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North Is No : Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy

Leon V. Sigal

he revelation that is ington to live up to its end of the bargain— buying equipment useful for en- initially by delaying international inspec- Triching uranium has led many in Washington has to tions to determine how much plutonium it Washington to conclude that North Korea, reprocessed before 1992. like Iraq, is again making nuclear weapons understand that That trade became the basis of the Oc- and that the appropriate response is to pun- Pyongyang is seeking tober 1994 Agreed Framework, whereby ish it for brazenly breaking its commit- the North agreed to freeze and eventually ments. Both the assessment and the policy an end to its hostile dismantle its nuclear arms program in re- that flows from it are wrong. relationship with the turn for two new light-water reactors North Korea is no Iraq. It wants to im- (LWRs) for generating nuclear power, an prove relations with the United States and U.S. When Washing- interim supply of heavy-fuel oil, some re- says it is ready to give up its nuclear, missile, ton fails to recipro- laxation of U.S. economic sanctions, and— and other weapons programs in return. above all to North Korea—gradual im- Pyongyang’s declared willingness to cate, Pyongyang re- provement of relations. The accord stopped satisfy all U.S. security concerns is worth a nuclear program that had already pro- probing in direct talks. More coercive alter- taliates. duced five or six bombs’ worth of plutonium natives—economic sanctions and military then lying in a cooling pond in Yongbyon force—are not viable without allied sup- and that by now would have been capable port. Yet, the Bush administration, long of reprocessing 30 bombs’ worth of pluto- aware of North Korea’s ongoing nuclear end to its hostile relationship with the nium a year. and missile activities, has shown little inter- United States. When Washington fails to re- In halting Pyongyang’s plutonium est in negotiating. ciprocate, Pyongyang retaliates by break- program, Washington got what it most Recognizing that, both and South ing its pledges in a desperate effort to get wanted up front, but it did not live up to Korea have refused to confront North Ko- Washington to cooperate. its end of the bargain. When Republicans rea and instead have moved to engage it. won control of Congress in elections just a Hard-line unilateralists in the Bush admin- week later, unilateralists in the Republican istration and Congress oppose such en- Tit-for-Tat to End Enmity Party denounced the deal as appeasement. gagement. As they continue to get their Unwilling to challenge Congress, the way, they are putting the United States on In the late 1980s, then-North Korean Clinton administration shrank from imple- a collision course with its allies, undermin- leader Kim Il Sung decided he had no bet- mentation. Construction of the first re- ing political support for the alliance in South ter way to provide for his country’s secu- placement reactor was slow to begin—it Korea and Japan and jeopardizing the U.S. rity than to end its lifelong enmity with the was supposed to be ready by 2003 but is troop presence in both countries. United States, , and Japan. He three years behind schedule—and the The United States rightly wants to stop reached out to all three, but in the early heavy-fuel oil was not always delivered on North Korea from acquiring nuclear arms; 1990s, the first Bush administration, deter- schedule. Above all, Washington did little prevent it from developing, testing, deploy- mined to put a stop to Pyongyang’s nuclear to improve political relations with ing and selling any more ballistic missiles; arming before easing its isolation, worked Pyongyang. get rid of its biological and chemical weap- to block closer South Korean and Japanese When the United States was slow to ons; and assure that, whatever happens in- ties with the North. Concluding that Wash- fulfill the terms of the 1994 accord, North ternally in North Korea, the artillery ington held the key to open doors to Korea threatened to break it. In February Pyongyang has emplaced within range of and , Pyongyang engaged seriously 1997, Pyongyang began warning it would Seoul is never fired in anger. with Seoul and Tokyo in the ensuing decade no longer be bound by the accord if Wash- To achieve its aims, Washington has to only when it was convinced Washington ington failed to uphold it. That played into understand that Pyongyang is seeking an was cooperating. growing suspicions in the U.S. intelligence Pyongyang also decided to trade in its community that an underground site at Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast nuclear arms program in return for an end Kumchang-ni might be nuclear related. In Cooperative Security Project at the Social Sci- to enmity. At the same time, it kept its late April 1998, the North stopped canning ence Research Council. nuclear option open as leverage on Wash- the plutonium-laden spent fuel at

8 Arms Control Today December 2002 Yongbyon, and it threatened to reopen the make possible by showing its readiness to more than 180 miles, the standard set by the reactor at Yongbyon for maintenance. Its cooperate. In anticipation of high-level talks Missile Technology Control Regime. decision to acquire equipment for enrich- in Washington proposed by Perry, it had The October 12 joint communiqué al- ing uranium probably dates back to this handed North Korea a draft communiqué luded to one way to verify the accord. “The time. in January 2000 declaring an end to enmity. sides agreed on the desirability of greater Had North Korea wanted to break the At their June 2000 summit meeting, the transparency in carrying out their respec- 1994 accord, it could have resumed repro- South and North pledged to reconcile, an tive obligations under the Agreed Frame- cessing. It did not. Instead, Pyongyang re- irreversible step toward ending a half-cen- work,” it reads. “In this regard, they noted solved to try again to end enmity, this time tury of internecine conflict. By reaching ac- the value of the access which removed U.S. using its missiles as inducement. On June 16, commodation, the one-time foes would be concerns about the underground site at 1998, Pyongyang publicly offered to nego- realigning relations in all of Northeast Asia Kumchang-ni.” North Korea had allowed tiate an end to its development as well as and opening the way to regional coopera- U.S. inspectors to visit the site twice and export of ballistic missiles. Development tion on security. even proposed permanent monitoring at meant not only tests but also production of As soon as the summit ended, the the site in the form of a joint venture. Such missiles for testing. Pyongyang also Clinton administration carried out its transparency was needed at other suspect warned that, if the United States was unwill- promise to end sanctions under the Trad- nuclear sites in the North, as well as for ing to declare an end to enmity, it would ing with the Enemy Act. Pyongyang also verification of a missile ban. keep testing missiles—a threat it carried out wanted Washington to end sanctions un- Above all, North Korea wanted Presi- on August 31, when it launched a three- der U.S. antiterrorism laws. Instead, in a dent Bill Clinton to come to Pyongyang to stage rocket in an unsuccessful attempt to joint statement issued October 6, the North seal the missile deal and place his imprima- put a satellite into orbit. renounced terrorism, and both sides “un- tur on the October 9 pledge, thereby con- Pyongyang’s bargaining tactics led derscored their commitment to support summating North Korea’s 10-year cam- many to conclude that it was engaging in the international legal regime combating paign to end enmity with the United States. blackmail in an attempt to obtain economic international terrorism and to cooperate Why would North Korea give up nuclear aid without giving up anything in return. It with each other in taking effective mea- arms and missiles, never mind its artillery was not. It was playing tit-for-tat, cooper- sures to fight terrorism,” specifically, “to threat to Seoul, if the United States re- ating whenever Washington cooperated exchange information regarding interna- mained its foe? and retaliating when Washington reneged, tional terrorism.” in an effort to end enmity. These steps prompted Kim Jong Il to send his second-in-command, Vice Marshal Reconciliation Derailed Jo Myong Rok, to Washington October 9, On the Road to Reconciliation 2000. A joint communiqué issued October President Clinton decided not to travel 12 read, “Neither government would have to North Korea, and without his commit- The 1998 missile test prompted a hostile intent toward the other.” In plain ment to go, negotiations with the North policy review in Washington conducted by English, we are not enemies. stalled. On June 17, 2002, Clinton said as former Defense Secretary William Perry, This declared end to enmity opened much to the Council on Foreign Relations: who concluded that “the urgent focus of the way to a missile deal. Within two weeks, “We were very close to ending the North U.S. policy toward the D.P.R.K. [Democratic in talks with then-Secretary of State Korean missile program in the year 2000. I People’s Republic of Korea] must be to end Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang, Kim believe if I had been willing to go there, we its nuclear weapons and long-range mis- Jong Il offered to end exports of all missile would have ended it.” sile-related activities.” In May 1999, Perry technology, including those in existing con- Instead of picking up the ball where traveled to North Korea where he af- tracts, and to freeze testing, production, Bill Clinton dropped it, George W. Bush firmed that the United States was ready to and deployment of all missiles with a range moved the goalposts when he assumed the negotiate in earnest again and this time of 300 miles or more. That covered the presidency in 2001. In so doing, he picked make good on its promises. Prior to Nodong; the Taepo Dong-1 and 2; and, a fight with ally South Korea. The White Perry’s trip, North Korea let the canning arguably, the Scud-C. In return, the United House broke with Kim Dae-jung in March of spent fuel at Yongbyon be completed. States offered to arrange for the launch of 2001 by publicly repudiating Kim’s policy It also allowed visits to the Kumchang-ni two or three satellites a year. The North of reconciliation and privately discourag- site by U.S. inspectors, who found it was said it would accept compensation in kind, ing the South from concluding a peace not nuclear related. not cash, to replace revenue forgone by agreement with the North or providing it The Perry policy paid off that Septem- halting its missile exports. Though it did not with electricity. Bush also disparaged Kim ber when Pyongyang agreed to suspend its say so at the time, Washington was pre- Jong Il, not a diplomatic way to address test-launching of missiles while negotiations pared to arrange for $200-300 million a someone who had just offered to stop proceeded. In return, Washington promised year in investment and aid.1 making and selling missiles. to end sanctions under the Trading with the To turn the freeze into a verifiable ban, After completing a review of policy Enemy Act, a pledge it was slow to carry out. significant issues remained to be explored toward North Korea, the Bush adminis- Meanwhile, South Korean President and resolved: “elimination” of North tration reneged on past U.S. commit- Kim Dae-jung, who had played a pivotal Korea’s missiles, on-site monitoring to ments and reinterpreted agreements with part in putting Washington back on the road verify the cessation of missile production the North unilaterally. First, it did not re- to reconciliation with Pyongyang, was qui- and deployment (what negotiators called affirm the October 12, 2000, U.S.-North etly arranging a summit meeting with “transparency” and “confidence-building Korea pledge of no “hostile intent”—a North Korean ruler Kim Jong Il—a meet- measures on missiles”), and extending the pledge it would repudiate the next year ing the Clinton administration had helped freeze to all missiles capable of a range of when it labeled North Korea a member

Arms Control Today December 2002 9 of the “axis of evil.” Second, the White By seeking weapons of mass de- gether. Taking a more moderate tone, the House announced June 6, 2001, that it struction, these regimes pose a administration opted not to certify North would seek “improved implementation” grave and growing danger. They Korea’s compliance with the accord, a re- of the 1994 Agreed Framework—in effect, could provide these arms to ter- quirement under U.S. law, while at the same reinterpreting it to require prompt rorists, giving them the means to time saying it would continue to abide by nuclear inspections without offering any- match their hatred. They could at- the accord’s provisions. thing in return. Third, the administration tack our allies or attempt to black- Some administration officials wanted to wanted the North to adopt “a less threat- mail the United States. In any of go further and accuse North Korea of “an- ening conventional military posture,” these cases, the price of indiffer- ticipatory breach” of the accord—on the which Pyongyang believes it cannot do ence could be catastrophic. grounds it had not allowed inspections by without reciprocity by Washington and the International Atomic Energy Agency Seoul, given its military inferiority. The What began as the purple prose of (IAEA) to determine how much reprocess- White House also decided that, as a mat- speechwriters soon became administration ing of plutonium it had done before 1991. A ter of policy, progress toward an agree- policy—and not just toward Iraq. On May case could be made that the North has not ment on missiles would depend on 6, in a reference that drew little public at- permitted inspections that are mandated by progress on other issues of concern. That tention, Undersecretary of State John Bolton the accord, for instance, at the isotope pro- assured no progress across the board. accused North Korea as well as Iraq of hav- duction laboratory at Yongbyon. But the in- In response to the June 6 White House ing “covert nuclear programs, in violation spections demanded by some Bush officials, statement, a North Korean Foreign Min- of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty however desirable, were not required by the istry spokesman on June 18 called on Wash- [NPT].” Bolton’s statement was followed text of the Agreed Framework, which reads: ington to implement “the provisions of the June 1 by Bush’s announcement of a new “When a significant portion of the LWR D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed Framework and the doctrine for combating states that are de- project is completed, but before delivery of D.P.R.K.-U.S. joint communiqué as agreed veloping weapons of mass destruction by key nuclear components, the D.P.R.K. will upon.” The North followed that up June waging preventive war—without allies, come into full compliance with its safeguards 28 with the hint of a deal: it linked a U.S. without United Nations sanction, in viola- agreement with the IAEA.” Nothing in the demand for nuclear inspections with its tion of international law. “We cannot put our negotiating record obliges the North to act own demand for electricity, which it sees faith in the word of tyrants who solemnly sooner.3 as compensation for the delay in provid- sign nonproliferation treaties, and then sys- ing the first reactor promised under the tematically break them,” he declared. “We Agreed Framework. At the same time, must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt Pyongyang’s New Tack however, the North warned of tit-for-tat: his plans, and confront the worst threats be- “If no measure is taken for the compensa- fore they emerge.” Some hard-liners in the Bush adminis- tion for the loss of electricity, the D.P.R.K. Even though it was aware of North tration claim its tough stance brought North can no longer keep its nuclear activities in Korea’s ongoing nuclear and missile activi- Korea to seek accommodation with South a state of freeze and implement the Agreed ties, the Bush administration made no ef- Korea and Japan, but they’ve got it back- Framework.”2 fort to enter into negotiations. The admin- ward: it led Seoul and Tokyo to improve re- istration had long said it would meet “any- lations with Pyongyang in order to head off time, anywhere,” but Pyongyang’s willing- a crisis. Grinding Axes ness to resume talks, conveyed to South Pyongyang opened the way. Con- Korean special envoy Lim Dong-won in vinced it was getting nowhere with Wash- Then came September 11. The next early April 2002, caught it unprepared— ington, Pyongyang changed course in Sep- day, a North Korean Foreign Ministry mired in an internal struggle over whom tember 2001 and resumed ministerial-level spokesman voiced regret and reiterated to send and what negotiating position to talks with Seoul to implement agreements North Korea’s opposition to all forms of take. On April 30, the administration offered reached in the June 2000 summit. In secret terrorism. On September 15, the head of a dates for a resumption, but the ongoing talks in around the same time, delegation from Pyongyang, arriving in internal struggle led it to seek a postpone- North Korea began tiptoeing toward a re- Seoul for ministerial talks, also expressed ment. It cited the deadly July 2 naval clash sumption of normalization talks with Ja- regret. A senior Foreign Ministry official between North and South Korea as a rea- pan as well. This marked an important shift handed Sweden’s chargé in Pyongyang a son to postpone talks proposed for July 10- for Pyongyang, which for the past decade note for the United States expressing con- 12 in Pyongyang, withdrawing the offer had engaged seriously with Seoul and To- dolences about the September 11 attacks— before North Korea had the chance to re- kyo only when it was convinced that Wash- a signal of willingness to cooperate on ter- spond. Even after Secretary of State Colin ington was cooperating as well. It had fi- rorism. Powell’s brief chat with Foreign Minister nally concluded that the path to reconcilia- Far from cooperating on terrorism or Paek Nam Sun at the Association of South- tion with Washington runs through Seoul anything else, the Bush administration east Asian Nations (ASEAN) Forum on July and Tokyo. It was also reducing the risk of sounded like it was spoiling for a fight. In- 31, Washington did not offer to set a date renewed confrontation with Washington stead of reaffirming the declaration of no for the start of talks. by persuading Seoul and Tokyo it was “hostile intent,” Bush repudiated it in his Meanwhile, hard-liners were trying to ready to deal. 2002 State of the Union address, when he undermine the Agreed Framework, the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s said, referring to North Korea, “States like basis for negotiations. Some Republicans in September 17 summit meeting with Kim these, and their terrorist allies, constitute Congress had long pressed to halt heavy- Jong Il was clear evidence of this. After the an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace fuel oil deliveries and reactor construction Bush administration spurned talks with of the world.” He went on: and abandon the Agreed Framework alto- Pyongyang, Tokyo tired of waiting for

10 Arms Control Today December 2002 Washington. On February 18, less than United States, Japan tried to coax Washing- determined to acquire nuclear arms early three weeks after the “axis of evil” speech, ton into engaging. in the 1990s, it could have done so by shut- Koizumi, with Bush at his side, said at a Unilateralists in Washington might ting down its reactor at Yongbyon anytime press conference in Tokyo, “Japan, through have wanted to impede North Korea-Japan between 1991 and 1994, removing the cooperation and coordination with the U.S. rapprochement, but others close to the spent nuclear fuel, and reprocessing it to and Korea, would like to work on normal- president recognized that failure to re-en- extract plutonium, then refueling the re- ization of relations with North Korea.” gage could put the U.S. military presence in actor to generate more plutonium. It could Pyongyang did not take long to respond. It play in Japanese politics by alienating sup- also have completed two more reactors revived Red Cross talks and pledged to re- porters of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and then under construction. By now, it could sume its search for the missing persons that strengthening the hand of right-wingers have generated enough plutonium for Tokyo suspected it had kidnapped two de- who insist “Japan can say no” to the United more than 100 nuclear weapons. Why give cades ago. States and look after its own security un- up a Barry Bonds for a player to be named? Yet, it came as a shock to some when bound by the alliance. And if North Korea was trying uranium Koizumi announced August 30 that he These concerns at last led the admin- enrichment because it was easier to hide, would hold a summit meeting in istration to hold the first substantive high- then why acknowledge that fact in talks Pyongyang. On the eve of the summit, in level talks with North Korea since Novem- with Kelly? a written response to questions from ber 2000. However, when the United Two other interpretations seem more Service, Kim Jong Il said that States sent an emissary to Pyongyang for tenable. One is that after 1997 the North the time had come to “liquidate the past.” talks, the administration was in no mood began hedging against U.S. failure to live Japan had to “apologize sincerely” for its to negotiate. Tokyo continues to push the up to the Agreed Framework but is now World War II occupation and “the issue of United States toward engagement, and fail- prepared to trade in that hedge. Another compensation must be correctly resolved.” ing that, it may try to broker a deal be- is that it is playing tit-for-tat to induce the Left unsaid was that he was about to ac- tween Washington and Pyongyang. United States to end enmity. These expla- knowledge the fate of Japanese citizens nations seem to fit the data disclosed by kidnapped by North Korea. An end to “ab- U.S. intelligence, which dates the first en- normal relations,” Kim said, “will also dis- Tit-for-Tat on Enrichment richment activity back to 1998. After 2000, sipate the security concerns of the Japanese activity picks up again in highly visible people.”4 Having moved to accommodate Seoul ways. In other words, after North Korea The September 17 communiqué pro- and Tokyo, Pyongyang was ready for warned of retaliation for what it called U.S. duced by the summit put security at the top nuclear tit-for-tat with Washington when U.S. failure to live up to the Agreed Framework of the agenda for Japan’s dialogue with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly ar- in 1997, it decided to shop for gas centri- North Korea. “In step with the normaliza- rived October 3. A day after Kelly had con- fuges for enriching uranium. It gave new tion of their relations,” they agreed to hold fronted him with evidence of the country’s impetus to the effort in 2001 and 2002 when parallel talks on “issues relating [to] secu- covert nuclear program, North Korean ne- the Bush administration’s hostility became rity.” These talks would “underscore the im- gotiator Kang Sok Ju acknowledged its ex- apparent. It would be useful to know portance of building a structure of coopera- istence. The admission was at once a threat whether U.S. intelligence detected any at- tive relations” in Northeast Asia—a possible to develop nuclear arms and an offer to stop. tempted purchases in 2000 when Washing- sign of Pyongyang’s support for Tokyo’s Kelly made it clear Washington did not want ton was being cooperative. formula of six-party talks—and, in a joint further talks; the North had to stop, or else. Either way, Pyongyang keeps signal- signal to Washington, “promote dialogue “Program” has a range of meanings ing its desire for a deal with Washington— among the countries concerned as regards from seeking to acquire gas centrifuges and and not just on nuclear and missile issues. all security matters including nuclear and other matériel usable for enrichment to hav- In a June 10 speech to the Asia Society, missile issues.” North Korea committed it- ing produced quantities of highly enriched Powell set out a four-point agenda for self to an indefinite extension of its morato- uranium. U.S. intelligence is said to have talks: “First, the North must get out of the rium on missile test launches. Whether proof that the North succeeded in obtaining proliferation business and eliminate long- Pyongyang also indicated willingness to some gas centrifuges from and range missiles that threaten other coun- eliminate its Nodong and longer-range “was trying to acquire large amounts of tries.” Second, “it must make a much more missiles is not yet known. high-strength aluminum” to make more— serious effort to provide for its suffering The communiqué committed Tokyo from Japan, of all places. U.S. intelligence says citizens.” Third, “the North needs to move and Pyongyang to resume normalization it “recently learned that the North is toward a less threatening conventional talks in October and “exert all efforts to es- contructing a plant that could produce military posture” and “live up to its past tablish diplomatic ties at an early date.” enough weapons-grade uranium for two or pledges to implement basic confidence- These talks would address economic assis- more nuclear weapons per year when fully building measures with the South.” “Fi- tance to the North, “including grants in aid, operational, which could be as soon as mid- nally, North Korea must come into full low-interest long-term loans and humani- decade.” That leaves plenty of time to nego- compliance with the International Atomic tarian aid through international organiza- tiate a verifiable end to the program. Energy Agency safeguards that it agreed tions” and “loans and credits through the The stunning revelation confirmed to when it signed the nuclear Nonprolif- International Cooperation Bank of Japan.” the worst suspicions of some, that North eration Treaty.” In reply, Pyongyang ac- For Japan to act on its own was un- Korea had intended to dupe the United cepted Powell’s agenda, suggesting a new precedented. Since the start of the Cold States all along by substituting a covert or revised Agreed Framework to accom- War, it had deferred to the United States nuclear program for the one it allowed to modate it. It also moved to set up a mili- on security matters. Knowing North Ko- be frozen. That contention does not seem tary hotline in the context of constructing rea wanted direct negotiations with the plausible. After all, if North Korea had been a rail link to the South.

Arms Control Today December 2002 11 On August 29, Bolton gave a much- the North. “I have decided to resume ne- tion under that declaration “not to possess ballyhooed speech in Seoul. The North, he gotiations,” Koizumi said October 18, “be- facilities for reprocessing or enrichment” said, has “an active program” of chemical cause I judged that taking the first major without providing for verification. The vis- weapons; has “one of the most robust step of moving from an adversarial rela- its to the suspect site at Kumchang-ni un- bioweapons programs on earth” and “is tionship to a cooperative one would be in der the Agreed Framework are useful pre- in stark violation of the Biological Weap- the best interests of Japan.” During his cedents for that. ons Convention”; is “the world’s foremost summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, he In a test of wills, North Korea does not peddler of ballistic missile-related equip- added, “I discerned their intention to seek lack leverage; it has yet to renounce the ment, components, materials, and techni- a comprehensive promotion of talks on a Agreed Framework, throw out the IAEA cal expertise”; and “has not begun to al- number of issues, such as nuclear weap- inspectors, reopen the plutonium-filled low inspectors with the International ons development and other national se- casks, or restart its Yongbyon reactor. In- Atomic Energy Agency to complete all of curity issues.”7 A high-ranking Foreign stead of trying to compel rightly reluctant their required tasks. Many doubt that Ministry official explained Japan’s decision allies to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea ever intends to comply fully to Asahi Shimbun this way: “We cannot Pyongyang, President Bush needs to ask with its NPT obligations.” afford to have North Korea leave the ne- himself: Is the world’s only superpower On August 31, 2002, a North Korean gotiating table. If the United States takes tough enough to sit down and negotiate in Foreign Ministry spokesman recited all of a more hard-line stance, we have to mol- earnest with North Korea? Bolton’s concerns and said, “The D.P.R.K. lify North Korea. The negotiations have U.S. hard-liners may want to use clarified more than once that if the U.S. has definitely become much harder.”8 Pyongyang’s “confession” to punish the a willingness to drop its hostile policy to- In its ongoing talks with South Korea North, but the crime-and-punishment ap- ward the D.P.R.K., it will have dialogue with and its responses to the Powell agenda, the proach has never worked before, and the U.S. to clear the U.S. of its worries over Bolton list of concerns, and the Kelly accu- there is no reason to believe that it will its security.” It was putting biological, sation, North Korea has now said it is pre- work now. Sooner or later, every admin- chemical, and conventional arms on the pared to negotiate with the United States istration since Ronald Reagan’s has given negotiating table—once the nuclear and on all of Washington’s security concerns. diplomatic give-and-take a try. Let’s hope missile deals are done. On October 20, Kim Early in November, North Korean ambas- this one does not have to undermine its Young Nam, president of the Supreme sador to the United Nations Han Song alliances or go back to the brink of war People’s Assembly and titular chief of state, Ryol spelled that out for anyone who had before doing so. ACT reiterated the August 31 formula in talks missed the point. “Everything will be ne- with Jeong Se-hyun, South Korea’s unifica- gotiable,” he said, including inspections of NOTES tion minister: “If the United States is willing the enrichment program and shutting it The author would like to thank the Carnegie to drop its hostile policy toward us, we are down. “Our government will resolve all Corporation and the Ploughshares Fund for prepared to deal with various security con- U.S. security concerns through the talks if their generous support. cerns through dialogue.”5 your government has a will to end its hos- In the talks with Kelly, Kang Sok Ju tile policy.”9 1. Michael R. Gordon, “How Politics Sank put the North’s covert nuclear program Accord on Missiles With North Korea,” The New York Times, March 6, 2001, p. A1. on the negotiating table. By Kelly’s own account, Kang laid out the terms of trade Negotiating a Way Out 2. These two statements and others issued by in general terms only. He asked for assur- North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesmen can ances the United States would not attack Diplomatic give-and-take with North be found at www.kcna.co.jp. the North, would sign a peace agreement Korea could satisfy U.S. nuclear and other 3. Robert Gallucci, An ACA Press Conference, or declare an end to enmity, and would security concerns without a replay of the “Progress and Challenges in Denuclearizing respect its sovereignty.6 A North Korean 1994 nuclear crisis. Then, like now, the North Korea,” Arms Control Today, May 2002, p. Foreign Ministry spokesman put the United States had three options: impose 16-17. terms somewhat differently on October sanctions, which were rightly deemed un- 4. “N. Korea’s Kim Eyes Better Ties, Ready to 25. North Korea, he said, “was ready to likely to be effective in curbing the North’s Visit Japan,” Kyodo News, September 14, seek a negotiated settlement of this issue nuclear program; attack the nuclear sites at 2002. on the following three conditions: firstly, Yongbyon, which was not certain to elimi- if the United States recognizes the nate all the nuclear material and sites in the 5. Jay Shim, “N.K. Ready to Resolve Nuclear D.P.R.K.’s sovereignty; secondly, if it as- North but certain to raise a political storm Crisis Thru Dialogue: Kim YN,” Korea Times, October 21, 2002. sures the D.P.R.K. of nonaggression; and in the South; or negotiate. By refusing to thirdly, if the United States does not negotiate, the administration might leave 6. Doug Struck, “Nuclear Program Not Ne- hinder the economic development of the itself with no other option than to live with gotiable, U.S. Told North Korea,” The Wash- D.P.R.K.” He spoke of “a nonaggression a nuclear-arming North. ington Post, October 20, 2002, p. A18. treaty” between the two. The 1994 Agreed Framework is a ba- 7. “Suddenly, Japan Has a Lot on Its Plate,” Already aware of the enrichment sis for negotiating further inspections of Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2002. program, Seoul and Tokyo had moved to nuclear activity by the North. Although engage Pyongyang in diplomatic give- the accord does not explicitly refer to ura- 8. Tetsuya Hakoda, “Analysis: North Korea and-take. They have not been driven off nium enrichment, it does say, “The D.P.R.K. Plays Wild Card,” Asahi Shimbun, October 18, course. After Kelly briefed them on his will consistently take steps to implement 2002. talks, Seoul went ahead with ministerial the North-South Joint Declaration on the 9. Philip Shenon, “North Korea Says Nuclear talks, and Tokyo moved up the date for Denuclearization of the Korean Penin- Program Can Be Negotiated,” The New York resumption of normalization talks with sula.” It thereby incorporates the obliga- Times, November 3, 2002, p. A1.

12 Arms Control Today December 2002