Independent Cinema in the Chinese Film Industry
Independent cinema in the Chinese film industry
Tingting Song
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Creative Industries Queensland University of Technology
2010
Abstract
Chinese independent cinema has developed for more than twenty years. Two sorts of independent cinema exist in China. One is underground cinema, which is produced without official approvals and cannot be circulated in China, and the other are the films which are legally produced by small private film companies and circulated in the domestic film market. This sort of ‘within-system’ independent cinema has played a significant role in the development of Chinese cinema in terms of culture, economics and ideology. In contrast to the amount of comment on underground filmmaking in China, the significance of ‘within-system’ independent cinema has been underestimated by most scholars.
This thesis is a study of how political management has determined the development of Chinese independent cinema and how Chinese independent cinema has developed during its various historical trajectories. This study takes media economics as the research approach, and its major methods utilise archive analysis and interviews.
The thesis begins with a general review of the definition and business of American independent cinema. Then, after a literature review of Chinese independent cinema, it identifies significant gaps in previous studies and reviews issues of traditional definition and suggests a new definition.
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After several case studies on the changes in the most famous Chinese directors’ careers, the thesis shows that state studios and private film companies are two essential domestic backers for filmmaking in China. After that, the body of the thesis provides an examination of the development of ‘within-system’ independent cinema.
Specifically, three factors: government intervention, the majors’ performance (state studios and, later, the conglomerates) and the market conduct of independent cinema at various points in their trajectories are studied.
The key findings of the study are as follows:
First, most scholars have overlooked the existence and the significance of within- system Chinese independent cinema. Drawing on an American definition of the independent sector, this thesis proposes a definition of the sector in China: namely, any film that has not been financed, produced, and/or distributed by majors. The thesis also notes important contradictions in applying this definition: i.e. film-making is still dependent on policies that frame industry development. The thesis recognises that major tensions apply to filmmaking in China, which significantly differentiates the Chinese independents from those in the US.
Second, the development of Chinese independent cinema is the result the rise of the private sector and the decline of the state studio system. As state studios encountered difficulties the private sector moved forward; consequently the environment improved for independent cinema.
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Third, before 2003, the film industry in China had little commercialisation. The government controlled independent cinema by means of license and censorship. State studios produced main melody films and Hollywood attracted most of the audiences.
Many independent filmmakers focused on commercial films, thus contributing to film commercialisation.
Fourth, after 2003, the film industry became increasingly fragmented. The government created distribution and exhibition opportunities for main melody films; conglomerates collaborated with Hong Kong players; Hong Kong co-productions and Hollywood occupied the film market; and small private film companies produced main melody films in order to earn meagre profits.
The original contribution of the thesis is to advance the study of Chinese independent cinema. The study suggests a reasonable and practical definition of Chinese independent cinema. It shows how the Chinese government authorities have implemented economic measures to gain ideological control in the film industry.
Finally, this the first study on Chinese independent cinema applying a synthesis of economic, political and historical perspectives.
Keywords independent cinema, the Chinese film industry, out-of-system independents, within- system independents, economic reform, state studios, private film companies, main melody films, commercial films
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ⅰ
Table of contents ...... ⅳ
Fugures ...... ix
Tables ...... xi
Statement of Original Authorship ...... xii
Acknowledgment ...... xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 1
1. Research scope ...... 1
2. Studies of Chinese cinema ...... 6
3. Research problem, approach, methods and the contribution ...... 8
4. Chapters ...... 15
Chapter 2 Review of American independent cinema: definition and business . 20
Introduction ...... 20
1. Defining independent cinema ...... 22
2. A relational term - independent in relation to the dominant system ...... 26
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3. Factors contributing to the boom in American independents ...... 37
4. Business strategies of American independent cinema ...... 39
Conclusion ...... 47
Chapter 3 A new definition of Chinese independent cinema ...... 48
Introduction ...... 48
1. Massive literature about the political significance of Chinese ‘independent cinema’ ...... 50
2. Confusing historical divisions of Chinese ‘independent cinema’ ...... 58
3. Limited literature about independent production ...... 62
4. The problematic traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema ...... 65
5. Towards a new definition of Chinese independent cinema ...... 67
Conclusion ...... 69
Chapter 4 State studios, foreign capital or private companies – changes in the career of contemporary Chinese film directors...... 71
Introduction ...... 71
1. Case one: Xie Jin- different results of working in state studios and in private companies ...... 73
2. Case two: Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou- returning home ...... 77
3. Case three: Jia Zhangke- a foreign markets’ permanent delegate in state studios’ clothing ...... 84
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4. Case four: Feng Xiaogang-the most skillful operator of private film production mode ...... 88
Discussion and conclusion ...... 92
Chapter 5 Emergence and initial development of independent film production companies (mid 1980s- mid 1990s) ...... 95
Introduction ...... 95
1. The condition for the emergence of independents ...... 97
2. The features of the first independent film production companies ...... 108
3. Good development of independents in the early 1990s ...... 113
Conclusion ...... 121
Chapter 6 Brave but vulnerable: the downfall of independents in 1996 ...... 124
Introduction ...... 124
1. Disorder after distribution reform ...... 127
2. Strict censorship ...... 132
3. Hollywood imports ...... 137
4. Experimental big pictures wave ...... 138
Conclusion ...... 144
Chapter 7 Commercialization of Chinese independent cinema (late 1990s) .... 147
Introduction ...... 147
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1. Stunning support for propaganda films ...... 149
2. The entry of entrepreneurs ...... 153
3. An American producer and the trend of urban youth film ...... 163
4. First independent distribution companies ...... 165
Conclusion ...... 171
Chapter 8 New majors in the age of the conglomerates ...... 173
Introduction ...... 173
1. Background- WTO and the notion of ‘cultural industries’ ...... 174
2. The reform of ‘industrialising Chinese cinema’ ...... 175
3. Dominance of the conglomerates ...... 187
Conclusion ...... 198
Chapter 9 Main melody independent cinema in the age of the conglomerates 201
Introduction ...... 201
1. Movie channels and digital theatre chains- new economic opportunities for low budget films ...... 203
2. The general picture of independents ...... 207
3. Main melody- the most important independent film type ...... 210
Conclusion ...... 225
Chapter 10 Conclusion ...... 227
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1. A new definition ...... 228
2. The development of Chinese independent cinema is due to the rise of private sector capital and the decline of the state studio system ...... 230
3. Independent cinema contributed in a positive way to film commercialisation . 233
4. Independent cinema contributed to the production of main melody films ... 21037
Conclusion ...... 239
Appendix 1 Figures ...... 242
Appendix 2 Tables ...... 260
Filmography ...... 266
Bibliography ...... 278
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Figures
Figure 1: Total feature films between 1978 and 1984 ...... 242
Figure 2: Distribution and exhibition structure before1993 ...... 243
Figure 3: Distribution and exhibition structure after reform ...... 244
Figure 4: Theatre chains system ...... 244
Figure 5: CFG corporate structure...... 245
Figure 6: Hong Kong co-productions between 1997 and 2006 ...... 246
Figure 7: Annual film output between 2003 and 2007 ...... 246
Figure 8: Annual box office revenue between 2003 and 2007 ...... 247
Figure 9: The cost of some blockbusters...... 248
Figure 10: The number of films aired by some major movie channels in 2005 ...... 249
Figure 11: Advertisement revenue (RMB million) of CCTV-6 and East Movie
Channel between 2003 and 2006 ...... 250
Figure 12: The number of private movie and TV companies between 2001and 2007251
Figure 13: The number of movies produced or co-produced by private movie and TV corporations, total year feature films and the proportion between 2001 and 2007 .. 253
Figure 14: The number of digital movies, year total feature films and the proportions between them between the year 2004 and 2007...... 255
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Figure 15: The proportions of digital movies made by private companies in 2004,
2005 and 2007 ...... 256
Figure 16: The number of films shown in theatres and the proportion between 2004 and 2007 ...... 257
Figure 17: Comparison of the number of domestic countryside films, children’s films and opera films ...... 258
Figure 18: Proportion between countryside films by private corporations and by state in 2007; proportion between children films by private corporations and by state in
2007...... 259
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Tables
Table 1: Ownership composition in industrial output (%) ...... 260
Table 2: Ownership composition in retail sales of consumer goods (%) ...... 260
Table 3: Plan targets, average cost per feature, budget, state subsidies, and vacancy of Shanghai, Changchun and Beijing studios in 1992...... 261
Table 4: Total personnel and personnel expenses of Shanghai, Changchun, Beijing studios in 1992 ...... 262
Table 5: Personnel structures of staff on the job in Shanghai, Changchun, Beijing studios in 1992 (Ni 1994, 92) ...... 263
Table 6: Annual feature production in PRC, 1996-2002 ...... 264
Table 7: Some emerging film conglomerates ...... 265
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Statement of Original Authorship
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signature:
Date:
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Acknowledgments
This thesis would not have been completed without the generous support from many sources.
First, I wish to thank my principal supervisor Michael Keane for his tenacious dedication and help offered during the course of my PhD study in the Queensland
University of Technology (QUT). His insightful comments and the example he has set in his own scholarly work, as well as the various academic seminars given by him, have greatly influenced my approaches to the study of the creative industries in
China.
I also would like to acknowledge the various critical suggestions made by my associate supervisor Weihong Zhang, who has contributed invaluable feedback on my thesis.
I should also appreciate the generous support by Terry Flew, Helen Yeates and Jon
Silver, who have read the entire manuscript of my thesis and offered invaluable suggestions for revision.
I am grateful to Nina Shen, Terry Flew, John Hartley, Brad Haseman, Susan Carson and Jenny Mayes, the Creative Industries Faculty, and the Research Centre of QUT
xiii for the provision of the research grants and the graduate assistantship during 2007-
2010.
My deepest gratitude is to my family: my ex-husband Chuanfa Wan who regularly found and sent me indispensable books and videos from China; my parents for looking after my daughter, which enabled me to keep my mind on study – the health and wellbeing of Alice has been an essential support for my work; and lastly, this thesis could not have been finalised without the encouragement of my husband
Xigeng Miao – during this three-year PhD journey, which was often accompanied by depression, his sincere and hardworking style has given me significant motivation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1. Research scope
Between 2007 and 2010 I stayed in Australia for a doctoral degree. During this period I watched many Australian films and from time to time I noticed the diversity of Australian cinema: the shocking violence of Mad Max, the emotional love between a Japanese man and an Australian woman in Japanese Story, the edge of your seat thriller Saw, the unique desert scene and strange passion of
Walkabout, and the strong hostility held by indigenous people to whites in The
Fringe Dwellers. ‘Why do not we have such films in China?’ I asked myself. In
China, for a long time, main melody1 film has been the most dominant form of state cinema. Other film types such as historical martial arts and comedies have been popular in recent years.
The general picture of Chinese cinema is that they appear too conservative.
Moviemakers are reluctant to criticise society and seldom examine extremes and abnormality. State studios used to be the dominant production force in China;
1 The Chinese cinema has had a tradition of ‘main melody’ (zhuxuan lu) films since the founding of the PRC. The main melody film is the type of film whose function is to carry out the ideological work of the Chinese Communist government, or, to put it another way, it is an officially made propaganda film. A major purpose of main melody films is to create role models and to engender an ethical foundation in the people. Films in this category include biopictures of communist leaders and model cadres.
1 however, conglomerates have grown to become the new force during the past decade. It is understandable that state studios, which were founded and subsidised by the state, produce main melody films for propaganda purposes while conglomerates produce conventional blockbusters to cater to broader audiences.
The question of why Chinese cinema lacks variety can be traced to forces beyond cinema itself. Private film production companies have grown in China for more than twenty years and have continued to prosper.
Any film not financed and produced by majors is normally regarded as independent cinema (Levy 1999; Hillier 2001; Tzioumokis 2006). As a propaganda tool, the Chinese film industry under the Mao Zedong led government was strictly controlled only state studios were authorised to produce films and receive subsidies from the government. The situation did not change until the
1978 policy of Opening and Reform. In 1984, the state withdrew financial support. Studios had to absorb private capital or directly contract out production to private companies. Against such a background, some elite directors established production companies. They purchased a studio’s logo to enter the film business and their films were legally circulated in the domestic market. They were what I call in this thesis ‘within-system independents’.
Several years later, in the early 1990s, a group of young graduates of Beijing Film
Academy challenged the state studios system. They produced films without official permission and distributed them to foreign film festivals. Their works
2 were banned in China; they are called underground or ‘out-of-system independent’. This was another model of independent cinema in China.
The term ‘independent cinema’ as applied in this thesis has its origins in
American cinema. According to the American independent experience, independent cinema initially appeared as a challenge to Hollywood and represented a challenge to conventions associated with the mainstream, no matter what its form or content. Chinese independent cinema has developed for about thirty years and has played an essential role in the film industry, especially in terms of quantity.
As mentioned earlier, the growth of independent cinema has not yet improved the diversity of Chinese film culture and in the thesis I offer an explanation of why this has been the case. It is easy to blame censorship for the monotonous tone of much Chinese cinema. Many movies have been banned in China. Whereas
Quentin Tarantino was able to sneer at both sides of the Second World War –
Germany and America – through the violence of representation in Inglourious
Basterds (2009), a Chinese film Devils on the Doorstep (guizi laile, dir. Jiang
Wen, 2000), with a similar theme, was banned because it took an ‘incorrect’ stance. According to a well-informed source, the Film Bureau said: The film does not show the hate and resistance of the Chinese people in the context of the War of Resistance against Japan. Instead, it focuses on and even exaggerates the ignorance, apathy and slavishness of the Chinese people (Chinese Art 2007).
However, censorship alone does not explain the phenomenon, because strict
3 censorship would have led to a more desolate scene in terms of enthusiasm for film investment and the film market.
During the early years of the new millennium, there was a boom in the Chinese film industry. Film production companies increased from dozens in the 1990s to more than 500 in recent years (Zhao 2009). The total number of feature films produced puts China among the top 5 producers in the world for 2006 (ybnews
2009). If we put this issue into a wider economic context, this prosperity seems quite inconceivable. Pirated copies of films are still on sale everywhere and a very small proportion of movies can be commercially shown. When we take
Hollywood into account, the flourishing of Chinese cinema is very surprising.
Due to the competition of Hollywood blockbusters, film industries in many nations, even the former film giant France and new fashion leaders like Korea and
Japan have stagnated (Jaeckel 2003; Shin and Stringer 2005; Japanese Economy
Division 2005). So, what is the secret for the survival of Chinese independent films, even though they are not very interesting and thought-provoking? Such an unusual economic phenomenon implies that a powerful government hand is manipulating things behind the scenes.
Independent cinema is relational to the dominant system. The discourse of
Chinese independent cinema changed after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001.
Before this time, state studios were the dominant majors and films. After China’s accession to the WTO, economic reform resulted in the conglomeration. The conglomerates became the new dominant majors. Correspondingly, films which
4 were made by small, private film companies and whose target market was the domestic audience were independent films. The two models of independent cinema noted above co-exist in China. In contrast to the amount of study on out- of-system filmmaking (underground cinema), the significance of within-system independent cinema has been neglected by scholars. The development of within- system independent cinema is the research realm of this thesis.
The term ‘independent cinema’ has its origins in American cinema. According to the American independent experience, independent cinema initially appeared as a challenge to large studios. However, Chinese independent cinema embarked on a very different and unique way: it increasingly relied on the state system; and it did not challenge the dominant system. More importantly, it rescued the dominant system from collapse; in this sense it served a function similar to independent cinema globally. Within-system independent cinema emerged as the state studios began to decline in the mid 1980s. The film market in China urgently needed independent cinema. The government subsequently issued many regulations to welcome private capital and independent film production.
Within-system independent cinema did not deal with controversial topics; in fact, entertainment was the typical character of early independents. By the late 1990s, independent cinema led the Chinese film industry into the way of film commercialisation. During the conglomeration era in the 2000s, the state government spent a great deal money on the infrastructure of film and TV communication media. The number of private film production and distribution
5 companies and independent films increased. The important point to emphasise is that in this period ‘within-system’ independent cinema moved towards the mainstream. Many became main melody films broadcast on CCTV-6. The questions that concern us are: How did the government lure private capital to the film industry and how has it guided it into ‘harmless’ productions? In short, how has within-system independent cinema survived and grown in the circumstances?
2. Studies of Chinese cinema
Despite the recent interest in Chinese cinema, independent cinema produced by small private companies and circulated in domestic market has remained under examined by scholars in both the East and the West.
The recent dramatic growth and change in Chinese cinema has drawn intensive attention from overseas critics. Well-known scholars such as McGrath (2008), Xu
(2007), Zhang Zhen (2007), Pickowicz (2006), Yingjin Zhang (2006), Berry and
Farquhar (2006) were concerned with the two contrasting phenomena, or images, in recent Chinese cinema – the emerging stunning transnational blockbusters and the transformation of former underground filmmakers’ works. The research often adopts a cultural studies approach. Few have noticed the existence of many low- budget independent cinemas and even fewer of them have evaluated the role independent cinema plays in the style, or genre, of Chinese cinema.
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Industry economics has been a very hot topic among Chinese film academics since 2003, when the government accelerated the reform of the film sector. A series of compilations of the film industry have been published. In 2005, the first authorised comprehensive research report – The China Film Industry Annual
Report: 2005-2006 edited by Zhang Huijun and Yu Jianhong – was published.
The report gathered many statistics, analysing film production, distribution and exhibition in 2005. After that, the China Film Association organised experts to continue serials of Research Report on Chinese Film Industry between 2006 and
2009. These reports followed the basic structure of the first one in 2005. Yin
Hong is an active researcher on the Chinese film industry. He has written annual investigation reports since 2002. By contrast with the official reports, which acted as advocators of the achievements made by the industry, Yin’s works analysed the weak points in the Chinese film industry, from regulation policies to the industrial environment. These annual reports, or investigations, chronologically discuss the development of the film industry and provide suggestions in terms of film regulation and operations at the macroscopic level. These works offer much data for the research of the Chinese film industry; however, they are generalised annual reports rather than documents that focus on a specific research problem. More importantly, with their emphasis on the dominant productive forces of state and private conglomerates, these reports overlooked the impact of small private companies on the film industry.
Prior studies on the topic focused on the country’s political and economic reform,
Zhu Ying’s work (2003) and Ni Zhen’s work (1994) are key documentations of
7 progressive policy changes on the reform of the Chinese film industry. However, their studies centred on the 1980s and 1990s. Since then there have been several major changes, notably rapid corporatisation and conglomeration of old state studios and big private companies and reform of the distribution–exhibition system. Furthermore, their emphasis was placed on state studios rather than independents.
Research on Chinese independent cinema has been popular for a long time.
However, much more emphasis has been placed on underground filmmaking than on private film productions, which is another form of Chinese independent cinema. The content of Chinese independent cinema, its definition, the literature review and the gaps in the literature will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
An apparent research gap exists in the study of Chinese independent cinema. Few scholars have paid attention to the role small private film companies and their film productions have played in the development of Chinese cinema. Even fewer scholars have examined the relationship between government intervention and the historical development of the independents.
3. Research problem, approach, methods and contribution
Research problem
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How has political management determined the development of Chinese independent cinema, and how has Chinese independent cinema developed through various historical trajectories? This is the thesis research problem.
Research approach
This study takes media economics as the research approach.
Economics is the study of production and consumption of resources and products, as well as the choices made to meet needs and wants (Picard 1989).
The political environment is a context for economics (Alexander, Owers and
Carveth 1993). In all nations, business activities are undertaken within the overall structures and constraints are set by policy. The result is that media industries vary considerably from one country to another. The context for media firms is set by the political, social and legal environments of the society within which the business is conducted. An overall nature of a country’s political organisation is clearly a fundamental factor in the determination of media industries and the business practices of media companies.
The study of economics is divided into two major branches: macroeconomics and microeconomics. For Picard (1989), macroeconomics analyses the operation of the economic system as a whole, usually at the national level, to understand its
9 relationship to issues such as economic growth, employment and inflation.
Macroeconomics focuses on the political economy of a nation, that is, the country’s public policies toward the economy, its aggregate production and its consumption of goods, employment and income, and the policies it uses to stimulate or retard growth or promote social welfare. Microeconomics departs from the large scale and considers the market system in operation, looking at the economic activities of producers and consumers in specific markets. It considers the behaviour of individual producers and consumers, as well as of aggregate groups of producers and consumers in those markets. There is interplay between macroeconomics and microeconomics. Government actions and policies affect the decisions of producers and consumers, and the performance of various product markets in turn stimulates government action or inaction (Picard 1989, 23).
Government intervention in the market is one of the key issues in media economics. Government regularly intervenes in media markets to promote social goals and influence the market conduct of media firms. Media companies regularly encounter government intervention. At the macroeconomic level, capitalist governments intervene to provide currency and raise taxes for economic and social infrastructure, to respond to economic and social ills (such as inflation, unemployment and poverty) and to stimulate or retard their economies (Picard
1989). At the microeconomic level, governments intervene to promote industries and commerce and to respond to market problems in industries by instituting policies that promote desirable outcomes and inhibit undesirable outcomes (Picard
1989).
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Intervention occurs through regulation, preferential policies, subsidies and various forms of taxation (Picard 1989).
Regulation of industry occurs in three ways. First, there is technical regulation.
Second, governments intervene through market structure regulation. They do this in order to control the number of producers and sellers and to attempt to diversify market structure using such methods as franchises and licenses in which certain types of structures are permitted or protected. Third, governments use behavioural regulation that controls how firms act, such as preventing anticompetitive action that might harm the market, controlling rates and prices in an effort to achieve macroeconomic goals, or controlling harmful externalities.
Examples are preferential policies by government or the provision of reduced prices for government services provided by government-regulated industries or agencies related to government. Tax breaks and exemptions from regulation are included in this category of intervention. The economic effect of these advantages reduces the cost of production, thus increasing profit for a firm or raising it to the point where the additional profit is an incentive for production.
Subsidies are cash transfers from government to industries to promote an industry or a type of production. They can also be provided to firms as an incentive to fight off harmful externalities or to pay for equipment that will combat them. Subsidies
11 increase revenue, thus increasing profit or creating incentives for production
(Picard 1989, 56).
Taxation involves cash transfers from producers or consumers to government to pay for government activities, but it is also used as a means of penalising firms for undesirable externalities and providing government money to ameliorate such problems (Picard 1989, 61).
Methods
This research is about the political management and the economic performance of
Chinese independent cinema. The study approaches these two core ideas using two major types of methods: archive analysis and interviews.
Archival analysis plays a critical role in developing the basis of this research and the object of analysis. Archive research is one of the most commonly used methods of investigating history (Stokes, 2003). In order to understand the history of Chinese independent cinema from the mid-1980s to date, it has been necessary to examine archives during this period. The archives of original material provide primary resources. The major task in archive studies is to find information about financial reports, production facts and primary legislative issues. Because the focus of much writing and research has been on studios, production reports kept in documentary archives offer very limited information about independent cinema and independent producers. The lack of substantial data is the most significant
12 obstacle in this research. However, due to the increase in enthusiasm for film entertainment, many well-known celebrities and industry players have been profiled and their stories are available on the internet. Using all sources available, and by combining and comparing them, I have been able to draw an outline of the development of independent cinema.
Data collection is relatively easy for recent times. However, source credibility is an essential concern when conducting documentary study. It happens quite often that statistics referring to the same object are different in various publications. The reliability of some data, even from official publications, is unclear. I was aware of the need ‘to interrogate these records rather than read them naively’ (Vitalis 2005,
14). Therefore, I tried to find as many sources of information as possible and compared the different versions. Hence, although the statistics might be not very accurate, when aggregated and analysed they give a satisfactory account of the real situation.
In addition to economic statistics, legislative documents are included in the search zone. The State Film Bureaucracy regulations, the files of the local government, and the secondary data of published commentary and analysis link to film policies, the political economy of the film industry and to cinema censorship. All are relevant to my research. These archival materials are found on websites of government agencies and ministries, and in book publications and academic journals.
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Interviews are an important research means for this type of study. Interviews help to find out about people’s ideas, opinions and attitudes, to understand the context and so elicit some interesting insights into the area. Interviews with film workers provided supplementary materials to offset the shortage of certain documentary sources. Furthermore, the experiences of film workers are a worthy research topic and has a great bearing on my research problem.
According to the requirement of my research, I conducted two formal interviews with film practitioners and did some casual interviews with filmmakers and audiences. By agreement, these interviewees were anonymous. Among the two formal interviewees, one was with a documentary director in Shanghai TV Station who has directed more than 30 documentaries and some feature films. Some of his works have been broadcast around the world. He was been a judge at several film festivals. The other formal interview was with a person who operates a small film production company in Xinjiang. He is a director and producer as well. His company has produced eight digital films. I used a semi-structured interview method with open-ended questions. The interviewees were given, to a certain extent, free range to talk about all aspects of the topic as it related to their interests. Questions were concerned with their filmmaking strategies and their comments on recent economic reforms.
In addition, the study includes some case studies, which include discussions of individual pictures as examples of filmmaking at different levels (state owned, private, majors, indies). The study also contains textual analysis. However the
14 analysis is limited to a general understanding of the films. The aim is to help explain the phenomenon from an industrial-economic perspective.
Contribution
The original contribution of the thesis will be to advance the study of Chinese independent cinema in three aspects. First, this study suggests a reasonable and practical definition of Chinese independent cinema. Second, this study provides a better understanding of the way that the Chinese government authorities have implemented economic measures to gain ideological control of the film industry.
Third, this is the first study of Chinese independent cinema that synthesises information from economic, political and historical perspectives.
4. Chapters
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part, Chapters 2 and 3, set out primary ideas about independent cinema. Chapter 2 is about the experience of
American independent cinema and Chapter 3 is about Chinese independent cinema. Not only does this chapter inlude an analysis of gaps in the literature but it is also the basis for all further analysis. The second part, Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, is the body of the thesis. Chapter 4 is about the changes that occurred to some famous Chinese directors. It acts as a bridging chapter which provides a general and lively picture of the development of Chinese cinema over the last 30 years. The other chapters are periodically divided, and they thoroughly examine the development of Chinese independent cinema at various historical times.
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Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are about the fluctuations of independent cinema during the
1980s and the 1990s. Chapter 8 and 9 consider issues of the new millennium;
Chapter 8 is about the majors while Chapter 9 is about independents. The third part of the thesis is the conclusion.
Chapter 2 is a general review of American independent cinema. The review begins with the question: ‘how do we define independent cinema?’ and then places emphasis on the term’s relational nature. After the discussion about definition, it moves on to investigate the wider industrial and social factors that have contributed to the boom of American independent cinema, and the key strategies that the independent sector has adopted to succeed in business.
Chapter 3 is about the review of Chinese independent cinema and its definition.
The chapter starts with a review of the political significance of underground
Chinese independent cinema. Then it focuses on the literature gap in independent production in the Chinese film industry and considers the definition of Chinese independent cinema. Finally, a new definition is proposed. This definition takes two kinds of independent filmmaking, underground and within-system, into account.
Chapter 4 is about the career trajectories of some contemporary Chinese film directors. Through case studies of Xie Jin, Chen Kaige, Zhang Yimou, Jia
Zhangke and Feng Xiaogang, this chapter provides a general picture of the
16 development of Chinese cinema with regard to its social, political and cultural background. More importantly, the chapter demonstrates the different approaches to filmmaking in today’s China, during the process of marketisation and globalisation and through the rise-and-fall of state and private film production forces.
Chapter 5 examines how political management determined the emergence and initial development of independent cinema between the mid 1980s and the mid
1990s. It begins with the introduction of the condition, including the centralised studio system and the 1980s’ economic reform in which the first independents arose. Then it studies the emergence of the first private film production companies of the mid 1980s, analysing the characteristics and advantages of the independents. Finally, the chapter addresses the progress in popular film production that independents made in the first half of the 1990s.
Chapter 6 examines the factors which determined the downfall of independent cinema in 1996 through case studies of four independent film production companies. More specifically, the factors of distribution reform, ideological pressure, Hollywood imports and big picture wave, all of which contributed to factors that led to the defeat of independents in 1996.
Chapter 7 analyses how political management affected the development of the film industry and how independent cinema provided the engine to the film
17 industry, in terms of both film production and distribution areas, in the late 1990s.
It begins with the examination of significant subsidies provided for the production of propaganda films and the damage it caused the film industry. Then it analyses the essential role independents played in commercialising film production and improving domestic film distribution.
Chapter 8 examines how political management has led the Chinese film industry to take the leap into the era of blockbusters after 2003. It starts with an introduction to the background –WTO and the notion of ‘cultural industries’.
Then it evaluates some particular reform measures on the theatre chain system, integrated conglomeration and Hong Kong co-productions. Proceeding from there, this chapter analyses the conglomerates’ dominance in the whole value chain. In conclusion it argues that the age of the conglomerates is coming and the giant conglomerates with political privilege and/or huge capital are the new dominant majors in the new age.
Chapter 9 examines how political management has determined the orientation of main melody for independent films in the age of the conglomerates. It starts with the introduction of new economic opportunities that state authorities have provided for low budget independent films. After offering a general picture of independent films in this period, this chapter classifies four different strategies adopted by independents. Finally, it claims that by controlling distribution channels and through the use of powerful economic sponsorships, the state has
18 firmly controlled the production of independent films and has successfully directed them towards being main melody.
The conclusion focuses on the research outcomes of this study in three aspects: the root of the problematic traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema and the new definition; the pattern of development between independent cinema and the private economic sector and state studios; and the relationship between political management and the market conduct of Chinese independent cinema at different historical trajectories.
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Chapter 2 Review of American independent cinema: definition and business
Introduction
Independent cinema appeared primarily as a challenge to large studios. The term
‘independent cinema’ has its origins in American cinema. According to
Tzioumakis (2006, 21), ‘the discourse of independent cinema appeared perhaps for the first time in 1908-9 with the formation of Motion Picture Patents Company and its antagonists, which became known as independents’. Many other nations or regions had similar experiences. In Japan in the 1920s, the first independent productions (dokuritsu puro) appeared when directors and actors left the studios in order to establish their own companies, which was a deliberate reaction against the studio system that had developed since the 1910s (Domenig 2003). In Hong
Kong, independent studios started with Golden Harvest. This was established in the 1970s by Raymond Chow and Leonard Ho, two of Run Run Shaw’s top lieutenants, and they began to finance and distribute independent projects (Curtin
2007, 47). The appearance of independent cinema in these areas may well be the natural result of market competition, but in some cases the emergence of independent cinema had a close relationship with political economy reform in each of the respective nations. Korean independent films appeared in the mid-
1980s when the new government, led by Chun Doo-hwan, loosened film control
(Cui 2006). Independent cinema in China also emerged in the mid-1980s when the state withdrew its subsidies from state studios. In Europe, the notion of
‘independent’ is similar to that in the United States, where commercial Hollywood
20 fare dominates and independent cinema is the alternative (Plotkin 2005).
However, in the context of facing competition with Hollywood films, European artists are all independent and many countries want to support their own national cinema (Domenig 2003).
Although the independent sector exists in many nations and regions, American independent cinema is the most noticeable in the world. The independent sector has existed in American film for one hundred years. From the mid-1980s, independent cinema began to gain a higher profile and thrived for almost three decades. American independent cinema included much distinctive work.
Furthermore, American independent cinema had a sustainable industrial, and institutionalised, base for its development. Much of the material in the American film industry has potential applicability to other nations. This is particularly the case given recent trends. The recent deregulation, global integration and privatisation trends that are now influencing many countries will likely make their respective film industries more similar to the United States than previously.
Therefore, before studying Chinese independent cinema, my study investigates
American independent cinema. This chapter provides a review of American independent cinema, beginning with the question of ‘how to define’ the subject; it then places emphasis on the term’s relational nature by reviewing the historical development of American independent cinema. After the discussion about definition, it will move on to discuss the wider industrial and social factors that have contributed to the boom in American independent cinema, and the key strategies that the independent sector has adopted to succeed in business.
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1. Defining independent cinema
Although it is ‘common sense’ to view independent cinema as meaning that it is independent of big studios, in practice what exactly is an independent film? How is it independent? In other words, what kind of production qualifies something as an independent film? Some understandings of ‘independent’ focuses on the film’s industrial orientation, some pay attention to the film’s aesthetics, others prefer to combine both.
The industrial realm is the most important part of any definition of independent cinema and it is the most easily applied definition for some institutions. Because there are four basic phases: development, financing, production and distribution, different economic definitions necessarily focus on different phases. Merritt
(2000, 4) focused on financing and production and stated that an independent was
‘any motion picture financed and produced completely autonomous of all studios, regardless of size’. Then he added a note on distribution, that films made by smaller studios or given a guarantee of distribution by one of the majors before production are classified as ‘semi-indies’ (Merritt 2000, 4). Holmlund (2005) concentrated on copyright ownership and pointed out that independent films are those that are not released by the Big-Eight majors. The independent Film and
Television Alliance (IFTA), a trade association for independent film and television industry, sets out an easily applied definition focused on how the film is financed. It states that a film should be considered an independent film if ‘more than fifty per cent of its financing comes from sources other than the major US
22 studios’ (Cones 2008, 3). Based on the IFTA definition, Cones was more precise in determining whether a given film was independent.
If an independent producer has responsibility for raising the funds to
develop, produce and distribute a motion picture, that is clearly an
independent film. If, on the other hand, an independent producer has
financed the development phase but has used the assistance of a major
studio/distributor or one of its subsidiaries in financing the production
phases in addition to the distribution of the film, it would not be accurate
to call that an independent film. Still further, if an independent producer
raised the financing for the development and production phases and then
merely looked to a major studio/distributor or to an affiliate or subsidiary
of one to release the picture that may be considered an independently
produced film that was merely released by a major studio/distributor,
affiliate or subsidiary (Cones 2008, 4).
Independent film initially appeared as a challenge to Hollywood and represented a challenge to conventions associated with the mainstream, no matter what its form or content. Therefore, some points of view on what is independent highlight its experimental aesthetics. A definition of ‘independent film’ in many dictionaries describes it as ‘art film’ and ‘avant-garde film’.
Many directors affirm that independence is a maverick activity rather than a commercial commodity.
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Independent film is really a way of thinking. I used to think it
was where the money comes from, but now it’s clearly about
having a vision and a point of view when you want to tell a story.
(Nancy Savoca, director of True love, quoted in Levy 1999, 1)
If it’s personal to a director, then it’s an independent. (Ted
Demme, director of Monument Avenue, quoted in Levy 1999, 1)
In this sense, Filmmaker Magazine (2003) editors draw attention to innovation in film. Independent movies ‘are broadly associated with alternative points of view, whether they be expressed in experimental approaches or through crowd-pleasing comedies’ (cited by Holmlund 2004, 3).
‘Avant-garde’, ‘alternative points of view’ and ‘innovation’ are the basis of such definitions. However, ‘spirit’, the essence of film’s alternative aesthetic leads to the ‘slippery and tricky’ nature of the definition.
Definitions combining both economic and aesthetic characteristics are more likely to be seen in critical works of which the intention is to analyse texture. In
Maltby’s account, Hollywood Cinema (2003), he simply states that any film not financed by the majors is independent; while a film with an innovative perspective and personal style is independent. In a similar vein, Hillier (2001, 4) in American
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Independent Cinema- a Sight and Sound Reader noted that ‘independent is a concept opposite to ´studio´’ and ‘Independent’ suggests work that is different from the mainstream, both in economic or aesthetic terms. Roger Ebert, the editor of Chicago Sun-Times, explained that an independent was outside the studio system, often with unconventional monetary resources and a director that produced the fim to express his or her personal vision rather than to aim at commercial benefits (cited in Hillier 2001, 8).
In fact, what exactly an ‘independent’ film is is still hotly debated. Independent cinema can be defined in many different ways, especially when considering that many independents have been taken over by majors. Therefore, many books on independent cinema begin with a discussion of the definition and then come down to the delimitation of the scope of independent cinema. In this respect, American
Independent Cinema (2005) by Geoff King and American Independent Cinema - an Introduction (2006) by Yannis Tzioumakis are worth mentioning.
King maintained that the extent to which a film was independent varied in both form and degree. He discussed indies in three orientations: film financing, form and the social issues they concerned themselves with. He said that independent movies varied in these three respects. Some were extremely radical, extremely- low-budget, unconventional in narrative and containing sensitive political issues.
Others remained in a closer relationship with Hollywood. In between were many shades of difference. The terms ‘independent’ or ‘indie’ were used in his book:
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primarily in the sense in which they had been established in the wider
culture in different trajectories, rather than according to a fix or literal
definition; and the indies examined were either clearly independent or
somewhere in the grey area which included studio-owned/affiliated
‘specialist’ or ‘independent’ labels (King 2005, 3 and 9).
In the introduction to American Independent Cinema - an Introduction (2006), after an exhaustive discussion of the problems caused by many approaches to the definition of independent cinema, Tzioumakis ended by choosing the term
‘discourse’ with which to approach American independent cinema.
To account for all these different forms and expressions of independent
filmmaking during the last hundred years, this study has approached
American independent cinema as a discourse that expands and contracts
when socially authorized institutions (filmmakers, industry practitioners,
trade publications, academics, film critics, and so on) contribute towards
its definition at different periods in the history of American cinema
(Tzioumakis 2006, 11).
2. A relational term - independent in relation to the dominant system
In some specific books or essays which analyse the development of American independent cinema at various phases, authors usually followed the formula of examining the contributing economic factors first, and then analyse the performance of majors and, finally, the independents in different periods. In this sense, Tzioumakis’s American Independent Cinema - An Introduction and the 26 essay Independent Film by Jon Lewis (1998) were good examples. Tzioumakis divided the development of American independent cinema into six phases.
The first independents (1908-9)
The discourse of independent cinema appears perhaps for the first time in 1908-9 with the formation of the Motion Picture Patents Company and its antagonists, which became known as independents. The company, the main holder of various patents associated with cinematographic technology, attempted to licence film business and to monopolize the American film industry. Those companies excluded from membership had to pay weekly fees for the right to use their licensed equipment. This attempt at domination was challenged by some companies. Between fifty and one hundred companies continued to run their business by using any means at their disposal, including illegal equipment and importing film stock from abroad. These ‘unlicensed outlaws’ attached the label independent to their practices.
The independents before the formation of the studios (1910s)
Some of the independents became the next rulers. The new rulers in 1916 adopted the Paramount system, which financed the production of feature films by advancing funds to production companies in exchange for exclusive distribution rights for a set period of time. Under this trade practice, exhibitors were forced to accept a company’s annual output in one large block of films. The practice kept films not made and distributed by the studios from reaching specific cinemas and
27 was an attempt to create a monopoly. A movement of resistance to the Paramount system emerged. Some first-run exhibitors were dissatisfied with block booking and formed a distribution company to acquire outstanding pictures made by independent producers, who had complete creative control in film production.
Among the independent producers were Charlie Chaplin and Mary Pickford, who established United Artists in 1919, a distribution company with the mission of supplying theatres with films made by independent producers outside the studios.
This practice of resistance could be labelled independent. Unlike its predecessor, which had its roots in outlaw production, this independent movement started with exhibitors.
Independents in the studio era (late 1920s- late 1940s)
The structure of the American film industry stabilised in the late 1920s. During the studio era (mid-1920s −late 1940s) the American film industry was dominated by eight companies, the Big Five (Paramount, Loew’s MGM, 20th Century-Fox,
Warner Bros and RKO) and the Little Three (Columbia, Universal and United
Artists). The Big Five were vertically integrated companies: they produced their films at self-owned studios; they developed a network of distribution around the world; and they owned theatres where they exhibited their own films. The Little
Three were organised in the same way as the Big Five but were not integrated on the same level. The major studios used the central producer system, that is to say, one executive – usually a top-class producer or a manager – supervised a large quantity of films per year. Oligopoly characterised the film industry during this period. The eight studios produced about three-quarters of all features made,
28 while this product was responsible for about 90 per cent of the box office takings.
The Big Five studios possessed 80 per cent of the first-run theatres concentrated in major metropolitan areas and neatly divided the exhibition market. The Big
Five exerted almost total control of the market. As a result, their films were increasingly ‘like sausages’ and had an obvious tendency towards extreme standardisation.
Starting from the studio era, top-rank independents and low-end independents existed in the independent regime. Many filmmakers established their own independent companies and produced prestige-level films. Prestige-level films were high-cost productions and were normally based on firmly established, pre- sold properties to ensure audience recognition. Such properties included nineteenth-century literature, Shakespearean plays, best-selling novels, popular
Broadway productions, and biographical and historical subjects. Prestige-level film production was a significant production trend and the biggest money-maker.
The representative title was Gone with the Wind by Selznick International Pictures in 1939. United Artists, one of the Little Three, with the access to first-run theatres was a very important distribution outlet for top-rank independent filmmakers. Top-rank independent production companies and their prestige-level films became an integral part of the film industry. Independent films did not present major aesthetic differences from the films produced by the studios and due to the majors’ control of theatres they did not pose any real threat to the studios’ domination of the film market.
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The introduction of the double bill in US theatres in late 1930 stimulated the increase in Poverty Row companies. The scheme entailed the presentation of two films for the price of one. The two films were of different genres. There was the main attraction, the film that received top billing. This was normally a well made, standard studio production or a prestige-level studio or independent film. Because of its position on the billing this type of film became known as the A film. On the other hand, there was the film that received the bottom billing. This was normally a low-budget picture made by specific studio units or a low-budget film made by independent companies away from the studios. This type of film was known as the B film. The scheme created a staggering demand for films and the market for
B films was guaranteed. The low-end independents also stood to benefit from the surge in theatre attendance noted during the pre-war and war years. The effects of
World War II made the 1940s into a ‘golden era’ for the established Poverty Row studios.
The independents in the transitional years (late 1940s – late 1960s)
This was the period of independent revolution. The Paramount Decree of 1948 mobilised the separation of exhibition from production and distribution became instrumental in gradually dismantling the studio system of production.
Independents would be in a position to compete with studio films on an equal basis for access to the best theatres. The increase in production costs, the drop in theatre attendance and the post-war recession forced the studios to start aggressively recruiting independent producers to supply them with the necessary product. The former studios were transformed into financiers and distributors of
30 independently produced pictures. From the mid-1950s onwards the studios started diversifying, mainly towards the broadcasting and the music industries. The company that pioneered this type of branching out to other media-related industries and revolutionised the film business was a former top-rank independent of the 1930s and 1940s, Walt Disney Productions. It became one of the most successful media companies in the world.
The discourse of post-1948 independent cinema expanded greatly to include all films that were financed and distributed by the former studios but which were physically produced by a different production entity. Studios and independents had already become strong allies. By the end of the 1950s, independent production was in full swing with almost 70 per cent of the ex-studios’ output being independently produced films. The political climate ensured that their films would not stray too far from the mainstream. It was extremely difficult for liberal independent filmmakers to present alternative world-views in their films. With the distributors’ emphasis on fewer but more expensive films that had the potential to return large profits, historical spectacles, war films and epics became the dominant film genres.
Low end independents entered a new era during the late 1940s/early 1950s. The most important development in low-budget independent filmmaking during the period of recession was the emergence of a particular audience: teenagers. Low- budget companies made an effort to cater to a youth audience with exploitation films, of which the characteristics were based on controversial topics or fads and
31 were produced cheaply and quickly. The explosion of the drive-in theatres provided exhibition sites for low budget exploitation films. The coming of television put an end to the double bill in cinemas, which decreased the demand of low budget B films. However, at a time of recession, leasing their films to television was perhaps the only solution for the low-end independents.
The New Hollywood (1967-75)
During the late 1960s, the American film industry presented an unusual picture. It had reached a respectable level of stability after the impact of the Paramount
Decree and the rise of television. The majors focused on big-budget epics and spectacles that mainly targeted a family audience and seemed to receive extremely sizable revenues. The most representative films included The Sound of Music and
My Fair Lady. However, in fact, the profit of majors was low due to their large budgets, marketing costs and profit sharing arrangements with their stars.
The need for a different type of independent production as an alternative to the mainstream was absolutely critical. The late 1960s became host to a series of mostly low-budget, independently produced films that found great, sometimes spectacular, success at the US box office. Independent productions such as The
Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde were targeted at a young audience and questioned established traditions. These films set new trends in their treatment of controversial material, like the representation of violence, sex and drugs, and it struck the final blow to the already weakened Production Code (see below). What was especially important with this category of independent filmmaking was that a 32 large number of independent producers consciously assaulted the codes and conventions of mainstream American filmmaking. They were perceived as representative of the counterculture, an alternative culture developed around differences in attitudes, mores and style of American youth to that of the other older generations, who continued to represent the official culture, the establishment.
American independent cinema in the age of the conglomerates (late 1970 till present)
According to Tzioumakis (2006), beginning in the late 1960s, almost all major ex- studios were in the process of becoming subsidiaries of conglomerates. The force of the conservative movement was also threatening to turn the diverse, thought- provoking, and stylistically and narratively challenging cinema of the late 1960s and early 1970s into harmless entertainment.
Top-rank independent production, already the majors’ preferred method of production since the 1950s, kept its hegemonic position in the conglomerate-run
Hollywood cinema. Event films, such as Jaws and Star Wars, became representative of mainstream cinema.
The advent of video and cable towards the end of the 1970s saved independents from extinction, as these technologies created a new space for low- budget exploitation product away from the theatrical exhibition market (Tzioumakis
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2006). Independent productions tended to exploit the new freedom in representing sex and violence made possible by the changes in the rating system in 1968. As exploitation companies, they closely watched trends and cycles in American cinema, trying to cash in on the latest fad or craze.
In addition, many of independents were supported by funding from various non- profit organisations, including federal government grants, local government grants and public television, in order to provide diversity of viewpoint and vision to the
American nation. This brand of independent filmmaking was preoccupied with voicing alternative views, representing minorities, examining social problems, uncovering hidden histories – in short, dealing with subject matter that commercial television and film largely avoided. This is the point when American independent feature filmmaking became widely perceived as a vehicle for the articulation of alternative voices and political positions and, therefore, clearly differentiated from other forms or brands of independent filmmaking.
Lewis’s (1998) examination of American independence in early and silent
American cinema is clearer than Tzioumakis’s. Movies in the United States began with Thomas Edison (1847–1931) who invented the motion picture technology.
Edison created the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) trust in 1908. The trust linked the interests of Edison and nine of his competitors: Biograph,
Vitagraph, Essanay, Kalem, Selig Polyscope, Lubin, Star Film, Pathé Freres, and
Klein Optical. The MPPC effectively exploited key industry patents on motion picture technology to fix prices, restrict the distribution and exhibition of foreign-
34 made pictures, regulate domestic production, and control film licensing and distribution. The trust was supported by an exclusive contract with the Eastman
Kodak Company, the principal and, at the time, only dependable provider of raw film stock.
According to Lewis (1998), Kodak exploited a clause in the original agreement and began to sell film stock to local independents. These independents had organised into a cartel of their own: the Motion Picture Distributing and Sales
Corporation (or Sales Company). The Sales Company ‘independents’ was led by
Carl Laemmle, William Fox, and Adolph Zukor. Non-MPPC production units boasted record revenues; by the end of 1911 they accounted for approximately 30 percent of the film market.
In 1912, a US Circuit Court gave the independents access to formerly licensed and restricted equipment. The victory in court put the independents on a level playing field with the MPPC. By 1914, the MPPC was out of business and the so-called independents took over. Laemmle founded Universal, Fox founded Twentieth
Century Fox, and Zukor founded Paramount. In the years that followed, these ex- independents became the new majors, which new independent cinema would be independent of, and from.
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Taken together, the relational feature of the term independent cinema was demonstrated in the following ways: (1) the industrial structure and the dominance changed at various historical trajectories, which correspondingly determined a different discourse of independence. In some certain period, the dominance was legitimated entities (like Edison’s Patent Company) and the independence was illegal outlaws. In other periods the dominance meant industrial majors (studios or conglomerates) and the independent were small film companies. (2) The balance of power in the American film industry did not remain unchanged. Some majors were associated with independent forms before they became dominant. Examples include Universal, Twentieth Century Fox,
Paramount and Disney, majors transferring from previously being independents.
Some majors were eliminated during the game process. (3) The regime of independents could be divided into two groups: top-rank independents and low- end independents. Top-rank independent cinema was about prestige-level high budget films assimilated to the mainstream. Low-end independent cinema was low-budget cinema, most of which were exploitation films produced by small companies and distanced from the majors’ influence. A specific type of independent cinema would be outstanding, while others were not, during a certain time. At some stages the significance of top-rank independents was greater than that of low-end productions, however, at other stages, low-end independents were more deserved of the label of ‘independent’. To sum up, then, the term independent has never stood for any one thing and has sometimes stood side by side with the majors. Independents have played the game within the constraints the dominant set up and sometimes they have not. For this reason, almost all seriously academic works on independent cinema start by examining the majors.
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3. Factors contributing to the boom in American independents
According to King (2005), American independent features remained quite thin on the ground before the early 1980s; however, from the mid 1980s the independent sector flourished for the next two decades. Milestone films that established the profile and impact of the indie sector include Stranger than Paradise, Sex, Lies, and Videotape, Pulp Fiction and many others. For Levy (1999) and King (2005), factors responsible for the flowering of indies included such things as greater demand for visual media, supportive infrastructure, conservative majors and the increase in availability of investment capital.
The greater demand for visual media, driven by an increase in the number of theatres and the adoption of home video as a dominant form of entertainment in the United States created a general increase in demand for films that could not be met by Hollywood studios. Penetration of video recorders into US households increased from three per cent in 1980 to nearly 75 per cent in 1989, creating an enormous demand for product. Cinema screens increased from 17,500 to 23,000 in the 1980s, and most of them were smaller screens in multiplex cinemas. Cable television also underwent rapid growth (King 2005, 21).
The sustained infrastructure comprised of independent distributors, festivals and organisational networks played an important part also. New Line Cinema, founded in the 1960s, started life as a non-theatrical distributor serving the campus market. Then it moved into theatrical distribution in the 1970s. The other
37 major distributor, Miramax, was founded in 1979 and soon grew up. Festival circuit formed another part of the institutional and higher-profile basis of independent cinema. The Sundance Film Festival was inaugurated in 1984 and became the primary showcase for indie films. Sundance now ranks second only to the Cannes Film Festival on the film map. The Independent Feature Project (IFP), founded in 1979, was a non-profit body and acted as forum for the development of independent features. The Independent Film Channel and Sundance Channel quickly emerged as a major force.
Indies’ prominence is directly related to Hollywood’s abandonment of serious, issue-oriented, provocative films. Despite their big budgets, in terms of artistic quality and originality the films the studios release are mostly minor. Committed primarily to the production of big ‘event’ movies, the studios leave plenty of room for small, mid-range indies. Hollywood was very slow to respond to demographic and other social changes. The most significant audience for which Hollywood failed to cater was the youth audience.
Investment capital was made increasingly available for film production and distribution. The Reagan revolution in the American economy from 1982 to 1988 created an increase in the availability of capital. A range of financial mechanisms, including loans, grants, limited partnerships and public offerings, were now available to filmmakers. The independent sector was particularly likely to gain from this situation, although the sums were relatively low. In addition, foreign pre-sales in European market were reliable.
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4. Business strategies of American independent cinema
The American independent sector has many exciting tales of feature length movies being made on micro-budgets. However, there is no such thing as an absolutely independent film. There are still economic factors at work. The movie has to go into the marketplace. The business of actually getting indie movies seen by audiences is a real industrial activity. How did indies move on? Or what strategies did indies adopt for survival amid the powerful Hollywood dominance?
According to literature analysis, strategies such as producing films that
Hollywood couldn’t, using alternative marketing and distributing strategies and depending on majors, played particularly important roles in the success of indies.
4.1 Alternative versions
The Production Code and the Rating System
For most observers indie films are the antithesis of Hollywood. Audacious, politically radical, quirky and offbeat are frequently words used to refer to independent cinema. The development of Code and Rating System in American film industry provided criteria for production and marketing of independent cinema.
The advent of sound on the motion picture screen brought new problems of self- discipline and regulation to the motion picture industry. Sound unlocked a vast amount of dramatic material, which for the first time could be effectively presented on the screen. To meet the new situation it became necessary to reaffirm
39 the standards and to revise and add to those principles, so that all engaged in the making of sound pictures might have a commonly understandable and commonly acceptable guide in the maintenance of social and community values in pictures.
The task resulted in the Production Code in 1930.
For Vaughn (2006), the 1930 Code attempted to bind motion pictures to Judeo-
Christian morality and used prior censorship to obtain that end. Under this scheme, censors, who had a strongly conservative agenda, changed movie scripts long before they reached the production stage. The 1930 Code held motion pictures directly responsible for spiritual and moral progress, for higher types of social life, and for much correct thinking.
In order to encourage artistic expression by expanding creative freedom and to assure that the freedom remained responsible and sensitive to the standards of the larger society, in 1968, Hollywood adopted a new system that replaced the
Production Code. Under the Rating System created in 1968, filmmakers gained the freedom to show almost anything. The new plan abandoned prior censorship and claimed to make no effort to alter what adults could see. Its goal was to give parents information to help them decide whether a movie was appropriate for their children by simply classifying films G through X. A G movie was suitable for all ages. Initially, an M indicated a film for mature audience. That symbol was changed to PG to suggest ‘parental guidance’ was required. R restricted admission for those under seventeen unless accompanied by a parent or adult guardian. X (or
40 later NC-17) signalled films that contained sex, violence, profanity, and other themes deemed inappropriate to anyone under seventeen.
Commercial exploitation films and culturally critical art films
According to King (2005), the major studios were unable to match all demands because of their commitment to a strategy in which resources tended to be concentrated primarily on a limited number of expensive films with the potential to earn blockbuster profits. Hence gaps existed. Independents operated in areas in which Hollywood had chosen not to tread, exploring new avenues in their search for territories not already colonised by the major studios. Both historically and today, independent producers have often served specialised, niche audiences of one kind or another. In general, commercial exploitation films and culturally critical art films have been two representative independent film types.
The most significant audience for which Hollywood failed to cater to and which created the basis for some of the most important strains of independent production was the youth audience. Hollywood was very slow to respond to the demographic and to other social changes during the 1950s and 1960s that created a large audience receptive to material targeted at teenage viewers (King 2005, 6). Into the gap stepped a number of independent producers. They were watching trends and cycles in American cinema, trying to cash in on the latest fad or craze. The most important of the characteristics was their conscious targeting of a young audience and their emphasis on questioning established traditions, both in terms of content and form. They supplied the teen audience with a range of low budget horror, hot- 41 rod, biker and beach-blanket movies. Such films tended to be in disreputable genres discriminated against by mainstream Hollywood (King 2005, 6). For King
(2005) and Tzioumakis (2006), Hollywood’s stealing of some of the elements of independent cinema and the implementation of the ratings system in 1968 encouraged independents onto more extreme ground to maintain their marketable differences in exploitation of new freedoms in representations of sex and violence.
Film from such independents belonged almost exclusively to R-rated sub-genres.
As a result, the soft-core nurse/teacher/stewardess film, the women’s prison picture, the erotic horror movie and a whole range of black exploitation flourished.
If exploitation was a version of independence that was nakedly commercial in intent, another strand of independence was the more artistic, and in some cases avant-garde, independent filmmaking, like American New Wave in the early
1960s and New Hollywood in the 1980s. This classification of a film as
‘independent’ based on its ‘independence of spirit’ was much like the ‘auteur’ theory where the director was the sole ‘author’ of the feature and thematic concerns could be traced through their bodies of work (Berra 2008). This different type of independent production was absolutely critical in terms of both content and style, and was deemed as the cinema of counterculture.
4.2 Marketing and distribution strategies
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Distribution is a critical component of the film business, the vital link required if films are to find their way into cinemas and to receive the necessary marketing and promotion to secure an audience. Contemporary Hollywood has moved increasingly towards a marketing and distribution strategy based on very wide releases of films accompanied by heavy television advertising. It was common for blockbusters to open simultaneously on almost all first run theatres with the aim of reaching a very large audience rapidly. Some films that did not succeed at the box office relatively quickly were likely to be pulled from distribution to make way for others. By comparison, the needs of smaller, offbeat independent films were very different. The basis of much of the success of independent distributors was their ability to give specialised attention to the particular requirements of individual titles that needed careful nurturing for them to achieve their full audience potential.
For King (2005), the traditional approach adopted by independent cinema was to open indies gradually, a platform release. The platform release strategy was designed to allow independent films to build an audience from relatively small beginnings and then built a profile through word-of-mouth recommendation, or
‘buzz’. That remained the most important factor in any success. An effort was often made to create advance awareness through pre-release showings at festivals, extra attention being gained by films that won prizes, especially at high-profile events such Sundance and Cannes. Festival screenings were a source of reviews from critics in both the mainstream and trade press. Reviews played a particularly important role in the independent sector. Although the core market of independent cinema lay in the regular art house audience, a strong marketing push was also
43 essential, and one of the key tasks of the independent distributor was to reach out to other audience groups. Films benefited from sound marketing strategies. The positive word-of-mouth from its core audience spread into the mainstream, and the cultural value of the films was often enhanced by award nominations that coincided with expansions from limited release to nationwide distribution. The success of the bigger independent distributors, especially Miramax and New Line, was based on their ability to achieve a crossover into larger audiences.
Similarly, Berra (2008) described a formula for Miramax: the acquisition of a film by an established filmmaker or new talent, followed by festival and critical exposure, then a limited release to capitalise on niche markets, followed by a wider release once the film had entered the mainstream. Two examples are
Quentin Tarantino and Miramax distribution. Quentin Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs swept through Sundance, Cannes and Toronto. Although it did not win any awards at Sundance, it became the festival’s most talked-about movie due to its extreme violence. Tarantino turned up at festival after festival, receiving lavish praise from intellectual critics for making the hottest indie of the year. Miramax took the film and began to distribute it. The film went public after the festival circuit. Tarantino’s second film Pulp Fiction cost $8 million to make. After winning the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival and an Oscar for Best
Original Screenplay, Miramax, the distributor, pushed Tarantino into the media spotlight. He appeared on the cover of almost every entertainment magazine and tirelessly promoted his films. At last, Pulp Fiction gave Miramax a $100 million hit in 1994.
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4.3 Dependence on majors
In American cinema history, some forms of independent production worked closely with Hollywood. As mentioned earlier, during the period of double billing in the late 1930s, the main attraction was the well made studio production, while the other film was normally a low budget picture made by independent companies. With Hollywood production becoming increasingly organised on a contracting out basis from the 1950s onwards, producers, directors and stars set up production companies which often worked closely with studios and, in most such cases, the films that resulted belonged solidly to the Hollywood mainstream
(Tzioumakis 2006).
Contemporary films were under pressure to earn more and rapidly or lose their place in theatres. Such pressure forced independent cinema to seek the majors’ assistance. On the one hand, film distribution became the insurmountable obstacle for every independent that wanted to apply the art-house filmmaking model in
America. Even the low-budget independent films needed national distribution to become profitable and enable young filmmakers to find financing for their next projects. As there was no other avenue for national (and international) distribution besides self-distribution, which required the filmmakers’ time and effort in touring the country with a print, filmmakers were forced to accept the importance of the established major distributors. On the other hand, even after being forced out of the exhibition business by legal action against their oligopolistic powers, the Hollywood studios retained control over the main networks of distribution, in both America and much of global market. Despite the fact that the majors’
45 marketing resources were more accustomed to promoting expensive films that targeted a family audience, their coverage of the US market, their presence in all major international markets and their relationship with major exhibitors were essential for the adequate commercial exploitation of any film. This meant that the success of independent cinema was, to a large extent, due to the majors. Even more, consequently, major, formerly independent, distributors were attached to
Hollywood studios. Miramax was acquired by Disney, while New Line was merged with the Turner Broadcasting Corporation in 1993.
On the other side, the majors were also keen to support the new independent movement. Because the expensive genre films they financed and produced increasingly had problems with finding a big enough audience to render them profitable, majors gradually reduced their executive production, shifting to financing and distributing independent productions. As noticed before, since the late 1940s ex-studios financed and distributed many independently produced films, and the New Hollywood in the late 1960s was independent within
Hollywood. Furthermore, as of 2003, all seven major studios – Disney, Warner
Brothers, Twentieth Century-Fox, Sony, United Artists, MGM, Paramount, and
Universal – have speciality divisions which focus on the financing and distribution of independent features (Holmlund 2005). Corporate sponsorship ensures that their films are released in ancillary markets and have a chance of reaching the intended audience. For instance, despite their subsidiary position, both New Line and Miramax were able to maintain some autonomy through control of the distribution of their releases. Significantly, their new affiliation with
46 the majors gave them a greater access to funds and more freedom to make decisions about production (Wyatt 1998).
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined a general review of American independent cinema. It has surveyed definitions of independent cinema. It has analysed the relational characteristic of independence and the common business modes for indies. The definition of independent cinema is still under hot debate. The common bases of definition are financial and aesthetic. Some commentators focus on either aspect while others combine them both. However, the economic realm is the most important part of any definition and it is the most practical one as well.
Independent cinema is a relational term; relational to its dominant system. At various historical junctures the balance of majors has changed and the discourse of independent cinema has taken a different path. In the economic structure of independent cinema, a range of factors, such as the growth in media needs, the foundation of independent infrastructure, conservative Hollywood and the increase in capital investment, have been the important contributors towards the boom of American independent film. With the development of the Code and
Ratings System, independent cinema continues to maintain an identity of challenging mainstream. Critically, art films being the representative independent forms. At the same time, however, under economic pressure contemporary
American independent cinema has to rely on the majors for financing and for distribution.
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Chapter 3 A new definition of Chinese independent cinema
Introduction
Chinese independent film productions emerged in the early 1980s when economic reform was taking place. As a propaganda tool, the Chinese film industry was strictly controlled by the state. Only state studios were authorised to produce films and receive subsidies from the government. The situation did not change until the
1978 policy of Opening and Reform which aimed at gradually developing a market-based economy. Since then, market reform has penetrated in many areas.
In 1984, the state withdrew some financial support and pushed state studios into the commodity economy. Studios, which still had to fulfil a state plan, had to absorb private capital or directly contract out production to private companies.
Against such a background, some elite directors established production companies. They purchased a studio’s logo to enter the film business, because only such nominal affiliation could guarantee the legal status of their films. Such a film production mode was named ‘independent production’ (duli zhipian) (Ni
1994, 101).
In the early 1990s, the film market was full of low quality domestic commercial films and Hong Kong co-productions, and the Fifth Generation2 directors already
2 Dividing filmmakers into different generations based on historic trajectory is one way of periodising Chinese cinema in Mainland China. The Fifth Generation, most of which are the 1982 Beijing Film Academy graduates (among which 48 lorded over the art film circle. A group of young graduates of Beijing Film
Academy who were allotted to studios in rural areas could not get opportunities to fulfil their ‘art film’ dreams in the official system, so they produced films without official permission and distributed them to foreign film festivals. Their filmmaking experience and their film style were very different to that of the Fifth
Generation. They were regarded as the Sixth Generation3 and their works were
‘independent cinema’ (duli dianying).
Although Chinese independent films have been a topic in film studies for a long time, a literature gap is apparent. These two kinds of independent filmmaking enjoyed extremely different degrees of academic attention. ‘Independent cinema’, with apparent political significance, has gained much more attention than the former, ‘independent production’, in both Chinese and international academies.
More significantly, the problematic traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema has caused many contradictions which many scholars have failed to justify.
Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige were quite famous), made experimental art films to challenge the socialist realist tradition. In the first decade of their filmmaking, Fifth Generation directors used common themes and styles and their films reflected a strong sense of history.
3 The Sixth Generation refers to a group of young filmmakers who came of age during the post-Mao era and who lived in urban centres. Many of them are 1989 Beijing Film Academy graduates. The prominent figures of this generation include Wang Xiaoshuai, Zhang Yuan and Jia Zhangke. By contrast with the Fifth Generation, they explored the social realities of their daily urban surroundings.
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This chapter intends to give a new definition for Chinese indies, a definition taking two kinds of independent filmmaking into account and in the light of the
American independent experience. The chapter includes five parts. The first part contains a review of the political significance of Chinese independent cinema.
Part two is about the confusing historical division of independent cinema. Part three concerns the limited literature on ‘independent production’. Part four is the review of the problematic definition of Chinese independent cinema. Finally, in part five, a new definition is proposed.
1. Massive literature about the political significance of Chinese
‘independent cinema’
Chinese ‘independent cinema’ emerged in the early 1990s. After the withdrawal of state subsidies from state studios in 1984, the state studios were forced to raise funds by themselves and to take responsibility for their own profits and losses.
Therefore, there emerged a wave of entertainment films with an apparent commercial pursuit (Zhu 2002). Meanwhile, the studios chose the established
Fifth Generation directors as their favourites to produce high prestige art films
(Zhang, 2007). Furthermore, the 1989 Tiananmen Square event urged the Party to tighten censorship control and to strongly support main melody films (Zhang,
2007).
In this situation, the young directors who graduated from the Beijing Film
Academy in 1989 were isolated. It was very difficult for them to get opportunities in the studios. They had to pave a unique way to fulfil their dreams of being a film 50 artist. Instead of waiting for chances to be offered by the state system, several young filmmakers were determined to shoot films without official permits and to ship them overseas for post production and to position them in film festivals.
Young filmmakers emerged in the shadow of the international fame of Fifth
Generation directors like Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, who had been dedicated to national legends and historical allegories since the late 1980s. By contrast, the
Sixth Generation directors explored the social realities of their daily urban surroundings and made such statement as ‘My camera doesn’t lie’4. Two important founders of such underground filmmaking and their works were Zhang
Yuan’s Beijing Bastards (Beijing zazhong, 1993) and Wang Xiaoshuai’s The
Days (dongchun de rizi, 1993). More new players followed, producing films underground or at the peripheral of studios and aiming at international film festivals. Such films included Red Beads (xuanlian, dir. He Li, 1993), The Blue
Kite (lan fengzhen, dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1994), Dirt (toufa luanle, dir. Guan
Hu, 1994), Postman (youchai, dir. He Li, 1995), Weekend Lover (zhoumo qingren, dir. Lou Ye, 1995), Rainclouds Over Wushan (wushan yunyu, dir. Zhang
Ming, 1995), The Making of Steel (gangtie shi zenyang liancheng de, dir. Lu
Xuechang, 1997), Suzhou River (Suzhou he, dir. Lou Ye, 2001), and the quite famous Jia Zhangke’s Hometown Trilogy series (Xiao Wu (xiaowu, 1998),
Platform (zhantai, 2000), and Unknown Pleasures (ren xiaoyao, 2002)) and Jiang
Wen’s Devils on the Doorstep (2000).
4 This is the title of a book designed as the ‘document of the avant-garde filmmakers born in 1961-1970’ (Cheng and Huang, 2002).
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However, by embarking on the underground path, they experienced harsher treatment in the censorship and regulatory system. The Seven Gentlemen Incident in 1994 was the most sensational. The film The Blue Kite was shown at the Tokyo
Film Festival without Chinese government approval and won the Best Film
Award. The official Chinese delegates withdrew their films in a show of protest.
More seriously, later in the same year, several underground filmmakers attended the Rotterdam Film Festival and organised a press meeting themed ‘Strive for the
Sixth Generation’s filmmaking right in China’. Irritated by such open offensiveness, the Film Bureau issued a ban on Tian Zhuangzhuang, Zhang Yuan,
Wang Xiaoshuai and four other filmmakers (7 in total). The ban was sent to all the state-owned studios, processing labs, and equipment rental services in the nation to effectively prevent any further underground filmmaking by these directors. The impact of the ban on Tian Zhuangzhuang was that he did not shoot for 10 years.
This unusual and stirring film phenomenon drew a lot of attention from domestic and foreign critics, mostly on the political significance of these maverick works, which demonstrated two things: the choice of terminology and the focus of texture analysis.
1.1 ‘Underground’, a term with a strong political connotation
There is a range of terminologies that have been used when characterising this alternative filmmaking. Film directors were likely to call them ‘independent’, domestic critics preferred ‘the Sixth Generation’. By contrast, overseas critics have deliberately applied the term ‘underground’ (Pickowicz and Zhang 2006). 52
‘Underground’ seems to suggest a subversive positioning, not only towards the dominant production system but more significantly towards the Party’s political dominance. Some critics claim that one of the advantages of using the term
‘underground’ is its implication of anti-socialism. For Zhang (2006), the term
‘underground’ did a better job of characterising the nature of such alternative work: unofficial and the intention of resisting state control. In Ran Ma’s The
Sixth Generation Cinema: To Continue the Dialogue with the West (2006), he mentioned how a commentator, Corliss, admitted that a banned indie-film from socialist China could arouse Western viewers’ curiosity to scrutinise the dissident implications in every frame. Some writers acknowledged the bias of political point of view from the West. Xu (2007) argued that films were ‘banned’ in China because they did not obey certain regulations, and if these conflicts happened in the West, we would call these practices ‘illegal’. However,in promotional activities the West would still title the works ‘banned in China’ and enlarge its political sensitivity.
1.2 Textual analysis: focusing on political qualities
Many commentators adopted the approach of textual analysis to study Chinese independent cinema and noted that the attempt at exploring marginal people and their marginalised lives in today’s China was a particular characteristic of Chinese underground films.
At a content level, many independent films offer visions about the struggling life of urban marginal people who are seldom explored in the mainstream. Zhang 53
(2007) stated that the common subjects in independent cinemas were people suffering on the margins. Ma (2008) claimed the sixth generation cinema touched on controversial topics, and the individual world they portrayed was accompanied by a sense of alienation, confusion and hopelessness. Xu (2007, 48) noted these
‘social underdogs’ in more detail. He said that they were social groups such as
‘prostitutes, petty criminals, the rural emigrants termed ‘the floating population’ in big cities, and laid-off workers from state-run industrial enterprises’. Xu also detailed the social issues which could be found in these directors’ films. For him, the crises included rapid formation of social classes, commercialisation of all aspects of social life, ubiquitous corruption, exploitation of the ‘floating people’, environmental problems, and rapid urbanisation that left little room for traditional life style.
More importantly, some critics tried to link the subject matter to a broader social background. Zhang (2007) commented that these subjects lived in contemporary transforming society, so the films presented a kind of temporal sense. Lau (cited in Ma 2008) regarded the films by the Sixth Generation as an important cultural product which was a consequence of the most crucial social development in China in the past twenty years, namely, ‘the process of globalization’. Xu (2007) mentioned that, with the directors’ increasing interest in the films’ relevance to society, their films had more social significance than ever. In this sense, some asserted ‘their films are definitely more ‘truthful’ to reality than the Fifth
Generation’s glamorization’ (Zhang 2004, 290).
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At a formal level, scholars paid attention to the documentary aesthetic in the underground cinema. Zhang (2007) said that when the independent directors made an effort to present marginal urban subjects, the reality themes were combined with the documentary aesthetic and thus the films created a ‘formal verisimilitude’. Zhang (2006) provided a list of independent directors whose films were deemed to have this vérité style. Zhang Yuan and Wang Xiaoshuai wove fictional and documentary styles together in their early works. Jia Zhangke insisted on the extremely fixed-frame long take. Lu Yue explored improvisation in his debut feature Mr. Zhao (zhao xiansheng; dir. Lu Yue, 1998). Zhang also mentioned other options such as real location, non-professionals and dialect, which have all been successfully explored in many independent films. Teo (2008) was interested in the documentary style of a recent film Blind Shaft (mangjing; dir. Li Yang, 2003). He noted the hand-held camera, real locations, non- professional actors and a lot of swear words.
1.3 The debate on political significance
Because such independent cinema was initiated as ‘out-of-system’ production and subsequently ‘unofficial’ ideology, the debates about its political significance were unsurprisingly accompanied with the discourse of alternative film culture.
Some critics contended that Chinese independent cinema was not subversive culture. For Pickowicz (2006, 4), ‘politically critical production is not a major characteristic of more recent underground filmmaking’, if the term ‘political’ meant subversive or dissent culture. In a similar vein, Berry (2006, 114) asserted 55 that contrary to the assumptions of many foreign critics, ‘independent filmmaking in China has never been a Soviet-style dissent culture’ and the state government hardly has persecuted or jailed underground filmmakers.
However, many more scholars claimed that underground filmmaking was political because the cinema tended to please the West. Their statements resulted from textual analysis. Xu (2007) said that representation of social injustices in underground films to some extent satisfied the West’s desire for discovering a
‘real’ China which could not be found in mainstream media. Xu explained that since many international critics still understood communist China as violator of human rights, they were satisfied with the social realities, such as social discriminations and widening wealth-poor gaps, which were representatively descriptive concepts in Chinese independent cinemas. Zhang (2006, 25) also contended political criticism was the identity of Chinese indies. For him, because the independent films were initiated counter to the dominant ideology of nationalism and heroism, Chinese independent filmmaking ‘cannot but become political’.
Furthermore, many writers had the same idea that underground filmmakers were political speculators, in some sense, once they joined the spectrums of funding and reception. Ma (2008) offered two cases to illustrate that without the international film festivals groundbreaking Chinese independent works would not be fully appreciated. After Zhang Yuan’s Mother (1990), which at the outset could not be distributed in China, won highly credited international film festival
56 awards, it was broadcast on Chinese TV and caused a large amount of debate in
China. In the case of Jia Zhangke, with the strong ‘critical capital’ his previous three films (Xiao Wu, Platform and Unknown Pleasures) had built up through international success, he was confident of bringing his work The World (2004) back to the domestic market. For Pickowicz (2006), some film festivals gave prizes to underground films due to their political bravery rather than because their cinematic achievements. Therefore, underground directors hoped to please foreign viewers with their censored works. Pickowicz asserted that the success for
Chinese independent films was to understand and enter into foreign funding, production and distribution circuits; without the Western viewer, the scenery of underground films could not unfold in the desired way. In this respect, the label of
‘Chinese underground film’ was a tag of critical capital and a phrase of marketability as well. Berry (2006, 113) pointed out ‘banned in Beijing’ or
‘underground film’ had been seen ‘as little more than a marketing tool that helps to sell the films to foreigners’. Zhang (2007, 10) also quoted Zhang Yimou’s words that described such filmmakers as ‘so well-informed about the outside world and so familiar with the path to success’ and ‘eagerly catering to Western critics’.
To sum up, the research on out-of-system Chinese independent cinema is massive.
The majority of the research concentrates on the political significance of these films. Textual analysis, cultural studies and political economy are the common approaches to the object of study. The general point of view is that underground filmmaking circulated in foreign markets describes an ‘ugly’ China to please the
West to gain funding and distribution there.
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2. Confusing historical divisions of Chinese ‘independent cinema’
By comparison with the massive, clear research about political significance of independent cinema, the research about its historical trajectories is much less and quite confusing.
Underground filmmaking emerged in the early 1990s. In the second half of the
1990s the appearance of director Jia Zhangke and his outstanding reputation gained in foreign film festivals led to this phenomenon becoming more noticeable.
However, in the new millennium, a series of significant reforms have been carried out in the Chinese film industry and, as a result, many underground filmmakers came above ground and made film productions in the system. For example, Jia
Zhangke had The World (shijie, 2005) and Wang Xiaoshuai had Qinghong
(qinghong, 2005). This dramatic turn of events caused another wave of debates as well. The evidence is the recent publication of several books, including From
Underground to Independent (ed. Pickowicz and Zhang 2006), The Urban
Generation (ed. Zhang 2007) and Sinascape (Xu 2007). However, there have been very few attempts from either inside or outside China to evaluate the historical stages of Chinese indies over the last 20 years and none of them has succeeded in elaborating it thoroughly and clearly.
There are three writers who have deliberately touched on the topic of historical trajectories of independent cinema. Zhang (2004) observed the development from the underground to the peripheral. The Sixth Generation directors started their underground filmmaking in the early 1990s. Three noted members made their 58 debuts this way: Zhang Yuan’s Beijing Bastards, Wang Xiaoshuai’s The Days, He
Li’s Red Beads and Postman. By the mid-1990s a different group in the Sixth
Generation emerged from the peripheries of the studio system. They raised funds from private sources, purchased studio labels and started low-budget filmmaking.
The representative works were Dirt, Weekend Lover, Rainclouds Over Wushan,
The Making of Steel. Zhang Yuan and Wang Xiaoshuai’s career also moved from the underground to the peripheral. In 1999, Zhang made his first domestically released feature Seventeen Years. Wang completed So Close to Paradise (yuenan gunyang, 1998) which had to wait three years before its limited release in China.
Zhang (2004, 290) concluded that by the late 1990s their constant ‘adolescent’ phase seemed to be over and the establishment enabled them to continue making films. No Visit After Divorce (lihun le jiu bie lai zhaowo; dir. Wang Rui, 1997) was the first from this group to enter the domestic top ten.
In accordance with the above views, Zhang divided the development stages of independent cinema on the grounds of ‘gradually moving from underground into the system’. However, Zhang’s division is easily challenged when he mentions the phase of being peripheral. In the 1990s, many films were funded by private capital and circulated by means of purchasing a state studio’s logo. According to
Zhang’s criterion, these films, not just the Sixth Generation, also belong to independent cinema. But Zhang did not consider them and simply equated independent cinema to the Sixth Generation.
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In an article Ten Years of Chinese Independent Films Cheng and Cheng (2003) divided its history into four stages: being born, puzzling phase, growing up and boom. In 1991, independent films were born quietly. They were The Days and
Mother (mama; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1990). The Days has historical significance in independent film history for having been shot totally outside the state system.
From 1992 to 1995, the independents were puzzled about where the road went.
During this period independent films tried to find opportunities to co-operate with the system. Important works of this time were Beijing Bastards, Weekend Lovers,
Dirt, Red Beads, Postman, Rainclouds Over Wushan, Sensitisation Age (ganguan niandai; dir. A Nian, 1994), Frozen (jidu hanleng; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 1996) and A Girl in Danger (weiqing shaonü; dir. Lou Ye, 1994). From 1996 to 1998, independent films came of age. The important works include Xiao Shan Goes
Home (xiaoshan huijia; dir. Jiang Zhangke, 1995), Xiao Wu, East Palace West
Palace (donggong xigong; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1996), So Close to Paradise, The
Making of Steel. The Making of Steel was shown in theatres after several modifications; the same also applied to So Close to Paradise. East Palace West
Palace was the first gay movie in China. The social subjects the independent movies explored became more diverse and increasingly more realistic. The emergence of Jia Zhangke showed another possibility for the independents. From
1999 to 2001 the independents flourished. Zhang Yuan came back to the system and completed Seventeen Years. Jia Zhangke produced Platform. Suzhou River
(suzhou he; dir. Lou Ye, 2001) and Beijing Bicycle (Beijing de danche; dir. Wang
Xiaoshuai, 2001) earned international reputations in many film festivals and also economic success in France and Japan. Lunar Eclipse (yueshi; dir. Wang Quanan,
1999) and The Orphan of Anyang (anyang yinger; dir. Wang Chao, 2001) were
60 fantastic tales. Men and Women (nannan nünü; dir. Liu BingJian, 1999) explored the homosexual subject even deeper than East Palace West Palace.
Cheng and Cheng’s division is more confusing than Zhang’s. For these two authors, some specific film titles were grouped differently. For example, the films
Beijing Bastards, Red Beads and Postman were grouped by Zhang as
‘underground’, while Cheng grouped them into ‘peripheral’ for co-operating with the system. Furthermore, Zhang adopted one criterion for division which was
‘moving to the system’; by contrast, Cheng’s criteria drifted. It seemed that Cheng divided the development according to two criteria. The criterion for the first two stages was ‘moving to the system’, while the criterion for the last two stages mixed together industry, reputation and culture. Therefore, the unclear and confusing historical division was unavoidable.
Ran Ma (2008) divided the historical stages into three: the pioneer period (late 80s to early 90s), the underground period (till late 90s) and the transitional period (till present). He said that the transitional period witnesses the so-called
‘transformation’ of several underground directors and the impact of globalisation on film market. While the Film Bureau announced new policies promising a freer and more relaxed filmmaking environment for the young filmmakers, the global net embraced by preeminent Fifth Generation directors Zhang Yimou and Chen
Kaige posed unprecedented challenges for this new generation. Such division was also very problematic. First, Zhang regarded the period during the 1990s as
‘underground’; however, in Zhang’s and Cheng’s version, this belonged to
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‘peripheral’ or ‘moving to the system’. Second, for the author, in the so called
‘transitional’ period, even those filmmakers who joined the state system were still marginalised, this time by globalisation. However, this was not true, because these directors’ films were funded by the West and warmly welcomed in foreign markets.
To sum up, these three historical divisions of Chinese independent cinema are unsatisfactory. The problem is that the authors have utilised the term ‘independent cinema’ very loosely. They have not placed the term within a theoretic framework and have not set forward a definition of Chinese independent cinema before examining the trajectories. These authors, at the beginning, took it for granted that
Chinese independent cinema was equated with Sixth Generation directors.
However, while they have managed to divide the periodic development of independent cinema, they have not avoided the changing political and industrial factors which have determined the development of independence, and because a solid economic basis has been lacking, their study cannot withstand close examination. Therefore, in the study of Chinese independent cinema, it is important to address the question of ‘What exactly is Chinese independent cinema?’
3. Literature on independent production
The first independent film productions emerged right after the economic reform in
China in the mid-1980s, several years earlier than out-of-system independents. As mentioned before, the state withdrew subsidies from state studios in 1984. Since 62 then, the state studios have experienced various reform measures aimed at establishing a market-oriented modern management system. In order to solve the problem of a lack of sufficient financing, studios have attracted investment from various private corporations or have contracted out film production to individual producers or directors. As a result, some directors established the first private film production companies. Since the state studio system was the sole entity authorised to produce and distribute films, private companies had to be attached to studios.
They paid money to studios for production quotas and their films, with studio logos, were distributed in the market. According to the definition of American independent cinema, these films, which were not financed and produced by dominant studios, were independent. These private companies were the first independents and the films they made were the first independent cinema in the
Chinese film industry. However, very few researchers have paid attention to this significant industrial phenomenon.
Zhu (2002, 81) used the term ‘coproduction’ to refer to this phenomenon.
Even though such production practice was usually termed ‘coproduction’,
in essence, the studios were ‘selling’ production rights in the name of the
management fee to wealthy investors. The investors typically borrowed
the host studio’s talent, equipment, and interior if necessary, which helped
to pay overhead and equipment maintenance fee.
Zhu examined the impact of coproduction on studios. She focused on the state studios rather than the private sector. Further, Zhu mentioned private investors but 63 overlooked private producers. And, more importantly, Zhu did not use the term
‘independent’ for such private film companies.
The term ‘independent production’ (duli zhipian) used to describe such activities in China for the first time appeared in a Chinese language book Reform and
Chinese Cinema edited by Zhen Ni (1994, 101-105). The book primarily listed five cases of the first private film production companies established in the late
1980s and early 1990s, and then analysed the significance of the private film production. However, private film production was not the subject matter of that chapter of Ni’s book. The central theme of Ni’s study was about how to develop state studios.
Although Ni did not consider the independent sector in a serious manner, at one point in the book the author uses the term ‘independent’. Every time the author used the term ‘private production’, the term ‘independent production’ appeared side by side. This means that the author implied that such private production was independent production in the Chinese film industry. This point of view can be confirmed later when the author took the relationship between American studios and independents in the 1950s as an example. He said, the interdependence between studios and independents was one of the features of the modern film industry; for example, in America, independent companies produced really popular films and ex-studios rented their studios to independent production and distributed independent films. Then Ni continued saying that independent productions already existed in China for some years and how to manage them to
64 positively stimulate the competition between indies and studios was an urgent issue. Furthermore, the author used the term ‘independent production’ rather than
‘independent cinema’. This means that the author tried to avoid confusing studio filmmaking and out-of-system independent filmmaking (underground) which was already called independent cinema. This also implies that the author adopted the term ‘production’ rather than ‘cinema’ to emphasise the industrial significance of this sort of filmmaking rather than its ideological or cultural significance. Thus questions emerge. Can we use one term, ‘independent cinema’, to refer to two kinds of independent filmmaking (underground and private film productions)? Or, in other words, is it reasonable to use the term ‘independent cinema’ to refer to private film productions? These questions, plus the previous one about the confusing result of historical divisions, draws attention to the problematic definition of Chinese independent cinema.
4. The problematic traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema
Unsurprisingly, the emphasis of most literature on what is Chinese independent cinema and how they are independent is placed on their out-of-system positions, especially their ideology. Pickowicz (2006) claimed that an independent Chinese film was produced outside the system; the directors had autonomy to initiate and produce the works and such films inevitably took a dissident stance. For Cui
(2005), independent filmmaking involved ‘experimental practices outside the official production system and its ideological censorship’. For Zhang (2006, 26), the term independent ‘best describes the alternative modes of production and circulation of their works: if not entirely independent of state institutions (for
65 nominal affiliation was required in some cases), at least independent of official ideology…. Their ‘independent’ status, accordingly, is defined not in relation to the private sources of their funding (increasingly from overseas, which means they are not financially independent) but with reference to their lack of approval by the government.’
These writers stubbornly adhered to the opinion of ‘independent of official ideology’. However, when those filmmakers were accepted by the government in recent years, which means that they have merged into official ideology, more or less, they are no longer independent according to the above definition. But a book edited by Pickowicz and Zhang which focuses on this transitional process is titled
‘From Underground to Independent’. For the authors, being officially rejected is underground, while being accepted is independent. This is contradictory.
Therefore, the traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema remains problematical.
Chris Berry (2006, 110) also doubted the traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema and argued that it was time to think about the new dominant majors in China today before suggesting a more appropriate definition. He first cited Kleinhans. For Kleinhans (1998, 308), ‘independent’ was a ‘relational term’, in relation to ‘the dominant system’, rather than being understood as totally ‘free- standing and autonomous’. Then Berry continued, according to Kleinhans’ standpoint, it is necessary to discuss what the dominant system was that Chinese independent filmmakers defined themselves against. Berry said, in the United
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States, the dominant system has always been large corporations or Hollywood.
Historically, the dominant model in the People’s Republic of China has been the state system. When the independent directors began their creative activities at the beginning of the 1990s, the state-run studios were the only dominant system that
Chinese directors had to distinguish themselves in relation to. However, the dominant forces are changing in today’s China. Berry contended that, recently, the rise of market forces and globalisation has played an important role in shaping
Chinese independent productions, so ‘the state, corporations, and foreign sources of funding and exhibition opportunities’ had become three large forces for independents to negotiate. However, Berry did not continue the study of the definition of Chinese independent cinema and did not offer a complete definition.
5. Towards a new definition of Chinese independent cinema
Berry’s statement and the review of how to define American independent cinema provide a very significant theoretical and conceptual framework to defining
Chinese independent cinema. There are three perspectives we need to keep in mind. First, the economic realm is the most important part of any definition of independent cinema and it is the most easily applied definition. Second, what is the dominant system in China? Third, when the industrial environment and the dominant system change, the discourse of independence changes.
The state studio system had a monopoly in China, but the situation changed after
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001. First, private investment was legally authorised by the new Film Regulations in 2002. Films made by 67 private companies did not need to be attached to state studios any more. Second, in ideological terms, underground filmmakers went above ground. The milestone event was the meeting organised by the Film Bureau between officials and underground directors in 2003. In the meeting, the leader of the Film Bureau said
‘Give them a free hand in their work’ (Liu 2004). Furthermore, some regulations aimed to relax censorship were issued at the same time (see Chapter 9). Therefore, the movement of underground filmmaking became weak. Third, the film industry entered into the age of conglomerates. Being stimulated by a range of reform measures, large amounts of capital, from state or private sector, from domestic or foreign sources, surged into the film industry. A few state studios and private corporations became integrated conglomerates, and the film industry became polarised. Against this privatisation and globalisation background, ‘the American experience of independence is becoming ever more relevant to understanding the
Chinese context’ (Berry 2006, 110).
The definition of Chinese independent cinema I propose in the light of American independent cinema is that any film that has not been financed, produced and/or distributed by majors is independent. During different periods the dominant system and the independents have changed. As mentioned above, the state system was the monopoly system before WTO. In this context, any film which was funded and produced by private entities in the 1980s and 1990s was independent.
There were two independent forms. One was completely independent films which were distributed and circulated outside the system. I call it ‘out-of-system independent’. The other was semi-indies (Chu 2007), which were produced by private film companies but distributed and exhibited in the system. I call it
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‘within-system independent’. In this respect, most underground filmmaking was out-of-system independent, while films financed and produced by private film production companies were within-system independent. The discourse of Chinese independent cinema changed in the age of conglomerates after WTO.
Conglomerates, the state studio system and foreign sources became new dominants. Correspondingly, in general, films which were made by small, private film companies and whose target market was domestic audience were independent.
Conclusion
Much effort has been applied to the political significance of underground filmmaking. By contrast, little attention has been paid to private film production, another kind of independent filmmaking in China. Further, no writer has placed these two independent objects together for discussion. As a result, there is inconsistency as to the starting point of ‘what is Chinese independent cinema’. A comprehensive and integrated study is a necessity because these two independent objects have the essential same ground – the same dominant system in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in recent years after 2000, China’s film industry has gone through dramatic changes. In this new situation, any insistence on keeping the tag of independent on those previously underground filmmakers who have already produced films in the system is illogical.
The new definition I propose (with reference to American independent cinema) is that any film that has not been financed, produced and/or distributed by majors is
69 independent. The definition, which focuses on a film’s economic basis, can be used to explain two independent phenomena before 2000, when the state was the sole dominant system, and the new independent discourse in the new millennium, when the state, conglomerates and foreign sources became dominant.
State studios, private companies and foreign sources are the most essential sources of backing for Chinese film directors. The next chapter will exemplify some celebrated Chinese directors’ careers to depict a living picture of the machinations of these dominant forces in the development of the Chinese film industry between the 1980s and the 2000s.
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Chapter 4 State studios, foreign capital or private companies – changes in the career of contemporary Chinese film directors
Introduction
This chapter examines the career trajectories of some contemporary Chinese film directors. Through four cases – Xie Jin, Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou, Jia
Zhangke and Feng Xiaogang, the most celebrated film directors in today’s China and also the representatives (except Feng Xiaogang) of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Generation – this chapter provides a general picture of the development of
Chinese cinema with regard to its social, political and cultural background. More importantly, the chapter demonstrates the different approaches to filmmaking in
China in marketing and through globalisation, and in the context of the fluctuating conditions imposed by state, private and foreign film production forces. Some of these directors have at various stages of their careers been identified, or have self- identified, as independents, and have subsequently moved closer to the mainstream according to circumstance and changing political realities.
This chapter starts with Xie Jin, who, after the foundation of the People’s
Republic of China, spent the major part of his career in state studios controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Xie Jin was skilful at setting up oppositions between characters or forces in his films, and his melodramas were the most popular films in the 1980s. After retirement, Xie Jin left the state studios and 71 established a private film company in the early 1990s. However, the critical and commercial performance of his films was far less successful than that of the films he shot for the state studios.
Then the chapter analyses the careers of Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou. Chen and
Zhang were both allocated to state studios after their tertiary graduation. Using bold symbolism, powerful imagery and revolutionary cinematic language, they firmly established their fame in the 1980s. Then, with substantial foreign funding, they created a series of epic films about twisted personalities in old China and became top international directors in the first half of the 1990s. Chen Kaige even went to Hollywood to shoot an English-language film. Starting from the late
1990s, both of them gave up their reliance on foreign investment and collaborated with domestic private capital. Since then Zhang and Chen have abandoned their elitist styles and have joined the vogue for profit-oriented and urban entertainment films.
The third case in this chapter is Jia Zhangke, whose films describe an individual response to the tough problems of current society. From the beginning of his career in the late 1990s, Jia Zhangke was an underground (illegal) filmmaker who made films without official approval and depended on foreign markets. However, ironically, after the industrial environment had improved and his credentials as a director had been restored by film authorities in the early 2000s, this former antagonist of official system showed an interest in cooperating with state studios,
72 but his new official colour did not change the nature of his filmmaking mode, which depended on Western viewers.
Finally, the chapter introduces Feng Xiaogang. In contrast to the above directors who had in one sense or another experienced state studios, Feng Xiaogang engaged in private filmmaking from the beginning. Feng co-established a small private production company in the early 1990s and produced melodramas funded by private investors. The company became bankrupt a few years later during a storm of tightening censorship in 1996. After that, Feng Xiaogang relied on a big private media enterprise and created his New Year Comedies. In the Corporate
Era in the new millennium, Feng Xiaogang became one of the major shareholders of this media corporation, which has now developed into a listed company. Some of his recent films even surpassed imported Hollywood blockbusters at the box office.
This chapter will conclude by posing a range of questions on the role of state studios and private companies in the development of the contemporary Chinese film industry.
1. Case one: Xie Jin – different results of working in state studios and in
private companies
The career of Xie Jin (1923-2008) spans five decades. After the founding of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Xie Jin worked at Shanghai Film
73
Studio for more than 40 years till his retirement in 1992. He was one of the few directors to continue to make films during and after the Cultural Revolution. He produced 20 films and had more than 100 million viewers. With contributions to every stage of the development of filmmaking from the earliest days of the post-
Revolutionary period, Xie Jin is counted as one of the most significant directors in
China.
Although he was the first generation director after the establishment of the PRC,
Xie Jin’s films were distinctive from propaganda films that were dominated by the characters of socialist-minded workers, peasants and soldiers. The emotional provocation of the depiction of women in his films established his reputation as a
‘woman's director’. Moreover, due to his early education in drama, Xie Jin placed much emphasis on dramatic structure and plot in his films and this was appreciated by mass audiences. By combining socialist realism with the aesthetics of Hollywood melodramas, Xie created an extremely popular genre. His style of filmmaking is often referred to as the Xie Jin melodramatic formula. Xie Jin’s breakthrough film Woman Basketball Player No. 5 (nvlan wuhao, 1956) was about the life of the intellectual class, focusing on basketball players and their coach. His next major film was from the 1960s, The Red Detachment of Women
(hongse niangzi jun), which described the cruel and violent warfare and the romantic relationship between the hero and the heroine. Another of Xie Jin’s classic works was Stage Sisters (wutai jiemer, 1964), which became one of the works targeted when the Cultural Revolution broke out in Shanghai. The government leader claimed that the film advocated the reconciliation of social classes and called it a terrible poisonous weed that needed to be uprooted. That
74 statement led to a mass rally denunciation of Xie Jin and his parents, who committed suicide.
After the Cultural Revolution, Xie Jin went back to making political melodramas featuring female protagonists. Most of the films were tragedies, such as The
Legend of Tianyun Mountain (tianyun shan chuanqi, 1980), The Herdsman (muma ren, 1982 ), Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain (gaoshan xiade huahuan, 1984) and Hibiscus Town (furong zhen, 1987). These films were reflections of life in the
Cultural Revolution. They condemned its political excesses and the strains placed on Chinese society. These highly successful films were regarded as milestones in
Chinese cinema as socialist realism, and further established Xie Jin as China’s most popular director before the rise of the Fifth Generation.
The third stage of the career of Xie Jin began after his retirement from the
Shanghai Studio in 1992. Although he was already 70 years old, Xie Jin still longed to direct films. He appealed to many wealthy businessmen to invest in his filmmaking, but all his attempts failed. Xie Jin was so frustrated that he decided to leave Shanghai for Beijing and to look for other opportunities. However, Chen
Zhili, the former deputy secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, repeatedly urged Xie Jin to stay in Shanghai and soon after Heng Tong Real
Estate Development Co., Ltd, a famous stock company in southern China, contacted Xie Jin and Xiejin-hengtong Movie&TV Corporation was established, with RMB8 million registered capital (Shi 2008). Further, the Management of
Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) issued a special policy for Xie Jin. Xie Jin’s
75 company would receive production quotas directly from MRFT, unlike other private film production companies who had to purchase a logo from the state studios. Without any financial difficulties, Xie Jin produced Old Man and His
Dog (laoren yugou, 1993) and Valley of Girls (n ü’er gu, 1995). However, both films failed and the registered money also ran out. After that, Xie Jin again had to rush about trying to find finance for his new film The Opium War (yapian zhanzheng, 1997). Luckily, in the celebration of Hong Kong’s handover to the mainland, The Opium War was listed as one of the Film Projects of Significant
Theme and received subsidies from the Education Department and Sichuan
Province Government. Although the film was the top domestic movie that year, the company still lost lots of money and was left in heavy debt. Very soon, the parent company, Heng Tong, left. In 1999, one of the biggest private companies
Zhong Lu Co., Ltd took over Xie Jin’s company and established Xiejin-Zhonglu
Movie&TV Corporation. Xie Jin got RMB4 million from this new investor for his next film (Wen 2009). Inspired by the great success of China’s women’s soccer team making the final of the World Cup in 1999, Xie Jin produced Women
Soccer Player No. 9 (nüzu jiuhao, 2000). Unfortunately, the disastrous defeat of the team in the Olympic Games in 2000 resulted in a crushing loss of box office revenue of the film. After that, Zhong Lu quickly abandoned its investment.
The performance of his private company showed that neither the quantity nor the quality of Xie Jin’s films produced independently was as good as those he directed at the Shanghai State Studio.
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2. Case two: Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou- returning home
Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou are two of the most prominent the Fifth Generation directors and are still active in the Chinese cinema world today. Many critics place these two directors together for comparison. They are key representatives of the Fifth Generation and the trajectories of their careers are somewhat similar.
Both were growing formative and famous in the state studio system in the second half of the 1980s, then received substantial foreign support and became quite famous at the weightiest international film festivals during the whole of the 1990s, and, finally, came back and collaborated with large private investors and focused on the domestic market.
As teenagers, Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou experienced the Cultural Revolution, which had an long-lasting impact on their perspectives and their filmmaking activities. Chen Kaige, the son of a well-known Beijing film family, was sent to the countryside and spent three years labouring in Yunnan province. Zhang
Yimou’s childhood was even more terrible and desperate than Chen Kaige’s, because his father was labelled the worst kind of counter revolutionary. After the
Cultural Revolution, they were admitted to the Beijing Film Academy in 1978 and graduated in 1982. Soon after, they were assigned to state studios. Due to their new cinematic language, this legendary class became known as the Fifth
Generation.
Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou spent thier formative years at state studios. In
1984, Chen Kaige, who was at Beijing Film Studio, joined his former classmate at 77 the Guangxi Film Studio. They went to the remote area of northern Shangxi province, where they shot Yellow Earth (huang tudi). Chen Kaige acted as director and Zhang Yimou was the cinematographer. As noted in the case of Xie Jin, the older generation of the Chinese film industry was inclined to accept the socialist realism model and Hollywood style films. In contrast with all of these traditional ideas about cinema, Yellow Earth, with sparse dialogue, little plot and brutally realistic depictions of the difficult lives of peasants, broke with all previous
Chinese filmmaking conventions and marked a cinematic revolution.
After expanding the horizons of Chinese cinema with this groundbreaking film,
Chen Kaige continued his innovation and experimentation, continually rebelling against cinematic norms and audience expectations. He made a series of highly personal and philosophically driven art films, such as 1986’s The Big Parade (da yuebin) and 1987’s King of the Children (haizi wang). Although all these films did not succeed commercially in the domestic film market, they did well in the international art film market. King of the Children, for example, was purchased by
14 nations at an exhibition of Chinese cinema and won some awards at foreign film festivals (Wang 2006).
Zhang Yimou established himself as the most dynamic visual stylist of the Fifth
Generation through a series of films he worked on as cinematographer – One and
Eight (yige bage, 1983), Yellow Earth and The Big Parade. In 1987 when Chen
Kaige produced King of the Children, Zhang Yimou made the switch from cinematographer to director with his debut feature Red Sorghum (hong gaoliang).
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Brimming with visual beauty and visceral brutality, Red Sorghum was important for establishing many of the key themes and tropes in Zhang’s next several films: enthusiasm with red colour, voyeuristic gazes and bold depictions of desire. Red
Sorghum won the Golden Bear Award at the 1988 Berlin International Film
Festival. This was the first Chinese film to win an award at a top international film festival.
After successfully establishing their fame in the state studio system, both Chen
Kaige and Zhang Yimou embarked on the second stage of their careers – seeking foreign finance. Zhang Yimou’s next series of films were all funded by foreign investors. Ju Dou (ju dou, 1990) was invested in by Japan Tokuma Shoten
Co.,Ltd. Raise the Red Lantern (dahong denglong gaogao gua, 1991) and To Live
(huozhe, 1994) was financed by Taiwan Niandai Film Corporation. The Story of
Qiu Ju (qiuju da guansi, 1992) was backed by Hongkong Sil-Metropole
Organisation. Shanghai Triad (yao a yao yaodao waipo qiao, 1995) was invested in by France UGC Images. All of these films won high honours at the most important film festivals, such as Venice, Cannes, and received nominations for
Academy Awards. Similarly, after The Big Parade, Chen Kaige’s films were all produced using mainly foreign investment and gained prizes at many top film festivals. Life on a String (bianzou bianchang, 1991) was financed by Germany
Pandora Filmproduktion GmbH. Farewell My Concubine (bawang bieji, 1993) and Temptress Moon (fengyue, 1996) were both invested in by Hongkong
Tomson Film Corporation. The Emperor and the Assassin (jingke ci qinwang,
1999) was invested in by Japan. Chen Kaige went to Hollywood and produced an
English-language thriller Killing Me Softly. Most of these movies caused hot
79 debate among critics and his most commercially successful work Farewell My
Concubine won the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival and was nominated for the Best Foreign Film at the Academy Awards, and won best film not in the
English language at the BAFTA awards.
Although they increasingly became seen to be great masters of Chinese film in the eyes of the international cinema world they could leave the limitations of Chinese censorship behind, Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige also had to deal with the equally powerful forces of the Western film market, which has its own set of rules and limitations. During this process, both Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige encountered some embarrassing problems and were frustrated by either their domestic audience or their foreign investors.
Their works never saw commercial success in the domestic market. Of all their films, only Zhang’s Red Sorghum and Shanghai Triad entered into the top 10 films of their year5. Most of the films were failures; for example, King of the
Children sold only one print in China (Dai 2005). Furthermore, some of their films were banned in China. Ju Dou was banned for its sexual content. In To live
Zhang addressed the way that personalities of human beings were tortured and twisted in the Cultural Revolution. Even today it still has not been publicly screened in China.
5 Source: China Film Year Book (1089); Movie (02/1996).
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Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige were heavily criticised for bringing shame, rather than honour, to the Chinese people. Partly because their films used foreign investors, their films catered to the fantasies and fetishes of Western audiences about China, especially Chinese women. For example, Zhang Yimou’s Ju Dou and Raise the Red Lantern explored the theme of young beautiful brides married off to older (often symbolically impotent) patriarchal figures in the old society.
Chen Kaige’s Farewell My Concubine made an exhaustive description of how a traditional opera troupe ruined young trainees’ health and spirit. Such content drew criticism for presenting an orientalist vision that caters to foreigners (Berry
2005).
Although they were well-established directors in China, both Chen Kaige and
Zhang Yimou were not completely trusted by foreign investors. Chen Kaige had the experience of being ‘forced’ to make a different edition of The Emperor and the Assassin for the American and European markets. He said,
I was basically forced to do that. The American studio sent someone to
Beijing who wanted all kinds of scenes cut. Since this was such a big-
budget film, I really didn’t have the freedom to ignore their requests. But
deep down I was very unhappy about this and was very reluctant to make
these cuts because the original version, which was shown in Japan, was
much closer to what I was trying to do with that film (Berry 2005, 99).
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Chen Kaige was the first Chinese director who tried to expand his career into
Hollywood. After The Emperor and the Assassin, he went to America to produce
Killing Me Softly. However, this film was not commercially screened. He recalled,
I was really unaccustomed to the way they do things in Hollywood. The
problem is that they could not care less whether or not you make a good
film; all they care about is whether or not your film can make money. The
screenplay presents a challenge to the morals of the audience. The vast
majority of mainstream American audiences are quite conservative.
Because it was too excessive and too bold in terms of its representations of
sexuality and incest, the studio executives in Hollywood were too
conservative and decided to go direct to video …… that experience left me
wondering how I could have been so stupid. It was an uncomfortable
experience (Berry 2005, 101).
Zhang Yimou never seemed to lack for overseas funding. However, when the actress Gong Li, who was Zhang’s partner and who starred in almost all of
Zhang’s previous films, suddenly separated from Zhang and married a
Singaporean tobacco businessman after the completion of Shanghai Trial, foreign investors hesitated to finance Zhang’s next film.
These unhappy experiences urged Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige to return home to the mainstream domestic audience. This time, they chose private film companies, not state studios, as their partners. Chen Kaige produced Together
(heni zai yiqi, 2002), which used investment from private companies 21 Century 82
Shengkai Film and 21st Century Hero Film Investments. This was really a major turning point in his career. All of his previous work had a rather sombre mood and heavy quality, but Together was a ‘feel-good movie’ (Berry 2005, 103).
According to such comment, Chen Kaige responded,
As Chinese artists, there is one element that we never include in our work,
and that is happiness. The happiness displayed in Together is really
coming from the heart……After twenty-five years of development in
China, something new is beginning to develop in the character and spirit
of the Chinese people. China is gradually becoming a commercial country
and we do need to protect our culture, but then again, is it a good thing to
make films that no one sees? I intend to make more happy films. I want to
make films that will excite people (Berry 2005, 104).
Because of the withdrawal of foreign investment, Zhang Yimou had to seek funding for his film Keep Cool (youhua haohao shuo, 1997) from a real estate businessman, Zhang Weiping. After that, they established their own company,
New Picture, and began a long term collaboration. The new company soon produced Not One Less (yige dou buneng shao, 1999) and The Road Home (wode fuqin muqin, 1999), which were totally different from Zhang’s previous style.
More significantly, the withdrawal of these two films from the Cannes Film
Festival highlighted Zhang’s decision to separate from Western backing. Zhang applied to the 2000 Cannes Film Festival; however, Cannes officials viewed the happy ending of Not One Less where the main characters' conflicts were resolved by the generosity of city dwellers and high-up officials, as pro-Chinese
83 propaganda and denied his films entry into the Festival's Official Selection. Rather than have his films shown in a less competitive portion of the festival, Zhang withdrew them both in protest, stating that the movies were apolitical. In an open letter published in the Beijing Youth Daily, Zhang accused the festival of being motivated by other than artistic concerns, and criticised the Western perception that all Chinese films must be either ‘pro-government’ or ‘anti-government’, referring to it as a ‘discrimination against Chinese films’.
I cannot accept that when it comes to Chinese films, the West seems for a
long time to have had just the one 'political' reading: if it's not ‘against the
government’ then it's ‘for the government’. The naïveté and lack of
perspective of using so simple a concept to judge a film is obvious. With
respect to the works of directors from America, France and Italy for
example, I doubt you have the same point of view.
—Zhang Yimou (20 April 1999). Beijing Youth Daily.
After the experiments of those small budget dramas, in 2002, Zhang Yimou produced Hero (yingxiong) and Chen Kaige produced Promise (wuji) in 2005.
These two revolutionary filmmakers again led the Chinese cinema into a new era
– blockbusters.
3. Case three: Jia Zhangke- a foreign markets’ permanent delegate in
state studios’ clothing
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Though Jia Zhangke may not have been among the earliest Chinese directors, like
Zhang Yuan and Wang Xiaoshuai, to make films outside the official system, his influence in the unofficial film world today is distinctive and unmatched. From his debut film, Xiao Wu (xiao wu, 1997), which was financed by overseas capital and exhibited and celebrated at foreign film festivals, Jia Zhangke was an underground filmmaker. His first three features were banned in China. However,
Jia never gave up the effort of becoming a part of the Chinese film industry and reaching Chinese audiences. He was eager to cooperate with state studios after
Xiao Wu’s ban. In 2004, his director credential was restored. However, though he had a successful partnership with the Shanghai State Studio for three films, with official approval and which were commercially shown, the major revenue of Jia’s films came from the West.
Jia Zhangke was born in 1970 and enrolled in the Beijing Film Academy in 1994 for advanced studies. During that time of the Academy, Jia borrowed some money from his relatives and produced three shorts: One Day in Peking, Xiao Shan
Going Home and Du Du. His fellow classmates from Hong Kong submitted the short Xiao Shan Going Home so he could attend an Independent Shorts
Competition hosted by the Hong Kong Arts Centre. The short was selected for competition and went on to win the first prize in the narrative film category. The success gave Jia the opportunity for a follow-up feature.
Hong Kong Hu Tong Communications invested RMB300,000 in his feature film
Xiao Wu. This directorial debut was a gritty and moving portrait of Fengyang, a
85 small town in Shanxi province from which the director hails. The protagonist,
Xiao Wu, is a small-time pickpocket who struggles to keep his foothold as his relationships fall apart in a fast-changing world. The film stood out for its hard- core realism and its shockingly honest display of a side of China seldom seen.
Although Xiao Wu gained huge international success from Berlin to Vancouver, it could not be commercially released in China. To obtain permission to show their films in commercial theatres, Chinese filmmakers must fulfil several requirements, including purchasing a quota number from a state studio, submitting both a plot synopsis and the completed film to government censors, and not making the film public – including submitting it to international festivals – until the censors' approval has been secured. Xiao Wu did not fulfil the above requirements; he had committed an illegal act. However, even if Xiao Wu had been submitted for examination, it would have been impossible to pass the censorship tests because the characters were too marginal and the portrayal of
China in the film was too grey.
After the success of Xiao Wu, there were many international producers interested in working with Jia Zhangke. Jia hoped to collaborate with Shanghai or Beijing
Film Studio to guarantee the legal position of his next films. However, neither studio took up the deal because of his ban. At last, Hong Kong Hu Tong
Communications and Japan Shozo Ichiyama financed and produced Jia Zhangke’s next films Platform (zhan tai, 2000) and Unknown Pleasures (ren xiaoyao, 2002)
(Zhang 2006).
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Jia Zhangke explained why he sought Hong Kong investment for his filmmaking as following:
I felt deeply anguished, because Xiao Wu is a Chinese story and I would
have enjoyed my public to be Chinese. This prohibition made lose my
public. While preparing Platform, we searched for a dialogue with the
government. Unfortunately, this film was not appreciated by the
government and I found myself in a bad mood while producing the
movie……My activity cannot be guaranteed inside of China. I need an
open space and international one, because I’ve got to find some investors.
I’ve chosen Hong Kong, since it still keeps free spaces and plus it’s a
Chinese place and this help my communication. So we have come to
decision: to establish our seat in Hong Kong. This to me sounds like an
optimum compromise, since it’s difficult to count on international
collaborations in Beijing (Damiani 2000).
After independently producing three feature films outside the official system, the
Film Bureau finally restored Jia’s credentials as a legitimate director in 2004. The
World represented Jia Zhangke's entry into China's ‘aboveground’ film scene. On his decidion to change his method of working, Jia said:
My first three films all failed to pass the Chinese censorship board and
weren't permitted to screen in China. This has pained me deeply. My films
are about the Chinese, our lives and emotions, yet they can't be seen by us.
It's like shouting out loud on the mountain, and there is no echo. It feels
very empty. Ever since Xiao Wu, my films have been recognised
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internationally, yet, these positive responses can never replace the
feedback of the Chinese audience (Shih 2006).
Originally, all of us so-called independent directors, or underground
directors, were that way because the censorship apparatus was to a large
degree restricting our freedom of choice. But now it looks like we'll have
the chance to express ourselves freely. That’s made us eager to become a
part of the process that my film can now reach a Chinese audience (Jaffee
2004).
The World, and Jia Zhangke’s next two films Still Life (sanxia haoren, 2006) and
24 City (ershi sicheng ji, 2008) were released under the auspices of the state
Shanghai Film Studio. Shanghai Film Studio was not only responsible for going through the legal procedures of film production, such as screenplay submission and application for quota, but, more importantly, in co-financing the film.
However, although these films were able to be shown in China, they did not do well. America and Europe remained the most important markets for Jia’s films and commanded a high price when the DVD copyright was sold there (Shih
2006).
4. Case four: Feng Xiaogang – the most skilful operator of private film
production mode
88
Feng Xiaogang is China’s most successful commercial film director since the middle of the 1990s. Some of his films are so popular with moviegoers that they have even surpassed imported Hollywood blockbusters at the box office. Feng’s films seem shallow and playful when compared to the astonishingly exquisite visuality, exotic auto-ethnography and relentless criticism of the dark side of
Chinese history, society and politics in films by the Fifth and Sixth Generation filmmakers. However, if we take a closer look at Feng’s works and career, and contextualise the popularity of his films against the background of Chinese film history and the evolution of Chinese popular cinema in the past two decades, we find that the significance of his films is not necessarily a result of awards and acclaims received from international film festivals and scholars, but, rather, they reflect the degree to which his films represent China’s national cinematic trends and the influence they exerted on China’s burgeoning, yet vulnerable, national film industry. Feng’s films not only reflect the changing social-political context of
Chinese cinema since the mid-1990s, but also demonstrate the nation-wide growth of popular cinema, a cinema that meets the needs of domestic audiences instead of serving as political propaganda or catering to the demands of international film festivals.
By comparison with the above directors who relied on state studios or foreign capital to establish fame, Feng Xiaogang’s career began with a small private film production company, Good Dream, in the early 1990s. After the bankruptcy of
Good Dream, Feng Xiaogang collaborated with another private media enterprise,
Huayi Brothers. The company developed so well that in just a few years it lept
89 forward into a listed media corporation, which was, at the time, the only private media company in China.
As for how to situate Feng’s cinema in the larger context of Chinese film history,
Feng’s own view on the difference between his films and those of other Chinese film directors is revealing. In a conference held at the Beijing Film Academy in
November 2001, Feng gave a metaphorical review of the history of Chinese cinema:
After the emergence of Chinese cinema, through their hard work and
diligence, the first three generations of directors erected a Sacred Hall of
Chinese Cinema. After its establishment, one day, a group of people
rushed in and took over the hall and then established their own style of
filmmaking and rules for other filmmakers to follow. In this way, the
Fourth Generation directors, represented by Xie Jin, sealed the door of the
Hall of Chinese cinema.
When the Fourth Generation directors were carefully guarding the door of
the Sacred Hall and enjoying a stable life and career there, suddenly a
gang of people entered the Hall. Rather than going through the door, they
entered through the window and then established their own way of
filmmaking. These are the Fifth Generation directors, represented by
Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige. Like the Fourth Generation directors, as
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soon as they entered the Hall, the Fifth Generation closed and sealed the
windows.
Now that both the door and windows were sealed, it became very difficult
for other directors to get in. But, out of all expectation, the Sixth
generation still found their way into the Hall- they entered through neither
the door nor the window, but from the underground.
As a result, it is now very crowded in the Hall of Chinese Cinema -
someone guards the door, another the window, and even the underground
tunnel is blocked by the Sixth Generation. I realized that it was impossible
for me to go in, and that there wouldn’t be any place left for me in any
case. So, I decided to build a side room beside the Hall. Now I am
surprised that my life here is not just comfortable, but more and more
prosperous. Now when I am peeping inside the Hall, it seems so crowded
that I really don’t want to be there (quoted in Zhang (2008, 155)).
This quote vividly depicts the place that Feng claims for himself in the history of
Chinese cinema. Within the edifice of socialist cinema, there is no place for
Feng’s non-political entertainment films or his films of social criticism. His films produced by private production entities are definitely outsiders to the Party- controlled film industry. At the same time, designed to satisfy the needs of ordinary urban audiences, his films do not fit the expectations of the
91 internationally famous art cinema of the Fifth and Sixth Generation directors.
However, this neglect and indifference is contradicted by the growing popularity and influence of his films in current Chinese cinema. In Feng’s case, despite working under the constraints of official film ideology and the pressure of profit- making, he has striven to retain in all his films a distinctive and personal imprint, characterised by his sense of humour and cynical commentary on the problems of
Chinese society. However, he has also had to make compromises. He has avoided conflict with film officials by avoiding a more implicit rendering of social commentary, and he has answered the demands of investors by inserting into his films as many commercial logos as possible.
Feng’s filmmaking career can be divided into four periods: the formative stage from the early 1990s to 1996, the bankruptcy, the New Year film period from
1997 to 2000, and the big budget film period after 2000. These stages will be depicted and analysed in the following four chapters respectively. Using Feng’s career and his films as examples, the thesis argues that these transformations are a result of changing film policies, the rapid pace of film industry reforms and the negotiations and compromises of Chinese filmmakers with film authorities and profit imperatives.
Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the careers of several the most celebrated contemporary
Chinese film directors, namely, Xie Jin, Chen Kaige, Zhang Yimou, Jia Zhangke and Feng Xiaogang. Xie Jin spent the majority of his career at a big state studio 92 and created many very influential melodramas. In the early 1990s, he established a private film production company and continued his film style. However, those films failed. Even the most successful film, the 1997 film The Opium War did not generate profit for the company. His company had to be reconstructed and eventually went out of business. Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige started their careers in the 1980s and produced films for state-owned studios. During most of the time in the 1990s Chen and Zhang utilised foreign capital to produce a series of films that won many prizes at top foreign film festivals but which were criticised by domestic scholars and audiences. In the late 1990s Zhang and Chen returned and collaborated with domestic private capital, and their films performed well commercially. After 2000, both of them started producing blockbusters. Jia
Zhangke started his career in the mid 1990s. His first films were all backed by foreign capital and successful at foreign film festivals, but were banned in China.
After 2000, Jia was allowed to produce films in the official system and he chose a state studio to co-produce his new films. However, his aboveground films still relied on the Western market. Feng Xiaogang insisted on private film production from the beginning of his career. The turning point of his career happened in 1996 when his own company went bankrupt. After that he cooperated with a media corporation and gradually his films became highly profitable.
According to the above review, we can see that the early 1990s, the mid 1990s, the late 1990s and after 2000 were significant turning points in the careers of these directors. In the early 1990s, Xie Jin and Feng Xiaogang established their private film production companies. During the mid 1990s, Xie Jin’s company had collapsed and Feng Xiaogang’s company had gone bankrupt, and Jia Zhangke
93 began his underground filmmaking. In the late 1990s, Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige returned and, with Feng Xiaogang, created warm and happy mainstream films.
After 2000, Jia Zhangke was admitted into the official system and he produced films that had the approval of the authorities and Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige and
Feng Xiaogang produced transnational blockbusters.
The review, though, raises some questions about the careers of these directors.
Why did Xie Jin succeed in a state studio but fail in a private company? Why did
Xie Jin’s and Feng Xiaogang’s companies not grow well? Why did Jia Zhangke go underground at the start point of his career? Why did he choose a state studio rather than a private company as his partner for his new films after entering the official system? Why did Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige seek foreign investment rather than domestic capital before the late 1990s? Why did they choose private capital rather than state studios after returning home in the late 1990s? How did
Feng Xiaogang have the ability to make highly profitable films?
All these questions are related to the issue at the core of this thesis: what role have state studios and private film companies played in the early 1990s, the mid 1990s, the late 1990s and after 2000? This issue will be addressed in the following four chapters.
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Chapter 5 Emergence and initial development of independent film production companies (mid 1980s- mid 1990s)
Introduction
In 1993, Feng Xiaogang co-founded a television and film production company,
Good Dream TV and Film Production and Consulting, with RMB200,000 as a fixed fund and eight employees (Zhang 2008). In order to attract investors, Feng had to work like a salesman, soliciting their support over dinner. He made films on subjects that appealed to an ordinary Chinese audience rather than to the elite film critics or foreign film festivals. Good Dream was one of many profitable independent film production companies in China in the early 1990s.
With state sponsorship mostly going to the production of main melody films, filmmakers who were either unable or unwilling to comply with the mainstream had to choose another way of making films. The Fifth Generation chose to rely on foreign capital, thus bypassing government sponsorship and allowing for a certain degree of freedom in regards to subject matter. The Sixth Generation moved toward an underground cinema. Another alternative way to raise capital was to depend on private funds and operate independently, but with the nominal affiliation to the state system. Feng Xiaogang’s films belong to this within-system independent cinema.
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The discourse of Chinese independent cinema did not appear until in the mid-
1980s in China when changes in the monopolisation of the film industry provided a glimpse of more entrepreneurial ways of making films. The decade of the 1980s was a transitional period for national economy in China. For more than three decades since the nation’s foundation in 1949, the focus of politics in China was on class struggle. A Planned Economy in which the government controls and regulates production, distribution, and prices was adopted as a dominant production mode in all industries. The film sector, as one of the most essential propaganda mechanisms, was strictly controlled by the state. A centralized studio system was the management mechanism in the Chinese film industry. The government established and subsidised the studios; in turn, the studios produced films to publicise the Party’s policies and ideology. Market competitions did not exist then and the studios did not have to care about audience favour. However, economic reform which started in 1978 generated a range of significant changes in society in the 1980s. The goal of the reform was to generate sufficient surplus value to finance the modernization of the mainland Chinese economy. One of the significant results of the reform was the growth of the private sector which became the key support mechanism for independent cinema.
For the film industry, the economic reform resulted in a shift from institutions
(shiye) to enterprises (chanye/qiye), and the gradual withdrawal of government backing. However, overstaffing, the unfair allocation of profits between production and distribution and the increase in production costs severely hindered the development of the studios’ productive forces. Therefore, a financial crises in state studios happened and they had to contract out staff. In this way, the first
96 independent film companies emerged.
Financial problems became even more urgent in the early 1990s. Studios stopped self-investing and sought help from private capital. Private capital became the major force of film investment in the early 1990s. Some regulations encouraging private investment were issued for the first time and the legal rights of private investors improved and independent film production companies developed. They grew larger and more professional. Some of them made excellent advances in economic and artistic terms.
This chapter examines how political management determined the emergence and the initial development of independent cinema between the mid 1980s and the mid
1990s. It begins with the introduction of the condition in which the first independents were formed. Then it studies the emergence of the first private film production companies in the mid 1980s. Finally, the chapter addresses the progress independents made in the first half of the 1990s.
1. The conditions for the emergence of independents
1.1 The centralised studio system
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the developments in the
Chinese film industry in the 1980s, we need to start with the centralised studio system that dominated the film sector before the 1980s.
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In 1953, under the direct guidance of Soviet experts, a plan for a Chinese film institution was initiated. By 1956, an integrated soviet-style film institution had been completed in the nation. State studios were established and the Ministry of
Culture’s Film Bureau was put in charge. A command economy management was adopted, with the central government allocating production funding, film quotas and film types to each studio according to the individual studio’s production capacity and specialities. Each studio was all-inclusive no matter how big or small they were, maintaining its own studios, equipment and its full staff of actors, writers, directors, cinematographers and technicians. The biggest studios were
Changchun, Beijing, Shanghai, and the ministry studio August First. Following the same model, between 1976 and 1980, 12 provinces and cities established their own film studios. They were Yunnan, Gansu, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Anhui, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Shanxi (Chen 2009). In addition, during the same period, the Beijing Film Academy established the Youth
Studio and, in order to attract foreign cooperation, Xinhua Net’ s Nanhai Film
Corporation and Film Cooperation Corporation were established (Yang 2008). In
1980, 16 studios were authorised directly under the State Council. They were:
Beijing, Changchun, Shanghai, August First, Zhujiang, Xi’an, Emei, Xiaoxiang,
Tianshan, Neimeng, Youth, Guangxi, Children, Fujian, Yunnan and Shenzhen film studios (Chen 2009). These state studios were the main forces in film production. They were totally sponsored by the state and mostly produced pedagogic and propaganda films.
For film distribution, the China Film Corporation (CFC) and state-owned distribution companies in provinces made up the distribution network. The CFC,
98 the sole distribution and exhibition agent responsible to the state, purchased the films at a fixed price and delivered the prints to the province levels, and then to the city and town levels. It purchased original film prints from studios at a mandatory price of RMB900,000 per film, regardless of each film’s individual market performance. The CFC provided an undiscriminating ‘contract’ for the entire studio production at no operating costs, which worked to the studios’ benefit by allowing them to sell unpopular films on the strength of the popular ones, or even without the strength of the popular ones. ‘Such a distribution system resembled the block-booking practice of Hollywood majors during the height of the studio era’ (Zhu 2003, 53).
Film culture was developed from the substance of Mao Zedong’s Talks at Yan’an
Forum (1942) – the guiding principle for works in art and literature. As Chu
(2002, 45) noted, ‘The creation of worker-peasant-soldier images, targeted at workers, peasants and soldiers, was the aim of artistic practice’. The state-owned and state-subsidised production and the studios produced ideologically motivated films according to the state’s production target. The function of such film production was to disseminate communist ideology and to ensure the Party’s political control.
State studios were guided and encouraged to produce films of three types. The first type was Revolutionary History Films with Significant Subjects, which depicted Party leaders and key events in China’s revolution. Such films were the most typical main melody films in the Chinese film industry. The famous films
99 included The White-Haired Girl (bai maonü) (1950), Guerrillas on the Plain
(pingyuan youjidui) (1955), Song of Youth (qingchun zhige) (1959), Zhang Ga, a
Boy Soldier (xiaobing Zhang Ga) (1963), From Victory to Victory (nanzheng beizhan) (1974), Sparking Red Star (shanshan hongxing) (1974), From Slave To
General (cong nvli dao jiangjue) (1979), Mayor Chen Yi (chenyi shizhang)
(1981), Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain (gaoshan xia de huahuan) (1984) and
Sun Zhongshan (sun zhongshan) (1984). The second type was the current events films, with self-examination. The representative films included Troubled Laughter
(kunao ren de xiao) (1979), the Herdsman and Hibicus Town. The revolutionary themed films paid attention to the past; the emphasis of the self- examination films was on the present. Both film types filled a vacancy and represented a continuity of the mainstream official culture. The third type of film was experimental art films. The Fifth Generation directors were the major force in this type of film. The aesthetic characteristics of these three film types were philosophic and artistic, or, in other words, solemn and noble, representing the interest of the official ideology and the planned economy.
Such a highly centralised studio system, with the integration of government and enterprise, the vertical administration of the central and local governments, lasted for about 30 years and played a significant role in film development. It kept the film industry moving forward and guaranteed the propaganda of mainstream ideology. After the demise of the Gang of Four, many censored films were screened and this resulted in a viewing wave. In 1979, the average theatre attendance was 28 and the total was 293 million (Yang 2008). The number of feature films rapidly increased from less than 40 in 1978 to more than 140 in the
100 early 1980s (see figure 1). For Ni (1994), the survival of the centralised studio system had its basis in China’s internal policies. First, the restricted import policy rejected Hollywood entertainment films. Second, the planned economic environment existed across the whole of society and the film institution belonged to a welfare mode of production and distribution. Third, large audience numbers were available in the domestic market when TV began to prevail before the 1980s.
The multitudinous consumers were the essential basis for the existence of the soviet style of the film industry (Ni 1994).
1.2 Open and Reform Policy and the development of the private sector
On December 18, 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of
China, Eleventh Congress was held in Beijing. This meeting had far-reaching significance for the Chinese Communist Party and represented an important turning point in its history. At the meeting, the Party leader Deng Xiaoping announced an ‘Open-and-Reform’ policy. ‘Open’ meant to open the door of China to the outside world; ‘Reform’ meant to invigorate the national economy through reform. As it turned out, the meeting marked a new page in the history of China’s reform. Since then, China has embarked on a gradual switch from the planned economy to what many now call the socialist market economy. The aim of the
Open and Reform Policy was to liberate and develop productive forces. Reforms came to rural areas first. The People's Communes, which were a collectivist model, were dismantled and farmers were encouraged to cultivate private plots and to sell the produce for profit. While rural reforms were being put in place, directions for urban reforms were actively being explored. The low productivity
101 of the bureaucratic economy was being challenged. The emphasis was on rationalising the relationship between the state and private enterprises in order to give the latter autonomy in production and day-to-day operations.
The Open Reform Policy brought breathtaking change to the private sector. The private sector, or what is sometimes referred to as civil society, had experienced a long period of suppression in China under the socialist government. An individual economy was recognised as capitalist because of its private means of production and its exploitation in hiring labour. Therefore, before China’s reform and open- door policy, the Chinese private sector was treated as ‘the tail of capitalism’ that had to be cut.
The reform and open-door policy in 1978 brought about changes. The individual economy in rural areas was acknowledged first, and then in urban areas. The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in December 1982 provided for the individual economy in cities and the countryside within legal restrictions and supplements of the socialist public economy. However, whether to encourage the private sector or not was still on the agenda. On 1 February 1983, the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emphasised in its No.1
Document certain issues of its rural economic policy that it thought it was best not to encourage or publicise the proprietors or private enterprises that employed many labourers, although it was not in a hurry to ban them either. In October of
1983, the thirteenth national congress of the CCP further clarified issues
102 concerning the private sector, stating that the development of the private sector was to some extent beneficial to the promotion of production, and that it stimulated the market, increased employment and satisfied various necessities of people’s lives. The private sector was seen an essential and profitable supplement to the publicly-owned economy. These statements from the thirteenth national congress of the CCP greatly contributed to the growth of the private sector.
The Chinese private sector began to develop after the Open Reform Policy.
According to Qian and Wu (2000) (see table 1 and table 2), since 1978, private enterprises in China had grown continuously; the percentage of private ownership composition in industrial output increased from 0 in 1978 to 0.5 in 1980, 3.1 in
1985 and 9.7 in 1990; the percentage of private ownership composition in retail sales of consumer goods increased from 2.1 in 1978 to 4.0 in 1980, 22.4 in 1985 and 28.7 in 1990. The vigorous growth in the private sector provided the financial possibility for the emergence of independent film production.
1.3 The decline in state studios
In the early 1980s the Chinese film industry faltered after a rapid expansion from the late 1970s. Film audiences began to decline. The Open Reform Policy allowed more Western, modern technology imports into China and people had more alternative entertainment options. From 1980 to 1983, film audience attendance in big cities declined by RMB2 billion, and during this period urban film release receipts dropped at a rate of RMB25 million per year (Zhu 2003, 65). The economic reform of the Chinese film industry was launched in this context. 103
The core of the economic reform of film by the mid 1980s was its functional transition, relocating the state studios from institutions to enterprises. The state in
1984 stipulated that the nature of the film sector was enterprise. The studios were required to balance their budgets and assume responsibility for profits and losses.
Government withdrew subsidies and the state studios had to raise funds from banks through their own efforts. They had to achieve profits and pay more than ten taxes. The aim of the reform was to increase the market competition; however, the conservative reform measures did not improve the production capacity of state studios; on the contrary, they led to a severe financial crisis. The reasons for this failure are as follows:
First, the reform did not increase studios’ share of box office returns, although a new settling of accounts was practiced. Before 1980, the CFC purchased any film from the studios at the price of RMB900,000 per film. What the CFC earned from box office profit was not returned to the studios. There was an upswing in film audiences after the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s. That wave encouraged the studios to demand more profit share. Therefore, the Ministry of
Culture issued a document (1588) in 1980 requesting that the CFC settle accounts with the studios according to the number of prints it made rather than by paying a flat fee for original prints (Ni 1994, 46). The document also set the price at
RMB9000 per print when the number of prints was between 100 and 110, a number based on the average prints of each film distributed by CFC for the past decade; the total money would be RMB990,000 if the number of prints exceeded
110. Thus, although the profit share of the studios was somewhat relevant to the total sales, and it meant a production had a market, the lowest amount of money it
104 could receive was RMB900,000 and the highest RMB990,000. In short, the reform allowed studios to earn about RMB90,000 more than before, which was not sufficient incentive for the production of films, nor was it a market value. In this sense, this settling of accounts according to the number of prints was conservative and just another form of the previous unified purchase and sale system. As a result, the unfair receipt allocation between distribution and production prevailed. Normally, in order to continue follow-up production, studios would get a rational division of box office receipts at no less than 25 per cent (Ni 1994, 63). In 1991 the domestic distribution revenue was RMB1.09 billion, however, the production studios received only RMB179 million, less than
10 per cent of the distribution return (Ni 1994, 95). Similarly, in 1992, the studios spent RMB164 million on production fund and produced 130 films for distribution, but they earned only RMB177 million (Ni 1994, 95). This limited profit share severely hindered the normal operation of the studios.
Second, subsidies from the government had not increased since 1984 but production costs had climbed. Because the state studios still operated with some institutional features, some subsidies were still allocated. For example, Shanghai
Studio’s subsidy was RMB4 million, Changchun Studio’s was RMB8.6 million and Beijing Film Studio’s was RMB3.8 million (see table 3). The amount of money had not grown for ten years. However, the average production cost of each movie had already increased to more than RMB1 million in 1992. In that year, the target number of features was 15 for Beijing and Shanghai, 17 for Changchun. It meant that the three studios each needed more than RMB10 million over and above the subsidies to reach their goal.
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Third, welfare fees were a huge burden for the studios. State enterprises ran at a full scale, covering all kinds of departments and services. Many big studios had kindergartens, child care, savings banks, grain shops, etc. Therefore, overstaffing, especially personnel for none-productive, administrative and multiple divisions, was one of the biggest problems for the studios. The statistics shown in table 4 and 5 are shocking. Retired and other personnel accounted for almost as many employees as those on the job, and among those who worked there were more administrators than major creative staff. Overstaffing caused huge overheads.
Salary and welfare fees took up more than 40 per cent of the revenue of the studios (Liu 2005). Han Sanping, the present CEO of China Film Group, recalled the past and said,
‘When I was assigned to be the head of Beijing Film Studio in 1995, after
paying out salaries to more than 1900 employees, there was only RMB200
thousand cash left on the account, and I needed to pay RMB1 million right
now for staff health care expenses’ (Xu 2007).
The slim returns, the poor government subsidies and the huge burden of overheads led to large shortages in the studios’ production funds. Many important studios ran into debt in the late 1980s. In 1987, the Beijing Film Studio, the leader of the state studios, lost money for the first time (Zhao 1991). By the end of 1989, the Shanghai studio was RMB20 million in debt; Xi’an was RMB20 million in debt; Beijing was RMB10 million in debt; and Changchun, RMB30 million in debt (Ling in Zhu 2003, 77).
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However, state studios still had to meet their minimal production targets. Banks hesitated to provide loans to studios due to their unsatisfactory financial reports.
Given this dilemma, seeking money from the private sector was the only way forward. Studios had to contract out employees to reduce the burden and to increase funding.
1.4 Contracting out system
Although the economic reform in the 1980s did not stimulate direct competition in the film industry, enterprise ownership reform led to a greater degree of creative autonomy for the studios. Obviously overstaffing and heavy welfare expenses were the biggest barriers for the studios to operate effectively. However, reducing the number of staff was still a very risky measure at that time due to the consideration of social stability. Therefore, narrowly dividing accounting units and practicing a contracting out system were common reform measures for the studios. For example, Changchun Studio divided its feature film production department into three. The studio provided each about RMB100 thousand per year, requiring them to complete 5-7 feature films every year and handing in to the studio 25 per cent of the production budget of each film as management fees, and, in addition, they had a RMB250 thousand as profit target (Ni 1994, 79).
Some other relatively small studios divided accounting units narrowly to production teams. E’mei Studio established two production units, requesting them raise funds for themselves and to pay the studio the fees for profit and management (Ni 1994, 79).
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By the late 1980s the contracting out system was very popular in all the studios, encouraging staff and providing them opportunities to seek investment from outside to deal with the shortage in production funds. The contracting out system enabled creative people to become independent professionals, and this provided the necessary conditions for the birth of independents.
2. The features of the first independent film production companies
Independent film production companies emerged in the mid-1980s. The important ones included Nanchang Film and TV Institution (1985), and Hainan Golden
Island Film and TV Company (1989).
Director-centred
These first independents were established by studio filmmakers. The contracting out system among producers and directors caused great changes in the relationship between staff and studios. It made it possible for filmmakers to be separated from the studios such that they could coordinate their independent companies. The director-centred form was a reflection of the director-centred tradition of film production in China. Therefore it is natural that the first independent companies were established by the widely regarded mainstream filmmakers, especially directors. For example, Jiangxi Studio’s director Zhang
Gang founded Nanchang Film & TV Institution; Beijing Studio’s director Xiao
Lang launched Hainan Golden Island Film & TV Corp. This was quite similar to the experience of American independents. The Paramount Decree of 1948 forced
108 the studios to lose control of theatre chains and gradually dismantled the studio system of production and distribution. Studios increasingly financed and distributed pictures by independent production companies. Most independent producers had their origins in studios but were freed from long-term studio contracts.
Film production companies
The first independents were production companies; none belonged to the distribution or exhibition sectors. On the one hand, this was because of the restrictions on the access to distribution and the very high capital requirement of the exhibition business. On the other hand, it reflected the old saying in China that where there is oppression there is resistance. The reform had not changed the unfair profit share between production and distribution. The studios earned much less than distributors and became the most unprofitable sector in the film industry.
The situation pushed studios to seek change. In this sense, it was the majors (state studios) who promoted the formation of independents in China.
Flexible and efficient
One of the major advantages the independents had over the major state studios was their flexible and efficient management and operation practices. Overstaffing had caused the studios to operate like a big old truck, slow to move and having more hands than needed. By comparison, the independent private companies had a very small number of staff. Nanchang Film & TV Institution had just 11
109 employees; Hainan Golden Island had only 4 people at the beginning (Ni 1994,
102). However, due to their hard-work ethic, these small-scale companies operated quite efficiently. Nanchang Film & TV Institution shot 17 comedy series of Aman (amen xiju) in ten years. Hainan Golden Island produced four features in four years. The independent companies rented studios and equipment from the majors. This strategy significantly reduced fixed costs and maintenance fees.
Nominal affiliation with state studios
Although independent status on this stage was identified by the private resources of their funding, independent films had to be attached to state studios, which were still the dominant force in the Chinese film industry. Private film companies were not authorised to produce and distribute their films independently. Nominal affiliations to state studios were needed. Therefore, in order to enter the film industry, the independents had to purchase a quota from state studios for their filmmaking. For example, the logos of the series of the comedy A’man were from
Fujian, Xi’an, Ermei, Shanxi studios, etc. Normally, such contract items were overcharged to private companies. Studios would take RMB300 thousand from private investors for a quota and the copyright would belong to the studio. Then if the movie was profitable, the studios would take 40 per cent of the profit and the investor would get only 60 per cent (Yu and Zhang 2008).
The pursuit of popular films
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The most significant contribution independents made to Chinese cinema was in their entertainment productions.
As mentioned before, the conservative reform measures did not create the incentive for studios to produce market value films. Studios were not bothered about how much box office revenue their films received. Such a philosophy was advantageous in the production of propaganda films and art films where studios produced pedagogic films to reach the goals set by the ministry officials. It contributed to the emergence of the famous Fifth Generation – the pioneers of
China’s first cinematic art wave. As Jia Zhangke commented,
‘The Fifth Generation started their careers when our country was still
planning for economic reform…… Films like Chen Kaige's Yellow Earth
and Zhang Yimou's Red Sorghum were produced by state studios. The
whole country was behind them, from funding to sales’ (Shih 2006).
The Fifth Generation’s modern films broke away from the pedagogic tradition and did not cater to vulgar tastes. Their films won distinguished artistic achievements.
However, their radically experimental films were a long way from the general audience’s tastes and resulted in very poor market performance. For instance, One and Eight sold only thirty prints, Yellow Earth had also sold only thirty prints two years after its release, Horse Thief (daoma zei, dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1986) sold only two prints (Yuan in Zhu 2003, 65). In general, a feature film in the mid
1980s needed to sell at least sixty to eighty prints to cover its production costs.
However, studios which were separated from the market and had no financial 111 pressure did not care about their commercial performance. The studio system even encouraged the trend towards art film production. Most directors were proud of the pursuit of elite taste and were ashamed to discuss such issues as popular films and box office revenue.
In comparison with the experimental nature of the Fifth Generation, the independents actively pursued commercial sensitivity. Being independent and without state subsidies, they were under pressure to earn money. Therefore, independent production companies studied audience tastes and made efforts to produce entertaining films, most of which were comedies, to please audiences.
Many independent films, for example the comedy series of A’Man produced by the Nanchang Film & TV Institution, were warmly welcomed by the market. The
Nanchang Film & TV Institution was the first independent film production company in China. It was established by Zhang Gang (1935-2006). Since the mid
1980s Zhang Gang had written 33 screenplays and directed 31 films (China
Comedy Net 2009). None of his films failed. This remarkable achievement was praised as the ‘Zhang Gang Phenomenon’ in film circles. A’Man is a series of popular, realistic comedies. The character named A’man lives a grass-roots level life. He is a good man but with many shortcomings. The problems he struggles with were very common to ordinary people in their daily lives. A’man was played by different actors in different series and had different identities. However, in all series, A’man always happily deals with his problems. The A’man series is not only funny but explores social problems and was greatly welcomed by audiences, especially the residents of small cities, towns and country people. Even today,
A’man is still a very hot topic for internet discussions. The average number of
112 prints of A’man was over 120, with the highest number 340; 16mm prints distributed to the countryside reached more than 1000 (Ni 1994, 102). A’man is the longest and the most successful film series in China.
3. Good development of independents in the early 1990s
3.1 Background
The decline in state studios and the growth in the private sector
The situation in the film industry became even worse in the 1990s than it had been in the 1980s. Between 1991 and 1992, box office revenue decreased from
RMB2.36 billion to RMB1.99 billion (Ni 1994, 2); theatre attendance dropped from 14.4 billion to 10.5 billion; distribution and exhibition revenue dropped by
17.9 per cent and 15.7 per cent respectively (Ni 1994, 50). Almost all the important state studios were in debt and struggling with the shortage in production funds.
By comparison, the private sector was developing very well, especially after Deng
Xiaoping’s speech during his tour of southern China in 1992. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the criteria for judgement of a specific economic sector should be whether it was beneficial to develop the production forces of socialist society and to reinforce the national strength of the socialist country and increase the people’s living standards. Deng’s speech overcame the political difficulties raised by those arguments about the nature of the private sector and created a relaxed environment for academic research and the growth of the private sector. In
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October 1992, the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP announced that the objective of the Chinese economic system reform was to establish a socialist market economy. It proposed that various economic sectors develop side by side in the long term and that different economic sectors were to be permitted to operate under diverse forms of joint-operation. Development of the Chinese private sector accelerated after the problem of the private sector’s nature was overcome. According to Zheng and Yang (2009), private enterprise had grown continuously at an average rate of more than 30 per cent every year since 1992.
According to Qian and Wu (2000) (see table 1 and table 2), the percentage of private ownership composition in industrial output grew by more than three-fold, from 9.7 per cent in 1990 to 31.8 per cent in 1995; the percentage of private ownership composition in retail sales of consumer goods increased from 28.7 per cent in 1990 to 40.9 perc cent in 1995.
First two regulations encouraging private capital into the film industry
In order to absorb more private capital into film production and to strengthen administration, the government issued two regulations.
The first one was issued in 1993: ‘On Strengthening of the Management about
Film Studios Fund-raising from Outside (No 530)’. The aim of the document was to strengthen the management of private investment. The regulation put forward terms of coproduction with private capital and declared the qualification of private investors. According to this document, film studios were encouraged to raise funds from outside sources to ensure the provision of ongoing funds. 114
Simultaneously, the regulation assigned studios to have the authorised rights to manage private capital. It emphasised that the Film Bureau did not accept any films produced by unauthorised entities; that studios were responsible for the management of production and financial processes; and that copyright belonged to studios. Therefore, according to the document, private capital was placed at a secondary position in coproductions with studios.
The second regulation was ‘About the Reform on the Management of Feature
Film Production’ in 1995. The aim of the document was to attract private capital.
Two factors had limited the private investment in film production. The first factor was the limited number of studios – 16 – authorised to produce feature films. If private capital wanted to invest in film production, it had to cooperate with these
16 studios. This apparently limited the opportunities to absorb private capital. The second factor was the extremely low legal status of private capital. Private investors could not sign their names on the film. Their names could be shown only at the end and and only as ‘Supporters’. Even for some prize-winners at domestic and international film festivals, studios would take the awards and then later give replicas to the investors. This unfairness did not foster enthusiasm in private investors.
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The document ‘About the Reform on the Management of Feature Film
Production’ changed this situation. It increased the number of authorised studios and approved the signing rights of the private. It stated that:
• In addition to the 16 state studios, another 13 provincial and city-level
state studios were approved to produce feature films.
• For other registered corporations, if their investment accounted more than
70 per cent, they could co-sign with the studio as a ‘joint- producer’.
In the next year, the quota reduced to 30 per cent. After that, private investors began to have the right to sign.
These two regulations on the one hand guaranteed the superior position of state studios; on the other hand, it increased the opportunities for private capital to cooperate with state studios. As a result, large amounts of private capital moved into film production and became the major source of investment. The number of films registered under the studio names but which were invested in by private capital quickly increased. In 1993 there were 81 such co-productions, accounting for more than half of the total 154 annual film output (Ling 1996). In 1995 Beijing
Studio absorbed RMB200 million and, unprecedentedly, had more than 30 co- production films with private investors (Yang 2008). Other studios were in the same position.
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3.2 Increasingly professional independents
Independent production companies developed quite well in the first half of 1990s.
Many new independent companies were established during this period, which
Chen Peisi, an independent film producer, described as ‘an age of hundred boats contending’ (Zhu 2009). Moreover, independent production companies became more professional than they had been in the 1980s and became the embryo from which modern cultural enterprises developed.
As mentioned above, independents in the 1980s were interested in the production of entertaining films. This trend continued into the 1990s, which is demonstrated by the movie list in those years. Large numbers of martial arts, detective, gun fighting and thriller movies were produced. Most of them were low budget and low quality films. However, at the same time, some professional companies emerged. Among these independents, Main Road, Good Dream, Golden Horse and Vanke were the leading players. In contrast with the short term opportunistic behaviour of the lesser producers, they were seriously engaged in film production.
They pursued not only economic profit but brand value and prestige. These four companies started small-scale but were very skilful in market judgement and stressed the importance of film quality. Therefore, in a very short time, they generated a steady increase in profit.
Main Road was established by Chen Peisi in 1993. Chen Peisi first founded his
Comedy Film & TV Corp. in Hainan in1991 and then relocated it to Tianjin and
117 renamed it Main Road. Chen Peisi was a very famous comedy actor in the 1990s in China. His father Chen Qiang was also a famous actor. In the 1950s Chen
Qiang had the chance to go abroad, to Budapest, to perform. As a memorial to the event, he named his elder son ‘Buda’ and the little son ‘Peisi’. Chen Peisi emerged as his father’s performing partner and created the first dad and son comedy team in China. His performance in Eating Noodle at the Spring Festival
Gala Evening made him hot property in the eyes of millions of people. Main
Road, without financial support from a parent company or any other business, managed to achieve self-reliance. It started by using loans from rich enterprises for which Chen Peisi had played in advertisements. Main Road gradually paid off its debt and was able to self-invest by the time its third film came along. Film budgets had risen from RMB830 thousand for An Interim Father (linshi baba,
1993) to RMB1.2 million for Sub-Husband (bianwai zhangfu, 1993) to RMB1.5 million for Filial Son and Filial Piety (xiaozi xiansun cihou zhe, 1994) (Yu 1997,
77). The profit from its first three movies was as high as 30 per cent; its registered capital was 1 million. Four years later, its capital totalled RMB4 million (Yu
1997, 76). In 1995, in order to enhance the quality and status of comedy cinema,
Main Road invested RMB4 million in Her Majesty is Fine (taihou jixiang, 1995), although at that time a film with the budget of over RMB2 million faced financial risks. Before shooting, Main Road organised large-scale audience research feedback to decide on the film’s style, budget and how it could be marketed.
Good Dream was established by Wang Shuo and Feng Xiaogang in 1993 in
Beijing. Good Dream’s limited financial ability with registered capital of only
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RMB100 thousand did not enable them to self-invest. Therefore, it had to contract out to produce programmes for wealthy investors. The formation of Good Dream itself was quite influential in the industry and acted as a magnet in the market at that time. Wang Shuo, one of the founders, was a renowned pop fiction writer in the early 1990s. Many of his novels were adapted into TV dramas and films. The other founder was Feng Xiaogang, whose fame was already established through his TV dramas Stories in Editorial Department (1990) and Beijingers in NewYork
(1993), which achieved very high ratings (Keane 2008; Zhu, Keane and Bai
2009). Good Dream’s first film was Farewell My Love (yongshi wo’ai; dir. Feng
Xiaogang; 1994). The investor budgeted for RMB2.5 million, but Feng Xiaogang spent only RMB1.7 million and much of that money paid for excellent imported camera equipment. The fine imagery of that film was highly praised by critics.
The investor sold the copyright for RMB3 million (Interview Feng Xiaogang
2006). The good returns for, and the prestige of, Feng’s films attracted many more contracts. Between 1993 and 1997, Sweet Dream produced Farewell My Love,
Papa (1995), and four TV dramas, including the critically acclaimed Chicken
Feathers (1995). These works caused wide debate among scholars at that time.
Golden Horse was established in 1993 by Teng Zhan, a former distribution leader in the Shenzhen Film Studio. With the experience of film distribution, Teng Zhan noticed that Hong Kong entertainment films were quite popular and profitable.
Golden Horse was the first private company in China to concentrate on co- productions with Hong Kong. Most of its films were exciting Kung-fu stories with a strong Hong Kong style. Golden Horse’s film projects invited many famous
Hong Kong directors and stars, such as Dicky Cheung Wai Kin, Donnie Yen, and
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Tung-Sheng Erh. Its first film was Bloody Brothers (yuba tianxia) in 1994. It was a Kung-fu movie, and was very successful. The company earned more than
RMB1 million (sina 2008). By 1995, Golden Horse had produced 12 films, including Iron Monkey (tiexue zhuangshi), Criminal (xinzhen fengyun), Cross
River (guojiang long) Shaolin Good Boys (shaolin hao xiaozi), Joint Attack
(lianhe chuji), Lovers’ Tears (zhi’ai qingyuan) and The Big Trail (da zhuizong).
Amazingly, all these movies were big hits. (He 2008).
Vanke Cultural Communication was established in Shenzhen in 1992. Vanke grew from being a big company’s film and TV department to becoming China’s leading film production company. Vanke used to be a film and TV department that produced documentaries and advertisings for the parent company Vanke Joint
Stock Co. Ltd. In 1990 it began film production. Vanke was the first independent to practice the producer system and star system. Early, back to 1991, they invited as many as twelve stars to work on the film The Spring Festival (guonian; dir.
Huang Jianzhong, 1991). The exploitation of art film and international film festivals gave Vanke an advantage. Vanke preferred scripts with realistic, modern life themes full of humanistic and artistic colour at a time when revolutionary legends and heroes were popular subjects. Vanke actively pursued international film festivals and the prizes it won greatly improved its reputation. Vanke’s representative works include Divorce Contract (lihun hetong; dir. Song Jiangbo,
1990), The Spring Festival and For Fun (zhaole; dir. Ning Ying, 1992). Its profit in 1993 was RMB5 million and by the mid 1990s, its capital totalled RMB19 million (Zhang 1997, 82). In 1994, it launched a project with a budget of RMB13
120 million. This was the first big budget domestic film in the history of Chinese cinema.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined how political management determined the emergence and initial development of within-system Chinese independent cinema between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s. It pointed out that the outgrowth of Chinese independent cinema resulted from the economic reforms of the 1980s. Economic reform led to the rise of the private sector and the decline of the centralised studio system; the emergence of independent cinema was the result of these two joint forces. The Chinese private sector started to develop after the Open Reform
Policy and accelerated after Deng Xiaoping’s remarks during his Southern Tour in
1992. The increasingly strong private sector provided the sustainable financial ability for film production. However, the reform did not stimulate the development of state studios. Studios encountered severe shortages in production funds and had to seek financial help from the private sector. Thus, changes in the monopolisation of the film industry occurred and an alternative production mode began to emerge. Chinese independent cinema emerged after the mid 1980s.
Some filmmakers founded their private film production companies and cooperated with state studios to produce films.
From the beginning, within-system Chinese independent cinema was caught in a two-way squeeze. On the one hand, it relied on the operation of state studios and
121 official film institutions; on the other hand, it had to operate independently and so did not enjoy any advantages in the process of production or in the distribution and exhibition of its products. In such an awkward situation, independent film production companies operated in a flexible and efficient way. More significantly, by comparison with state studios that paid attention to art or propaganda rather than entertainment, independent companies pursued entertaining popular films that were attractive to film audiences and inoffensive to film authorities. Unlike state-sponsored films, independent films had diversity in their subject matter, like comedy, romance, kung-fu and urban melodrama.
The trend in entertainment answers the question raised in the previous chapter:
‘Why did Xie Jin succeed at a state studio but fail at a private company?’.
Spending more than 40 years in state studios, Xie Jin already deeply relied on the centralised studio system. His film tasks were allocated by studios and he did not need to worry about finance, screenplays or distribution. The welfare nature of the
Chinese film industry at that time guaranteed his films’ audience. However, when he established his own independent company, he could not fit in with the needs of the new environment. He still insisted on the artistic experiment (Old Man and
His Dog and Valley of Girls) and ignored commercial elements in film production. Therefore, unsurprisingly, Xie Jin’s company did not develop well in the new age.
During this period, due to relatively loose condition, Chinese independent cinema developed well and some companies became the embryonic form of modern and
122 professional film enterprises. However, all of a sudden, almost all independent companies came crashing down to earth in 1996, Feng Xiaogang’s Good Dream even going bankrupt. The next chapter will explore how political factors were responsible for this sudden decline.
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Chapter 6 Brave but vulnerable: the downfall of independents in 1996
Introduction
In the spring of 1996, Feng Xiaogang shot the film Living a Miserable Life (guo zhe langbei bukan de shenghuo). The film tells a story of the devastating consequences of an extramarital affair. Liang Yazhou has been married to his high school sweetheart, Song Xiaoying, for more than ten years, but their marriage enters a state of crisis when Liang falls in love with his personal assistant, Li
Xiaodan, a young, attractive and energetic woman. This love triangle brings everything but happiness and harmony to the three, especially after the wife discovers her husband’s infidelity. After much fighting, crying, regret, and, finally, confession, the husband leaves his mistress and returns to the family.
Unfortunately for the film, Beijing Film Studio, the co-producer of the project, received an official letter from the Film Censorship Board of the Chinese Film
Bureau. According to the letter, the film would not be approved and had to be aborted. The film had already been in production for half a month and over RMB1 million had been spent. Good Dream suffered a total financial loss and went bankrupt.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, private film production companies developed as well as could be expected before the mid 1990s. However, many independent companies encountered financial difficulties and gave up film
124 production in 1996. The fledgling companies Main Road, Good Dream, Golden
Horse and Vanke did not escape the crisis by sheer luck.
The distribution reform was initiated in 1993 and its goal was to dismantle the monopolised distribution status of China Film Corporation and to encourage the film industry to develop according to market demands. The result of the reform, however, was the rise of new monopolisation and disorder in the distribution sector. Although they spent lots of energy and money on distribution, independent production companies found that the receipts of their films were quite meagre.
The poor return forced Main Road to give up film production.
The notion of spiritual pollution became a focus for the Party’s agenda after Jiang
Zemin was elected as President in 1993. Authorities responded by taking a swipe at mass media, to gag press on some controversial topics in 1996. In the Changsha
Meeting, ideological rectitude was reasserted as the basis for the further development of domestic films. Although Feng Xiaogang’s films in this period were not obviously offensive to the censors, they more or less focused on dark subjects such as social problems and so were far from the standards of main melody films.
In order to attract audiences back to movie theatres and thus function as a driving force in the rejuvenation of a weak film market, which had experienced a continuous decline in attendance and box-office revenue since the 1980s, in 1994,
125 the Chinese Film Import and Export Corporation signed a contract with major
Hollywood studios to import ten Hollywood films each year. In 1995, ten
Hollywood blockbusters entered Chinese movie theatres. As a result, box office revenue in 1995 witnessed an increase of 15 percent over revenues in 1994
(Zhang 2008, 64). However, the side effect of Hollywood imports was that most domestic films with meagre production budgets became increasingly unappealing to audiences, who preferred the high production quality of Hollywood blockbusters. Therefore, facing a shrinking market, many independent film production companies retreated to the relatively profitable area of TV productions.
Golden Horse was one such company.
Stimulated by the impressive box office revenue of the Hollywood films, some domestic film directors tried to emulate the big picture productions and stir up a big picture wave in 1995. Most of the big budget films were produced by independent film production companies. However, an apparent opportunistic behaviour and the lack of experience led to the companies making losses, and so this fever quickly waned. Vanke’s King of Lanling (lanling wang; dir. Hu Xuehua,
1995) was among these big pictures.
This chapter examines the factors which determined the downfall of independent cinema in 1996 through the four cases of Main Road, Good Dream, Golden Horse and Vanke. The chapter will, more specifically, examine the factors of distribution reform, ideological pressure, Hollywood imports and the big picture wave, all of which were conducive to the defeat of independents in 1996.
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1. Disorder after distribution reform
Understanding distribution reform is the key of understanding the wane of Main
Road. Main Road’s turning point was the distribution of Her Majesty is Fine, its biggest investment project. Main Road spent a lot of money and time on distribution. However, after one year’s hard work, the return was only able to cover the film budget. The meagre profit in film market forced Main Road to shift into TV drama production at the end of 1996. The difficult distribution situation was the result of the distribution reform of 1993. To understand the reform, it is necessary to know the network of distribution and exhibition before 1993.
1.1 Distribution and exhibition before 1993
The network of distribution and exhibition in China before 1993 was huge and multilayered. 80,000 people were involved in distribution and 400,000 people were involved in exhibition (Zheng 1993, 5). In this huge network there were four wholesalers operating at different stages (see figure 2). CFC was the first wholesaler. It was the central monopolist to which studios had to sell their films.
CFC delivered prints to distributions at provinces, the second wholesalers.
Provincial distributors offered prints to cities, the third wholesalers. City distriibuters took prints to towns, the fourth wholesalers. Then finally, the prints went to theatres for exhibition. After the exhibition round, theatres would keep 50 per cent of the box office revenue for themselves and pay the remaining 50 per cent, which was the distribution revenue, to the upper level distributors. The upper distributors kept 50 per cent of that money and paid the remainder to the next
127 level. After having money deducted for four times, what was left was delivered to
CFC.
None of the players in this multilayered distribution and exhibition network could make a profit. Distributors were unsatisfied because the amount of money left for them was quite small. Studios were not satisfied because in this network the number of prints they sold remained small, which resulted in low revenue. CFC would pay RMB1 million for a fixed number of prints as the advance money on distribution rights to studios. Province distributors would pay the surplus money to CFC if they demanded more prints than CFC ordered. At that time, the price was RMB10.5 thousand per print. Therefore, local distributors would limit the number of prints they demanded as much as possible. Therefore, the number of prints distributed nationwide was only about 100 and the film market would not be opened up. This distribution system became the target of the reforms of the
Socialist Market Economy.
1.2 Distribution reform in 1993
In October 1992, the Fourteenth Party Congress declared that the objective of economic reform was shifting and the planned economy would be dismantled and a well-functioning market economy would be created. The market economy stimulated significant reorganisation of policies of reform and the intensification of social change. In the full force of construction of the Socialist Market
Economy, the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) issued Document
3 which was aimed at distribution reform.
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On the New Year day of 1993, MRFT issued ‘Document 3: Suggestions on the
Deepening of Chinese Film Industries Institutional Reform’. The main points of the document were:
• Dismantle the monopoly of CFC. Studios encouraged to directly negotiate
with provincial distributors.
• Relax the price of film tickets.
In 1994, ‘Document 345: Further Deepening of Chinese Film Industries
Institutional Reform’ was issued. Studios could then directly distribute their films to distributors at all levels in 21 wealthy provinces and cities.
Document 3 and the ones that followed were the most critical reform measures since reforms had started in the industry in the 1980s because they touched on the core problem of the film industry: the distribution system. The aim of dismantling of the CFC’s monopoly was to stimulate competition between studios and distributors. Document 3 directly caused a range of dynamic reforms in the film industry. However, unexpected chaos quickly appeared.
1.3 Disorder after the reform
Document 3 dismantled a 40-year monopoly by the CFC. The effect was groundbreaking, but soon after the old balance was broken a new balance between
129 players in the industry could not be reached. Complaints were heard from the production sector. In the old system, studios used to receive RMB1 million per film from the CFC and could continue normal production, and they did not need to worry about distribution and marketing. In the new system, however, they did not receive the RMB1 million and had to pay attention to distribution and promotion. They found that the number of distributors they faced increased from one to dozens of distributors all over the nation. These were the new monopolists in provinces and cities (see figure 3). Furthermore, a multilayered distribution net still existed; provincial distributors monopolized other distributors. Studios were confused and lost in this new environment.
After one year of reform, the film industry was in crisis. Distribution revenue in
1993 had reduced to the half of that of 1992 (Ni 1994, 56). The situation became even more severe in 1995 when China started to annually import ten international blockbusters. The CFC, which was the most powerful distributor in China with the most excellent theatre chains, was responsible for the distribution of imports.
It became a new monopolist, but this time for Hollywood. A producer recalled his experience in those days. He took his film to the CFC. A receptionist told him,
‘your film budgeted only RMB3 million. It will not get money in box office. Our
CFC is a luxurious restaurant, offering shark’s fin, lobster and abalone. Your film is a steam bun. Our restaurant is not selling buns. You know that’ (Yi 2005)?
Other distributors at lower levels were much more interested in big imported pictures than small budget domestic cinema. Facing fierce competition with
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Hollywood imports, many domestic films could not get exhibition time in theatres.
1.4 The unhealthy market situation
This unhealthy market situation made domestic cinema even gloomier. In 1996
Main Road’s Her Majesty is Fine was distributed. Chen Peisi visited tens of distributors, one by one, trying to please them with fine food and wine and find the best deal for the film. Her Majesty is Fine made it to the top 4 of the 10 domestic films in 1996. However, it was the least profitable film which Main
Road produced. According to Chen, the market environment was very unhealthy then; large amounts of box office revenue were blocked by local theatres (Yu,
1997, 77). After this miserable experience, Chen determined that he would not make such a big effort as far as film distribution was concerned from then on. At the end of 1996, Main Road started a TV drama series.
As noted in Chapter 4, in the case of Xie Jin, although the film The Opium War was the top domestic movie in 1997, Xiejin-hengtong Company still lost much money and was left in heavy debt. The failure was also due to the deceitful theater operations. The film’s budget came in at more than RMB100 million, the most expensive film in China at that time. It was a high quality project and state authorities strongly recommended the film for the celebrations for Hong Kong’s return to China. This caused a great upsurge in its audience. However, significant box office receipts were blocked by local theatres. The revenue was amounted to
131 only RMB80 million and Xie Jin received only tens of thousands yuan (Wen
2009). Xie Jin’s company never recovered from this setback.
2. Strict censorship
Strict censorship in 1996 led to the bankruptcy of Good Dream. Good Dream lost
RMB6 million in 1995 due to the failure of the film I am your father (woshi ni baba) and the TV drama series Dark Side of the Moon (yueliang beimian) to get approval from the authorities (Yu 2007; Keane and Tao 1999). Productions being banned had a deadly impact on a small independent like Good Dream. In 1996,
Good Dream started the film Living a Miserable Life in a do or die effort at survival. However, two weeks after shooting began, the film was banned. At the end of 1996, Sweet Dream announced that it was bankrupt. The tragedy of Good
Dream was not an isolated case in the political climate in 1996.
Entertaining films have surged since the economic reforms of the 1980s. To solve the problem of a shrinking market, many studios and production companies managed to produce popular films to attract audiences. The launch of the Socialist
Market Economy reform in 1993 further stimulated capital investment into popular films. The ensuing boom significantly charged the dominant position of main melody films. The function of cinema as a pedagogical tool controlled by the Party in order to propagate official ideology and a positive Party image was reaffirmed. This ideological control reached a peak in 1996 when authorities made efforts in two directions: to strengthen high-handed policy and to sponsor main melody films. 132
2.1 High-handed policy
Authorities took a swipe at the mass media in order to muzzle public opinion on some controversial topics in 1996. A series of twenty prohibitions were issued.
These prohibitions strictly controlled the press on topics such as China’s economy, leadership, ideology, radical conflicts, and American election year reporting. Some of the prohibitions were (Zhong in Calkins 1998, 319-320):
• Discussion and follow-up reports on hot topics among the people
concerning the economy and society are not permitted;
• Discussion and debates on the systematic reform of the domestic economy,
especially on the reform of the state-owned sector, are forbidden;
• The study of traditional Chinese culture and philosophy must be closely
watched. Any intention of substituting Marxism, Leninism, and Mao
Zedong Thought with Confucianism must be severely prohibited;
• All newspapers and broadcasting stations located in Beijing and most
provincial centres are forbidden to relay reports of racial confrontations
in the border areas in order to avoid negative impacts on readers;
• The international hot topics about this ‘election year’ should not be
followed. When reporting on this topic, emphasis should be placed on the
scandals that have occurred during the electoral process so that the
readers can fully understand the hypocritical side of Western democracy;
• All party papers are not allowed to publish contributions from freelance
writers without first being reviewed by the censors or without permission
from the Party Committee in charge.
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While most of these prohibitions targeted the press, a couple of them referred specially to film. Prohibition Number Three stated,
All articles and books about the Cultural Revolution are not to be
published; films about the Cultural Revolution are also forbidden.
Other relevant prohibitions forbade themes of individualism. Prohibition Number
Four stated,
Any portrayal of individualism is not permitted in literary works, including
TV films, short stories, and novels. Reversals of conclusions and verdicts
on political events and personages in history already made by the party
are strictly forbidden.
The political climate soon affected film censorship. China’s first set of State regulations on film management ‘the Film Administration Regulations’ took effect on July1, 1996. On July 11, the Film Censorship Committee Board and
Film Re-censorship Committee Board were founded. Heavier scrutiny of scripts in order to make a spiritual cleanup began soon after. The Film Bureau reaffirmed the regulation approved in 1989 about script censorship and submission before shooting. The regulation required that all feature film scripts be censored and approved by the appropriate local government, and that studios submit completed scripts and any censorship suggestions to the Film Bureau before shooting began.
The restatement emphatically pointed out the significance of censorship and the
134 approval of scripts. As a result, production quotas that had been transferred to studios was again strictly controlled by the central government.
2.2 State sponsorship of main melody films
President Jiang delivered a manifesto entitled the ‘Construction of Spiritual
Civilisation’ at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress in 1996. This was the start of a campaign to widely promote main melody in the cultural industries. The manifesto stated the significance of thinking, of mental and cultural construction, with the emphasis being that cultural departments must provide excellent art work to encourage people, and that all mass communication should carry the correct propaganda line and positively educate and guide ordinary people.
In the film industry, ‘9550 project’ was set up to sponsor productions of main melody films. In March 1996, the MRFT held a national film workers’ conference in Changsha. The Changsha Meeting demanded that the industry annually produce ten excellent domestic pictures in the Ninth Five-Year-Plan. When it came to the question of which films should be considered ‘excellent’, film officials promoted ideological rectitude as the foremost criterion. Ding Guangen, head of the Ministry of Propaganda stressed in his talk that ‘films should have the function of making audiences love the Party and their socialist country, rather than arousing their concern and dissatisfaction; films should advocate justice prevailing over evil rather than pessimistic sentiments, and should bring happiness and beauty to the audiences, rather than wasting their time on absurdity and 135 fabricated plots’ (Zhang 2008, 66). From the MRFT’s list of ‘important’ films of
1996, four subjects appear to have been particularly supported by the MRFT: history, children, peasants, and the army.
To guarantee the promotion of propaganda films in the film market, the Changsha
Meeting issued rules on the protection of domestic production. It mandated that two-thirds of the films distributed and exhibited be domestic productions and that two-thirds of screening time be reserved for domestic pictures. A series of detailed orders about organising staff to view propaganda films were also issued.
This conservative guidance of Chinese cinema, stressing the pedagogical and moralising functions of cinema neglected cinema’s other roles as a form of entertainment, as social criticism, as personal/ artistic expression and so on. The promotion of propaganda films and ideological pressure affected the essential direction of the film industry. Studios produced many mainstream propaganda films through biographies of various socialist heroes and model Communist members such as Kong Fancen and Leifeng. The propaganda films were able to claim their box-office success through the government-organised and government-sponsored public viewing. Therefore, six propaganda films were in the top ten box-office revenue list in 1997. Meanwhile, many privately invested films were banned or withdrew. Jia Zhangke graduated from the Beijing Film
Academy in that year. As a criticised director, Jia was not welcom in the conservative environment. For this reason, Jia did not try to cooperate with state studios but directly created his own underground film.
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In 1996, Beijing Studio’s nine privately invested films were cancelled. Among them was Good Dream’s Living a Miserable Life. The conclusion of censorship was: ‘The script takes delight in depicting flirting with, chasing, and raping women and exphasises sex and inappropriate feelings. Exposing sin without criticising it is against well-accepted moral and ethical values and will be misleading to a mass audience’6.
3. Hollywood imports
International blockbusters were imported into China in 1995. In the early 1990s,
Chinese cinema had continued to lose audiences. Theatre attendances had dropped from 29.3 billion in 1979 to 0.3 billion in 1994 (Wang 2008). Many theatres, under terrible stress, became furniture shops, electronic game rooms or billiard halls. China used to import some cheap out-of-date international films through the method of copyright purchase. But, in order to attract audiences back to theatres and recover Chinese cinema, the MRFT issued ‘Document 348: About Further
Deepening the Reform of the Film Institution’ in 1994. According to the rule, from the year 1995 on, China would annually import ten international films which would reflect up-to-date global cultural achievement and represent excellence of cinematic art and technique. The first imported film from Hollywood was The
Fugitive at the end of 1994. In 1995, True Lies, Lion King, Forrest Gump, Bad
Boys, Die Hard, Outbreak, A Walk in the Clouds and The Mask were imported.
6 Source from I devote my youth to You by Feng Xiaogang (2003, 87-88).
137
The big budget imports significantly shook the Chinese film industry. Almost all the imported Hollywoods enjoyed big hits in the film market in China and audiences were attracted back to the cinema by the high-tech, high-budget and star-studded movies. In some big cities people even queued in long lines. The imports generated huge box-office revenue, totalling an average of 70-80 percent of all box-office returns in 1995 (Zhu 2003, 86). However, after viewing gorgeous scenes in big pictures, audiences did not like the rustic and crude low budget films any more.
Hollywood imports squeezed the domestic film market into an even smaller room.
In this environment, many private independent production companies did not run the risk of making films. Golden Horse gave up film production and retreated to
TV and did not return until 2004, when the film industry changed again.
4. A wave of experimental big pictures
Vanke’s sinking resulted from the failure of a big budget film King of Lanling
(1995). In 1995, Vanke invested RMB13 million in the production King of
Lanling. It was the first big budget domestic film in the history of Chinese cinema. However, the film was a severe failure, with the sale of only 5 prints. To answer the questions of why Vanke made such a big investment in 1995 and why it failed, we need to understand the craze of big pictures in 1995 and its experimental features.
138
The craze of domestic big pictures was stimulated by the imported blockbusters.
Along with Hollywood blockbusters, some Hong Kong pictures – Rumble in the
Bronx, Thunderbolt, Drunken Master 2 – were also imported. These were Jackie
Chan action movies. Among them, Rumble in the Bronx premiered in Chinese language areas during the 1995 Spring Festival and grossed RMB110 million in box office takings in mainland China (Ma 2008). This was a strong stimulus for filmmakers who had never thought China had such a big market for a Chinese cinema! The huge success of imported blockbusters greatly stimulated the big picture consciousness of Chinese filmmakers. For the first time, they realised the significance of high investment in making quality films. In 1995, five films set investment records in the history of Chinese cinema. They were: Blush (hongfen; dir. Li Shaohong, 1995), In the Heat of the Sun (yangguang canlan de rizi; dir.
Jiang Wen, 1995), King of Lanling, Red Cherry (hong yingtao; dir. Ye Daying,
1995) and Shanghai Triad. These films generated the first wave of domestic big budget cinema in China.
Independent production companies were responsible for this big-budget film craze. All the big budget films in 1995, except Shanghai Triad, which was overseas invested, were produced or distributed by domestic independent private companies. Ocean Film distributed Blush and In the Heat of the Sun; Vanke invested in King of Lanling; Beijing Cultural Services Consulting Company invested in Red Cherry. After 1995, there were only two big pictures, in 1996 and
1997. They were produced through independent investment. Ocean Film invested in The Emperor’s Shadow (qin song, 1996); Xiejin-hengtong Film invested in The
139
Opium War. Independents demonstrated their courage in competing with
Hollywood blockbusters by investing in domestic big budget films.
The most significant contribution of independents was to practice new distribution methods for domestic films. As mentioned earlier, the distribution network was in disorder and terribly inefficient after the distribution reforms in
1993. By comparison with timid studios, independents undertook the mission of big pictures distribution with great ability and courage. They practiced the split- revenue method (Blush); their marketing strategies were diversified and some fresh forms, such as interaction between stars and audience, appeared (Blush, In the Heat of the Sun); the embryo of modern distribution strategies, such as wide release and platform release, were tried (Blush, In the Heat of the Sun, Red
Cherry). The box office revenues of Blush (RMB30 million) (Qing 2005), In the
Heat of the Sun (RMB50 million) (Ren 2008) and Red Cherry (RMB40 million)
(Zhang 2005) meant that they were listed among the top ten films, alongside the imports, in 1995, which greatly reactivated the formerly quiet film market.
Therefore, the year 1995 is honored as ‘the year of cinema’.
However, investors did not earn much money from the successful distribution of the big pictures. The meager profits exposed the experimental nature of this first big budget film craze.
4.1 The experimental features
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Risks of investment in art films
Almost all the big pictures were art films rather than commercial genres. Art film creation has been granted as a dream and an honour for Chinese filmmakers at all times. The arrival of the Fifth Generation exploration film brought cinematic modernisation to the Chinese cinema. The high praise and honours their films received from important international film festivals greatly drove the enthusiasm of creating art films. Thus, in the mid 1980s, there emerged an art film wave. This wave reached a climax in 1992-1993 when three Chinese films The Story of Qiu
Ju, Woman Sesame Oil Maker (xianghun nv; dir. Xie Fei), Farewell My
Concubine won the highest prizes at three of the most significant European film festivals Venice, Berlin and Cannes, respectively. The lofty success of art film led to unfair discrimination against popular commercial film productions and this led to them not being taken seriously and to be seen as an essential weakness in the
Chinese film market. Although economic reform had continued for almost 20 years, popular film production was still constrained by low budget and low quality, which already severely lagged behind the profitable ability of Chinese cinema.
Chinese filmmakers took the same action – creating art films for their first big budget projects, although their ‘big picture consciousness’ was attributed to
Hollywood’s high-cost commercial films. Blush was a women-oriented movie focusing on relationship-based issues. Red Cherry, a film with 70 per cent Russian dialogue, was about the Chinese resolutioners’ offspring’s Russian life. In the
Heat of the Sun was a nostalgic theme. Making a great investment in art films that
141 normally had a limited audience was bound to be risky. It was coincidental, or lucky, that these non mainstream films received good revenue in the market. For instance, three years later the director of Red Cherry created a similar romantic revolutionary film, A Time to Remember (hongse lianren), and took a severe loss.
If we could say that fresh marketing and promotion strategies saved the big budget art films, then the same cannot be said for the film King of Lanling. The film was a mythic oriental legend about a female tribe leader atoning for her son’s crime. It was an even more extreme ‘art’ film, even from the perspective of the present. People spoke an imaginary ‘ethnic minority’ language. Meaning was expressed by dance and gesture. According to Vanke, rejecting real language catered to the Western viewing practice of watching a film without subtitles. It was a fact that art films were more likely to win a prize at film festivals than were commercial ones. However, the scheme of accepting overseas markets by rejecting domestic markets for a big budget film was absolutely wrong. King of
Lanling sold only 5 prints in China and did not receive awards at important film festivals. After this big defeat, Vanke went into TV dramas to retrieve the loss.
A lack of producer supervision
The necessary supervision of producers was lacking. Thinking of art film more highly than commercial film led to the prevailing use of the director system and the lack of a producer system in film production processes. The lack of producers’ supervision led to severe overspending. This was more likely to happen in an
142 inexperienced director’s debut. In the Heat of the Sun was a perfect example of what can happen without a certain degree of producer supervision. The film used
250 thousand feet of film (noted: The epic Farewell My Concubine used 120 thousand feet of film); the wasting film rate was 15:1 (noted: normally it was 3:1); in order to get a satisfying photo for hanging on the wall, it took 23,040 pieces of photos; in order to shoot a three-minute’s farewell scene, it rented 20 tanks, more than 10 planes, and thousands of people (Ren 2008). Wang Shou, who was a guest performer, had an expressive description about his experience. In the film he was thrown in the air and then carried by hundreds of people. The throwing was repeated and repeated during a whole night. At last, hundreds of people were so tired that no one stretched arms to carry him. The film’s original budget was
RMB8 million but finally it cost more than RMB20 million. Therefore, although the film’s box office revenue was over RMB50 million, it was still in debt. In
Jiang Wen’s opinion, high quality only came from numerous shootings.
Undoubtedly, In the Heat of the Sun was a great movie; however, the need to balance art pursuit and budget control was the issue raised by this film.
Opportunism
An opportunistic nature was another weak point of independents. It was common sense that wealthy businessmen would be responsible for the funding of many independent films. They were not film experts and just wanted to reap staggering profits, therefore they were not in a position to make a correct judgement about film projects, or, in other words, they would easily blindly follow stars. The boss of Ocean Film first earned some money from a coincidental help of a director
143 friend. He then established Ocean Film to invest in films. The successful distribution of Blush and In the Heat of the Sun made the company increasingly ambitious. It then invested RMB40 million in The Emperor’s Shadow in 1996
(Luo 2008). It recruited almost the same stars in In the Heat of the Sun and hoped for another wonder to happen. However, it inflicted heavy losses on the entire budget. The intensive marketing and promotion activities could not save it and it suffered a crushing failure. Ocean Film quickly disappeared from film investment.
This failure, along with the failure of The Opium War in 1997, dampened the enthusiasm of independents for big pictures and the craze waned.
Conclusion
Through a study of Main Road, Good Dream, Golden Horse and Vanke, this chapter has examined the factors of distribution reform, censorship, Hollywood imports and the big picture craze, which determined the downfall of independent cinema in 1996. Although the distribution reform dismantled the monopoly of the
CFC, the new network blocked the smooth distribution channel of domestic cinema and led to a period of disorder and meagre profit. The Changsha Meeting reasserted ideological rectitude as the basis for the further development of domestic films. Authorities strictly controlled censorship and highly promoted main melody films. Hollywood imports played a significant role in the change in audience’s taste and subsequently dominated the film market. Last but not least, inexperienced investment in big pictures caused the demise of some wealthy independents.
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Private independents were destined to be sacrificed. The political status of independent cinema still had not been secured. Although private capital and independent cinema had become the major force in the film market by the mid
1990s, independent filmmaking was not legitimated by the authorities. Private film companies had no right to produce a film independently. The autonomy they enjoyed was still extremely limited. Due to their ‘private’ nature, their film productions were under close surveillance through film censorship. Such conflicts became more acute when private capital increasingly sought nothing but profit and their entertainment film productions apparently threatened the pedagogic and political education function of main melody films. Therefore, soon after the reinforcement of a conservative film policy was advocated, independent cinema became the target of rectifying the film culture and style. In addition, film officials continued to show their strong support for main melody films by requesting distribution companies give these films priority in distribution and exhibition; no similar attention was paid to the development of private film companies which operated independently, and developed at the initial stage of reform and lacked experience. Therefore, they suffered most in an immature market. This is also the answer to the question raised in chapter 4 ‘Why did Zhang
Yimou and Chen Kaige seek foreign investment rather than domestic capital before the late 1990s?’ Zhang and Chen were already well-established film masters at that time and the domestic environment was not reliable for them.
Therefore, they preferred to rely on foreign capital and international markets rather than the domestic one.
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To sum up, the fate of private independents, in this shaky and unstable macro environment, was not under their control. They were brave, but vulnerable.
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Chapter 7 Commercialisation of Chinese independent cinema (late 1990s)
Introduction
After the 1996 collapse of Good Dream, as he writes in his autobiography, Feng
Xiaogang was labelled ‘poisonous’ by the film world, and no one dared to invest in his works (Feng 2003). The downfall of Good Dream proved to be a turning point in Feng’s career. Learning a lesson from his aborted and banned projects, he designed a brand new genre, the New Year Celebration Film, which was intended to appeal to general audiences and not overtly challenge the status quo. The
Beijing Film Studio and another state film company Beijing Forbidden City made a plan of New Year Cinema for Feng Xiaogang. Feng’s New Year trilogy between
1997 and 1999 easily passed the censors and achieved huge success at the box office. However, due to a leader reorganisation in the state studios, they stopped the investment in Feng’s next film project. At that moment, a private advertising company, Huayi Brothers, signed a long term contract with Feng Xiaogang. From that point, Feng Xiaogang’s career developed very smoothly. Not only has Feng’s genre of light-hearted romantic comedy been successful, but Huayi Brothers’ mode of operation has become a lucrative business model and a way of making quick money.
The second half of the 1990s was a conservative period for the Chinese film industry. State studios received enormous subsidies from the government and
147 concentrated on propaganda films production. The enthusiasm of private investment in film production declined greatly. The total film features dropped to the lowest point between 1997 and 2001.
However, Chinese independent cinema made a groundbreaking achievement during this depression. In the second half of the 1990s, the Chinese private sector kept up its high speed development. By September 1997, the Fifteenth National
Congress of the CCP explicitly confirmed that the private sector was an important constituent of the Chinese socialist market economy. This statement signified a breakthrough in ownership theory and recognition of the non-public economy; the private sector was now no longer only a supplement to the main economy, but an important constituent. According to table 1 and table 2, between 1995 and 1998, private ownership composition in industrial output increased from 31.8 per cent to
36.8 percent; private ownership composition in retail sales of consumer goods increased from 40.9 per cent to 62.7 per cent. In addition, the lowest point of the
Chinese film industry, in the late 1990s, provided the best time for entry in terms of capital requirement. In this context, first cultural entrepreneurs with strong capital ability came on the stage then entrepreneurs opened up a new page on materialism and commercialisation in Chinese cinema.
Three specific factors gave independents considerably more salience during this period. First, cultural entrepreneurs came on the stage and significantly energised a halting situation. They collaborated with top Chinese film directors to produce mainstream commercial films and significantly increased film revenue sources.
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Second, an American independent producer developed a new genre of low budget urban youth cinema which had never been seen before in China. Third, professional independent distribution companies emerged and broke the monopoly of state distributors.
This chapter analyses how political management affected the development of the film industry and how independent cinema provided the engine for it in terms of both film production and distribution areas. The chapter begins with an examination of the significant subsidies in the production of propaganda films and the damage it caused to the film industry, and then it analyses the essential role independents played in commercialising film production and in improving domestic film distribution.
1. Stunning support for propaganda films
During the second half of the 1990s, the attention of state studios shifted to the production of propaganda films. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the 9550 Project, which was to produce 10 high excellent films each year during the Ninth Five-
Year-Plan between 1996 and 2000, was launched after the Changsha Meeting in
1996. Undoubtedly, state studios were in charge of propaganda films production.
Government correspondingly issued a series of regulations aimed at providing subsidies for this project.
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Subsidies came directly from two funds. The first one was National Film
Undertaking Development Special Fund (Treasury Department and MRFT (1996)
No. 803). The Special Fund was put into effect at the beginning of 1997 and required 5 per cent of all box office revenue from cinemas to be set aside in the
Special Fund. The fund was mostly allocated for ‘excellent’ propaganda feature film production. The second subsidy, more importantly, came from Film and TV
Mutual Support Fund (Treasury Department (2000) No. 23). The Fund was founded in 1996 specificly for the 9550 project. According to the regulation, 3 per cent of the annual advertisement revenue of China Central Television was set aside, with the amount no lower than RMB30 million, and 3 per cent of the annual advertisement revenue of provincial television stations was also drawn out.
The financial support given during the term of 9550 was massive. Film and TV
Mutual Support Fund provided RMB440 million, and National Film Undertaking
Development Special Fund provided RMB130 million (Zhang and Ding 2002). In these 5 years, the Film Bureau directly funded over 150 films, which took up one third of the total film output (Zhang and Ding 2002). CCTV Movie Channel was founded in 1996 and became another strong supporter of film. During the term of the 9550 project, the Movie Channel received RMB1,200 million from advertising and returned RMB500 million to domestic film production (Zhang and Ding
2002).
The government subsidies increased even more after 2000. For instance, in 2002, the central Film and TV Mutual Support Fund provided RMB76.452 million, the
150 regional Film and TV Mutual Support Fund in 21 provinces and cities provided
RMB39.555 million, the Movie Channel provided RMB150 million; 71 among
100 feature films in that year were funded by the government (Yin 2007 ).
Due to the high financial aid provided by the government, many high budget epic propaganda films were able to be produced. These included The Liberation of
Northwest China (jiefang da xibei, 1996), The Great Turning (da zhuanzhe,
1997), Fight for Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou (dazhan ning hu hang, 1997),
Sweeping the Southwest (jiefang da xinan, 1998), Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic
Situation (Zhou Enlai de waijiao shengya, 1998), Great Friend –Zhou Enlai
(weida de youyi-Zhou Enlai, 1998), Chairman Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shaoqi, 1998),
The National Anthem (gouge, 1999), Fatal Decision (shengsi juezhe, 2000),
Cosmos and Man (yuzhou yu ren, 2001), Purple Sunset (ziri, 2001) and Red Turn
(zouchu xibai po, 2001).
The production and circulation of propaganda films had a negative impact on the development of Chinese cinema. Propaganda films were politically targeted, such as large anniversary celebrations or government awards, rather than towards any real audience needs, and they received special care from the government and had a privileged position in the market. These market-irrelevant activities not only disturbed the film market’s normal order, but also damaged the reputation and quality of Chinese cinema and hurt the enthusiasm of audiences. The film industry severely declined. The annual total feature film production dropped sharply after
1996, from more than 150 in the early 1990s to average of 86 between 1997 and
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2001. In 2001 it dropped to lowest point of 80 (See table 3). For overseas sales,
China’s total overseas sale of films between 1996 and 2000 was ‘just’ US$13.86 million (Miller et al. 2005, 9). Cinema became a propaganda tool. More and more of the audience was isolated from cinema. Audience attendance decreased from
10,500 million in 1992 to 220 million in 2001; box office revenues decreased from RMB1,990 million to RMB840 million (Zhang 2004, 192).
The enthusiasm for private investment in film was cracked down on, although some regulations aimed at attracting non studio capital were issued. At the end of
1997, MRFT issued Individual Case License of Feature Film Production on a trial base. It provided for state film units, television stations and TV drama production units above the province level or city level with equal conditions to be able to apply to the Film Bureau for Individual Case License of Feature Film Production to produce films. In the next year, to stimulate private capital, the qualifying conditions were expanded to include private film & TV production companies.
However, this notice did not have much effect. Most independent production companies gave up film production. Some time-honoured companies produced only one or two films during those five years. For example, Main Road only had
Three Men and a half (haohan santiao ban; dir. Xu Tongjue, 1998), Rosat, which was established by director Li Shaohong in 1995, had Red Suit (hong xifu; dir. Li
Shaohong, 1998), and Xiejing- Hengtong had Women Soccer Player No. 9. In practice, these independent companies, out of habit, cooperated with state studios rather than applying for individual case licenses. In those years, only 20 films or
152 so were annually produced by independent companies7. By comparison with the year 1993, as was noted in Chapter 6, when more than half of the total films were funded by private capital, this was a big decrease. At the meantime, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 put a brake on much of the capital coming out of Hong
Kong. Co-productions in the year 1996, 1997 and 1998 dropped from 21 to 12 and then to 6 (Miller et al. 2005, 8). Losing capital from both domestic private and overseas sources, the situation of the film industry became even more worrying.
However, this depression was an essential period in the history of independent development.
2. The entry of entrepreneurs
2.1 Cultural entrepreneurs
In the second half of the 1990s some successful entrepreneurs began a long-term involvement in the entertainment industry. As mentioned in previous chapters, most independent production companies were established by directors. Their limited capital and management experience did not enable them to develop very well. Many of them vanished after one or two film projects. This situation had not changed until the late 1990s when entrepreneurs participated into the film industry. The most influential entrepreneurs and their companies included Wang
Zhongjun’s Huayi Brothers, Zhang Weiping’s New Picture and Dong Ping’s Hua
Yi.
7 Analysis from China Film Yearbook (1996-2000).
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These entrepreneurs already had strong capital ability before their film investment. Wang Zhongjue founded his advertising company, Huayi Brothers, in
Beijing in 1994 with US $100,000 he’d earned in America during his study abroad. Because of his successful introduction of the Corporation Identity (CI) system to the China Bank and many state giant groups such as Petro China, China
Union, China Electric Power (Hou 2006), Huayi Bros’ capital reached RMB600 million in the third year (Li 2007). Huayi Brothers’ first venture into film and television was to finance the TV comedy The Psychotic Clinic (xinli zhensuo, dir.
Ying Da) in 1997. Wang Zhongjue’s advertising ability guaranteed the promotion of the TV series. He earned RMB4 million from this project (Li 2007). This successful TV drama investment encouraged Huayi Brothers to enter into film- related business in 1998.
Zhang Weiping, the boss of New Picture, was hired by a foreign company,
Siemens, as marketing and promotion manager at the beginning of the 1980s because of his sensational communication ability, although he could not speak a word of English. Two years later he went to Hainan Island and began a real estate business. Then he returned to Beijing and established a medicine and airflight food agency. He started in the film business as a result of his assistance in Zhang
Yimou’s Keep Cool (youhua haohao shuo; 1997). He invested RMB26 million in the film. At that time he had no idea about film distribution, so he sold the film copyright at a very low price to another distributor, Dong Ping. This resulted in a loss of more than RMB10 million (Zhang 2007). Soon after this failure he and
Zhang Yimou established New Picture and decided to concentrate on film.
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Dong Ping studied music at university but after graduation he engaged in international petrol trade and built a fortune. He established Hua Yi in Beijing in
1996. Dong Ping chose distribution as the first step to getting to know the inside story of the film industry. He strategically bought a range of excellent Chinese classic films at very low prices in 1996, when state studios did not realise the future value of film copyright (Interview Dong Ping 2003). He then copied them through digital hi-tech and re-released them on DVD. At the end of 2000 many classic films flooded into video shops and became a phenomenon of the cultural market. Hua Yi became the biggest copyright owner in China. However, his real entry into the film industry was the distribution of Keep Cool. Zhang Weiping had lost a lot of money; however the same movie let Dong Ping earn his first amount of money in the film business. He bought the rights for RMB8 million from
Zhang Weiping, then he marketed and distributed the film, which then earned him more than RMB46 million from the box office (Interview Dong Ping 2003). After this adventure, Dong Ping turned to film production.
The primary film investments of these entrepreneurs are quite coincidental.
However, if we place these entrepreneurs against the backdrop of the quick development in the private sector and the dying state studios, their activities are understandable. The Reform and Open Policy generated many wealthy businessmen in the late 1990s. As Zhang Weiping said, ‘it was too easy to make money in those days and so it was no fun’ (Xiong and Du 2004). On the other hand, with the decline in state studios, the problem of the shortage in film supply and cultural diversity became severe. This situation offered a potentially wide market for entrepreneurs to fill. They were able to utilise relatively low budgets to
155 activate thirsty film audiences. These reasons can explain why Zhang Yimou and
Chen Kaige chose private capital rather than state studios after they were frustrated by foreign investors and returned home in the late 1990s. The following part of the chapter will analyse how entrepreneurs opened up new possibilities in the industry.
2.2 Collaboration with top directors and the production of
mainstream commercial films
Collaboration with top directors
Although these merchants had no film background, they realised the key role of film directors in the film market and so made great efforts to collaborate with them. The result proved that wise collaborations greatly reduced their risk from the start.
Huayi Bros focused on Feng Xiaogang and took the opportunity to sign a long term contract with him. Huayi Bros had a relationship with Feng Xiaogang for his second New Year Cinema Be There Be Square (bujian busan, 1998), although
Huayi Bros’ investment then was pretty small, accounting for only 10 percent
(Wu 2009). By Feng’s third New Year Cinema Sorry Baby (meiwan meiliao) in
2000, Huayi Bros’ investment had increased to 60 percent (Interview Wang
Zhongjue 2005). The same year, state studios stopped financing Feng’s film A
Sign (yishen tanxi, 2000) and other private investors also pulled out because the
156 film was not a comedy. Huayi Bros. stepped in and provided assistance to Feng
(Zhang 2008). Feng Xiaogang has worked in Huayi Bros ever since.
Zhang Weiping, New Picture’s boss, invested only in Zhang Yimou’s films. As an internationally celebrated director, Zhang Yimou did not lack overseas funding.
His famous films Judou, Raise the Red Lantern, The Story of Qiu Ju, To Live and
Shanghai Trial were all funded by overseas capital. All of these films starred by the actress Gong Li. For international investors and audiences, Zhang and Gong were a team. Therefore, after Gong Li separated from Zhang, foreign investors did not want to risk funding his next film Keep Cool (1997). Zhang Weiping, a close friend of Zhang, backed the whole production (Xiong and Du 2004). After this project, they jointly founded their company New Picture. Within several years, this company had opened a new era of blockbusters in China.
Compared to Huayi Bros and New Picture, Hua Yi’s collaboration with directors was not so successful. After the successful distribution of Be Cool, Hua Yi chose
Chen Kaige’s The Emperor and the Assassin (jingke ci qinwang, 1999) for distribution. However, that film suffered heavy losses (Meng 2005). Soon after,
Hua Yi invested in Jiang Wen’s Devils on the Doorstep. Without the Film Bureau approval, Jiang secretly shipped the print to the Cannes Film Festival in spite of investors’ strong opposition. This violation resulted in severe punishment from the Film Bureau: the film was banned in China (Qingdao News 2004). This adventure proved to be another financial failure. Hua Yi was one of the three
157 investors for this film and was almost destroyed by the defeat. After that, it had to merge into an IT company (Interview Dong Ping 2003).
Mainstream commercial films
While state studios produced propaganda films for survival and small independent companies retreated to TV dramas, top rank independent companies preferred to produce mainstream commercial films. Their films became interested in contemporary subjects and local everyday concerns. The stories were expressed in an entertaining and popular way. Therefore, the films not only catered to mainstream audience tastes but were ideologically acceptable to the censor.
Feng Xiaogang replaced irony with humour, romance and sympathies in his New
Year Cinema series. Sorry Baby is about a pretty girl from Singapore who falls in love with a warm-hearted car driver; Big Shot’s Funeral (dawan, 2001) laughed at business upstarts and praises plain truth and love. More interestingly, A Sign, was a story based on the screenplay for Living a Miserable Life, which was banned due to its description of an affair. However, Feng adapted the story, showing that the man finally regretted his actions and recovered his wife’s goodwill.
Zhang Yimou’s films moved away from depression and abnormal psychologies.
He experimented with new styles in urban settings. Keep Cool was noted by the press as ‘Zhang’s coming into modern city.’ The Road Home (wode fuqin muqin,
1999) expresses a reverence for knowledge and pure love. Happy Times (xinfu
158 shiguang, 2001) tells a story about how grass-root workers help a blind girl. More representatively, Not One Less (yige dou buneng shao, 1999), a funny story with the backdrop of the compulsory education policy and the educational Hope
Project in China, was praised by the government and thus enjoyed preferential treatment reserved for propaganda films, with authorities organising staff to watch the film.
After the failure of Devils on the Doorstep, which did not pass censorship, Hua Yi financed the film Breaking the Silence (piaoliang mama; dir. Sun Zhou, 2000, starring Gong Li). It is about how a mother cared for and trains her deaf-mute son.
This touching film won many awards in international film festivals.
Most of these new, mainstream, commercial films topped the domestic feature rankings and proved to be successful at the box office. Although they were fewer than those produced through the studio, independent films accounted for the majority of the total box office revenue. Other small independent companies followed on, and participated in, this mainstream production trend. Rosat, for example, had Red Suit (dir. Li Shaohong) in 1998. The major character in the film, a female worker, was worried that she would be taken off duty because she had made a criticism about a leader, but she was given awards as an advanced worker during the economic reform. The film won the highest government award, the Huabiao Prize, which is the highest monetary award in China.
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In short, in the second half of the1990s, independent companies contracted with the most famous directors in China and developed mainstream commercial films to gain both audience and government support. Thus art, capital and the state formed a new partnership. Some directors could even accumulate political capital by making mainstream films. This complicity moved forward to the next stage and quickly developed into a powerful trend.
2.3 The strategies to increase film revenue
The domestic film market in China was barren and it was quite hard to cover the cost of even a low budget film. The budget for most of the films produced by independent companies was not high. The cost for Zhang Yimou’s films (except
Keep Cool) was about RMB10 million each (Xiong and Du 2004); Feng
Xiaogang’s films belonged to the genre of family drama and so the budget was not high. Film revenue mostly came from box office revenue, DVD or VCD copyright and TV station broadcasts. Feature films with low budget and popular subjects were likely to easily cover their costs. However, in fact, the available audience was not so many that even RMB3 million budget films found it difficult to earn enough money through box office revenue in the domestic market (Yi
2005).
To deal with the problem, entrepreneurs creatively increased revenue channels.
Firstly, entrepreneurs created opportunities for product endorsement in films for large business enterprises. In order to recoup as much of their budget as possible before the film was completed and released, entrepreneurs actively increased 160 advertising opportunities for enterprises. Huayi Bros, whose major business was advertising, firstly explored this option in film. Sorry Baby (2000) was the first film which had product placement and cinema advertising. Products of many famous brands, such as BMW, Baoxiniao Suit, Motorola and Coca-Cola, were endorsed in the film and the company earned about RMB15 million in advertising
(Tian 2009). Big Shot’s Funeral ’s product placement saw a long list of sponsor companies whose names and products were on display in the film. Zhang
Yimou’s films also arranged opportunities for advertisements. For example, in
Not One Less the wish of the rural kids was to drink ‘Coca-Cola’.
Secondly, entrepreneurs touched the pulse of international sales. At that time the domestic box office revenue per annum was only about RMB800 million, which was even lower than one week’s box office revenue of a blockbuster in America
(Ouyang 2008). For this reason, film entrepreneurs hoped to earn money from international markets. Many previous Chinese films had opened international markets through attending international film festivals. Most of them were art house films and so the market was a niche. The example was the Fifth Generation.
By comparison, in the late 1990s, independents tried to promote their films in a commercial way with the strategies suitable for international big budget films.
Huayi Bros cooperated with American Columbia for split-share distribution for the film Big Shot’s Funeral (2001) worldwide. It was the first time that China had taken the major role in international cooperation. The film benefited from
Columbia’s distribution channels in more than 60 nations (Interview Wang
Zhongjue 2005). Another typical example of international cooperation was Hua
Yi’s Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (2000 dir. Ang Li). In 1999 after a meeting
161 with Ang Li at a film festival in the United States, Dong Ping, the sole Chinese invester, together with Columbia Pictures and the Hong Kong company EDKO
Film, financed and produced Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon. This film and then was pre-sold the international distribution rights to Sony (Interview Dong Ping
2003). Pre-sales is selling the right to distribute a film in different territories before the film is completed. Typically, upon signing a pre-sale contract, the buyer will pay a certain proportion of the whole amount deposit to the film's collection account, with the balance due upon the film's delivery to the foreign sales agent. ‘Pre-sale’ is a common way adopted by independent projects to receive secured finance or distribution by majors. Hua Yi was the first company to try this method in China. Such a strategy worked, later, in Hero. New Picture also managed to open international market. Zhang’s status was re-established after his
Not One Less and The Road Home won awards at the Berlin Film Festival. Sony
Classic distributed Not One Less, The Road Home and Happy Times.
Thirdly, entrepreneurs used films to build synergisms. Hollywood giants such as the Walt Disney Company had diversified into all areas of the media and were maximising profits by building synergy between their corporate activities. For them, film played a key role in their profit lines. Chinese corporations followed this strategy, attempting to use film to enhance their reputation and then to strengthen their capital ability. A good example was Huayi Bros. Huayi Bros produced and distributed World without Thieves (tianxia wuzei; dir. Feng
Xiaogang) in 2003. One of the story plots was about how two thieves stole a car.
The car’s brand was BMW. Huayi Bros was one of its agents in China. The film received about RMB110 million for box office revenue while the auto sale
162 revenue reached RMB2 billion (Liu 2005). This case indicates the rise of the corporate conglomerate trend that was about to come onto the stage.
To sum up, during the most difficult time, independent cinema managed to broaden revenue sources using such ploys as product placement, cinema advertising, cooperating with major foreign distributors and building synergy.
Due to their effective operations, the films of famous Chinese directors like Feng
Xiaogang could be highly profitable. Their operations, to some extent, pulled the conservative Chinese film industry onto the active commercialisation track.
3. An American producer and the trend of urban youth film
Low budget cinema was the emphasis of independent film production companies in their primary period. At the end of the 1990s, a kind of low budget film genre – urban youth cinema – emerged in China. This new genre was developed by an
American producer and his independent company, Imar, and it soon stimulated a wave of debuts by young directors at the turn of the millennium.
Peter Loehr, whose Chinese name was Luo Yi, was an American producer in
Beijing. Being deeply infected by Chen Kaige’s Farewell My Concubine, he went to Beijing to establish his own company Imar (Palmer 2000).
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In terms of nurturing new talents, Imar was a really independent company. While top rank independents like Huayi Bros or New Picture sought out well-established directors, Imar nurtured fledgling directors. More significantly, noticing the absence of cinema specifically aimed at the youth market, Imar took a more local approach in developing low budget urban youth cinema. For Loehr, an American producer, filmmaking in China was freer than in America because it was possible to launch a film project in China with a limited budget, something which was impossible in America (Zhang, Wang and Wang 2005). Similarly to top rank indies, Imar adopted ‘mainstream’ strategies in order to enter the mainstream market. However, the targeted audience for Imar was urban youth. For that purpose, Loehr contracted a young director, Zhang Yang. Their first two films were Spicy Love (aiqing mala tang, 1998) and Shower (xizao, 2000). These two films, with youth themes, were totally different from the dark and marginal works of the Sixth Generation. They were bright, colourful, interesting and quick-paced.
And, most importantly, they were very touching. Spicy Love comprised of five parts that told of the love stories of people at all ages, from high school students to retired people. Shower was about the intensive emotion between a father and his handicapped son, and between the past and the present. The contemporary
Chinese atmosphere in the film not only attracted domestic audiences but was easily understood by international audiences. These two films were very successful. The box office revenue of Spicy Love was second to Titanic in 1998
(Yi 2005). Shower won five top awards at four foreign film festivals, including
Toronto and San Sebastian, and sold to 56 countries (Yi 2005). It is the second best ever Chinese film as far as overseas sales is concerned – the most successful is Hero, which came two years later. After its success in overseas markets,
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Shower returned to China and received more than RMB30 million from box office receipts (Zhao 2005).
The success of Imar was very influential. State studios, including Beijing,
Shanghai and Xi’an, immediately initiated a Youth Talent Project to fund urban cinemas and nurture the talent pool. A number of young directors had their debut performances as a result. In the year 1999, twelve young directors made their debuts, including: Flying with You (banni gaofei; dir. Li Hong, Shanghai Studio),
Love in the Internet Era (wangluo shidai de aiqing; dir. Jin Chen, Xi’an Studio)
(Zheng 2000). In total, there were 41 debuts in 2001 and 11 in 2002 (Zhang 2004,
293). Thus, at the turn of the new millennium, a trend towards young directors and youth films was forming.
4. First independent distribution companies
Another significant event for independent cinema in the late 1990s was the emergence of the first independent distribution companies. As was noted in
Chapter 6, the problem for domestic film distribution was intense after the issue of
Document 3 in 1993. Many studios and independent companies were not competent and the CFC regional distributors and cinemas looked forward to the arrival of Hollywood imports and ignored domestic films. As a result, many domestic films were isolated and directly laid aside after shooting. The market urgently needed professional distributors for domestic films. However, compared to the gradually more lenient policy for independent production, distribution was a highly restricted zone for private capital, even for non-film state entities. In 1996, 165 the Film Bureau published a list of 27 distribution companies that were approved to distribute films nationwide. These 27 distributors were the CFC and other provincial studios, all of which belonged to the state film system (Liu 2005). It meant that private capital or even the state non-film sector was kept away from film distribution. This obvious contradiction left loop-holes for unscrupulous businessmen to make a living by purchasing film prints from studios and then showing them around the country. In this context, some film distribution workers in the state system stepped forward and established independent distribution companies. Similar to the situation in film production, due to the restriction of policy, these primarily independents could not work independently; they had to tie themselves to state distribution authorities and act as a distribution agents for certain movies. There were two important professional distributors. One was
Three-Sword and the other was Bona.
4.1 Three-Sword Film Society- the first independent distribution
company in China
Three-Sword was founded in 1995 in Guangzhou by three film experts. They knew local audiences and had very good social networks in Guangdong. The emphasis of their business was on the distribution of propaganda and main melody low budget films in Guangdong.
The most salient strength of Three-Sword was in distributing propaganda films.
Propaganda films were likely to be rejected by audiences because most
166 propaganda films stood high above the masses and looked like pedagogic and boring textbooks. However, the most attractive advantage of distributing propaganda films was the low distribution right fee. Therefore, Three-Sword focused on the distribution of propaganda films. Three-Sword painstakingly worked to write advertising words that aroused the interest of the leaders who would decide which movies they would organise staff to watch. Three-Sword searched for the engaging parts in propaganda films and related them to audience psychology. For example, for the film Fight for Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou
(1997), they adopted the advertising strategy for high-concept Hollywood blockbusters to evoke audience interest. For the opening, it said, there were thousands of sailing boats on the Yangtze River, millions of liberation soldiers marching to the central area of South China: this was the final battle between the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party. Then it continued:
Did you know this most significant historical event was actually caused by a mistaken action of a military company? During the fight in alleys in Shanghai, in order to protect heritage buildings, soldiers could not fire their canons and suffered heavy casualties. Did you know how they finally won? After living in
Zhongnanhai, Chairman Mao often looked over at the Forbidden City; however, he never entered into the palace next to the wall. Why? Early morning, after the battle, an old resident in Shanghai opened the window. He saw an exciting scene and sighed with emotion: ‘Jiang Jieshi could not come back again’. What did he see? At last, it added, this awesome epic war will be shown at the best cinema and the effects will be as good as Hollywood. In this way, the promotional strategy greatly stimulated audience curiosity and enthusiasm. Finally, the film was exhibited for as long as three months. It was a triumph, given that it was a
167 propaganda film and the entire marketing cost was only some pocket pennies for the cost of paper, envelopes and stamps. In similar ways, Three-Sword successfully distributed many propaganda films. The revenue of some films such as the documentary Contest (jiaoliang, 1996) even out performed Hollywood imports like The Fugitive and was the best selling documentary in Guangzhou in recent decades.
The second achievement Three-Sword made was to distribute very low budget main melody films. By comparison with the way it hunted for novelties for the distribution of propaganda films, Three-Sword used propaganda measure to distribute main melody films that praised moral excellence. For example, in 1994 they decided to distribute the film The Story of a Singleton (yige dushengnü de gushi; dir. Guo Lin, 1995). The story was about a 7-year single-child girl who took care of her sick mum, alone, while studying hard. How to educate the single- child generation was a hot topic in society. They grasped this hot issue and paid attention to the girl’s optimistic and tough spirit. Such method of ‘educating people with models, helping to change people with true feelings’ was popular in propaganda. Three-Sword skilfully used propaganda means to distribute this film.
Their positive, encouraging and virtue-praising promotion was so effective that many parents even waited in long queues to buy tickets.
Between 1995 and 1999, Three-Sword distributed a total of 21 domestic Chinese films. Most of the films were propaganda or low budget main melody films. None of them failed. Some films even created a distribution wonder. For instance, a
168 classic animation Havoc in Heaven (danao tiangong; dir. Wan Laiming, 1961) in the 1960s even exceeded the Hollywood import The Lion King (1995). Three-
Sword was a regional distributor and their distribution strategies were mostly only regionally suitable. This weak point definitely limited their further development.
Therefore, in the new context after 1999, when the distribution reform of theatre chain went nationwide, Three-Sword had to stop its business.8
4.2 Bona: the first nationwide scale independent distribution
company in China
Bona Cultural Communication Company was established by Yu Dong in 1999.
Yu Dong graduated from the Management Department at Beijing Film Academy.
After four years working at Beijing Studio’s domestic film distribution department, he quit the job and established his own distribution company. Bona deserves to be mentioned because it was the first successful, nationwide scale, independent distribution company and it grew up very quickly by distributing
Hong Kong films.
Similarly to Three-Sword, Bona chose low budget domestic films as their entry point to the market. However, different to the regional focus of Three-Sword,
Bona began with a nationwide distribution of low budget art house cinema.
Bona’s first film was Tell Me Your Secret (shuochu nide mimi; dir. Huang
8 The statistics and examples of this part are from Three-Sword – the first private film distribution company (Qi 2005) and The strategies of distributing domestic films (Qi 1998).
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Jianxin, 2000). The film listed in the domestic top ten in 2000 and Bona earned
RMB500 thousand from its first deal (Interview Yu Dong 2005). In 2000 the total box office revenue of films distributed by Bona reached as high as RMB10 million. Its second big win happened in 2001, for a young director’s debut, Roots and Branches (wode qiongdi jiemei; dir. Yu Zhong, 2001). The film cost only
RMB2 million to make but received more than RMB20 million and became the top domestic film for that year (Interview Yu Dong 2005). This success greatly increased the reputation of Bona. Bona continued to distribute many important low budget young directors’ debut films in 2002, such as The Missing Gun
(xunqiang; dir. Lu Chuan, 2002), Spring Subway (kaiwang chuntian de ditie; dir.
Zhang Yibai, 2002), Angel Is Not Lonely (tianshi bu jimo; dir. Zhang Fanfan,
2002) and TV Boys (TV xiaozi; dir. Li Hong, 2002). The films they distributed were almost all low budget debut films in those years. However, sustainable development for a distribution company cannot rely on low budget films. Bona tried to explore more diverse monetary potentialities.
In China at that time, Hollywood films were monopolised by the CFC and large private production companies that had enough ability to distribute their highly commercial films. The only way left for Bona was to distribute Hong Kong films.
The milestone for Bona was The Touch (tianmai chuanqi; dir. Bao Dexi, 2002), which was directed by Oscar winning Best Cinematographer Peter Bao, and starred Michelle Yeoh, who just finished Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon.
Normally the CFC was the only qualified distribution company for such a big budget film. However, Yu Dong bravely allocated all his money on a gamble with the CFC. He promised the Hong Kong producer to pay an amount of money for
170 the minimum of revenue and then share profits later. This international regulation let him win the deal. Although the CFC scheduled Spider Man at the same time to place a barrier to The Touch, the film still received RMB30 million and almost entered the top ten films for that year. Bona soon became very famous among
Hong Kong producers and became a special distribution agent for Hong Kong films. Partly because of the successful distribution by Bona, Hong Kong coproductions increased sharply from about 10 in 2002 to 35 in 2003 (Interview
Yu Dong 2005). Simultaneously, Bona’s revenue dramatically climbed from
RMB83 million in 2002 to RMB130 million in 2003 (Interview Yu Dong 2005).
It turned from being an expert in exploring niche markets for low budget films to being a qualified distributor for high budget commercial films.
Conclusion
For the Chinese film industry, the second half of the 1990s was a very special period. On the one hand, the situation was extremely conservative. Harsh censorship was carried on and the government stunningly supported propaganda films. With the direct subsidies from the National Film Development Special
Fund, the Film and Television Mutual Support Fund and CCTV Movie Channel, state studios had adequate funding for the production of propaganda films. Such strong political intervention severely damaged the whole film industry. The enthusiasm of private investment quickly waned. Both the total of feature films and their audiences sharply declined.
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However, on the other hand, starting from this period, Chinese cinema paved the way towards a truly commercial development. It was independents who led this trend. The accelerated development in the private sector in the late 1990s generated a group of cultural entrepreneurs with strong capital ability. They contracted the most influential directors in China and produced mainstream commercial films that attracted mass audiences and did not encounter problems with censorship. Furthermore, they adopted various strategies to explore film markets and increased revenue. In contrast with those top ranked independents, an
American producer, Peter Loehr, and his company, Imar, provided a perfect example for a low budget independent film company. He collaborated with young directors and developed urban youth cinema in China. Its triumph stirred a trend for youth films. Hence, the idea of making films in the system penetrated into the young generation. The late 1990s also saw the emergence of the first professional distribution companies, among them Three-Sword and Bona were well-known.
Because of these independent distributors, many low budget domestic films, including propaganda, main melody and art house films, were able to be distributed and exhibited in main theatre chains. Their activities and achievements changed the conditions that had led to inefficient distribution and they encouraged the production of domestic films.
To sum up, then, the rapid development in the private sector and the extremely conservative state system generated an essential opportunity for the involvement of independents in the film industry. Their creative activities led Chinese cinema into a mainstream, but commercial, direction.
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Chapter 8 New majors in the age of the conglomerates
Introduction
Feng Xiaogang and his company Huayi Bros developed even more successfully in the first decade of the new millennium. It seemed that Feng owned the overlordship in the world of Chinese cinema. His films broke out of the restrictions of light-comedic New Year films and moved towards more diversified genres such as cops and robbers (A World Without Thieves (tianxia wuzei), 2004), period costume martial arts (Banquet (yeyan), 2006) and war (Assembly (jijie hao), 2007). All his films gave excellent commercial performances. The brand of
Feng Xiaogang was so famous that even his very low budget film If You Are the
One (feicheng wurao, 2008) could earn more than RMB300 million at the box office and became the top film for that year, although the film had endless advertisement spots and looked very boring. Furthermore, Feng had been chosen as a deputy of the National People's Congress for two years and made comments on film lawsuits. Huayi Bros developed into an integrated conglomerate and became the premier entertainment company in China.
The most dramatic changes in the Chinese film industry happened after China’s entrance into the World Trade Organisation in 2002 and after the central government promoted an industrialisation of Chinese culture. Against this background, a new and even more dramatic round of industry reforms in Chinese
173 cinema was implemented. Important documents were issued one after another.
They were aimed at establishing a fair and competitive film market, stimulating investment in the film industry, and boosting competitive advantage. Within several years, highly commercialised modes of film production and high production-value blockbuster films burst onto the scene.
This chapter examines how political management has led the Chinese film industry to take the leap into the era of blockbusters. It starts with some background – WTO and the notion of ‘cultural industries’. Then it evaluates some particular reform measures imposed on the theatre chain system, integrated conglomeration and Hong Kong co-productions. Proceeding from there, the chapter analyses the conglomerates’ dominance in the whole value chain. In conclusion it argues that the age of the conglomerates is coming. The giant conglomerates with political privilege and/or a huge capital will be the new dominant majors in the new age.
1. Background – WTO and the notion of ‘cultural industries’
Change in the Chinese film industry became even more urgent than ever before with China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to
WTO agreements upon accession, China would double the quota of ‘revenue sharing’ films from 10 to 20. China would also allow an additional 20 foreign films per year on flat fee licensing terms. By the third year, the combined film quota would be increased from 40 to 50; foreign service providers would be allowed to construct or renovate cinemas in the form of a joint-venture with 174 foreign ownership, up to 49 per cent. At the time, Hollywood productions accounted for 70 per cent of the cinema box office (Australian Entertainment and
Arts Alliance 2004). Clearly, China's film industry was in for some fierce foreign competition after its entry into the WTO.
The central government began to pay attention to the development of cultural industries at the beginning of the 21th century. The term ‘cultural industries’ appeared for the first time in the central government document The Tenth Five-
Year Plan on the Development of National Economy and Social Development in
2000 (xinhua news 2000). In November 2002, the 16th National People's Congress of the Communist Party committed to actively developing cultural undertakings and cultural industries. It said
‘Cultural industries are the important approach to flourish socialist culture
and satisfy people’s spiritual and cultural demands in the context of
marketization economy. It needs to …… strengthen the whole ability and
competition of our nation’s cultural industries’ (xinhua net 2002).
It was the first time that the term ‘cultural industries’ had been separated from
‘cultural undertakings’ in official reports, which meant that the development of cultural industries was on the government's agenda. This would provide unprecedented opportunities for the cultural industries.
2. The reform of ‘industrialising Chinese cinema’
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A new round of reform of the film industry made its first appearance in the wake of China’s entry into the WTO. ‘Several Opinions on Further Deepening the reform of the Film Industry (320)’ was issued just before accession to the WTO.
It listed some urgent problems in the film industry, like the dispersion of film enterprises, low market-occupation of domestic films, blocked distribution channels, irregular market operations and the shortage in financing. The target of the reform was to establish a dynamic and stimulating-all-parts management and operation mechanism; to establish a nationwide, open competitive and orderly film market; to form a range of conglomerate film groups and modern enterprises. ‘Several Opinions’ marked the start and the direction of the industrialisation of the cinema world (Zhang and Yu 2006, 3).
2.1 Movie theatre chains system
The distribution and exhibition of domestic films was still in a terrible condition, although the distribution reform in 1993 had ended the sole monopoly of the CFC.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the bureaucratic monopoly still existed. More than 30 province distributors replaced the CFC to become a new monopoly. Multi-layer distribution still existed, with film prints being delivered from provinces to cities and then to towns, thereby allowing province and city distributors to gain much benefit and leave limited money for productions and theatres. In practice, production players received only 35 per cent of the box office revenue, and then it had to refund 3 per cent for Promotion and Marketing, so in fact it normally received only 32 per cent (Mao 2003, 236). Low revenue made high investment in film production impossible, which resulted in poor quality and poorer revenue.
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Thus vicious circle could not be avoided. In ‘Several Opinions’, one of the reform targets was to establish a nationwide, open, competitive and orderly film market; and one of the main reform measures was to establish the system of movie theatre chains. With that order, a movie theatre chain system was soon established.
A movie theatre chain is generally made up of several theatres. The theatres use the same brand, the same package of movies and sessions, and the same management. Movie theatre chain systems had fewer layers and more channels than the administrative distribution. It was the one widely adopted by Western countries.
Theatre chains were mandatorily established throughout the whole nation. In
December 2001, ‘Detailed Implementation Rules of the Reform of Film distribution and exhibition Mechanism’ was issued. It required every province to establish at least two theatre chains. Sizable inter-province chains were encouraged as well. A theatre chain within a province was to have no less than 10 theatres, and at least 15 in an inter-province theatre chain. Those regions without theatre chains could not exhibit any split-share imported movies. In addition, in order to regulate the film market and to avoid the act of failing to report box office revenue, it required that theatres exhibiting split-share movies had to install a computer-sale system which connected ticket information nationwide and transferred the statistics to the Film Bureau every day. In practice, the National
Film Development Special Fund, the Province Film Development Special Fund and the China Film Group subsidised the installation of the computer sales system
177 to the tune of RMB13 million (Mao 2002, 173). In June 2002, 30 movie theatre chains were established in 23 provinces (Zhang and Yu 2006, 3).
Besides the mandatory establishment of theatre chain systems, film authorities promoted the construction of modern cinemas. Both quantity and quality of movie theatres in China in the 1990s were very poor. In 2000, the number of movie theatres in the whole country was less than 4,000 (Zhang 2002, 175). Most of those theatres were one-screened auditoriums. By contrast, there were more than
23,000 screens in America in the 1980s (King 2005, 22). The lack of screens and the poor condition of theatres severely limited box office revenue. To stimulate the renovation of old cinemas, in 2002, the Administration of National Film
Development Special Fund issued ‘Notice of the Implementation of Subsidized
Interest to Support Urban Theatres Transformation’. According to the rule, the
Special Fund would provide each qualifying theatre with Subsidised Interest for a maximum loan of RMB8 million.
Theatre chains system, which brought about the wave of cinema renovation, provided the conditions for the birth of blockbusters. Theatre chains systems reduced distribution layers, as shown in figure 4. Therefore, the proportion of box office revenue allocated for film production was able to increase. With the termination of administrative monopolies, market competition gradually grew.
These factors provided the conditions for the birth of blockbusters, which needed saturation release to regain capital outlay in a short term. In the year 2002, just when the theatre chains were establishing themselves nationwide, the first
178 blockbuster in China Hero (Yingxiong, dir. Zhang Yimou, 2002) came. For the first time, in China, the production part of Hero received as much as 40 per cent of the box office revenue (Yu 2008, 11), and the film earned more than RMB200 million at the domestic box office in just 20 days (Yu 2004, 212).
2.2 The transformation of state-owned studios into media empires
To compete with global Hollywood productions, an industry heavyweight was needed. ‘Several Opinions’ outlined ways to enhance the capacity of production and operation. Foremost among these ways was the reconstruction of the business of state filmmaking into enterprise groups by means of either integrating previously separate sectors of production, distribution, exhibition, printing,
VCD/DVD production, and sales into one enterprise/corporation, or the merging of state-owned film studios with other state-owned entertainment enterprises.
During this process, state authorities played an important role. In 1997, vertical and horizontal convergence in state enterprises was suggested at the Fifteenth
Congress of China Communist Party (Jiang 1997). In 2000, ‘Several Opinions’ urged the formation of a range of conglomerate film groups and modern enterprises. This officially endorsed method for strengthening state filmmaking institutions was soon brought into effect in the reforms of major film studios.
China Film Group (1999), Jilin Chuangchun Film Group (1999) and Shanghai
Film Group (2001) were formed first, and the integration trend continued with
Hunan Xiaoxiang Film Group (2003), Sichuan Emei Film Group (2008), Zhujiang
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Film Group (2008), and Shanxi Xian Film Group (2009) being founded. These groups were upgraded from previously being provincial state studios with good reputations.
In the reform of film conglomeration, the Chinese film industry followed the
Hollywood system, especially in its corporate structure: production entities partnered with distributors and theatre chains to merge into vertically integrated companies.
Let’s take the China Film Group (CFG) as an example. In February 1999, eight formerly separate entities were consolidated into China’s foremost media corporation: China Film Corporation (CFC), Beijing Film Studio, China
Children’s Film Studio, China Film Co-production Corporation, China Film
Equipment Corporation, China Movie Channel, Beijing Film Developing and
Printing & Video Laboratory, Huayun Film & TV Compact Discs Company. With this, the CFG officially became ‘the most comprehensive and extensive state- owned film enterprise in China with the most complete industry chain that facilitates film production, distribution and exhibition as a coordinated process and integrates film, TV and video into one single entity’ (CFG website). Its streamlined operations included all major elements in film business: financing, production, distribution and exhibition, digital cinema, film import/export, and investment in cinema construction (see figure 5).
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The other film groups had a similar corporate structure to the CFG. Among them the Shanghai Film Group (SFG) was perhaps the biggest. The SFG had the
Oriental Movie Channel, a movie and TV base with colonial Shanghai setting, and the biggest theatre chain in the country, Lianhe, and also a hotel business. Its capital assets were RMB2.1 billion, just less than the CFG’s RMB2.8 billion (Yin and Zhan 2008). However, their film production ability was far less than CFG’s.
In 2004, for example, CFG produced or co-produced 23 films, while the Shanghai
Film Group made only 5, Changchun Film Group 9, Xian Film Group 3,
Xiaoxiang Film Group 9, Emei Film Group 3 and Zhujiang Film Group 1 (Yin
2007). Apart from CFG and SFG, No other film groupproduced a top 30 film in that year (Yin and Zhan 2007).
State film groups naturally enjoyed priority in access to film markets due to their government origin. Take CFG as ane example again. First, CFG enjoyed public resources. CCTV-6 was a satellite movie channel which aired 10 Chinese, foreign feature films, animations and documentaries daily. It was also in charge of broadcasting domestic film festivals – Huabiao, Golden Rooster/Hundred Flowers
– and the American Oscars. Its annual revenue in 2004 reached RMB100 million
(Tong 2005, 34). Second, CFG enjoyed regulatory privilege. Distribution of foreign films was controlled solely by CFG, and thus acquisition, release schedules and censorship were its responsibility. Although another firm, Huaxia, was authorised as a second distributor for foreign movies in 2006, CFG’s monopoly remained in place because it owned an 11 percent share of Huaxia
(CFG website). With the strength of sovereign administration behind it, its market advantage and its dominance were ensured.
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2.3 Legal entry of private capital into the film industry
The Chinese private sector kept up a high speed of development at the beginning of the 2000s. According to Zheng and Yang (2009), by the end of 2005, the number of private enterprises was 4.30 million, while total registered capital was
RMB6133.11 billion. It hired a total of 58.24 million employees. Non-public sectors have contributed to one-third of GDP and four-fifths of new employment in recent years. The individual and non-public sectors have become important drivers of economic growth and employment. In the new era, State Administration of Radio Film Television (SARFT, formerly MRFT) issued many regulations to stimulate private investment in the film industry.
Production
Previously, private enterprises had had to cooperate with state studios to produce films. After the New Film Management Ordinance of 2001, private enterprises could produce films independently on the basis of Individual Case License of
Feature Film Production. Temporary Regulations on Access to Film Production,
Distribution and Exhibition (2003) permitted private enterprises either to cooperate with state studios or to independently form film production enterprises which would have rights and responsibilities equal to the state studios. After producing at least two films according to the Individual Case License of Feature
Film Production and having at least RMB1 million as registered capital, private enterprises could be granted a License of Feature Film Production. The enterprise was then able to go through the formalities for gaining a business certificate.
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Along with widening access to film production and distribution, the right of cooperation with foreign filmmakers (including those in Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan) was also extended to private enterprises. The Rules on Sino-foreign
Cooperation in Film Production (2003) (SARFT, No. 19) provided for film production enterprises in China holding a License of Feature Film Production to also cooperate with foreign filmmakers. In 2004 an amended rule, The Rules on
Sino-foreign Cooperation in Film Production (2004) (SARFT, No. 31), went further, providing for private film enterprises with Individual Case License of
Feature Film Production to cooperate with foreigners.
Distribution
New reform measures also opened up distribution channels which were strictly controlled within the state film system for private enterprises. According to
Temporary Regulations, private film and TV enterprises that had distributed at least two films and had registered capital of at least RMB500 thousand could apply for a License of Film Distribution and then establish a film distribution corporation to distribute domestic films nationwide. Private distribution enterprises were given equal rights and responsibilities as state provincial distribution companies.
Exhibition
Private and foreign capital was encouraged into cinema construction or renovation. By comparison to production and distribution, into which the state
183 still forbade foreign capital to enter, exhibition was relatively open to many kinds of capital. In 2001 the ‘Detailed Implementation Rules of the Reform of Film distribution and exhibition Mechanism’ (SARFT and Ministry of Culture, No. 17,
2001) provided for theatre chains to attract private capital, with the prerequisite that state capital owned a greater share. Then, in 2004, SARFT issued a ruling,
‘Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Film Industry’. It provided for state non-film capital and private capital to solely invest in theatre chains or cinema construction; and foreign investors were allowed to take up to a
75 per cent stake for the construction and/or refurbishment of cinemas in Sino- foreign equity joint ventures in certain trial cities. From January 1, 2004, investors from Hong Kong and Macao were be able to take up to a 75 per cent stake.
2.4 CEPA and Hong Kong co-productions
Chinese filmmakers were not sufficiently experienced in making commercial genre films. In today’s China, only two directors, Zhang Yimou and Feng
Xiaogang, can guarantee enough return on high budget films. Many other directors, even some well established directors, had learnt bitter lessons. Chen
Yifei’s Barber (lifa shi, 2006), for instance, cost RMB35 million and earned only
RMB8 million in box office receipts (xinhuanet 2006), Xu Jinglei’s Letter From
An Unknown Women (yige mosheng nvren de laixin, 2004) cost RMB20 million and earned RMB 7million (Zhang 2005). Hou Yong’s Jasmine Women (moli huakai, 2004) cost RMB20 million and earned RMB4 million (China Film
Association 2007, 33). Jiang Wen’s The sun still raises (taiyang zhaochang shenqi, 2007) cost RMB60 million and earned RMB17.3 million (China Film
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Association 2008, 158). These heavy losses exposed the severe problem of the lack of commercial film professionals in mainland China. To strengthen the competitive ability, the Chinese film industry was in need of outside help. Hong
Kong films were competent at doing this sort of thing.
Hong Kong films had a very high profile in creating and internationally releasing commercial films. Because of their similar culture, Hong Kong commercial films and TV have been popular in mainland China since the 1980s. As the centre of
Oriental Hollywood, Hong Kong films used to account for large per cent of the imported films of many nations in South-East Asia, such as Taiwan, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia and Korea (Si 2006). Furthermore, at the moment when foreign capital was still not allowed to establish film production and distribution companies in China, many Hollywood major companies such as Columbia, 21
Century Fox and Warner Bros. established branches in Hong Kong after 2000, intending to use Hong Kong’s political and economic net to explore the huge market in mainland China in the near future (Fu, 2007).
Hong Kong’s vibrant film tradition and expertise, and its easy access to
Hollywood’s influential distribution channels made Hong Kong the natural place the Chinese film industry to go to seek help. However, before 2003 Hong Kong films were regarded as foreign films and were restricted by quota; and the copyright of Hong Kong co-productions belonged to mainland studios and so none of the revenue earned in mainland China went to Hong Kong producers (Wu
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2007). These restrictions and unfair regulations lagged behind other areas in the development of co-operation between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong. The situation did not change until 2003, when the Closer Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) was put into effect.
On 29 June 2003, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (the
Mainland) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA). On 29 September 2003, the attachment of CEPA was signed. Then, on
27 October 2004, 18 October 2005, 27 June 2006, 29 June 2007, 29 July 2008 and
9 May 2009, CEPA’s Supplementary Agreement One to Six were signed.
The series of CEPA agreements greatly stimulated the increase in the cooperation between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong. The agreement was signed between the PRC’s central government and the governments of the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions. Under CEPA, Hong Kong would be granted greater access to the mainland entertainment market, above and beyond
China's WTO commitments. In detail, Hong Kong film imports would no longer be restricted by quota; Hong Kong co-productions were regarded as domestic films and were able to be distributed nationwide. Correspondingly, measures in the proportion of principle staff in co-productions were amended. In 1996, directors in co-productions had to be from the Chinese mainland. The same applied to other major staff members before the project would be approved by the
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Film Bureau. In 2001, the relative rule still insisted on the majority of staff being
Chinese; however, it cancelled the restriction on directors and allowed the maximum of principle foreign stars to account for more than half of the total.
With CEPA in 2004, there was no restriction on Hong Kong staff, but Chinese mainland actors had to make up at least one third of the total.
CEPA significantly solved the problems of the lack of capital and talent in the
Chinese mainland. Since then, Hong Kong co-productions have shown astonishing growth – from an average of 10 before 2003 to more than 40 in 2004 and then 30 more recently (see figure 6).
In summary, this new economic reform of industrialising Chinese cinema was a kind of government-led reform, in which the central government played an essential role. A series of regulations were issued to establish a fair and open market, stimulate consumer needs and investment, improve production capacity and attract talent. Soon after the initiation of the reform, dramatic changes occurred. With large amounts of capital moving into the film industry, conglomerates emerged, and they gained absolute dominance in the film market.
3. Dominance of the conglomerates
3.1 The surge in capital inflows to the film industry
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Capital is the most determinative engine for developing the film industry. The
Chinese film industry has made rapid progress since 2003 when the film reform of industrialisation was initiated. Both film production and box office revenue increased at a very high rate between 2003 and 2007 (see figure 7 and 8). The stunning economic recovery stimulated investment in the film industry. During this process, the established state film groups and private film companies had the advantage when raising capital.
CFG absorbed large amounts of state capital. In 2007, the State Council approved
CFG to release RMB500 million in enterprise bonds to absorb funds for the building of the biggest digital production base in China (China Film Association
2008, 12). After the foundation of this digital base, domestic films would be able to do their digital post production in China. It was regarded as the National
Significant Cultural Industries Project and received as much as RMB2 billion for the first round subsidy (CFG website). The launch of this digital base further confirms CFG’s dominant position.
Huayi Bros experienced four important investment events: Beijing real estate group, Taihe, invested RMB25 million into Huayi Bros in 2000; Hong Kong
TOM Group invested US$10 million in 2004; Investors represented by IT key player Ma Yun invested US$12 million; Beijing Focus Media and other corporations invested US$20 million in 2007 (Chinafilm 2008). During this process, Huayi Bros’ capital significantly increased and the principals were still the major shareholder.
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By comparison, Bona and Hua Yi became subsidiaries of a diversified corporation, China Poly Group. China Poly Group was one of 138 state enterprises directly under the Central Council. It had major interests in four unrelated fields – military and civil commodity trade, real estate, cultural industries and mining. The Group’s total property amounted to over RMB100 billion in June 2009 (Poly Group website). Bona merged into Poly and formed
Polybona in 2003. In the same year it entered into film production. Hua Yi, for its significant bargaining chip, Travel Satellite TV, received Poly’s RMB410 million for the merger into Polyhuayi in 2003 (Fu 2003).
During those years some important production players appeared (see table 7), and they also had tremendous capital strength. Century Hero was established by
CITIC and China Film Group. CITIC (China International Trust and Investment
Corporation) was a large transnational conglomerate and its total assets stood at
RMB1,631.6 billion in 2008 (CITIC website). Orange Sky was established in
2005 by Wu Houbo, Japan NEC’s senior advisor in China. Orange Sky was an integrated group, with film and movie production, advertisement, music production and artists’ agency. It invested some famous films such as The
Warlords (touming zhuang; dir. Peter Chen, 2007), Red Cliff (dir. John Woo,
2008). In 2007 Orange Sky merged into Hong Kong Golden Harvest Film and became the majority shareholder. Enlight Pictures relied on Enlight Media, which was the biggest TV programme private producer and distributor in China. Warner
China Film HG was created by China Film Group, American Warner Group and the biggest private film & TV production base, Hengdian Group.
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Exhibition, due to its low risk and high return, attracted huge capital compared to film production and distribution. Capital from state enterprises like CFG, SFG and
Boly Group; private capital from the likes of Wanda, Time Antaeus; Hongkong capital from Harvest, Broadway, UME; and foreign capital from Warner and
Korean A Tcon rushed to invest in theatres (Yu and Huang 2007). By 2006, theatre chains had 1,425 cinemas and 3,554 screens (Yin and Zhan 2008). Most of these cinemas were multiplex cinemas with several smaller screens, and were located in large cities. Their modern digital equipment and luxurious environment resulted in new entertainment centres.
3.2 The tendency of conglomeration
Along with the merging of ex-state-studios, private companies were also keen to vertically integrate themselves. Soon after they had legal access to film production, distribution and exhibition in 2003, the top ranked independents set up their integrated corporate structures.
Huayi Bros
The major business of Huayi Bros in the 1990s was film and TV production and advertisement. In order to deal with film distribution, in 2003, Huayi Bros consolidated with the state-owned West Film Group to form a joint stock corporation (Lin 2003). In 2009, Huayi Bros formally got into exhibition and post-exhibition exploration, making a contract with the coastal city Qingdao to create a huge film theme park (Liu 2009). During those years, Huayi Bros took
190 over a music record company and established an agency for artists. Huayi
Brothers were a diverse group in terms of entertainment, with TV, film, artist representation, advertising and a music label in their stable of activities. The corporation is now one of the weightiest entertainment conglomerates and one of the biggest private-sector film companies in China.
Bona
Bona was the first domestic private firm to receive a film distribution license in
2003 (Zhang and Xue 2004, 3). As a professional distributor, in order to guarantee the resource of excellent material, Bona set foot into the realm of film production.
Its first film was entitled The Foliage (Meiren cao, dir. Lv Yue, 2004) in 2003.
Till 2007, the company had invested, produced or co-produced more than 60 films, emerging as one of the leaders in film investment, production and distribution (Yin and Zhan 2008). At the same time, its business expanded to include artist representation and theatre chains. At one timed nicknamed China’s
Miramax, in 2007, Variety magazine recognised the successful development of
PolyBona Films and wrote highly about PolyBona transformation from Miramax to Paramount (Polybona website).
Hua Yi
Hua Yi was also in the process of diversifying itself. After the failure of two films
The Emperor and the Assassin and Devils on the Doorstep, Hua Yi took over two famous TV companies: Yingda Film & TV Corporation, which was in charge of
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80 per cent of situation comedies in China, and Xinbaoyuan Film & TV
Corporation, which produced several top TV dramas in 2000 and 2001
(menglvren 2005). Then it took two advertising companies and established an artists’ representation arm (Meng and Liu 2005, 262). Hua Yi successfully purchased 49 percent of the shares of Hainan’s Travel Satellite TV in 2003 (Fu
2003). In 2005 Hua Yi became a shareholder of the second biggest theatre chain in China, Beijing New Film Association (menglvren 2005). Hence, Hua Yi successful integrated itself, owning two content production bases (movie & TV, and advertisement) and two release channels (Satellite TV and theatre chain).
Such an attractive structure significantly enhanced its value.
3.3 Dominance in the whole value chain
A host of conglomerates, the new majors, scrambled for markets. Their ambitions and dominance are demonstrated by the following:
Firstly, they signed up the majority of excellent directors and financed a wide range of genres.
The majors kept the foremost directors in China. Feng Xiaogang was in Huayi
Bros., Zhang Yimou was in New Picture, and Chen Kaige was in China Film
Group. Furthermore, the majors did not let any emerging director slip by and funded many new directorial debuts. For instance, Huayi Bros financed Lu
Chuan’s The Missing Gun (Xunqiang, 2001); Polyhuayi invested in a range of
192 young directors including Xu Jinglei’s My Father and I (Wo baba he wo, 2003),
Gu Changwei’s Peacock (Kongque, 2005), and Houyong’s Jasmine Women.
Some independents who came up with box-office surprises or who had a good artistic profile did not escape their notice. Shanghai Film Studio collaborated with
Jia Zhangke’s company Xstream Pictures and was responsible for distributing his films when Jia began to give up underground filmmaking after 2003 (longhunet
2008). After the successful distribution of Crazy Stone (Fengkuang de shitou, dir.
Ning Hao, 2006) and good reception of Silver Medallist (Fengkuang de Sanche, dir. Ning Hao, 2008), Warner China Film HG focused on Ning Hao. The group made a ‘first-look’ deal with Ning Hao in 2007, requiring Ning Hao to provide at least 6 projects in the future 2 years and Warner China Film HG to have priority in assessing them (sohu 2007).
The majors not only concentrated on high budget works, but, in order to further occupy the market, to look for fresh talents and increase their reputation, they were also interested in a range of film genres. Han Sanping, the CEO of CFG, said main melody, blockbusters and children’s films constituted the major products of
CFG (Han 2008). The strategy of SFG was to produce main melody, high budget commercial films and art films (Ren, 2008). Polybona also planned to produce more than 20 films a year, including high budget commercial films, children films, main melody and art films (Yu 2008). Huayi Bros also invested in some low budget art films such as Cala. My Dog! (Kala shitiao gou, dir. Lu Xuechang,
2003) and Kekexili (dir. Luchuan, 2004).
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Secondly, domestic conglomerates partnered Hong Kong filmmakers to produce blockbusters.
Blockbusters in China started with Zhang Yimou’s Hero. Zhang Yimou and the producer Zhang Weiping initially, primarily, just wanted to create a medium budget film with a little Kung-fu style. Jiang Zhiqiang, the CEO of Hong Kong
Edko Film, boosted the plan onto the blockbuster stage. Zhang Yimou asked him to introduce him to a martial arts director. Jiang had just finished the film
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon at that time. Zhang recalled, ‘The cooperation began and Jiang asked me, ‘Do you need Jet Li to play? And Maggie Cheung?
And Tony Leung?’ I answered, ‘That is great! But the budget must rise’. He said,
‘No worries. The market is quite good now’. Thus, Hero was changed from a normal budget art-Kung-fu film into a super martial arts film with a budget of
RMB260 million. Zhang was excited, ‘we have money now. We will be able to buy 100 horses, and colour them black! Haha!’ (Xu 2008). Hero’s fantastic performance in both the domestic and international markets made it an icon in the
Chinese film industry. After Hero, Jiang and Zhang produced House of Flying
Daggers (shimian maifu) in 2004; then Chen Kaige continued the trend with The
Promise (wuji) in 2005; Feng Xiaogang had The Banquet in 2006; Peter Chan had
The Warlords in 2007; John Woo had Red Cliff in 2008. All of these blockbusters were Hong Kong co-productions.
The huge potential of blockbusters attracted large amounts of capital. Joint investment and bank loans led to an increase in the budget of Hong Kong co-
194 productions and the film industry to allied itself with foreign, especially Hong
Kong, capital to produce blockbusters. Financial sources became more and more complicated. Nine financing parties, for instance, were listed on The Warlords; and more than 15 on Red Cliff. Meanwhile, the majors had an advantage in receiving loans from banking institutions as compared to other small companies.
Bank loans were the second main financing source in the projects of high budget films. According to Yin (2008), for the films made during 2006-2007, bank loans took up 37 per cent of the total financing, followed by self-financing, which accounted 49 per cent. In mainland China, only one major, Huayi Bros, enjoyed bank loans for film production. Shenzhen Development Bank provided RMB50 million for The Banquet; China Merchants Bank provided RMB50 million for
Assembly; Guangdong Development Bank provided RMB65 million for The
Forbidden Kingdom (Gongfu zhiwang, dir Rob Minkoff 2008) (Yin, 2008).
Another two majors, New Picture and China Film Group, received bank loans from overseas. Hong Kong Standard Chartered Bank provided a loan for The
Curse of Golden Flower and US$70 million for Red Cliff (Yin 2007). Joint investment and bank loans resulted in the rapid increase in the budget of blockbusters, from Hero’s RMB260 million to Red Cliff’s RMB700 million (see figure 9). By contrast, in 2009, the average cost of domestic films was only
RMB5 million (China Film Association 2009). Clearly, most financing was concentrated on a few blockbusters and capital was centralised.
Hong Kong co-productions played a significant role in the increase in the box office revenue. Since 2003, when CEPA was signed, the box office revenue of domestic films had been more than that of imported films (China Film
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Association 2009). In 2004, 7 of the top 10 domestic films were Hong Kong co- productions and they took up more than 70 per cent of the total domestic box office revenue (Yin and He 2008). In 2007, Hong Kong co-productions accounted for 100 per cent of the top 10 films, 90 per cent of the top 20, 80 per cent of the top 30 and 74 per cent of the top 40 films (Yin 2008). Hong Kong co-productions obviously provide the majority of film revenue in mainland China.
Thirdly, the majors controlled the release of films through overwhelming marketing and the assistance of some unfair competition elements.
The majors promoted their blockbusters aggressively. Hero is the perfect example. Its marketing activities created many firsts in the history of Chinese cinema. For the first time, a film’s advertisement appeared on TV; a website was formed for it; a documentary, a novel and stamps were released at the same time
(Yu 2004). Its premiere was held at the Great Hall of the People, the symbol of highest Chinese authority. Even Jet Li said, ‘I have attended many open ceremonies, but I haven’t been to such a grand one’ (Yu 2004, 129). The blockbusters that followed, such as The Promise and A world without thieves, copied many of the strategies of Hero in their marketing campaigns. With this sort of overwhelming marketing, blockbusters were not just entertaining movies, they became news events. People talked about them, and they were ‘must go’ films. At the premiere of The Curse of Golden Flower, I asked a young boy in a long queue for the ticket, ‘If the film disappoints you, what is your response’? He answered,
‘It doesn’t matter. I just want to see it as soon as possible’. With the explosive
196 marketing, it was not surprising that theatre chains would rush to purchase blockbusters. For example, for the film The Curse of Golden Flower, 850 film prints were sold (Huang, Yu and Chen 2006). By comparison, Jia Zhangke’s Still
Life, which premiered on the same day, sold only 50 prints (Liu and Jiang 2006).
Still Life earned only RMB1,400 (Long 2007) for its first two days of screening in
Changsha, while The Curse of Golden Flower earned more than RMB15 million for its premiere night (Bai 2006).
Some unfair competition elements further aided the majors’ dominance in exhibiting films. As integrated companies, the majors usually controlled theatre chains in China. It was different from the America film industry in which exhibition was divorced from production and distribution after the Paramount
Decree in 1940. CFG owned 7 theatre chains, which generated 40 per cent of the total box office revenue (Han 2008). SFG owned the Lianhe theatre chain, which earned the most box office revenue for 4 years between 2003 and 2006 (Ren
2008). The control of theatres guaranteed their films had access to cinemas.
Further, CFG’s privilege played a significant role in protecting its films in competition with Hollywood. CFG controlled the distribution of foreign imports and was responsible for release schedules. Therefore, CFG were able to handle blackout periods, those times when foreign films were banned. For this reason, no
Hollywood film could be exhibited when Zhang Yimou’s films, of which CFG was one producer, were on show. Even government authorities were involved in, and gave preferential treatment to, blockbusters. For example, as the most authoritative news source, the News Report of CCTV-1 broadcast the news when some blockbusters, including Hero, The Curse of Golden Flower and Assembly;
197 were released, and when Hero was released, the Cultural Ministry issued special document to protect its copyright. The participation of the state propaganda department in the commercial moviemaking business reveals the film authorities’ supportive attitude towards the maximisation of profit through any means.
So, with their powerful capital force and with the support of the authorities, the conglomerates dominated the whole value chain in the film industry, from talent to financing to production to distribution and release. The film industry became increasingly concentrated.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined how political management determined the conglomeration of the Chinese film industry.
In the wake of China’s entry into the WTO, state authorities launched a range of reform measures aimed at modernising the film industry so that it could compete with Hollywood imports. The establishment of theatre chain systems and the integration of state studios were enforced. Almost all sectors in the film industry were opened up to private film companies. CEPA loosened the restrictions on
Hong Kong co-productions. Dramatic changes happened. Large amounts of capital surged into the industry. Well established film companies and new players moved towards conglomeration. Using powerful capital access or political privileges, the conglomerates partnered Hong Kong filmmakers and dominated
198 the film industry. Their high budget Hong Kong co-productions and Hollywood imports divided up the market fifty-fifty.
The industrialisation of the cinema world can be seen as a measure initiated by the state film administration. This tendency toward conglomeration could not take place without the government’s implementation of several policies promoting the full-scale industrialisation of Chinese cinema. As a result of the reform, the striving for profit and commercialisation in every possible way became a major preoccupation of the Chinese filmmaking industry in the early 2000s. With the in- surge of large amounts of capital, the power of capital quickly became more significant and noticeable than that of administrative power. Meanwhile the film industry became increasingly centralised and polarised.
Therefore, the discourse of independent cinema has changed. Before 2003, majors were state studios and independents were private film companies that did not have legal right to produce and distribute films. Since 2003, when regulations were issued to legislate for private status, the Chinese film industry entered an era of the conglomerates. The majors have become the dominant conglomerates, no matter whether they were state or private, while independents are small private companies. The next chapter will study independent films in this new era.
The competition between majors was fierce and the situation was far from stable.
Century Hero and Bolyhuayi declined, and SFG, Orange Sky and Enlight
199 strengthened. Among all the important majors, or mini majors, CFG, Huayi Bros. and Bolybona have developed the most steadily. New Picture, thanks to Zhang
Yimou, who has become a national brand, owned special political and capital privileges like no other. This can answer the question raised in Chapter 4, ‘Why did Jia Zhangke choose a state studio (SFG) rather than a private company as his partner for his new films when entering the official system?’ In the early 2000s, with the surge in capital flowing to the film industry, well-established private film companies such as Huayi Bros, New Pictures and Boly Huayi, the new major entrepreneurs like Orange Sky and Hengdian, and state enterprise CFG, absorbed large amounts of capital and became significant conglomerates. With strong capital ability, they were ambitious, focusing on blockbusters markets and grabbing huge profits. For Jia Zhangke, his films were able to be distributed in mainland China; his market was overseas, not in China (This point of view will be explained in the next chapter). What he expected was that his films would be available for the domestic audience, rather than earn much money from the domestic market. Therefore, those weighty players, which longed for huge profit, were not suitable for him. For SFG, due to its lack of contracted famous directors, it could only rely on a few coproductions to maintain its reputation; it coproduced
The White Countess (2005) with Britain and America, and My Blueberry Nights
(2007) with America and Hongkong. Unfortunately, these projects were not satisfying. SFG was eager to seek a well-known director to improve its fame. In this situation, therefore, SFG and Jia Zhangke collaborated. It was a win-win deal: on the one hand, Jia appreciate SFG’s theatre chain and historical fame, on the other hand, SFG needed Jia’s reputation in both domestic and overseas film circus.
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Chapter 9 Main melody independent cinema in the age of the conglomerates
‘What we pursue is to produce films which satisfy both the state interest and public moral standards’ (Interview with a private movie and TV company boss).
Introduction
The gradual polarisation of the film industry in China was the end result of developments in the blockbuster era. The conglomerate subsidiaries and the diversified corporations and their high budget films, most of which were Hong
Kong co-productions, occupied one side of the film market. A few relatively large and old companies continued to perform below par. Li Shaohong’s Rosat fought back by producing many expensive and entertaining films such as Baobei in Love
(lian’ai zhongde baobei, 2004) and The Door (men, 2007). However, the films’ economic performance was unsatisfactory. Golden Horse, which used to be a famous independent film production company in the first half of the 1990s, but who, in 1996, shifted to TV serials, has recently made a comeback. However, it has done little more than co-finance Hong Kong co-productions and blockbusters like Beyond Our Ken (gongzhu Fuchou ji; dir. Peng Haoxiang, 2004), Protégé
(mentu; dir. Er Dongsheng, 2007) and Red Cliff (2008). Since 2003, when the legal status of private film companies was approved and some revenue sources were guaranteed, numerous small private companies have emerged and produced many low-budget films, which occupied the other side of the market in terms of
201 quantity. It was at this point that the discourse of Chinese independent cinema started to favour low-budget private film-making over top-ranked ones.
Censorship in this period had loosened. Previously, a detailed screenplay and a completed film had to be submitted to SARFT for examination. In 2003, the new regulation, Temporary Regulations on Film Screenplay (Outline) Register and
Film Examination, required only a 1000-word précis of the script to be submitted, and the power of film examination was decentralised and transferred to subordinate locations in Beijing, Shanghai, Jilin, Guangdong, Shanxi, Zhejiang,
Shandong, Hunan and Sichuan. After issuing legislation and reform measures targeting the monopolistic and arbitrary nature of the old censorship system, a thematically diverse range of films was expected to develop. However, a close examination reveals that the themes and styles of independent films in this period became increasingly monotonous and most of them belonged to main melody films.
This chapter examines how political management determined the orientation of main melody for independent films in the age of the conglomerates. It starts with the introduction to the new economic opportunities state authorities provided for low budget independent films. After offering a general picture of independent films in this period, the chapter classifies four different strategies adopted by independents. Finally, it claims that with its control over release channels and economic sponsors, the state firmly controlled the production of independent films and successfully directed them towards main melody.
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1. Movie channels and digital theatre chains: new economic
opportunities for low budget films
The chances of survival for a low budget independent film seemed hopeless in the age of the conglomerates when high budget commercial films controlled the theatre chains in big cities and, at the same time, pirated VCD, DVD and internet broadcasts prevailed in the market. However, with the policy that was aimed at developing digital films, movie channels and digital theatre chains were established. They created new hope for low budget films.
1.1 Movie channels
In 2004, SARFT issued the Outline of Digital Development in Film (SARFT,
(2004) No. 257), which suggested the convergence of movies and TV and using movie channels to broaden film markets. During the process of conglomeration, state film groups formed their own movie channels. China Film Group’s movie channel, CCTV-6, was the earliest, in 1995, followed by Shanghai Film Group’s
East Movie Channel and Shanxi Film Group in 2003, Changchun Film Group’s movie channel in 2004, Xiaoxiang Film Group’s in 2005, and Zhujiang Film
Group’s in 2008. SARFT imposed some restrictions on the operation of movie channels. These included that TV serials should not account for more than 45 per cent of the total programme time and that TV serials and imported films should not be aired in prime time (Wang et al. 2008, 21); (Suo 2008, 302). These requirements guaranteed the broadcast of movies on TV channels.
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Movie channels aired thousands of movies a year and earned high advertisement revenue (see figure 10 and 11). They were thirsty for film material and could purchase films at a good price. Among all the movie channels, CCTV-6 was the most outstanding, followed by the East Movie Channel. In 2006 their advertising revenue was RMB800 million and RMB230 million, respectively. In total,
CCTV-6 spent more than RMB2 billion on 3,900 domestic films between 1995 and 2007 (China Film Association 2008 218). Therefore, sales to movie channels became the most realistic and stable outlet for most low-end independent films.
In addition, there were many movie, TV or entertainment channels in almost all provincial TV stations. They had a fixed schedule for showing movies. These channels also played an important role in providing revenue for domestic films.
1.2 Digital theatre chains
The central government had a range of subsidies to support the development of digital exhibition. The Outline of Digital Development in Film (SARFT, (2004)
No. 257) stated that the key point of developing digital films was to establish fine digital distribution and exhibition nets. The Outline put forward a proposal that more than 500 digital screens should be built within 3 to 5 years and that digital movies should completely replace film in 5 to 10 years.
Since then, a number of digital screens have been rapidly established. In practice, three technology standards were adopted in areas such as luxury theatres in
204 metropolises, theatres in small cities and counties, and in the countryside (Zhang and Yu 2006, 170).
In big cities, most digital screens adopted international technology standards. In
2005, with the investment of RMB200 million by SARFT, CFG established the first digital theatre chain and installed 164 digital screens in expensive multiplex cinemas in 70 cities (Zhang and Yu 2006, 170). Then CFG united with the
Shougang Group and received RMB600 million for digital screens installation
(China Film Association 2008, 36). In addition, other theatre chain groups, such as Dadi and Time Antaeus, were interested in digital screens. At the end of 2007, there were about 700 digital screens in China, and CFG owned 625 of them
(China Film Association 2008, 36).
SARFT formed the Administration Centre of Digital Film Content in 2004. This institution was responsible for public welfare exhibition in rural areas. The centre researched and developed the Digital Movies Mobile Playing System (DMS), which used satellite or disc to transfer digital film content (Li 2006, 278). Its audio and video quality was much better than traditional 16mm films. In 2006, the project for digital film exhibition in rural counties was launched in trial areas in 8 provinces and RMB115.49 million was granted by the central and regional governments (Gan 2007, 261). In 2008, the central government purchased 7,000 digital projects for rural counties and by the end of the year, there were 26 satellite receivers and 147 registered countryside digital theatre chains and 20,000 projectors (China Film Association 2009).
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Along with the great effort of building digital theatres, the state encouraged theatres to exhibit digital domestic movies. The Rules on Encouraging Exhibiting
Domestic Digital Movies (SARFT, (2004) No.3) stated that theatres where the box office revenue from domestic digital movies accounted for two thirds of its total digital revenue a year would be refunded the total National Film Undertaking
Development Special Fund that it turned over for its digital movies in that year; and theatres would be refunded two-thirds of the Fund if the revenue of its domestic digital movies accounted for one half.
There were two significant advantages of digital screens for independent cinema.
The first one was the considerable reduction in print cost. The cost of one 35mm film print was about RMB10 thousand while a digital copy cost only about RMB1 thousand (SARFT 2005, 50). The amount of money saved was significant for low budget films. Therefore, more and more low-budget domestic movies abandoned film copies and chose to release digital copies in digital theatre chains. The second advantage of digital theatres was that the film market was able to stretch into underdeveloped or poor areas. At the time, more than 70 per cent of the total box office revenue came from theatres in metropolitan centres such as Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Hubei (Tong 2006, 68). It meant that vast areas in small cities and rural counties had not been exploited. As conglomerates already occupied the first class film market, audiences in residential areas, universities, factories, small towns and rural areas became the targets of independents. Clearly, the wave of establishing digital theatre chains subsidised by the state created the infrastructure for the development of independent cinema.
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2. The general picture of independents
A series of reform regulations in 2003 resulted in the proliferation of private movie and TV corporations. However, many of these companies were short-lived and their films had a meagre income.
2.1 For production entities: large quantity vs. small number of survival
The effect of the reform measures was obvious. Figure 12 shows that after private enterprises were legally legislated, the number of private film enterprises in 2004 more than doubled from 2003, from 48 to 103. In 2007, after three years of growth in the digital infrastructure, the number had made a three-fold increase, to
330 in 2007.
However, the majority of these corporations survived only for a short term and they obviously had an opportunistic nature. According to Zhao (2008, 40), among more than 300 small private companies, more than 260 had co-produced only one film. The study of the movie list shows that a company named Shitong Jiaxun amazingly co-produced 25 films in 2004 but suddenly disappeared and produced nothing in following years. For many small companies, film-making was not their major business. Wosen, for instance, listed more than 13 businesses that included the sale of construction material, hardware, chemical, office works and computers in its balance sheet. Some corporations did not treat film-making in a serious manner. For example, some companies even tried to change the title of a Korean
TV serial and then to sell it. Therefore, although the number of private movie and
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TV companies increased sharply, many of them were opportunistic and lacked strict management.
2.2 For independent films: large quantity vs. low budget and low
revenue
With the proliferation of private movie and TV companies, films produced or co- produced by these companies also increased.
The increase in the number of independent films had a similar pattern as the number of private movie and TV companies (see figure 13). Opening access to the film business and digital infrastructure development resulted in a sharp rise in the number of independent films. The number of independent films more than doubled, from 61 in 2003 to 129 in 2004, then had a sharp growth from 179 in
2006 to 299 in 2007. Since 2004, independent movies have accounted for more than half of the year’s total feature films, and they have become the main force in film production. However, behind the statistical growth, independent films could not free themselves from the predicament of being low budget digital productions and receiving low revenue.
Many ‘Poverty Row’ companies adopted high-definition digital video to produce cheap digital format movies. The number of digital movies increased from 11 in
2004 to 197 in 2007, an almost 20-fold leap, while film movies remained stable at about 200 (see figure 14). Furthermore, the majority of cheap digital movies were
208 produced by private companies. Movies made by private companies accounted for: all 7 produced in 2004; 47 of the 52 made in 2005; and 166 out of 197 in
2007 (see figure 15). Therefore, because independent companies produced many cheap digital movies, the total year feature films had a sharp increase.
The outlook for theatrical exhibition was not an optimistic one for low budget films. Only a small proportion (about 30 per cent) of films could be exhibited in mainstream theatres (see figure 16). Furthermore, even for some lucky low budget films shown in theatres, box office revenue was unsatisfactory. For example, between January and September in 2007, 11 films raised less than RMB10 thousand in the Beijing New Film Association theatre chain and about 70 films raised less than RMB1 million (Chen 2008, 107). Therefore, box office revenue was not the main revenue source for low-budget films.
In practice, CCTV-6 was the most important release channel for low-budget digital movies and the bid price was only RMB1 million. In my interviews with film practitioners, almost all mentioned that their movies were sold to CCTV-6 and a few of them sold to the East Movie Channel. In 2006, CCTV-6 broadcast
600 or so digital movies (China Film Association 2008, 37). CCTV-6 purchased rural life and children film genres at RMB900 thousand and historical and war genres at RMB1-1.1 million (Yue 2008, 52). After being bought by CCTV-6 at such prices, movies had few chances to explore other revenue channels as CCTV-
6 held the copyright for TV broadcasts worldwide for 50 years, and DVD copyright as well (Tan 2009, 46). Sales of broadcast and DVD copyright to other movie channels were much lower than that paid by CCTV-6. The price offered by
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East Movie Channel was about RMB500 thousand for 10 years domestic TV broadcast copyright; and the common price for DVD copyright was about
RMB200 thousand (Zhang and Li 2007).
To sum up, there was a huge increase in the number of private movie and TV corporations and independent cinemas. Indeed they became the main force in the
Chinese film industry. However, many small private companies were opportunistic and did not survive long. Normally these companies produced low- budget digital films and relied on CCTV-6 for meagre profits.
3. Main melody - the most important independent film type
To carefully classify the film market and then fill in the gaps with works that the majors ignore is the common production strategy for independents. With the concentration of the conglomerates and their Hong Kong partners in high-budget commercial films, independents were likely to produce ‘Littles’ to survive: little budgets, little characters, little background, and little stories. In practice, the majority of private film production companies produced low budget main melody films to gain government subsidies. Commercial and art house films were relatively few.
3.1 Main melody films
The reforms that paid attention to the industrial mechanism and digital technology did not mean that the government had loosened its ideological control. Film was
210 not only a business with large profits, it still had responsibilities as far as propaganda and education was concerned. In the new reform era, the government’s support became even more critical and powerful. Private companies, which had already gained equal rights with state studios, produced main melody films to gain financial support from the government.
3.1.1 Films for annual ceremonies
China was a highly centralised communist country and there were many official
Party and Army ceremonies every year. These ceremonies needed many main melody films to help the celebrations. The most significant ceremonies were Party
Foundation Day on July 1, Army Foundation Day on August 1 and National Day on October 1. Leading up to these ceremonies, especially at ten-year anniversaries, SARFT would organise a variety of public welfare exhibition activities that lasted for as long as one month, and CCTV-6 would broadcast suitable films in parallel (China Film Market 2001).
Independent companies produced many main melody films to meet a range of annual revolutionary ceremonies. For example, in 2005, for the 60th anniversary of the anti-Japanese war, there were 30 military revolutionary films, which accounted for 11.5 per cent of the total of 260 films produced in that year (Zhang and Yu 2006, 22). Among them, private corporations co-produced eight, namely:
My mother Zhao Yiman (wode muqin zhao yi man; dir. Sun Tie, 2005) by Beijing
Hongri, Diary on Travels of Kunlun (Kunlun riji; dir. Dong Ling, 2006) by
Xinjiang Yangguang Yulu, Qixia Temple 1937 (qixiasi 1937; dir. Zheng Fangnan, 211
2005) by Nanjing Jinghui and Shanghai Huamin Taige, Chang Longji (chang longji; dir. Li Jun, 2005) by Beijing Tianma Xingye, Tiexue by Nanning Teixue
Kunlun, Mystical Valley (shenmi gu; dir. Zheng Ning, 2005) by Beijing Yamei
Ya, Empty Mountain (kongshan; dir. Zhang Yiming, 2005) by Beijing Tianli
Hesheng and The Town of Water 1938 (shunzhen; dir. Xie Mingxiao, 2005) by
Shanghai Guangjiao. Other ceremonies did not escape the attention of independents. For instance, Beijing Kunjin Xingye produced Scratched Days
(huahen suiyue; dir. Gao Feng, 2005) for the centenary of the first film made in
China; East Shanghai produced Wonder Wemen (nüren bense; dir. Huang
Zhenzhen, 2007) for the tenth anniversary of the return of Hong Kong; and
Beijing Red Century produced My Career as a Teacher (wode jiaoshi shengya; dir. Zheng Kehong, 2007) for the celebration of Teachers’ Day.
3.1.2 Countryside films and children’s films
Countryside films and children’s films are two main melody genres that the state authorities have particularly spent much money and energy on.
With more than 800 million people living in the countryside, an important way to ensure sustainable development of the nation is to develop the rural economy and culture. Film and other mass media like TV and broadcast services in rural areas play a significant role in delivering the Party’s policy and ideology and in improving farmers’ scientific and technological knowledge.
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Since the end of the 1990s there have been three projects that have had a significant impact on the film service in rural areas. The first was the 2131 project which SARFT and the Country Ministry initiated in1998. The goal of the project was that, by the beginning of the 21st century, every village would exhibit one film in every month. The second project was the Tibet and Xinjiang Project proposed by the State Council in 2000. Based on the goal that every village in
China should have radio and TV, the project paid special attention to the rural areas Tibet and Xinjiang. It was the largest radio and TV broadcast infrastructure development project in China’s history. During the tenth Five-Year-Plan between
2001 and 2005, the 2131 Project and New West Project provided RMB238 million to 632 poor areas in 22 provinces and west border areas to improve facilities for the exhibition of films (Gan 2006, 270). The third project was the construction of the New Socialist Countryside Project (the State Council, (2005)
No. 1), the foremost task facing China in the 2006-2010 Five-Year period.
The countryside film service led to an increase in demand for films whose expected audiences were farmers. New Countryside Digital Movie Distribution
Corporation was formed by CFG in 2005. The corporation was in charge of purchasing films for the countryside with the government paying the cost. In the first year, it bought 200 films, and went on to buy more than 50 films annually in future years (Guan 2007, 270). In 2010 there were 7.71 million shows of public welfare digital films in the countryside (Zhao 2008).
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Children’s feature films were a weak point in the Chinese film industry. A severe rash of youth criminals in 2004 prompted the authorities to adopt stringent measures to strengthen the moral education of youth. In 2004, SARFT issued On
Financing Children’s Feature Films and Countryside Films. According to the regulation, SARFT would finance ten children’s feature films and ten countryside films every year. Based on the revenue and their ideological and artistic significance, the top ten films were granted subsidies. The costing was no more than RMB800 thousand. RMB400 thousand went to digital films.
To a great extent, the regulation stimulated the production of children’s films and countryside films. Previously, fewer than five countryside films were being produced each year. After the regulation, the number increased, with 38 in 2005,
57 in 2006 and 68 in 2007 (Zhao 2008). The proportion of children’s films of all feature films was 1 per cent in 2005 (Zhang and Yu 2006, 25), 7.2 per cent in
2006 (China Film Association 2007, 18) and 8 per cent in 2007 (China Film
Association 2008, 25). Countryside films increased from 23 to 38, children films from 16 to 25 between 2004 and 2005. By comparison, opera films, which did not have any subsidies remained static (see figure 17).
Private companies were responsible for many countryside films and children’s films. They produced and co-produced 26 out of the total of 38 countryside films, and 5 out of 7 children’s films in 20059. In 2007, they produced and co-produced
9 The number is from the analysis of the movie list in 2005 in The China film industry annual report (2005-2006) (Zhang and Yu 2006, 475-504).
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60 out of a total of 68 countryside films and 28 out of a total of 32 children’s films10. In other words, private companies participated in almost 90 per cent of countryside and children films in 2007 (see figure 18). Some main melody films made by private companies even won official awards. For example, the countryside films Warm (nuan; dir. Huo Jianqi, 2002) by Beijing Jinhai Fangzhou,
When Ruoma Was Seventeen (nuoma de shiqi sui; dir. Zhang Jiarui, 2004) by
Yunnan Liangli, and Silent Mountain (chenmo de yuanshan; dir. Zheng Kehong,
2005) produced by Hubei Red Century won Excellent Feature Film Awards at the
Huabiao Awards. The children’s film Walking To School (zoulu shangxue; dir.
Peng Jiahui and Peng Cheng, 2009), produced by Shenzhen Xin Jindian and
Hunan Runshi Rongguang, won Excellent Children’s Feature Film Award at the
Huabiao Awards.
The revenue from countryside films, except for the box office revenue in mainstream theatres, came mainly from copyright sales to CCTV-6, DVD copyright, and sales to the New Countryside Digital Movie Distribution
Corporation. For example, the countryside film Warm Spring (nuanchun; dir.
Wulan Tana, 2004) received RMB880 thousand for the sales to CCTV-6, the military and DVDs, and RMB150 thousand for sales to New Countryside (Zhang and Li 2007). In addition, the Huabiao Award was an important revenue source in itself. The Award given to Warm Spring was worth RMB1 million (Zhang and Li
2007). By contrast, the revenue sources for digital countryside films was quite
10 The number is from the analysis of the movie list in 2007 in China Film Yearbook (China Film Association 2008, 63-152).
215 limited, almost solely coming from CCTV-6, whose bid price was RMB900 thousand. In addition, if the quality proved to be very high CCTV-6 agreed to pay an additional ten per cent of the budget (Cao 2009, 13). There is now the Baihe
Award for digital movies. The winner receives RMB200 thousand, the second receives RMB150 thousand, and the third receives RMB50 thousand (Cao 2009,
13).
Countryside films were likely to show the main melody flag so as to appeal to the official judges who determined whether or not they could be released to CCTV-6,
New Countryside Distribution and the government’s Huabiao Awards. Therefore, most of them apparently sang the praises of the recent reforms and the new changes in the countryside. For instance, the digital series Anecdotes of Judge Lao
Zhang (faguan laozhang yishi; dir. Gan Feng, 2004) were about the improved legal capacity of farmers against a background of legal reform in the countryside.
Two of the Anecdotes won Huabiao Awards.
Revenue for children’s films relied to a great extent on official recommendation and group tickets in the education sector. Children’s film was another important public welfare film type in China. To strengthen the role films played in the moral education of students, the Education Department, SARFT and the Cultural
Department in 1997 issued On Doing Well the Work of Recommendation and
Distribution of Education Films for Junior and Senior Students. The rule provided for the Education Department to select 30 feature films for students and regional education departments, and they had to organise students to watch at least 2 to 3
216 films in every semester. Between 1997 and 2009 a total of more than 400 feature films, including children films, were recommended. Being recommended by the
Education Department was the most effective means of distributing children’s films. The company Haiyan Heqing collaborated with the China Communication
University to produce education-themed films. The Vice-Chancellor, Qi Weimin, had a good relationship with the Education Department in his hometown in
Heilong Jiang Province. With official recommendation, his films received satisfactory box office revenue there (Qi 2009). Fluting Red Scarf (piaoyang de honglin jin; dir. Yu Lijuan and Pan Chen, 2003) co-produced by Beijing Jingu was recommended by the Education Department as an essential film for students and received more than RMB10 million at the box office (sina 2003) (Pan 2007,
289). Invisible Wings (yinxing de chibang; dir. Feng Zhenzhi, 2007), produced by
Beijing Yinhe Meng, Xi’an Wuzhou and Hangzhou Longji won the highest award, the Golden Elephant, in 2007 at the 15th International Children’s Film
Festival held in India. The Propaganda Department and the Education Department issued a special document to recommend it (sina 2007). The film received
RMB16.16 million at the box office (China Film Association 2008, 12). Net
Mother (wangluo mama; dir. Zhou Yong, 2008) co-produced by Guangdong
Dahe, was recommended by the Education Department, SARFT and the Cultural
Ministry and had more than 300 public welfare exhibitions (chinanews 2008).
In order to be recommended for students nationwide, children’s films needed to be very main melody. All the children’s films mentioned above were about inspiring vigorous effort. Fluting Red Scarf recalled how the red scarf was born in the fierce revolution; Invisible Wings was the story about how a disabled girl
217 trained very hard to get to the Olympic Games; Net Mother, was about a girl who was injured by fire but still managed to help many kids break an addiction to the internet.
3.1.3 Current events films
Current events films that were adapted from true stories in current life and which praised the true, the good and the beautiful in socialist society were another type of popular main melody independent film. CCTV-6, due to its news features, had a high demand for such films and so further encouraged their production.
Praising local government functionaries was a common type of current event film.
For example, Hu Bei Red Century produced Silent Mountains (2005) to praise
Zhou Guozhi, a Communist cadre who dedicated himself to the local poor in a rural village in Hu Bei Province. Beijing Huaxia Golden Horse produced Selfless and Fearless (zhenshui wuxiang; dir. Xu Geng, 2006) to tell touching stories about Song Yushui, a judge in Beijing Haidian District. Dalian Henguang made a series of films about model policemen in Dalian. Qingdao Shenyuan produced
Gold Medal Worker (jinpai gongren; dir. Gao Liqiang, 2005) about a Qingdao
Port worker, Xu Zhenchao, who worked very hard and significantly increased the efficiency of the port.
Independent companies were also keen to produce films that reflected hot topics or current affairs. For instance, in October 2004, President Hu Jintao and Prime
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Minister Wen Jiabao called for lessons to be learnt from Zhou Guozhi, and in the following March Silent Mountains appeared. Beijing Sunmingqiang produced the first anti-evil religious film Flower Street (huajie; dir. Mao Yao, 2002) in 2000 at a time when China was suppressing Falun Gong. In April 2003 Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) prevailed in China and two months later the first
SARS film, Unshirkable Duty (yibu rongci; dir. Wang Huanwu, 2003), was broadcast on CCTV-6.
Apart from these hot topics and events, other current phenomena, such as environmental protection, farmer workers, Korean fashion and the martial arts craze, were adopted as themes in independent cinema. In one of the interviews I conducted, one producer said,
‘The key point is to grasp the current topics’.
‘With the experience of two or three films, you will know exactly the
formula of how to produce a main melody film. It must be based on the
true stories in actual life.’
Then he continued,
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‘It must praise rather than criticize. Main characters are mainstream, not
marginal. No coarse language, prostitutes, gambling or drugs. Ultimately,
it must have a brightly happy ending, not grey and dull.’
To sum up, films for Party and national ceremonies, countryside films, children’s films and current event films were the most representative main melody film types in independent cinema. The state-owned CCTV-6, digital theatre chains and countryside theatre chains, and the government’s Huabiao Awards were their main distribution channels.
3.2 Traditional Chinese culture films
While so many independents undisguisedly praised the leadership of the Party, some independent cinema focused on folk art. Main melody films relied on official support and gained benefit from the domestic film market. By contrast, folk art films took advantage of the enormous traditional culture in China and explored the overseas market.
Two independents – Beijing Sun Mingqiang and Hangzhou Jingu – were outstanding in this respect. The Beijing Sun Mingqiang company spent only
RMB800 thousand on a leather-silhouette show film, Roads to Rich (xiaokang lushing; dir. Mao Yao, 2003). It was the first shadow show film made in China. It depicted the excellence of traditional shadow show and added other folk art forms such as stilts and somersaults to improve its beauty. Korea purchased the film for
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RMB400 thousand and CCTV-6 and Countryside Distribution bought it as well
(1394bbs 2004). After that, the company produced another folk art film which described Wulanmuqi, a hunting tribe folk art group from the Inner Mongolia grassland.
Hangzhou Jingu Film & TV Planning Co., Ltd. was formed by the combination of the private Beijing jingo and the State Zhejiang film distribution company. The corporation planned and developed a series of non-material cultural heritage films.
The films were based on the legends of Chinese folk arts under special state protection. The first series included wax printing, shadow play, Kunqu opera and
Lung-chuan sword. The corporation took full advantage of its state-owned status and sought to obtain local government support by coordinating with the district where the legends originated. In addition, they actively explored overseas markets by taking part in film festivals. Their films were purchased by Japan KACOON and Taiwan Film Association (Pan 2008, 287).
To some extent folk art films belong to the grouping of main melody. They raised the slogan ‘using films to protect our traditional culture and original art’.
Therefore it is understandable that such films would be shown on CCTV-6.
Furthermore, due to their identity of Chinese traditional culture, they would be welcomed by overseas markets. Therefore, although CCTV-6 normally bought the worldwide rights to the films it acquires, in these cases, these projects’ owners would negotiate with CCTV-6 to keep the overseas broadcast rights. So these folk art films had one more distribution channel than normal main melody films.
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3.3 Copycatting comedy films
Unique and special films were needed to entertain young audiences in China. The conglomerates produced transnational commercial films, which featured
‘superstars’ from the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, and aimed to occupy the whole East Asia market. Uncompetitive high-budget films led to an attempt to try to satisfy as large an audience as possible. Thus the generation of more and more conservative and mainstream stories could not be avoided. One of the proofs of this was that almost all blockbusters were historical epic films. Several years before, white-collar workers with high education and high salaries were regarded as the majority of the film audience in China.
However, surprisingly, according to the latest audience investigation, the average age of the present domestic audience is only 21.7 years (Zheng et al. 2009). The investigation also showed that while Hollywood was the favourite for white-collar office workers, fashion, craze and comedy were admired by high school and college students (Zheng et al. 2009).
Crazy stone (fengkuang de shitou; dir. Ning Hao, 2006) was a very significant originator of the copycat comedy films. The film was funded by Beijing Sifang
Yuanchuan and Hong Kong’s Andy Lau’s ‘Focus: First Cuts’ series. The story was about how the two opposite ends of the law – bandits and police – crazily dealt with a piece of jade. The film was pieced together in a ridiculous imitation of Hollywood blockbusters and Hong Kong fashion, and was filled with funny grass-roots dialogue. The movie was shot digitally on HD cameras and budgeted only RMB3 million (Wikipedia). Reports about its black comedy style and its
222 novelty spread quickly by word of mouth and it received RMB23 million at total box office revenue in Mainland China (Wikipedia).
Two years after Crazy Stone, a similar film appeared: Almost Perfect (shiquan jiumei; dir. Wang Yuelun, 2008). The movie was produced by Beijing Happy Star and Zhejiang Superstar. It obviously followed the path of Crazy Stone, boldly laughing at authority and the upper classes through shameless fabrication. The producer, Li Xiang, a famous TV entertainment programme host, said the comedy film was specially made for people who were born in the late 1980s (Yan 2008).
The film cost only RMB3.5 million, although an additional RMB4 million was spent on promotion. It received RMB50 million at the box office (Ning et al.
2009).
That these low-budget comedy commercial films were able to contest with high- budget films in theatre chains demonstrates the qualities of independent cinema.
However, such films were quite rare on this stage.
3.4 Art house films
An art house film is typically regarded as a seriously non-commercial independent film. However, in the conglomerates age, Chinese art films are quite few.
After the censorship environment was relaxed in 2003, many former underground directors came back to the state system. Jia Zhangke had The World, Wang
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Xiaoshuai had Qinghong and Zhang Yuan had Little Red Flowers (kanshang qu henmei; dir. Zhang Yuan, 2005). These films won numerous awards at international film festivals. However, they tended to circulate in foreign markets rather than in domestic ones. Jia Zhangke said that the traditional market for his films was in North America and Europe, where his Xiao Wu, Platform and
Unknown Pleasure sold very well (Zhizi 2005). Wang Xiaoshuai also said that his reputation was guaranteed by the stable circulation and revenue in foreign markets
(QQ 2005). Therefore, although their films produced little income in the domestic market, their overseas revenue was satisfactory, with RMB120 million coming in for The World and RMB80 million for Qinghong, by comparison with their domestic revenue of RMB450 thousand and RMB3.55 million, respectively
(Zhang 2007) (Lu 2005) (Wu and Xu 2005) (daliandaily 2005). The reason that
The World performed so badly was that it lacked interesting and exciting plots.
Other directors such as Zhang Yuan and Tian Zhuangzhuang had similar experiences. Thus, the Sixth Generation’s films had little relationship with the domestic film industry. Furthermore, these well-established filmmakers often had links with conglomerated bodies. For example, Jia Zhangke was part of Shanghai
Film Group and Century Hero invested in Zhangyuan’s Little Red Flowers.
Accordingly, these ‘major’ art films fall outside the terms of this thesis.
Few other low-budget art films deserve to be mentioned, except for Tuya’s
Marriage (tuya de hunshi; dir. Wang Quan’an, 2007). The film was produced by a small, private company, Xi’an Film Production Company. The story takes place in
Mongolia. A woman, Tuya, wants to re-marry after her husband becomes disabled, but things are difficult because she insisted on feeding her ex-husband.
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Tuya’s Marriage was the first low budget art film widely released in theatres.
After it won a Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film Festival, many film reviewers and distributors paid more attention to it. Finally, the Huaxia
Distribution Company, one of the two State distributors that monopolised the right to import Hollywood movies, took it over. The strategy adopted by Huaxia was one of wide release. The distribution company prepared 100 prints of the film and re-scheduled the times for imported films so as to leave time for this film to be exhibited (sohu 2007). The film was screened not only at theatre chains in big cities, but also at digital theatre chains and countryside theatre chains; it was the first time that a domestic low-budget art film had enjoyed preferential treatment over the expensive commercials (sohu 2007). However, in the end, the film received only RMB3 million at the box office (sohu 2007).
The experience of Tuya’s Marriage was that awards at important foreign film festivals were still the most important ingredient for success for low-budget art films. In Tuya’s case, its Berlin award made it able to recoup its costs (sohu
2007).
Conclusion
During the process of the reform ‘industrialising Chinese cinema’, state authorities on the one hand encouraged the conglomerates and their high budget commercial films to occupy the expensive theatre chains in metropolitan cities to grab huge economic profits, on the other hand it developed a cheap but wide digital distribution network, movie channels and digital theatre chains for low 225 budget films. At the same time with the construction of infrastructure, the government issued a series of regulations to guarantee main melody films as the content of these state owned distribution and release channels.
In this milieu, many independent companies, that is to say, small private companies, used opportunist tactics on the policies and produced main melody films for the state. In this way, the state played the role of a service buyer and independent films acted as a service provider. As a result, the state strictly controlled the development of independents.
Some film types such as low budget commercial and art films which did not rely on government subsidies and which therefore possessed the true qualities of independence, remained quite thin in the market.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion
This thesis is a study of how political management has determined the development of Chinese independent cinema. The study has taken media economics as the research approach and used documentary analysis and interviews as its main methods.
The thesis began with a general review about the definition and business of
American independent cinema. Then, after a literature review of Chinese independent cinema, it noted a significant gap in the previous study. In summary, it found that the traditional definition of Chinese independent cinema is very problematic while ‘within-system’ independent cinema, another form of Chinese independent cinema, has been overlooked. Simultaneously, in the same part, a new definition was suggested and the research target, the within-system independents, referring to small private film companies and their films, was established.
After several case studies on the changes in the careers of the most famous
Chinese directors, the thesis then pointed out that state studios and private film companies were the two most essential domestic backers for filmmaking in China.
After that, the body of the thesis provided an examination of the development of within-system independent cinema. Specifically, three factors were studied:
227 government intervention, the majors’ performance (state studios and, later, the conglomerates) and the market conduct of independent cinema at various trajectories.
Research outcomes of this study reflect three aspects. First, the thesis pointed out the literature gap in the study of Chinese independent cinema and the root of the problematic definition of Chinese independent cinema. It has proposed a new definition. Second, the thesis linked the development of Chinese independent cinema to the macroeconomic level and found a pattern of development between independent cinema and the private economic sector and state studios. Third, the thesis examined the relationship between political management and the market conduct of Chinese independent cinema at different historical trajectories.
1. A new definition
Four aspects are noteworthy in the review of American independent cinema.
Firstly, industrial orientation is the most important basis of any definition of independent cinema. Secondly, independent cinema is a relational term, relational to the dominant system. With the changes in the balance of majors the discourse of independent cinema might be different. Thirdly, factors such as the growth in media needs and available capital investment, the improvement of independent infrastructure and conservatism of Hollywood are important factors in the boom of American independents. Fourthly, independent cinema is identified as a challenge to mainstream, and with the development of Code and Rating Systems,
228 exploitation, commercial and critical art films are the representatives American independent types.
The review of Chinese independent cinema in this thesis reveals that little effort has been made in the study of ‘within-system’ independents. More significantly, because scholars have generally utilised a definition of Chinese independent cinema that lacked a solid economic basis, many authors have been at odds in studying the transformation of Chinese independent cinema in recent years.
Drawing insights from American independent experience, this thesis has proposed a new definition of Chinese independent cinema, namely: any film that has not been financed, produced and/or distributed by the majors is independent. Starting from that point, the thesis argued that the discourse of Chinese independent cinema changed after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. Before this time, state studios were the dominant majors and films not produced by state studios were, therefore, independent. They included underground films and films produced by private companies and which were officially approved. After China’s accession to the WTO, economic reform resulted in the conglomeration of the film industry.
The conglomerates, the state system and foreign sources became the new dominant majors. Correspondingly, films which were made by small, private film companies and whose target market was domestic audience were independent films.
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This new definition is based on relatively solid industrial ground and is useful for a practical application. The definition consists of both within-system and out-of- system independents (underground). Furthermore, the definition can explain many emerging realities in the new millennium.
This thesis has, therefore, focused on within-system independent cinema that was officially approved and circulated in the domestic film market; or, in other words, independent cinema in the Chinese film market.
2. The development of Chinese independent cinema is due to the rise of
private sector capital and the decline of the state studio system.
Independent film production increased when the private sector became stronger and the state studios system weakened. The rise in the private sector provided the necessary capital for private film production, while the problems of state studios created new opportunities for private capital to invest in films.
In 1985, the director Zhang Gang established his company. It was the first private film production company in China (it was named ‘institute’, not daring to directly use the term ‘company’). At that time, in the mid-1980s, the private sector was still very weak and whether it was good or bad for media was still a matter for vigorous debate in the political sphere. For state studios, 1985 represented the second year that the state had withdrawn subsidies and studios were forced to
230 raise their own funds. In the late 1980s, many state studios were required to adopt a contracting out policy to reduce financial burdens. Some elite directors gradually separated from the studios and established private film production companies. These companies were in the elementary stage, quite limited in number and scale. More importantly, those film production companies were director-centred, which meant that private capital did not consciously invest in film production.
The real development of independent cinema began in the 1990s when the private sector accelerated its development large scale. By the mid-1990s, as mentioned above, almost all studios were experiencing severe debts. For state studios, private capital became a straw to clutch at. In contrast, the private sector gained significant development during this period. Private capital began to invest in the film industry and was responsible for the majority of film output in the first half of the 1990s. Large amounts of private capital moved to the film industry. Some capital flowed directly into studios, some into directors’ workshops or companies, and other capital was devoted to establishing film production companies, despite the relatively low sums involved.
In the late 1990s, state studios received significant subsidies and concentrated on main melody film production. The state film industry was heavily regulated both in output and style. Meanwhile, in the private sector, rising stars of the business world, with strong capital ability, had emerged. In Feng Xiaogang’s autobiography (2003), he mentions how he tried to flatter rich businessmen in
231 order to gain financial support. According to his jokey description, those entrepreneurs had businesses in every rich areas in Beijing; they did not settle in the Olympic Village area just because they sympathised with the State. Some of those entrepreneurs entered into the film industry and began modern cultural corporations like Huayi Bros and New Picture. To some extent they saved the sinking ship of the Chinese film industry and significantly influenced the future direction of Chinese cinema.
In the 2000s, a few state studios and some private firms transferred into conglomerates. In contrast to the major studios, mid and small size studios still could not extricate themselves from a difficult financial position. The private sector continued to sustain development in the general economy; its contribution to GDP reaching one-third. Simultaneously, large numbers of small private film production and distribution firms mushroomed. They made a clear and definite commitment to replace small state studios in the active exploration of the domestic film market.
To sum up, the more difficulties the state studios encountered the more smoothly the private sector moved forward; the better this was for the development of independent cinema.
After periodically examining political management and the behaviour of the majors (state studios and the conglomerates) and independent cinema, the thesis
232 has identified the relationship between political management and the development of Chinese independent cinema. The relationship is very different before and after
China’s entry into the WTO.
3. Independent cinema contributed in a positive way to film
commercialisation.
Government intervention in independent cinema mostly occurred in the production sphere. On the one hand, state authorities increasingly welcomed private capital to invest in film production. In 1993, the document On
Strengthening of the Management about Film Studios Fund-raising from Outside
(No 530) was the first official document to openly encourage studios to raise funds from outside. In 1995, the regulation About the Reform on the Management of Feature Film Production expanded the scope of the market for the state system to allocate resources. According to the regulation, in addition to the 16 state studios, another 13 provincial and city-level state studios were approved to produce feature films; and if private investments accounted more than 70 per cent
(reduced to 30 per cent the next year), they could co-sign with the studio as a
‘joint- producer’. In 1997, the regulation Individual Case License of Feature Film
Production provided that the right of film production was expanded to state film units and TV production units, then to private film and TV companies next year.
On the other hand, and more importantly, state authorities discriminated against private capital. The government used production licenses, behavioural regulation
233 and huge subsidies for main melody films to control the activities of private film productions. Firstly, all regulations concerning private investment emphasised that private capital should be under the management of responsible studios. Only state studios or other relative film units were authorised to produce films. No private film production companies received licences for individual productions until
1997. Secondly, the government used censorship to take ideological control of private productions. Along with the regulation of nominal affiliation, the regulation of examining scripts before shooting was reaffirmed after the Changsha
Meeting in 1996. Ideological issues or hints in film content were strictly scrutinised by government officials. Thirdly, by comparison to the discrimination against private film productions, the government introduced heavy taxation to form several funds and awards to subsidise state studios to produce high quality main melody.
Therefore, government interventions in film production welcomed private investment while also inhibiting the political or cultural position of private film productions. The interventions in film production led to an inequity in the market structure.
The government intervention in the distribution and exhibition sphere during this period involved settling accounts according to the number of prints, dismantling the monopoly of CFC, importing Hollywood blockbusters and protecting domestic films. These regulations attempted to create efficiency in the film industry. However, they failed. Along with the new settling of accounts, a quota
234 was set that imposed restrictions on the maximum and minimum price. Therefore, the reform did not generate a significant incentive to film production. After dismantling the monopoly of the CFC, the monopolisation of the film industry was still inflexible and the situation became even worse than before. The order of the film market was messy and much box office revenue was deducted by local theatres. The proportion of revenue returned to production was still quite low.
More disconcerting was the fact that Hollywood imports attracted the majority of audiences and squeezed the domestic cinema into an even smaller room. Domestic film protection regulation could not reverse the trend.
Government intervention in film distribution failed to create an efficient film market. The majors were state studios subsidised to produce many high budget main melody films. The dominant films in the market were Hollywood imports, which attracted the greatest audience.
Independent cinema in this period budgeted to reduce expenditure, but, more significantly, found unique ways to broaden its sources of income. Independent producers devoted themselves to creating mainstream commercial films. When state studios focused on the production of sanctimonious main melody or elitist art films, which were far removed from the masses and reality, independent producers created many entertaining films to relax audiences. Many Kung-fu and detective films, dramas and comedies were produced. They were harmless to the communist government, and audiences loved them. Such entertaining films generated significant box office revenue in the first half of the 1990s. The
235 popularity of films by Zhang Gang and Chen Peisi showed that comedies with a root in everyday real life and exposing some minor social problems were extremely attractive to domestic audiences. This feature was strengthened and maintained in independent cinema during the second half of the 1990s when censorship became tough. Independent cinema consciously pulled itself onto a more mainstream track. Under the big themes of apparently singing the praises of socialism and Party authorities, independent cinema insisted on describing the daily life of the common people to cater to audiences. Family, love, warmth, the arousal of enthusiasm, tears, and laughter were the basic elements in independent cinema. Films directed by Feng Xiaogang and Zhang Yimou in this period illustrate this poin.
Independent cinema in the late-1990s for the first time made good use of advertising in the film market. Chinese cinema relied solely on revenue from the sale of content (box office revenue) by the mid-1990s. Due to the inefficient film market, many films could not cover their costs at the box office. In order to broaden revenue sources, cultural entrepreneurs began to sell space to advertisers.
Feng Xiaogang’s films in the late-1990s were the first to insert advertising into films (product placement) and cinemas.
Furthermore, independent producers began to explore international mainstream markets. In the late 1990s, entrepreneurs collaborated with famous directors like
Feng Xiaogang and Zhang Yimou. Their mainstream commercial films gave up
236 niche art house markets in foreign countries and began to enter mainstream international markets.
To sum up, independent cinema was subjected to the supervision of the state system and subsequently reflected mainstream features. However, independent cinema also tried to be interesting and to amuse general audiences. Furthermore, independent cinema for the first time sold film as a commodity to advertisers.
Thus, the nature of the dual product film market – content product and access to audiences for advertisers – was operational in independent cinema. Independent cinema for the first time began to explore international mainstream markets. In this respect, it was independent cinema that reflected the market economy and film commercialisation in the Chinese film industry.
4. Independent cinema contributed to the production of main melody
films.
A new round of drastic reform for ‘industrialising Chinese cinema’ began after
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. The government’s support generated unprecedented opportunities for the development of the film industry. A range of mandatory measures established movie theatre chain systems, computer-sale systems and integrated film groups. Private capital gained legitimacy in almost all the sectors in film business. The agreement of CEPA acted as a catalyst for Hong
Kong co-productions. The power of capital quickly rose to become more
237 significant than administrative power. The film industry entered the age of the conglomerates and became increasingly polarised.
Majors were the state or private conglomerates. Their high budget Hong Kong co- productions and Hollywood imports divided up the market half and half.
During the modernisation reform, the government did not ignore the ideological function of films. State authorities subsidised and founded a cheap but wide digital distribution network for low budget films and at the same time issued a series of regulations to guarantee the distribution and release of main melody films.
State film administrations allocated air frequency and satellite resources and authorised state film groups to form movie channels. Then SARFT partnered CFG to establish a low-tech standard digital theatre chain in rural areas; both central and local governments subsidised this huge project. The advantages of these two channels are apparent. First, the media content could be in digital format, which led to a considerable reduction in production cost. Second, these two channels were accessible to the masses because their networks were huge and they were free. These two advantages guaranteed the possibility of transferring large amounts of content to a large number of customers.
238
With the construction of infrastructure, a range of concerned regulations were issued to restrict programme types and the quantity aired in these movie channels and digital theatre chains. Moreover, the government purchased many main melody films for these two channels. Ceremony films, countryside films, children’s films, and current event films with main melody themes were on the list of necessities in the government purchasing plan.
The ideal industrial environment for independent cinema was still a long way off.
The limited number of screens and high ticket prices meant that low budget films were relatively inaccessible to audiences. The problem of pirated copies was still severe. The implementation of the rating system was still a long way off and the criteria for censorship were indefinite in China.
Therefore, in this situation, many independent films adopted a conservative and secure way of producing main melody films rather than confronting more risky theatrical competition. Because of their reliance on state distribution channels, there was no departure from the dominant norms of ideology. By comparison, commercial films catering to teenagers, and thought-provoking art films popular in independent film types in many nations, are very rare in today’s China.
Conclusion
239
This study has examined how political management has determined the development of independent cinema and how independent cinema has trversed various historical trajectories.
The key findings of the study are as follows:
1. A solid definition is lacking. Most significantly, scholars have overlooked
the existence and the significance of within-system Chinese independent
cinema. In light of the American independent experience, this thesis has
proposed a new definition, which is that any film that has not been
financed, produced and/or distributed by majors is independent. Before
2003, the state system was the monopoly system and any film which was
funded and produced by private entities was independent. There were two
types of independent cinema in China. One was out-of-system and the
other was within-system. After 2003, private companies had the same
rights as state studios. In the new era, conglomerates, state studios and
foreign sources became dominant. Correspondingly, in general, films
made by small, private film companies and whose target market was
domestic audience were independent cinema.
2. The development of Chinese independent cinema is a result of the rise of
the private sector and the decline of the state studio system. As state
studios encountered difficulties, the private sector moved forward. This
situation impacted on the development of independent cinema.
240
3. Before 2003, the Chinese film industry had no real effective
commercialisation. The government controlled independent cinema by
means of licenses and censorship. State studios produced main melody
films and Hollywood films attracted most audiences. Independent cinema
focused on mainstream commercial films and contributed to film
commercialisation.
4. After 2003, the film industry was polarised and immature. The
government created distribution and exhibition opportunities for main
melody films. Conglomerates collaborated with Hong Kong players. Hong
Kong co-productions and Hollywood occupied the film market. Small
private film companies produced many main melody films to earn meagre
profits.
241
Appendix 1 Figures
Figure 1: Total feature films between 1978 and 1984
(Source: From Beijing Film Studio to China Film Group: 30 years of China film production (Yu and Zhang 2008)).
242
Figure 2: Distribution and exhibition structure before 1993
State studios
CFC
Province distributors (about 32)
City distributors (about 400)
Town distributors (about 2000)
Exhibition theatres
243
Figure 3: Distribution and exhibition structure after the reform
State studios
Province distributors
City distributors
Town distributions
Exhibition theatres
Figure 4: Theatre chain system
Production
Distribution
Theatre chains
244
245
Figure 6: Hong Kong co-productions between 1997 and 2006
(Source: Analysis the Cooperation Film Market between Hong Kong and Inland
(Zhang 2007)).
50 45 40 35 productions
- 30 25 20 15 10 5
Hong Kong co 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Figure 7: Annual film output between 2003 and 2007
(Source: 2008 Research report on Chinese film industry, Page 4).
246
Figure 8: Annual box office revenue between 2003 and 2007
(Source: The China film industry annual report (2005-2006) (Zhang and Yu 2006,
131) and xinhuanet 2008)).
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5 Box office revenue, billion RMB billion revenue, office Box 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
247
Figure 9: The cost of some blockbusters
(Source: Research report on Chinese film industry 2007-2009, edited by China
Film Association).
800
600
400
200
0 (millionRMB) Hero House of The The Curse Red Cliff Cost of blockbusters of blockbusters Cost Flying Promise of Golden Daggers Flower
248
Figure 10: The number of films aired by some major movie channels in 2005
(Source: 2005-2006 The China film industry annual report (Zhang and Yu 2006,
231, 234)).
Movie Channel Films aired
CCTV-6 3285
East Movie Channel 2094
Changying Movie Channel 2200
Shanxi Movie Channel 1800
249
Figure 11: Advertisement revenue (million RMB) of CCTV-6 and East Movie
Channel between 2003 and 2006
(Source: 2008 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film Association
2008, 217, 235)).
250
Figure 12: The number of private movie and TV companies between 2001and
2007
(Source: 2005-2006 The China film industry annual report (Zhang and Yu 2006,
30); 2007 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film Association
2007, 47); 2008 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film
Association 2008, 31) and the analysis of movie lists in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008 China Film Yearbook).
Year Small Private movie & TV corporations
2001 24
2002 38
2003 48
2004 103
2005 144
2006 152
2007 330
(a)
251
350 300 250 Private movie & 200 TV corporations 150 100 50 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(b)
252
Figure 13: The number of movies produced or co-produced by private movie and TV corporations, total year feature films and the proportion between
2001 and 2007
(Source: 2005-2006 The China film industry annual report (Zhang and Yu 2006,
30); 2007 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film Association
2007, 47); 2008 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film
Association 2008, 31) and the analysis of movie lists in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008 China Film Yearbook).
Year Movies by Small Total year Proportion
Private feature films
2001 26 80 30
2002 35 100 35
2003 61 140 44
2004 129 212 61
2005 172 260 66
2006 179 330 54
2007 299 402 74
(a)
253
350
300 Movies by Small Private 250
200
150
100
50
0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(b)
450 400 350 300 Movies by the 250 State 200 Movies by Small 150 Private 100 50 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(c)
254
Figure 14: The number of digital movies, year total feature films and the proportions of the digital movies between the year 2004 and 2007
(Source: 2008 Research report on Chinese film industry (China Film Association
2008, 35); 2005 China Film Yearbook (China Film Association 2005, 64-126)).
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Digital 11 52 110 197 movies
Film movies 201 208 220 205
Total 212 260 330 402 movies
Proportion 5 20 33 49
(a)
(b)
255
Figure 15: The proportions of digital movies made by private companies in
2004, 2005 and 2007
(Source: Analysis from Movie List in 2005-2006, the China film industry annual report (Zhang and Yu 2006, 475-504), 2005 China Film Yearbook (China Film
Association 2005, 64-126) and 2008 China Film Yearbook (China Film
Association 2008, 63-152)).
250
200
150 Digital movies by State
100 Digital movies by Private
50
0 2004 2005 2007
256
Figure 16: The number of films shown in theatres and the proportions between 2004 and 2007
(Source: Genres of domestic low budget films (Chen 2008, 107)).
2004 2005 2006 2007
Movies shown in 40 60 85 150 theatres
Total feature films 212 260 330 402
Proportion 19 23 26 37
(a)
450 400 350 300 Movies unshown in 250 theatres 200 Movies shown in theatres 150 100 50 0 2004 2005 2006 2007
(b)
257
Figure 17: Comparison of the number of domestic countryside films, children’s films and opera films
(Source: The China film industry annual report (2005-2006) (Zhang and Yu 2006,
25)).
40 35 30 2004 25 2005 20 15 10 5 0 Countryside films Children films Opera films
258
Figure 18: Proportion between countryside films by private corporations and by state in 2007 (a); proportion between children films by private corporations and by state in 2007 (b).
(a)
(b)
259
Appendix 2 Tables
Table 1: Ownership composition in industrial output (%)
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
State-owned 77.6 76.0 64.9 54.6 32.6 27.0 or controlled
Collectives 22.4 23.5 32.1 35.6 35.6 36.3
Private 0 0.5 3.1 9.7 31.8 36.8
Table 2: Ownership composition in retail sales of consumer goods (%)
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
State-owned 54.6 51.4 40.4 39.6 39.8 20.7 or controlled
Collectives 43.3 44.6 37.2 31.7 19.3 16.6
Private 2.1 4.0 22.4 28.7 40.9 62.7
Note: State-owned means 100 per cent state ownership. State-controlled means the state has 51 per cent or more shares in joint ventures or joint stock companies.
Collectives refer to urban collective enterprises and rural township-village
260 enterprises. Private enterprises refer to the rest, including foreign firms. Source:
China's Transition to a Market Economy: How Far across the River? (Qian and
Wu 2000).
Table 3: Plan targets, average cost per feature, budget, state subsidies, and vacancy of Shanghai, Changchun and Beijing studios in 1992
(Source: Reform and Chinese cinema (ed. Ni 1994, 93)).
Studio Plan Average cost Budget State Vacancy
targets per feature (RMB subsidies (RMB
(RMB million) (RMB million)
million) million)
Shanghai 15 0.95 14.25 4.00 10.25
Changchun 17 1.10 18.70 8.60 10.10
Beijing 15 1.02 15.30 3.80 11.50
261
Table 4: Total personnel and personnel expenses of Shanghai, Changchun,
Beijing studios in 1992
(Source: Reform and Chinese cinema (ed. Ni 1994, 89)).
Studio Total Personnel Personnel
Expenses (RMB million)
Staff on Retired Other Total Salary Medical Other Total
the job care
Shanghai 1583 800 191 2574 8.4 2.2 4.4 15
Changchun 2270 1100 1200 4570 5.9 5 5 15.9
Beijing 1400 500 475 2375 3 1.2 4.8 9
262
Table 5: Personnel structure of staff on the job in Shanghai, Changchun,
Beijing studios in 1992
(Source: Reform and Chinese cinema (ed. Ni 1994, 92)).
Studio Major Assistant creative Labourer Administrator
creative staff staff
Shanghai 220 335 751 309
Changchun 286 514 1145 334
Beijing 225 172 730 210
263
Table 6: Annual feature production in PRC, 1996-2002
(Source: Chinese National Cinema (Zhang 2004, 197)).
Year Total feature films
1992 166
1996 110
1997 85
1998 82
1999 99
2000 83
2001 80
2002 100
264
Table 7: Some emerging film conglomerates
Conglomerates The relationship with state enterprises
and/or patrons
Century Hero China International Trust and Investment
Corporation (CITIC),
China Film Group
Orange Sky Hongkong Golden Harvest Film
Enlight Pictures Enlight Media
Warner China Film Hengdian Group China Film Group,
American Warner Group,
Hengdian Group
265
Filmography
A Girl in Danger (weiqing shaonü; dir. Lou Ye, 1994)
A Time to Remember (hongse lianren; dir. Ye Daying, 1998)
A Walk in the Clouds (dir. Alfonso Arau, 1995)
Almost Perfect (shiquan jiumei; dir. Wang Yuelun, 2008)
A’Man (aman xiju xilie; dir. Zhang Gang, 1984-2006)
An Interim Father (linshi baba; dir. Chen Peisi, 1993)
Anecdotes of Judge Lao Zhang (faguan laozhang yishi; dir. Gan Feng, 2004)
Angel Is Not Lonely (tianshi bu jimo; dir. Zhang Fanfan, 2002)
Assembly (jijie hao; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2007)
Bad Boys (dir. Michael Bay, 1995)
Banquet (yeyan; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2006)
Baobei in Love (lian’ai zhongde baobei; dir. Li Shaohong, 2004)
Barber (lifa shi; dir. Chen Yifei, 2006)
Be There Be Square (bujian busan; dir.Feng Xiaogang, 1998)
Beijing Bastards (Beijing zazhong; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1993)
Beijing Bicycle (Beijing de danche; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 2001)
Beyond Our Ken (gongzhu fuchou ji; dir. Peng Haoxiang, 2004)
266
Big Shot’s Funeral (dawan; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2001)
Blind Shaft (mangjing; dir. Li Yang, 2003)
Bloody Brothers (yuba tianxia; dir. Jin Gang, 1994)
Blush (hongfen; dir. Li Shaohong, 1995)
Bonnie and Clyde (dir. Arthur Penn, 1967)
Breaking the Silence (piaoliang mama; dir. Sun Zhou, 2000)
Cala.My Dog! (kala shi tiao gou, dir. Lu Xuechang, 2003)
Chairman Liu Shaoqi (liu shaoqi; dir. Fu Hongxing, 1998)
Chang Longji (chang longji; dir. Li Jun, 2005)
Contest (jiaoliang, 1996)
Cosmos and Man (yuzhou yu ren; dir. Xin Yingyi, 2001)
Crazy Stone (fengkuang de shitou, dir. Ning Hao, 2006)
Criminal (xinzhen fengyun; dir. Gao Fei, 1994)
Cross River (guojiang long; dir. Wang Jun, 1995)
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (dir. Ang Li, 2000)
Devils on the Doorstep (guizi laile; dir. Jiang Wen, 2000)
Diary on Travels of Kunlun (Kunlun riji; dir. Dong Ling, 2006)
Die Hard (dir. John McTiernan, 1995)
Dirt (toufa luanle; dir. Guan Hu, 1994)
267
Divorce Contract (lihun hetong; dir. Song Jiangbo, 1990)
Du Du (dudu; dir. Jia Zhangke, 1996)
East Palace West Palace (donggong xigong; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1996)
Empty Mountain (kongshan; dir. Zhang Yiming, 2005)
Farewell My Concubine (bawang bieji; dir. Chen Kaige, 1993)
Farewell My Love (yongshi wo’ai; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 1994).
Fatal Decision (shengsi juezhe; dir. Yu Benzheng, 2000)
Fight for Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou (dazhan ning hu hang; dir. Wei Lian,
1997)
Filial Son and Filial Piety (xiaozi xiansun cihou zhe; dir. Chen Peisi, 1994)
Flower Street (huajie; dir. Mao Yao, 2002)
Fluting Red Scarf (piaoyang de honglin jin; dir. Yu Lijuan and Pan Chen, 2003)
Flying with You (banni gaofei; dir. Li Hong, 1998)
For Fun (zhaole; dir. Ning Ying, 1992)
Forbidden Kingdom (dir. Rob Minkoff, 2008)
Forrest Gump (dir. Robert Zemeckis, 1994)
From Slave To General (cong nuli dao jiangjue; dir. Wang Yan, 1979)
From Victory to Victory (nanzheng beizhan; dir. Cheng Yin and Tang Xiaodan,
1974)
268
Frozen (jidu hanleng; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 1996)
Gold Medal Worker (jinpai gongren; dir. Gao Liqiang, 2005)
Gone with the Wind (dir. Victor Fleming, 1939)
Great Friend –Zhou Enlai (weida de pengyou zhou enlai; dir. Song Chong and
Shen Lei, 1998)
Guerrillas on the Plain (pingyuan youjidui; dir. Su Li, 1955)
Happy Times (xingfu shiguang; dir. Zhang Yimou, 2001)
Havoc in Heaven (danao tiangong; dir. Wan Laiming, 1961)
Her Majesty is Fine (taihou jixiang; dir. Chen Peisi, 1995)
Hero (yingxiong; dir. Zhang Yimou, 2002)
Hibiscus Town (furong zhen; dir. Xie Jin, 1987)
Horse Thief (daoma zei, dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1986)
House of Flying Daggers (shimian maifu; dir. Zhang Yimou, 2004)
If You Are the One (feicheng wurao; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2008)
In the Heat of the Sun (yangguang canlan de rizi; dir. Jiang Wen, 1995)
Inglourious Basterds (Quentin Tarantino, 2009)
Invisible Wings (yinxing de chibang; dir. Feng Zhenzhi, 2007)
Iron Monkey (tiexue zhuangshi; dir. Zhao Lujiang, 1995)
Japanese Story (dir. Sue Brooks, 2003)
269
Jasmine Women (moli huakai; dir. Hou Yong, 2004)
Jaws (dir. Steven Spielberg, 1975)
Joint Attack (lianhe chuji; dir. Huo Yongfu and Xue Cun, 1996)
Ju Dou (ju dou; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1990)
Keep Cool (youhua haohao shuo; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1997)
Kekexili (keke xili; dir. Luchuan, 2004)
Killing Me Softly (dir. Chen Kaige, 2002)
King of Lanling (lanling wang; dir. Hu Xuehua, 1995)
King of the Children (haizi wang; dir. Chen Kaige, 1987)
Letter From An Unknown Woman (yige mosheng nüren de laixin; dir. Xu Jinglei,
2004)
Life on a String (bianzou bianchang; dir. Chen Kaige, 1991)
Little Red Flowers (kanshang qu henmei; dir. Zhang Yuan, 2005)
Love in the Internet Era (wangluo shidai de aiqing; dir. Jin Chen, 1998)
Lovers’ Tears (zhi’ai qingyuan; dir. Li Guoli, 1996)
Lunar Eclipse (yueshi; dir. Wang Quanan, 1999)
Mad Max (dir. George Miller, 1979)
Mayor Chen Yi (chenyi shizhang; dir. Huang Zuolin, 1981)
Men and Women (nannan nünü; dir. Liu BingJian, 1999)
270
Mother (mama; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1990)
Mr. Zhao (zhao xiansheng; dir. Lu Yue, 1998)
My Career as a Teacher (wode jiaoshi shengya; dir. Zheng Kehong, 2007)
My Fair Lady (dir. George Cukor, 1964)
My Father and I (wo baba he wo; dir. Xu Jinglei, 2003)
My Mother Zhao Yiman (wode muqin zhao yi man; dir. Sun Tie, 2005)
Mystical Valley (shenmi gu; dir. Zheng Ning, 2005)
Net Mother (wangluo mama; dir. Zhou Yong, 2008)
No Visit After Divorce (lihun le jiu bie lai zhaowo; dir. Wang Rui, 1997)
Not One Less (yige dou buneng shao; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1999)
Old Man and His Dog (laoren yugou; dir. Xie Jin, 1993)
One and Eight (yige bage; dir. Zhang Junzhou, 1983)
One Day in Peking (beijing de yitian;dir. Jia Zhangke, 1994 )
Outbreak (dir. Wolfgang Petersen, 1995)
Papa (baba; dir. Wang Shuo, 1995)
Peacock (kongque; dir. Gu Changwei, 2005)
Platform (zhantai; dir. Jia Zhangke, 2000)
Postman (youchan; dir. He Li, 1995)
Promise (wuji; dir. Chen Kaige, 2005)
271
Protégé (mentu; dir. Er Dongsheng, 2007)
Pulp Fiction (dir. Quentin Tarantino, 1994)
Purple Sunset (ziri; dir. Feng Xiaoning, 2001)
Qinghong (qinghong; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 2005)
Qixia Temple 1937 (qixiasi 1937; dir. Zheng Fangnan, 2005)
Rainclouds Over Wushan (wushan yunyu; dir. Zhang Ming, 1995)
Raise the Red Lantern (dahong denglong gaogao gua; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1991)
Red Beads (xuanlian; dir. He Li, 1993)
Red Cherry (hong yingtao; dir. Ye Daying, 1995)
Red Cliff (dir. John Woo, 2008)
Red Sorghum (hong gaoliang; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1987)
Red Suit (hong xifu; dir. Li Shaohong, 1998)
Red Turn (zouchu xibai po; dir. Li Xiepu, 2001)
Reservoir Dogs (dir. Quentin Tarantino, 1992)
Roads to Rich (xiaokang lushang; dir. Mao Yao, 2003)
Roots and Branches (wode qiongdi jiemei; dir. Yu Zhong, 2001)
Saw (dir. James Wan, 2004)
Scratched Days (huahen suiyue; dir. Gao Feng, 2005)
Selfless and Fearless (zhenshui wuxiang; dir. Xu Geng, 2006)
272
Sensitization Age (ganguan niandai; dir. A Nian, 1994)
Seventeen Years (duonian huijia; dir. Zhang Yuan, 1999)
Sex, Lies, and Videotape (dir. Steven Soderbergh, 1989)
Shanghai Triad (yao a yao yaodao waipo qiao; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1995)
Shaolin Good Boys (shaolin hao xiaozi; dir. Yan Yingming and Yuan Fang, 1994)
Shower (xizao; dir. Zhang Yang, 2000)
Silent Mountain (chenmo de yuanshan; dir. Zheng Kehong, 2005)
Silver Medallist (fengkuang de saiche, dir. Ning Hao, 2008)
So Close to Paradise (yuenan gunyang; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 1999)
Song of Youth (qingchun zhige; dir. Chen Huaiai and Cui Wei, 1959)
Sorry Baby (meiwan meiliao; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2000)
Sparking Red Star (shanshan hongxing; dir. Li Jun and Li Ang, 1974)
Spicy Love (aiqing mala tang; dir. Zhang Yang, 1998)
Spider Man (dir. Sam Raimi, 2002)
Spring Subway (kaiwang chuntian de ditie; dir. Zhang Yibai, 2002)
Stage Sisters (wutai jiemer; dir. Xie Jin, 1964)
Star Wars (dir. George Lucas, 1977)
Still Life (sanxia haoren; dir. Jia Zhangke, 2006) Stranger than Paradise (dir. Jim
Jarmusch, 1984)
273
Sub-Husband (bianwai zhangfu; dir. Chen Peisi, 1993)
Sun Zhongshan (sun zhongshan; dir. Ding Yinnan, 1984)
Suzhou River (suzhou he; dir. Lou Ye, 2001)
Sweeping the Southwest (xiguan da xinan; dir. Yang Guangyuan, 1998)
Tell Me Your Secret (shuochu nide mimi; dir. Huang Jianxin, 2000)
Temptress Moon (fengyue; dir. Chen Kaige, 1996)
The Big Parade (da yuebin; dir. Chen Kaige, 1986)
The Big Trail (da zhuizong; dir. Zhang Chi, 1996)
The Blue Kite (lan fengzheng; dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1994)
The Curse of Golden Flower (dir. Zhang Yimou, 2006)
The Days (dongchun de rizi; dir. Wang Xiaoshuai, 1993)
The Door (men; dir. Li Shaohong, 2007)
The Emperor and the Assassin (jingke ci qinwang; dir. Chen Kaige, 1999)
The Emperor’s Shadow (qin song; dir. Zhou Xiaowen, 1996)
The Fringe Dwellers (dir. Bruce Beresford, 1986)
The Fugitive (dir. Andrew Davis, 1993)
The Graduate (dir. Mike Nichols, 1967)
The Great Turning (da zhuanzhe; dir. Wei Lian, 1997)
The Herdsman (muma ren; dir. Xie Jin, 1982)
274
The Legend of Tianyun Mountain (tianyun shan chuanqi; dir. Xie Jin, 1980)
The Liberation of Northwest China (jiefang da xibei; dir. Wei Linyu, 1996)
The Lion King (dir. Roger Allers, 1994)
The Making of Steel (gangtie shi zenyang liancheng de; dir. Lu Xuechang, 1997)
The Mask (dir. Charles Russell 1995)
The Missing Gun (xunqiang; dir. Lu Chuan, 2002)
The National Anthem (gouge; dir. Wu Ziniu, 1999)
The Opium War (yapian zhanzheng; dir. Xie Jin, 1997)
The Orphan of Anyang (anyang yinger; dir. Wang Chao, 2001)
The Red Detachment of Women (hongse niangzi jun; dir. Xie Jin, 1960)
The Road Home (wode fuqin muqin; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1999)
The Sound of Music (dir. Paul Treasure, 1975)
The Spring Festival (guonian; dir. Huang Jianzhong, 1991)
The Story of a Singleton (yige dushengnü de gushi; dir. Guo Lin, 1995)
The Story of Qiu Ju (qiuju da guansi; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1992)
The Sun Still Raises (taiyang zhaochang shenqi; dir. Jiang Wen, 2007)
The Touch (tianmai chuanqi; dir. Bao Dexi, 2002)
The Town of Water 1938 (shunzhen; dir. Xie Mingxiao, 2005)
The Warlords (touming zhuang; dir. Peter Chan, 2007)
275
The White-Haired Girl (bai maonü; dir. Wang Bin and Shui Hua, 1950)
The World (shijie; dir. Jia Zhangke, 2004)
Three Men and a half (haohan santiao ban; dir. Chen Peisi, 1998)
Titanic (dir. James Cameron, 1997)
To Live (huozhe; dir. Zhang Yimou, 1994)
Together (heni zai yiqi; dir. Chen Kaige, 2002)
Troubled Laughter (kunao ren de xiao; dir. Deng Yimin and Yang Yanjin, 1979)
True Lies (dir. James Cameron, 1994)
Tuya’s Marriage (tuya de hunshi; dir. Wang Quan’an, 2007)
Unknown Pleasures (ren xiaoyao; dir. Jia Zhangke, 2002)
Unshirkable Duty (yibu rongci; dir. Wang Huanwu, 2003)
Valley of Girls (nü’er gu; dir. Xie Jin, 1995)
Walkabout (dir. Nicolas Roeg, 1971)
Walking To School (zoulu shangxue; dir. Peng Jiahui and Peng Cheng, 2009)
Warm (nuan; dir. Huo Jianqi, 2002)
Warm Spring (nuanchun; dir. Wulan Tana, 2004)
Weekend Lover (zhoumo qingren; dir. Lou Ye, 1995)
When Ruoma Was Seventeen (nuoma de shiqi sui; dir. Zhang Jiarui, 2004)
Woman Basketball Player No. 5 (nülan wuhao; dir. Xie Jin, 1956)
276
Woman Sesame Oil Maker (xianghun nü; dir. Xie Fei, 1993)
Women Soccer Player No. 9 (nüzu jiuhao; dir. Xie Jin, 2000).
Wonder Wemen (nüren bense; dir. Huang Zhenzhen, 2007)
World without Thieves (tianxia wuzei; dir. Feng Xiaogang, 2003)
Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain (gaoshan xiade huahuan; dir. Xie Jin, 1984)
Xiao Shan Goes Home (xiaoshan huijia; dir. Jiang Zhangke, 1995)
Xiao Wu (xiao wu; dir. Jia Zhangke 1998)
Yellow Earth (huang tudi; dir. Chen Kaige, 1984)
Zhang Ga, a Boy Soldier (xiaobing Zhang Ga; dir. Cui Wei and Ouyang
Hongying, 1963)
Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Situation (zhou enlai de waijiao shengya, 1998)
24 City (ershi sicheng ji; dir. Jia Zhangke, 2008)
277
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