CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NATO UNCLASSIFIED" PUBLIC DISCLOSE® EXEMPLAIRE 374 COPY ^ W IS* "ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ; 8th February, 1957. MMARY RECORD C"-R(57)7 -

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe, on Wednesday, 6th.February, at 10.15" a."~m7 •

PRESENT

Chairman: The Lord Ismay

BELGIUM GREECE •

Mr. A. de Staercke Mr. M. Melas Mr. K. Aars .

CANADA PORTUGAL

Mr. L.D. Wilgress Mr. H. Andersen ' -Count de Tovar

DENMARK • ITALY TURKEY

Mr. M.A. Wassard Mr. M. Pinna Caboni Mr. Z. Kuneralp

FRANCE LUXEMBOURG UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. A. ParcTdi S Mr., A. Philippe Sir Christopher St'eel

GERMANY I NETHERLANDS t ' ' Mr. H. Blankenhorn Mr, G0 W. ' Pe rk i ns

I Mr,. E.N. van Kleff ens

Deputy Secretary GénéralINTERNATIONA: L BaroSTAFFn A. Bentinck

Assistant Secretary Mr. A. Casardi for-Political Affairs; •-•il Assistant Secretary General / \ for Economics and Finance: Mr. F.D. Gregh

Acting Assistant Secretary General for Production- and Mr, A. F. Moreau

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Logistics: Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge - ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative General G.M. de Chassey • CONTENTS Item Subject . Page No.

I. Military consequences of POL shortages 3

II. Allied Command Europe counter-surpirise military ' 6 alert system N III. . Rules for engagement of unidentified aircraft "by 6 NATO fighters in peacetime • IV. Exercise "'Strikeback" ' 8 "

V. Division of responsibilities in wartime between the national territorial commanders and the 9 major and subordinate NATO commanders

VI.. Overall organization of the integrated NATO forces 9

VII. Meeting of Poreigh Ministers in Bonn: desirabil- 9 ity of holding a public session

VIII. Political consultation'within the Council: list 10 of suggested topics

IXf Committee of Economic Advisers: interpretative t 12 comments by the United States Delegation X. NATO scientific and technical conference: pro- 12 posais by the United States Delegation

XI. Departure of Sir Christopher Steel 13

XII. Future meetings of the Council 13 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED NATO SECRET I. MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF FOL SHORTAGES Previous reference: C-R(57)3 Document: C-M(57)7 1. Mr. STOCK (Chairman of the Petroleum Planning Committee) commented on the Committee's report on this subject, circulated under reference,C-M(57)7. The report stressed four points in particular: > ( a) With regard to minimum levels of stocks, referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9> the position was as follows.; on the basis of reported military stocks it appeared that the levels at Ist January, 1957? were not signi- ficantly different from those at 31st October, 1956, On the same basis, to obtain a minimum 30-days' level, it would be necessary to increase military stocks by ; a total of approximately a quarter of à million tons in the NATO European area. Of this deficit, up to 180 mille tons might have to be- imported.

(b) Some countries had made arrangements for an all- purpose national emergency reserve, earmarked out o'f company-owned stocks. The Committee recommended that for planning purposes a distinction should be drawn V so that the military element of these general purpose reserves might be taken into account when member countries reported their military stocks to NATO. This point was dealt with in paragraph 7.

( c) Vln paragraph 6, the relationship of military stocks to other stocks was considered. It appeared to the Committee that, in some countries, after the company- owned stocks earmarked for military use were set on one-side, the stocks remaining were inadequate for the support of the civilian economy, There was thus a lack of balance in the figures submitted. The Council might wish to suggest that member countries > take this point into account to arrive at a more real- istic balance between military reserves and civilian ' . stocks.

( d) The Committee,. in paragraph 10, had rather diffidently considered the question of reserves for non-NATO:forces. The Committee had not been sure that this was a question really within their competence, but had wished to

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED point out that it appeared from the figures before them that non-NATO forces in certain countries might have to draw on sources of supply at present ear- marked for NATO forces, -

2. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, commenting on paragraph 9 of the report, said that he had gone into the figures in respect of French reserves. From the explanations he had received, he had come, to the conclusion that the only serious shortage was in respect of' diesel fuel. Even that shortage could be overcome through the trans- fer of stocks held in the country. He was therefore not particularly worried by the figures quoted, as far as France was concerned. Withr -U-

regard to the point made by Mr. Stock In connection with reserves for non-NATO forces, he thought that this was a question which the , Council should certainly consider at some stage. Finally, he • t'hpught that the Council should also at a later stage examine the question of the vulnerability of stocks, dealt with in paragraph 11 of the report, 3. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that when thef Suez, crisis had developed at the beginning of November, POL stocks held in Greece happened to be exceptionally low, largely because certain orders already placed had not been filled. Further orders had been placed subsequently, and those too had not yet, in many cases, been filled. His authorities believed that if NATO could help to get orders already placed filled in the near future, the position in Greece would be reasonably satisfactory. • It would mean that at least 40,000 out of the 50,000 tons recommended for Greece would be available. He proposed to discuss this particular aspect of the problem with the Chairman of the Petroleum Planning Committee,

U. • The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE urged that all government- , owned stocks, irrespective of whether they covered more than 30-daya' military wartime requirements or not., should be excluded from the returns submitted to OEEC. If government-owned stocks were not suf- ficient to cover the first 30 days' military requirements, the balance if possible, should.be made up from company-owned stocks,, earmarked for this purpose, and withdrawn from the .OEEC figures. This would put all NATO countries on the same basis. It should,however,be borne in mind that the earmarking of certain commercial stocks to meet; the . military requirements for the first 30 days could only be done If there was a proper balance between the military coverage and the- civilian coverage for wartime needs. For instance, if 30-days' , coverage had been obtained for military requirements by wholly or partly earmarking commercial stocks, and the remaining commercial stocks were only sufficient to cover up to five or ten days' civilian requirements, the position was obviously out of balance.

5, He agreed with the points made in paragraphs 9 (i) and:(ii) of the report. However,-he underlined the possible difficulties, of getting non-NATO members of OEEC to agree to military stockpiling* under present conditions. It seemed to him an open question whe.ther the ceiling should be fixed-at the 30-day level or higher. He believed it was more realistic to fix the ceiling at 30-days', at least for the present. -. 6, Finally, a few countries had had the foresight to obtain government-owned reserves well in excess of 30-days'and he did not believe they should be penalised for this action.- It should be left to their discretion to decide whether they were justified in drawing on government-owned stocks, at least to a certain extent, to minimise the effect on the- civilian economy during the: present oil shortage, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 7, The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE thought the suggestions made by the 'Committee in paragraph 9 (i) would present no difficulty for- his Government, as far as physical/facilities for storage were concerned, Hov/ever, the financing of the oil needed to make up the deficit was a more serious problem. 8, The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been trying to clear -with his authorities the question of unbalance between stocks earmarked for military purposes on the -one hand and civilian use on the other,' From the information'given him, he believed that the Belgian Ministry of Defence had stocks earmarked for 82½ days for national military purposes. Por civilian purposes there was a 5^ day reserve,, which, he was informed, would not lead to any diffi- culties . ;

9. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE felt that the relationship between civilian and military stocks had never been seriously con- sidered in most countries. Movement of-stocks In wartime would be extremely difficult. Moreover, the 30-days' stocks referred to : should be held in depots'which, were not vulnerable. This was seldom the case at present, since most company-owned stocks were held in largè ports which were likely to be the first bombing objective in wartime.

10. Mr. STOCK pointed out that a preliminary-report on the question of vulnerability had" been examined by the Petroleum Planning Committee and by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, and would form the subject of a report to the Council. Briefly, the-; report indicated that, on the basis of reasonable , assumptions with regard to the effect of bombing in the early days of thermonuclear war, only four out of the ten NATO countries in the European area would have enough POL to last for 30 days of war. He agreed with the United Kingdom Representative that military and other essential reserve stocks should not be held in vulnerable areas; but to trans- fer them to non-vulnerable areas would be expensive«. The first . estimate of his Committee was that it would cost nearly £20 million.

11. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities f.j had only juSlj-^aaej^ved the Committee's report. At first sight, they?;-.,, considered It a mo^î~^a^àabl^d£cument, but there were a number of ' questions they would wish toas!T~llr~e^3nngction -with it after fuller study. He therefore suggested that the CourKrii-^hould consider, the. report again, after representatives had.been informe^eiL^their governments' considered views.

12. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE thought that the question of vulnerability referred to in the report was of great importance.: As he saw it, there, v/ere two alternatives before governments: either to transfer their depots to non-vulnerable areas, or to provide the best possible defence for existing depots through artillery and air- craft. This was a technical problem; he thought the two alternatives should be carefully studied. ., "I

13. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE replied that this question had been carefully• considered by the military authorities. The )' problem of stockpiling differed from country to country. Solutions could be found in dispersal and camouflage and in some cases by ' underground storage. To attempt to defend all high priority target's would be too costly an undertaking. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 14. Mr. STOCK, in concluding, urged that governments should make available to the Petroleum Planning Committee any new statistical information at their disposal, as well as figures on the realistic lines he had suggested in his opening statement, in order that the . Committee could get on with its work as quickly as possible,

15. The COUNCIL: ; (1) invited the International Staff,in consultation with the Chairman of the Petroleum Planning Committee5 to prepare a paper containing concrete recommendations for the implementation of the Committee's. report, taking into account the points made in- the course!of discussion, and agreed to discuss this at their next meeting; >

(2) took note of the statements made in the course of: discussion.

NATO SECRET II. ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE COUNTER-SURPRISE MILITARY ALERT SYSTEM Previous reference: C-R(57)6 Documents: M. C. 67(Revised) (Final) RDCA6/57. _ 16. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that at their previous meeting the Council had agreed to defer consideration of M.C.67. A memoran- dum had since then been circulated from SACEUR (RDC/46/57), in which SACEUR informed the Council that he-had instructed his subordinate commanders to open discussions with the national authorities on the basis of the proposed counter-surprise military alert system out- lined in M.C. 67. Was the Council now prepared, as requested by the Military Committee, to take noté that SACEUR had been authorised'1 by that Committee to negotiate on this matter- direct with the appro? priate national authorities? :.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that the information that had been .given was helpful. However, he thought that diffi- culties might arise in the course- of negotiations, since the measures proposed in some cases had political implications. He therefore'-' believed that it would be desirable for SACEUR to report periodically on the progress of his negotiations, in particular indicating any difficulties that had.arisen.

18. The STANDING-GROUP REPRESENTATIVE thought that there would probably be no difficulty in SACEUR submitting periodic reports of - the kind proposed. At the same time, he stressed the fact that the new system would have to remain a flexible one, and urged that., SACEUR be given a free hand in his conduct of the negotiations. \

19. The COUNCIL: , (1) took note that SACEUR had been authorised by the • Military Committee to negotiate on a counter-surprise- military alert system direct with the appropriate;, national authorities;

(2) invited SACEUR to report to the Council, -from time

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED to time, on the progress of his negotiations, indicating, in particular, any difficulties that ; had arisen.. • . ^ NATO SECRET

III. RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT,OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT BY NATO FIGHTERS IN PEACETIME ' - ' * ' Previous reference: C-R(57)6 .- '•• Documents:- M. C. 66( Final) • . RDC/45/57 •20. 'The CHAIRMAN pointed out that certain suggestions had i;. "been put forward at the last' meeting with regard to the procedure for promulgating the visual identification signals set out in enclosure "C" to M.C.66.. A re-draft of the procedure in the light of the points made at the previous meeting had been circulated as RDC/U-5/57. This procedure had been agreed with the European Representative of ICAO insofar as his organization was concerned.

21. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that'his authorities had given further thought to this problem, and had come across certain difficulties: (a) Certain identification rules were established by Prance, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR for Berlin and the previously occupied zones of Germany. They were still in force. These rules were not identical with the rules proposed by % ' the Military Committeeil (b) There were also differences in the rules proposed by the Military Committee and the rules in force in the United States and Canada. ( c) His authorities thought that promulgation of the rules should be on'a government-to-government basis, and not through ICAO. He therefore thought that - a-final decision on the rules should be deferred until these points had been clarified.

22. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that it was the very fact that there were various rules in existence that had led the Military Committee.to try to work out a standardised set of rules. However, if the United States Representative could indicate in concrete terms the exact difficulties of his authorities with regard to the first two points he had made, the military authorities would try to find the answer. 23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Military - Committee must have taken into account the rules already existing in Germany on the one hand, and North America on the other, in drafting its own rules. ,

2k. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE thought that the first point made by the United States Representative was important. If the Russians were familiar with, and were ready to v/ork, rules operating in the air corridors leading to Belrin, it might be unwise to change these rules unless there were over-riding reasons, for so doing. Could the military authorities say whether this point had been taken into account, and whether there was any over-riding

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED reason for changing existing rules? 25. After further discussion, the COUNCIL: (1) agreed that its decision taken at its meeting on 30th January, 1957? to approve the rules for engage- ment of unidentified aircraft by NATO fighters in peacetime set out in M. C. 66(Pinal) , should be 1 regarded as being in suspense for the time being;

(2) invited the Standing Group Representative to obtain clarification from the military authorities on the first two points raised by the United States Repre- sentative, and recorded in paragraph 21' above; (3) agreed to reconsider the question when the clari- fication requested in (2) above had been received. NATO SECRET IV. EXERCISE "STRIKEBACK" Previous reference: C-R(57)4 Document : RDC/22/57 26. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been instructed by his authorities to inform the Council that elections v/ere to take' place in the Federal-Republic on 15th September. Since there v/as likely to be tension at the time of the elections,, his authorities felt that it would be undesirable f or • a large scale NATO exercise to take place at much the same time." To hold an exercise at such a time would give the USSR an opportunity of stressing the aggressive purpose of NATO,, and of increasing the natural tension to be expected' in Germany at that time. He was therefore instructed to ask that the exercise be postponed until the second half of October.

27. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that- an election v/as to take place in his country on 7th October. He asked that the exercise be postponed until a week or two after that date. 28. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE then gave some details with regard to the exercise. So far as land forces were concerned, there was no1 question of tnoop movements, since it was to be a head- quarters and signals exercise only. With regard to naval forces, he could not say what SACLANT was preparing to do in the North Atlantic, but in the European zone only comparatively small vessels would be employed, and.he did not think the possibility of exploitation for propaganda purposes v/as very great. With regard to air forces, it was true that the position was rather different: in the four days of the exercise, it was planned that more than 3,000 sorties would be made, and there would be considerable activity visible both in the air and at aerodromes. He added that it would be extremely difficult to change the date proposed for the exercise, since the date had been arrived at only after very long discussion betv/een the Chiefs of Staff of the countries concerned, and the NATO exer- cise had been carefully planned to fit in with the various national exercises.

29. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE recognised the difficulty in changing the date, but said that he was under firm instructions to request a postponement. 30. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the Gerroan

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Representative. However awkward it, might be to change the date, there were important political implications in the point made by the German Representative, and he thought that the military author- ities should recognise this. 31. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that there was con- siderable political significance in the exercise, and his authorities were not sure that, when the time came to take a final decision, they would agree that it v/as politically desirable. However, he v/as not opposed to the military authorities continuing with their 'plans for the- exercise. He -thought a final decision by the Council would be helped if.full details of the scale of the exercise were made avail- able. 32, The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported the United States Representative in this view, and said that his Government was also anxious to have full details of the,exercise,

33. After further discussion, the COUNCIL: . ' ! . (1) invited the Standing Group Representative to inform the Standing Group that the date proposed for the exercise was not acceptable; (2) invited the Standing Group'Representative to obtain full details of the proposed exercise, and to ask whether a change of date to the latter half of October presented insuperable difficulties; . (3) agreed that a final decision on exercise "STRIKEBACK" could only be given much nearer the actual date of the" exercise.' NATO CONFIDENTIAL V. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES _IN WARTIME BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ' TERRITORIAL ÜOMMÄ'NDERS" AND THE IvjAJOR AND StIBCM)lNATir NATO • COMMANDERS ' "* " • ' ^ .-

Document : M. C0 36/1( Pinal)

3k. On the proposal of the United States Representative, the COUNCIL:

agreed to defer consideration of this question until its next meeting.., , NATO CONFIDENTIAL VT. OVERALL ORGANIZATION OF THE INTEGRATED NATO .FORCES Document: M„ C., 57( Final) 35. The CHAIRMAN pointed.out that the Military'Committee's • report on this question contained much of what was originally in document D. C. 21-(/3. The Military Committee had pointed out in para- graph 2 of the cover note that it should be clearly understood that the Council's approval of the document would not prejudice any future discussions or decisions which might take place'on the higher military structure of NATO. ^ ( - 36. The COUNCIL:

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED • approved document M. C-. 57(Final) , which supersedes D0 C,2l4/3(Final) , , NATO RESTRICTED

VII. MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BONN: DESIRABILITY OF' HOLDING A PUBLIC SESSION Previous reference: C-R(57)6 • - ' . '

37. The CHAIRMAN reminded -the Council that at their previous meeting they had agreed that permanent representatives would consult NATO SECRET SÖST NATO RESTRICTED their governments with regard to the desirability of a public session at the beginning of the Foreign Ministers meeting in Bonn in May. If a decision on this point could be taken at the present meeting, it would help the host government to make its plans, and the Council could later consider the business to be done at any such public session.'

38. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the idea of a public s es sïtrft-,. hut thought that plans for it should be made well in advance. He as3ttmed-.it would open with a welcoming speech 1 -from the Foreign Minister of the 'tre-si. country and a reply by the --- . Chairman of the Council. However, he thcmght that something more : than that would be needed, and plans should be prepared as soon as''1 possible.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that he was in complete agreement with this view.

40. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thou^it it might be well to decide what form such a meeting might take. When they were clearer on this point, the Council might take its decision. He suggested that the German Representative should discuss this point with the International Staff. There was general agreement with the . view put forward by the United States Representative.

41. The COUNCIL: (1) invited the German Representative to discuss with the International Staff what kind of public session, if any, should be held at the opening of the Bonn meeting;

(2) agreed to consider the'matter further in the light of the results of the discussion referred to in (I) above.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL Vni. POLITICAL CONSULTATION' WITHIN THE COUNCIL: LIST OF SUGGESTED TOPICS ' Previous reference: C-R(57)5 Document: C-M(57)lO ' 42. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Council that at its meeting on 23rd January, after provisionally approving the terms of reference for a Committee of Political Advisers, it had instructed this Com- mittee to prepare a list of topics suitable as subjects for political DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED discussion within the Council. The Council had agreed that on receipt of this list (now before it in C-M(57)10) it would decide the priority to be accorded to the topics.

43. Mr. CASARDI ( Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers) said that the Committee had first considered a wider list of topics than that shown in C-M(57)l0. However, it had decided that it would-be unwise to submit a lengthy first list. The first two topics (Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy, and the Situ- ation -in the Satellites)in themselves covered a wide scope and papers for the Bonn meeting in connection with them-would have to be • NATO COKFIDEHTIAL prepared. With regard to the third topic (Aid to Hungary) which had already "been referred to the Committee, it had not yet "been possible to prepare a report, mainly because,the Committee had found it difficult to draw a line between what, constituted humani- tarian aid on the one hand, and rehabilitation of the Hungarian economy on the other. At its last meeting the Committee had asked him, as Chairman, to make the following points to the Council:

(a) the Committee would like information with regard to existing trade agreements between NATO countries and Hungary; (b) the Committee would like the views of the diplomats of NATO countries in Budapest as to the best, form of aid which could be given without- bolstering up the Kadar régime;

(c) the Committee hoped that the Council would recommend to member governments not to undertake any aid commit- ' ments, apart from those which were clearly humani- tarian, until the information required under (a) and .(b) above was available, and a common policy had been worked>out among NATO nations.

UU. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE asked exactly what was meant by the sixth topic - Relations between NATO and the Countries.

•45. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE referred the United States Representative to two* documents: first, the Turkish memorandum submitted at the recent Ministerial Meeting, and second, the state- ment made by Mr. Menderes at that meeting. He thought that what Mr. Menderes had had in mind was that it was important, from the point of view'of the defence of NATO, to take into account the fact that there was a need of links between NATO and the countries of the Baghdad Pact for planning purposes. The question was one which, he thought, certainly merited consideration.

46. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, suggested that the Committee might be asked to consider the question of de jure recognition of the Kadar régime. Most NATO countries recognised it de facto, but it might be well to work out a common line with regard to de jure recognition. It was agreed that this point should be considered by the Committee under topic 4, and that priority should be given to it.

47. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Delegation felt it would be unwise at the present stage for the Committee to examine the broader aspects of disarmament listed in 5(b), in particular

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED its relation to European security. There was general agreement with this point of view. 48. A brief discussion took place with regard to the way in which the Committee might consider the aspects of disarmament listed in paragraph 5(a) of C-M(57)l0.. It was agreed that the main task of the Comittee should be to work out the machinery by which the Council could be kept continuously informed as to the progress being made in the United Nations Sub-Commission on Disarmament. .It was also agreed that the substance of the disarmament question should be discussed in the Council before the Committee went further into the matter. NATO CONFIDENTIAL •

k9. ' The COUNCIL : ' , ( l) invited the ComraIttee of' Political Advisers to continue its studies of trends and implications • 1 of Soviet policy, and of the situation in the satellites; (2) invited the Committee to study Hungarian problems with the following order of priority: (a) the question of de jure recognition of • the Kadar régime; (b) aid to Hüngary; ( c) Hungarian refugees;

(3) invited the Committee to consider those aspects of the question of disarmament listed in paragraph 5(a) of C-M(57)l0, in the light of the comments made in the course of discussion; (4) invited the Commi tte'e to submit to the Council, if possible within a week, a definition ,of what it had. in mind by "Relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact";

(5) took note of the oral report by the Chairman of the Committee on the work so far done by the Com- mittee, recorded in paragraph U-3 above. NATO CONFIDENTIAL IX. COMMITTEE OF'ECONOMIC ADVISERS: INTERPRETATIVE COtfflJEMTS BY THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION . Document: RDC/52/57 50. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE explained the reasons which had led his Delegation to submit this paper to the Council. His Delegation had been worried as to how the Committee would function if it was purely and simply an ad hoc committee. His Delegation therefore suggested that there should be a Standing Com- mittee which would consider the various problems submitted to the economic advisers, and decide the way in which such problems should be handled: in some cases It might be necessary to convene special experts, while in others experts on delegation staffs might be used.

51. The COUNCIL: DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED agreed to"defer consideration of this question until its-next meeting.

NATO. RESTRICTED X. NATO SCIENTIFIC AND'TECHNICAL CONFERENCE: -PROPOSALS BY THE " • UNITED STATES DELEGATION : : ! ; ~ Document: RDC/53./57 52. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said -that his authorities . NATO RESTRICTED had. given some thought to this question,' and to-the'work being' done by the OEEC in this field. They believed that there was a rôle for NATO'to play, and. for that reason had submitted the pro- posals contained in RDC/53/57. He hoped that a decision could be taken by the Council in the fairly near future, though not necessarily. at the present meeting in view of the short time dele-, gâtions had had to consider the proposals,

53. The COUNCIL: agreed.to defer consideration of the United States proposals until its next meeting. NATO RESTRICTED

XI. DEPARTURE OF SIR CHRISTOPHER STEEL 54. The CHAIRMAN said that this was the last public meeting of the Council at which Sir Christopher Steel would be present. He was sure the Council would wish to record its gratitude for the co- operation which Sir Christopher had always given to the work of the Council, and to express their best wishes to him in his future work. 55. Sir CHRISTOPHER STEEL said that he would simply say that he very greatly appreciated working with NATO, and was. extremely grateful to the very real friendship there offered him by all his colleagues. He would greatly regret leaving the organization. ,s , 56. The COUNCIL: ' warmly, endorsed the tribute paid by the Chairman to Sir Christopher Steel. NATO UNCLASSIFIED XII. FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

57. The Council fixed its next meeting" for Thursday, 14th Feb- ruary, at 10.15 a.m. ' DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED