Dissolving Tensions Between the Groups and Resuming the Work of the Constituent Assembly the Transitional Experiment in Tunisia: Between Conflict and Agreement
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Dissolving tensions between the groups and resuming the work of the Constituent Assembly The Transitional experiment in Tunisia: between conflict and agreement Mohamed EL HAMDI The day Mohamed El Brahmi was assassinated, I telephoned one of the opposition leaders to discuss what action should be taken, and he responded grimly that everything was over and the country was on the path to nowhere. Obviously, the aforementioned leader had exceeded a state of shock and exaggerated the political situation; however, the feeling that troubled him and many of us on that day truly expressed the dangers facing Tunisia on the sad day of Ramadan. On 25 July 2013, Mohamed El- Brahmi was assassinated and the work of the Constituent Assembly, the source of political legitimacy following the elections of 23 October 2011, was effectively suspended. During the summer of 2013, we witnessed the climax of the political crisis following the revolution. However, the crisis did not begin with the withdrawal of 60 opposition members affiliated to the Democratic Group and the sit-in protests organised by them. The Convention of 23 October was in a permanent state of crisis, which reached its peak on two occasions. The first occasion was upon the assassination of Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013, which expedited the fall of the government of Hamadi Jebali and the formation of the second Troika government under the leadership of Ali Al-Arayedh. The second incident was the assassination of Mohamed El Brahmi, which almost destroyed the entire political process, as it led to the suspension of the legislature, namely the Constituent Assembly. Neither a political nor a security context could justify the members of the Troika infringing the suspension that came into effect with the withdrawal of almost a third of the Assembly members, despite the attempts by some in the Troika to rely on the quorum rules to resume the work of the Assembly (the Bardo sit-in almost descended into a storming of the Assembly). These attempts ended with an official announcement by the leadership of the Assembly on 6 August 2013 suspending its operations. This was a declaration of the extent of the crisis afflicting the Constituent Assembly and the course of the entire democratic transition. The operation of the Constituent Assembly was officially and effectively suspended and the entire political process was blowing in the wind. Positions ranged between the intransigence and obstinacy of the Troika, which insisted upon its legitimacy and did not see any link between the assassination of El Brahmi and the need to suspend the Assembly, or the call for the resignation of the government; and the obstinacy of the "Radical" opposition which called for the nation to be rescued from the Convention of 23 October and the removal of the transitional process completely. The third position began as a minority and reticent view, which perceived the assassination of El Brahmi as no accident, but an indication that it was time to reset the course of action by separating the executive branch and radically altering the duties of the Assembly. Those holding this third point of view believed that the situation did not require a "rescue" that would destroy the political process and push the country into oblivion, but required the correction of deviations. Moreover, it did not involve one party eradicating the other, but rather required agreement and settlement between numerous parties, none of which could successfully direct the transitional process alone. It is now possible to state, with the benefit of hindsight, that 25 July 2013 was the height of the crisis and the beginning of the "solution". Even if the Democratic Alliance Party was the only opposition party who advocated this position and remained outside of the salvation front, it would gradually beat every radical or militant party in the view of both those governing and the opposition—particularly when this standpoint is adopted by parties with democratic and moral weight, such as the Tunisian General Labour Union. The choice of reaching agreements and reconciliation will prevail after a summer in which Tunisia almost slid into civil war, as the Assembly was suspended, thousands protested in Bardo and friction between opposition and government supporters almost led to confrontations. The scenario in Egypt was not far from the minds of many people, neither those who feared such a scenario and sought to avoid it and those who considered it a "possible way out of the crisis". Regardless of whether the radical standpoints of both of the most divergent parties represented their real convictions or were tactics implemented to improve the terms of negotiation, as claimed by some in the aftermath, the conditions for a confrontation were already present. Therefore, the efforts of the National Dialogue Quartet were extremely important, as merely getting the conflicting parties to the negotiating table became necessary to defuse the crisis and reduce the tensions and public protests. Therefore, it is evident that the Constituent Assembly was both the focal point of the crisis and its solution. It frames the constitution; it elected the government and supports it; and is responsible for all aspects of the democratic transition, whether positive or negative. These issues had been in dispute between the Troika and the opposition from the beginning, as the Constituent Assembly was simultaneously the subject of the conflict and its first result. The conflict over the Assembly emerged early, as the political parties held differing views in relation to its nature, powers and the limits of its duties. Was it merely mandated to draft the constitution, or did it have powers in relation to the election of the government and oversight of all elements of the democratic transition? The Assembly was also pulled in different directions regarding the boundaries of its role. Was its actions confined to boundaries it should not exceed, or was it the "master of itself", as claimed by the members of the majority? The term of the Assembly was also a subject of intense conflict from the onset of discussions regarding the drafting of its interim powers. The opposition argued that a term of one year subject to renewal should be stipulated, as agreed upon by the main parties in the High Authority for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution. The Troika denied this pledge, which was the basis upon which the call for Assembly elections was made. Instead it left the Assembly as the "master of itself" and did not specify a parliamentary term. This renunciation of previous pledges raised fears regarding the intentions of the Troika, particularly their intention to remain in power for an undefined period, or until a peaceful transfer of power was possible. Therefore, the legitimacy of the Assembly was challenged once the first year of its term had ended and its leaders were accused of stalling and of having no intention of leaving power. This was all prior to the assassination of Chokri Belaid. The first image of the Assembly as an Assembly of the majority or of progress raised concerns among an element of the elite regarding the intentions of the majority to frame a constitution that represented the Tunisian public, would guarantee freedoms and protect the gains of modernisation. Therefore, doubts were raised regarding the ability of majority logic (the simple or the advanced) to protect national companies and frame a reliable constitution. Talk began of the dangers of authoritarianism and the protection of the gains of modernisation. Initial claims thus insisted on the need to reach an "agreement" and not to rely on democracy by "hand count". What has been said about the Assembly applies even more so to the government. If the Assembly provides an arena for the opposition, despite the fact that a section of the opposition often viewed the Assembly to be governed by the majority (particularly the parties with a weak representation in it, such as the Popular Front and Nidaa Tounes, founded after the elections), then the government is the government of progress, and its tool in controlling the elements of the state and re-engineering society. This fact resulted in the idea of protecting the social fabric of Tunisia from the dangers of Islamisation. The intense conflict over the constitution and the government first took place within the Assembly, and then progressed to the media and public arena (political and civilian). The Assembly was indeed the focal point of the political life and the arena for its conflicts. Despite the enumeration of the parliamentary groups and the official image of the Assembly as politically divided and experiencing political tourism (transfers between groups), the main struggle within the Assembly gradually developed into a larger struggle between two main groups. A group led by Al-Nahda, which included the members of the Troika and some "independent" members; and a second group led by the Democratic Group, comprising of numerous parties (Republican, Alliance, Social Democratic Path, Afek, Al-Watad...) and able to attract democratic members. These allegiances governed the operation of the Assembly prior to its suspension on the 6th August 2013, and their effects lasted in a less obvious manner after the suspension. The differences and the line of conflict were generally obvious during the televised Public Sessions, in the operation of the committees, in the organisation surrounding the leaders of the groups and in the Consensus Committee. The matters in contention between the two groups were basically: 1. The contents of the constitution and the political and ideological pledges relating to it, including the organisations stemming from it and responsible for interpreting and implementing it, namely, the entire constitutional framework. 2. The executive branch, which was the first issue to divide the political arena into the majority and the opposition, despite the conviction of some that the outset of the Assembly's work during the founding stage could not sustain such a division, a view particularly propounded by the Troika as an accusation against the actions of the opposition.