The Law on All‑Seated Stadiums in England and Wales and the Case for Change
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by E-space: Manchester Metropolitan University's Research Repository Rigg, David (2018)Time to take a stand? The law on all-seated stadiums in England and Wales and the case for change. The International Sports Law Journal, 18 (3-4). pp. 210-218. ISSN 1567-7559 Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/621742/ Version: Published Version Publisher: Springer DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-018-0136-9 Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 Please cite the published version https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk Time to take a stand? The law on all-seated stadiums in England and Wales and the case for change David Rigg The International Sports Law Journal ISSN 1567-7559 Int Sports Law J DOI 10.1007/s40318-018-0136-9 1 23 Your article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution license which allows users to read, copy, distribute and make derivative works, as long as the author of the original work is cited. You may self- archive this article on your own website, an institutional repository or funder’s repository and make it publicly available immediately. 1 23 The International Sports Law Journal https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-018-0136-9 ARTICLE Time to take a stand? The law on all‑seated stadiums in England and Wales and the case for change David Rigg1 © The Author(s) 2018 Abstract In June 2018, the UK Government announced a review of the ban on standing at football matches in the Premier League and Championship. Nearly 30 years since the Hillsborough disaster, there is growing interest in the introduction of safe- standing to football grounds in England and Wales. This paper considers ofcial reports dating back to 1924 in an attempt to understand the woeful safety record of UK football grounds in the twentieth century, and the many missed opportunities to secure the safety of fans. The argument is made that Taylor LJ’s lack of trust in both the desire and ability of footballing authorities and clubs to ensure fan safety led him to make all-seating a cornerstone of his vision for football. The current law is then reviewed before considering how safe-standing difers from the crumbling and overcrowded terraces of the 1980s. The paper concludes that stadium and crowd management measures, backed up by a robust regulatory system which has the support of all stakeholders, are necessary to ensure the continuing safety of football fans in England and Wales. Keywords Safe standing · Sports Law · Regulation · Hillsborough 1 Introduction calculation of capacity and match day attendance. The rec- ommendations of those earlier reports were ignored until The expert Report of the Technical Working Party which 1973. When a system of licensing was introduced by the assisted Taylor LJ’s Inquiry into the Hillsborough stadium Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (SSGA 1975), it failed disaster included the observation that “Whilst standing to change entrenched practices and attitudes to safety. Rather accommodation is not intrinsically unsafe, all-seater sta- than safety per se, it was Taylor LJ’s determination to change dia bring benefts to spectator comfort, safety and crowd attitudes and usher in a “new ethos for football” that led him control”.1 Taylor went on to conclude “There is no pana- to recommend all-seated stadiums. cea which will achieve total safety and cure all problems of There is now heightened interest in the introduction of behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfed that seating “safe-standing” to football stadiums in England and Wales does more to achieve those objectives than any other sin- through the use of the rail-seat. Each ticket holder is desig- gle measure”.2 None of the reports into crowd safety in the nated a specifc seat. The seat can be locked into an upright twentieth century had found any inherent danger in stand- position for games where standing is allowed and each row ing on the terraces, and standing areas are still permitted of seats has a barrier for fans to lean on which ensures that in the leagues beneath the Premier League and Champion- fans occupy a specifc and easily identifable place. Safe- ship provided they meet regulatory standards. The causes of standing areas already exist in the German Bundesliga, the the many previous incidents and disasters were the absence Dutch Eredivisie, and, in 2016, Scottish Premier League of basic and rudimentary safety practices concerning sta- club Celtic installed a 2600 capacity area. This paper begins dium and crowd management, primarily relating to the by considering what was unsafe about the old standing ter- races, the failure of the licensing system and what motivated Taylor LJ to recommend all-seated grounds. Attention then * David Rigg [email protected] turns to the nature of safe-standing, whether the rail-seat 1 Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan 1 University, Lower Ormond Street, Manchester M15 6BH, Taylor (1990), appendix 3, p. 95 at para 3. UK 2 Ibid, para 61. Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 The International Sports Law Journal addresses Taylor’s concerns and whether the rail-seat might calculation of the capacity of individual enclosures on the already comply with existing legislation. The argument is Leppings End and no separate access to those enclosures. made that, just as all-seated stadiums were never suggested Overcrowding could occur even if the overall attendance for as a panacea to achieve total safety and cure all problems of the stand was theoretically safe. The recommendations of the crowd control, neither can the same be said of safe-standing. Shortt and Moelwyn-Hughes Reports were not adopted and a system of self-regulation was preferred by government. The reports did not recommend seating as a solution to crowd 2 Sixty-six years of missed opportunities safety, but instead emphasised the importance of basic safety features which begin with the safe management of the crowd Of the 41 disasters and incidents involving death or injury outside of the ground. It is implicit in both reports that a mix- at British football grounds between 1888 and 1989, crowd ture of ground management and crowd management meas- pressure, either direct or leading to structural collapses, was ures are necessary to ensure crowd safety. the immediate cause of all except the 1985 Bradford and Birmingham tragedies.3 Despite this, prior to Taylor’s Final 2.1 The failure of the licensing system Report, no report had given any serious consideration to the introduction of all-seating. The Interim Popplewell Report, A system of licensing for “designated grounds” by local which preceded the Hillsborough Inquiry by 4 years, dis- authorities was in place by the time of Hillsborough follow- missed the idea: “it failed to take account of the idiosyncra- ing the SSGA 1975.6 The Act included many recommenda- sies of football fans. A lot of them it seems do not wish to tions of the Wheatley Report 1973, which followed the deaths sit down; they wish to stand. They wish to stand, apparently, of 66 people crushed on a stairway at Ibrox Park, Glasgow. because there is for them a special atmosphere associated with The defciencies of the licensing system had already been being on the terraces. If seating is provided for them they may exposed by the 1985 Bradford City fre which killed 56 peo- well tip back the seats and stand in front of them; then stand ple. Although the Bradford City ground was not a “designated on the seats; and fnally rip up the seats and use them as weap- ground” for the purpose of the 1975 Act, an earlier visit by a ons”.4 This analysis is demonstrative of the approach, com- member of the local authority Safety Team had highlighted mon at the time, which confated crowd control with ground a number of serious health and safety considerations which safety, and assumed that hooliganism was a greater threat to would need addressing if the ground ever did require a licence spectator safety than crumbling and mismanaged grounds. under the Act. The Popplewell Final Report found that both Both the Shortt Report 1924 and the Moelwyn Hughes the SSGA 1975 licensing system and the associated Green Report 1946 contained recommendations which, if imple- Guide7 had been “disregarded” by non-designated clubs.8 mented and robustly administered, would have prevented Hillsborough.5 The Shortt Report recommended that the number of entrances and exits to grounds should be ade- 6 Until 1985, to meet the vociferous concerns regarding the potential quate with not less than one turnstile for every 1250 fans cost to smaller clubs, only those grounds accommodating more than (the afected terrace at Hillsborough had seven turnstiles for 10,000 spectators in Divisions One and Two of the Football League, 10,100 ticketed fans); with other turnstiles held in reserve the Premier League in Scotland and certain international football and and distributed around the circumference of the ground (there Rugby League stadia were given designated status. The Interim Pop- plewell Report resulted in designated status being extended immedi- were no reserve turnstiles at Hillsborough) and clear signage ately to all clubs in the top four English divisions and the Scottish stating the area of the ground to which each entrance gives Premier League and all major rugby league grounds. Following the access (the signage at Hillsborough was criticised for draw- Final Popplewell Report, the Safety of Sports Grounds (Designation) ing fans to the overcrowded pens behind the goalmouth). Order 1986/1296 added all major rugby union, cricket and athletics grounds to the licensing regime of the 1975 Act.