Npr 3.3: the U.S.-Dprk Nuclear Deal: a Russian Perspective
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Valery I. Denisov t is widely acknowledged today that the Democratic demonstrated the ability to “sit on two chairs”: one People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is continuing Soviet and one Chinese. It also showed a talent for Ito use its “nuclear card” successfully in the com- maneuvering between them, which enabled North Ko- plicated diplomatic dialogue with the United States. rea to receive support and aid from both allies. When The signing of the the relationship be- Agreed Framework in tween the Soviet Union October 1994 in Geneva, and North Korea be- the Kuala Lumpur agree- VIEWPOINT: came strained (1960 to ments in June 1995, and 1970), Kim Il-sung finally the agreement THE U.S.-DPRK NUCLEAR skillfully used even this signed in New York in occasion to his advan- December 1995 between DEAL: A RUSSIAN tage. Clearly, this situ- the Korean Peninsula En- ation could not last ergy Development Orga- PERSPECTIVE forever. Pyongyang nization (KEDO) and also realized this, and North Korea on the pro- by Valery I. Denisov showed increasing con- vision of light water re- cerns over the fact that actors (LWRs) were all the Soviet Union and the result of difficult American-North Korean compro- South Korea would sooner or later attempt to normal- mises. But there is a “plus” sign on the side of ize their relations. The North Korean leadership also Pyongyang. recognized its vulnerability regarding the economic However governments or political circles within the challenge presented by South Korea, where Pyongyang international community might evaluate the results of was losing the competition and its position was weak- the negotiations between the United States and North ening every year. Under these circumstances, the DPRK Korea, one has to admit that they present a unique case leadership made a decision in the 1970s to pursue its where priority in the dispute was not given to the re- own nuclear program, in case the situation should de- sponsible international organization—in this case the velop unfavorably for North Korea. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Instead, At the same time, the DPRK’s diplomats undertook the compromise was achieved through bilateral agree- an active political initiative to solicit support from the ments. According to international nonproliferation stan- international community for its program of peaceful dards, the compromise was not without its flaws, but a unification and creation of the so-called Democratic positive balance on the nuclear issue has been achieved Confederative Republic of Korea (DCRK). North Ko- in the Agreed Framework. As for its negative aspect— rea also wanted to prevent the establishment of diplo- the fact that the inspection of the DPRK’s nuclear fa- matic relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) cilities has been postponed until the year 2000—this and the Soviet Union and entrance of one or both Ko- can be “worked out” in the subsequent stages of the rean states into the United Nations. The DPRK Minis- document’s implementation. That is why the process try of Foreign Affairs pursued this three-fold diplomatic of implementing the U.S.-North Korean agreement— thrust determinedly in its contacts with representatives with its “compromise” nature and its different inter- from the Soviet Union and South Korea. During sev- pretations—will be difficult, complicated, and full of eral meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs obstacles. This viewpoint examines the U.S.-DPRK agreements from an outsider’s perspective, but one Dr. Valery I. Denisov is Russia’s Ambassador to North which has been informed by a long experience in deal- Korea. Prior to his appointment, Dr. Denisov served ing with North Korean officials. for over 10 years in the Soviet/Russian embassy in Pyongyang and, more recently, as Deputy Director of the First Asian Department in the Russian Ministry of PYONGYANG IS FORCED TO CHANGE ITS Foreign Affairs. This original paper was translated from STRATEGY AND TACTICS Russian by Anna Mikheeva, with assistance from James Over the past 50 years, the leadership of North Ko- Clay Moltz. This study was funded by a grant from the rea, in the person of Kim Il-sung, rather successfully Rockefeller Foundation. 74 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Valery I. Denisov of the Soviet Union and the DPRK in the 1980s, the litical situation on the Korean peninsula, and the United Soviet side had repeatedly stated its support for the States had become actively involved in attempting to North Korean version of the unification of Korea in settle these problems. Pyongyang and Washington had the creation of a DCRK. Soviet representatives spoke begun confidential diplomatic contacts in Beijing on out against “unfounded attempts to create a ‘two-Ko- the level of advisors to the embassies. Similar contacts rea’ situation by ‘mutual recognition’ of North and took place in Panmunjom between military representa- South, as well as their separate or simultaneous admis- tives of the two states. Thus, in its external policies sion to the U.N.”1 Pyongyang emphasized direct dialogue with the United From the Chinese side, assurances of support for the States, with the “nuclear card” acting as North Korea’s peaceful unification of Korea also followed. The Chi- “bait” for Washington. nese never failed to underline the necessity for the “re- While North Korea continued to preserve its con- laxation of tension on the Korean peninsula,” stressing nections with China in case an “emergency” situation that both Koreas should participate in this process. The might arise, it had also initiated focused diplomatic ef- ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that continua- forts. North Korea’s ultimate goals were the complete tion of practical contacts with South Korea “is a contri- normalization of relations with the United States and a bution to the lessening of tension on the peninsula and parallel settlement of the nuclear problem on terms fa- promotion of peaceful unification of Korea.”2 vorable to itself. Through this complicated political The DPRK leadership continued to voice its increas- struggle, Pyongyang also hopes for an improvement in ing concerns about the growing cooperation between relations with Japan and other Western countries. the Soviet Union and South Korea, first in the trade The current policy of the North Korean leadership is and economic spheres, and later in the political realm. to see that Russia does not adopt an independent role in The ideological foundation for relations between North the settlement of the nuclear question. Pyongyang would Korea and its allies was becoming less and less de- rather see Moscow as the “coauthor” for North Korea’s fined. Calls to Moscow and Beijing to preserve their policy. In other words, North Korea would prefer that “class-based” approach towards the South Korean re- Moscow fully support its course of action in the dia- gime were no longer effective. Mikhail Gorbachev ex- logue with the United States. In Pyongyang’s thinking, pressed his support for the development of economic this would strengthen its position vis-a-vis the United cooperation with the ROK “in the context of overall States. As for South Korea, Pyongyang wants to elimi- normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula.”3 nate Seoul from the process of negotiations altogether. The visit by Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Beijing in early September 1990 fi- U.S.-DPRK DIALOGUE: FIRST RESULTS BRING nally convinced the North Korean leadership that it was HOPE impossible to stop the process of normalization of rela- tions between the Soviet Union and the Republic of The critical point in the North Korean nuclear prob- Korea. North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim lem came on March 12, 1993, when the DPRK gov- En Nam made the undiplomatic remark that such ac- ernment issued a statement in which it declared its tions on the part of the Soviet Union “force Pyongyang intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Prolifera- to take necessary measures to build certain types of tion Treaty (NPT) (of which it been a member since weapons by our own means.”4 Political observers re- December 1985). It indicated that this dispute could be garded this statement as a hint that North Korea was decided only through direct negotiations with the United 5 actively developing nuclear weapons. From this mo- States. ment on, one can argue that Pyongyang had begun to The U.S. administration, however, in spite of such re-evaluate its foreign policy strategy, placing its bet an extreme step by the North Korean government, con- on the “nuclear card,” which, above all, required the tinued contacts with Pyongyang. The result of these realization of its plans to enter into a dialogue with the negotiations became the Joint Statement, signed in June United States to resolve a whole range of bilateral prob- 1993 in New York. A close analysis of the U.S.-North lems, including the normalization of relations. Korean document reveals that in exchange for a tempo- By the end of the 1980s, the North Korean nuclear rary delay of its withdrawal from the NPT, Pyongyang problem had led to significant complications in the po- had received a number of very important obligations The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 75 Valery I. Denisov from the United States. The United States agreed to and Pyongyang had already developed a history of co- refrain from the threat or use of force, to respect the operation and wanted to achieve new compromises with- DPRK’s sovereignty, and not to intervene in its inter- out any outside help. nal affairs. The DPRK, in its turn, declared that it would In August 1994, the United States and DPRK signed temporarily postpone its withdrawal from the NPT.6 In another document in Geneva.