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PYONGYANG REPUBLIC North Korea’S Capital of Human Rights Denial Pyongyang Republic

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PYONGYANG REPUBLIC North Korea’S Capital of Human Rights Denial Pyongyang Republic H R N K ROBERT COLLINS PYONGYANG REPUBLIC North Korea’s Capital OF HUMAN RIGHTS DENIAL PYONGYANG REPUBLIC NORTH KORea’s CAPITAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS DENIAL Robert Collins H R N K Copyright © 2016 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior permission of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 435 Washington, DC 20036 P: (202) 499-7970 www.hrnk.org ISBN: 78-0-9856480-6-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016932202 BOARD OF DIRECTORS Gordon Flake (Co-Chair) Chief Executive Officer, Perth USAsia Centre,The University of Western Australia Co-author, Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea Katrina Lantos Swett (Co-Chair) President and CEO, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice John Despres (Co-Vice-Chair) Consultant on International Financial & Strategic Affairs Suzanne Scholte (Co-Vice-Chair) President, Defense Forum Foundation Seoul Peace Prize Laureate Helen-Louise Hunter (Secretary) Attorney Author, Kim II-Song’s North Korea Kevin C. McCann (Treasurer) General Counsel, StrataScale, Inc. Counsel, SHI International Corp. Roberta Cohen (Co-Chair Emeritus) Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Specializing in Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues Andrew Natsios (Co-Chair Emeritus) Former Administrator, USAID Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and Executive Professor, The Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University Author of The Great North Korean Famine Morton Abramowitz Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation Jerome Cohen Co-Director, US-Asia Law Institute, NYU Law School Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations Lisa Colacurcio Advisor, Impact Investments Rabbi Abraham Cooper Associate Dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center, LA Jack David Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Paula Dobriansky Chair, World Affairs Council of America Adjunct Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Distinguished National Security Chair, U.S. Naval Academy Nicholas Eberstadt Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute Author of books on North Korea including The End of North Korea Carl Gershman President, National Endowment for Democracy Stephen Kahng President, Kahng Foundation David Kim Coordinator, The Asia Foundation Debra Liang-Fenton U.S. Institute of Peace Former Executive Director, HRNK Winston Lord Former Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Department of State Former Ambassador to China Former Director of Policy Planning Staff,Department of State Former President, Council on Foreign Relations Former Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy David Maxwell Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program, Georgetown University Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.) Marcus Noland Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics Author of books on North Korea including Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas Jacqueline Pak EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Greg Scarlatoiu TABLE OF CONTENTS About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)...............................................1 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. 2 Concepts & Terms .......................................................................................................................... 3 Preface ............................................................................................................................................ 5 About the Author ...........................................................................................................................6 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................6 Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 7 Chapter 2: Why the Pyongyang Republic Was Created .............................................................. 11 Chapter 3: The Suryong and Human Rights Denial—Power in the Pyongyang Republic ........ 18 3.1 Suryong, Juche, and Human Rights Denial ..................................................................... 18 3.2 The Monolithic Guidance System ..................................................................................... 22 3.3 The Monolithic Ideology System ..................................................................................... 24 3.4 Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology ............................................................................. 25 3.5 Centralization of Ideological Authority in Pyongyang .................................................... 27 Chapter 4: Pyongyang Republic’s Power Elite............................................................................30 4.1 Identifying the Elite ..........................................................................................................30 4.2 Power Elite, Cadre Elite, Lesser Elite ............................................................................... 33 4.3 Political Bureau (Politburo) .............................................................................................. 35 4.4 Central Military Commission (CMC)................................................................................. 35 4.5 National Defense Commission (NDC) ..............................................................................36 4.6 North Korea’s Cadre Policy: Recruitment, Training, and Evaluation .............................39 4.7 The Lives of the Elite: Loyalty, Survival, and Corruption ................................................ 42 4.8 Current Leaders of the Pyongyang Republic & Their Role In Human Rights Denial .....46 4.9 Other Key Advisers ...........................................................................................................54 Chapter 5: Privilege in the Pyongyang Republic ......................................................................... 57 5.1 Privilege and Human Rights Denial .................................................................................58 5.2 Housing in Pyongyang: The Ultimate Privilege ...............................................................59 5.3 Food Security in Pyongyang .............................................................................................65 5.4 Privileged Education in Pyongyang ................................................................................67 5.5 Affluence in the Pyongyang Republic .............................................................................71 5.6 The Poor in Pyongyang ................................................................................................... 73 Chapter 6: Life in the Pyongyang Republic .................................................................................76 6.1 Residency Requirements ................................................................................................ 77 6.2 Wealth Disparity...............................................................................................................79 6.3 Public Services & Utilities ................................................................................................80 6.4 Law & Order in Pyongyang ............................................................................................. 81 6.5 Public Mobilization ..........................................................................................................82 6.6 Demographics of Pyongyang*........................................................................................83 Chapter 7: Building the Pyongyang Republic ............................................................................. 91 7.1 Pyongyang before the Kim Regime ................................................................................ 91 7.2 Kim Il-sung’s Pyongyang .................................................................................................93 7.3 Kim Jong-il’s Pyongyang Republic ..................................................................................96 7.4 Kim Jong-un’s Republic of Changjeon Street ............................................................... 101 7.5 Bad Construction and Building Collapse .......................................................................103 7.6 Justifying the Pyongyang Republic .............................................................................. 106 Chapter 8: Pyongyang’s Power Institutions and Human Rights Denial .................................. 108 8.1 Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) ...................................................................................... 108 8.2 KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) .................................................. 112 8.3 KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) .................................................... 117 8.4 State Security Department (SSD) ..................................................................................120
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