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The Escalation Between Israel and Hamas
BICOM Briefing The escalation between Israel and Hamas May 2021 What has happened so far? Between Sunday evening and Wednesday morning, over 1000 rockets were fired by Hamas and Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza at Israeli towns and cities, killing five civilians. It includes the largest barrage on the Gush Dan / Tel Aviv metropolitan area in the country’s history, as well as dozens of rockets fired at Beersheva, Ashkelon, Ashdod and other communities in the south. On Sunday evening, rockets were fired at Jerusalem and the Knesset was evacuated. The IDF estimates that approximately 850 rockets have managed to reach Israel, with another 200 landing inside the Gaza Strip itself. This morning, a sixth civilian was killed by an anti-tank missile on Kibbutz Netiv Ha’asara close to the Gaza border. In response, as part of Operation Guardian of the Walls, Israel has carried out over 500 sorties on targets in Gaza, aimed at neutralizing Hamas terror infrastructure and the organisation’s operatives. The PIJ’s rocket manufacturing and storage facilities have reportedly been damaged. Hamas headquarters and military intelligence and R&D – located in high rise buildings in Gaza – have also been hit (following IDF warnings to civilians to evacuate the area). On Tuesday night, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowing to continue striking “with full power” and Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi warning Hamas and PIJ will pay a heavy price. As of Wednesday noon, the Hamas-run health ministry said the death toll in Gaza is 43, with Israel saying it has killed at least 18 terrorist operatives. -
Palestinian Forces
Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax : 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] Palestinian Forces Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies [email protected] Rough Working Draft: Revised February 9, 2006 Copyright, Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. May not be reproduced, referenced, quote d, or excerpted without the written permission of the author. Cordesman: Palestinian Forces 2/9/06 Page 2 ROUGH WORKING DRAFT: REVISED FEBRUARY 9, 2006 ................................ ................................ ............ 1 THE MILITARY FORCES OF PALESTINE ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 2 THE OSLO ACCORDS AND THE NEW ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN WAR ................................ ................................ .............. 3 THE DEATH OF ARAFAT AND THE VICTORY OF HAMAS : REDEFINING PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ARAB - ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 4 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY FORC ES ................................ ................................ .......... 5 Palestinian Authority Forces During the Peace Process ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 The -
Burden Sharing and the Haredim
8 Burden Sharing and the Haredim On March 12, 2014 the Knesset passed, on its which scholars should remain exempt, but also third reading, Amendment 19 to the Military states that draft evaders will be subject to arrest if Service Law, which aims to widen the participation quotas are unmet. !e comprehensive exemption of Ultra-Orthodox young men and yeshiva granting all Haredi yeshiva students aged 22 students in military and civilian national service. and over who join the workforce is of particular !is amendment also aims to promote their significance. integration into the working population. On April 17, 2014, the Ministerial Committee on Background: !e History of Burden Sharing in Military Service set concrete steps for the amendment’s implementation the Exemption (!e Arrangement and follow up. !ese were given the force of a for Deferral of Army Service Cabinet resolution. Under the new arrangement, by Yeshiva Students) the amendment will take full e"ect on July 1, Compulsory military service applies under the 2017, following an adjustment period. When in Security Service Law (Combined Version) of 1986. full force, the military or civilian national service According to this law, Israeli citizens are subject inductees will number 5,200 a year (two thirds to conscription at age 18 unless granted an of the age cohort according to current figures). exemption. Exemption was the subject of lively Until then, yeshiva students will be able to defer debates between yeshiva heads and the political their enlistment and receive an exemption at age leadership in the early days of the state. !e 22, as long as the yeshivot meet their recruitment executive committee of the Center for Service targets, which will be implemented according to to the People considered the conscription of the mandated schedule: in 2014, a total of 3,800 yeshiva students, and in March 1948 authorized Haredim are expected to join the IDF or national a temporary army service deferment for yeshiva service; in 2015, 4,500; and 5,200 in the years that students whose occupation was Torah study.1 follow. -
Hamas Type of Organization
Hamas Name: Hamas Type of Organization: Political religious social service provider terrorist violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist jihadist Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group pan-Islamist Qutbist Sunni Place of Origin: Gaza Strip Year of Origin: 1987 Founder(s): Ahmed Yassin, Mahmoud Zahar, Hassan Yousef, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Mohammed Hassan Shama’a, Abdul Fattah Hassan Dukhan, Ibrahim Fares Al-Yazouri, Salah Shahada (Founder of the Qassam Brigades), Issa Al-Nashar Places of Operation: Gaza Strip, West Bank, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran Overview Also Known As: Harakat al-Muqawana al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement); Al-Tiar Al-Islami (The Islamic Stream); Al-Athja Al-Islami (The Islamic Trend)1 Executive Summary Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood [1] that emerged in the Gaza Strip in the late 1980s, during the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israel. The group’s ideology blends Islamism and Palestinian nationalism and seeks the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.Since 2017, Hamas claims to have severed its ties to the Brotherhood. The group also receives financial and military support from Iran. Qatar has also provided significant funding for the group. Hamas uses its provision of social services to build support amongst grassroots Palestinians, helping it to win the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. However, the group’s engagement in politics and welfare has not tempered its commitment to terrorism. Hamas’s preferred methods include suicide bombings, rocket and mortar attacks, shootings, and kidnappings. Hamas as a whole or its armed faction have been labeled terrorist organizations by the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, the European Union, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. -
2014 Gaza War Assessment: the New Face of Conflict
2014 Gaza War Assessment: The New Face of Conflict A report by the JINSA-commissioned Gaza Conflict Task Force March 2015 — Task Force Members, Advisors, and JINSA Staff — Task Force Members* General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.), Task Force Chair Former Deputy Commander of United States European Command Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, USA (ret.) Former Commander, U.S. Army North Lieutenant General Richard Natonski, USMC (ret.) Former Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command Major General Rick Devereaux, USAF (ret.) Former Director of Operational Planning, Policy, and Strategy - Headquarters Air Force Major General Mike Jones, USA (ret.) Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command * Previous organizational affiliation shown for identification purposes only; no endorsement by the organization implied. Advisors Professor Eliot Cohen Professor of Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Corn, USA (ret.) Presidential Research Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston JINSA Staff Dr. Michael Makovsky Chief Executive Officer Dr. Benjamin Runkle Director of Programs Jonathan Ruhe Associate Director, Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy Maayan Roitfarb Programs Associate Ashton Kunkle Gemunder Center Research Assistant . — Table of Contents — 2014 GAZA WAR ASSESSMENT: Executive Summary I. Introduction 7 II. Overview of 2014 Gaza War 8 A. Background B. Causes of Conflict C. Strategies and Concepts of Operations D. Summary of Events -
The Clashes in East Jerusalem Situation As at May 10, 2021
רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י ד ע מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר The clashes in East Jerusalem Situation as at May 10, 2021 May 11, 2021 = Overview Over the past few days, there has been an increase in the intensity of the violent clashes between Israeli police and Palestinians in East Jerusalem that began in the beginning of the month of Ramadan. The epicenter of the conflict is the Al-Aqsa Mosque. There have also been clashes at the Damascus Gate, the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, Issawiya and additional neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The incidents also led to a flare-up in the Gaza Strip. Rockets were fired at Israel, incendiary balloons were launched, causing dozens of fires in the Gaza envelope area, and night harassment units were deployed along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The height of the incidents was on May 10, 2021, Jerusalem Day in Israel, when thousands of Palestinians in the Al-Aqsa Mosque threw stones at the Mughrabi Gate. -
Israel Report Is a Student Publication of Reconciliation Efforts Between the Rival Palestinian Factions
To provide greater exposure to primary Israeli news sources and opinions in order to become better informed on the issues, and to gain a better understanding of the wide range of perspectives that exist in Israeli society and politics. Issue 1129 • November 2, 2018 • 24 Marcheshvan 5779 IN DRAMATIC MOVE, PLO PULLS OUT OF ALL AGREEMENTS WITH and let his followers vote for Berkovitch or not vote at all. ISRAEL (Israel Hayom 10/30/18) Ger is the largest and most influential hassidic sect. Alter is not expected to The Palestine Liberation Organization's Central Council declared that it was issue a ruling until just ahead of the runoff race. The religious Zionist Bayit suspending its recognition of Israel until Israel agrees to acknowledge an Yehudi Party and Meuhadim leader Aryeh King are expected to endorse independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and with east Lion, but many of their supporters will back Berkovitch. Jerusalem as its capital, Ramallah's Wafa news agency reported Monday. Berkovitch came to the Kedma Restaurant that overlooks the Old City walls The council further decided to suspend all security and economic ties with from the Mamilla Shopping Center to thank his supporters, while Lion’s party Israel, as outlined in the 1994 Paris Economic Protocol. was held at the Pavilion Hall in the capital’s Talpiot neighborhood. The decision, announced after a two-day meeting in Ramallah, is declarative “We proved that we can run positive and optimistic campaigns,” Berkovitch and nonbinding, the report said. According to the report, the PLO essentially told Army Radio Wednesday. -
Vetoing Peace: Israeli Coalition Dynamics and the Peace Process, 1992-2005
Vetoing Peace: Israeli Coalition Dynamics and the Peace Process, 1992-2005 By Rebecca Farley Carleton College Faculty Adviser: Professor Al Montero In the 1990s, the Oslo Accords offered a series of unprecedented opportunities for peace in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, by the end of the decade, a second Palestinian uprising had broken out, and as of today, a comprehensive peace settlement still has not been achieved. Much of the blame for this has been focused on the political failure of the Palestinians both to control anti-Israeli violence and to pursue a coherent peace agenda. While the Palestinians have certainly failed on these and other fronts, insufficient attention has been paid to the intricacies of the Israeli political system as a factor in the failure of peace negotiations. I argue that Israel’s complex coalition politics explain a great deal of its inability to generate consistent political support for peace. To evaluate how coalition dynamics affect the formulation of peace policy in Israel, I apply George Tsebelis’ veto player theory to the government decision-making process. I find that large coalitions, ideological polarization within coalitions, and low cohesion in the dominant coalition partner impair the government’s ability to reach a consensus on peace legislation. Though this analysis offers valuable insights into Israeli coalition politics, Tsebelis’ variables cannot fully explain the empirical complexities of the Israeli case. To fill these gaps, I move beyond the veto player theory to propose a new model of government decision-making. I identify two additional variables that affect the government’s ability to reach a consensus on the implementation of a peace agreement: coalition volatility and level of system competition. -
The 2014 Gaza War: the War Israel Did Not Want and the Disaster It Averted
The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel Did Not Want and the Disaster It Averted Hirsh Goodman and Dore Gold, eds. with Lenny Ben-David, Alan Baker, David Benjamin, Jonathan D. Halevi, and Daniel Rubenstein Front Cover Photo: Hamas fires rockets from densely populated Gaza City into Israel on July 15, 2014. The power plant in the Israeli city of Ashkelon is visible in the background. (AFP/Thomas Coex) Back Cover Photo: Hamas terrorists deploy inside a tunnel under the Gaza City neighborhood of Shuja’iya on Aug. 17, 2014. (Anadolu Images/Mustafa Hassona) © 2015 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 13 Tel Hai Street, Jerusalem, Israel Tel. 972-2-561-9281 Fax. 972-2-561-9112 Email: [email protected] www.jcpa.org Graphic Design: Darren Goldstein ISBN: 978-965-218-125-1 Contents Executive Summary 4 Preface 5 Israel’s Narrative – An Overview 7 Hirsh Goodman Telling the Truth about the 2014 Gaza War 31 Ambassador Dore Gold Israel, Gaza and Humanitarian Law: Efforts to Limit Civilian Casualties 45 Lt. Col. (res.) David Benjamin The Legal War: Hamas’ Crimes against Humanity and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense 61 Ambassador Alan Baker The Limits of the Diplomatic Arena 77 Ambassador Dore Gold Hamas’ Strategy Revealed 89 Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi Hamas’ Order of Battle: Weapons, Training, and Targets 109 Lenny Ben-David Hamas’ Tunnel Network: A Massacre in the Making 119 Daniel Rubenstein Hamas’ Silent Partners 131 Lenny Ben-David Gazan Casualties: How Many and Who They Were 141 Lenny Ben-David Key Moments in a 50-Day War: A Timeline 153 Daniel Rubenstein About the Authors 167 About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 168 3 Executive Summary The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel Did Not Want and the Disaster It Averted is a researched and documented narrative that relates the truth as it happened. -
From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
From Cast Lead to Protective Edge Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1888 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9787-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Nir Elias/Reuters; Amir Cohen/Reuters; Abu Mustafa/Reuters; Tsafrir Abayov/AP Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 through Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014. -
ICT Incident and Activists Database
ICT Incident and Activists Database PERIODIC REVIEW Summary of Terrorist Incidents and Counter-Terrorist Operations Worldwide August 2014 International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il Highlights Between August 1 and August 26, Operation ‘Protective Edge’ entered phase three of the campaign in which the IDF pulled out ground forces from Gaza. During this stage, rocket attacks continued targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers. During the 50-day campaign, 64 IDF soldiers were killed and 469 IDF soldiers were wounded. Four Israeli civilians were killed by rocket or mortar strikes, including a 4-year-old child, and 36 others were wounded by shrapnel. Gaza health officials said that more than 2,100 Palestinian civilians were killed throughout the campaign and many thousands more were wounded. Israeli authorities claimed more than 1,000 Hamas militants were killed throughout the 50-day operation. During Operation ‘Protective Edge’, Hamas violated 11 ceasefire agreements, firing at Israeli civilians and forces during ceasefires and UN-declared humanitarian windows. On August 26, a cease-fire agreement was finally announced, brokered by the Egyptian government with the support of Qatar and the US, but without a fixed long-term agreement. On the morning of August 3, Islamic State (IS) militants advanced into and captured Sinjar Mountain in northern Iraq. According to some reports, as many as 500 Yazidis were massacred in the IS attack and its aftermath, and dozens more died of hunger while fleeing the IS advance. In response to the ongoing threat of IS, the US launched airstrikes on August 8 against IS targets in northern Iraq using Predator drones and Navy F-18 fighter jets in order to destroy rebel positions around the city of Erbil. -
To Read the December 2012 Montreal Chanukah Edition
9x12 file_Layout 1 12-12-04 12:28 PM Page 1 Page 1 D ECEMBER 2012 CHANUKAH 1929 - 2012 Eighty -Three Years of 1929 Service - to Years 2012 Canadian Jewry Eighty - -Three www.thejewishstandardmag.com (Cover story on page 2) M 9x12 file_Layout 1 12-12-04 12:28 PM Page 2 2 The Jewish Standard, December 2012 Israelis Turn Attention to MICHAEL HAYMAN PUBLISHER AND EDITOR January 22nd Election With the ceasefire between Israel Yair Lapid has sought out modern JULIUS HAYMAN and Hamas still holding campaigning for Orthodox rabbis who share his views EDITOR AND PUBLISHER the January 22nd election has resumed. on religious extremism. He counts among 1937-2000 The bi-partisan spirit that Israelis dis- his friends rabbis Shai Piron, Benny Lau played during Operation Pillar of Defense and Dov Lipman. Indeed, Piron is second has already given way to the vitriolic on Yesh Atid’s list. And in contrast to the attacks that inevitably accompany politi- home in which he grew up, when guests cal debate in Israel. Opposition Leader visit Lapid’s Tel Aviv residence they will Shaul Mofaz wasted no time in criticiz- find kosher food on the table. ing the government for agreeing to a Yair Lapid may be more concilia- ceasefire long before the operation’s tory than his father. He may want to goals had been met. avoid fratricidal conflicts. But Lapid With a month left until voters intends to confront those who oppose his cast their ballots, every public opinion view that “religion should not be involved Cover Story poll indicates that Benjamin Netanyahu in politics”.