North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy
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North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy Leon V. Sigal he revelation that North Korea is ington to live up to its end of the bargain— buying equipment useful for en- initially by delaying international inspec- Triching uranium has led many in Washington has to tions to determine how much plutonium it Washington to conclude that North Korea, reprocessed before 1992. like Iraq, is again making nuclear weapons understand that That trade became the basis of the Oc- and that the appropriate response is to pun- Pyongyang is seeking tober 1994 Agreed Framework, whereby ish it for brazenly breaking its commit- the North agreed to freeze and eventually ments. Both the assessment and the policy an end to its hostile dismantle its nuclear arms program in re- that flows from it are wrong. relationship with the turn for two new light-water reactors North Korea is no Iraq. It wants to im- (LWRs) for generating nuclear power, an prove relations with the United States and U.S. When Washing- interim supply of heavy-fuel oil, some re- says it is ready to give up its nuclear, missile, ton fails to recipro- laxation of U.S. economic sanctions, and— and other weapons programs in return. above all to North Korea—gradual im- Pyongyang’s declared willingness to cate, Pyongyang re- provement of relations. The accord stopped satisfy all U.S. security concerns is worth a nuclear program that had already pro- probing in direct talks. More coercive alter- taliates. duced five or six bombs’ worth of plutonium natives—economic sanctions and military then lying in a cooling pond in Yongbyon force—are not viable without allied sup- and that by now would have been capable port. Yet, the Bush administration, long of reprocessing 30 bombs’ worth of pluto- aware of North Korea’s ongoing nuclear end to its hostile relationship with the nium a year. and missile activities, has shown little inter- United States. When Washington fails to re- In halting Pyongyang’s plutonium est in negotiating. ciprocate, Pyongyang retaliates by break- program, Washington got what it most Recognizing that, both Japan and South ing its pledges in a desperate effort to get wanted up front, but it did not live up to Korea have refused to confront North Ko- Washington to cooperate. its end of the bargain. When Republicans rea and instead have moved to engage it. won control of Congress in elections just a Hard-line unilateralists in the Bush admin- week later, unilateralists in the Republican istration and Congress oppose such en- Tit-for-Tat to End Enmity Party denounced the deal as appeasement. gagement. As they continue to get their Unwilling to challenge Congress, the way, they are putting the United States on In the late 1980s, then-North Korean Clinton administration shrank from imple- a collision course with its allies, undermin- leader Kim Il Sung decided he had no bet- mentation. Construction of the first re- ing political support for the alliance in South ter way to provide for his country’s secu- placement reactor was slow to begin—it Korea and Japan and jeopardizing the U.S. rity than to end its lifelong enmity with the was supposed to be ready by 2003 but is troop presence in both countries. United States, South Korea, and Japan. He three years behind schedule—and the The United States rightly wants to stop reached out to all three, but in the early heavy-fuel oil was not always delivered on North Korea from acquiring nuclear arms; 1990s, the first Bush administration, deter- schedule. Above all, Washington did little prevent it from developing, testing, deploy- mined to put a stop to Pyongyang’s nuclear to improve political relations with ing and selling any more ballistic missiles; arming before easing its isolation, worked Pyongyang. get rid of its biological and chemical weap- to block closer South Korean and Japanese When the United States was slow to ons; and assure that, whatever happens in- ties with the North. Concluding that Wash- fulfill the terms of the 1994 accord, North ternally in North Korea, the artillery ington held the key to open doors to Seoul Korea threatened to break it. In February Pyongyang has emplaced within range of and Tokyo, Pyongyang engaged seriously 1997, Pyongyang began warning it would Seoul is never fired in anger. with Seoul and Tokyo in the ensuing decade no longer be bound by the accord if Wash- To achieve its aims, Washington has to only when it was convinced Washington ington failed to uphold it. That played into understand that Pyongyang is seeking an was cooperating. growing suspicions in the U.S. intelligence Pyongyang also decided to trade in its community that an underground site at Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia nuclear arms program in return for an end Kumchang-ni might be nuclear related. In Cooperative Security Project at the Social Sci- to enmity. At the same time, it kept its late April 1998, the North stopped canning ence Research Council. nuclear option open as leverage on Wash- the plutonium-laden spent fuel at 8 Arms Control Today December 2002 Yongbyon, and it threatened to reopen the make possible by showing its readiness to more than 180 miles, the standard set by the reactor at Yongbyon for maintenance. Its cooperate. In anticipation of high-level talks Missile Technology Control Regime. decision to acquire equipment for enrich- in Washington proposed by Perry, it had The October 12 joint communiqué al- ing uranium probably dates back to this handed North Korea a draft communiqué luded to one way to verify the accord. “The time. in January 2000 declaring an end to enmity. sides agreed on the desirability of greater Had North Korea wanted to break the At their June 2000 summit meeting, the transparency in carrying out their respec- 1994 accord, it could have resumed repro- South and North pledged to reconcile, an tive obligations under the Agreed Frame- cessing. It did not. Instead, Pyongyang re- irreversible step toward ending a half-cen- work,” it reads. “In this regard, they noted solved to try again to end enmity, this time tury of internecine conflict. By reaching ac- the value of the access which removed U.S. using its missiles as inducement. On June 16, commodation, the one-time foes would be concerns about the underground site at 1998, Pyongyang publicly offered to nego- realigning relations in all of Northeast Asia Kumchang-ni.” North Korea had allowed tiate an end to its development as well as and opening the way to regional coopera- U.S. inspectors to visit the site twice and export of ballistic missiles. Development tion on security. even proposed permanent monitoring at meant not only tests but also production of As soon as the summit ended, the the site in the form of a joint venture. Such missiles for testing. Pyongyang also Clinton administration carried out its transparency was needed at other suspect warned that, if the United States was unwill- promise to end sanctions under the Trad- nuclear sites in the North, as well as for ing to declare an end to enmity, it would ing with the Enemy Act. Pyongyang also verification of a missile ban. keep testing missiles—a threat it carried out wanted Washington to end sanctions un- Above all, North Korea wanted Presi- on August 31, when it launched a three- der U.S. antiterrorism laws. Instead, in a dent Bill Clinton to come to Pyongyang to stage rocket in an unsuccessful attempt to joint statement issued October 6, the North seal the missile deal and place his imprima- put a satellite into orbit. renounced terrorism, and both sides “un- tur on the October 9 pledge, thereby con- Pyongyang’s bargaining tactics led derscored their commitment to support summating North Korea’s 10-year cam- many to conclude that it was engaging in the international legal regime combating paign to end enmity with the United States. blackmail in an attempt to obtain economic international terrorism and to cooperate Why would North Korea give up nuclear aid without giving up anything in return. It with each other in taking effective mea- arms and missiles, never mind its artillery was not. It was playing tit-for-tat, cooper- sures to fight terrorism,” specifically, “to threat to Seoul, if the United States re- ating whenever Washington cooperated exchange information regarding interna- mained its foe? and retaliating when Washington reneged, tional terrorism.” in an effort to end enmity. These steps prompted Kim Jong Il to send his second-in-command, Vice Marshal Reconciliation Derailed Jo Myong Rok, to Washington October 9, On the Road to Reconciliation 2000. A joint communiqué issued October President Clinton decided not to travel 12 read, “Neither government would have to North Korea, and without his commit- The 1998 missile test prompted a hostile intent toward the other.” In plain ment to go, negotiations with the North policy review in Washington conducted by English, we are not enemies. stalled. On June 17, 2002, Clinton said as former Defense Secretary William Perry, This declared end to enmity opened much to the Council on Foreign Relations: who concluded that “the urgent focus of the way to a missile deal. Within two weeks, “We were very close to ending the North U.S. policy toward the D.P.R.K. [Democratic in talks with then-Secretary of State Korean missile program in the year 2000. I People’s Republic of Korea] must be to end Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang, Kim believe if I had been willing to go there, we its nuclear weapons and long-range mis- Jong Il offered to end exports of all missile would have ended it.” sile-related activities.” In May 1999, Perry technology, including those in existing con- Instead of picking up the ball where traveled to North Korea where he af- tracts, and to freeze testing, production, Bill Clinton dropped it, George W.