1 Hume and the Problem of Theory and Practice in Philosophy and Political Theory

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1 . David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739–1740], ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; second edition edited by P.H. Nidditch, 1978), Book 3, part 2, section 12, paragraph 7, p. 572. 2 . David Hume, “The Sceptic” [1742], in David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 6, p. 161. 3 . David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding [1748], ed. Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955 and Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), section 1, paragraph 6, p. 18. 4 . Hume’s major works are: Treatise , Essays, Moral, Political and Literary [1741– 1742, with subsequent editions adding new essays], An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [1751], ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688, 6 volumes [1754–1762], (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1777], ed. Norman Kemp Smith (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947). 5 . Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954, 1970), title page and chapter 1. 6 . “A collection of rules, even of practical rules, is termed a theory if the rules concerned are envisaged as principles of a fairly general nature, and if they are abstracted from numerous conditions which, nonetheless, necessarily influence their practical application.” Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying, ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’,” in Hans Reis, ed. Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 61. 7 . “Conversely, not all activities are called practice , but only those realizations of a particular purpose which are considered to comply with certain generally conceived principles of procedure.” Kant, “On the Common Saying, ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’”. 8 . The term “cash value” was used by William James in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981). It was meant to be metaphorical and applicable to metaphysical and religious questions. But the pragmatists were regularly accused by their critics of being crude materialists, the philosophical exponents of the values of a “commercial” society. 9 . There are notable exceptions, many of which are mentioned in the notes below. In addition to these works, see also: Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), Terence Ball, ed. Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977), Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human

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Activity (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), Ian Shapiro ed., Theory and Practice (Nomos 37) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Richard E. Flathman, “Theory and Practice, Skepticism and Liberalism,” in Flathman, Toward a Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) and Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individuality in Political Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), Stephen Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984). 10 . Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) and “On the History of Theory and Praxis” in Terence Ball, ed. Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977). See also Nathan Rotenstreich, Theory and Practice: An Essay in Human Intentionality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), which covers similar ground and, additionally, covers pragmatism. 11 . For an account of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy as a practice, or way of life, see Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 12 . Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics , trans. David Ross, revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Book 6, sections 2–3, pp. 138–140 on contemplation; Book 1, section 3, p. 3 on not expecting precision from the study of human affairs. 13 . This is also the thesis of Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), who distinguishes action, work and labor from each other. Lobkowicz was probably influenced by Arendt. 14 . Lobkowicz, “On the History of Theory and Praxis,” p. 24. His interpretation of Marx, which discounts the importance of Marx’s famous “Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach,” is controversial (see his Theory and Practice , chapter 25, pp. 409ff.). 15 . John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1929). 16 . William James, “Pragmatism and Common Sense,” lecture 5 of Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking . 17 . On the utilitarians, see Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955). 18 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” p. 161. 19 . Hume, Treatise , Book 3, part 2, section 12, paragraph 7, p. 572. 20 . Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism [usually translated as “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”], trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Book 1. 21 . Sextus accused the Academic skeptics of denying that any knowledge of reality was possible and of being dogmatic in their denial. Diogenes Laertius, in his chapter on Pyrrho in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers , however, claimed that it was Pyrrho who denied the reality of the world around him, and that he denied this reality in practice. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers , trans. C.D. Yonge, paragraph 3. In the rest of his account, however, Diogenes accurately summarized Sextus Empiricus’s version of Pyrrhonism. Notes 259

22 . Ancient skepticism was revived in the modern world, according to Richard Popkin, first by Catholics like Erasmus, who defended the authority of the Pope and the church against Luther’s certainty that each individual could discover the truths of Christianity on his own by reading the Bible. Thus when Descartes and other modern philosophers like Berkeley and Hume attempted to refute “Pyrrhonian” skepticism, this was not simply a “straw man” but a recognizable philosophical position. See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 23 . Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill Company, 1962), Book 10, chapter 9, 1181b15, p. 302. W.D. Ross and J.L. Ackrill translated this passage as “philosophy of human nature,” while Ernest Barker translated it as “philosophy of things human.” See Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1112, J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Ethics (London: Faber & Faber, 1973), p. 181, and Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 359. Aristotle defined man as a “political animal” in the Politics , Book 1, chapter 2, 1253a. On the (mis)translation of Aristotle, see Arendt, The Human Condition , p. 23. 24 . According to Pascal, “We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they wanted to divert themselves, they wrote the Laws and the Politics, to amuse themselves. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious. The most philosophic [thing] was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; if they presented the appearance of speaking of great matters, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible.” Blaise Pascal, Pensees , no. 331, trans. W.F. Trotter (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1958). Cited in Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 22. Arendt believed that philosophers were hostile to politics and that this hostility originated with Plato. 25 . Plato, The Republic , trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1955, 1974, 1987), Book 9, 592b, p. 358. See also Book 5, 472c–d, p. 201. One motive for emphasizing the non-practical elements in Plato was to absolve him of the charge of “totalitarianism” that had been leveled by Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, The Spell of Plato (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957). See Leo Strauss, “Plato” in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). 26 . “[T]he Academy was always, under Plato, ‘primarily a school of philosophic statesmen’,” according to Desmond Lee, quoting Francis Cornford. See Lee, “Translator’s Introduction,” Plato, The Republic , pp. xvii–xviii. Plato described his efforts in Syracuse in his “Seventh Letter,” in Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII (London: Penguin, 2005). 27 . Aristotle, Politics , trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Book 4, chapter 1, 1288b21. Aristotle’s “advice” to tyrants is in Book 5, chapter 11, 1313a34–1315b10, pp. 218–224. 260 Notes

28 . At the end of part 2 of Leviathan , Hobbes compared his task to that of Plato in the Republic and decided that his theory was more practicable because he does not require that rulers learn mathematics, only the “Science of Naturall Justice” expounded in Leviathan . “I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), chapter 31, last paragraph, p. 408. In “A Review and Conclusion,” at the end of Leviathan (second to last paragraph, p. 728), Hobbes wanted his book taught in the universities in order to teach “the Preachers, and the Gentry” (who in turn teach the people) their duties. 29 . “After I had read over the list of the persons and descriptions elected into the Tiers Etat, nothing which they afterwards did could appear astonishing. Among them, indeed, I saw some of known rank, some of shining talents; but of any practical experience in the state, not one man was to be found. The best were only men of theory.” “The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false.” Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France [1790] (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1910, 1960), pp. 38, 59. 30 . Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 303. 31 . Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, expanded edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 2009). 32 . As the reference to Bismarck indicates, this problem of the relationship between theory and practice in politics overlaps the debate between “idealism” and “realism” in politics. This debate is most salient in international relations theory, but applicable to politics generally. It overlaps the theory/practice problem because a particular political ideal may be sound in theory but impractical and therefore not “realistic” or “possible.” There is also the question of ethics and these ethical and methodological issues often overlap the theory/practice issue, but are not identical to it. For a portrayal of Hume as a “liberal realist,” see Frederick Whelan, Hume and Machiavelli: Political Realism and Liberal Political Thought (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). 33 . Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History: A Study in the Development of Liberal Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 1, p. 28. 34 . For example, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, 1936). 35 . On this view, theory is separated from truth, but it becomes part of practice, as the practice of justifying a particular interest. Obviously, the paradox or contradiction is that the theorist of ideology claims his own theory is true and therefore an exception to his general theory. Mannheim believed intellectuals were a distinct class that could somehow be objective in their theories, but no one today would be so naïve. Today, however, theorists of Notes 261

ideology tend to avoid this whole issue by reinterpreting ideologies as consti- tutive of reality, rather than simply reflecting or masking it. 36 . Hume’s “absolute scepticism in speculation very naturally brought him round to Toryism in practice; for if no faith can be had in the operations of human intellect, and one side of every question is about as likely as another to be true, a man will commonly be inclined to prefer that order of things which, being no more wrong than every other, he has hitherto found compatible with his private comforts. Accordingly Hume’s scepticism agreed very well with the comfortable classes, until it began to reach the uncomfortable: when the discovery was made that, although men could be content to be rich without a faith, men would not be content to be poor without it, and religion and morality came into fashion again as the cheap defence of rent and tithes.” The quote is from a deleted passage in Mill’s essay “Bentham.” The passage is reprinted as footnote 1 in John Stuart Mill Essays on Literature and Society , ed. J.B. Schneewind (New York: Collier Books, 1965), p. 288. It is quoted in Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 235. 37 . Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 2009) and Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 38 . Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Achieving Our Country (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998). 39 . See Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory,” and Stanley Fish, “Consequences,” in W.J.T. Mitchell, ed. Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). See also, Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989). 40 . Hume, Treatise , Book 3, part 1, section 1, paragraph 5, p. 458. In the conclusion, Hume compared this distinction to the difference between anatomy and painting. Anatomy and painting were later used to characterize “the different species of philosophy” in the first section of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding . 41 . Immanuel Kant, “On Universal Practical Philosophy,” in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics , eds. Peter Lauchlan Heath and Jerome B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 41. 42 . Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics views political science as the “master” science of the good and Book 10 seems to preview the Politics , suggesting that these works need to be understood together. This is also because Greek ethics at this time is understood as the ethics of the citizen, rather than the ethics of a private person. See, A.W.H. Adkins, “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” Political Theory , vol. 12, no. 1, February 1984, pp. 29–49. 43 . Note that Lobkowicz’s distinction between three original “free” ways of life was reduced by the Stoics to two and that these were identified with particular philosophical schools. The lives of the philosopher and the statesman are subsumed by the Stoics under the life of virtue and the Epicureans get identified with the life of pleasure. The source for the doctrines and practices 262 Notes

of the schools was Cicero, but Michael Prince claims the division between speculative and practical philosophy was a product of the Enlightenment. Michael B. Prince, “A Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy and Literature,” in John Richetti ed. The Cambridge History of English Literature, 1660–1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 407. 44 . Kant, “On Universal Practical Philosophy,” p. 42. 45 . Whereas rules of prudence usually take the form, “if you want X [in this case, happiness], you must do Y,” Kant insisted the formula for prudence was universality: “Because everyone wishes to be happy, which is presupposed of all, he must observe this.” “On Universal Practical Philosophy,” p. 43. For the different types of reasoning involved between Kant’s ethics and prudential or happiness-oriented ethics, see the first essay of Kant, “On the Common Saying, ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’”. 46 . On this alternative division, see Prince, “A Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy and Literature,” p. 396. Hume’s conception of “moral science” is in the “Introduction” to Treatise . “Logic” was confused with psychology up through the twentieth century, as was epistemology, which was supposed to be the foundation of logic. 47 . Kant, “On Universal Practical Philosophy,” p. 42. 48 . “For many English-speaking philosophers, Division I of [Heidegger’s] Being and Time releases us from our obsession with propositions and mental contents. It shows us that our everyday practices and skills are more fundamental than our theoretical assertions. Heidegger becomes a route back to pragmatism ... ” Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 179. For a similar use of Wittgenstein, see Theodore Schatzki, Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 49 . Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny, eds. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (New York: Routledge, 2001). 50 . Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Sherry Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” Comparative Studies in Society and History , vol. 26, no. 1, 1984, pp. 126–166. 51 . David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York: Macmillan, 1983). This leads to the criticism that philosophers like Bloor (and Wittgenstein, on Bloor’s reading) reduce knowledge and ethics to anthropology and to the criticism that this “sociologism” is relativist. A similar controversy in the philosophy of science surrounds the interpretation of Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1st edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). These concerns about relativism also dovetail with the discussion of knowledge as ideology mentioned above. 52 . The original effort here was Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1958). For a critique of all these theories of practices as failing to explain social behavior, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practice: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions (Chicago and Cambridge, UK: University of Chicago Press and Polity Press, 1994). 53 . Stephen Toulmin, “The Recovery of Practical Philosophy,” The American Scholar , vol. 57, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 337–352 and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Notes 263

“Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). 54 . Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984 (New York and London: Routledge, 1988). See also, Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995) and Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Some Philosophy Departments, such as the one at the University of Liverpool, offer an M.A. in “philosophy as a way of life.” For a recent attempt to portray the “ways of life” of 12 philosophers, see James Miller, Examined Lives: From Socrates to Nietzsche (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 55 . A combination of practical and practice “turns” was also apparent in ethical theories that argued (paradoxically) that most ethical theory was irrel- evant to ethical practice and that truly being ethical requires dispensing with ethical theory. See the pragmatist and historicist statement on ethics of Joseph Margolis, Life without Principles: Reconciling Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 1996) and the argument that, despite theoretical differences, in practice there is an overlapping consensus on what behavior is ethical, in James P. Sterba, The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics (New York : Oxford University Press, 2005). For disparage- ment of ethical theory, see also Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) and those ethical theories influenced by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, such as John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). 56 . A similar concern was behind Max Weber’s famous lectures on science and politics as “vocations” (or ways of life) and is reflected in the continuing interest in them. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). 57 . In political theory, this was referred to as the “political turn.” See Manfred Steger, “Imperial Globalism, Democracy and the ‘Political Turn’,” Political Theory , vol. 34, no. 3, January 2006, pp. 372–382. 58 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 235. The quote is from a deleted passage in Mill’s essay “Bentham.” The passage is reprinted as footnote 1 in Mill, Essays on Literature and Society , p. 288. 59 . David Hume, “My Own Life,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary , paragraph 2, pp. xxxii–xxxiii. 60 . Hume, “My Own Life,” paragraph 21, p. xl. 61 . Quoted by Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 203. Cumming cites Mill’s review of Brodie’s History of the British Empire in the Westminster Review 2 (October 1824), p. 346. 62 . In an influential nineteenth century interpretation of Hume, T.H. Huxley argued that Hume’s desire for fame “was the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies, after the third part ... of the Treatise , in 1740, and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely to yield, and did in fact yield, a much greater return of that sort of success which his soul loved.” Hume (London, 1879), pp. 10–11; quoted in Ernest Campbell 264 Notes

Mossner, “Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David Hume,” in V.C. Chappell, ed. Hume (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 9. 63 . As Mounce explains, most philosophers and historians of ideas who are not Hume scholars see his empiricism as a version of logical positivism, and this accounts for the neglect of his “humanist” and naturalist side. (By “naturalism” is meant the reduction of ideas, reason and knowledge to psychology and sentiments of human nature, a project that most Hume scholars attribute to him.) H.O. Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 5. 64 . See, for example, the debate between the conservative political theorist Donald Livingston (who sees Hume as the first conservative, before Burke, because he diagnosed and opposed ideological politics) and liberal theorist John Stewart (who sees Hume as a precursor to the Reform Whigs and Liberals of the nineteenth century), Donald W. Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” and John B. Stewart, “The Public Interest vs. Old Rights,” in Hume Studies , vol. 21, no. 2, November 1995, pp. 151–188. 65 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, pp. 235–236. Cumming’s book is one of the few to focus on the relationship between theory and practice in philosophy and political theory. Cumming devotes two chapters to Hume, but also covers Cicero, Polybius, Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Bentham and both Mills. 66 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 236. “In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.” ( Treatise , introduction, paragraph 5, pp. xix–xx). 67 . Hume, Treatise , Book 3, part 1, section 1, paragraph 26, p. 469; italics added. 68 . Hume, Treatise , Book 1, part 4, section 7, paragraph 7, p. 268. 69 . Hume, Treatise , Book 3, part 3, section 6, paragraph 6, pp. 620–621. 70 . Hume, Treatise , Book 3, part 3, section 6, paragraph 6, pp. 620–621, italics added. 71 . “[Hume] applied his psychological theory to the problem of the relation between a psychological theory and its practical application. Having begun by comparing his theory, as an analysis of men’s minds, to an anatomical dissection of their bodies, he introduced a further analogy to painting in order to acknowledge the psychological fact of the discrepancy between this analysis and its practical application.” Cumming, Human Nature and History, vol. 2, p. 238, italics added. I would distinguish a discrepancy between a dissected body or mind and a living body or mind (as in the passage on virtue as comparable to colors, but having no effect on practice) and the relationship between anatomy and painting, where the painter does not paint dissected bodies, but does use them as an indirect guide to painting living bodies. 72 . Cumming quotes this passage from Bentham’s “Chrestomatia”: “Practice, in proportion as attention and exertion are regarded as necessary to due performance , is termed art: knowledge, in proportion as attention and exertion are regarded as necessary to attainment , is termed science ... In the very nature of the case, they will be found so combined as to be inseparable. Notes 265

Man cannot do anything well, but in proportion as he knows how to do it: he cannot ... know anything but in proportion as he has practiced the art of learning it ... ” Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 238. The passage can be found in the Works of Jeremy Bentham , ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh, 1843), vol. 8, p. 27. 73 . David Hume, “My Own Life,” in Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 5. 74 . According to Peter Millican, “the most natural explanation is that Hume himself had already come to see, within a short time of publishing the Treatise , many of the problems that Reid would later fix on. This explanation is corroborated by plenty of textual evidence for Hume’s philosophical dissatisfaction with the Treatise , ranging over a fifteen year period from the 1739 letter to Kames, the Abstract, the Hutcheson letter of March 16, 1740, the appendix from the end of 1740, at least one essay from 1742, the Enquiry of 1748, and the letters to Elliot in 1751 and to Stewart in 1754. On this account, Hume wrote the Enquiry not as a mere ‘recasting’ of Book 1 of the Treatise , but as a new work which took over from the Treatise the central ‘Philosophical Principles’ that Hume wanted to retain, refocused them onto his principal target while steering away from the irrelevances of detailed associationist psychology, and greatly strengthened the central core of his message, which was to be a clear manifesto for inductive empirical science and against superstitious metaphysics.” Peter Millican, “Hume’s ‘Compleat Answer to Dr. Reid” (2006), section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5, p. 12. Available at http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican.html 75 . Those who believe the earlier and later theories are different include Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 206, J.T. King, “The Place of the Language of Morals in Hume’s Second Enquiry ,” in D.W. Livingston and J.T. King, eds. Hume: A Re-evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), John O. Nelson, “Two Main Questions Concerning Hume’s Treatise and Enquiry ,” Philosophical Quarterly , 81, July 1972, pp. 333–350, Peter Millican, “The Context, Aims and Structure of Hume’s First Enquiry ,” in Millican, ed. Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Annette Baier, “Why Hume Asked Us Not to Read the Treatise ,” in Baier, ed. Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). Nelson draws an analogy between Hume’s shift between the Treatise and Enquiries and Wittgenstein’s shift from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations . For others who see Hume as anticipating the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations , see Peter Jones, Hume’s Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982), chapter 5; and “Strains in Hume and Wittgenstein,” in Hume: A Re-evaluation ; John W. Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 86–87, 104; and P.F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 14–21. 76 . For example, see Ira Singer, “Nature Breaks Down: Hume’s Problematic Naturalism in Treatise iv,” Hume Studies , vol. 26, no. 2, November 2000, pp. 225–244 and David Pears, Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 266 Notes

77 . Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [1764] (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823), chapter 1, section 5, p. 14. 78 . David Hume, “My Own Life,” in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary . The following summary is drawn from Mossner, The Life of David Hume and from the brief biography in F.L. Lucas, The Art of Living: Four Eighteenth Century Minds: Hume, Horace Walpole, Burke, Benjamin Franklin (New York: Macmillan, 1960), which in turn is derived from Mossner’s biography. I have added a few things from Hume’s autobiography and letters. 79 . Letter # 374 to the Countess de Boufflers, March 1, 1767 and letter #383 to Hugh Blair, April 1, 1767, in J.Y.T. Greig, ed. The Letters of David Hume , vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), pp. 123, 134. 80 . Quoted in Mossner, The Life of David Hume , p. 51. The exact nature of Hume’s beliefs remains controversial. His friends insisted that his anti-cleri- cism concealed his real Christian beliefs. In his essay on miracles, Hume wrote piously, but probably ironically, “our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason.” See David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Hendel (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), section 10, part 2, paragraph 27, p. 140. Many believe that Hume was an atheist (and that Philo represents his position in the Dialogues on Natural Religion ). Others see Hume’s insistence that “skeptics must also be skeptical of their skepticism” as leading to an “attenuated Deism” (a belief in a creator, but skeptical that we can infer anything else). See J.C.A. Gaskin, “Hume on Religion,” in David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 322. Another possibility is that Hume was simply an agnostic who believed we could know nothing about these topics. See James Noxon, “Hume’s Agnosticism,” in V.C. Chappell, ed. Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1968). 81 . Letter to Countess de Boufflers, July 1764, quoted in Mossner, Life of David Hume , p. 464. 82 . Letter from Adam Smith, L.L.D. to William Strahan, Esq., November 9, 1776. A copy, along with Hume’s autobiography, is at the beginning of Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary . 83 . L.A. Selby-Bigge, “Introduction” to David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), T.H. Huxley, Hume (New York: Harper & Brothers, no date). 84 . A.J. Ayer, ed. Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 4, 10, 22. See also Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952) and Hume (New York: Hill & Wang, 1980); republished as Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 85 . Norman Kemp Smith, “The Naturalism of David Hume (I),” Mind , new series, vol. 14, no. 54, April 1905, pp. 149–173, “The Naturalism of David Hume (II), Mind , vol. 14, no. 55, July 1905, pp. 335–347, and The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1941; Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 86 . Mossner, The Life of David Hume . See also Roderick Graham, The Great Infidel: A Life of David Hume (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2004), which corroborates Mossner. Notes 267

87 . Jerome Christensen, Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). 88 . Mossner seems similarly naïve in his account of this episode (pp. 313–315). Although publisher Andrew Millar led the suppression of Hume’s History , Mossner portrays Hume as easily adapting to the new reality and signing a new contract with Millar. So, rather than capitulating to a monopoly, Hume is portrayed as a savvy businessman. 89 . See Robert Zaretsky, The Philosopher’s Quarrel: Rousseau, Hume and the Limits of Human Understanding (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and David Edmonds and John Eidenow, Rousseau’s Dog: A Tale of Two Great Thinkers At War in the Enlightenment (New York: HarperCollins, 2006). 90 . The letter was never sent to anyone and thus appears as a therapeutic exercise. The letter is in J.Y.T. Greig, ed. The Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), vol. 1, letter #3, pp. 12–18. The letter is also included as an appendix to David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume .

2 Hume’s Naturalism and Skepticism in the Treatise and His Appeal from Theory to Practice

1 . All references to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (T) refer to Book, Part, Section, paragraph and page number. For example, “T. 1.2.5.19, 60” refers to Treatise , Book 1, Part 2, Section 5, paragraph 19 and page 60. Page numbers refer to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; second edition edited by P.H. Nidditch, 1978). References to the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) refer to Section, Part and paragraph. Page numbers refer to David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hendel, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1955 and Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995). 2 . The Advertisement, which can be found in the Selby-Bigge edition of the Enquiries , reads: “Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature: A work which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers, who have honoured the Author’s Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the Author never acknowledge, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigoted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.” 3 . Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [1764] (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823), dedication and chapter 1 (introduction). 268 Notes

4 . Hume identifies three types of skepticism in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , section 12: 1) a Cartesian skepticism that precedes philosophy by doubting everything; 2) a Pyrrhonian skepticism that is subsequent to theorizing and doubts reason, the senses and common sense; 3) a mitigated or Academic Skepticism that corrects Pyrrhonism with common sense, and which Hume adopts. In the Treatise , Hume also characterizes as a skeptic the ordinary man who automatically rejects as “metaphysics” all difficult or abstract theories (T. introduction, paragraph 3, xiv) and the person who submits “blindly” to nature (T. 1.4.7.10–11, 269–270). In Hume’s essay, “The Sceptic,” however, the skeptic is not skeptical about reason or the senses but rather about philosophy, which usually errs by seizing on one or two principles and trying to apply them to everything else; the skeptic also believes that moral dispositions are hardwired by nature into each of us at birth, so morality, in practice, is “subjective.” Finally, the skeptic doubts that philosophers have much to teach us that is not also available to a person with common sense. 5 . Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1950), introduction, pp. 5–7, 8–10. 6 . For the debate over the meaning of these passages see the essays in V.C. Chappell, ed. Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1968) and W.D. Hudson, ed. The Is- Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969). 7 . For example, Alfred Cobban, In Search of Humanity: The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History (London: Jonathan Capte, 1960); Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Meridian, 1963), pp. 293–294, 338; Robert C. Solomon, History and Human Nature (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), chapter 4. 8 . A.J. Ayer, ed. Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 4, 10, 22. See also Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952) and Hume (New York: Hill & Wang, 1980); republished as Hume: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 9 . A.D. Lindsay, “Introduction” to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J.M. Dent, 1911), vol. 1, p. xi; and Isaiah Berlin, “Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism,” in Berlin, Against the Current (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979). 10 . Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy [1637 and 1641 respectively] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998). 11 . John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, vols. 1 and 2 [1690] (New York: Dover Publications, 1959) and George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous [1713] (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954). “Empiricism” derives from the Greek word empeiria , which means experience . 12 . Norman Kemp Smith, “The Naturalism of David Hume (I),” Mind , new series, vol. 14, no. 54, April 1905, pp. 149–173, “The Naturalism of David Hume (II), Mind , vol. 14, no. 55, July 1905, pp. 335–347, and The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1941; Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 13 . Norman Kemp Smith, “The Naturalism of David Hume (I),” p. 152. Today, naturalism in philosophy means a purely scientific understanding of Notes 269

philosophical problems. For example, “naturalist epistemology” means studying the brain scientifically in order to understand the source of knowledge. See, for example, W.V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, Columbia University Press 1969).This differs from two other uses of the term naturalism, which are relevant to Hume. According to Agassi, “the traditional sense of ‘naturalism’ is straightforward and seems to have been instituted by Pierre Bayle to desig- nate the view of the world as devoid of all supernatural intervention, the view of the world as ‘disenchanted’, to use the equivalent term accredited to Max Weber. Clearly, all Epicureans and neo- Epicureans, Hume included, were naturalists in this sense. This is not the sense in which [Norman Kemp] Smith uses it in his 1905 essay, ‘The Naturalism of Hume’. The first part of this essay opposes T.H. Green’s traditional reading of Hume as a philosopher who streamlined the ideas of Locke and Berkeley and proposes to replace it with the view of Hume’s view as ‘naturalism’. ‘Hume’s ... naturalistic view of reason’, we are told (p. 158) ‘is a new theory of belief’: Humean belief, on Smith’s new reading, ‘is not caused by knowledge but precedes it, and as it is not caused by knowledge it is not destroyed by doubt’ (p. 165).” Joseph Agassi, “A Note on Smith’s Term ‘Naturalism’,” Hume Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (April 1986), p. 93. I am using the term in Kemp Smith’s sense, where knowledge is “reduced” to beliefs (or knowledge is reduced to “psychology”); but this sense also implies Bayle’s sense of a secular world without God. For the view that Hume’s naturalism is compatible with the current sense, see Steven Luper, “Naturalized Epistemology,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6 , ed. Edward Craig (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 721–722. 14 . Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume , introduction. The naturalist interpretation opposes the interpretations of Hume as either a true skeptic or as a forerunner of logical positivism. It is the dominant interpretation among Hume scholars, although the other interpretations prevail among philosophers generally. For others who interpret Hume as a naturalist, see: Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Antony Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Wade L. Robison, “David Hume: Naturalist and Metasceptic,” in D.W. Livingston and J.T. King, eds. Hume: A Re-evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976); Robert Connon, “The Naturalism of Hume Revisited,” in David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi and Wade L. Robison, eds. McGill Hume Studies (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1976); J. Kemp, Ethical Naturalism: Hobbes and Hume (London: Macmillan, 1970); Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflection on Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); P.F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University, 1985); and H.O. Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). Although Kemp Smith denied that Hume was a skeptic, the naturalist interpretation of Hume raises the question of whether or how Hume distinguishes between his “causal” explanation of beliefs (which are not skeptical) and the “justification” of those beliefs as valid or true. Louis Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) argues that for Hume “causal” judgments that are “stable” are justified. Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s 270 Notes

Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 2002) argues that Hume uses what Garrett calls “the title principle” to justify beliefs: “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not it can have no title to operate on us.” (T. 1.4.7.11, 270; italics added) Hume’s problems with justifying our ideas of the continued existence of objects and personal identity arise because they are not “stable” or “lively” in terms of his naturalist principles. 15 . Both the Treatise (Book 1, part 3, section 16) and the later Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (section 9) discuss “of the reason of animals.” 16 . Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, and Luper, Naturalized Epistemology. As we will see below, Hume rejects resolving epistemology into psychology if the latter means reducing thought to nerve functions (as it does for neuroscientists) because he wants to base knowledge on subjective experience . But the problem of “psychologism” (the “illicit” reduction of logic to psychology) haunts his naturalism, as it does all subjectivist epistemologies. Quine, however, explicitly advocated a return to psychologism and wanted to hand epistemology over to psychologists and cognitive scientists. 17 . Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue Or Merit” [1699], in Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times [1711], ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Frances Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises [1726], ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). 18 . Morality is “subjective” in the state of nature (whatever helps me is good, whatever hurts me is bad), but reason tells us what general rules we should obey in order for there to be social peace. The purpose of the state is to establish and enforce these rational and prudential “laws of nature.” See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), chapter 6, paragraph 7, p. 120 (morals); chapters 14 and 15 (laws of nature), chapter 17 (the purpose of the state). 19 . Shaftesbury, who had been tutored by Locke, believed that Locke’s moral theory was based on selfishness. This was also the opinion of Hume. See Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), Appendix 2 (“Of Self-Love”), paragraph 3, p. 89. 20 . He called virtue “the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride.” Bernard Mandeville, “An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” in Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits [several editions 1714–1732], ed. F.B. Kaye (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 51. The essay is also reprinted in D.D. Raphael, ed. British Moralists, 1650–1800, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 234. 21 . Paul Russell, The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) argues that the Treatise is more overtly irreligious than is usually thought. 22 . The contents of Book 1, Of the Understanding, of the Treatise is as follows: Part 1. Of ideas, their origin, composition, abstraction, connexion, etc. Sect. I. Of the origin of our ideas. Sect. II. Division of the subject. Sect. III. Of the ideas of the memory and imagination. Sect. IV. Of the connexion or association of ideas. Sect. V. Of relations. Sect. VI. Of modes and substances. Sect. VII. Of abstract ideas. Notes 271

Part 2. Of the ideas of space and time. Sect. I. Of the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time. Sect. II. Of the infinite divisibility of space and time. Sect. III. Of the other qualities of our idea of space and time. Sect. IV. Objections answered. Sect. V. The same subject continued. Sect. VI. Of the idea of existence, and of external existence. Part 3. Of knowledge and probability. Sect. I. Of knowledge. Sect. II. Of probability, and of the idea of cause and effect. Sect. III. Why a cause is always necessary. Sect. IV. Of the compo- nent parts of our reasonings concerning cause and effect. Sect. V. Of the impressions of the senses and memory. Sect. VI. Of the inference from the impression to the idea. Sect. VII. Of the nature of the idea or belief. Sect. VIII. Of the causes of belief. Sect. IX. Of the effects of other relations and other habits. Sect. X. Of the influence of belief. Sect. XI. Of the probability of chances. Sect. XII. Of the probability of causes. Sect. XIII. Of unphilosophical probability. Sect. XIV. Of the idea of necessary connexion. Sect. XV. Rules by which to judge of causes and effects. Sect. XVI Of the reason of animals. Part 4. Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy. Sect. I. Of scepticism with regard to reason. Sect. II. Of scepticism with regard to the senses. Sect. III. Of the antient philosophy. Sect. IV. Of the modern philosophy. Sect. V. Of the immateriality of the soul. Sect. VI. Of personal identity Sect . VII. Conclusion of this book. 23 . Again, “empiricism” derives from the Greek word empeiria , which means experience . 24 . Norton argues that Hume’s choice of “level” is arbitrary because he considers Hume to be “post-skeptical,” by which Norton means that Hume believed anyone who had read Berkeley would automatically be converted to skepticism. According to Norton, then, Hume’s intentions in Book 1 are simply to rehearse skeptical arguments in order to then move on to the theory of the passions in Book 2, etc. Consequently, it does not matter where you start. David Fate Norton, “Introduction” to Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This is a fascinating interpretation of the Treatise , but I think it better characterizes Hume’s later position as an Academic Skeptic in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , where Hume explicitly writes that Berkeley’s theories “form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted” (EHU 12.3.15, footnote). 25 . Similarly, at the beginning of Book 2, on the passions, Hume rejected the search for their origin: “It is certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their corre- spondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them would lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy” (T. 2.1.1.2, 275–276). 26 . Peter Millican, “The Context, Aims and Structure of Hume’s First Enquiry ,” in Millican, ed. Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 33. 272 Notes

27 . “[P]hilosophers ... immediately upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest of mankind in those exploded opinions, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue identically and uninterruptedly the same in all their interrupted appearances.” (T. 1.4.2.53, 216) “When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its [abstract reasoning’s] conclu- sions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and it is difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained with difficulty” (T. 3.1.1.1, 455; brackets added). 28 . One reason they did this was because they believed readers could verify the truth of their theories by performing the same experiments on themselves. 29 . “Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking” (T. 1.1.1.1, 1–2). 30 . S ome Hu me s c hol a r s a r g ue t h at Hu me ’s r e a l p o sit ion i s ph i lo s oph ic a l r e a l i sm, not idealism. See, for example, John P. Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (London & New York: Manchester University Press, 1983), P.J.E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Fred Wilson, The External World and Our Knowledge of It: Hume’s Critical Realism, an Exposition and a Defense (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), Galen Strawson, The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and the essays debating Hume’s realism or idealism in Rupert Reid and Kenneth A. Richman, eds. The New Hume Debate (London & New York: Routledge, 2000). As Wright’s title indicates, if Hume was a realist, his realism was “skeptical” and not direct or easy to prove. In practice, of course, we all, including Hume, believe the world is real: “whatever may the reader’s opinion at the present moment ... an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world” (T. 1.4.2.57, 218). 31 . “After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it – ‘I refute it thus. ’” James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson , notes by John Wilson Croker (Albany, NY: James B. Lyon, 1889), volume 1, chapter 18, p. 375. 32 . Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1950), introduction, pp. 5–7, 8–10. 33 . David Hume, “An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature” (1740), in Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Charles Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), pp. 193–194. Notes 273

34 . Ira Singer, “Nature Breaks Down: Hume’s Problematic Naturalism in Treatise iv,” Hume Studies , vol. 26, no. 2 (November 2000), pp. 225–244. 35 . According to Stroud, Hume’s “‘explanation’ amounts to nothing more than the claim that we get the idea of continued existence of bodies by feigning or supposing the existence of bodies that continue to exist when unper- ceived ... Not only is that no explanation, it does not help Hume establish the dominance of the imagination over the understanding.” Stroud, Hume , pp. 108–109. 36 . Hume does not see it this way, apparently because, as he notes, in two previous instances in Book 1 he had explained other ideas as fictions of the imagination. One fictional idea is of a perfect standard of equality, which mathematicians employ despite the fact that our experience is of an imperfect standard of equality (T. 1.2.4.25, 49). The second fictional idea derives from applying our experience of duration in time, which consists of noticing a succession of changes in surrounding objects, to objects that do not appear to change so as to believe that unchangeable objects nevertheless exist in time (T. 1.2.5.29, 50–51). Both explanations, according to Hume, involve the mind imagining something that is not experienced and then believing it. Hume sees his explanation of the “fiction” of continued existence as similar. But the idea of a perfect standard of equality is something only “mathematicians” suppose, and the idea that an object that appears not to change actually exists in time (let alone the idea of time, as distinct from experience of a succession of changes) seems as though it probably does not occur “naturally,” and required other developments in human society before it could even be conceived. The belief in the continued existence of objects is more basic to human survival than ideas of unchangeable objects in time and perfect equality and therefore ought to be explainable according to some theoretical principle. Hume claims that philosophers were so convinced of the continued existence of objects that they resolved the contradiction with a new theory that held that there are both perceptions and objects: perceptions were distinct and interrupted, but the objects continued to exist independent of the perceptions. But Hume believes this theory was wrong. This philosophical system ... is the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embraced by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. The imagination tells us, that our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects. (T. 1.4.2.52, 215) The philosophers resolved the contradiction “by feigning a double existence” of both perceptions and objects. (T. 1.4.2.52, 215) For an interpretation of Hume that claims that Hume himself actually endorses this philosophical theory of double existence (and that his reference to “monstrous offspring” 274 Notes

is actually a compliment), see Wilson, The External World and Our Knowledge of It , pp. 592–606. 37 . In contrast to my interpretation here, most interpreters of T. 1.4.2 try to “fix” Hume’s mistakes. See Ayer, Hume: A Very Short Introduction, chapter 3, pp. 57–63. The tradition of fixing Hume’s mistakes goes back to H.H. Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). According to Bennett, Hume’s argument about the continued existence of objects is “extremely difficult, full of mistakes, and taken as a whole—a total failure; yet its depth and scope and disciplined complexity make it one of the most instructive arguments in philosophy.” Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 313. It is therefore instructive (and tempting) to try to fix it. A similar effort has gone into trying to fix Hume’s theory of personal identity. 38 . For similar assessments, see Singer, Nature Breaks Down and David Pears, Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 39 . Hume’s discussion is restricted to personal identity as an idea , rather than as a “passion”: “we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject ... ” (T. 1.4.6.5, 253). 40 . “I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (T. 1.4.6.4, 252). 41 . That is, to the extent the question of a self is not simply a verbal dispute, Hume believes he has solved the problem with his theory of how the mind creates the fiction of the self. Hume even goes on, in the following paragraph to “explain” our ideas about “simplicity” as due to more “feigning” by the mind: “An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity , and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object” (T. 1.4.6.23, 263; italics added). 42 . There are various interpretations of what Hume meant in this passage. Most interpreters agree with Kemp Smith that the second principle is a corol- lary of the first. Some note that if this is the case, it undermines Hume’s account of identity in general. For example, see Jane L. McIntyre, “Hume on the Self,” McGill Hume Studies (San Diego, CA: Austin Hill Press, 1976), p. 81. McIntyre, however, goes on to “improve” Hume’s theory so that it will “work.” I interpret the passage to mean that from the “mind’s” perspective there are only distinct existences with no connections. The empiricist theory is completely directed “outward” and consists solely of experiences from outside. The mind could never derive an impression of itself that could be anything other than the totality of experiences. It could therefore never distinguish between the self and experience. But either interpretation reveals the flaw in the empiricist project: it cannot account for some essen- tial experiences. Notes 275

43 . According to Pears, Hume’s recantation of his theory of personal identity suggests he sensed something wrong with his whole system: “His specifi- cations of the two unacceptable ways of improving his theory of personal identity both involve revisions of the fundamental principles of his system. This suggests that his problem is global. In fact, in the Appendix he writes like a philosopher who has followed his basic principles consistently only to find that in the end, instead of recommending a theory, he has reduced it to absurdity. In such cases it is notoriously difficult to know how far back to go before starting again.” David Pears, “Hume’s Recantation of His Theory of Personal Identity,” Hume Studies , vol. 30, no. 2 (2004), p. 260. 44 . Nicholas Phillipson has interpreted this shift in an intriguing way: “Here was evidence that the purpose of the passions was to preserve, not corrupt. Their task was to rescue us from unfettered reason, which seemed bent on our destruction, not our salvation. They returned us to the time-bound world of common life which alone could offer us the prospect of happiness.” Nicholas Phillipson, Hume (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p. 46. 45 . I believe this interpretation works, whether we adopt the Norman Kemp Smith thesis that Books 2 and 3 were written first, or the thesis that the Treatise was composed in the order in which it appears. It works better with the Kemp Smith interpretation because then the theory/practice problem emerges directly out of the skepticism of Book 1. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume . 46 . “It is evident, that pride and humility, though directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness ” (T. 2.1.2.2, 277; italics added). 47 . “It is evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that it is not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it” (T. 2.1.11.4, 317). 48 . L.A. Selby-Bigge, in his 1893 introduction to the two Enquiries , demon- strated the numerous differences between Hume’s Treatise and his later Enquiries and “Dissertation on the Passions.” Selby-Bigge also included tables comparing the works. See David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals , ed. L.A. Selby- Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. xi-xl. 49 . David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hendel, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 162. The topic is covered from pp. 160–162 (section 12, part 1). 50 . “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been 276 Notes

made to that purpose” (Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , section 5, paragraph 2, footnote 19, p. 43). 51 . David Hume, “A Dissertation on the Passions,” in Hume, The Philosophical Works, vol. 4 , eds. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964; reprinting the 1882 London edition), pp. 139–166. Compassion is discussed in section 3, paragraph 4, p. 157, and is defined as “an uneasiness in the sufferings of others.” 52 . Those who believe the earlier and later theories are different include Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History: A Study in the Development of Liberal Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, p. 206. J.T. King, “The Place of the Language of Morals in Hume’s Second Enquiry ,” in D.W. Livingston and J.T. King, eds. Hume: A Re-evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), John O. Nelson, “Two Main Questions Concerning Hume’s Treatise and Enquiry ,” Philosophical Quarterly 81 (July 1972), pp. 333–350. Nelson draws an analogy between Hume’s shift between the Treatise and Enquiries and Wittgenstein’s shift from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations . For others who see Hume as anticipating the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations , see Peter Jones, Hume’s Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982), chapter 5; and “Strains in Hume and Wittgenstein,” in Hume: a Re-evaluation ; John W. Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 86–87, 104; and P.F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism (New York: Columbia University, 1985), pp. 14–21. 53 . Annette Baier, “Why Hume Asked Us Not to Read the Treatise ,” in Baier, Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). As M.A. Stewart noted concerning Hume’s public repudiation of his Treatise : “He either did not wish to be remembered for a relative failure, or wished to gloss over changes of mind since 1740, or genuinely believed the Enquiries preserved enough of his philosophy in a form that did not give unnecessary hostage to his critics. It was, nevertheless, a rationalization. The drastic change in the posthumous role of Section III [on the association of ideas] is consistent with this—a change in philosophical conception at the expense of literary balance.” M.A. Stewart, “Two Species of Philosophy: The Historical Significance of the First Enquiry ,” in Peter Millican, ed. Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 81. 54 . David Hume, “My Own Life,” in Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hendel, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 5. 55 . For example, T.H. Huxley, Hume (New York: Harper and Brothers, no date), p. 11. 56 . Peter Millican, “The Context, Aims and Structure of Hume’s First Enquiry ,” in Millican, ed. Reading Hume on Human Understanding , pp. 49–52 and Stephen Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). 57. Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 1, p. 159. 58 . Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , section 1, paragraph 10, p. 16. 59 . For examples of Hume’s use of “my system” in Book 1, see T. 1.3.6.9, 91; T. 1.3.10.6, 121; T. 1.3.11.5, 125; T. 1.3.13.11, 149; T. 1.3.16.8, 178; T. 1.4.2.23, Notes 277

199; T. 1.4.2.31, 201. Hume also refers to “his” system throughout Books 2 (including some of the section titles) and 3. 60 . Academic Skepticism is introduced at the beginning of section 5, paragraph 1 as the “skeptical solution of these doubts” about causation. “The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement, of danger in hasty deter- minations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice.” This is reiterated again in section 12, part 3. 61 . Hume makes only four references to skepticism before part 4: once at T. introduction, paragraph 3, xiv; twice at T. 1.2.5.26, 64, footnote (this directed the reader to the Appendix, pp. 638–639, which was written later); and in Book 1, part 3, section 13 (“Of Unphilosophical Probability”), paragraph 12: “Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again saved by a new direction of the very same principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet it is only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities.” (p. 150) 62 . “reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradic- tions” (EHU 12.2.4, 166). 63 . “It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradic- tions, if it be admitted, that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, present to the mind.” (EHU 12.2.4, 166, footnote). This was the naturalist argument of the Treatise . 64 . “There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection” (EHU 12.3.1, 169). 65 . “By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it” (“Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature,” paragraph 27, pp. 193–194). 66 . T. Appendix, paragraphs 19, 636. The other reference is in paragraph 10, 633. As noted previously, Hume mentioned skepticism twice at Appendix, pp. 638–639, which was written to be a footnote to T. 1.2.5.26. 278 Notes

67 . “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature ... No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others” (EPM 5.2. footnote 19, 43). 68 . “one considerable advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings” (EHU 1.8, 19). The paragraph goes on to make the anatomy and painting arguments from the conclusion of the Treatise , where Hume was referring to the practical implications of his speculative theory of morals. In the first Enquiry , this discussion is applied to epistemology, which now, too, must have practical implications. In addition, Hume promises practical-minded readers relief: “We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after” (EHU 1.12, 21). 69 . “Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice ” (T. 3.1.1.26, 469; italics added). 70 . Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [1764] (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823), dedication and chapter 1 (introduction). 71 . Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind , chapter 1 (introduction), section 6. 72 . “To go quickly through Reid’s other criticisms in turn, the psychology of the Treatise can indeed appear naïvely simplistic both in its classification of ideas, and in attempting to explain so much with three crude associative principles, but the Enquiry evinces no such extreme simplifying ambition, and even hints at a mature awareness that the association of ideas may be too narrow a theoretical base. The Treatise ’s attempt to define belief and other propositional attitudes in terms of force and vivacity is also withdrawn: the Enquiry makes no such attempt; nor does it conflate the operation of custom with that of the associative relations, indeed it specifically distinguishes the two ... and claims only that they are analogous. Reid is particularly scathing about Hume’s views on personal identity and the ontological independence of perceptions, but neither features at all in the Enquiry ; nor do the arguments concerning the immateriality of the soul to which Reid specifically objects. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Enquiry pointedly distances itself from the apparently excessive scepticism of the Treatise with regard to the external world, overtly advocating a mitigated scepticism and making clear from the outset that the existence of the external world is not in doubt. It is debatable whether this represents a real change in Hume’s sceptical outlook, because the Treatise position as developed in I iv 2, I iv 4 and I iv 7 is notoriously obscure. But in the Enquiry , at least, the limits of Hume’s scepticism are greatly clarified, and his presenta- tion is completely purged of the apparent Pyrrhonian excesses that Reid so enthusiastically mocks. “All this can hardly be coincidence, and the most natural explanation is that Hume himself had already come to see, within a short time of publishing Notes 279

the Treatise , many of the problems that Reid would later fix on. This explanation is corroborated by plenty of textual evidence for Hume’s philosophical dissatisfaction with the Treatise , ranging over a fifteen year period from the 1739 letter to Kames, the Abstract , the Hutcheson letter of 16th March 1740, the Appendix from the end of 1740, at least one essay from 1742, the Enquiry of 1748, and the letters to Elliot in 1751 and to Stewart in 1754. On this account, Hume wrote the Enquiry not as a mere ‘recasting’ of Book I of the Treatise , but as a new work which took over from the Treatise the central ‘Philosophical Principles’ that Hume wanted to retain, refocused them onto his principal target while steering away from the irrelevances of detailed associationist psychology, and greatly strengthened the central core of his message, which was to be a clear manifesto for inductive empirical science and against superstitious metaphysics.” Peter Millican, “Hume’s ‘Compleat Answer to Dr. Reid” (2006), section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5, p. 12. Available at http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican.html 73 . Hume alludes to Reid’s insults in his letter to Blair: “As to one particular Insinuation, I rather choose not to take notice of it because I could not properly reply to it without employing a Style, which I would not willingly use towards one who has the Honor of being the Name of your Friend.” P.B. Wood, “David Hume on Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind on Principles of Common Sense: A New Letter to Hugh Blair from July 1762,” Mind, new series vol. 95, no. 380, October 1986, p. 416. 74 . Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind , chapter 1, section 5, p. 14. 75 . James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposi- tion to Sophistry and Skepticism [1770] (London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1778). 76 . Wood, “David Hume on Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind on Principles of Common Sense,” p. 416. 77 . Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , introduction. 78 . Hume, “An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature,” paragraph 1, p. 183. 79 . David Fate Norton, “Hume and His Scottish Critics,” in David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi and Wade L. Robison, eds. McGill Hume Studies (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1976), pp. 323–324. 80 . Heiner F. Klemme, “Scepticism and Common Sense,” in Alexander Brodie, ed. The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 132. 81 . Wood, “David Hume on Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense,” p. 415.

3 The Systematic Theory of Theory of the Treatise of Human Nature

2 . David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983) , section 1, paragraph 10, p. 16. 3 . “The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be entered upon” (T.1.1.2.1, 8). 4 . Mark Blackwell, “Preposterous Hume,” in Alexander Dick and Christine Lupton, eds. Theory and Practice in the Eighteenth Century: Writing Between Philosophy and Literature (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008). 5 . Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History: A Study in the Development of Liberal Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 200–201. 6 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, pp. 165–166. 7 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 237. 8 . “All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations ... .which two or more objects bear to each other” (T. 1.3.2.2, 73). “Reason or science is nothing but the comparison of ideas, and the discovery of their relations” (T.3.1.1.24, 466). 9 . Thus in Book 1, part 3, section 15 of the Treatise , Hume formulates general “rules by which to judge of causes and effects.” 10 . “But though education be disclaimed by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, it prevails nevertheless in the world, and is the cause why all systems are apt to be rejected at first as new and unusual. This perhaps will be the fate of what I have here advanced concerning belief ... ” (T. 1.3.10.1, 118). 11 . “Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms” (T.1.1.4.6; 12–13). 12 . David Hume, “An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature,” in Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), last paragraph, p. 198. 13 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, pp. 162–163; Cumming’s footnote cites T 455–456, at the beginning of Book 3. 14 . For examples of Hume’s use of “my system” in Book 1, see T. 1.3.6.9, 91; T. 1.3.10.6, 121; T. 1.3.11.5, 125; T. 1.3.13.11, 149; T. 1.3.16.8, 178; T. 1.4.2.23, 199; T. 1.4.2.31, 201. Hume also refers to “his” system throughout Books 2 (including some of the section titles) and 3. 15 . Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , section 9, part 2, paragraph 3, p. 80 and Appendix 2, paragraph 7, p. 91. Hume frequently mentions other philosophers’ systems in both Enquiries . 16 . Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1940). 17 . This is noticed by Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 167. 18 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 159. 19 . G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, 1959). Philippa Foot argues that this problem begins with Moore and then philosophers go back to Hume to find a predecessor. See her introduction to Philippa Foot, ed. Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). For the debate over the meaning of these passages in Hume see the essays in V.C. Chappell, ed. Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: Notes 281

University of Notre Dame, 1968) and Hudson, ed. The Is- Ought Question . For a rejection of Moore as simply espousing a “definist fallacy” that one cannot define one thing (ethics, or the good) in terms of another thing (pleasures), see W.K. Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind , vol. 48, 1938, pp. 464–477; reprinted in Foot, Theories of Ethics .

4 The Behaviorist Theory of Practice of the Treatise

1 . All references in the text to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature refer to Book, Part, Section, Paragraph and page number. For example, “T. 3.2.12.7, 572” refers to Treatise , Book 3, Part 2, Section 12, Paragraph 7 and page 572. Page numbers refer to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; second edition edited by P.H. Nidditch, 1978). 2 . Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianpolis: Hackett, 1983), 3.2.26, 33–34. 3 . Emphasizing the importance of practice, Norton’s paragraph continues: “Only after conventions were tacitly developed by the practice of mutual restraint were the ideas of justice and injustice formed. The same must also be said of the subsidiary ideas of property, right, and obligation.” David Fate Norton, “Editor’s Introduction,” in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , eds. David Fate Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 186. 4 . Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 20. 5 . Russell Hardin presents Hume (along with Hobbes) as a “game theorist” and the inventor of a third conception of social order, in contrast to either an authoritatively imposed order or to voluntary consent or community consensus. In Hume’s conception, social order is an unintended consequence of the short-term mutual interests of individuals. Hardin’s interpretation of Hume implies a theory of practice in which individual actors are essentially rational and react rationally to each other’s actions. They understand that their “avidity” threatens their own self-interest in enjoying their own possessions and they mutually adopt the (rational) rule of stability of possession (and the particular rule that each person should start off with whatever possessions he happens to have at the time). This convention of stability of possessions has the unintended consequence of giving everyone the ideas of justice and property. Other rules of property, such as the rights of occupation or succession for acquiring property and the rule that possessions can be transferred by consent, are adopted. People learn by experience that breaking the rules disrupts social relations as well as induces hostile responses by others. From a game theoretic perspective, each person employs a rational strategy of “tit for tat” in which each person obeys the rules as long as others obey the rules. If someone breaks the rules the others retaliate, etc. (if their response is to also break the rules, then society falls apart). Gradually, people learn it is in their rational self-interest to obey the rules of property (in order to ensure cooperation and avoid retaliation) and a system of justice 282 Notes

gradually develops as an unintended consequence of obeying the rules. This system was not foreseen by anyone at the beginning. Because Hume never discusses game theory (nor likely sees things in this game theoretic way), details like these are not discussed, but could be presumed. The game theoretic account of Hume’s theory of justice, however, does not address the fact that (on Hume’s account) once the system of justice develops, it becomes a new source of moral obligation, different from rational self-interest or expecting “tit for tat” from others. Russell Hardin, David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 6 . Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, p. 194. 7 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, pp. 194–195. 8 . “We come now to the second question we proposed, viz. Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice. This question will not detain us long after the principles, which we have already established. All we can say of it at present will be dispatched in a few words: And for farther satisfaction, the reader must wait till we come to the third part of this book. The natural obligation to justice, viz, interest, has been fully explained; but as to the moral obligation, or the sentiment of right and wrong, it will first be requisite to examine the natural virtues, before we can give a full and satisfactory account of it” (T. 3.2.2.23, 498). 9 . Hume’s references to a spectator in Book 3 appear at T. 3.3.1.8, 577; 3.3.1.14, 581; 3.3.1.21, 585; 3.3.1.30, 591; 3.3.4.2, 607. 10 . Bernard Mandeville, “An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” in D.D. Raphael, ed. British Moralists, 1650–1800, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 234. 11 . Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Martin Oswald (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), Book 10, chapter 2, 1172b–1173a. 12 . Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Eccesiastical Polity (1593), vol. 1 (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1907, 1963), Book 1, chapter 8, paragraph 3, p. 176; Hooker cites Aristotle as well as other authorities to back up this claim. 13 . Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (1625), vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Book 1, chapter 1, section 12, paragraph 1, p. 159, italics added. Hooker also endorsed the “a priori” proof as superior, but believed the popular proof was more suitable for his book. 14 . Barbeyrac’s comment is in a note to Grotius, Rights of War and Peace , above, p. 159. 15 . The “consent of mankind” argument was frequently used to prove the existence of God. In his Natural History of Religion , however, Hume denied that the “consent” of believers was valid, suggesting that they were afraid to admit their doubts. Therefore their “consent” did not count. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991), section 12, paragraph 16. 16 . Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1910, 1960), pp. 84, 31. 17 . “If any difficulty attend this system concerning the laws of nature and nations, ‘twill be with regard to the universal approbation or blame, which follows their observance or transgression, and which some may not think sufficiently explain’d from the general interests of society. To remove, as far as possible, all scruples of this kind, I shall here consider another set Notes 283

of duties, viz. the modesty and chastity which belong to the fair sex” (T. 3.2.12.1, 570). 18 . As the sociologist Michael Mann wrote, “human beings are social, not soci- etal, creatures.” Human societies are overlapping networks of people, not a “totality.” See Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Mann doubtless would be uncomfortable agreeing with Thatcher, as am I! 19 . Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) argues that Hume’s artificial virtues go against nature and therefore require “a beneficial but covert program of systematic social deception to cause these traits to be taken for virtues” (p. 3). This effectively makes Hume into a disciple of Mandeville, though Hume’s motives are presumably more benevolent. 20 . I will discuss the possibility that this silence is evidence of Hume’s skeptical “irony” in Chapter 8. 21 . Letter #13, David Hume to Francis Hutcheson, September 17, 1739, in J.Y.T. Greig, ed. The Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), vol. 1, pp. 32–33.

5 The Practical Philosophies of Skepticism and Commercial Humanism

1 . David Hume, “The Sceptic,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraphs 52, 55, pp. 178, 180. 2 . David Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraphs 2, 5, 10, pp. 269, 271, 274. 3 . A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1936, 1946, 1952), chapter 6. 4 . Adam Smith, Letter to William Strahan, November 9, 1776, paragraph 3. The letter appears at the beginning of Hume’s Essays, History and collected works. The quote in the Essays version is Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , p. xlvi. 5 . David Fate Norton, “Introduction to Hume’s Thought,” in Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 24. 6 . Norton, “Introduction to Hume’s Thought,” p. 25. For other views that claim Hume was a reformer, see Donald Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 8; Donald T. Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), and John B. Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 7 . J.G.A. Pocock, “Virtue, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought,” chapter 2 in Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 50. 8 . It is important to remember that terms like “virtue theory,” “civic humanism” and “commercial humanism” were not used by Hume and 284 Notes

other eighteenth century writers, but are terms that political theorists and historians have applied retrospectively in order to better understand their thought. Imputing virtue theory and commercial humanism to Hume is meant to clarify the meaning of his practical philosophy, but perhaps at the price of imposing too rigid a framework or label, or to the neglect of alternative interpretations. Thus interpretations inevitably vary. 9 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 6, p. 161. 10 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 8, p. 162. 11 . In David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), section 5, “Why Utility Pleases,” part 1, paragraphs 3, 6, pp. 39, 40. 12 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 28, p. 168. 13 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 28, p. 168. 14 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 29, p. 169. 15 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 29, p. 169. 16. Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 6, p. 161. 17 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 30, p. 170. 18 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 33, p. 171. 19 . Ernest Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954, 1970), chapter 6, pp. 66–73. 20 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 35, p. 172. 21 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 36, p. 172. 22 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraphs 52, 55, pp. 178, 180. 23. Hume, “The Sceptic,” footnote to paragraph 52, p. 177 24 . Hume the author is not so naïve that he completely trusts mere reading: “But trust not altogether to external aid: By habit and study acquire that philosophical temper which both gives force to reflection, and by rendering a great part of your happiness independent, takes off the edge from all disor- derly passions, and tranquillizes the mind. Despise not these helps; but confide not too much in them neither; unless nature has been favourable in the temper, with which she has endowed you.” “The Sceptic,” footnote to paragraph 52, p. 179. 25 . Hume explains all this in his “Advertisement” to the 1741 edition of the Essays , which, unfortunately, is not reprinted in the Liberty Classics edition. See also Mossner, The Life of David Hume , pp. 139–142. 26 . The first collection of Essays , published in 1741, contained 15 essays ordered as follows: (1) “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion”; (2) “Of the Liberty of the Press”; (3) “Of Impudence and Modesty”; (4) “That Politicks may be reduc’d to a Science”; (5) “Of the First Principles of Government”; (6) “Of Love and Marriage”; (7) “Of the Study of History”; (8) “Of the Independency of Parliament”; (9) “Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republick”; (10) “Of Parties in General”; (11) “Of the Parties of Great Britain”; (12) “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm”; (13) “Of Avarice”; (14) “Of the Dignity of Human Nature”; and (15) “Of Liberty and Despotism.” 27 . Cicero, On the Orator , Books 1 and 2, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). Cicero’s term is translated variously as culture, manners, education, urbanity, and kindness. For an excellent discussion of Cicero and humanitas , see M.L. Clarke, The Roman Mind: Studies in Notes 285

the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius (London: Cohen & West, Ltd., 1956), chapter 12 “Humanitas.” 28 . On Cicero and the humanist tradition, see also Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 1. 29 . For valuable discussions of Renaissance humanism, see Eugene F. Rice, Jr. The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Humanism,” in Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, eds. The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and James Hankin, “Humanism, Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy,” in Hankin, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Richard Tuck, “Humanism and Political Thought,” in Anthony Goodran and Angus Mackay, eds. The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe (London and New York: Longman, 1990). 30 . The term “classical,” derived from art history, is also used by some historians instead of “humanism” to describe eighteenth century thought, as is reference to “the battle of the books” (between ancients and moderns) and to the classics of antiquity. The period when Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope wrote was referred to, then and now, as the “Augustan Age.” Philip Ayres, Classical Culture and the Idea of Rome in Eighteenth Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Philip Hicks, Neoclassical History and English Culture: From Clarendon to Hume (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), Joseph Levine, The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), Gloria Vivenz, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith’s Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 31 . Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation ; vol. 1: The Rise of Modern Paganism ; (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967). Gay’s vol. 2: The Science of Freedom (1969) addresses the scientific pretensions of the Enlightenment. 32 . Letter #13, Hume to Francis Hutcheson, September 17, 1739, in J.Y.T. Greig, ed. The Letters of David Hume, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), paragraph 4, p. 34. 33 . David Hume, “Of Eloquence,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985) paragraph 3, p. 98. 34 . David Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), a passage that was omitted in later editions. It appears as note “h” in the Liberty Classics edition, p. 623. 35 . In his Natural History of Religion , Hume argues that although Cicero was a religious skeptic, in public and family life he maintained all the Roman religious traditions. It would not be difficult to apply this Ciceronian prudence to Hume himself, who did not like being accused of either deism or atheism. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), section 12, paragraph 14. In Cicero’s “On the Nature of the Gods,” the skeptic Cotta is a Roman priest and is devout in everyday life. 36 . Colin Heydt, “Relations of Literary Force and Philosophical Purpose in Hume’s Four Essays on Happiness,” Hume Studies , vol. 33, no. 1, April 2007, p. 7. 286 Notes

37 . David Hume, “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 5, p. 6. 38 . Hume, “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” paragraph 3, p. 5. 39 . The essays of the 1742 collection were as follows: (1) “Of Essay-Writing”; (2) “Of Eloquence”; (3) “Of Moral Prejudices”; (4) “Of the Middle Station of Life”; (5) “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”; (6) “The Epicurean”; (7) “The Stoic”; (8) “The Platonist”; (9) “The Sceptic”; (10) “Of Polygamy and Divorces”; (11) “Of Simplicity and Refinement”; and (12) “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole.” 40 . David Hume, “Of Essay Writing” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 6, p. 536. 41 . Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” paragraph 1, p. 533. 42 . Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” paragraph 1, pp. 533–534. 43 . Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” paragraph 4, pp. 534–535. 44 . It is also tempting to interpret Hume’s essay “Of Impudence and Modesty” (later withdrawn) as also alluding to the impetuosity of the Treatise and its motto from Tacitus, “Happy the times, when one can think what one likes, and say what one thinks.” 45 . Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” paragraph 5, p. 535. 46 . A good overview of Hume’s esthetics is Peter Jones, “Hume’s Literary and Aesthetic Theory,” in David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Timothy M. Costelloe, Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). 47 . Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” paragraph 6, p. 91. 48 . Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” paragraph 8, pp. 91–92. 49 . Hume applies his discussion from Treatise , Book 2, part 3, section 4, on the violent passions: “When two passions are already produced by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any. The predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. The spirits, when once excited, easily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to imagine this change will come from the prevailing affection.” (paragraph 2, p. 420) 50 . Hume sees other pains like frustration and absence as inducing pleasure, as in delaying the telling of a secret or the climax of a story, or in absence making the heart grow fonder. Delay and absence are painful, but enhance the eventual pleasure. (He adds that the reverse is possible: exaggerating the calamity of the death of a child makes the parents even more aggrieved than they originally were.) 51 . David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraphs 7, pp. 229–230. 52 . Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraph 9, pp. 230–231. 53 . Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraphs 11–12, p. 233; I have combined the end of paragraph 11 with the beginning of paragraph 12. 54 . Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraph 18, p. 237. 55 . Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraph 27, pp. 242–243. Notes 287

56 . For those who miss the absence of religious writers from the humanist tradition, in the last two paragraphs Hume explicitly states that esthetic judgment requires bracketing the absurd religious beliefs of some of the ancient and Renaissance humanists. “It must for ever be ridiculous in PETRARCH to compare his mistress, LAURA to JESUS CHRIST.” “Of the Standard of Taste,” last paragraph, pp. 248–249. 57 . “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraph 33, p. 246. 58 . “Of the Standard of Taste,” paragraph 33, p. 246. 59 . On Hume as a virtue theorist, see Christine Swanton, “Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?” Hume Studies , vol. 33, no. 1, April 2007, p. 91–113 and Jacqueline Taylor, “Virtue and the Evolution of Character,” in Saul Trager, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). For a dissent, which argues that Hume is better understood in the context of the modern natural law theory of Grotius, see James Harris, “Hume on the Moral Obligation to Justice,” Hume Studies , vol. 36, no. 1, 2010, pp. 25–50. The view of Hume as producing a modernized theory of natural law used to be the dominant one and is well expressed in Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). But Cicero’s “On Duties” (Hume’s supposed model) fits virtue ethics better than natural law. Greek and Roman virtue ethics originally overlap natural law theories because natural law originally addresses the question of whether virtue is natural or the product of artificial conventions. Natural law theories diverged from virtue theories as the “rule-following” connotations of Stoic self-denial and natural law set in: Stoics did their duties and natural law consisted of the rules of justice for property, not wisdom, courage or moderation. At the beginning of The Law of War and Peace , Grotius criticized Aristotle’s virtue ethics of a “mean” between extremes because justice must be exact. But some of the virtues survived in the distinction made by natural law theorists between “perfect” and “imperfect” duties, the latter of which Grotius sometimes calls “the law of love” (Grotius, Law of War and Peace , I.I.iii-x.4; I.II.viii.10.) Perfect duties were the duties of justice and were moral duties required of every person. Imperfect duties were virtues like benevolence (good will toward others) or Christian charity ( caritas , love); these were praiseworthy but not required by the duties of justice. Hume’s distinction in the Treatise between the artificial virtue of justice and the natural virtues like benevolence follows the modern natural law distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and so Hume’s moral theory can be placed in the natural law tradition and interpreted as one of several attempts to “modernize” natural law theory. But Hume emphasizes the natural virtues more than the natural law tradition does because these “imperfect duties” derive directly from the sentiments of human nature, and he returns to the ancient emphasis on talents and abilities as virtues because these are useful and agreeable to ourselves and to others. In one place he distinguishes “equity” from justice and classifies equity as a natural virtue: “Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity bear the greatest figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their tendency to the good of society.” (T. 3.3.1.11) This use of equity makes it an Aristotlean virtue. (But elsewhere, he treats equity and justice as a pair.) 288 Notes

60 . For brief accounts of modern virtue theory, see Greg Pence, “Virtue Theory,” in Peter Singer, ed. A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), Roger Crisp, “Virtue Ethics,” in Edward Craig, ed. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 622–626, Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics”, in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Rosaline Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics” (2007), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/ ethics- virtue/). 61 . Both utilitarianism and Kantianism presuppose a “moral sense” in the sense that moral agents must either desire the greatest good of the greatest number or want to will as the maxim of their actions that this maxim be a universal law. But once this assumption is made, the calculations or universal character of the action are matters of reason. Kant famously stated that his moral theory would be valid for a “race of devils,” provided they possessed reason. 62 . EPM, appendix 4, paragraph 11, pp. 102–103. 63 . It is wise to hide one’s pride so as not to offend others, but no one is actually humble according to Hume. 64 . When Hume makes the same statement in the later Enquiry , he cites Cicero: “A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, says CICERO, in less perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more social and softer virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. These are always good and amiable” (EPM 2.1.3, 17; the footnote cites Cicero’s Offices , Book 1). 65 . As noted in the previous chapter, in the Treatise Hume eventually arrived at this categorization in book 3, part 3, section 1, second to last paragraph, p. 591. 66 . EPM 9.1.2, 73. Balthasar Gracian (1601–1658) was a Jesuit monk and university rector who published Oraculo manual y arte de prudencia (The Art of Worldly Wisdom) in 1637. Baldassare Castiglione (1478–1529) was a minor Italian nobleman and diplomat, who published his Book of the Courtier in 1528. 67 . “The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformit y to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment” (EPM, 1.4, 14) . 68 . Cumming, Human Nature and History, vol. 2, pp. 165–6. 69 . This and the following quotes from Hume are used by Cumming to illus- trate this point, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 166. 70 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 10, p. 274. 71 . Donald T. Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990) emphasizes this material dimension of Hume’s moral theory. 72 . “A rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities” (T. 3.2.1.14). 73 . See the essay, “Of Avarice” (later withdrawn). 74 . EPM 2.2.13, 12. 75 . For example, in “Of the Study of History,” which is addressed to women, Hume remarks that women are “debarred the severer studies by the tender- nesss of their complexion” as well as “the weakness of their education.” (David Hume, “Of the Study of History,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political Notes 289

and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 6, p. 535) Some feminist theorists see Hume’s emphasis on emotions as an anticipation of feminist theories. See for example, Anne Jaap Jacobson, ed. Feminist Interpretations of David Hume (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000). 76 . Hume, “My Own Life,” last paragraph, p. xl, and Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” paragraph 6, p. 535, in Essays Moral, Political and Literary . 77 . “Of the Study of History.” This essay was later withdrawn. 78 . Treatise , Book 2, part 2, section 5, “Of our esteem for the rich and powerful.” He explains “Of property and riches” in Book 2, part 1, section 10. See also EPM section 6, “On qualities useful to ourselves,” part 2, on riches. 79 . “The pleasantries of a waterman, the observations of a peasant, the ribaldry of a porter or hackney coachman, all of these are natural, and disagree- able.” David Hume, “Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 2, p. 191. In the essay “Of Taxes” Hume wants to lighten the tax burden on the poor, in contrast to the prevailing opinion that heavier taxes force the poor to work. On the other hand, Hume opposes the Poor Laws because he believes they encourage laziness. 80 . David Hume, “Of National Characters,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), note 10, p. 208. In the earlier editions, Hume asserted: “I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.” See variant reading “i,” p. 629. In the 1777 edition, he took out the “and in general ... four or five different kinds” clause in order to specify only blacks. 81 . Beattie attacked Hume’s racism from a Christian and “nationalist” perspective (the British, he argued, are the most “generous” people) and implied that the Scottish philosopher’s views were derived from his skepticism and atheism. See Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth , part 3, chapter 2, pp. 426–430. 82 . David Hume, “Of the Middle Station of Life,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 2, p. 546. This essay was later withdrawn. 83 . Hume, “Of the Middle Station of Life,” paragraph 3, p. 546. 84 . David Hume, “Of Interest,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 12, pp. 301–302. 85 . See David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 171 and note 53. 86 . He sees all of the House of Lords, and most of the Commons, as land-owners. David Hume, “Of Public Credit,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 33, p. 365. 87 . David Hume, “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), p. 416. 88 . Hume, “Of Public Credit,” paragraph 24, p. 358. 89 . J.G.A. Pocock, “Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton,” in Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History . 290 Notes

See also Hume’s essay, “Of Public Credit,” where he fears Britain’s expenses, especially for war (financed from the public debt), threaten to bankrupt the country and shift all power to speculators and away from the landed classes. 90 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 12, pp. 275–276. 91 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 22, p. 280. 92 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 5, p. 271. 93 . David Hume, The History of England (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), vol. 1, appendix 1, paragraph 34, pp. 179–180 (section on criminal laws, rules of proof). 94. From Hume’s Advertisement to the first edition of his Essays (not included in the Liberty Classics edition). 95 . These essays were 1) Of Commerce, 2) Of Refinement in the Arts (originally titled, “Of Luxury”), 3) Of Money, 4) Of Interest, 5) Of the Balance of Trade, 6) Of the Balance of Power, 7) Of Taxes, 8) Of Public Credit, 9) Of Some Remarkable Customs, 10) Of the Populousness of Antient Nations, 11) Of the Protestant Succession, and 12) Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.” 96 . David Hume, “Of the Origin of Government,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, pp. 37–38. 97 . Hume, “Of the Origin of Government,” last paragraph, pp. 40–41. 98 . David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, pp. 512–513. 99 . “Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpa- tion or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.” David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 9, p. 471. See also Frederick Whelan, Hume and Machiavelli (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). 100 . “It is confessed, that private justice, or the abstinence from the proper- ties of others, is a most cardinal virtue: Yet reason tells us, that there is no property in durable objects, such as lands or houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand to hand, but must, in some period, have been founded on fraud and injustice.” Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 38, p. 482. 101 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 2, chapter 23 on Richard III, last paragraph, p. 525. 102. Hume, “Of the Origin of Government,” paragraph 7, pp. 40, 41. 103 . The full quote is: “Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to supply a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sover- eign.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , book 4, introduction, first sentence. Notes 291

104 . In later editions, Hume toned down his praise to read: an “author of genius as well as learning, [who] has prosecuted this subject at large, and has established from these principles a system of political knowledge which abound in ingenious and brilliant thoughts and is not wanting in solidity.” David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , ed. Charles Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1957), section 3, part 2, paragraph 34, p. 27, note 2. (The Hackett edition omits textual variations.) 105 . In his Politics , Book 4, chapter 1, Aristotle outlined the tasks of political theory as determining: 1) the best form of government, 2) the best form for an average people, 3) the best form for a particular people, and 4) how to maintain an existing government for a particular people. 106 . David Hume, “Of Parties in General,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 55. For Machiavelli’s view of founders of states, see The Prince , chapter 6 and the last chapter, 25. 107 . Whereas the first half of Rousseau’s Social Contract bases the state on the contract, the second half recommends Roman political institutions, such as censors, a civic religion, and elections, for preserving the state, which is supposed to be a small city-state like republican Rome or Rousseau’s Geneva. 108. Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 9, p. 273. 109 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 10, pp. 273–274; see also “Of Civil Liberty,” on the modern secret of the balance of power as regulating relations among nations and on the greater domestic security provided by modern police compared to the plague of robbers and highwaymen in Roman times (paragraph 12, p. 93). 110 . Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” paragraph 11, p. 274. 111 . Notoriously, he supports tariffs on German linen because these compete with English linen: “A tax on German linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and industry.” David Hume, “Of the Balance of Trade,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 37, p. 324. 112 . For a fascinating account of Hume’s views on attempts to develop Scotland on the basis of paper money and his ambivalence, see George Caffentzis, “Hume, Money and Civilization; or Was Hume a Metalist?” Hume Studies , vol. 27, no. 2, November 2001, pp. 301–336. Caffentzis is writing a trilogy in which Locke’s philosophical realism or materialism is linked to his preference for metallic money; Berkeley’s philosophical idealism is linked to a preference for paper money; and Hume’s idealism leads to an initial endorsement of paper money in the Scotch scheme; but paper money leads to speculation and a crash (as it did in Scotland), so in practice Hume is a hard money man. Even though paper money works in theory, it does not work in practice. 113 . J.G.A. Pocock, “Hume and the American Revolution.” 114 . Hume, “Of Public Credit,” paragraph 1, pp. 349–350. Hume believed the mercantilist policy of amassing gold was not inflationary if it was the government that was hoarding the gold (so that it did not circulate in the economy) and if the government spent it during wartime on foreign 292 Notes

mercenaries (who were outside the economy). Foreign mercenaries would be cheaper than paying domestic soldiers. See David Hume, “Of Money,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, pp. 281–282. 115 . Hume, “Of Public Credit,” paragraph 23, p. 358. 116 . “[W]ithout a militia, it is in vain to think that any free government will ever have security or stability.” “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” paragraph 64, p. 525. Later in the essay, Hume complained that, because the current British system placed control of the military in the monarch, “The sword is in the hands of a single person, who will always neglect to disci- pline the militia, in order to have a pretence for keeping up a standing army.” (paragraph 68, p. 527) 117 . Hume, “Of Parties in General,” paragraph 11, p. 60. To be exact, another source of faction was affection for a particular family, by which Hume presumably meant the affection of some Tories for the Stuart family. Hume blamed factions of principle on Christianity. For the Whigs and Tories, see “Of the Parties of Great Britain.” 118 . David Wootton, “David Hume, ‘the historian’,” in David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 301. Wootton quotes a letter that Hume wrote in which he claimed: “I am not surely unfavorable to the Parliament. Till they push’d their Advantages so far as to excite a civil War, so dangerous & unnecessary, I esteem their Conduct laudable; & to this Extremity nothing carry’d them but their furious Zeal for Presbytery: A low Bigotry, with which they sully’d a noble Cause.” David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, vol. 1 , ed. J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), p. 222. 119 . Hume, The Letters of David Hume , #122, p. 237. Cited in Mossner, The Life of David Hume , p. 311. 120 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 6, chapter 71, p. 531. 121 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 6, chapter 71, pp. 533–534. Hume also explained his position in a letter to the Whig historian Catherine Macaulay, who had sent him a copy of her history depicting the same events from a Whig perspective: “For as I look upon all kinds of subdivision of power, from the monarchy of France to the freest democracy of some Swiss Cantons, to be equally legal, if established by custom and authority; I cannot but think, that the mixed monarchy of England, such as it was left by Queen Elizabeth, was a lawful form of government, and carried obligations to obedience and allegiance; at least it must be acknowledged, that the princes and ministers who supported that form, tho’ somewhat arbitrarily, could not incur much blame on that account; and that there is more reason to make an apology for their antagonists than for them. I grant, that the cause of liberty, which you, Madam, with the Pyms and Hampdens have adopted, is noble and generous; but most of the partisans of that cause, in the last century disgraced it, by their violence, and also by their cant, hypocrisy, and bigotry, which, more than the principles of civil liberty, seem to have been the motive of their actions. Had those principles always appeared in the amiable light which they receive both from your person and writings, it would have been impossible to resist them; and Notes 293

however much inclined to indulgence toward the first James and Charles, I should have been the first to condemn those monarchs for not yielding to them.” To Catherine Macaulay, March 29, 1764 in David Hume, New Letters of David Hume , ed. Raymond Klibansky and Ernest C. Mossner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), letter #40, pp. 81–82. 122. Hume, History of England, vol. 4 on Elizabeth, Appendix 3, paragraph 13. 123. Hume, History of England, vol. 4, Appendix 3, paragraph 35. 124 . Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism: Ethics and Imagery from Swift to Burke (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). The term “Augustan” was used by contemporaries on the analogy to the flourishing of the arts (Virgil, etc.) during the principate of Augustus, who had put an end the Roman civil wars. Similarly, the flourishing of the arts after the Revolution of 1688 was considered an analogous situation. Fussell stretches the term (which is usually only applied to the time of Swift and Pope) to include Johnson, Gibbon and Burke, at the end of the eighteenth century. 125 . Fussell’s identification of humanism and conservative is made in chapter 1, “What is Humanism?” He seems to take his conception of humanism from the conservative twentieth century humanist Joseph Wood Krutch. 126 . Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) and From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). For the resemblance of Hume’s conception of humanity to Nussbaum’s see Ryan Patrick Hanley, “David Hume and the ‘Politics of Humanity’,” Political Theory , vol. 39, no. 2, April 2011, pp. 205–233. 127 . According to Burke, the philosophes and the French revolutionaries “explode or render odious or contemptible that class of virtues which restrain the appetite. These are at least nine out of ten of the virtues. In the place of all these they substitute a virtue which they call humanity or benevolence. By these means, their morality has no idea in it of restraint, or indeed of a distinct settled principle of any kind. When their disciples are thus left free and guided only by present feeling, they are not longer to be depended upon for good or evil. The men who today snatch the worst criminals from justice, will murder the most innocent persons tomorrow.” Letter to Claude-Francois de Rivarol, June 1, 1791 in Harvey C. Mansfield, ed. Selected Letters of Edmund Burke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 294–295. On the influence of Rousseau and his “philosophy of vanity,” see Edmund Burke, “Letter to a Member of the National Assembly” (1791), excerpted in Richard M. Gamble, ed. The Great Tradition: Classic Readings on What It Means to be an Educated Person (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), pp. 492–497. 128 . In his “Thoughts on French Affairs” (1791), Burke attacks Hume as an atheist who is in favor of both despotism and radical egalitarianism; he implies that Hume was a Jacobin: “A predominant inclination towards it [Jacobinism] appears in all those who have no religion, when otherwise their disposition leads them to be advocates even for despotism. Hence Hume, though I cannot say that he does not throw out some expressions of 294 Notes

disapprobation on the proceedings of the levelers in the reign of Richard II., yet affirms that the doctrines of John Ball were ‘conformable to the idea of primitive equality, which are engraved in the hearts of all men.’” Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1910, 1960), p. 314. 129 . Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary defined the word humanity as synonymous with benevolence. The historian Paul Hazard, however, claimed that humanity was “a new virtue.” “It was a virtue peculiarly adapted to the eighteenth-century moralists because it stressed that human condition from which they thought they always had to start, to which they must always return, and which, in consequence, was for them, the all in all.” Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing (Cleveland: Meridian, 1963), p. 171. 130 . Irving Babbitt, chapter 1 of Literature and the American College: Essays in Defense of the Humanities (1908), excerpted in Richard M. Gamble, ed. The Great Tradition: Classic Readings on What It Means to be an Educated Person (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), p. 541. 131 . Babbitt, quoted in Gamble, ed. The Great Tradition , p. 542. 132 . Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), part 7, section2, chapter 3, paragraph 21, pp. 305–306. 133 . Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , part 7, section 2, chapter 4, p. 306. 134 . Marie Martin, “Hume on Human Excellence,” Hume Studies , vol. 18, no. 2, November 1992, pp. 383–400. 135 . Marie Martin (previous note) argues that modern benevolence derives from the Christian virtues that Hume professed to despise and that Burke believed were about self-control. Both Burke and Hume would be perplexed, but the Christian Francis Hutcheson would not. 136 . Mossner, The Life of David Hume , pp. 180, 186, 310–311. 137 . On Hume as a conservative, see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life , Sheldon Wolin, “Hume and Conservatism,” in Donald W. Livingston and James T. King, eds. Hume: A Re-evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), Nicholas Capaldi and Donald W. Livingston, eds . Liberty in Hume’s History of England (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1990). On Hume as a moderate, see Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics , and Scott Yenor, “Hume and the Pathway to Political Moderation” (http://www.jackmillercenter.org/2010/02/hume- and-the-pathway-to-political-moderation/ ) On Hume as a liberal, see F. A. Hayek, “The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume,” in V. C. Chappell, ed., Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 335–360 (that is, Hayek argues Hume’s theory supports the classical liberalism of Hayek). For the idea that Hume was a liberal because he was a reformer, see John B. Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Neil McArthur, David Hume’s Political Theory: Law, Commerce and the Constitution of Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), who explicitly follows Stewart, but also characterizes Hume as a “precau- tionary conservative.” Notes 295

138 . McArthur, David Hume’s Political Theory , p. 119. See also the debate between Livingston and Stewart on Hume’s conservatism in Hume Studies , vol. 21, no. 2, November 1995: Donald W. Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” pp. 151–164 and John B. Stewart, “The Public Interest vs. Old Rights,” pp. 165–186. Stewart sees Hume as a precursor to the Reform Whigs and Liberals of the nineteenth century. 139 . “We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal.” Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France , pp. 87–88. 140 . Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France , p. 76. 141 . Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France , pp. 31–32. 142 . For an account of how Hume’s History of England was understood in France before and during the French Revolution, see Laurence L. Bongie, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter- revolution (2nd ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000, originally published in 1965). According to Bongie, French readers thought Burke’s polemic was eccentric. Many conservatives instead drew on Hume’s account of the Civil War to warn against what was unfolding. 143 . Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” pp. 151–164. 144 . Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” p. 157. 145 . Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” p. 156. Oakeshott’s language of “coherence” and “intimations of traditions” is in Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London and New York: Methuen, 1967). 146 . Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life and Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume’s Pathology of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 147 . Livingston, however, believes Burke opposed rationalism in politics with a religious metaphysics that is not truly conservative. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life , p. 329. 148. David Hume, “Of the Coalition of Parties,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 5, pp. 495–496. 149. Hume, “Of the Coalition of Parties,” paragraph 13, p. 498, italics added. 150 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 2, chapter 23 on Richard III, last paragraph, p. 525. 151 . Livingston, “On Hume’s Conservatism,” p. 158–159. 152 . It is also important to note that Oakeshott’s famous account of tradition in Rationalism in Politics was preceded and succeeded by different theories of practice. In Experience and Its Modes , the world of practice and practical activity is a world of desires and values; practitioners constantly evaluate the practical world. In the later “On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct,” the relevant mode of understanding conduct is history because only historical narratives capture the “self-disclosing” and “self-enacting” qualities of human action. Oakeshott notoriously never explained why he changed his views or how his changed views related to his earlier views. See Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933) and “On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct,” in Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 296 Notes

6 The Common Sense Theory of Theory in the Enquiries, Essays and History of England

1 . References to the Enquiries (abbreviated as EHU and EPM) are to Section number, part number (if a section is divided into parts), paragraph and page. Page numbers refer to David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955 and Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). References to Hume’s Essays are to Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph and page number. 2 . David Hume, “Of Commerce,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 2, p. 253. 3 . David Hume, “Of the Study of History,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 7, p. 567. 4 . The contents of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are as follows: Section 1: On the different species of philosophy Section 2: Of the origin of ideas Section 3: Of the association of ideas Section 4: Sceptical doubts about the operation of the understanding Section 5: Sceptical solution of these doubts Section 6: Of probability Section 7: Of the idea of necessary connection Section 8: Of liberty and necessity Section 9: Of the reason of animals Section 10: Of miracles Section 11: Of a particular providence and future state Section 12: Of the academical or sceptical philosophy 5 . James Hankin, “Introduction” to Hankin, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 2. 6 . M.A. Stewart, “Two Species of Philosophy,” in Peter Millican, ed. Reading Hume on Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 90–91. Kate Abramson argues that Hume genuinely wants to unite the two species and does so by altering his literary style. Kate Abramson, “Happy to Unite, or Not?” Philosophy Compass , vol. 1, issue 3, May 2006, pp. 290–302 and “Hume’s Distinction between Philosophical Anatomy and Painting,” Philosophy Compass , vol. 2, issue 5, September 2007, pp. 680–698. 7 . Aristotle is the source of this distinction, which again is derived from the distinction between philosophy and politics as rival ways of life. 8 . Hume, “Of Commerce,” paragraph 1, p. 253. 9 . This also underscores that Hume’s abandonment of his naturalist system was gradual and reluctant. But it also underscores that it was abandoned. 10 . This personal background is stressed by Peter Millican, “The Context, Aims and Structure of Hume’s First Enquiry ,” in Millican, ed., Reading Hume on Human Understanding and Stephen Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract . (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). Notes 297

11 . In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , published posthumously, Hume’s character Philo attacks the argument from design by suggesting that the imperfections of the world could easily be due to “an infant deity” who botched his first world-creating project. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), part 5, p. 169. Alternatively, Philo says, the imperfections of the world might be due to an old, senile deity. 12 . The contents of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals are as follows: 1. Of the General Principles of Morals 2. Of Benevolence, parts 1 and 2 3. Of Justice, parts 1 and 2 4. Of Political Society 5. Why Utility Pleases, parts 1 and 2 6. Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves, parts 1 and 2 7. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Ourselves 8. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others 9. Conclusion, parts 1 and 2 Appendices: 1. Concerning Moral Sentiment 2. Of Self-Love 3. Some farther Considerations with regard to Justice 4. Of some Verbal Disputes 13 . “HOBBES and LOCKE, who maintained the selfish system of morals.” EPM Appendix 2, paragraph 3, p. 114. Hume associates the selfish theory with the Epicureans in paragraph 4. 14 . In the first Enquiry : “Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.” (EHU 12.3.10, 173) In the second Enquiry , the virtues are facts representing the general tastes of mankind. 15 . The idea that benevolence was a natural virtue, praised for itself, was still there, as a quality agreeable to ourselves (EPM 7.18, 66). 16 . Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 170–171. 17 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 197. 18 . Cumming, Human Nature and History, vol. 2, p. 194. 19 . Cumming also saw the second Enquiry as more aesthetic: “Just as the process of scientific observation in the Treatise was continuous with the ordinary observer’s perceptions and judgments of the natural objects and other men, so the process of scientific observation in the Principles [of Morals] is continuous with the esthetic perception of an art object or with the audience’s response to a speech.” Cumming, vol. 2, p. 209. 20 . Many historians argue that the Middle Ages included several “renaissances,” in which antiquity was revived, and that the Renaissance was distinctive in signaling the beginning of the end of these revivals (because of the advent 298 Notes

of science). The Church Fathers had been educated in the classics and often tried to reconcile the pagan thinkers they admired with Christianity. 21 . Arguably, however, both theories presuppose traditional morals, as in the familiar criticism that utilitarianism cold-bloodedly authorizes oppressing or slaughtering minorities if that will enhance the greatest happiness. Any reply is along the lines of John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of utility (in “Utilitarianism”) as the “permanent interests of mankind” (which is essentially traditional morals). Similarly, Kant believed his principles would apply to a “race of devils,” provided they were rational—and hence a republic of devils would end up with laws similar to those of human republics. But, arguably, if devils did not possess the same sentiments as humans, they would derive different (devilish) laws. 22 . David Hume, “A Dialogue,” in Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), p. 113. 23 . Some commentators have argued that the principle of sympathy was dissolved in the second Enquiry into the sentiment of humanity. L.A. Selby- Bigge, for example, asserted “In the Enquiry sympathy is another name for social feeling, humanity, benevolence, natural philanthropy, rather than the name of the process by which the social feeling has been constructed out of non-social or individual feeling.” Selby-Bigge, “Editor’s Introduction,” Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. xxvi. Others who follow Selby-Bigge in this interpretation include Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), p. 533; Henry Aiken, “Introduction” to Hume’s Moral and Political Philosophy (New York: Hafner, 1972), p. xxi; Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Frederick Whelan, Order and Artifice in Hume’s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 169. 24 . Cumming, Human Nature and History , vol. 2, p. 212. 25 . Cumming, Human Nature and History, vol. 2, pp. 213–214 26 . Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , part 1, paragraph 10, p. 134. 27 . Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , part 1, paragraph 11, p. 134. 28 . Hume, “Of Commerce,”, paragraph 2, p. 254. 29 . Hume, “Of Commerce,” paragraph 2, p. 254. 30 . In the first Enquiry , Hume considers politics as analogous to physics. “The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into” (EHU 12.3.7, 172) . 31 . David Hume, “That Politics May be Reduced to a Science,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 4, p. 16. See also EHU 8.1.18, 99–100 for a similar formulation. 32 . Hume, “That Politics May be Reduced to a Science,” paragraph 8, p. 18. 33 . For example, in the first Enquiry : “It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, Notes 299

generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclina- tions, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English” (EHU 8.1.7, 92–93) . 34 . David Hume, “Of Eloquence,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 98. 35 . David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 42. 36 . David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985). 37 . At the end of this essay, Hume proposed an improvement for the British system, which was to transform the House of Lords into a meritocratic, instead of hereditary, institution. The Lords would also be able to select factional leaders from the House of Commons, thereby removing them from power in the Commons and isolating them in the House of Lords. Hume proposal was thus designed to preserve the mixed government of England, but to make it more meritocratic and less factional. 38 . David Hume, The History of England (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), vol. 3, chapter 26, near the end when the laws of Henry VII are discussed, p. 74. 39 . For valuable accounts of Hume’s economic views, see Eugene Rotwein, “Editor’s Introduction” to David Hume: Writings on Economics (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955), Andrew S. Skinner, “David Hume: Principles of Political Economy,” in David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Tatsuya Sakamoto, “Hume’s Economic Theory,” in Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, ed. A Companion to Hume (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 40 . David Hume, “Of Money,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraphs 1–5, pp. 281–285. 41 . David Hume, “Of the Balance of Trade,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 13, pp. 312–313 has the water analogy. 42 . The economy—including the international economy—is a circuit in which money and commodities flow like water and where everything that appears to leave returns through the circuit. Poor countries (like Hume’s Scotland) can catch up to rich countries (like England) because their labor costs are cheaper, and so poor countries will attract investment and become exporters; but as these poor countries become rich, their labor costs will rise and their cost advantage will diminish. But a world of wealthy nations invites more international trade because wealthier customers prefer more “refined” commodities which other rich nations can provide. This is the argument of “Of the Jealousy of Trade.” 43 . In all these cases that appear to be exceptions, Hume’s explanations are more sociological than economic; they are explained by “the manners and customs of the people.” Hume, “Of Money,” paragraph 11, p. 290. 44 . Adam Ferguson, “Of the Principles of Moral Estimation: A Discussion between David Hume, Robert Clark and Adam Smith,” in the Ferguson Manuscripts. Quoted in Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life 300 Notes

(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 71. Phillipson sees this as a likely explanation. 45 . David Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 87. 46 . Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” paragraph 3, p. 89. 47 . David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 28, p. 477. 48 . David Hume, “Of Some Remarkable Customs,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 366. 49 . David Hume, “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 42, p. 400. 50 . Hobbes represents: “A lively instance how precarious all reputations, founded on reasoning and philosophy! A pleasant comedy, which paints the manners of the age, and exposes a faithful picture of nature, is a durable work, and is transmitted to the latest posterity. But a system, whether physical or metaphysical, commonly owes its success to its novelty; and is no sooner canvassed with impartiality than its weakness is discovered. Hobbes’s politics are fitted only to promote tyranny, and his ethics to encourage licen- tiousness. Though an enemy to religion, he partakes nothing of the spirit of scepticism; but is as positive and dogmatical as if human reason, and his reason in particular, could attain a thorough conviction in these subjects.” Hume, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 62, fifth paragraph from the end, p. 153. This echoes the opening of the first Enquiry , where the systems of abstruse philosophers lie in ruins while the easy and obvious moralizing of practical philosophers like Cicero are still read. 51 . Probably Hume’s most “scholarly” essay is “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in which he meticulously uses the writings of the ancients to refute the view (held by Montesquieu and others) that the population of the ancient world was larger than that of the modern world. This essay shows how comfortable Hume is with historical documents. 52 . David Hume, “Of the Study of History,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 3, p. 565; the reference to the practice of the world is in paragraph 7, p. 567. 53 . Hume, “Of the Study of History,” paragraph 7, p. 567. 54 . Hume, “Of the Study of History,” paragraph 7, pp. 567–568. 55 . Some commentators argue that Hume’s shift from human nature to history involves a shift to historicism . Baumstark argues that Hume became a historicist by rereading the classics during the period 1749–1751 and becoming aware of irreconcilable differences among cultures. It seems to me this rereading reaffirmed Hume’s classicism and humanism, which are para- mount in the “ancients vs. moderns” theme of “Of the Populuousness of Ancient Nations.” See Moritz Baumstark, David Hume: The Making of a Philosophical Historian: A Reconsideration (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2007; published by University of Edinburgh Press, 2009); dissertation at: http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/3265 56 . Hume writes of “History, the great mistress of wisdom” in the History of England , vol. 5, at the end of chapter 59 on the demise of Charles I, 10th paragraph from the end, p. 545. Notes 301

57 . Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), provocatively suggested that readers who knew only Hume’s Treatise and Essays would logically conclude that any history by Hume would be a cultural or sociological history given Hume’s concerns for moral and cultural matters (p. 121) But this downplays Hume’s preoccupa- tion with politics and his conception of politics as shaping culture. Pocock has suggested that Voltaire could write his “Essay on Manners” ( Essai sur les Moeurs ) because the state in France was secure. In contrast, Hume’s history of England had to be a history of the rise of the modern English state because Britain’s “system of liberty” was a recent and precarious achievement. J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion: Volume 2: Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 13, p. 201. 58 . J.C. Hilson, “Hume: The Historian as Man of Feeling,” in J.C. Hilson, M.M.B. Jones and J.R. Watson, eds. Augustan Worlds (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1978), pp. 209–210. 59 . Victor G. Wexler, David Hume and the History of England (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1979), p. 13. Hume’s earlier view is in “Of the Parties of Great Britain,” later versions of which contain a footnote to the last paragraph (note 11 in the Liberty Classics edition) admitting that Hume had changed his mind. In the History , Hume admits to following Clarendon. As Laird Okie points out in “Ideology and Partiality in David Hume’s History of England ,” Hume Studies , vol. 11, issue 1, April 1985, Hume follows Clarendon to the point of paraphrasing entire paragraphs from him. 60 . “Of all Hume’s works, it can be argued that the History of England is his only attempt at practical moral instruction.” Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume , p. 40. 61 . Tacitus, Annals , Book 3, paragraph 65. Thomas Gordon translation, 1737. According to Hicks, “Tacitus enjoyed a reputation as the most philosophical of the ancient historians” and Hume’s admirers, like Edward Gibbon, called him the “Tacitus of the Scots.” Phillip Hicks, Neoclassical History and English Culture (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 203, 198. 62 . Laurence Bongie, David Hume (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), mentions that French readers appreciated that Hume’s History was not nationalistic and that it treated France fairly. Catholic readers, however, did not like Hume’s attacks on the Church and clergy. 63 . David Wootton, “David Hume: ‘the historian’,” in David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 301. 64 . Quoted in Hilson, “Hume: The Historian as Man of Feeling,” p. 210. The letter is in vol. 1, p. 210 of Hume’s letters. 65 . Letter to William Strahan, vol. 1, p. 222; quoted in Hilson, “Hume: The Historian as Man of Feeling,” pp. 210–211. 66 . Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume , pp. 42–43 on readers’ responses, including the reactions of both Boufflers and Boswell. 67 . Most of these appear in special Appendices to the medieval and Tudor volumes and to the reign of James I; sometimes they appear at the end of a chapter on the reign of a particular monarch. As Pocock writes, “Hume is the first of British historians to master the writing of history in the double key of political narrative and sociological generalization.” Pocock, Barbarism and Religion , chapter 13, p. 208. 302 Notes

68 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 4, appendix 3, p. 384. 69 . Smith, Wealth of Nations , book 3, chapter 4, “How the Commerce of the Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the Country.” 70. Hume, History of England, vol. 2, chapter 26, last paragraph. 71 . It is important to realize that although Hume views the transition from ancient times to modern as one of progress, he does not believe in “automatic” progress, which became a common belief in the nineteenth century. Hume saw nations and civilizations as having lives analogous to individual human beings: they would eventually grow old and die. Furthermore, democratic mobs or popular superstitions could always destroy a society and return it to barbarism. As several commentators have noted, toward the end of his life Hume despaired at what he considered a growing republican anarchy. But he had earlier predicted that England would end as an “absolute government,” or despotism. In either case, progress stops and decline sets in.

7 The Common Sense Theory of Practice of the Later Works

1 . David Hume, History of England (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), volume 5, chapter 55, p. 380 note AA, p. 572. 2 . David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), original first paragraph; see note “a,” p. 647. References to Hume’s Essays in the notes below are to the Liberty Classics edition. 3 . David Hume, “Of Commerce,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 2, p. 254. 4 . Hume referred to “my love of literary fame, my ruling passion” in “My Own Life,” in Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Hendel, p. 10. 5 . David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 32. 6 . “Of the First Principles of Government,” paragraphs 2–4, pp. 33–34. 7 . James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics , ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 8 . David Hume, “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985). The following remarks in the text summarize this essay. 9 . “Of the First Principles of Government,” paragraph 3, p. 33. Nevertheless, Hume considers parties of principle to be a modern invention, which he blames on Christianity. “Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phaenomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs.” David Hume, “Of Parties in General,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 11, p. 60. 10 . David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 2, p. 43. See also, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 69 on Charles II and the after- math of the Exclusion Crisis, p. 438. Notes 303

11 . David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 1, p. 465. 12 . Hume, “Of the Parties of Great Britain,” paragraph 12, p. 72. 13 . This is the theme of “Of Passive Obedience,” but Hume uses similar arguments in the Treatise and “Of the Original Contract.” 14 . Hume, “Of the Parties of Great Britain,” paragraph 10, p. 71. 15 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 5, chapter 50 on Charles I, paragraph 5, p. 158. 16 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 5, chapter 50, paragraph 6, p. 159. 17 . Hume, History of England , vol. 5, chapter 50, paragraph 7, p. 159; interpretive brackets added. 18 . Hume, History of England , chapter 50, paragraphs 8–9, 159–160. 19 . Hume, History of England , chapter 50, paragraph 10, p. 160. 20 . Hume, History of England , chapter 50, paragraph 10, pp. 160–161. 21 . After describing the position and beliefs of the parliamentary leaders, and deducing the practical consequences that “logically” follow from them, Hume sets out the situation and beliefs of Charles I and deduces his policies from his beliefs and situation. In Hume’s description of Charles and the patriots, then, they both act on the basis of reason, given their particular beliefs or interests. 22 . Hume, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 71, paragraph 72, p. 533. 23 . Hume, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 71, paragraph 72, p. 533. 24 . The other irrational element in politics at this time comes from particular personalities, such as Buckingham, who are reckless in their policies. 25 . Hume, History of England , vol. 5, chapter 50, paragraph 16, p. 164. 26 . Hume, History of England , vol. 5, chapter 55, p. 380 note AA, p. 572. 27 . “The religious hypocrisy, it may be remarked, is of a peculiar nature; and being generally unknown to the person himself, though more dangerous, it implies less falsehood than any other species of insincerity.” Hume, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 63, on the Commonwealth, near the end of the chapter, p. 142. 28 . Hume, History of England , vol. 6, chapter 67, paragraph 1, pp. 332–333, italics added. 29 . Hume, History of England , vol. 2, chapter 23 on Richard III, last paragraph, p. 525. This was the end of the medieval volumes, where Hume’s theme had been the anarchy and barbarousness of ancient English politics. 30 . “So absolute, indeed, was the authority of the crown, that the precious spark of liberty had been kindled, and was preserved, by the Puritans alone; and it was to this sect, whose principles appear so frivolous, and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution.” Hume, History of England , vol. 4, chapter 40 on Elizabeth, pp. 145–146. 31 . George Caffentzis, “Hume, Money and Civilization; or Was Hume a Metalist?” Hume Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, November 2001, pp. 301–336. 32 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 7, pp. 469–470. 33 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 7, p. 470. 34 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 9, p. 471. 35 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 38, p. 482. 36 . The equivalent section in the Treatise is 3.2.10.6, 557. 37 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 10, p. 471. 38 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraphs 12–16, pp. 472–473. 304 Notes

39 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 20, p. 474. 40 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 28, p. 477. 41 . On the other hand, it is clear that Hume does not like democracy, which he believes empowers a mob that will follow any impetuous demagogue. Democracies will always be tumultuous and unstable. He assumes that a stable society must be a hierarchy and that an elite (which can include the representatives) must decide for the people. Under a stable government, there can be elections (as in England), but this would consist of voting by an elite of property owners (as in Hume’s ideal republic as well as England). 42 . Hume, The History of England , vol. 2, chapter 23 on Richard III, last paragraph, p. 525. 43 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 32, p. 479. 44 . Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” paragraph 47, pp. 486–487. 45 . Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” paragraph 1, pp. 512–513. 46 . Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” paragraph 2, pp. 513–514. 47 . Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonweath,” paragraph 4, p. 514. 48 . Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” original first paragraph; see note “a,” p. 647 (the note is missing from the text in the Liberty Fund edition). 49 . David Hume, “Of Money,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 5, note “c,” p. 285. The passage was later omitted and appears under the variant readings, note “c,” p. 632. 50 . “Would not such a one have been regarded as an extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could tamper and play with a government and national constitution, like a quack with a sickly patient?” David Hume, “Of the Protestant Succession,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 15, p. 509. 51 . David Hume, “Of Public Credit,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraphs 22, 27, 28, pp. 357, 360, 361. 52 . Hume, History of England , vol. 5, chapter 51, p. 191, and chapter 54, p. 293. The context implies that this term was used at the time.

8 Hume, Theory and Practice Today

1 . Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), section 1, paragraph 6, p. 18. 2 . The letter is in J.Y.T. Greig, ed. The Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), vol. 1, letter #3, pp. 12–18. The letter is also included as an appendix to David Fate Norton, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 3 . David Hume, “The Sceptic,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 28, p. 168. 4 . The exception was the Epicureans, who believed the life of pleasure was best and who were not interested in politics. In practice, this meant a private life of “prudence” that included following morals. They were criticized by the other philosophical schools because prudence seemed to allow for occa- sional “unethical” actions. Notes 305

5 . Eugene Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 30. 6 . That is, those who emphasize science as the basis of everything tend to derive morals from human nature. Most people trained in the humanities or social sciences, however, tend to be “cultural relativists” or “social constructionists” of one sort or another; they tend to believe morals are relative to societies and/or are constructed by societies. For a recent example of an attempt by a secular humanist to derive morals from neuroscience (and of his frustration arguing against cultural relativists), see Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 2010). 7 . There are subfields of political philosophy and philosophy of esthetics, but these are sidelines in philosophy. 8 . The posthumously published essay “On Certainty” suggests a more positive attitude toward philosophy. 9 . Stephen Toulmin, “The Recovery of Practical Philosophy,” American Scholar, vol. 57, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 337–352, especially p. 349. 10 . Again, terms like “speculative theory,” etc. are contemporary and not used by Aristotle (who would view it as a pleonasm). Again, Aristotle’s distinction derives from the ancient Greek distinction between theory and practice as the rival ways of life of philosophers and politicians. 11 . When Toulmin and others, like Gadamer, try to describe a more general notion of practical philosophy, however, they bring in rhetoric and esthetics as paradigms of what “practical reasoning” involves. Toulmin, “The Recovery of Practical Philosophy,” pp. 337–352 and Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Lobkowicz complained about the confusion of “production” with action. 12 . As we mentioned in chapter one, this is based on the original Greek distinction between theory and practice as a distinction between two ways of life, the theoretical or philosophical life of the philosopher, and the practical or political life of the citizen. As Adkins argues, the intrusion of Aristotle’s metaphysical biology and philosophical theory only takes place in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics , where Aristotle argues for the superiority of the contemplative life of the philosopher over the active life of the citizen. See, A.W.H. Adkins, “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February, 1984), pp. 29–49. 13 . Immanuel Kant, “On Universal Practical Philosophy,” in Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 42. 14 . It is beyond the scope of this study to debate these issues. Although each side seems to be firmly entrenched and can be expected to repeat its positions (and hence one could reasonably anticipate immediate deadlock), the aim here is to encourage those who are already interested in practical philosophy. I am hoping that including scientific human nature, common sense and evidence from the social science and humanities will be appealing to them. 15 . I see this interpretative step taking place at the level of common sense, although it might need “theoretical” support from specifically interpretative modes of thought such as Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer originally 306 Notes

linked hermeneutics to common sense and to practical philosophy, but the development of his theory carried him far away from these topics. See the beginning of Han-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , 2nd revised edition (New York: Crossroad, 1989). 16 . The study of Hume also raises the issue in moral theory (for example, in Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) about whether or not accounts of moral practices or animal behavior by anthropologists and biologists count as “real morality” or whether only a “normative” principle such as “universalizability” renders a particular practice moral. Hume would be on the side of the anthropologists and biologists, rather than the philosophers. 17 . Examples are the theories of Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal (New York: Holt Rhinehart & Winston, 1971) and Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York: Atheneum, 1961) and The Territorial Imperative (New York: Bantam Books, 1978). Even a feminist like Elaine Morgan in The Descent of Woman (New York: Bantam Books, 1972, 1973) thinks human practices of smiling and talking in groups, etc. are the same as those of chimpanzees. 18 . Toulmin, “The Recovery of Practical Philosophy,” pp. 337–352. Nevertheless, the “applied” fields of “medical ethics,” “business ethics,” etc. do seem to be the areas where issues of the relationship of theory and practice arise and this relationship can plausibly be seen as going in both directions. But, again, this is moral theory, whereas Toulmin was thinking of how medical issues more directly raise philosophical issues like “the mind-body problem,” etc. in contrast to studying these issues from within the traditional philosophical subfield of “philosophy of mind.” 19 . G.E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) available at http://www. ditext.com/ moore/ common-sense.html. Stephen Boulter, The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy (Houndsmill, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Similarly, the common sense “ordinary language philosophy” of J.L. Austin and others accomplished the important task of refuting the paradoxes of positivist philosophy. 20 . Rorty recognized a role for philosophy in this sense: “‘Philosophy’ can mean simply what [Wilfred] Sellars calls ‘an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.’ Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when he praised the Athenians for ‘philosophizing without unmanliness’ ... No one would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense.” Richard Rorty, “Introduction,” in Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xiv. 21 . “The task is not to build new, more comprehensive systems of theory, with universal and timeless relevance, but to limit the scope of even the best-framed theories, and fight the intellectual reductionism that became entrenched during the ascendancy of rationalism ... Interlocking modes of investigation and explanation check exaggerated claims on behalf of all universal theories, and reinstate respect for the pragmatic methods appropriate in dealing with concrete human problems. In clinical medicine and jurisprudence, human ecology and social history, historical geology and developmental psychodynamics alike, the model of Euclid’s axioms and theorems was from Notes 307

the start misleading in orientation and confused in outcome. From now on, every science will need to employ those specific methods that have proved, in concrete experience, to match the characteristic demands of its own intellectual problems.” Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: the Hidden Agenda of Modernity , (Chicago: Macmillan/Free Press, 1990), p. 193. 22 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 27. 23 . G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), section A, chapter 1, pp. 58–67 and Charles Taylor, “The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology ,” in Alasdair MacIntrye, ed. Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), where Taylor compares Hegel’s criticisms to Wittgenstein’s approach in his Philosophical Investigations . 24 . Hume, “The Sceptic,” paragraph 6, p. 161. 25 . EPM 9.1.12, 78–79. 26 . In this respect Hume is diametrically opposed to Hobbes, who believed that experience was uncertain and that only “science” constituted wisdom. 27. See Robert McShea, Morality and Human Nature: A New Route to Ethical Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), who sees Hume as the relevant philosopher of human nature and ethics. 28 . For example, Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 29 . A famous reference to cultural relativism comes from Herodotus’s Histories (3.38) where the Persian king asks about the funeral practices of Greeks and people from India. The Indians eat their dead, which horrifies the Greeks; and the Greeks burn their dead, which horrifies the Indians. The king rather quickly concludes from this single example of moral disagreement that “Custom [nomos ] is king.” 30 . Nevertheless, Hume expressed doubts in “Of the Standard of Taste,” when he noted that people agree on general moral terms like virtue, justice, fair- ness, and so on, but disagree on their specific applications. I argued that Hume tried to solve this problem by invoking a “humanist” solution of deferring to the judgments of a secular elite, whose superior taste and moral judgment had been refined by study and experience. A consensus among the great minds of history could stand in for a “consensus of mankind” or a universal human nature. 31 . See, for example, Stephen S. Hall, Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010) on how neuroscience explains our human capacity for “wisdom.” See also David Brooks, The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character and Achievement (New York: Random House, 2011). Brooks sees these recent scientific discoveries as vindicating the “British Enlightenment” and the ideas of Hume, Adam Smith and Burke. Hume would be pleased. But, as we argued in chapter 3, Hume’s associational psychology more closely resembles “behaviorist” psychological theories like those of B.F. Skinner. 32 . On historicism and the humanities, see Isaiah Berlin, “The Divorce between the Sciences and the Humanities” (1974) in Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, 1982). Berlin sees Vico as the first historicist. Another was Fustel de Coulanges, whose The Ancient City [1864] was designed to disabuse would-be revolutionaries from 308 Notes

trying to revive ancient civic life by arguing that the Greek and Roman city-states were centered on religion . On this view, any attempt to emulate ancient ideals would involve understanding and believing the ancient religion , which would be impossible. In contrast, Hume and his generation believed the ancients and moderns were separated by different circumstances (war, dependence on agriculture and slavery in the ancient world) and these different circumstances explained why the same human nature exhibited different manners . If somehow these circumstances could be duplicated, the moderns would behave the same as the ancients because they had the same human nature. For Fustel, see Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: A Study in the Religion, Laws and Institutions of Greece and Rome [1864] (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001). 33 . William Bennett, “The Humanities, the Universities and Public Policy,” in John Agresto and Peter Riesenberg, eds. The Humanist as Citizen (Washington: National Humanities Center, 1981) and Jacques Barzun, “ Exuent the Humanities” (1980) in Barzun, The Culture We Deserve (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). But a generalist education today includes learning about the sciences and social sciences, as well as the humanities. For a description see F. Champion Ward, “Principles and Particulars in Liberal Education,” in Arthur G. Cohen, ed. Humanistic Education and Western Civilization: Essays for Robert M. Hutchins (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). 34 . Bruce A. Kimball, Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986). Kimball claims that Cicero and the humanists aimed at educating statesmen and so rejected philosophical “sophistry” in favor of patriotic education. He therefore accuses all modern advocates of liberal education, whether liberal or conservative (like Bennett and Barzun), as reviving the “Socratic” education that the humanists rejected (Socrates is the hero of contemporary liberal education). But, although interesting, and a way of clarifying the different objectives of philosophy and politics, this thesis is not convincing about Cicero or the Renaissance humanists. From the beginning, the attempt is to reconcile philosophy and politics. Although philosophy is supposed to serve politics, it also modifies it, particularly in the realm of morality. Powerful men need to be benevolent and just in general, as well as patriotic, competent and generous with friends and allies. 35 . “When we call something classical, there is a consciousness of something enduring, of significance that cannot be lost and that is independent of all the circumstances of time—a kind of timeless present that is contempora- neous with every other present.” Gadamer, Truth and Method , p. 288. 36 . “Classics” now have to hold their own in the “canon wars” in the humanities over what gets taught as a classic and why. 37 . Arendt saw the philosopher Karl Jaspers as trying to do this. Both Jaspers and Arendt believed modern global communications were threatening national cultures with dissolution and that the solution should be some sort of global communication among cultures in which each learned from the others and where each culture’s past was viewed as containing treasures that could be brought into contemporary “dialogue.” Jaspers’ The Great Philosophers include Confucius and the Buddha; he also developed the notion of an “Axial Age” Notes 309

(800–200 BC) in which all the great world religions and philosophies developed. Unlike Hegel, who viewed each nation as contributing something to universal history but then being eclipsed by other nations, the Axial Age hypothesis emphasizes the continuing relevance of the past and of each great civilization to universal history. The global “dialogue” among civilizations aims at a future global civilization that preserves the “classics” of each civilization. Hannah Arendt, “Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?” in Arendt, Men in Dark Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968). 38 . Roger Crisp, “Virtue Ethics,” in Edward Craig, ed. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), volume 9, p. 623. 39 . “Most virtue ethicists, including [Phillipa] Foot and [Alasdair] MacIntyre, combine an Aristotelian emphasis on the virtues with a modern skepticism about the possibility of an objective theory of the good for an individual.” Crisp, “Virtue Ethics,” p. 624, col. 2. He sees this problem as forcing MacIntyre (in After Virtue ) into an emphasis on social contexts (in which the virtues are functionally related to the successful performance of particular social roles) and then into cultural relativism. 40 . “[W]here the riches are in few hands, these must enjoy all the power, and will readily conspire to lay the whole burthen on the poor.” David Hume, “Of Commerce,” in Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), paragraph 17, p. 265. 41 . See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1942, 1947, 1950). Hayek claimed Hume as an inspiration in Friedrich Hayek, “The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume,” in V.C. Chappell, ed. Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968). Russell Hardin thinks that if Hume were alive today, he would be an Austrian School economist. Hardin, David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 199. The vehemence of Hume’s fulminations against the public debt suggests that he would also be a “deficit hawk.” 42 . Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 106. 43 . J.M. Kenyon, Stuart England (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). 44 . Frederick Whelan, Hume and Machiavelli (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). 45 . Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), chapter 6, “Equality, Value and Merit.” 46 . F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 47 . “A plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of politics. And only a society already infected with Rationalism will the conversion of the traditional resources of resistance to the tyranny of Rationalism into a self-conscious ideology be considered a strengthening of those resources.” Michael Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics,” in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other essays (London: Metheuen, 1962), pp. 20–21. 48 . Resistance to revolutionaries and “projectors” has usually been considered the province of conservatives, but this is also the experience of less powerful groups when their ways of life are destroyed by conquering 310 Notes

groups, particularly if the conquerors try to “civilize” them. It usually takes an anthropologist to figure out why these groups don’t take too well to “civilization.” 49 . For this, see the conservative Kenneth Minogue, Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), whose book ends with “politics” under siege from feminists and “moralists,” and the socialist Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics [1962] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), who sees democracy as well as ideology threatening politics. Somehow Minogue’s conservatism and Crick’s socialism are not considered “ideological.” 50 . What is also often overlooked is that one of the prime reasons government policies or programs “don’t work” is because they have been “watered down” by compromises, particular interests that need to be covered have been exempted in order to be “reconciled,” and the programs are usually underfunded. Here a case could be made that more “rationalism” would have resulted in more effective policies. 51 . For example, Aladair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Perss, 1988), chapters 15 and 16; and Sheldon Wolin, “Hume and Conservatism” (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), p. 253. 52 . Raymond Williams, “David Hume: Reasoning and Experience,” in Hugh Sykes and George Watson, eds. The English Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 144. 53 . Louis Kampf, On Modernism: The Prospects for Literature and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 60–61. 54 . Shirley Robin Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 118–119. Bibliography

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“Abstract of A Treatise of Human Christensen, Jerome, 24–5 Nature,” 20, 39–40, 53, 57, 60, Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 66, 128 68, 239 Academic Skepticism of, 6, 29, 124 Aristotle humanism of, 16, 108, 114, 122–3, conception of theory of, 4, 9, 237–8 131, 156, 229–30, 244, 247 consent of mankind as valid for, Hume’s admiration for, 121, 94, 95, 237 124, 130 ethics and politics linked by, 10, “On Duties” of: as model for 11, 237 Hume’s ethics, 106, 124, 131; Hume on, 124, 130, 132 as practical philosophy, 106; as man as political animal in, 7, 114, 238 virtue ethics, 132 politics and practice in, 7, 11, on humanity, or benevolence, 157 237, 238 cognitive science, 30, 237 politics as rules for lunatic commercial humanism, see under asylum, 7 humanism, Hume and speculative and practical common sense, 11, 75, 76, 82, 83 philosophy of, 237–8, 239, 240 and argument from design, 244 virtue ethics of, 115, 132, 249 Aristotle and, 94, 237, 239, 240 Ayer, A.J., 29 and consent of mankind, 94 corrects skepticism, 57, 175, 231 Babbitt, Irving, 156 differences between Reid and Hume Baier, Annette, 54 on, 59, 60–1, 167 Barbeyrac, Jacques, 94 Hume’s “Sceptic” and, 6, 17, 116, Beattie, James, 22, 48, 59–60, 138, 243 120, 244 Bentham, Jeremy, 5, 14, 16, 163, Moore and, 241 184, 186 needs to be purged by Academic Berkeley, George, 28–31, 35, 38, 51, Skepticism, 60, 231 58, 59, 77 and paradoxes of philosophy, 241 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, first philosophy as, 58, 60, 219, 241 viscount, 122, 151–2, 213 as practical, 58, 167, 219, 231–2, Boswell, James, 20, 201 233, 239 Boufflers, Marie-Charlotte-Hyppolyte, Reid and, 59, 167, 241 countess of, 21–2, 25, 138, 201 skeptical dimension of, 6, 7, 14, 42, Burke, Edmund, 8, 16, 68, 156, 158, 111, 241, 244–5 205, 253 and systematic theory, 190–5, 241 criticisms of virtue of William James on, 5 humanity, 156 see also Hume, David, and specific Hume and, 17, 26, 68, 82, 95, writings 156–64, 235 consent of mankind, 94–5 theory and practice and, 8, 253 conservatism, 8 and Burke, 8, 17, 156–64 Caffentzis, George, 220 and Hume, 17, 138–42, 155–64, Capaldi, Nicholas, 158 250–1

321 322 Index

Cumming, Robert Denoon, 8 theory of theory of, 167, 177–90, on analogical structure of Treatise, 197, 199, 231–3, 234, 249 69–70 utility in, 183–6, 189 on differences between Hume and and virtue ethics, see virtue ethics Cicero, 66, 136 Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, 2, on Hume as traditionalist, 183 20, 21, 210, 236 on theory and practice in Hume, as commercial humanist, 115, 14–15, 66, 87–8, 99, 181, 183 137–42 as humanist, 16, 24, 115, Descartes, Rene, 4, 28, 29, 31, 59, 122–4, 230 130, 230 as Hume’s practical philosophy, 16, Dewey, John, 5 109, 112, 115, 121–2, 166, 229, “Dialogue, A,” 135, 184, 186 238, 239 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, as political, 115, 125, 142–4, 22, 124, 191, 244 149–55 political practice in, 210–14 Enquiry Concerning Human see also specific essays Understanding, An, 6, 21, 53 Academic Skepticism of, 28–9, 48, Ferguson, Adam, 195–6 57, 59, 166–7, 175–6 Fish, Stanley, 9 differences from Treatise, 53–8, 60, Forbes, Duncan, 158 166, 169, 176 Foucault, Michel, 12 polemical point of, 174–7 Fussell, Paul, 156 practical starting point of, 168–73 summary of, 173–5 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 11 theory as reflections of common Gay, Peter, 124 life in, 17, 56, 58, 60, 165, 166, Green, Thomas, 23 169, 176 Grotius, Hugo, 94 theory of practice of, 205–8 theory of theory of, 173–7 Haaksonssen, Knud, 87 Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Hankins, James, 168 Morals, An, 21, 146, 166 Harrington, James, 114, 127, 143, and Christian virtues, 135 211, 224 common sense method of, Hayek, Friedrich, 158, 251, 252–3 177, 180 Hegel, G.W.F., 243 differences from Treatise, 54, 55–6, Heidegger, Martin, 11 58, 63, 70, 82, 83, 101, 105, 106, history 133, 178, 197, 230 humanist, 18, 251 facts and values united in, 180 and human nature, 193–4 humanism in, 183 humility of historians about, 252 humanity replaces sympathy in, Oakeshott’s view of, 251–2 142, 186 –8 philosophical, 199, 227–8 love of fame in, 137 as practical past, 251–2 property and authority in, 138 and practice of the world, and reason, 141, 177–8 204, 245 skepticism in, 189–90 virtue and, 197–8 summary of, 177 wisdom and, 198, 245 theory of practice of, 208–10 see also History of England Index 323

History of England, 2, 16, 21, 23–5, civic, 114, 143, 148, 149 112, 141, 152–5, 195 commercial, 113, 114–15, 122, accident in, 218–19 137–42, 148–9 common sense method of, Enlightenment and, 124 197–202, 216, 234 humanitarianism and, 156–7 dramatic qualities in, 200–1 humanities and, 122–3, 247–8 Enlightenment theme of progress human nature and, 16, 17, 123–4, in, 201–2, 228 230, 236 as humanist history, 18, 200, 230, Hume and, 122–37, 183, 247–8 234–5, 251 practical philosophy and, 123, impartiality in, 200 229–30, 236, 242 liberty in, 144, 154, 155 Renaissance, 16, 123, 229–30 moral judgments in, 200, 201, 219 science and, 230, 239 as political, 115, 143, 199, 219, 235 secular, 122, 123, 230 political practice in, 210, 214–19 humanity, virtue of as practical philosophy, 112, 168, and benevolence, 58, 84, 102, 105, 201, 229, 235 118, 131–5, 139, 181, 187–9, 209, as Tory, 23, 153 218, 232 Hobbes, Thomas, 2, 144 Burke’s criticisms of, 156–7 applying theory to practice, 7 humanitarianism and, 156–7 Hume and, 69, 144, 197 industry, knowledge and, 110, 137, moral theory of, 31, 80, 84–6, 92, 141, 230 108, 123, 131, 143, 144, 177, 184, as modern, 110, 136–7, 142, 148, 187, 197 156, 201, 230, 248, 249 political theory of, 92, 144, 145, 197 unites beauty and morality, 142 Hooker, Richard, 94 Hume, David human nature British politics and, 149–55 Aristotle and, 238, 239, 240 commercial humanism of, 122, as foundation for everything, 31, 137–42, 148–9 232, 239, 240, 245–6 conservatism of, 155–64 and humanism, 123–4, 229, economic views of, 137–8, 143, 149, 230, 232 195, 234, 250–1 and political animal, 114, 238 empiricist method of, 33, 64–5, 66, problem of level of analysis of, 88, 178, 183, 231 33, 35 esthetic theory of, 124–31, 132, 142 and “rational animal,” 29, 244, 246 historical status of philosophy of, sentimental theory of, of 8–9, 254–6 Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, 31 humanism of, 24, 122–4 and social animal, 7, 74–5, 114–15, irony in, 29, 48, 100, 174, 147, 169–70, 244, 246 254–5, 256 theories of, prove what we already is/ought relation in, 2, 13, 24, believe, 35, 241 29, 78–9, 83, 104, 180, 182–6, see also Treatise of Human Nature, A 194, 232 humanism life of, 19–22 Augustan, 156 love of literary fame of, 13, Christian, 123, 157 19–20, 210 Ciceronian, 16, 108, 114, 122–3, as man of letters, 2, 19, 24, 125, 229–30, 244, 247 198, 199, 227 324 Index

Hume, David – continued 220, 225, 242; separation of, Mill’s interpretation of, 12–13, in theory, 14, 17, 63, 77–8, 79, 235, 236 83–4, 106–7; summaries of, moral theory of, 76–80, 84–109, 12–19, 227–37; united in theory, 131–7, 140–2, 177–90, 248–50 17, 167, 180, 182, 220, 242 naturalism of, see under naturalism; theory of practice in: behaviorist Treatise of Human Nature, A or mechanical, 16, 17, 84–106; passion for theory of, 19, 25–6 common sense, 17, 18, 101, 163, political realism of, 95–7, 145, 204 204, 205–19 political theory of, 91–8, 142–64, theory of theory in: common sense, 190–5, 252–4; see also entries 167–202; systematic, 16, 17, under politics, Hume’s theory of 64–80, 189–95 practice of traditionalism in, 14, 123–4, 158, practical philosophy in: analogy to 161–4, 167, 183, 186, 232 painting, 14–15, 84, 106–7, 108; virtue ethics of, see under virtue comparison to Aristotle, 237–9; ethics conception of, 9, 14, 79, 106; see also specific writings derived from common sense, and topics 167, 180, 191, 232, 236; derived Hutcheson, Francis, 30–1, 84, 107, from theory of human nature, 124, 131, 132, 142, 157, 239 16, 108–9, 111, 117, 122–4, 229; Huxley, T.H., 23 Essays as, 121–42, 230; History “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” as, 112, 168, 201, 229, 230, 235; 144, 194, 204, 223–4, 233 “Sceptic” as, 116–21 as reformer, 112–13 James, William, 5 religious views of, 20, 174–5; see Johnson, Samuel, 38, 156 also secularism reputation of, 22–4 Kampf, Louis, 254–5 secularism of, 13, 16, 29, 51, 60, Kant, Immanuel, 9–11, 23, 29, 39, 60, 108, 111, 112–13, 114, 122–4, 132, 184, 238, 240, 243, 249 162, 228–31, 235, 246–7 Kemp Smith, Norman skepticism of, 2, 6, 7, 12–14, 16–17, on Hume as naturalist, 24, 30, 72 19, 22–5, 28–9, 243–5; academic, on Hume as writing Books 2 and 3 6, 29, 56–61, 124, 167, 172, first, 64, 72 175–6, 231, 235; Pyrrhonian, Klemme, Heiner F., 60 175–6; see also specific works Kenyon, J.M., 252 social views of, 138–42 speculative philosophy in: analogy Letwin, Shirley Robin, 255–6 to anatomy, 14–15, 83–4, 106–7, Livingston, Donald 108; conception of, 9, 14, 79, 106; on conservatism, 158 Enquiries as, 167, 171–3, 181, 231; on foundations of political Treatise as, 106–8 thought, 161, 163 theory and practice in: appeals on Hume and Burke, 161 from theory to practice, 18, Lobkowicz, Nicholas, 4–5 28, 35, 47, 51, 57, 58, 70, 72, Locke, John, 2, 7, 14, 28, 29, 31, 82–3, 89, 91, 93–5, 98, 100, 35, 36, 58, 64, 65, 143, 150, 174, 103–4, 169, 191, 220, 223, 228, 175, 230 243; centrality of, 12, 227, 228; Hume and, 20, 127, 144–5, 177, separation of, in practice, 182, 223, 239 Index 325

Machiavelli, Nicolo, 114, 143, “Of the Original Contract,” 145, 146, 198 196, 220–3 Mandeville, Bernard, 31, 80, 84, 90, “Of the Origin of 91, 105, 108, 117, 123, 131, 157, Government,” 144–5 184, 188, 239, 246 “Of the Populousness of Ancient Marxism, 5, 8, 9 Nations,” 139, 196 McArthur, Neil, 158 “Of the Protestant Succession,” McNally, David, 139 163, 225 Mill, John Stuart, 5, 14, 16, 163 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts on Hume, 8, 12–13, 122, 235, 238 and Sciences,” 202 Miller, David, 158 “Of the Standard of Taste,” Millican, Peter, 59 128–31, 200 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de “Of the Study of History,” 166 Secondat, baron de, 146, 193, 234 “Of Tragedy,” 128 Moore, G.E., 79, 241 Mossner, Ernest, 24, 25, 158 Pascal, Blaise, 7, 135, 186 “My Own Life,” 19, 22 philosophy as common sense, 58, 60, naturalism 219, 241 abandonment of system of, by empiricism in, 13, 29–30, 33, 40, Hume, 60, 61, 105, 166, 176 66, 183 definition of, 30 idealism in, 38 and neuroscience, 30, 230 rationalism in, 16, 29–31, 46, 66, and skepticism, 39, 40, 45–8, 51, 58, 176, 183, 228 131, 235 realism in, 38 see also under Treatise of Human way of life of as model of Nature, A theory, 4 neuroscience, 30, 230, 246, 247 see also practical philosophy; Newton, Isaac, 31, 34, 36, 39, 54, 68, speculative philosophy; see also 73, 184, 247 specific philosophers Norton, David Fate, 86, 113 Plato, 6, 7, 96, 116, 130, 136, Nussbaum, Martha, 156 157, 229 Academy of, as school for Oakeshott, Michael, 161, 164, 205, statesmen, 7 251–2, 253 political theory as rules for lunatic “Of Commerce,” 143, 165, 172, 191 asylum, 7 “Of Essay Writing,” 125–7, 168, 172 utopian tradition of, 7, “Of National Characters,” 138 224, 225 “Of Parties in General,” 139 Pocock, J.G.A., 113, 139, 149 “Of Public Credit,” 139, 225 political theory (political “Of Refinement in the Arts,” 110, 137, philosophy) 140, 148, 202 as Aristotle’s philosophy of human “Of Simplicity and Refinement in affairs, 7 Writing,” 127–8 Plato and Aristotle on, 7 “Of Some Remarkable Customs,” 196 as science of a legislator, 146–7 “Of the Balance of Trade,” 195 as social science, 7 “Of the Coalition of Parties,” 162 utopian tradition of, 7 “Of the Delicacy of Taste and see also politics, Hume’s Passion,” 124–5 theory of 326 Index politics, Hume’s theory of confusion with production, 4 allegiance to government, 91–7 definition of, 3 best form of government in, 223–4 politics as original model of, 4 British, 149–55 scientized, 5 common sense theory of, 210–19 turn toward, in academic and contract theory of government, theory, 11–12 2, 7, 82, 92–4, 150, 161, 204, see also under Hume, David; theory 213, 220–3 and practice forms of government shape society pragmatism in, 146–9 Dewey and James, 5 foundations of, 144–6, 161, 163 instrumental conception of human nature and, 204, 210, 212 theory in, 5 normative evaluations in, 194, Rorty’s version of, 9 223, 233 projectors, political projectors and, see under projectors, definition of, 225 political difference from politicians, 224–5 realism, see under realism, political Pyrrho, 6 as science, 17, 146–9, 192–7 Pyrrhonism, see Hume, David; Tory, see Tories skepticism Whig, see Whigs politics, Hume’s theory of practice of Quine, W.V., 124 hypocrisy as modern form of, 213–14 realism irrationality in, 216–19 philosophical, 38 parties or factions and, 212–14 political, 17, 95–7, 145, 204, 221–2, plots and conspiracies in, 210, 218 252, 253 political actors as “knaves” in, 194, Reid, Thomas, 48, 167, 241 210, 212, 233 criticisms of Treatise, 58–60 rationalism in, 8, 9, 158, 161–3, Hume’s opinion of, 59, 61 212–13, 220, 253–4 misunderstanding of Hume, 60–61 same recurring motives in, 193–4, Rice, Eugene, 229–30 204, 210 Rorty, Richard, 9, 236 in Stuart England, 214–19 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 2, 7 “tribunitian arts” in, 204, 216 Hume and, 144 positivism Hume’s quarrel with, 21–2, 25 Hume as positivist, 24, 29, 111–12, 123, 176, 236 “Sceptic, The” logical, 13, 24, 29, 243 chance more influence than practical philosophy philosophy for, 120–1 Aristotle and, 7, 237–8 Hume as author criticizes, 121 humanism as, 121 influence of philosophy only Kant’s conception of, 9–11 indirect for, 119–20 as moral theory, 10 philosophy as common sense in, outline of, 239–42 17, 116 see also under Hume, David; see also as practical philosophy, 16–17, under specific writings 116–21 practice subjectivist morality of, 17, 117 as actual behavior, 10 virtuous life as the happiest for, confusion with politics, 7 118, 229, 244 Index 327

Schumpeter, Joseph, 251, 252 neglect of, 4 secularism, 246–7 originates in distinction between see also under Hume, David philosophy and politics, 4, 7 Selby-Bigge, L.A., 23, 54 problem of, 3 Sextus Empiricus, 6 separation of by: conservatives, Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 8; pragmatism of Rorty and Third Earl of, 30–1 Fish, 9; skeptical tradition, 5–6; Skepticism universities, 5 Academic, 6, 29, 124, 231 unity of: Marxists, 5; Pragmatists, common sense version of, 6, 229 5; Utilitarians, 5 moral, 31 see also under Hume, David; specific philosophical version of, 6 works; theory, practice Pyrrhonian, 6, 17, 29, 59–61, 243 Tories, 21, 95, 114, 125, 143, 150–5, tradition of, 5–6 161, 204, 213–14, 235, 248 see also under Hume, David; Hume as a Tory, 8, 12–13, 21, 23, naturalism; see also specific writings 139, 153; see also Hume, David, Smith, Adam, 22, 89, 114, 146, 149, conservatism of 168, 195, 201, 234, 250 Toulmin, Stephen, 11, 236, 241 on Hume as model of Treatise of Human Nature, A philosopher, 22–3 allegiance to government in, 91–7 on Hume’s Charon story, 112 appeals to practice in, 32, 35, 47, on moral systems, 157 51–2, 58, 93–5, 97–100 on science of a legislator, 146 association of ideas in, 36–8, 66–9 Socrates, 6, 96 causation and belief in, speculative philosophy 38–9, 66–9 and Aristotle, 9, 237 flaws of, 28, 35, 41–5, 89–90, Kant’s conception of, 9 103–4, 105, 230 see also under Hume, David; Hume’s dissatisfaction with, 28, see also specific writings 48, 53 Stewart, John, 158, 161 as Hume’s greatest work, 23, 28 Stewart, M.A., 170 idealism and realism in, 30, 37–8 Strauss, Leo, 8 impressions and ideas in, 36, 64–6 intentions of Hume in, 29–31 “That Politics May be Reduced to a introspective method of, 33–6 Science,” 196, 197, 233 justice in: as artificial, 80; as laws theory of property, 80, 86, 144; moral definition of, 3 obligation to respect, 88–91, as ideology, 8 100–4; as practice, 84–8 instrumental conception of, 5 level of analysis in, 33–5, 41, 51–2, philosophical life as model for, 4 61, 72 of practice, see Hume, David; morals in: theory of, 76–9; practice specific works of, 82–3, 84–91, 97–100 science as model for, 4 naturalism of, 13, 30, 40ff, 51, of theory, see Hume, David; specific 56–8, 60, 72, 105, 176 works and neuroscience, 30, 230 see also under Hume, David; theory overview of, 31–2 and practice passions in, 72–4 theory and practice personal identity in, 47–8 importance of, 3, 12 practice of the world in, 97–100 328 Index

Treatise of Human Nature – continued virtue reversal pattern (secondary is life of, as happiest, 117, 135, 228, primary) in, 63, 64–6, 70, 72, 74, 229, 244 79–80, 89, 93, 102, 128 and reason, 141 skepticism in, 28–9, 40–52; about social life and, 117, 136–7, reason, 40–1; about the senses, 141–2 41–5; caused by breakdown of see also virtue ethics naturalist system, 32, 41–2, 46, virtue ethics 48, 57; interlude of, 28, 32, 45–51; Aristotle and, 115, 132 naturalism not, 39–40, 57; not characteristics of, 132, 249 intended, 45–6; recovers from and humanist tradition, 115, by appealing from theory to 230, 232 practice, 32, 47, 51–2 Hume and, 115, 131–5, 230, 232, speculative philosophy in, 9, 58, 77, 249–50 79, 83, 106–9 sympathy in, 74–6, 88–91, 100–4 Weber, Max, 254 system of, 56, 69–72 Whigs, 2, 20, 21, 95, 114, theory and practice separate in, 14, 122, 125, 143, 150–5, 158, 161, 17, 63, 77–8, 79, 83–4, 106–7 163, 199, 200, 204, 212–14, 235, theory of practice of, 81–106 248, 252 theory of theory of, 62–80 Hume as a Whig, 153, 158, 194 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 11, 236 utilitarianism, 5, 16, 132, 184, 249 Wolin, Sheldon, 158 utility, Hume’s theory of, 183–6, 232, 251, 253 Yenor, Scott, 158