Can Washington and Seoul Try Dealing with Pyongyang for a Change?

By Leon V. Sigal

Can Washington and Seoul Try Dealing With Pyongyang For a Change?

ike his predecessors, President Barack ray and an uncertain leadership transition. Washington also took Pyongyang’s Obama is learning the hard way that missile and nuclear tests as slapping away the hand that Obama had held out the only thing worse than negotiating during the 2008 campaign. L That is far from the whole story. with North Korea is not negotiating with North Korea’s tests were retaliation for South Korea’s halt to delivery of prom- North Korea. ised energy aid in late 2008. Seoul’s action reneged on an October 2007 six-party agreement to disable the plutonium facilities at Yongbyon. In addition, North Korea most likely carried out the Instead of moving to resume talks, the Disengagement has never gone down attack on the Cheonan to avenge a South administration sustained the suspension well with Pyongyang, which has long Korean attack on one of its own naval of promised energy aid by South Korea tried to exploit its nuclear program to vessels in November 2009. that President George W. Bush endorsed convince Washington to end years of What North Korea has yet to do is just before he stepped down. It has now enmity and reconcile by signing a peace restart its Yongbyon reactor to generate matched the Bush record of holding just treaty to end the Korean War and fun- more plutonium-laden spent fuel, com- one high-level meeting with Pyongyang damentally improving relations. Even plete a plant for enriching substantial in its ﬁrst 21 months in ofﬁce, and it worse, U.S. disengagement conceded quantities of uranium, or conduct addi- still speaks of “strategic patience” as if the initiative to the Lee Myung-bak tional missile and nuclear tests it needs the pressure of sanctions and isolation government in South Korea, which was if it is to develop a deliverable warhead will somehow make North Korea relent. determined to show the North who is and reliable missiles. 10 Nothing of the sort has transpired. boss. That led to the North Korean at- An effort to induce North Korea not 20 Instead, the North stopped disabling tack on a South Korean navy corvette, to take these steps should be a matter of its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon the Cheonan, in the West (or Yellow) Sea, some urgency in Washington. It has not and conducted a missile and a nuclear killing 46 on board. been, in part because political operatives November test, then reprocessed the spent fuel Much of Washington saw the attack in the White House harbor doubts about removed from its reactor during the dis- on the Cheonan as an unprovoked bolt its prospects for success and do not ODAY ODAY

T abling to extract another bomb’s worth out of the blue by a regime attempting want to give the Republicans a target for of plutonium. to divert attention from domestic disar- partisan attack by seeking another deal

Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council and author of

ARMS CONTROL Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (1998). He has served as special assistant to the director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the U.S. Department of State and a member of the editorial board of The New York Times. 16 with North Korea and in part because was seeking the means to enrich uranium negotiator Christopher Hill held a bi- Obama wanted to mend fences with to scuttle that accord. The North’s lateral meeting with his North Korean allies, most notably South Korea, alien- response was to restart its plutonium counterpart that led to resumption of ated by Bush’s unilateralism. Disinfor- program. Confronted with the grim the six-party talks, resuscitation of the mation from Seoul assiduously laid the prospect of unbounded nuclear arming September 2005 accord, and the refreez- grounds for disengagement. The North’s in the North, Bush grudgingly accepted ing of North Korea’s plutonium pro- economy was in decline, it alleged, de- a September 2005 six-party joint state- gram. In October 2007, the talks yielded spite the South’s own data that showed ment that committed North Korea to an accord on “second-phase actions” gross domestic product and trade had “abandoning all nuclear weapons and under which the North pledged to make grown for nine of the past 10 years. A existing nuclear programs” in return for “a complete and correct declaration of succession struggle was said to be raging pledges by the United States and Japan all its nuclear programs” and to disable despite signs since early 2009 that an to normalize relations; pledges by the its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon, orderly leadership transition was under United States, South Korea, and China pending their permanent dismantle- way.1 Understanding the recent pattern to negotiate “a permanent peace regime ment. In return, it was to get energy of U.S.-Korean interactions is essential if on the Korean peninsula”; and the pro- aid and an end to U.S. sanctions under Washington is to head off more trouble vision of energy aid by the five parties.2 the Trading with the Enemy Act and on the Korean peninsula. Washington immediately contravened removal from the U.S. list of state spon- that promising accord by implementing sors of terrorism. The agreement made Engagement Plateaus in 2007 an Illicit Activities Initiative intended no mention of verification, which was The 1994 Agreed Framework verifi- to get banks around the globe to freeze left to a later phase. ably froze North Korea’s plutonium Pyongyang’s hard-currency accounts. At the same time, South Korean program up front, pending its ultimate When Bush became president, the president Roh Moo-hyun was sign- dismantlement. The United States, in North had suspended tests of longer- ing a potentially far-reaching summit return, promised two replacement reac- range missiles, had an estimated one or agreement with North Korean leader tors by a target date of 2003, supplies two bombs’ worth of plutonium, and Kim Jong Il that included, among other of heavy fuel oil in the interim, and was verifiably not making more. By Oc- provisions, a pledge “to discuss ways of above all, an end to enmity—“to move tober 2006, it had six to eight bombs’ designating a joint fishing area in the toward full normalization of politi- worth of plutonium, had resumed test- West Sea to avoid accidental clashes cal and economic relations.” In 2002, launching missiles, and had just con- and turning it into a peace area and hard-liners in the Bush administration ducted its first nuclear test. also to discuss measures to build mili- seized on intelligence that North Korea Within three weeks of that test, U.S. tary confidence.”3 Had that provision ARMS CONTROL TODAY LEE JAE-WON/AFP/Getty Images JAE-WON/AFP/Getty LEE November 20

South Korean navy personnel stand guard next to the wreckage of the salvaged patrol ship Cheonan during a May 19 media briefing 10 in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul. The ship sank March 26 near the maritime border with North Korea. An international investigation found significant evidence of North Korean responsibility, which Pyongyang has denied. 17 tage of the opening to demand a verification protocol, and Bush went along. Washington gave Pyongyang a draft protocol that demanded “full access upon request to any site facility or location,” among other highly intrusive measures.6 On July 30, the White House delayed delisting the North as a state sponsor of terrorism until it accepted them. North Korea promptly stopped the disabling and, accusing the United States of an “outright violation” of the October 2007 accord, soon announced it would move to restore the reactor and other facilities.7 In a transparent effort to resume Pool/Getty Images Pool/Getty proliferation forsworn in that accord, it also sought permission to overfly India with weapons technology believed to be bound for Iran. In a last-ditch attempt to complete the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong disabling, Hill flew to Pyongyang on Oc- Il exchange copies of a signed joint declaration on October 4, 2007, during their tober 1 with a revised protocol. His inter- summit in Pyongyang. In their agreement, the two leaders pledged “to discuss ways locutor, Kim Gye Gwan, agreed to allow of designating a joint fishing area in the West [Yellow] Sea to avoid accidental clashes.” “sampling and other forensic measures” at the reactor, reprocessing plant, and fuel been pursued, it might have prevented its reactor at Yongbyon; and again now. fabrication facility at Yongbyon, which the November 2009 naval clash and the By escalating tensions, Pyongyang has could have sufficed to ascertain how sinking of the Cheonan. been trying to compel Washington to much plutonium Pyongyang had extract- That was not to be. Within two re-engage while strengthening its own ed in the past. If not, he also agreed to months, Lee was elected president of bargaining leverage. allow “access, based on mutual consent, South Korea. Determined to display to undeclared sites.”8 toughness toward North Korea, he aban- Seoul Impedes Six-Party Talks That oral commitment did not assuage doned engagement and backed away from The current crisis began in June 2008 af- South Korea or Japan, which insisted it the 2007 summit agreement, specifically ter North Korea declared it had separated be put in writing. Much to the dismay of the West Sea provision.4 He also allied 38 kilograms of plutonium, an amount the Aso government in Tokyo, Bush then with Japan to undermine the October at the lower end of the range of U.S. esti- delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of 2007 six-party accord. In so doing, he mates. In a side agreement, Washington terrorism. The disabling resumed, with 60 pushed North-South engagement off its allowed Pyongyang to defer disclosing its percent of the spent fuel rods out of the precarious plateau and over the precipice. uranium-enrichment activities and any reactor and roughly one-half the prom- proliferation assistance it had given to ised energy aid yet to be delivered—none Pyongyang’s Bargaining Behavior Syria. Doubts soon surfaced in Seoul, To- from Japan. With South Korea due to The most propitious moments in Korea kyo, and Washington about the accuracy deliver the next tranche, Seoul now sided policy have come when Washington and completeness of the declaration. with Tokyo to insist that the delivery of and Seoul moved in tandem to recon- The day North Korea handed China energy aid be suspended unless Pyong- cile with Pyongyang. That was the case its declaration, the White House said it yang accepted a written commitment to in October 2007, as well as in January intended to fulfill its obligations under more intrusive verification. Again, Wash- 10 2000 with the first North-South summit the October 2007 accord to delist the ington went along. At the seventh round 20 and that October with the exchange of North as a state sponsor of terrorism and of six-party talks in December, South Ko- visits by Secretary of State Madeleine end sanctions under the Trading with rea, Japan, and the United States, but not Albright and Vice Marshal Jo Myong the Enemy Act but only if Pyongyang China or Russia, threatened to halt the November Rok, the highest-level U.S.-North Kore- agreed to cooperate in verifying the aid. On his departure, Kim Gye Gwan left an contacts to date. The most dangerous declaration. As Secretary of State Con- no doubt that there would be retaliation ODAY ODAY

T crises came when Seoul blocked engage- doleezza Rice acknowledged on June 18, for any reneging on energy aid: “We’ll ment between Washington and Pyong- Washington was moving the goalposts: adjust the speed of our disablement work yang in March 1993, prompting North “What we’ve done, in a sense, is move if it doesn’t come in.”9 Korea to announce its intention to up issues that were to be taken up in On entering the White House, Obama renounce the nuclear Nonproliferation phase three, like veriﬁcation, like access stayed this course. Consumed by the 5

ARMS CONTROL Treaty; in May 1994, when it abruptly to the reactor, into phase two.” global financial meltdown and loom- removed all the spent nuclear fuel from Seoul, along with Tokyo, took advan- ing depression, he made no move to 18 undo the reneging on energy aid or to and overthrowing our system” and said internationally. It wants the MDL line enter into talks with North Korea. In Pyongyang “will no longer be bound by extended out to sea. Seoul, meanwhile, Lee’s approval rate any agreement.” That called into question A possible way around the NLL dispute had plummeted to 34 percent, and his its commitment to “abandon” its nuclear emerged in a wide-ranging summit dec- party’s right wing was growing restive. weapons and its existing nuclear pro- laration signed in October 2007 by Kim Worried that Obama might move to re- grams. The spokesman listed three other Jong Il and Roh, Lee’s predecessor. They sume nuclear negotiations with Pyong- steps Pyongyang would take in response. pledged to discuss establishment of a joint yang or initiate peace talks, hard-liners First, it would “actively examine the con- fishing area in the West Sea “to avoid made common cause with Tokyo. If struction of a light-water [nuclear] plant.” accidental clashes” and also to discuss engagement sped up, a senior South Ko- Such a plant would require enriched “measures to build military confidence” rean official told a reporter, Japan could uranium. Second, the Yongbyon facilities that might forestall such clashes.12 That help by “slamming on the brakes.”10 “will be restored to the original state for could have been a useful opening step in Skeptical of Washington’s intentions normal operation,” which stopped short a Korean peace process. and unmoved by Obama’s warm words, of saying North Korea would restart its Two months later, President-elect Lee’s Pyongyang opted to force the action. In reactor to generate more spent nuclear transition team opposed implementa- late January, it began assembling a rocket fuel. Third, the 6,500 spent fuel rods tion of the October declaration. He later at the Musudan-ri launch site, an ef- removed during disabling “will be repro- backed away from a 2000 summit accord fort that would take two months, giving cessed.”11 By extracting another bomb’s that, among other steps toward reconcili- Obama time to reconsider engagement. worth of plutonium, it could conduct ation, had committed the North to abide In public, it did its best to portray the its second nuclear test that May without by the provisional line until permanent test launch as a peaceful attempt to put a depleting its stock of plutonium. That test borders were drawn. satellite into orbit; in private it made clear prompted a tightening of UN sanctions The moves drew a bristling response to visitors that, without the promised and stepped-up Chinese engagement. from Pyongyang. In late March 2008, energy aid, it would have no recourse but after building up its shore artillery near to strengthen its deterrent. Pouring Oil on Troubled Waters the disputed waters, it accused South Ko- Intent on avoiding an open breach Not content just to impede six-party talks, rean vessels of violating “its” territory and with Seoul and Tokyo, Washington the Lee government in Seoul also flung launched short-range missiles into the joined them in warning of additional down the gauntlet in its competition with contested waters, underscoring the risks of UN sanctions under Security Council the North, which led to firefights in con- leaving the issue unresolved. It also called Resolution 1718 if Pyongyang went tested waters off Korea’s west coast. for a permanent peace treaty to replace ahead with the launch. That resolution, Those waters have been troubled ever the armistice agreement, a step the Lee adopted in response to Pyongyang’s since the end of the Korean War in 1953, government was loath to take. 2006 nuclear test, had called on the when the U.S. Navy unilaterally imposed A heated war of words erupted in North to “suspend all activities under a ceasefire line at sea north of the Military 2009. On January 17, assailing the its ballistic missile program and in this Demarcation Line (MDL) on land. North South’s defense minister “for making context reestablish its pre-existing com- Korea has long objected to this Northern full preparations for the possible third mitments to a moratorium on missile Limit Line (NLL), which is not recognized West Sea skirmish,” a North Korean launching.” Russia and China, however, took the position that the resolution did not bar satellite launches. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket in an un- successful attempt to put a satellite in orbit. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo promptly sought UN sanctions. Beijing initially demurred, convinced that sanc- ARMS CONTROL TODAY tions would delay the resumption of talks, but it was not about to take the blame in Washington for blocking UN action. It drafted a Security Council Images Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Jung president’s statement with the United States that condemned the launch for contravening Resolution 1718 and im- November posed sanctions. Spurning the UN action, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman 20 denounced six-party talks as “an arena 10 which infringes on our sovereignty North Korea’s public demolition of the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear complex and which aims only at disarming us is shown on a TV screen at a railway station in Seoul on June 27, 2008. 19 military spokesman warned, “[W]e will With little to show for his efforts to sibly targeted at suspect North Korean preserve…the extension of [the] MDL in re-engage, Kim Jong Il turned up the firms, indiscriminately aimed at shut- the West Sea already proclaimed to the heat. On October 15, the North Korean ting down North Korean bank accounts world as long as there are ceaseless intru- navy accused the South of sending 16 everywhere.19 China, where most of the sions into the territorial waters of our side warships into the disputed waters, ac- accounts were located, was unwilling; in the West Sea.”13 Not to be outmuscled, cording to a report by North Korea’s Ko- Chinese officials were convinced that South Korea’s defense minister told the rean Central News Agency, which said, economic engagement was bringing National Assembly a month later that it “The reckless military provocations by about needed change in North Korea. “will clearly respond to any preemptive warships of the South Korean navy have Joint naval exercises by U.S. and artillery or missile attack by North Korea” created such a serious situation that a South Korean warships in the West Sea,

The message’s meaning was technically obscure, but politically obvious: Pyongyang was saying it was ready for “dialogue”—or else.

in the contested waters.14 The message to naval clash may break out between the ostensibly to reinforce deterrence, were navies on both sides was to shoot first and two sides in these waters.”16 also designed to demonstrate the risk to ask questions later. Shortly thereafter, just such a clash China of not going along with pressure In August 2009, Pyongyang reached took place. On November 9, a North on North Korea.20 That only antagonized out to re-engage with Seoul and Wash- Korean patrol boat crossed the NLL into Beijing, prompting it to conduct naval ington. Intent on releasing two American the contested waters—precisely what the exercises of its own. Some in Washington journalists who had strayed across the 2007 summit had sought to forestall— and Seoul wanted to pick a fight with border from China, Kim Jong Il invited and a South Korean vessel fired warning Beijing over North Korea, but cooler former President Bill Clinton to meet him shots at it. The North returned fire and heads understood that continued coop- on August 4 and renewed an invitation the South opened up, severely damag- eration with China is the key to security for U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth ing the North Korean vessel and causing in Northeast Asia.21 to come to Pyongyang for talks. He also an unknown number of casualties. On sent his two top officials dealing with November 12, after Pyongyang’s demand Next Steps North-South relations to Seoul for Kim for an apology went unanswered, North Events of the past decade have erased any Dae-jung’s funeral with a personal in- Korea’s party newspaper, Rodong Sin- trace of trust between Washington and vitation for Lee for a third North-South mun, spoke of avenging the attack: “The Pyongyang. Words alone will no longer summit meeting, but Lee, mistaking the South Korean forces will be forced to pay suffice to restore it. Both sides will need to gesture for a sign of weakness, spurned dearly for the grave armed provocation take sustained actions to reassure one an- the invitation. perpetrated by them in the waters of the other if denuclearization and reconcilia- On September 3, the North Korean north side in the West Sea of Korea.”17 tion are to have any chance of proceeding. permanent representative to the United Five days later, according to North Ko- What does Pyongyang see in engage- Nations informed the Security Council rean accounts, Kim Jong Il went to a ment? Kim Jong Il has promised “a radical president by letter that Pyongyang’s naval base with his high command and turn in his people’s standard of living” “experimental uranium enrichment has ordered the training of a “do-or-die unit and a “strong and prosperous country” by successfully been conducted to enter of sea heroes.”18 That order was carried 2012, the centenary of his father’s birth. 10 into completion phase.”15 Was the North out on March 26 with the attack on the He needs foreign capital for his economy 20 moving to construct an enrichment Cheonan, an attack for which Pyongyang to grow, and he does not want to be whol- plant? The message’s meaning was tech- has since denied responsibility. ly dependent on China for it. If he wants nically obscure, but politically obvious: A UN Security Council statement to meet those goals, he knows he will November Pyongyang was saying it was ready for condemned the attack but, at China’s need to move to denuclearize. Moreover, “dialogue”—or else. Washington delayed behest, did not name North Korea as he may not yet have given up trying to ODAY ODAY

T Bosworth’s trip until December. Without the perpetrator. South Korea and the improve his security by convincing Wash- a commitment from Seoul to resume United States imposed new sanctions on ington, Seoul, and Tokyo to end enmity shipments of energy aid, he had little to the North. The South curtailed trade, and normalize relations. He will not yield offer except long-standing U.S. positions but stopped short of shutting down the his nuclear programs without a sustained on the need to resume six-party talks and Kaesong industrial park in North Korea, process of reconciliation.

ARMS CONTROL denuclearization in return for an improve- which South Korean firms operate jointly Even a comprehensive settlement will ment in relations. with the North. U.S. sanctions, osten- have to be implemented step by tortured 20 step. Some might cavil that such a gradual October 2000. Launches of North Korean 5. Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Policy Towards Asia,” approach will allow Pyongyang to engage satellites and Nunn-Lugar aid for convert- Address at the Heritage Foundation, Washing- in salami tactics, offering thinner and ing its missile facilities might be a quid ton, DC, June 18, 2008. thinner slices of its nuclear wherewithal pro quo for that step. 6. “Verification Measures Discussion Paper,” and leaving elimination of its weapons to A summit meeting between Obama April 12, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp- come at the end of that process, if ever. Of and Kim Jong Il, establishment of full srv/politics/documents/kesslerdoc_092608. course, a step-by-step approach, illustrated diplomatic relations, and much deeper pdf?sid=ST200809260002. below, would have to overcome the lack of economic engagement are likely to be 7. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s De- political will in Washington to offer much needed for Pyongyang to dismantle its cision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear in return and find a way to convince reactor and reprocessing plant and allow Facilities,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), August 26, 2008. Seoul and Tokyo to contribute their share. its enrichment and reprocessing to be A starting point might be for Pyongyang verifiably ended. It is unclear whether 8. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of to turn over the replacement fuel rods it the North’s programs can be completely State, “U.S.-North Korea Understandings on Veri- fication,” October 11, 2008, http://merln.ndu. has, forestalling a restart of its reactor, and eliminated without recommitment by edu/archivepdf/northkorea/state/110924.pdf. to revive its moratorium on missile and the other parties to construct a nuclear nuclear tests. Additional energy aid might power plant in the North, but conven- 9. “North Korea Warns Nuclear Disabling Might Slow,” Associated Press, December 13, 2008. be an acceptable quid pro quo for the fuel tional power plants should be provided rods, because South Korea was negotiating as dismantlement proceeds at Yongbyon. 10. “Japan ‘Could Become Seoul Ally in N. Korea such an arrangement with the North in Some in Washington wrongly want Issues,’” Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 2009. 2007. A test moratorium will require politi- to focus on preventing Pyongyang from 11. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vehe- cal moves by Washington, at a minimum further proliferation, but the transfer of mently Refutes UNSC’s ‘Presidential Statement,’” the start of a peace process in Korea to be nuclear know-how has proven difficult to KCNA, April 14, 2009. conducted in parallel with six-party talks prevent. Elimination of the North’s pro- 12. “Declaration on the Advancement of South- and some relaxation of UN sanctions. duction capacity is the key to stopping North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity.” Such a peace process is the key to its exports of missile components and 13. “Principled Stand of the KPA to Defend So- preventing more Cheonans and advanc- nuclear equipment. Even worse, unless cialist Country As Firm As Iron Wall Clarified,” ing talks on denuclearization. Although Pyongyang’s nuclear programs are halted KCNA, January 17, 2009. South Korea committed itself to a peace and dismantled, it may eventually gen- 14. “S. Korea to Strike Back If N. Korea Provokes regime in the September 2005 joint dec- erate enough fissile material to export. Armed Clash: Defense Minister,” Yonhap, Feb- laration, the Lee government is reluctant If unbounded, those programs will sow ruary 20, 2009. to enter into such talks. In addition, it further doubts in Seoul and Tokyo about 15. “DPRK Permanent Representative Sends has backed away from negotiating a joint relying on Washington for their security, Letter to President of UNSC,” KCNA, Septem- fishing area and naval confidence-build- only making alliance relations more dif- ber 4, 2009. ing measures that could be the first of ficult to manage. 16. “Halt to Intrusion of S. Korean Warships several agreements on the way to a treaty. However reluctantly, the Obama ad- Into DPRK Waters Demanded,” KCNA, Octo- Turning Seoul around will be critical to ministration is now inching back to the ber 15, 2010. further progress. negotiating table. Talks might work but 17. “S. Korea Will Be Forced to Pay Dearly for Permanent dismantlement best might only if Washington and Seoul are com- Armed Provocations,” KCNA, November 12, 2009. begin at the fuel fabrication plant at Yong- mitted to sustained political and eco- 18. Young-jong and Ser Myo-ja, “Fleet Officer byon, which would preclude Pyongyang nomic engagement and a peace process in Says Kim Intensified Navy Training After Nov. from reloading its reactor to generate more Korea. That remains to be seen. ACT 10 Defeat,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 6, 2010 (quoting plutonium-laden spent fuel. An economic [North] Korean Central Television interview of inducement, such as Nunn-Lugar funding ENDNOTES naval officer Kim Kwang-il on April 25, 2009). of alternative employment for those who 19. Daniel Glaser, Remarks at press conference at 1. Among the signs were Kim Jong Il’s designation worked at the facility might facilitate that the U.S. embassy, Tokyo, August 4, 2010. of his third son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor and step.22 So would political gestures, such as 20. Elizabeth Bumiller, “U.S. and South Ko- ARMS CONTROL TODAY the elder Kim’s directive on the son’s nomination sending Secretary of State Hillary Rodham rea Plan Naval Drill as a Message,” The New to the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea. York Times, July 21, 2010, p. A8 (quoting Clinton to Pyongyang and concluding a See “N. Korea Leader Names Third Son as Succes- Admiral Robert F. Willard, commander of the peace declaration with the two Koreas and sor: Sources,” Yonhap, January 15, 2009. Another U.S. Pacific Command). China affirming that they have no hostile sign was the promotion of Kim Jong Il’s brother- intent toward one another and commit- in-law to serve, in effect, as regent. 21. Mark Landler, “Diplomatic Storm Brewing Over Korean Peninsula,” The New York Times, ting them to sign a peace treaty when the 2. “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of Six- May 20, 2010, p. A8; John Pomfret, “U.S. and North is nuclear free. Party Talks,” September 19, 2005.

South Korea to Announce Joint Military Exer- November While in Pyongyang, Clinton might 3. “Declaration on the Advancement of South- cises,” The Washington Post, July 15, 2010, p. A10. try to reconstitute the offer that Kim Jong North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” 22. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program Il put on the negotiating table to end October 4, 2007. is commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar pro- 20 exports, testing, production, and deploy- 4. Jung Sung-ki, “Peace Zone Project Faces De- gram after its original cosponsors, Senators Sam 10 ment of medium- and longer-range mis- railment,” Korea Times, December 30, 2007. Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). siles when Albright visited Pyongyang in 21