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Lamey, J 2013 Peace in Patani? The Prospect of a Settlement in stability Southern Thailand. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 33, pp. 1-17, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bt ARTICLE Peace in Patani? The Prospect of a Settlement in Southern Thailand Jay Lamey* The Kingdom of Patani was formally incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam a little over 100 years ago and has been in varying states of rebellion since then. This resistance has at times had a violent character, as it does right now, but has also involved a resilient attachment to various aspects of the local identity, such as the religion, language, and local historic narra- tive. While the right of the inhabitants of the area to legally claim self-determination under international law is tenuous, a broader understanding of self-determination may be able to support the concept of a regional autonomy arrangement within the Thai state. Prima facie, an autonomy arrangement has the potential to address many of the grievances of the Malay-Muslim community in the Patani region. There are also now some positive Southeast Asian examples of autonomy solutions made under similar circumstances, particularly Aceh and Mindanao. This possibility has entered mainstream political discussion in Thailand in recent years. However, credible and committed leadership would be needed from both sides in order for some kind of negotiated settlement to be agreed upon and implemented. Talks between an insurgent group and the Thai government began in 2013. However, these have highlighted significant challenges that would surround any peace process, particularly the dispersed nature of the insurgency. Introduction first few months but the meetings continue, Peace talks between the Thai government with the most recent occurring on 13 June and rebels from the southern Patani region, 2013 (at the time of writing). begun in March 2013, have ushered a century This research essay explores the possibil- of tensions into a new phase. Rebellion and ity of a negotiated settlement for the Patani resistance have been consistent hallmarks of region and how this settlement might be the Malay-Muslim areas of southern Thailand supported by international law. It finds that since the Kingdom of Patani was definitively while the right of the inhabitants of the incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam at the area to legally claim self-determination is beginning of the 20th century. The author of tenuous, a broader understanding of self- this essay visited the area as a journalist in determination may be able to support the 2008 and can confirm the presence of a sim- concept of a regional autonomy arrange- mering pro-independence sentiment among ment that could address some of their long- some of the Malay-Muslim population there standing grievances. This would require a (Lamey 2008: 114). The nascent ‘peace pro- major shift in approach from the Thai state, cess’ has already been severely tested in its which prefers to imagine itself as possessing a unified character and identity, but there are signs that Thai leadership and society * Ratio International, Hong Kong are becoming increasingly open to such a [email protected] possibility. Far greater coherence and clar- Art. 33, page 2 of 17 Lamey: Peace in Patani? The Prospect of a Settlement in Southern Thailand ity would also be required among resistance were not consulted (Aphornsuvan 2007: 30) groups. Stuttering motions in this direction - were shared between Britain and Siam. are being helped along by the establishment The important question of whether Siam’s of regional autonomies for minority groups role in this process was ‘colonial’ is discussed in the Philippines and Indonesia, with both in a later section. Loos argues that Siam fits cases bearing some striking similarities to neither the classic archetype of the colonised the situation in the Patani region. or the coloniser, but noted that in the south it undertook practices remarkably similar History and Context to those of the colonial European powers The Colonial Era (2010: 75). It began in 1901 by abolishing Siam underwent dramatic changes during the tribute system and declaring the seven the 19th century as the twin forces of colo- kingdoms, which included the eponymous nialism and modernisation transformed the Kingdom of Patani and other smaller sultan- kingdom into a state. An important aspect ates, to be provinces under the direct rule of of this was the management and confirma- Bangkok, as had already happened in other tion of its borders with the neighbouring parts of Siam (Aphornsuvan 2007: 23). This French and British powers. It was this pro- involved convincing the rajahs to relinquish cess that brought Patani definitively under administrative control to Siamese bureau- the control of Bangkok and sowed the seeds crats and accept state pensions, with taxes to of today’s conflict. be collected by the centre. Most of the rul- Prior to the arrival of the colonial powers ers signed a document accepting these terms in the Siamese milieu, borders on a map or but the Rajah of Patani steadfastly refused, on the ground did not define the extent of certain that to do so would signal the end political control. Instead, control extended of Patani’s ‘independence’ (Aphornsuvan as far as the influence of a ruler, a limit that 2007: 26–7). But the tide of history was too could wax or wane depending on the prevail- strong and the old kingdoms were combined ing circumstances (Baker and Phongpaichit into one province. The Anglo-Siamese treaty 2009: 51). Such influence was often held was then signed in 1909, finally confirming together through tributary arrangements the boundaries of the modern state, which with local rulers who retained control over endure today (Treaty Between the United their societies. At the outer edges of Siamese Kingdom and Siam, 9 July 1909). influence, it was also not uncommon for a local ruler to be under the sway of two pow- Opposing Identities in the Modern ers simultaneously. This ambiguity charac- Thai State terised the political status of the sultanates Although Thailand was not officially colo- of the Malay Peninsula in the 19th Century, nised, it underwent many of the same pro- including Patani, which found themselves cesses as post-colonial states. In many ways increasingly squeezed between an expand- it was a forerunner of other states in the ing Britain and a rapidly modernising Siam region that emerged after World War II and (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009: 50, 69–70). faced the challenge of rallying their diverse After a major confrontation with the French populations. In Thailand, this process began in 1893 resulted in a serious territorial loss, in earnest early in the 20th century and was the Siamese entered negotiations to secure without doubt driven by the centre, with var- their borders once and for all. This included a ious official bodies deciding and disseminat- focus on the status of the Malay sultanates in ing what it meant to be ‘Siamese’. There was the south. Baker and Phongpaichit describe even a National Culture Act, which contained these southern negotiations as being ‘rela- detailed codes of behaviour (Aphornsuvan tively easy’ (2009: 59) as the polities - who 2007: 35). This brought the authorities into Lamey: Peace in Patani? The Prospect of a Settlement in Southern Thailand Art. 33, page 3 of 17 a clash with the Malay south which had its out that while the concept of ‘Thai Islam’ has own deeply ingrained Muslim culture that proven anathema for the Malay Muslims, it weaved through every aspect of life. is a reasonable description of Muslim com- Today, owing to the nation’s name change munities in other parts of Thailand, which in 1939, the concept is known as ‘Thai-ness’ speak Thai and are generally integrated into or kwaampenthai in Thai (Winichakul 1997: mainstream society (2009: 15). 3). Thai-ness is understood to be something This brings into sharper relief the distinc- innate that all Thais are born with and that tiveness of the Malays in Thailand’s three they thus know instinctively (Winichakul southernmost provinces, who often identify 1997: 5). The slogan ‘Nation Religion King’ with a multi-dimensional ethnic sensibil- helps identify the key institutions with ity that extends beyond, but does include, which Thais are expected to identify (McCa- their religion. The resilience shown by the rgo 2010: 266) and there is a strong inher- Malay-Muslim identity in the Patani region ent assumption regarding the role of Bud- can be usefully explained by imagining a dhism, even though it is not actually the tripod of three interlocking elements: the official religion (Liow 2009: 20). Alongside Malay language and culture, Islam, and their these characteristics is an official history, a own alternative narrative of historical griev- sort of national founding myth. In it, wise ance. The education system provides a good kings judiciously adopted only the posi- example of all of these dynamics and their tive aspects of the West while unique and interaction, with Liow concluding that 100 valuable Thai customs and institutions were years of efforts aimed at integrating educa- simultaneously preserved (Winichakul 1997: tion systems in the Patani region have had a 3). Meanwhile, they dealt deftly with the ‘tremendously corrosive’ impact on relations colonial powers and thus, despite having to between the Malay community and the state make sacrifices, preserved the independence (2009: 22). When explaining the current con- of the nation. Indeed, the fact that Thailand flict, contemporary commentators often add ‘was never colonised’ is integral to national two more elements: poverty and deliberate self-understanding (Jackson 2010; 37–8) governmental neglect, particularly through and is an important discussion that will be the use of the area as a dumping ground for returned to in the next chapter.

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