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Home , G20, G7 Research Group, John Kirton

GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE GOALS

It finds that members generally extracted. Commitments are defined as Raising compliance comply with their commitments. discrete, specific, politically binding, pub- Furthermore, seven instruments appear licly expressed, and collectively agreed to to have significant effects on compliance statements of intent; they are promises with G20 commitments rates. These instruments are: the num- by summit members to undertake future ber of total commitments produced at action to move toward, meet, or adjust to the summit, the number of official docu- reach a welfare target. They must also be Two evidence-based instruments ments released at the summit, the inclu- measurable. sion of a specific date in the commitment, the hosting of a same-subject ministerial meeting, the binding level of the commit- »G20 members ment, mention of developing countries in The authors: ABSTRACT the commitment, and the number of com- generally G20 leaders can enhance compliance mitments on the same subject produced Jessica Rapson with their collective G20 summit commit- at the summit. comply with Senior Researcher at the ments through the informed use of two Of these instruments, the hosting of G20 Research Group and instruments over which they have direct a same-subject ministerial meeting and the their summit control. By hosting same-subject minis- the binding level of the commitment have terial meetings and using highly binding the most plausible causal relationship commitments.« language in their commitments, G20 lead- with compliance. Same-subject ministe- ers may increase the probability of those rial meetings – that is, meetings of G20 Director of the G20 and G7 commitments being realized. These in- ministers on a specific subject relevant The team then selects a subset of pri- Research Group struments have significant effects on G20 to a commitment (e.g. macroeconomic ority commitments that best represent Co-director of the BRICS compliance even when gross domestic policy) – may enhance information sharing the central priorities and overall achieve- Research Group product (GDP), GDP per capita, change in and policy coordination, while using more ments of the summit including those from Co-director of the Global GDP per capita, and year effects are con- binding language in commitments could both its built-in and innovative agendas. Health Diplomacy Program trolled for. foster a shared sense of urgency for col- They code the commitments for the pres- lective and coordinated actions.3 Thus, by ence of particular compliance catalysts or INTRODUCTION hosting same-subject ministerial meet- constraints – elements thought by summit A major criticism of G20 summit govern- ings and using highly binding language, the analysts and practitioners to raise or lower The institution: ance is the failure of members to comply G20 may be able to increase compliance. compliance. with the summit commitments that their Compliance for each commitment is leaders collectively make, possibly com- METHODOLOGY then measured on a three-point scale, promising the effectiveness of the institu- For each G20 summit, the G20 Research where each member is awarded +1 for full The G20 Research Group is a global network tion.1 It is thus important to know the de- Group, led by teams from the University compliance, 0 for a work in progress, or -1 of scholars, students and professionals in the gree to which members comply with their of and the Russian Academy of for non-compliance. Analysts assess each academic, research, business, non-govern- commitments and, above all, how such National Economy and Public Administra- member’s compliance with the priority mental and other communities who follow the compliance can be improved to better ad- tion (RANEPA), identify the official summit commitments according to a standardized work of the G20 leaders, finance ministers and dress the issues that the G20 seeks to re- documents issued by the G20 leaders and method outlined in the compliance coding governors, and other G20 institu- 2 5 tions. It is directed from Trinity College and solve. This study attempts to answer this extract the passages that contain commit- manual. the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public question using the latest data assembled ments.4 Within these documents, the pas- Since 2008, the G20 Research Group Policy at the . by the G20 Research Group. sages that constitute commitments are and RANEPA have produced compliance

224 225 GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS reports on the progress made by each G20 ject, compliance is highest for commit- Figure 1: Effect of total number of commitments on G20 compliance member in meeting the priority commit- ments on macroeconomic policy at 80%, ments made at each summit. They have followed by financial regulation at 77%, also published an interim compliance re- energy at 73%, climate change at 69%, port, timed to assess progress at the half- development at 67%, and at 67%. By way point between summits. member, compliance is highest for the Eu- The data analyzed in this study came ropean Union and at 85%, from 5,407 individual G20 member as- followed by at 84%, at sessments of compliance with 277 com- 84%, at 83%, at 75%, Ja- mitments made at summits from 2008 to pan and the at 74%, 2018. The effects of eight instrumental at 71%, at 69%, at 68%, variables on these compliance scores were and at 65%, at 62%, assessed using a polynomial regression and at 60%, at model, controlling for possibly confound- 57%, and, lastly, at 56%. ing effects of GDP and year. Variables affecting compliance RESULTS The study assessed the effects of eight Commitments instruments: the number of total commit- The 14 summits that have taken place be- ments produced at the summit, the num- tween November 2008 in Washington, DC, ber of official documents released at the and June 2019 in , , have pro- summit, the inclusion of a specific date in duced a total of 2,725 commitments. These the commitment, the hosting of a same- commitments cover a broad range of sub- subject ministerial meeting, the binding jects including macroeconomic policy with level of the commitment, mention of de- Figure 2: Effect of number of documents on G20 compliance 476 commitments; financial regulation veloping countries in the commitment, with 350; trade with 175; energy with 157; the number of commitments in the same labor and employment with 153; financial subject produced at the summit, and the institutional reform with 144; crime and number of words in official documents. corruption with 128; food and agriculture When controlling for these variables and with 123; technology with 94; and climate the effects of GDP and year, the number change with 91. Over time, the number of of words in official documents released at commitments made at each summit has summits had no significant effect on com- generally risen, with a peak of 529 com- pliance. The seven remaining significant mitments made at the Summit in instruments are discussed below. July 2017. Number of total commitments Compliance The relationship between the total number Members’ compliance with their leaders’ of commitments produced at a given sum- priority commitments has generally risen mit and a G20 member’s compliance with over time. Overall, average compliance is any specific commitment from that sum- 71%. The highest compliance was 79% at mit is convex (Figure 1). On average and in November 2018. By sub- holding all other variables constant, as

226 227 GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS the number of overall commitments made Number of documents creases G20 compliance by 5.15%. This date. This is significant at the 1% level increases, compliance decreases until it The relationship between the total number slope decreases by 0.4% per additional (p = 0.000). reaches a minimum at 236 commitments, of official documents produced at a given document until compliance is minimized and then increases. This is significant at summit and a G20 member’s compliance at six documents. After this point, each ad- Same-subject ministerial meeting the 5% level (p = 0.014). for any specific commitment from that ditional document increases G20 compli- Compliance was significantly higher for For the first 236 commitments, on av- summit is convex (Figure 2). On average ance by 5.15% with an increasing slope of commitments on the same subject as a erage and holding all other variables con- and holding all other variables constant, 0.4% per document. ministerial meeting (Figure 4). On average stant, each additional 10 commitments as the number of official documents pro- and holding all other variables constant, decrease G20 compliance by 0.95%. This duced increases, compliance decreases Specific date commitments on the same subject as such slope decreases by 0.002% per additional until a minimum at six documents, and Compliance was significantly lower for a ministerial meeting had 4.4% higher 10 commitments until compliance is mini- then increases. This is significant at the commitments that contained a specific compliance than those without. This is sig- mized at 236 commitments. After this point, 5% level (p = 0.012). date (Figure 3). On average and holding nificant at the 1% level (p = 0.000). each additional 10 commitments increase For the first six documents produced, all other variables constant, commitments G20 compliance by 0.95% with an increas- on average and holding all other variables with a specific date had 15.12% lower Binding level ing slope of 0.002% per 10 commitments. constant, each additional document de- compliance that those without a specific Each commitment was categorized by

Figure 3: Effect of specific date on G20 compliance Figure 4: Effect of same-subject ministerial meeting on G20 compliance

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Figure 5: Effect of binding level on G20 compliance whether it used words that indicated a high- Mention of developing countries er or a lower degree of binding, as defined Compliance was significantly higher for in the Compliance Coding Manual.6 For commitments that did not mention de- example, the words “promise,” “are deter- veloping countries (Figure 6). On average mined to,” and “pledge” indicate a high de- and holding all other variables constant, gree of binding, while “support,” “should,” commitments that did not mention devel- and “urge” indicate a low degree of binding. oping countries had 9.53% higher compli- Compliance was significantly higher ance that those that mentioned develop- for commitments that contained words in- ing countries. This is significant at the 1% dicating a higher binding level (Figure 5). level (p = 0.000). On average and holding all other variables constant, commitments with a higher bind- Number of same-subject commitments ing level had 12.33% higher compliance The relationship between the number of that those that contained words indicating same-subject commitments produced at a lower binding level. This is significant at a given summit and G20 member compli- the 1% level (p = 0.000). ance for any specific commitment from that

Figure 7: Effect of mention of developing countries on G20 compliance

Figure 6: Effect of same-subject commitments on G20 compliance

230 231 GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS summit is positive (Figure 7). On average may nonetheless wish to include specific RECOMMENDATIONS that these two strategies have an effect on and holding all other variables constant, as deadlines in their commitments. Despite potential confounds and the seem- G20 compliance, even when economic fac- the total number of same-subject commit- The low percentage of variance ex- ingly low explanatory power of the model, tors and the effects of other instruments ments increases, compliance increases. there nonetheless remains evidence to are controlled for. Specifically, on average, This is significant at the 1% level (p = 0.002). suggest that the two instruments with the compliance is 4.4% higher when a same- On average and holding all other vari- »It is high-est potential for a causal mechanism subject ministerial meeting is held and ables constant, each additional 10 same- for compliance also are significantly corre- 12.33% higher when a higher level of bind- subject commitments increase G20 com- recommended lated with compliance. These are, as pre- ing language is used. pliance by 2.6%. viously mentioned, the hosting of a same- It is thus recommended that G20 lead- that G20 subject ministerial summit and the binding ers host same-subject ministerial meet- DISCUSSION level of the commitment text. Although the ings and use strong language for high-pri- Of the seven instruments found to signifi- leaders host benefits of these two instruments may ority commitments to enhance compliance cantly affect compliance, the hosting of a seem obvious, the analysis in this study and im-plementation of their collective same-subject ministerial meeting and the same-subject now offers em-pirical evidence to confirm G20 summit commitments. binding level of the commitment text have the most plausible potential for a causal ministerial relationship with compliance. Specifically, meetings of G20 ministers on a specific meetings.« subject relevant to a commitment may enhance information sharing and policy coordination, and using more binding plained by the variables included in this language in commitments could foster study (approximately 7%) should also be a shared sense of urgency for collective noted. This value may indicate that com- and coordinated actions.7 Caution should pliance is determined mostly by factors be taken, however, in concluding that the outside the control of the G20 and actions effects found in this study are definitely of leaders are, to a large degree, inde- causal. pendent of commitments made at G20 The remaining instruments have a summits. 1 Kokotsis, 194. substantially more dubious relationship Finally, there are potential issues with 2 Kirton and Larionova, 3-4. 3 with compliance, making it difficult to de- the categorical coding mechanism used Slaughter, 37; Larionova, Rakhmangulov, and Shelepov, 211. 4 Kirton and Larionova, 264. termine any causal connection. For exam- by the G20 Research Group. The categori- 5 Program, 23. ple, the number of commitments made at cal codes used may not correspond to the 6 Global Governance Program, 5-6. a summit might be the result of uniquely continuous values they were given in this 7 Slaughter, 37; Larionova, Rakhmangulov, and Shelepov, 211. synergistic collaboration among the lead- study. For example, a score of 0 indicates ers that produces both high compliance partial compliance, which was treated as Global Governance Program, Trinity College, University of Toronto. Compliance Cod-ing Manual and a high number of commitments. 50% compliance in the study, but the true for International Institutional Commitments. August 19, 2019. Kirton, J. and Larionova, M., eds. Accountability for Effectiveness in Global Governance. Further, some instruments might have degree of compliance could be much high- Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. an effect on compliance but might not be er. This could make the effect of the vari- Kokotsis, E. “G20 and BRICS: Enhancing Delivery Legitimacy.” International Organisations Research Journal 12, desirable for leaders to change. For in- ables examined on compliance in terms of no. 2 (2017): 195-207. stance, including a specific date is asso- percentages very different, and possibly Larionova, M., Rakhmangulov, M., and Shelepov, A. “Explaining G20 and BRICS Compliance.” In Accountability for Effectiveness in Global Governance, edited by J. Kirton and M. Larionova, 193-215. ciated with lower compliance as it makes higher. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. compliance more difficult, yet G20 leaders Slaughter, A.M. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

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