Controlling Political Corruption in Latin America: Institutional Constraints on Executive Power
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Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Dissertations Graduate College 12-2017 Controlling Political Corruption in Latin America: Institutional Constraints on Executive Power George G. Lluberes Western Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Lluberes, George G., "Controlling Political Corruption in Latin America: Institutional Constraints on Executive Power" (2017). Dissertations. 3193. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/3193 This Dissertation-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONTROLLING POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER by George G. Lluberes A dissertation submitted to the Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Political Science Western Michigan University December 2017 Doctoral Committee: Mahendra Lawoti, Ph.D., Chair Kevin Corder, Ph.D. Laura Hastings, Ph.D. Susan Pozo, Ph.D. CONTROLLING POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER George G. Lluberes, Ph.D. Western Michigan University, 2017 Corruption has remained resilient in Latin America. In just two decades, six Latin American executives from five distinct countries have faced impeachment processes resulting in removals from office due to issues surrounding corruption. Certainly, corruption has been a longstanding challenge to Latin American democracy and good governance. This study analyzes this phenomenon while discerning between grand and petty corruption. By focusing on executive corruption specifically, this study creates a more nuanced understanding of what affects corruption at high-levels of government in Latin America. Why have political corruption levels in Latin America remained stagnant in spite of significant gains in political and economic liberalization? In answering this question, I examine the institutional conditions that lead to differences in levels of executive corruption. A quantitative analysis of 17 countries over 20 years (1996-2016) finds that constraints imposed by the judiciary on the executive are a key element in explaining differences in executive corruption levels. Next, a qualitative analysis of two cases, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, seeks to shed light on the causal mechanism(s) through which judicial constraints lower executive corruption. An in-depth examination of individual components of judicial independence revealed the importance of judicial selection procedures and how constraints imposed on executive power are effective in curtailing executive corruption. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This has been an arduous intellectual endeavor, one which has tested me in more ways than I could have imagined. I am forever indebted to those who pushed me every step of the way, those who offered words of encouragement and advice, those with whom I debated my ideas, as well as those that challenged them. To all of you I say thank you. First, I express my sincerest gratitude to my parents, Laura and Jorge, which have cemented in me the values that have allowed me to succeed. To my mother, for being my greatest supporter and many times, my best investigative resource, this achievement is yours as much as it is mine. To my father, your belief in unrelenting progress and hard work has been my guide. To my brother Alan, I have learned from you the amazing things one can accomplish by having passion. Second, the countless hours spent by my committee in guiding, broadening, and challenging my thoughts have been invaluable. Dr. Mahendra Lawoti, Dr. Kevin Corder, Dr. Laura Hastings, and Dr. Susan Pozo, thank you for all of the effort you put in revising my work. These years of scholarship have been incredibly fruitful because of you. Finalmente, a Dios mi eterno agradecimiento por las victorias y los obstáculos que Él ha puesto en mi camino. George G. Lluberes ii Copyright by George G. Lluberes 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS AKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..ii LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….ix LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..x PART I CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM OF EXECUTIVE CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA……………………………………………….1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6 Corruption and Political Liberalization…………………………………………………………………..6 Corruption and Economic Liberalization.……………………………………………………………..11 Corruption and Accountability……………………………………………………………………………..11 Executive Power………………………………………………………………………………………………….20 Measuring Corruption………………………….…………………………………………………………..…23 Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………24 Significance of the Research……………………..……………….……………………………………………………….25 Outline of the Dissertation…..……………………………………………………………………………………………..25 iii Table of Contents -- continued CHAPTER II. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS………………………………………………………………………………………………………..26 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………26 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….28 Executive Corruption……………………………………………………………………………………………28 Research Design…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..32 Accountability………………………………………………………………………………………………………33 Executive Power Concentration.………………………………………………………………………....35 Judicial Nomination, Removal and Constraints…..………………………………………………..36 Democratic Quality………………………………………………………………………………………………37 Democratic Experience………………………………………………………………………………………..37 Education…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….38 Ethnic Fractionalization…...…….………………………………………………………………………..….38 Civil Service………………………………………………………………………………………………………….39 Openness to Trade……………………….……………………………………………………………………..39 Regulation……………….……………………………………………………………………………………….…40 iv Table of Contents – continued CHAPTER Natural Resource Endowments………………….…………………………………………………….…40 Hypotheses and Operationalization…………………………………………………………………….40 Methods………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………43 Findings……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………....48 Political Liberalization………………………………………………………………………………………...50 Economic Liberalization…………………………………………………………………………………..….51 Ethnic Fractionalization……………………………………………………………………………………….52 Constraints on the Executive……………………………………………………………………………….52 Strength of Predictors…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….58 Robustness…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….59 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..60 PART II III. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………….63 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………63 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………64 Vertical Accountability…………………………………………………………………………………………64 v Table of Contents -- continued Horizontal Accountability…………………………………………………………………………………….66 Executive Power………………………………………………………………………………………………….68 Research Design……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..72 Case Selection……………………………………………………………………………………………………..73 Methodology and Data…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..78 Executive Corruption…………………………………………………………………………………………..78 Political Party Institutionalization………………………………………………………………………..79 Judicial Independence and Constraints………………………………………………………………..80 Legislative Shield………………………………………………………………………………………………….81 IV. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..82 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………82 High Executive Corruption………………………………………………………………………………………………………83 The Sun Land Corporation Case…………………………………………………………………………..92 Party Institutionalization………………………………………………………………………………………………………..94 Concentration of Executive Power.……………………………………………………………………………………….101 Executive’s Constitutional Term…………………………………………………………………………101 Non-Legislative Power…………………………………………………………………………………….…102 Legislative Shield……………………………………………………………………………………………….104 vi Table of Contents -- continued Analyzing Judicial Independence…………………………………………………………………………………………..108 Nomination of Justices: Erosion of Independence……………………………………………..109 Judicial Council…………………………………………………………………………………………………..114 Tenure and Removal of Justices…………………………………………………………………………116 Financial Independence…………………………………………………………………………………….118 Judicial Constraints in Practice….……………………………………………………………………….120 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...126 V. URUGUAY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….128 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 128 Low Levels of Executive Corruption…..………………………………………………………………………………….129 Party System Institutionalization…………………………………………………………………………………………..131 Executive Power……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………137 Executive’s Constitutional Term……………………………………………………………………….……137 Non-Legislative Power………………………………………………………………………….……………….138 Legislative Shield………………………………………………………………………………….……………….140 Judicial Independence……………………………………………………………………………………….………………….143 Nomination and Removal of Tenure of Justices…………………………………………………….143 Financial Independence………………………………………………………………………………………..145 Judge Salaries……………………………………………………………………………………………………….147