University of Alberta Change in the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy toward India (1998-2005): Accommodating the Anomaly by Vandana Bhatia A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science ©Vandana Bhatia Fall 2012 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my husband Amitabh. Thanks for all your support, understanding, sacrifice, and patience through this arduous journey. I could not have accomplished my dream without your devotion, encouragement, and unwavering support. I also dedicate this thesis to my children, Mahima (8.5 years) and Aditya (7 years). You have been the best kids in the world. Your unconditional love, smiles, and hugs helped me overcome loads of mother’s guilt. ABSTRACT For more than three decades, the U.S. prohibited the transfer of advanced nuclear technologies to India—a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1998, in an unprecedented challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, India crossed the nuclear threshold and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, inviting the wrath of Washington in the form of sanctions. Yet, in 2005, within seven years of India’s nuclear crossover, the Bush administration pledged to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, the nuclear outlier. The 2005 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement aroused sharp reactions and unleashed a storm of controversy. This study utilises regime theory to investigate whether the U.S.-India nuclear agreement undermines, or brings India within, the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This research examines the evolution of the change in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy toward India. India’s quest for advanced technology posed a persistent challenge to the NPT-centric nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite the imposition of technological embargoes, the U.S. failed to prevent India’s nuclear breakout in 1998, and was unable to deal effectively with the postproliferation challenge posed by India. In the changed global nuclear scenario of the 21st century, especially after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, Washington realised that leaving India outside the nonproliferation regime was not beneficial to international security. This research concludes that the 2005 U.S.-India civilian nuclear accord did not provide unlimited technological access to nuclear India, but was congruent with the principles and norms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In return for civilian nuclear cooperation, India had to accede to the non- NPT regulations and institutions of the nonproliferation regime. Thus, contrary to prevailing notions, the nuclear agreement was an attempt by the Bush administration to accommodate India—the recalcitrant anomaly—within the nonproliferation regime. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Dr. W. Andy Knight who supervised my graduate studies. I appreciate his invaluable contribution of time, ideas, and efforts to make the graduate experience productive and stimulating. He has been encouraging, supportive, and understanding in pursuit of this research project. He gave me the freedom to pursue my ideas and viewpoints, yet encouraged me to think critically and produce high quality research. I thank committee members Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi and Dr. Greg Anderson who were accessible for discussions, guidance, and encouragement and Dr. Joseph Doucet for his time, interest, and helpful comments. I thank Dr. Thomas Keating, a teacher and former committee member, for guidance, encouragement, and support; it was always a learning experience to attend his lectures. I thank Dr. Lori Thorlakson, associate chair (graduate programs), for understanding, advice, and support and Dr. Lois Harder, former graduate chair, for guidance and funding opportunities. I thank several groups of people that directly or indirectly supported this research. Seventeen policy experts and officials provided valuable information and insights that enabled the writing of this dissertation. The cooperative staff at several research centres/institutions that I visited as part of the field research. The American Political Science Association (APSA) provided a visiting scholarship at the Centennial Center for Political Science & Public Affairs. In addition, I thank Dr. Marcia Craig for editing the thesis. Most importantly, I owe special gratitude to my loving family members. I am indebted to my parents, Gopal K. Puri and Saroj Puri, who not only instilled a life-long love for learning, but also invested every bit to educate me at the best academic institutions. My brothers, Manish and Jiten, are my eternal sources of motivation, support, and love. My husband Amitabh has been supportive in every possible way. Finally, my little daughter also deserves a mention as she put a huge colourful note in front of my desk that boosted my confidence during the stressful stages of thesis writing. It read, “You Can Do It.” TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 Research Inquiry 1 Research Question 4 Rationale for Research 4 Theoretical Framework 7 Methodology 12 Ethical Considerations 17 Limitations and Scope 18 Significance of this Research 19 Organisation of the Study 20 CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW 22 “Responsible” Nuclear Behaviour 23 Proliferation Begets Reward 27 Dealing with Defacto Nuclear States 30 Nonproliferation Compromised 31 Power Transition: Dissatisfied (Nuclear) State 35 Democratic Bomb and Nonproliferation Regime 39 Counter-Enlightenment: Unravelling Nonproliferation Regime 42 Concluding Remarks 46 CHAPTER 2 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA: AN ANOMALY 50 Nonproliferation: Contrasting Perspectives 52 Drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Critical Analysis 54 India’s Quest for Technology 64 Cirus Agreement: Fallout with Canada and the U.S. 68 India’s Challenge to the NPT: An Anomaly 74 CHAPTER 3 POKHRAN II: DEFIANCE OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 81 Inevitable Antagonists 82 Clinton’s Approach: “Cap, Rollback, and Eliminate” 87 Broadening of Bilateral Ties 93 Strengthening of NPT-centric Regime 95 Pokhran II: Imposition of Sanctions 103 Pokhran II: Defiance of Nuclear Regime 108 Flawed U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy 110 CHAPTER 4 POST-POKHRAN II (1998-2000): SHIFTING OF NUCLEAR GOALPOSTS 116 The Fiasco of Sanctions 118 Talbott-Singh Dialogue 126 Nuclear Benchmarks 128 Shifting Nuclear Goalposts 134 (In) Significance of the Dialogue 136 CHAPTER 5 REORIENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 140 Security Cooperation 142 Strategic Partnership 144 Bush’s Nuclear Prism 150 Re-imaging India: A “Responsible” Partner 159 Nuclear Renaissance and India 166 Nuclear Safety Cooperation 168 Recognition of India’s Nuclear Energy Needs 172 Strategic Trade: Confidence Building Measures 175 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 180 Significance of the HTCG and NSSP 184 CHAPTER 6 THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: ACOMMODATING THE ANOMALY 187 The Policy Decision 188 Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Constituent Attributes 192 Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: An Instrument of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy 198 Accommodating India within the Nuclear Regime 202 Moratorium on Nuclear Testing 205 Controlled Nuclear Fuel Supply 207 Strengthening of India’s Nuclear Safeguards 208 Adoption of IAEA Nuclear Safeguards 211 Denial of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies 214 Commitment to Fissile Material Cut-off 218 CONCLUDING CHAPTER (SEVEN) 221 Progression or Retrogression 226 U.S.-India Nuclear Dialectic: Obama Administration 230 Relevance for Contemporary Proliferation Cases 234 Contribution to Theory and Praxis 238 Future Directions for Research 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C ABBREVIATIONS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile AERB Atomic Energy Regulation Board CD Conference on Disarmament CIA Central Intelligence Agency CII Confederation of Indian Industry CIRUS Canada India Research U.S. (nuclear reactor) CRS Congressional Research Service CSI Container Security Initiative CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DAE Department of Atomic Energy DoD Department of Defence DPG Defense Policy Group ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty GWOT Global War on Terror HTCG High Technology Cooperation Group IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor JTG Joint Technology Group NAPS Narora Atomic Power Station NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited NRC National Regulatory Commission NSSP Next Steps on Strategic Partnership SCG Security Cooperation Group START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NCNWS Nuclear Capable Non Weapon State NNPA Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 NPR Nuclear