Shapiro, Ian (1956–) to enable. He calls democracy a “subordinate foundational good” for that reason: democracy David Switzer and Elisabeth Ellis is valuable because it offers the best means to oppose domination and not because democracy Ian Shapiro is Sterling Professor of political is itself a good to be desired (Shapiro 1999 : 21). science and Henry R. Luce Director of How does Shapiro know that democratic the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center institutions are the best bulwarks against domi- for International and Area Studies at Yale nation? Rather than positing some absolute University. Born in South Africa, he received good and reasoning from it to necessary institu- his BSc with honors from Bristol University in tions, Shapiro practices what he calls “adaptive” the UK. Shapiro holds PhD and JD degrees political theory. There has never been agreement from Yale University, and served as the chair of on principles of justice, and even if there were a the Department of Political Science at Yale single best account of justice for human beings, from 1999–2004. He is a fellow of the American we have no reason to believe that most people Academy of Arts and Sciences and the would assent to it. Moreover, our empirical American Philosophical Society, and a member knowledge of how politics works evolves contin- of the Council on Foreign Relations. uously to account for ever-changing conditions, At this writing, Shapiro’s most important while being permanently subject to necessary scholarly contribution is his theory of imperfections (such as the resistance to observa- democratic justice. Taking a realistic perspective tion of important determinants of political out- on political life, Shapiro begins with the fact comes like leadership and norms, not to mention that advocates for democracy have always been the inherent contingency of political outcomes clearer about what they oppose than what themselves). These considerations should they plan to accomplish. This reactive character humble the ambitions of utopian political phi- of democratic movements is no flaw, but the losophy and political science alike, and (as we authentic expression of what human beings can discuss below) Shapiro does expend consider- achieve politically under endemic conditions of able scholarly energy in applying the limits of uncertainty. We may not know what is politically possible knowledge of politics to inappropri- possible at any given moment – indeed, Shapiro ately ambitious schools of thought in both fields. counsels suspicion of “vanguardist” theorists Out of these critical considerations, however, whose inflexible and dogmatic ideas can lead to come Shapiro’s programs for doing defensible a lot of human suffering – but we do have a political theory and political science in the strong sense of injustice when it confronts us. adaptive and problem-driven (as opposed to Though there is no one sense of justice whose method-driven) modes. deficit we can measure, and though there are as In fact, Shapiro’s substantive work deliber- many kinds of injustice as there are contexts for ately collapses the disciplinary distinctions it, still most people associate injustice with the between political theory and political science experience of powerlessness. “People demand (1989: 66). For example, when Shapiro analyzes justice to escape domination” (Shapiro 2012 : 1). the strategic political dynamics facing agents Whether it comes from oppressive states, seeking cooperation under conditions of entrenched social hierarchies, or even from uncertainty, he employs the wisdom of within the family, domination prevents people canonical theorists like Thomas Hobbes and from pursuing their interests, and for Shapiro, Niccolò Machiavelli, but also the insights of the ordinary pursuit of life is what politics ought present-day political scientists like Robert
The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0934 2
Axelrod. It is very difficult if not impossible to and inaccurate for others (e.g., estate tax repeal, achieve stability by dominating every other where the intensity of preferences is much actor as all three scholars would tell us in their lower) (Shapiro 2011 ). different ways. With long-run domination of Whether discussing economic policy, social everyone else off the table, a rational actor will science method, or philosophical ideals, pursue the second option of making sure that Shapiro tends to orient his positive claims by no one else dominates us either. Considerations criticizing related and competing positions. like these lead Shapiro to advocate domestic Thus, for example, his recent work on non- democratic institutions to oppose domination, domination, though it begins and ends with and also the policy of containment in interna- crucial substantive arguments about justice as tional relations (Shapiro 2007). nondomination, is mainly a working through Shapiro takes his insight where he finds it: of the alternative positions of Rawls, Walzer, from canonical philosophers to contemporary Foucault, Habermas, Pettit, and Skinner political scientists, and from detailed case (Shapiro 2012 ). An extremely prolific theorist studies to mass interviews. His most compre- writing in several academic disciplines, Shapiro hensive account of democratic theory to date, is not easily identified with any one school Democratic Justice ( 1999 ), uses a series of case of thought; between this and his habit of studies of political conflicts in context to orienting his positive arguments around cri- deepen and illustrate general considerations tiques of interlocutors, it is perhaps not sur- about political life. In work with Michael prising that Shapiro is better known today as a Graetz on the debate in the United States over critic than for his more important substantive estate tax repeal, Shapiro and his coauthor con- contributions to democratic theory. Another duct interviews and historical research to reason Shapiro is difficult to categorize stems address the puzzling problem of how a policy from his problem-driven, adaptive method. benefiting a few at the expense of a huge Ever wary of armchair scholarship, Shapiro majority could attract broad bipartisan support opposes the use of strategies, ethical or meth- (Graetz and Shapiro 2005 ). The main insights odological, that obscure reality for the sake of of his theory of democratic justice, such as his dogma. It is this consistent commitment to focus on real interests and attention to insiders’ approaching the political world in a way that wisdom, shape his inquiries into specific topics: prioritizes political reality over ideology that thus Shapiro consistently argues that groups makes Shapiro’s criticisms so strong, and his are not monolithic but full of competing own place in the ideological world so difficult players with disparate interests, and he consis- to define. tently opposes rationalist theorists who would In his first book, The Evolution of Rights in pre-judge the results of democratic decisions. Liberal Theory ( 1 9 8 6 ) , S h a p i r o p r o v i d e s a n i d e o - In this way, Shapiro is practicing a relatively logical history of the development of the concept minimalist, Schumpeterian form of democratic of rights in liberal thought, tracing it from theory, in which constraining domination and Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to John Rawls other “bads” takes priority over the conven- and Robert Nozick. Over the course of his later tional democratic imperative to pursue the works, Shapiro relies on results from this study of “common good.” Unlike some contemporary liberal theory, including, for example, the fact that political theorists, Shapiro’s engagement with there never has been agreement about the political science is central to his work: for substantive contents of natural rights, or the example, he demonstrates that political sci- related conclusion that the presumption of a pre- ence’s median voter theorem is not “right” or political order must always be counterfactual “wrong,” but accurate for some types of policy (this last bolstered with evidence drawn from (e.g., social security privatization in the US, across empirical and historical social science). about which voters have intense preferences), Shapiro’s method in Evolution i s d e v e l o p e d i n 3 opposition to two alternative approaches. First, previous ideas of justice, specifically those of his method proceeds “in contrast to those the liberals and the communitarians. He commentators who identify ‘modernity’ with a opposes the liberal attempt to reserve a space single-unit idea” (Shapiro 1986 : 5), referring spe- beyond politics for private life, and argues that cifically to Leo Strauss, C. B. Macpherson, and the ubiquity of politics and conflict makes this Alasdair MacIntyre. Rather than presuming that impossible. While sympathetic to the goals of an idea can be defined by a singular ideology, he communitarian thinkers like Walzer and approaches rights in liberal thought as being a MacIntyre, he is critical of their appeals to con- group of related doctrines that are complex and sensus, and builds his own principle of justice quite variable. Second, Shapiro’s work in Evolution on the democratic “intuition that dissensus is stands opposed to the history of ideas approach an essential ingredient to the just ordering of taken by Quentin Skinner and his followers. any domain of human interaction” (Shapiro While Shapiro does not deny the importance of 1999 : 14). locating work within its historical context, his As already noted, Shapiro describes democ- main goal in the book is “comprehending con- racy as a subordinate foundational good. He temporary ideas historically” (Shapiro 1986 : 11), argues that it is foundational in the sense that and thus he finds it necessary to go beyond fram- no other commitment should be considered ing ideologies purely within historical context. In prior to or more vital to justice than the com- the concluding chapter of his book, Shapiro prac- mitment to democracy. In calling democracy a tices the type of thinking that illuminates the rest subordinate good, Shapiro is arguing that while of his career. By engaging in a historical search for goods should be pursued through democratic the development of rights, treating the topic means, they should not be sacrificed to democ- as the evolution of an ideology, Shapiro questions racy. “Valuable as democratic participation is … the kind of “ideal theory” practiced by contempo- it is not the point of the exercise” (Shapiro rary theorists like Rawls and Nozick, calling 1 9 9 9: 2 3 ) . D e m o c r a c y i s n o t v a l u a b l e f o r i t s instead for a more empirical approach that own sake, but only for the superordinate goods emphasizes “factual arguments about the causal it provides. This does not mean, however, that structure of the world which is where problems of democracy is merely instrumental for Shapiro, social justice arise” (Shapiro 1986 : 304). as he argues that there is inherent value in pur- Answering the call for a new methodological suing collective good through democratic approach to the practice of political thought means. In making the case that democracy is that he made in The Evolution of Rights in the best way to pursue the goal of justice, Liberal Theory, Shapiro turned to a theory of Shapiro recognizes two specific elements of democratic justice. Shapiro’s articles, “Three democracy that are responsible for its effective- Ways to Be a Democrat” ( 1994 ) and “Elements ness: collective self-government and institu- of Democratic Justice” (1996), both of which tionalized opposition. The values of collective were reprinted in The State of Democratic self-government will be expressed differently Theory (2003a), provided the basis of what in different contexts, and decision rules ought eventually became Democratic Justice ( 1999 ), likewise to vary depending on circumstances, which as we have already discussed contains but they ought always to ensure that people the most detailed account to date of his affected by a policy have a say in making it. theory (though the forthcoming Justice Institutionalized opposition works toward jus- against Domination will provide a new ver- tice by allowing for periodic turnovers in sion). In Democratic Justice, Shapiro proposes power, by encouraging stability through allow- to overturn the prevailing wisdom that the ing dissenting groups to focus on the present goals of democracy and justice conflict with government rather than bringing down the each other. Proceeding in typical fashion, state, and by ensuring that there is transpar- Shapiro constructs his argument against ency in the use (and abuse) of power. With 4 these principles as his starting point, Shapiro the action for the agent performing it, often applies these ideals of democratic justice to through the use of linguistics and hermeneu- political conflicts endemic to all stages of tics. Shapiro and Wendt are critical of this human life, from the governing of children to approach too, arguing that while “the phenom- the eventual ending of life. enal realm should not be granted a privileged Some of Shapiro’s most influential contribu- status that delimits the bounds of inquiry, nei- tions have been his critiques of the methodo- ther should it be arbitrarily disprivileged” logical approaches taken by his fellow scholars. (Shapiro & Wendt 1992 : 210). The biases of the While criticizing dogmatic forms of inquiry, interpretivist school lead them to ignore plau- however, Shapiro has also devoted consider- sible causal explanations for social behavior, able professional energy to encouraging and this is as large a problem for the authors as scholars in many different fields to pursue the complete reliance on empiricism. problem-driven research from a realistic per- Shapiro and Wendt suggest that a different spective and to learn from each other’s work. approach, that of the realists, offers a better Thus Shapiro’s many edited books include con- way of interpreting social science phenomena. tributions by scholars from a wide variety of Realism differs from interpretivism in that it disciplinary backgrounds, each of whom con- asserts that the self-understanding emphasized stitutes part of an effort to grasp a pressing by the interpretivists is itself a product of causal political problem. Among his more exclusively processes. It stands against empiricism, how- critical works, probably the best known is his ever, in that it looks to the unobservable world Pathologies of Rational Choice , w r i t t e n w i t h for explanations of social actions, as well as to political scientist Donald Green, which we dis- what can be observed. “By itself observation is cuss below (1994). However, Shapiro has also not an adequate foundation for knowledge: written important critical essays about the Existence claims always involve a combination future of political theory, specifically, and the of observation and theory-based inference” field of political science, more generally; we (Shapiro & Wendt 1992 : 211). What realism turn to these here. does for scientific practice is to clear away epi- In his 1992 article with Alexander Wendt, stemic constraints, Shapiro and Wendt argue, “The Difference that Realism Makes: Social and in doing so it allows for a more complete Science and the Politics of Consent,” Shapiro study of social phenomena. Once again, it is argues against two forms of social inquiry, through critique that Shapiro builds his logical empiricism and interpretivism, con- substantive contribution, this time arguing for cluding in favor of a third alternative of realism. the realist study of social science largely Shapiro and Wendt argue against logical through a critique of its alternatives. empiricism, which is grounded in the idea that Shapiro also criticizes the conduct of science should be about building general political science as a whole, as well as the role scientific laws and testing them predictively, by that political theorists have played in it. His noting that the nature of social life makes it argument in “Problems, Methods, and Theories very difficult to come up with law-like state- in the Study of Politics, or What’s Wrong with ments about society without ignoring some of Political Science and What to Do about It” its essential features. For the authors, “an (2002) is twofold. First, he argues that the move empiricist approach to explanation may exhibit toward method- or theory-driven rather than systematic biases that lead their proponents to problem-driven approaches in political science ignore the opaque dimensions of causal rela- have been a detriment to the scientific tions” (Shapiro & Wendt 1992 : 205). In opposi- enterprise. Second, he argues that political the- tion to this approach we have the interpretivists, orists have had a role in this problematic who argue that social action should be under- development, and that they should make stood by attempting to decode the meaning of strides toward mitigating it. 5
Regarding the first problem with method- “problematizing redescription” of convention- driven research, Shapiro is critical of work that ally understood political phenomena; rede- studies a phenomenon in order to vindicate a scription would allow us to see new possibilities particular theoretical approach, rather than to that were occluded by conventional accounts. understand a problem, since such work will Shapiro has not only been critical of tend to construct an empirical world that con- political theorists’ place in the discipline of forms to its expectations. Of course, Shapiro political science, but also of the practice does not argue that theoretical approaches of political theory itself. In his 1989 article, cannot influence the search for problems in “Gross Concepts in Political Argument,” he the world of political science; instead, he criticizes political theorists for relying too asserts that they should not drive the research much on “gross concepts,” which he defines agenda. His further complaint with the the- as what happens when theorists “reduce what ory-driven mode of scientific inquiry stems are actually relational claims to claims about from its reductive quality. Rather than looking one or another of the components of the rela- at all possible explanations of a phenomenon, tion” (Shapiro 1989 : 51). Arguments about theory-driven research will only look at the the priority of autonomy put forth by any explanations that best fit the theory being pos- number of liberal theorists make this error, ited. Shapiro responds to the common according to Shapiro. Theorists from Mill to counterargument – that we should adjudicate Rawls to Nozick have claimed that autonomy among competing theories according to their is the major feature of their work, and yet, predictive power – by noting that a focus on Shapiro argues, what they are really arguing prediction makes it likely that areas of politics about is what liberties should be applied to that do not lend themselves to prediction will whom, and at what cost. He is similarly criti- be neglected, and thus that the practice cal of communitarians, dismissing their views will lead political science to focus on phe- as romantic, and arguing that they ignore the nomena because they are easily predicted, ever shifting boundaries of the political “rather than because we have independent world. Shapiro points to two possible reasons reasons for thinking it worthwhile to study for the continued use of gross concepts in them” (Shapiro 2002 : 609). political theory. First, he notes that the use of In his related critique of political theorists, these concepts leads to continued debates, Shapiro complains that they have ceased to which, intentionally or not, can be good for understand the empirical side of political academic careers. Second, he points to the knowledge, and that they focus far too much need in political theory to derive moral on arguing with each other, rather than beliefs from a few basic “foundationalist” exploring substantive problems in politics. principles, pointing out that this need is far Consistent with his usual method, Shapiro’s more difficult to overcome. It is the human sharp critiques of political science and the role need for unifying and simplifying concepts of political theorists in it support substantive that drives political theorists to use gross recommendations for how to fix the problems concepts. In order for the discipline of he identifies. Shapiro argues that political theo- political theory to advance, theorists must rists have a large role to play in turning political transcend disciplinary boundaries and science research back to problem-driven address the empirical questions that their questions. He recommends that political conceptual inquiries naturally raise: “If a theorists become more engaged with the theory of freedom is partly a theory of empirical side of the discipline, and that they enabling and restraining conditions, many, if should be active in identifying what is at stake not most, of the most pressing and politically in the systematic study of politics. Among charged questions will be empirical ones other tasks, theorists should engage in about their nature” (Shapiro 1989 : 66). 6
Providing a similar critique of theory- that rational choice theory can have a place in driven methodology within the realm of the study of politics as long as it becomes more empirical political science, Shapiro, writing empirically accountable. The authors provide with Donald P. Green, criticizes the prevalent a couple of substantive recommendations to use of rational choice theory in political sci- that end. First, they suggest that rational choice ence. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory theorists must begin more systematically to (1994), Green and Shapiro describe “the syn- develop empirical tests of their theories, and drome of fundamental and recurrent meth- avoid constantly updating their theories to fit odological failings rooted in the universalist the data, unless they plan on retesting them. aspirations” of contemporary political sci- Second, they call on rational choice theorists ence (Shapiro 1994 : 33). Much like Shapiro’s to stop attempting to universalize rational other criticisms, this one focuses on rational choice theory and to recognize the limits to choice scholars’ commitment to vindicating the theory. the theory, rather than to a research program In addition to his substantive theoretical and designed to understand and explain actual critical work, Shapiro has also made important political phenomena. This flaw in rational contributions to the furthering of political choice theory manifests itself in three ways theory education. His political theory text- according to Green and Shapiro. First, it book, The Moral Foundations of Politics shapes its new theories according to evidence (2003b), grew out of a course he has taught at that disproves previous theories, and they Yale for decades; the book has been an influen- argue that this is done in a way that avoids tial work in making the field of political theory actual empirical testing of the formulated intelligible to a larger audience. Additionally, theories. The second point, closely related to his introductory course, from which the book the first, is that when rational choice theorists takes its name, has been made available to the do test their hypotheses, they escape rigorous wired world for free through Yale’s online open scientific scrutiny by either using the variety course series. of unobserved thought processes tied up in Shapiro has written dozens of books and arti- rationality to explain away empirical failures, cles, many more than could be summarized in or by testing their hypotheses in ways that do the brief space available to us here. We have not necessarily fit the theory being tested. chosen to focus on his theory of democratic jus- The third reason for their critique lies in how tice and on a few of the projects that directly rational choice theorists select and interpret support that theory, but we could also have the evidence for their theories. Green and discussed Shapiro’s forays into constitutional Shapiro argue that rational choice theorists law, his readings of canonical figures, his writ- often will accept supporting empirical evi- ings on international relations, his engagements dence, while completely ignoring strong evi- with groups of scholars like the deliberative dence against their theories. They also note democrats, his writings on democratic transition that rational choice theorists will focus on in South Africa, or any of the many other topics exceedingly obscure and small bits of evi- on which Shapiro has written. The same skep- dence to prove the force of their theories. tical yet hopeful voice emerges in each of these Finally, they will arbitrarily restrict the texts, reminding us that even though we face domain of their theories, according to Green daunting odds in our efforts to understand how and Shapiro. democracy can work for justice and against Green and Shapiro’s criticism of rational domination, we ought to continue to try. choice theory focuses mainly on its empirical results. Above all else, they are concerned with SEE ALSO: Contingency ; Democracy ; theories’ congruence with the empirical real- Distributive Justice ; Justice ; Liberal Theory ; State ities of the political world, and they do believe of the Discipline in Political Science 7
R e f e r e n c e s Shapiro , I. ( 2003b ) The Moral Foundations of Politics . New Haven, CT, and London : Yale Graetz , M. J. and Shapiro , I. ( 2005 ) Death by University Press . a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing Shapiro , I. ( 2007 ) Containment: Rebuilding Inherited Wealth . Princeton, NJ : Princeton a Strategy against Global Terror . Princeton, University Press . NJ : Princeton University Press . Green , D. P. and Shapiro , I. ( 1994 ) Pathologies Shapiro , I. ( 2011 ) The Real World of Democratic of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique Theory . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University of Applications in Political Science . New Haven, Press . CT, and London : Yale University Press . Shapiro , I. ( 2012 ) “ On Non-domination ,” University S h a p i r o , I . ( 1 9 8 6 ) The Evolution of Rights in Liberal of Toronto Law Journal , 62 ( 3 ), 293 – 336 . Theory . C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Shapiro , I. and Wendt . A. ( 1992 ) “ The Difference that Press . Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Shapiro , I. ( 1989 ) “ Gross Concepts in Political Consent ,” Politics and Society , 20 ( 2 ), 197 – 223 . Argument ,” Political Theory 17 ( 1 ), 51 – 76 . Shapiro, I. ( 1994 ) “ Three Ways to Be a Democrat ,” Further Reading Political Theory , 22 ( 1 ), 124 – 51 . Shapiro , I. ( 1996 ) “ Elements of Democratic Justice ,” Shapiro , I. ( 1996 ) Democracy’s Place . Ithaca, Political Theory , 24 ( 4 ), 579 – 619 . NY : Cornell University Press . Shapiro , I. ( 1999 ) Democratic Justice . New Haven, Shapiro , I. ( 2005 ) The Flight from Reality in the CT, and London : Yale University Press . Human Sciences . Princeton, NJ : Princeton Shapiro , I. ( 2002 ) “ Problems, Methods, and University Press . Theories in the Study of Politics, or: What’s Shapiro , I. (forthcoming) Democracy Wrong with Political Science and What to Do and Distribution . Princeton, NJ : Princeton about It ,” Political Theory , 30 ( 4 ), 588 – 611 . University Press . S h a p i r o , I . ( 2 0 0 3 a ) The State of Democratic Shapiro , I. (forthcoming) Justice against Theory . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Domination . Cambridge, MA : Harvard Press. University Press .