Change in the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Toward India (1998-2005): Accommodating the Anomaly

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Change in the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Toward India (1998-2005): Accommodating the Anomaly University of Alberta Change in the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy toward India (1998-2005): Accommodating the Anomaly by Vandana Bhatia A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science ©Vandana Bhatia Fall 2012 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my husband Amitabh. Thanks for all your support, understanding, sacrifice, and patience through this arduous journey. I could not have accomplished my dream without your devotion, encouragement, and unwavering support. I also dedicate this thesis to my children, Mahima (8.5 years) and Aditya (7 years). You have been the best kids in the world. Your unconditional love, smiles, and hugs helped me overcome loads of mother’s guilt. ABSTRACT For more than three decades, the U.S. prohibited the transfer of advanced nuclear technologies to India—a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1998, in an unprecedented challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, India crossed the nuclear threshold and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, inviting the wrath of Washington in the form of sanctions. Yet, in 2005, within seven years of India’s nuclear crossover, the Bush administration pledged to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, the nuclear outlier. The 2005 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement aroused sharp reactions and unleashed a storm of controversy. This study utilises regime theory to investigate whether the U.S.-India nuclear agreement undermines, or brings India within, the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This research examines the evolution of the change in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy toward India. India’s quest for advanced technology posed a persistent challenge to the NPT-centric nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite the imposition of technological embargoes, the U.S. failed to prevent India’s nuclear breakout in 1998, and was unable to deal effectively with the postproliferation challenge posed by India. In the changed global nuclear scenario of the 21st century, especially after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, Washington realised that leaving India outside the nonproliferation regime was not beneficial to international security. This research concludes that the 2005 U.S.-India civilian nuclear accord did not provide unlimited technological access to nuclear India, but was congruent with the principles and norms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In return for civilian nuclear cooperation, India had to accede to the non- NPT regulations and institutions of the nonproliferation regime. Thus, contrary to prevailing notions, the nuclear agreement was an attempt by the Bush administration to accommodate India—the recalcitrant anomaly—within the nonproliferation regime. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Dr. W. Andy Knight who supervised my graduate studies. I appreciate his invaluable contribution of time, ideas, and efforts to make the graduate experience productive and stimulating. He has been encouraging, supportive, and understanding in pursuit of this research project. He gave me the freedom to pursue my ideas and viewpoints, yet encouraged me to think critically and produce high quality research. I thank committee members Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi and Dr. Greg Anderson who were accessible for discussions, guidance, and encouragement and Dr. Joseph Doucet for his time, interest, and helpful comments. I thank Dr. Thomas Keating, a teacher and former committee member, for guidance, encouragement, and support; it was always a learning experience to attend his lectures. I thank Dr. Lori Thorlakson, associate chair (graduate programs), for understanding, advice, and support and Dr. Lois Harder, former graduate chair, for guidance and funding opportunities. I thank several groups of people that directly or indirectly supported this research. Seventeen policy experts and officials provided valuable information and insights that enabled the writing of this dissertation. The cooperative staff at several research centres/institutions that I visited as part of the field research. The American Political Science Association (APSA) provided a visiting scholarship at the Centennial Center for Political Science & Public Affairs. In addition, I thank Dr. Marcia Craig for editing the thesis. Most importantly, I owe special gratitude to my loving family members. I am indebted to my parents, Gopal K. Puri and Saroj Puri, who not only instilled a life-long love for learning, but also invested every bit to educate me at the best academic institutions. My brothers, Manish and Jiten, are my eternal sources of motivation, support, and love. My husband Amitabh has been supportive in every possible way. Finally, my little daughter also deserves a mention as she put a huge colourful note in front of my desk that boosted my confidence during the stressful stages of thesis writing. It read, “You Can Do It.” TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 Research Inquiry 1 Research Question 4 Rationale for Research 4 Theoretical Framework 7 Methodology 12 Ethical Considerations 17 Limitations and Scope 18 Significance of this Research 19 Organisation of the Study 20 CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW 22 “Responsible” Nuclear Behaviour 23 Proliferation Begets Reward 27 Dealing with Defacto Nuclear States 30 Nonproliferation Compromised 31 Power Transition: Dissatisfied (Nuclear) State 35 Democratic Bomb and Nonproliferation Regime 39 Counter-Enlightenment: Unravelling Nonproliferation Regime 42 Concluding Remarks 46 CHAPTER 2 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA: AN ANOMALY 50 Nonproliferation: Contrasting Perspectives 52 Drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Critical Analysis 54 India’s Quest for Technology 64 Cirus Agreement: Fallout with Canada and the U.S. 68 India’s Challenge to the NPT: An Anomaly 74 CHAPTER 3 POKHRAN II: DEFIANCE OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 81 Inevitable Antagonists 82 Clinton’s Approach: “Cap, Rollback, and Eliminate” 87 Broadening of Bilateral Ties 93 Strengthening of NPT-centric Regime 95 Pokhran II: Imposition of Sanctions 103 Pokhran II: Defiance of Nuclear Regime 108 Flawed U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy 110 CHAPTER 4 POST-POKHRAN II (1998-2000): SHIFTING OF NUCLEAR GOALPOSTS 116 The Fiasco of Sanctions 118 Talbott-Singh Dialogue 126 Nuclear Benchmarks 128 Shifting Nuclear Goalposts 134 (In) Significance of the Dialogue 136 CHAPTER 5 REORIENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 140 Security Cooperation 142 Strategic Partnership 144 Bush’s Nuclear Prism 150 Re-imaging India: A “Responsible” Partner 159 Nuclear Renaissance and India 166 Nuclear Safety Cooperation 168 Recognition of India’s Nuclear Energy Needs 172 Strategic Trade: Confidence Building Measures 175 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 180 Significance of the HTCG and NSSP 184 CHAPTER 6 THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: ACOMMODATING THE ANOMALY 187 The Policy Decision 188 Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Constituent Attributes 192 Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: An Instrument of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy 198 Accommodating India within the Nuclear Regime 202 Moratorium on Nuclear Testing 205 Controlled Nuclear Fuel Supply 207 Strengthening of India’s Nuclear Safeguards 208 Adoption of IAEA Nuclear Safeguards 211 Denial of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies 214 Commitment to Fissile Material Cut-off 218 CONCLUDING CHAPTER (SEVEN) 221 Progression or Retrogression 226 U.S.-India Nuclear Dialectic: Obama Administration 230 Relevance for Contemporary Proliferation Cases 234 Contribution to Theory and Praxis 238 Future Directions for Research 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C ABBREVIATIONS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile AERB Atomic Energy Regulation Board CD Conference on Disarmament CIA Central Intelligence Agency CII Confederation of Indian Industry CIRUS Canada India Research U.S. (nuclear reactor) CRS Congressional Research Service CSI Container Security Initiative CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DAE Department of Atomic Energy DoD Department of Defence DPG Defense Policy Group ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty GWOT Global War on Terror HTCG High Technology Cooperation Group IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor JTG Joint Technology Group NAPS Narora Atomic Power Station NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited NRC National Regulatory Commission NSSP Next Steps on Strategic Partnership SCG Security Cooperation Group START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NCNWS Nuclear Capable Non Weapon State NNPA Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 NPR Nuclear
Recommended publications
  • CPC Outreach Journal #740
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 740, 02 September 2009 Articles & Other Documents: U.S. Eyes 12 Giant "Bunker Buster" Bombs Pakistan Denies It Altered US-made Missiles U.S. Mulls Alternatives For Missile Shield NSA: India Doesn‘t Need Another Nuclear Test Iran is Continuing Nuclear Activity, says United Nations Pakistani Nuke Scientist says Restrictions Lifted Watchdog Iran Ducking Scrutiny of Alleged Nuclear-Weapon 'Pak Enhancing Its Nuclear Weapons Capabilities' Studies, IAEA Says Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Bolstered Ability to Ministry Wants ¥176 Billion for Missile Shield Make Fuel but Slowed Its Output Iran, Syria have not Carried Out Sufficient Cooperation Would-Be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudis Say in Clarifying Nuke Issues: IAEA Cargo of North Korea Materiel is Seized En Route to Israel Has Iran in Its Sights Iran Watchdog Extends Probe into Alleged Secret Site Don't Get Scammed By Russia Again 'IAEA Hiding Incriminating Evidence' Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Western Hypocrisy Iran 'Ready' for Nuclear Talks Another Attempt to Malign Pak Nuke Program Russia: Building a Nuclear Deterrent for the Sake of Controversy Over Pokhran-II Needless: Manmohan Peace (60th Anniversary of the First Soviet Atomic Test) U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Hearing Committee On
    U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION OCTOBER 4, 2001 Serial No. 107–44 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 75–563PDF WASHINGTON : 2001 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Dec 14, 2001 Jkt 075563 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\MESA\100401\75563 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TOM LANTOS, California JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ROBERT WEXLER, Florida AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York RICHARD BURR, North Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana GREGORY W.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Policy Toward Iran—Next Steps
    UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN—NEXT STEPS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 8, 2006 Serial No. 109–183 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 26–438PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, HOWARD L. BERMAN, California Vice Chairman GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American ELTON GALLEGLY, California Samoa ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California PETER T. KING, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York DARRELL ISSA, California BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JERRY WELLER, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B.
    [Show full text]
  • Indo-Us Nuclear Cooperation: Altering Strategic Positioning & Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia
    “INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION: ALTERING STRATEGIC POSITIONING & SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA” The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) is an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization for collaborative research, networking and interaction on strategic and international issues pertaining to South Asia. Set up in 1992, the RCSS is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The RCSS is a South Asian forum for studies, training and multi-track dialogue and deliberation on issues of regional interest. All activities of RCSS are designed with a South Asia focus and are usually participated by experts from all South Asian countries. The Centre is envisaged as a forum for advancing the cause of cooperation, security, conflict resolution, confidence building, peace and development in the countries of the South Asian region. The RCSS serves its South Asian and international constituency by: (a) networking programmes that promote interaction, communication and exchange between institutions and individuals within and outside the region engaged in South Asian strategic studies; (b) organizing regional workshops and seminars and sponsoring and coordinating collaborative research; and (c) disseminating output of the research through publications which include books, monographs and a quarterly newsletter. The RCSS facilitates scholars and other professionals of South Asia to address, mutually and collectively, problems and issues of topical interest for all countries of the region. Queries may be addressed to: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27 Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7 SRI LANKA Tel: (94-11) 2690913-4 Fax: 2690769; e-mail: [email protected] RCSS website: http://www.rcss.org RCSS Policy Studies 44 “INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION: Altering Strategic Positioning & Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia” SADIA TASLEEM REGIONAL CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES COLOMBO Published by Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27, Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7, Sri Lanka.
    [Show full text]
  • Williamfjasper Theunitednatio
    Below the surface of public attention, internationalists have been working for decades to build the United Nations into an all- powerful world government. In this carefully documented study, William F. Jasper shows that, with the United Nations, the American people are being offered what amounts to poison disguised as candy. From all directions we hear that global problems require global solutions which means, we are told, that America must surrender more authority to the United Nations. Mr. Jasper exposes that power grab, one of the greatest "trust me" schemes in all of history, as totally corrupt. Behind the humanitarian pretexts, he demonstrates a much more sinister agenda at work. In The United Nations Exposed, the author offers readers an incredible treasure of understanding of what is happening to America — how and by whom. But most importantly, Mr. Jasper concludes his expose by explaining how responsible Americans can use an understanding of the threat to preserve freedom. Contents Introduction ......................................................................... ix Prologue .............................................................................1 Part I: Foundations 1. The Threat ....................................................................13 2. Disarmament and Submission......................................27 3. The Secret Network of Power .................................. 41 4. "Capitalists" and the Communist Dimension ... .53 Part II: Stealth Strategies for Building the Superstate 5. Orchestrating the Globalist
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Gary Milhollin Before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary
    WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee September 17, 2003 1701 K STREET, NW SUITE 805 WASHINGTON, DC 20006 PHONE: 202-223-8299 FAX: 202-223-8298 EMAIL: [email protected] I am pleased to appear before this joint committee to discuss Iran's nuclear program and Iran's imports of sensitive technology. I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research organization here in Washington that is devoted to stopping the spread of mass destruction weapons. I will begin by describing the challenge posed by Iran to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and then I will comment on some important Iranian procurement attempts. I will conclude with a discussion of Iran's possible noncompliance with its international obligations. I would like to submit one item for the record. It is a recent op-ed and table authored by myself and Valerie Lincy for the Week in Review section of the New York Times. The article discusses the possibility that Iran could gain nuclear weapon capability while claiming to be a member in good standing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The article can be found electronically on my organization's web site: http://www.wisconsinproject.org. The Stakes With Iraq now under U.S. occupation, Iran is rapidly emerging as the new mass destruction weapon threat in the Middle East. If Iran's nuclear program continues down its present path, Iran is likely to achieve nuclear weapon capability within the next few years.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Gary Milhollin
    Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate May 26, 2000 I am pleased to appear before this distinguished Committee to testify on the export of dual-use technology. I would like to submit three items for the record. The first is an article on supercomputer export controls that I wrote for the Outlook section of the Washington Post on March 12, the second is an article on Iraqi procurement efforts that I wrote for the New Yorker magazine on December 13, 1999 and the third is a report entitled “25 Myths about Export Control” that my organization prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today. The Committee has asked me to comment on two concepts that have been proposed for use in U.S. export controls. The first is known as “mass market status;” the second as “foreign availability.” The Committee has asked what the effect would be on our national security if these concepts were adopted as U.S. policy. The two concepts are now incorporated into S. 1712, the bill recently reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. In my judgment, if this bill were enacted it would overturn and to a great extent nullify the system of export controls that the United States has built up over the past half-century. Our present law attempts to strike a balance between national security and freedom of trade.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 India’S Nuclear Debate Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016
    Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 India’s Nuclear Debate Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 Series Note War and International Politics in South Asia Series Editor: Srinath Raghavan Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, and Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London, University of London. Th is Series seeks to foster original and rigorous scholarship on the dynamics of war and international politics in South Asia. Following Clausewitz, war is understood as both a political and a social phenomenon which manifests itself in a variety of forms ranging from total wars to armed insurrections. International politics is closely intertwined with it, for war not only plays an important role in the formation of an international order but also a threat to its continued existence. Th e Series will therefore focus on the international as well as domestic dimensions of war and security in South Asia. Comparative studies with other geographical areas are also of interest. A fundamental premise of this Series is that we cannot do justice to the com- plexities of war by studying it from any single, privileged academic standpoint; the phenomenon is best explained in a multidisciplinary framework. Th e Series welcomes a wide array of approaches, paradigms and methodologies, and is interested in historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented scholarship. In addition to monographs, the Series will from time to time publish collections of essays. Also in this Series Fighting Like a Guerrilla: Th e Indian Army and Counterinsurgency Rajesh Rajagopalan ISBN 978-0-415-45684-5 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World Editor: Harsh V.
    [Show full text]
  • India–United States Relations
    India–United States relations India–United States relations, also known as Indian– Indo–American relations American relations or Indo–American relations, refers to the international relations between the Republic of India and the United States of America. Prominent leaders of India's freedom movement had friendly relations with the United States of America which continued well after independence from the United Kingdom in 1947. In 1954, the United States made Pakistan a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) treaty-ally. India cultivated strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union to counter India United States Pakistan–United States relations. In 1961, India became a Diplomatic mission founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid Indian Embassy, United States involvement in the Cold War power-play between the United Washington, D.C. Embassy, New States and the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration's Delhi support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Envoy affected relations until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in U.S. Ambassador 1991. In the 1990s, Indian foreign policy adapted to the Indian Kenneth Juster unipolar world and developed closer ties with the United Ambassador Harsh Vardhan States. Shringla[1] In the twenty-first century, Indian foreign policy has sought to leverage India's strategic autonomy in order to safeguard sovereign rights and promote national interests within a multi-polar world. Under the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the United States has demonstrated accommodation to India's core national interests and acknowledged outstanding concerns. Increase in bilateral trade & investment, co-operation on global security matters, inclusion of India in decision- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with making on matters of global governance (United Nations U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction December 1993 OTA-BP-ISC-115 NTIS order #PB94-126984 GPO stock #052-003-01361-4 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993). Foreword ontrolling the spread of weapons of mass destruction depends on how hard it is to manufacture them and on how easy such weapon programs are to detect. This background paper, a companion volume to OTA’s report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,cl reviews the technical requirements for countries to develop and build nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with the systems most capable of delivering these weapons to distant or defended targets: ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and cruise missiles. It identities evidence that might indicate the production of weapons of mass destruction, and technical hurdles that might provide opportunities to control their spread. Of the weapons considered here, nuclear weapons are the most difficult and expensive to develop-primarily due to the difficulty of producing the required nuclear materials. These materials, and the equipment needed to produce them, have quite limited civilian applications and are tightly controlled. States have produced nuclear weapon materials indigenously by evading international controls, but at great cost and with substantial opportunity for detection. For chemical and biological weapon materials, in contrast, most of the equipment needed also has civilian applications and has become widely available, making the capability to produce such weapons much more difficult to monitor and control.
    [Show full text]
  • Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 1993 Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? David A. Koplow Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1735 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 301 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the International Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons ARTICLES PARSING GOOD FAITH: HAS THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED ARTICLE VI OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? DAVID A. KOPLOW* The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has long been the cornerstone of the international effort to retard the spread of nuclear weaponry to additional countries, now appreciated as the greatest post-cold war threat to international peace and security. Under this treaty, the parties also undertook to pursue in good faith additional negotiations leading to further reductions in nuclear weapons-and, in fact, such subsequent bargaining has recently yielded dramatic, far-reaching successes. Professor Koplow, however, argues that in one crucial respect, the United States has been derelict in implementing the obligations of the NPT: Recent American presidents have rigidly refused to participate in negotiations that could lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, abolishing all nuclear explosions everywhere. Although the NPT's requirement of test ban negotiations is ambiguously stated, a close reading of the legal materials establishes that it was a key ingredient in the basic bargain of the NPT, and that numerous countries consider it a major, unresolved treaty controversy.
    [Show full text]
  • Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: from Commitments to Compliance
    The Dubai Initiative Policy Brief Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance Dr. Bryan R. Early Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief Dr. Bryan R. Early Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative Better Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University July 6, 2009 ExPort ConTRol DEvEloPmEnT In THE UnITED ARAB Emirates | 1 Introduction The swiftness with which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has launched its civil nuclear program presents a number of challenges for policymakers in seek- ing to ensure the program’s safety and security. At the onset of its efforts, the UAE government consulted with a set of the world’s leading nuclear suppliers to develop a framework that would help its nuclear program conform to the highest standards in terms of safety, security, and nonproliferation. The UAE drew on these con- sultations in making a sweeping set of international commitments in April 2008 to ensure that the sensitive nuclear materials and technologies it would acquire as part of its nuclear program would be securely controlled.1 While the UAE has been widely praised for the depth and breadth of the nonproliferation commitments it has made, it will be the UAE’s efficacy at complying with them by which its suc- cess will be judged. The largest commitment-compliance gap for the UAE government po- tentially relates to its system of nonproliferation export controls. Export controls While the UAE’s are national restrictions that governments place upon their constituencies’ exports recent nonprolifera- of sensitive goods and technologies, which generally include arms and dual-use goods that can contribute to WMD programs.2 Up until the fall of 2007, the UAE tion commitments did not possess a comprehensive export control law at the federal level—let alone strongly signaled an institutional framework capable of administering it.3 This allowed the country to the international to be exploited by the A.Q.
    [Show full text]