The World According to Europe's Insurgent Parties

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The World According to Europe's Insurgent Parties EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN SCORECARD FLASH RELATIONS ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Susi Dennison & Dina Pardijs As the political earthquake caused by the UKIP-orchestrated British leave vote reverberates across the EU, the full force SUMMARY of European anti-establishment parties is hitting home. Sinn Fein has called for a vote on reunifying Ireland and • UKIP’s triumph in securing a majority to leave Northern Ireland, and pressure is mounting from the Scot- the EU in the UK referendum was only the start of tish National Party for a second independence referendum. a broader trend of insurgent parties destabilising The rest of the EU is in no way insulated from the impact the EU. of the Brexit vote. Within hours of the UK’s decision, the news had been welcomed by “insurgent” parties across the • Insurgent parties currently hold 1,329 seats in 25 continent – the Front National in France, the PVV in the EU countries – and are playing a direct role in Netherlands; the AFD in Germany; Lega Nord in Italy; and government in eight member states. FPO in Austria, all calling for the referendum to be emulated in their countries. • Their weapon of choice is undoubtedly the referendum, and insurgent parties across te EU Across Europe, traditional political elites are being chal- are pushing for at least 34 referenda in the coming lenged by newer, smaller, and leaner parties from both left years on various issues such as EU membership, and right. They are winning office – currently holding 1,329 eurozone membership, and refugee relocation seats in 25 countries – and playing a role in government in www.ecfr.eu quotas. eight member states. They are capturing the political agen- da and forcing mainstream parties to adopt their positions. • Some key trends can be identified in their views on Their weapon of choice is undoubtedly the referendum, international affairs: they are sceptical about the used to whip up popular support for their pet issues. EU, resent the United States, and are sympathetic to Russia. Most prefer borders closed, migration Now more than ever, it is important to understand what June 2016 low, and trade protected. They all want to return these new political forces stand for, and what they really power to the people through direct democracy. think. ECFR has carried out the first comprehensive survey of these outsiders, identifying 45 parties, analysing their • These parties could act as a significant block public statements, and interviewing representatives of 41 of in upcoming EU Council plans for a migration them. We found that, though these “insurgents” come from compact with neighbouring transit countries, across the political spectrum, from hard left to far right, ECFR/181 and many will oppose the extension of Russia some key trends can be identified in their views on interna- sanctions beyond the summer. tional affairs, which are challenging some of the basic tenets of the European consensus. They are broadly sceptical about the EU, resent the United States, and are sympathetic to Who are Europe’s new insurgent parties? Vladimir Putin’s Russia. They prefer borders closed, migra- tion low, and trade protected. Above all, they want to return This study looks at voices outside the political mainstream power to the people through direct democracy. that are influencing and shaping the development of EU for- eign policy today. For each member state we selected the The UK’s vote on the EU and the Dutch vote on Ukraine most influential non-mainstream groups – for some coun- could be just the first in a landslide of popular referendums tries such as Slovakia or the Czech Republic, where there across Europe. ECFR’s research found that outsider parties are many such parties, we focused on a selection. The only across the EU have plans to push for votes on 34 issues that member state in which we decided there was no relevant would have direct consequences for the EU in the coming party was Luxembourg. years. These insurgent forces are using the media, popular pressure, and political office to force national referendums The parties we have included are not exclusively of the right on issues that were previously the preserve of governments or the left, ranging from the Communist Party in France and and civil servants. socialist Die Linke in Germany, through to far-right groups such as Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, and Insurgent parties are winning seats in local, regional, na- Jobbik in Hungary. Some challenge the establishment from tional, and European parliaments, and challenging estab- the sidelines, and some, such as Law and Justice in Poland, lishment views on how policymaking should be done. In and Syriza and the Independent Greeks in Greece, are serv- Italy, the Five Star Movement won the mayoral elections ing in current coalition governments. The insurgent parties in Rome. are broadly sceptical about the EU in its current state. Their positions range vastly within this, from France’s Front Na- tional and Britain’s UKIP, which was founded with the aim Are you for or against of taking the UK out of the EU, through to Portugal’s Left the EU-Turkey refugee deal? Bloc and Spain’s Podemos, which advocate for EU reform. A sense of the need to “re-democratise” policymaking na- FOR tionally and across the EU is common to almost all these parties, with Switzerland often held up as an example. They 22% all see their role as speaking the truth and challenging the elites on behalf of the people. The youngest, ALFA, was formed in Germany in July 2015 as a breakaway from anti- immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while AGAINST the oldest, Ireland’s Sinn Féin, was founded in 1905. A full THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER PUTIN, MIGRATION THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: 78% list of the parties and their stance on various issues can be found in the annex to this paper. Foreign policy Through interviews with foreign policy representatives of each party that agreed to meet up – 41 out of the 45 we cov- The outsiders are bolstered by shifts in the political climate. ered – and analysis of their public pronouncements, we ex- Foreign policy in particular is no longer an elite game, con- plored their positions on the key foreign policy challenges ducted behind closed doors by small coteries of politicians facing the EU. These include the refugee crisis and the EU’s and diplomats. In the run-up to the UK's referendum on EU relationship with Turkey; security and terrorist threats to www.ecfr.eu membership, stirring speeches by David Cameron and Tony Europe; the Ukraine crisis and the EU’s relationship with Blair on the risks for Britain’s security and the global impact Russia; EU–US relations, including on Middle East policy of leaving the EU fell on deaf ears. People care little about and trade; and the UK referendum. a seat at an international table if its consequences at a na- tional and local level are not clearly communicated. Mean- Most of the parties focus primarily on domestic issues, and while, digital developments make it easier for the public to some lack fully developed foreign policy positions – for June 2016 hold politicians to account over high-level deals such as the example, different representatives of Germany’s AfD gave Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a different answers on foreign policy, and other party repre- planned EU–US trade agreement – or the EU–Turkey deal sentatives stated that they could only answer in a personal to manage refugee flows. capacity. But even newer parties, which have had less time to elaborate policy beyond the core issues on which they This flash scorecard draws on our interviews with these par- were founded, are quickly developing their positions on for- ECFR/181 ties and analysis by our network of researchers across the eign policy. They are driven towards this by the impact of 28 EU member states to draw out the implications for Euro- the refugee crisis across the EU, and the interplay between pean decision-making over the coming years. its foreign and domestic dimensions. 2 There was a surprising amount of consensus on the existen- In terms of policy towards Europe’s neighbourhood, there tial threats facing the EU. For 34 out of the 45 parties cov- is a general consensus among the insurgent parties that ered, the refugee crisis or the threat of terrorism and radical more enlargement would be a bad thing – that the EU is Islamism (these issues were inextricably linked in the re- big enough and, if anything, should be gradually dissolved. sponses of most) were among the top two threats facing the However, there is slightly more openness to the inclusion EU. This response was not the preserve of the right wing: it of countries to the east (notably Ukraine) than to the south was shared by Germany’s Die Linke, the French Communist (notably Turkey, with major fears expressed about the pos- Party, Spain’s Podemos, and the Lithuanian Labour Party. sibility of Turkish accession). Still, only 10 parties respond- ed unequivocally that they supported Ukraine’s path to EU On the refugee crisis, Angela Merkel’s “refugees welcome” accession and, of these, two wouldn’t support NATO acces- policy does not appear to attract the criticism that might sion for Ukraine (UKIP’s position was the reverse, support- have been expected: only seven parties put it among their ing Ukraine joining NATO but not the EU).
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