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Damn the Torpedoes: the History of Science And DAMN THE TORPEDOES: THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND UNDERSEA WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II by Gary Lee Sims A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in History MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY Bozeman, Montana April, 2017 ©COPYRIGHT by Gary Lee Sims 2017 All Rights Reserved ii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to two World War II Navy men from my youth, Ward Franklin Sims, and Donald Schwab, crewmates and friends who served on the battleship USS North Carolina. Young men like these two volunteered to fight for their country before their adult lives began. There were many other young men like these two who chose to serve on the most dangerous duty of the war with the U.S. Navy Submarine Service. The Submarine Service was the smallest, most elite section of the U.S. Navy and sank more enemy ships than any other group of warships involved in the war. But there was a price they paid. Fifty-two submarines, three hundred seventy-four officers and 3,131 submariners perished during the war. This dissertation is dedicated to them, as well. iii ACKNOWLEGEMENTS I could not have completed this work without travel grant help from the Montana State University College of Letters and Science and the Montana State University Graduate School. Special thanks go Dr. Karlene Hoo, Dean of the MSU Graduate School, who gave me personal support as well as a special dissertation completion fellowship. Mary Kuthmiller and Jan Zauha at the Renne Library, Montana State University, Bozeman, Ginny Kilander, Amanda Shaw and staff at the American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie and Mary Ryan and staff at the U.S. Naval Undersea Museum, Keyport, Washington were especially helpful and gracious during my research visits. Mr. Charles R. Gunderson, former Mechanical Engineer with the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division met with me twice. Chapter Two could not have been written without Mr. Gunderson’s expertise. I had the greatest dissertation committee members, Dr. Tim LeCain, Dr. Robert Rydell and Dr. Brett Walker. I especially thank my Chairman, Dr. Michael Reidy who literally went above and beyond. My youngest son Connor helped with research at Keyport, my oldest son Graham created art for my dissertation presentation. My wife Mary was constantly by my side during this process. Mary assisted in research, editing, formatting and gave me constant support during the difficult days of the writing process. Her parents also supported me in every way. They made this dissertation possible. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………. 1 The USS Sargo ........................................................................................................1 Thesis and Organization ………..………………………………….…………...... 5 Resources and Past Scholarship …………………………………………………16 1. EARLY SUBMARINES AND TORPEDOES …………………………...………… 22 Battle of Tsushima ……………………………………………………………... 22 Thesis and Organization.……………………………………………………….. 23 High-risk Systems …………………….………………………………………... 25 Black Boxes ……………………………………………………………………. 27 Warfare on the High Seas ……………………………………………………… 29 Early Submarine Precursors: The Submersibles ……………………………….. 30 The Submarine: Initial Basic Development …………………………………… 34 The Submarine Part One: Submersion ……………………...………………….. 35 The Submarine Part Two: Propulsion.………………………………………….. 37 Steam Engines ………………………………………………….. 37 Internal Combustion Engine …………………………………… 37 Fuel …………………………………………………………….. 38 Diesel Engines …………………………………………………. 39 Battery Power for Undersea Travel ……………………………. 41 Analysis …………………………………………………….…………………... 41 John Phillip Holland …………………………………………… 42 Early Submarine Strategy: Europe …………………………….. 44 The First Torpedoes ……………………………………………………………. 47 Underwater Warfare Going into World War I ……………………….………… 52 Tactics and Strategy -- Alfred Thayer Mahan …………………. 53 Blockade: Gentlemen’s War Part One …………………………. 55 The Submarine Comes into its Own …………………………… 59 Interwar Years: Gentleman’s War Part Two …………………………………... 63 Designing the Fleet Submarine ………………………………… 67 War Plan Orange ……………………………………………….. 70 German Influences ……………………………………………... 72 Conclusion …………………………………………………...………………... 74 2. MODERN MARVELS ……………………………………………………………… 76 The USS Halibut ……………………………………………………………….. 76 Thesis and Organization ……………………………………………………….. 78 Designing the Fleet Submarine ………………………………………………… 79 v TABLE OF CONTENTS – CONTINUED Basic Function …………………………………………………………. 84 Submarines in Combat …………………………………………………. 85 The Science Behind Sinking a Ship ……………………………………………. 86 The Mark XIV Torpedo ………………………………………………………... 88 The Warhead……..……….………………………………………….…. 89 Exploders ………………………………………………………………. 90 The Air-Flask Section ………………………………………………….. 93 The Midships Section ………...………………………………………... 95 The Afterbody ………………………………………………………….. 96 The Development of the Mark XIV Magnetic Influence Exploder ……………. 97 Organizations and People ……………………………..……………………… 100 Requests of Vessels for Live Testing …….……...……………………. 100 Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Construction and Repair …………………...……….……… 101 Newport Torpedo Station ……….….…………………….…………… 104 U.S. Naval Command, Bureau of Ordnance, and Men in the Field …….…………...……………………...…………….. 108 Charles Andrews Lockwood …………..…………….………………... 108 Ralph Waldo Christie ……………… ……………….………………. 111 William Henry Purnell Blandy ……………………………………….. 114 James Fife …………………………………………………………….. 116 Command Changes in the Pacific …………………………………….. 118 Analysis of Production Issues ………………………………………… 119 Analysis of Exploder Development ….……………………………….. 120 Pre-War Testing …………………………….………… 122 Sink-Ex Testing ………………………………………. 123 Administrative and Staffing Issues of Torpedo Construction ………………………………………………………… 125 3. CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION ………………………………………………… 131 The USS Wahoo ……………………………………………………………… 131 Thesis and Organization ……………………………………………………… 135 Torpedo Shortage and Conservation Measures ………………………………. 137 Contact, Attack and Firing Solutions …………………..………………….…. 142 Searching for a Target ………………………………………………… 143 Periscope ……………………………………………………………… 143 Masthead height ………………………………………………………. 144 Torpedo Data Computer ……………………………………………… 147 The Torpedo Rooms ………………………………………………….. 149 Analysis of the Fire Control Process …….…………….………...…… 148 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS – CONTINUED Wartime Problems ……………………………………..………..……………. 151 Command and Skipper Problems ….………………………..……..….. 153 Torpedo Issues ……………………….……………………..…….…... 156 Initial Response by Command …….………………………………….. 158 Changes in Personnel ……………….………………………………… 161 Depth Issue ….…………………….………………………….……..… 163 Prematures …………………………………………………….………. 168 Duds …….…………………......…………………………….………... 179 Conclusion ……………………………….……………………………..…..… 183 4. HIGH-RISK SYSTEMS ……………………………..…………………………….. 187 The USS Squalus ……………………………………………………………... 187 Thesis and Organization ……………………………………………………… 194 High-risk Systems ………………………………………..…………………… 195 Incidents and Accidents …………….………………………………… 196 Failures ………………………………………………………..………. 197 Squalus as a High-Risk System ………………………………………………. 198 Degree of Disturbance ………………………………………………... 199 Coupling …………………………………………………….………… 199 Linear vs. Complex Systems ………………………………….………. 200 Engineered Safety Features ……………………………...….………… 202 Mental Models and No time for Correction …………………………... 203 Resolution of the Squalus Story ………………………………………. 206 Operator Error ………………………………………………………… 208 MK XIV Torpedo …………………………...………………………………... 209 Hydro Diaphragm …………………………………………………….. 211 Depth-Setting Mechanism ……………………………………………. 212 The Mark VI Exploder: Electrical Engineering View ………………... 213 The Arming and Delay Switch ……………………………………….. 217 Generator …………………………………..…………………….…… 218 Voltage Regulator and Noise Filter …………………………………... 219 Pick-up Coil …………………………………………………………... 219 Thyratron Tube ……………………………………………………….. 221 To the Target …………………………………………………….……. 221 Capacitors …………………………………………………………….. 223 Solenoid ………………………………………………………………. 224 Analysis ………………………………………………………………. 224 Analysis of the Mark XIV/VI High-Risk System ……………………………. 225 Definitions ……...……….………………..…………………….……. 226 Task Analysis …………..……………………………..…..…………. 226 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS – CONTINUED Degree of Disturbance ……………………….……………………….. 227 Incident versus Accident ……….…………………………….……….. 227 Engineered Safety Features ….……………………………….……….. 227 Linear versus Complex, Visible versus Invisible ………………….…. 228 Redundancy ……………….………………………………………….. 228 Mental Models ………………….………………………………..…… 228 Coupling ………………………………………………………….…… 229 Transformation Processes and the Environment ……………………… 230 Materials and Relationships in Action ………………………………... 233 Science in War ………………………………………………………………... 233 Submarine Reports ……………………………………………………. 234 Testing ………………………………………………………………… 235 Corrective Systems for the MK XIV/VI ……………………………… 235 Torpedo Failure Response Program ………………………….……….. 241 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………….…… 243 5. BLACK BOXES ……...…………………………………………………………… 245 The USS Sculpin ……………………………………………………………… 245 Thesis and Organization ……………………………………………………… 246 Command Structure …………………………………………………………... 247 History of Science …………………………………………………………….. 248 The Strong Programme ……………………………………….. 248 Materialism, Actor Network Theory and Black Boxes ………. 249 Networks ……………………………………………………… 251 Black Boxes …………………………………………………... 253 MK XIV Depth Control as a Black Box ……………………… 255 MK VI Magnetic Influence Exploder as a Black Box ………... 267 Production Science ……………………………………………………………. 259 Opening a Black Box ………………………………………………………….
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