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Smoleńsk W Okowach Lodu. Rzecz O Reorganizacji Wielkiej Armii Napoleona W Listopadowe Dni 1812 Roku
ZESZYTY NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU JAGIELLOŃSKIEGO Prace Historyczne 140, z. 1 (2013), s. 65–84 doi:10.4467/20844069PH.13.005.1044 SMOLEŃSK W OKOWACH LODU. RZECZ O REORGANIZACJI WIELKIEJ ARMII NAPOLEONA W LISTOPADOWE DNI 1812 ROKU Rafał Kowalczyk Uniwersytet Łódzki ABSTRACT SMOLENSK IN THE FETTERS OF ICE. ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GREAT NAPOLEONIC ARMY IN NOVEMBER 1812 In the year 1812, Smoleńsk was to have served as a supply center for the Great Army. When deciding to retreat from the battlefi eld at Malojaroslavec, Napoleon was convinced that Smoleńsk was well prepared and that the Great Army would be able to spend the winter in its vicinity. Yet it turned out that the Great Army commissariat and the local Napoleonic governors were not able to adequately prepare the Smoleńsk fortress. Therefore on reaching Smoleńsk, Napoleon made the decision that the Great Army should retreat further to the west – onto the territories of the former Polish Commonwealth – Lithuania. In the course of a few days from 9–14 November, he managed to increase the size of the Great Army by around 20 thousand soldiers. When leaving Smoleńsk, Napoleon’s army had still around two hundred canons at its disposal. It had adequate supplies of food, ammunition and was to a large degree “rejuvenated”. Napoleon had attained a great feat at Smoleńsk. He had in fact saved the Great Army. Without his effort, the army’s further march would have been impossible. The reorganized Great Army was able to retreat further to the west and its regiments were ready to fend off the attacks of the enemy – that is Russians, as was proved by the heavy fi ghting in the battle of Krasne. -
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Institute of National Remembrance https://ipn.gov.pl/en/digital-resources/articles/4397,Battle-of-Warsaw-1920.html 2021-10-01, 13:56 11.08.2020 Battle of Warsaw, 1920 We invite you to read an article by Mirosław Szumiło, D.Sc. on the Battle of Warsaw, 1920. The text is also available in French and Russian (see attached pdf files). The Battle of Warsaw was one of the most important moments of the Polish-Bolshevik war, one of the most decisive events in the history of Poland, Europe and the entire world. However, excluding Poland, this fact is almost completely unknown to the citizens of European countries. This phenomenon was noticed a decade after the battle had taken place by a British diplomat, Lord Edgar Vincent d’Abernon, a direct witness of the events. In his book of 1931 “The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920”, he claimed that in the contemporary history of civilisation there are, in fact, few events of greater importance than the Battle of Warsaw of 1920. There is also no other which has been more overlooked. To better understand the origin and importance of the battle of Warsaw, one needs to become acquainted with a short summary of the Polish-Bolshevik war and, first and foremost, to get to know the goals of both fighting sides. We ought to start with stating the obvious, namely, that the Bolshevik regime, led by Vladimir Lenin, was, from the very beginning, focused on expansion. Prof. Richard Pipes, a prolific American historian, stated: “the Bolsheviks took power not to change Russia, but to use it as a trampoline for world revolution”. -
The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960 Dissertation
INTIMIDATING THE WORLD: THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ARMY, 1956-1960 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Paul C. Jussel, B.A., M.M.A.S., M.S.S. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Advisor Professor John R. Guilmartin __________________ Professor William R. Childs Advisor Department of History ABSTRACT The atomic bomb created a new military dynamic for the world in 1945. The bomb, if used properly, could replace the artillery fires and air-delivered bombs used to defeat the concentrated force of an enemy. The weapon provided the U.S. with an unparalleled advantage over the rest of the world, until the Soviet Union developed its own bomb by 1949 and symmetry in warfare returned. Soon, theories of warfare changed to reflect the belief that the best way to avoid the effects of the bomb was through dispersion of forces. Eventually, the American Army reorganized its divisions from the traditional three-unit organization to a new five-unit organization, dubbed pentomic by its Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor. While atomic weapons certainly had an effect on Taylor’s reasoning to adopt the pentomic organization, the idea was not new in 1956; the Army hierarchy had been wrestling with restructuring since the end of World War II. Though the Korean War derailed the Army’s plans for the early fifties, it returned to the forefront under the Eisenhower Administration. The driving force behind reorganization in 1952 was not ii only the reoriented and reduced defense budget, but also the Army’s inroads to the atomic club, formerly the domain of only the Air Force and the Navy. -
Warsaw in Short
WarsaW TourisT informaTion ph. (+48 22) 94 31, 474 11 42 Tourist information offices: Museums royal route 39 Krakowskie PrzedmieÊcie Street Warsaw Central railway station Shops 54 Jerozolimskie Avenue – Main Hall Warsaw frederic Chopin airport Events 1 ˚wirki i Wigury Street – Arrival Hall Terminal 2 old Town market square Hotels 19, 21/21a Old Town Market Square (opening previewed for the second half of 2008) Praga District Restaurants 30 Okrzei Street Warsaw Editor: Tourist Routes Warsaw Tourist Office Translation: English Language Consultancy Zygmunt Nowak-Soliƒski Practical Information Cartographic Design: Tomasz Nowacki, Warsaw Uniwersity Cartographic Cathedral Photos: archives of Warsaw Tourist Office, Promotion Department of the City of Warsaw, Warsaw museums, W. Hansen, W. Kryƒski, A. Ksià˝ek, K. Naperty, W. Panów, Z. Panów, A. Witkowska, A. Czarnecka, P. Czernecki, P. Dudek, E. Gampel, P. Jab∏oƒski, K. Janiak, Warsaw A. Karpowicz, P. Multan, B. Skierkowski, P. Szaniawski Edition XVI, Warszawa, August 2008 Warsaw Frederic Chopin Airport Free copy 1. ˚wirki i Wigury St., 00-906 Warszawa Airport Information, ph. (+48 22) 650 42 20 isBn: 83-89403-03-X www.lotnisko-chopina.pl, www.chopin-airport.pl Contents TourisT informaTion 2 PraCTiCal informaTion 4 fall in love wiTh warsaw 18 warsaw’s hisTory 21 rouTe no 1: 24 The Royal Route: Krakowskie PrzedmieÊcie Street – Nowy Âwiat Street – Royal ¸azienki modern warsaw 65 Park-Palace Complex – Wilanów Park-Palace Complex warsaw neighborhood 66 rouTe no 2: 36 CulTural AttraCTions 74 The Old -
Janusz Odziemkowski Bitwa Nad Autą, 4–6 Lipca 1920 Roku
Janusz Odziemkowski Bitwa nad Autą, 4–6 lipca 1920 roku Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 14(65)/1 (243), 51-74 2013 JANUSZ ODZIEMKOWSKI bitWa nad autą, 4–6 lipca 1920 roku dniach 4–6 lipca 1920 r. na północnym odcinku frontu polsko-rosyj- skiego, rozciągającego się od dolnej Dźwiny po ukrainne stepy, 1 Armia gen. Gustawa Zygadłowicza toczyła walki z wojskami Frontu Zachodnie- Wgo Michaiła Tuchaczewskiego. Przeszły one do historii jako „bitwa nad Autą”, od nazwy rzeki, na której była oparta obrona centrum zgrupowania 1 Armii. Bitwę nad Autą trzeba zaliczyć do najważniejszych wydarzeń wojny Rzeczypospolitej z Rosją bolszewicką. Zapoczątkowała ona bowiem odwrót wojsk polskich na Białorusi i Li- twie, przejęcie inicjatywy przez przeciwnika, którego rozpoczęty wówczas pochód na zachód został zatrzymany dopiero po 6 tygodniach na przedpolach Warszawy. Mimo tych okoliczności bitwa nie doczekała się szerszego opracowania w polskiej literaturze historycznowojskowej, nie zajmuje też zatem właściwego jej miejsca w świadomości historycznej społeczeństwa. Zasadnicze kwestie związane z bitwą nad Autą dotykają dwóch zagadnień: przy- czyn porażki 1 Armii oraz związanego z tym pytania, czy przy ówczesnym stosunku sił na północnym odcinku frontu przegranej można było uniknąć lub przynajmniej zminimalizować jej skutki. TEREN Bitwa rozegrała się na froncie o szerokości około 100 km, rozciągającym się od rzeki Dźwiny w rejonie Dryssy na północy, po bagna górnej Berezyny na południu. Wysunięty najdalej na północ odcinek frontu 1 Armii obejmował obszar o szerokości około 20 km, usytuowany między Dźwiną skręcającą w tym miej- scu na północny zachód, a jej lewobrzeżnym dopływem – Dzisną. Mniej więcej w centrum tego obszaru leży jezioro Jelnia. W 1920 r. -
Man Is Indestructible: Legend and Legitimacy in the Worlds of Jaroslav Hašek
Man Is Indestructible: Legend and Legitimacy in the Worlds of Jaroslav Hašek The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Weil, Abigail. 2019. Man Is Indestructible: Legend and Legitimacy in the Worlds of Jaroslav Hašek. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42013078 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use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
Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War.Pdf
NESTOR MAKHNO IN THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR Michael Malet THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE TeutonicScan €> Michael Malet \982 AU rights reserved. No parI of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, wilhom permission Fim ed/lIOn 1982 Reprinted /985 To my children Published by lain, Saffron, and Jonquil THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London rind BasingSloke Compafl/u rind reprutntatiW!S throughout the warld ISBN 0-333-2S969-6 Pnnted /II Great Bmain Antony Rowe Ltd, Ch/ppenham 5;landort � Signalur RNB 10043 Akz.·N. \d.·N. I, "'i • '. • I I • Contents ... Acknowledgements VIII Preface ox • Chronology XI .. Introduction XVII Glossary xx' PART 1 MILITARY HISTORY 1917-21 1 Relative Peace, 1917-18 3 2 The Rise of the Balko, July 19I5-February 1919 13 3 The Year 1919 29 4 Stalemate, January-October 1920 54 5 The End, October I92O-August 1921 64 PART 2 MAKHNOVSCHYNA-ORGAN1SATION 6 Makhno's Military Organisation and Capabilities 83 7 Civilian Organisation 107 PART 3 IDEOLOGY 8 Peasants and Workers 117 9 Makhno and the Bolsheviks 126 10 Other Enemies and Rivals 138 11 Anarchism and the Anarchists 157 12 Anti-Semitism 168 13 Some Ideological Questions 175 PART 4 EXILE J 4 The Bitter End 183 References 193 Bibliography 198 Index 213 • • '" Acknowledgements Preface My first thanks are due to three university lecturers who have helped Until the appearance of Michael PaJii's book in 1976, the role of and encouraged me over the years: John Erickson and Z. A. B. Nestor Makhno in the events of the Russian civil war was almost Zeman inspired my initial interest in Russian and Soviet history, unknown. -
Baltic Security and Defence Review 2010
Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 12, Issue 1 2010 Baltic Security and Defence Review is the publication of the Baltic Defence College © 2010, Baltic Defence College, All rights reserved ISSN 1736-3772 (print) 1736-3780 (online) Editorial Board Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Richard DiNardo, Professor, US Marine Corps Staff College Dr. Joel Hayward, Dean, RAF College Cranwell, UK Dr. Adam Seipp. Dept of History, University of Texas Dr. Jürgen Foerster, Department of History, University of Freiburg Col. Robert Ehlers PhD, Professor, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space power Studies Dr. Arunas Molis, Department of Strategy and Politics, Baltic Defence College Brigadier General Walter Feichtinger PhD, Austrian National Defence Academy Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Flemming Hansen, Royal Danish Defence College Assistant editor and layout: Villu Varjas Cover design and print: Momo Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.bdcol.ee All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, fax: +372 717 6050, e-mail: [email protected] Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 12, issue 1, 2010 Contents Baltic Defence College Workshop on the New NATO Strategic Concept, 18 February 2010 By Baltic Defence College faculty............................................................ -
Russian Army, 4 June 1916
Russian Army 4 June 1916 Northwest Front: Finland Garrison: XLII Corps: 106th Infantry Division 421st Tsarskoe Selo Infantry Regiment 422nd Kolpino Infantry Regiment 423rd Luga Infantry Regiment 424th Chut Infantry Regiment 107th Infantry Division 425th Kargopol Infantry Regiment 426th Posinets Infantry Regiment 427th Pudozh Infantry Regiment 428th Lodeyinpol Infantry Regiment Sveaborg Border Brigade 1st Sveaborg Border Regiment 2nd Sveaborg Border Regiment Estonia Coast Defense: 108th Infantry Division 429th Riizhsk Infantry Regiment 430th Balksy Infantry Regiment 431st Tikhvin Infantry Regiment 432nd Baldaia Infantry Regiment Revel Border Brigade 1st Revel Border Regiments 2nd Revel Border Regiments Livonia Coast Defense: I Corps 22nd Novgorod Infantry Division 85th Vyborg Infantry Regiment 86th Wilmanstrand Infantry Regiment 87th Neschlot Infantry Regiment 88th Petrov Infantry Regiment 24th Pskov Infantry Division 93rd Irkhtsk Infantry Regiment 94th Yenisei Infantry Regiment 95th Krasnoyarsk Infantry Regiment 96th Omsk Infantry Regiment III Corps 73rd Orel Infantry Division 289th Korotoyav Infantry Regiment 290th Valuiisk Infantry Regiment 291st Trubchev Infantry Regiment 292nd New Archangel Infantry Regiment 5th Rifle Division (Suwalki) 17th Rifle Regiment 18th Rifle Regiment 19th Rifle Regiment 20th Rifle Regiment V Siberian Corps 1 50th St. Petersburg Infantry Division 197th Lesnot Infantry Regiment 198th Alexander Nevsky Infantry Regiment 199th Kronstadt Infantry Regiment 200th Kronshlot Infantry Regiment 6th (Khabarovsk) Siberian -
The Changkufeng and Nomonhan Incidents – the Undeclared Border War and Its Impact on World War Ii
University of Texas at El Paso DigitalCommons@UTEP Open Access Theses & Dissertations 2014-01-01 The hC angkufeng And Nomonhan Incidents - The Undeclared Border War And Its Impact on World War II Tobias Block University of Texas at El Paso, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd Part of the Asian History Commons, Asian Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Slavic Languages and Societies Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons Recommended Citation Block, Tobias, "The hC angkufeng And Nomonhan Incidents - The ndeU clared Border War And Its Impact on World War II" (2014). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 1588. https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/1588 This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CHANGKUFENG AND NOMONHAN INCIDENTS – THE UNDECLARED BORDER WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON WORLD WAR II TOBIAS BLOCK DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY APPROVED: __________________________________________ Joshua Fan, Ph.D., Chair __________________________________________ Paul Edison, Ph.D. __________________________________________ Jose Villalobos, Ph.D. __________________________________ Bess Sirmon-Taylor, Ph.D. Interim Dean of the Graduate School THE CHANGKUFENG AND NOMONHAN INCIDENTS - THE UNDECLARED BORDER WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON WORLD WAR II by Tobias Block, BA Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at El Paso in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department Of HISTORY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS OF EL PASO May 2014 Table of Contents Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. -
The Russian Civil War
Reds! RULEBOOK © 200 Rodger MacGowan TheREDS! Russian Civil War, 98-92 Table of Contents . Introduction ................................................ 2 3. City, Sea and Resource Control ................. 13 2. Components ................................................ 2 4. Reinforcements and Replacements ............ 14 3. Game Set-up ............................................... 3 5 Poland ......................................................... 14 4. How to Win ................................................ 4 6. The Makhno Partisans ................................ 15 5. Sequence of Play ........................................ 4 7. Nationalist Garrisons .................................. 15 6. Initiative and Random Events .................... 5 8. Allied Withdrawal ....................................... 16 7. Activation and the Action Phase ................ 5 9. Winter ......................................................... 16 8. Zones of Control ........................................ 6 20. Special Units and Markers .......................... 16 9. Stacking ...................................................... 7 Strategy Notes ................................................... 19 0. Movement .................................................. 8 Design Notes ..................................................... 20 11. Combat ....................................................... 10 Historical Overview .......................................... 2 2 Supply and Rally ........................................ 12 Expanded -
The Armed Forces of South Russia by Marja Erwin
The Armed Forces of South Russia By Marja Erwin The Armed Forces of South Russia developed from the previously-separate Don Armies and Volunteer Army, and incorporated other pro-White forces such as the Southern Army. In 1919, they had the support of the Entente powers, which eventually supplied about 200,000 rifles, more than 6,000 machine guns, more than 1,100 artillery pieces, and even 74 tanks. By 1919, Armed Forces of South Russia included three main troop categories: 1. Officers' Units. The officers' units were the original core of the Volunteer Army. The Guard and Grenadier units joined later but were similar. These were the most reliable shock troops of the Armed Forces of South Russia. By late 1918, the Volunteer Army began to conscript officers in Volunteer-occupied areas. By late 1919, the Armed Forces of South Russia combined regular units into the officers' regiments, in order to mobilize additional officers' regiments. 2. Cossack Units. These included most of the Don Armies and much of the Volunteer Army. These included most of the White cavalry. The Don and Terek Cossacks were mostly Russian. The Kuban Cossacks were mostly Ukrainian, but included many Russians. 3. Other Units. These included revived units of the old army, non-Cossack units of the Cossack hosts, and others. The Armed Forces of South Russia did not consider peasants, workers, and others as reliable as the officers and Cossacks; the regular forces generally conscripted officers and cossacks before trying to recruit others, but the Cossack forces often conscripted non-Cossacks into their scout units.