GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS It finds that G20 members generally extracted. Commitments are defined as Raising compliance comply with their summit commitments. discrete, specific, politically binding, pub- Furthermore, seven instruments appear licly expressed, and collectively agreed to to have significant effects on compliance statements of intent; they are promises with G20 commitments rates. These instruments are: the num- by summit members to undertake future ber of total commitments produced at action to move toward, meet, or adjust to the summit, the number of official docu- reach a welfare target. They must also be Two evidence-based instruments ments released at the summit, the inclu- measurable. sion of a specific date in the commitment, the hosting of a same-subject ministerial meeting, the binding level of the commit- » G20 members ment, mention of developing countries in The authors: ABSTRACT the commitment, and the number of com- generally G20 leaders can enhance compliance mitments on the same subject produced Jessica Rapson with their collective G20 summit commit- at the summit. comply with Senior Researcher at the ments through the informed use of two Of these instruments, the hosting of G20 Research Group and instruments over which they have direct a same-subject ministerial meeting and the G7 Research Group their summit control. By hosting same-subject minis- the binding level of the commitment have terial meetings and using highly binding the most plausible causal relationship commitments.« language in their commitments, G20 lead- with compliance. Same-subject ministe- John Kirton ers may increase the probability of those rial meetings – that is, meetings of G20 Director of the G20 and G7 commitments being realized. These in- ministers on a specific subject relevant The team then selects a subset of pri- Research Group struments have significant effects on G20 to a commitment (e.g. macroeconomic ority commitments that best represent Co-director of the BRICS compliance even when gross domestic policy) – may enhance information sharing the central priorities and overall achieve- Research Group product (GDP), GDP per capita, change in and policy coordination, while using more ments of the summit including those from Co-director of the Global GDP per capita, and year effects are con- binding language in commitments could both its built-in and innovative agendas. Health Diplomacy Program trolled for. foster a shared sense of urgency for col- They code the commitments for the pres- lective and coordinated actions.3 Thus, by ence of particular compliance catalysts or INTRODUCTION hosting same-subject ministerial meet- constraints – elements thought by summit A major criticism of G20 summit govern- ings and using highly binding language, the analysts and practitioners to raise or lower The institution: ance is the failure of members to comply G20 may be able to increase compliance. compliance. with the summit commitments that their Compliance for each commitment is leaders collectively make, possibly com- METHODOLOGY then measured on a three-point scale, promising the effectiveness of the institu- For each G20 summit, the G20 Research where each member is awarded +1 for full The G20 Research Group is a global network tion.1 It is thus important to know the de- Group, led by teams from the University compliance, 0 for a work in progress, or -1 of scholars, students and professionals in the gree to which members comply with their of Toronto and the Russian Academy of for non-compliance. Analysts assess each academic, research, business, non-govern- commitments and, above all, how such National Economy and Public Administra- member’s compliance with the priority mental and other communities who follow the compliance can be improved to better ad- tion (RANEPA), identify the official summit commitments according to a standardized work of the G20 leaders, finance ministers and dress the issues that the G20 seeks to re- documents issued by the G20 leaders and method outlined in the compliance coding central bank governors, and other G20 institu- 2 5 tions. It is directed from Trinity College and solve. This study attempts to answer this extract the passages that contain commit- manual. the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public question using the latest data assembled ments.4 Within these documents, the pas- Since 2008, the G20 Research Group Policy at the University of Toronto. by the G20 Research Group. sages that constitute commitments are and RANEPA have produced compliance 224 225 GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS reports on the progress made by each G20 ject, compliance is highest for commit- Figure 1: Effect of total number of commitments on G20 compliance member in meeting the priority commit- ments on macroeconomic policy at 80%, ments made at each summit. They have followed by financial regulation at 77%, also published an interim compliance re- energy at 73%, climate change at 69%, port, timed to assess progress at the half- development at 67%, and trade at 67%. By way point between summits. member, compliance is highest for the Eu- The data analyzed in this study came ropean Union and United Kingdom at 85%, from 5,407 individual G20 member as- followed by Germany at 84%, Canada at sessments of compliance with 277 com- 84%, Australia at 83%, Korea at 75%, Ja- mitments made at summits from 2008 to pan and the United States at 74%, China 2018. The effects of eight instrumental at 71%, Brazil at 69%, Italy at 68%, Mexico variables on these compliance scores were and Russia at 65%, South Africa at 62%, assessed using a polynomial regression Argentina and Indonesia at 60%, Turkey at model, controlling for possibly confound- 57%, and, lastly, Saudi Arabia at 56%. ing effects of GDP and year. Variables affecting compliance RESULTS The study assessed the effects of eight Commitments instruments: the number of total commit- The 14 summits that have taken place be- ments produced at the summit, the num- tween November 2008 in Washington, DC, ber of official documents released at the and June 2019 in Osaka, Japan, have pro- summit, the inclusion of a specific date in duced a total of 2,725 commitments. These the commitment, the hosting of a same- commitments cover a broad range of sub- subject ministerial meeting, the binding jects including macroeconomic policy with level of the commitment, mention of de- Figure 2: Effect of number of documents on G20 compliance 476 commitments; financial regulation veloping countries in the commitment, with 350; trade with 175; energy with 157; the number of commitments in the same labor and employment with 153; financial subject produced at the summit, and the institutional reform with 144; crime and number of words in official documents. corruption with 128; food and agriculture When controlling for these variables and with 123; technology with 94; and climate the effects of GDP and year, the number change with 91. Over time, the number of of words in official documents released at commitments made at each summit has summits had no significant effect on com- generally risen, with a peak of 529 com- pliance. The seven remaining significant mitments made at the Hamburg Summit in instruments are discussed below. July 2017. Number of total commitments Compliance The relationship between the total number Members’ compliance with their leaders’ of commitments produced at a given sum- priority commitments has generally risen mit and a G20 member’s compliance with over time. Overall, average compliance is any specific commitment from that sum- 71%. The highest compliance was 79% at mit is convex (Figure 1). On average and Buenos Aires in November 2018. By sub- holding all other variables constant, as 226 227 GLOBAL SOLUTIONS JOURNAL ∙ ISSUE 5 ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS the number of overall commitments made Number of documents creases G20 compliance by 5.15%. This date. This is significant at the 1% level increases, compliance decreases until it The relationship between the total number slope decreases by 0.4% per additional (p = 0.000). reaches a minimum at 236 commitments, of official documents produced at a given document until compliance is minimized and then increases. This is significant at summit and a G20 member’s compliance at six documents. After this point, each ad- Same-subject ministerial meeting the 5% level (p = 0.014). for any specific commitment from that ditional document increases G20 compli- Compliance was significantly higher for For the first 236 commitments, on av- summit is convex (Figure 2). On average ance by 5.15% with an increasing slope of commitments on the same subject as a erage and holding all other variables con- and holding all other variables constant, 0.4% per document. ministerial meeting (Figure 4). On average stant, each additional 10 commitments as the number of official documents pro- and holding all other variables constant, decrease G20 compliance by 0.95%. This duced increases, compliance decreases Specific date commitments on the same subject as such slope decreases by 0.002% per additional until a minimum at six documents, and Compliance was significantly lower for a ministerial meeting had 4.4% higher 10 commitments until compliance is mini- then increases. This is significant at the commitments that contained a specific compliance than those without. This is sig- mized at 236 commitments. After this point, 5% level (p = 0.012). date (Figure 3). On average and holding nificant at the 1% level (p = 0.000). each additional 10 commitments increase For the first six documents produced, all other variables constant, commitments G20 compliance by 0.95% with an increas- on average and holding all other variables with a specific date had 15.12% lower Binding level ing slope of 0.002% per 10 commitments.