in parties with more than one candidate compet- ing in the internal election, the winners were usually those located furthest from the median national voter, but closer to the party’s constituents. In a relatively recent article, Colomer (2003) shows how ‘the candidates selected on a primary elections’ basis tend to be not very popular or losers in the corresponding presidential elections’ (p. 119). This occurs due to the differences between who participates in the two rounds. The candidate closest to the median voter within the partisan electorate should be the winning candidate of a primary elec- tion; however, ‘a centrist within a party may be an extremist for the whole elect- orate’ (Buquet and Chasquetti, 2008, p. 328). At the same time, it has been argued that the extent of this problem actually varies depending on how primaries are organised because ‘in more open systems, participation by a wider spectrum of the electorate means that candidates must appeal to more moderate voters, leading to the election of more moderate candidates’ (Gerber and Morton, 1998). As one can see, despite the important progress in the development of 3See for instance Buquet (1997); Instituto de Ciencia Polı´tica (2000); Altman et al. (2006). Universal Party Primaries and General Election Outcomes 837 primary theories, the jury is still out on certain issues. I therefore put forward the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: Candidates selected in primary elections with more than one candidate are likely to be the ones located farthest away from the median voter, but closer to the party’s constituents. Within the Latin America region, Carey and Polga-Hecimovich have examined whether primary elections produce presidential candidates who are stronger or weaker in general elections than candidates chosen by other methods.4 They found that the selection of candidates in primaries appears to be an asset—what they term the Primary Bonus Hypothesis—with such candidates reaping a bonus in the general election of about 5% (Carey and Polga- Hecimovich, 2006). There is no evidence of any primary penalty whatsoever. Yet, if all parties competing in the general elections have primaries, the primary bonus hypothesis is nullified as it is impossible for every party to increase their relative electoral support. Not in vain,