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Life Cycle Cost of Smart Wayside Object Controller Livscykelkostnad Av Smart Wayside Object Controller

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Life Cycle Cost of Smart Wayside Object Controller Livscykelkostnad Av Smart Wayside Object Controller DEGREE PROJECT IN VEHICLE ENGINEERING, SECOND CYCLE, 30 CREDITS STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN 2021 Life Cycle Cost of Smart Wayside Object Controller Livscykelkostnad av Smart Wayside Object Controller FILIPP ZAROV KTH ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING SCIENCES i Author Filipp Zarov MSc in Railway Engineering School of Engineering Sciences KTH Royal Institute of Technology Title Life Cycle Cost of Smart Wayside Object Controller Livscykelkostnad av Smart Wayside Object Controller Host Company ALSTOM Transport AB Trafikverket External Supervisor Fredric Bonnevier, Head of DC performance, ALSTOM Internal (KTH) Supervisor Zhendong Liu, Researcher, vehicle engineering and solid mechanics, KTH Examiner Sebastian Stichel, Professor, Department of Engineering Mechanics, KTH Date August 2021 ii Sammanfattning I ett regionalt järnvägssignalsystem är utdelar de enheter som ansvarar för att kontrollera spårutrustning och fungerar de som gränsyta för spårutrustning med ställverksdatorn och tågtrafikledning systemet. Dock, tillhörande kablar (signalkablar ock kraftkablar), samt anläggningsinfrastruktur utgör en stor kapitalinvestering och de är en källa till märkbar kapitalkostnad och driftskostnader, särskilt på landsbygdsområden, där tillgänglighet och anslutning till elnätet och ställverket är problematisk. Dessutom, kablar och signalutrustning utsätts för stöld och sabotage i sådana områden. Detta kan öka den totala livscykelkostnaden ytterligare. Shift2rail forskningsprogram, som genomförs av EU och järnvägsintressenter, försöker att ta itu med problemet och modernisera utdelar konceptet genom projektet “TD2.10 Smart Radio Connected Wayside Object Controller”, där målet är att utveckla en Smart Spårutrustning Utdelar, så kallade SWOC. En SWOC har kapacitet för trådlös kommunikation mellan central ställverket och spårutrustning, samt decentralisering av satällverkslogiken. Dessa innovationer kan minska nödvändig kabeldragning, öka tillgängligheten av diagnostiska data, vilket minskar underhålls- och driftskostnader och kan leda till energibesparing genom att använda lokala kraftkällor. Den viktigaste effekten av SWOC är en betydande minskning av kapitalkostnader, driftskostnader och totala livscykelkostnaden för en installation som använder SWOC istället för typiska utdelningsystemet. Detta examensarbete fokuserar på att uppskatta LCC för ett SWOC-system och jämföra det med en konventionell utdelingsystem genom att utveckla en LCC-modell som täcker båda fallen, samt att använda denna modell för att undersöka när det är mer lönsamt att implementera en SWOC istället av ett typiskt utdelingsystem. Detta görs genom att använda LCC-analys och kombinera en mängd olika metoder i en parametrisk studie. För att göra detta genomförs en grundlig analys av ett modernt regionalt järnvägssignalsystem, samt grunden för livscykelanalys. Samtidigt beskrivs både ett typiskt utdelingssystem - och SWOC-system samt faktorer som påverkar deras kostnad deskuteras. Metoden består av LCC-modelleringsdelen samt insamling av metoder och tekniker som används för att beräkna LCC för OC / SWOC-system och för att uppskatta kostnaderna för olika delmodeller och parametrar för processen. För modelleringsprocessen valdes stationen i Björbo, som arbetar under ERTMS-R-systemet, men för analysens skull antas att det typiska bassystemet på plats är en typisk OCS och tillsammans med befintlig planritning och kabelplan är används som grund för analys. Slutligen används den bildade LCC-modellen i en parametrisk studie för att undersöka hur LCC påverkas genom att använda OC eller SWOC samt hur LCC reagerar på förändringar i parametrar såsom antal OC / SWOC, trafiktäthet och lokala kraftinstallationskostnader för Björbo-stationen. Nyckelord: järnvägssignalsystem, ställverk, hårdvara, Utdelar, SWOC, livscykelkostnad, förnybara energikällor iii Abstract In a regional railway signalling system, object controllers are the devices responsible for controlling Track Side Equipment and act as interfaces for TSE with the interlocking computer and the Traffic control system. However, associated cabling (signal and power cabling) and civil works pose a major capital investment and it is a source of significant Capital and Operational expenses, particularly in rural areas, where accessibility and connectivity to power grid and to the interlocking are a problem. Furthermore, cables/signalling equipment are exposed to sabotage and theft in such areas. This can increase the total Life Cycle Cost even further. The Shift2Rail research programme, which was initiated by the European Union and railway stakeholders, tries to address this issue, and revamp the Object Controller concept through the project “TD2.10 Smart radio connected wayside object controller”, where the aim is to develop a Smart Wayside Object Controller (SWOC). A SWOC is capable of wireless communication between central interlocking and TSE as well as decentralization of interlocking logic. These innovations can reduce the cabling required, increase the availability of diagnostic data, thus reducing maintenance and operational costs and can lead to power saving by utilizing local power sources. The most important impact of the SWOC is a significant reduction of CAPEX, OPEX and of total LCC for an installation utilizing SWOCs, instead of typical OCS. This work focuses on estimating the LCC of a SWOC system and to compare it with a conventional OCS by developing an LCC model that covers both cases, as well as to use this model to examine when it is more profitable to implement a SWOC, instead of an OCS system. This is done by utilizing LCC analysis and combining a variety of methods in a parametric study. To that extend, a thorough analysis of a modern regional railway signalling system, as well as the basis for LCCA are being discussed. At the same time, both OC and SWOC systems are being described and factors affecting their cost discussed. The methodology is comprised of the LCC modelling part as well as the collection of methods and techniques used to calculate the LCC of OC/SWOC systems and to estimate the costs of different sub-models and parameters of the process. For the modelling process, the station of Björbo was chosen, which operates under ERTMS-R system, but for the sake of the analysis it is assumed that the typical base system in place is an OCS and together with the existing track layout and equipment it is used as the basis of the analysis. Finally, the formed LCC model is being used in a parametric study to examine how the LCC is affected by using OC or SWOC as well as how LCC responds to changes in parameters such as number of OC/SWOC, traffic density and local power installation cost for the Björbo station. Keywords: railway signalling system, interlocking, hardware, Object Controller, Smart Wayside Object controller, Lifecycle Cost, renewable energy sources iv Nomenclature and Abbreviations AC Alternating Current OC Object Controller ABS Automatic Block System OCS Object Controller System ATC Automatic Train Control O&S Operations and Support ATP Automatic Train Protection OPEX Operational Expenses CAPEX Capital Expenses PCE Parametric Cost Estimation CTC Centralized Traffic Control PD Power Distribution CCS Command Control and Safety PSU Power Supply Unit dB Decibel PVC Polyvinyl Chloride DC Direct Current PV Photovoltaic DMU Diesel Multiple Unit RBC Radio Block Centre DTC Direct Traffic Control ROW Right Of Way EC Element Controller (see OC/OCS) SHS Standalone Hybrid System EMU Electric Multiple Unit SWOC Smart Wayside Object Controller EPR Ethylene Propylene Rubber STM Specific Transmission Module ERA European Union Agency for Railways TCC Traffic Control centre ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System TD Technology Demonstration ERTMS-R European Rail Traffic Management System – TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio Regional ETCS European Train Control System TMS Traffic Management System EU European Union TOC Total Ownership Cost FO Fiber Optics TOB Technical Object Building GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications – TPSS Traction Power Substation Railway LCC Life Cycle Cost TRV Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Administration) LCCA Life Cycle Cost Analysis TSE Track Side Equipment LED Light Emitting Diodes TT&TO Timetable and Train Orders LEU Landside Electronic Unit TVM Time Value of Money LRBG Last Reference Balise Group TWC Track Warrant Control LSZH Low Smoke Zero Halogen UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply MBS Manual Block System UHF Ultra-High Frequency Radio NTC National Train Control XLPE Cross-Linked Polyethylene v Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank Fredric Bonnevier, Head of DC performance of Alstom, for guiding me through this task, by providing data crucial for the estimation of SWOC LCC model, by helping to define the scope of such a task as well as providing an in- depth understanding and useful advice, as well as support for the implementation of this project. Second, I would like to thank Mihael Zitnik, system engineer and fellow EMC Expert of Alstom for providing me with data related to OCS and SWOC, for helping me understand the SWOC project from an energy perspective and for providing me with data related to energy consumption of crucial objects, such as cables and OCs. Third, I would like to thank Anders Lindahl, Research engineer at KTH, Transport planning division for his invaluable help, guidance and provision with legislation, regulations and technical documents related to signalling infrastructure in Sweden. Fourth, I want to thank Tyler Dick, lecturer
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