Korea Mapping Report

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Korea Mapping Report 2 Korea Mapping Report Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) Korea Mapping Team Summer 2020 Mary Nkechi Ogbuehi, Project Lead Ashley Ahn Lindsey Lapinski Jungyun Lee Shinui Cindy Kim Sean (Soohyoung) Kim Natasha Kossovsky Lucy Popko 3 ABOUT THE THINK TANKS AND CIVIL SOCIETIES PROGRAM (TTCSP) The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania conducts research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world. Often referred to as the “think tanks’ think tank,” TTCSP examines the evolving role and character of public policy research organizations. Over the last 30 years, the TTCSP has developed and led a series of global initiatives that have helped bridge the gap between knowledge and policy in critical policy areas such as international peace and security, globalization and governance, international economics, environmental issues, information and society, poverty alleviation, and healthcare and global health. These international collaborative efforts are designed to establish regional and international networks of policy institutes and communities that improve policy making while strengthening democratic institutions and civil societies around the world. ABOUT THE LAUDER INSTITUTE The Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies offers an M.A. in international studies and conducts fundamental and policy-oriented research on current economic, political, and business issues. It organizes an annual conference that brings academics, practitioners, and policymakers together to examine global challenges such as financial risks, sustainability, inequality, and the future of the state. ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The University of Pennsylvania (Penn) is an Ivy League school with highly selective admissions and a history of innovation in interdisciplinary education and scholarship. A world-class research institution, Penn boasts a picturesque campus in the middle of Philadelphia, a dynamic city that is conveniently located between Washington, D.C. and New York, New York the University of Pennsylvania was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1740 to push the frontiers of knowledge and benefit society by integrating study in the liberal arts and sciences with opportunities for research and practical, pre-professional training at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Penn is committed to meeting the full demonstrated need of all undergraduates with grant-based financial aid, making this intellectually compelling integration of liberal and professional education accessible to talented students of all backgrounds and empowering them to make an impact on the world. Table of Contents 4 Table of Contents 3 Introduction 4 Literature Review 6 Government-Think Tank Relations & Think Tanks’ Effect on Public Policy 7 Government Think Tanks 7 Local Government Think Tanks 9 Private Think Tanks 11 Scholarly Policy Research Institutes 12 Republic of Korea in Global Context & Asia Pacific 14 India 15 China 17 Japan 19 Australia 20 Singapore 22 Republic of Korea 23 Think Tank Geographic Distribution 25 Methods & Techniques 31 Key Findings & Conclusions 31 Bibliography 33 Introduction Over the course of the summer of 2020, the Korea Mapping Team, a subgroup of the Asia Data Collection team, conducted research to identify and map think tanks in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Spearheaded by Dr. James McGann of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies 5 Program at the University of Pennsylvania, the goal of the project was to create a comprehensive database of think tanks located within the Republic of Korea (ROK). ROK was chosen as a subject of research because it has traditionally been under-researched in global think tank data collection. The mission of this project was to determine the number of and identify think tanks currently operating in ROK. Moreover, team members were tasked with conducting granular research on think tanks within the region, including their location, their affiliations, and the topics most frequently researched by think tanks. Another objective of this mapping project was to conduct regional analyses on the Asia Pacific region in general. Specifically, information collected from think tanks in ROK by the Korea Mapping Team was compared with the information collected from the China, Japan, India and Taiwan Regional Mapping teams to produce a regional analysis. Initially, project leaders utilized the Internet and targeted keyword google searches as a starting point for data collection. Aided by Hankyung Magazine and the database they provided, the team began by compiling a spreadsheet of prominent South Korean think tanks. The team then looked at the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program 2019 Global Go-To Index in its data collection phase to find think tanks that had previously been rated by TTCSP in the region. Finally, team members looked at top universities, government institutions, and for profit corporations around the country to find think tanks. Through a combination of the above methods, team members were able to compile an extensive list of top institutions in the region. The Hankyung list, in tandem with our knowledge of think tanks from the Index, was used to create Internet searches to find affiliated think tanks. Email and contact information the team found was located via the publicly available websites of think tanks in ROK. Throughout the course of the project, team members compiled a literature review which discusses the history and development of research institutions in ROK. The literature review was also intended to discuss the function of think tanks in public policy in the region. Ultimately, the team sought to construct as extensive a list as possible of think tanks in ROK. The Korea Mapping team looked to create a representative sample and then draw conclusions about the demographics of ROK think tanks. The team found 300 think tanks over the course of the project. Analyses were then conducted on the information collected. Our analyses looked at the top three policy areas that think tanks in the region research, the years in which the think tanks were established, their affiliations, and their locations within the ROK. Through these analyses we endeavor to present a more complete picture of the think tank industry within the Republic of Korea and the Asia-Pacific region at large. Going forward, we have a solid base on which the TTCSP program can build to explore more think tanks and in greater depths. 6 Literature Review This literature review will take an overview approach to think tanks in the Republic of Korea. This first section will discuss Juan Felipe Lopez Aymes’s interpretation of a “Knowledge Regime” in the context of South Korea’s think tank development from 1945, the first stage of think tank development, to the early 1960s. The following section will provide a timeline that delineates the major points of think tank development and think tank-government relations from the 1960s to the middle of the think tank boom in Korea, the 1990s. “Knowledge Regime” & South Korean Think Tank Development In his piece, “Formation and Evolution of the Knowledge Regime and the Development Process in Korea,” Juan Felipe Lopez Aymes explores the relation between the political system to its knowledge regime. Aymes defines a knowledge regime as “a set of actors, organizations, and institutions that produce and disseminate policy ideas that affect how policy-making and production regimes are organized and operate” (Aymes, 2014). Knowledge regimes in the context of this report are think tanks. This literature review will explore the typologies, and development of think tanks in the Republic of Korea. During the post-colonial era, the Republic of Korea was under a very centralized and dictatorial leadership. Economic development and public policy issues were in the strict hands of the government alone, with some outside input from US officials (Aymes, 97). This changed under the presidency of Park Chung-Hee which is considered the beginning of the development state of think tanks (Aymes, 2014). During this era the first think tank was formed, the Korean Development Institute (KDI). It was established in 1971 and allowed for a non-government structured entity to have a voice in government affairs (Aymes, 2014). It must be noted that KDI is a government funded entity, not a part of the formal structure of government. However it had more autonomy than most institutions during its founding. KDI functioned as a fount of economic policy research. The success of KDI paved the way for more institutions focused on economics to be founded. Think Tanks at this time, were a departure from the centralized policymaking that Park Chung-Hee was known for (Aymes, 2014). In the 1990s, the democratization era in ROK, the space for ideas and their production increased again. This is credited to political changes that occurred in the late 80s, when the Republic of Korea had free & open elections in 1989. With the new government and more expanse for ideas, new organizations not dedicated solely to the economy emerged. Such institutions include the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) (Aymes, 2014). CCEJ and NGOs were new actors in public policy and in the creation of ideas and their dissemination. However, the consistent issue of gaining access to policy makers persists to this day. There is 7 still a political culture in which the president’s vision for the country, particularly the economy, is predominant. Think tanks with access to the president and policymakers research and formulate policy to make the vision possible (Aymes, 2014). Government-Think Tank Relations & Think Tanks’ Effect on Public Policy In this section, we will explore the relation between Korean think tanks and the government, the role of Korean think tanks, and the effect of think tanks on public policy from the 1960s through the present. We break down think tanks into the following affiliation categories: national government, local government, private, and scholarly think tanks. Within the category of private think tanks, we provide further categorization as civil society, political party, or corporate.
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