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University Microfilms

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A Xerox Education Company 73-11,585

SUTHERLAND, Anthony Xavier, 1944- JOZEF TISO AND MODERN SLOVAKIA.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1972 History, modern

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1973 ANTHONY XAVIER SUTHERLAND

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED J02EF TISO AND MODERN SLOVAKIA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Anthony Xavier Sutherland, B.A.,M.A.

The Ohio State University 1972

Approved hy

Adviser G Department of History PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank Dr. Carole Rogel of

The Ohio State University under whose guidance this

paper was written. I also wish to thank The Ohio State

University, Department of History which provided me with a travel grant and the Graduate School of The Ohio

State University for the Dissertation Fellowship which enabled me to complete the research for this project,

A special word of thanks goes to*Dr. Milan Durica of the University of Padua and Frantisek Vnuk of Australia who guided much of the early research. I want to extend my appreciation to Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum for the use of his private library, to Rev, Andrew Pier, Director of the Slovak Institute who loaned me many books, to

Dr. Jozef Pauco for the use of his library, and to

Dr. Karol Murin, Dr, Frano Tiso, Dr, Jozef Mikus, and

Dr. Jorg Hoensch who answered my many questions. VITA

August 15» 1944. . , . Born - Suffern, New York

June, 1 9 6 6. B.A., St, Vincent College Latrobe, Pennsylvania

I966-I9 6 8, ...... Teaching Assistant, Department of History, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

August, 1968 , . , . , M.A. Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

1968-1971 . Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State Univer­ sity, Columbus, Ohio

1971-1972 . Dissertation Fellowship, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

East Central Europe. Professor Carole Rogel

Twentieth Century Europe. Professor Andreas Dorpalen

Russian History. Professor Michael Curran

Modern Chinese History. Professor Samuel Chu TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii

VITA ...... , ...... iii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter

I. THE SLOVAK POLITICAL TRADITION...... 4

II. THE FORMATIVE YEARS AND EARLY POLITICAL CAREER (TO 1929)...... 39

III. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY ...... 62

IV. FROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE (1938-1939)...... 106

V. HEAD OF THE SLOVAK STATE (1939-19^5). • 1^9

VI. IDEOLOGIST OF THE STATE ...... 200

CONCLUSIONS...... 234

APPENDIX

A ...... 239 B ...... 2^7

C ...... 2^9

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 252 INTRODUCTION

April 18, 1972 marked the 25th anniversary of the execution of Jozef Tiso, leader of the Slovak Peoples*

Party and president of the wartime Slovak Republic

(1939-19^5)• His execution by the National Tribunal followed one of the most debated trials in all Slovak history. Opened December 2, 19^6, it ended March 19»

19^7 with Tiso's conviction for treason for his partici­ pation in the collapse of the inter-war Czechoslovak

Republic and for crimes against the people of Slovakia, especially his suppression of the Slovak Uprising of

19^.

Jozef Tiso remains, however, one of the key person­ alities in modern Slovak history. Born near the end of the 19th century and ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1910, Tiso entered political life through the Slovak

Populist Party in 1918-1919 during the first months of the Czechoslovak Republic, He rose rapidly in the party, becoming first a party vice-president and then, after

1938, successor to Andrej Hlinka and leader of the party.

1 2

During most of the interwar period, he served as a deputy for the party in the Prague Parliament, and in the 1930's was the party's leading ideologist. In 1938 after the advent of Slovak autonomy, Tiso became Prime

Minister of the first Slovak government. After the

German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939$ he was elected president of the separate Slovak state.

Tiso's importance, however, lies not only in his role as political leader, but also because he was a self- proclaimed interpreter of the Slovak national ideology.

To many Tiso became a symbol of the Slovak nation itself for he headed the first independent Slovak state in historyi Tiso was very much conscious of Slovak history and made regular references to Slovak national tradition v t and former Slovak leaders like Stur, Daxner, Kuzmany,

Moyses and Hlinka, men with whose work he felt con­ tinuity,

Jozef Tiso is the single most controversial figure in modern Slovak history. To some he was a martyr, the greatest Slovak of the century and leader of the nation's destiny through the most glorious period in its history.

To others he was a traitor who helped in the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic, a quisling who for five years obediently served the interests of Nazi Germany. Yet, there have been few individuals in the history

of the Slovak nation or of any nation that have been

more neglected by historians than Jozef Tiso. No

scholarly account of his life has appeared since his

death in 19^7. Only one study, Po Svatoplukovi druha

nasa hlava. has been published by the noted Slovak pub- v ^ licist, Konstantin Culen, but half of this book, unfor­

tunately, dealt with Tiso's trial; furthermore the work was written with a very pronounced anti-Czech and anti-

Protestant bias. There have been a few short monographs

on Tiso published - one Dr. Joseph Tiso by Prantisek Vnuk, and another by Milan Durica, Die slowakische Politik

1938/39 im Lichte der Staatslehre Tisos. - but other than these virtually nothing has been written. Even

Marxist historians in Czechoslovakia have for the past twenty-five years cautiously avoided a study of Tiso, though several works have appeared on Slovak Populists and various aspects of the Slovak Republic, but in these

Tiso has been given little attention.

There is a need now for an objective examination of

Jozef Tiso both as a political leader and as a major ideologist of the Slovak nation. It is hoped that this study will open the door to a better understanding of the life and work of one of the most important Slovak per­ sonalities. CHAPTER I

THE SLOVAK POLITICAL TRADITION

The Slovak Populist movement was the most impor­ tant political and ideological force in modern Slovak history, Organized in the late 19th century, it became the foremost bearer of Slovak nationalism and defender of Slovak national rights in the 20th century. In the years before 1918 it led the struggle against Magyari- zation and during the period of the Czechoslovak Repub­ lic fought Czech centralism and the idea of a united

Czechoslovak nation. Its national ideology was deeply rooted in the Slovak past and based on the premise that the Slovak people had always formed a distinct nation, characterized by a unique language and having just claim to a precise geographic territory.

Although no Slovak political ideology existed before the 19th century, the historical assumptions for a national ideology and for the Populist movement revert back to the Middle Ages - to the time of the

Kingdom of Great Moravia, Great Moravia was the first 5 known Slavic political unit which included the area that later became Slovakia.^ Centered in Nitra, Slovakia, it included at its height most of the territory of present day Czechoslovakia, and lasted until the early

10th century when it finally fell to the invading Magyars.

Although there was no real link between Great Moravia and modern Slovakia, the existence of a Great Moravia has played an important role in the development of a political ideology. Many Slovaks during the national awakening of the 19th century came to regard Great

Moravia as the first Slovak state. In their writings they glorified its history and the exploits of its rulers. The Great Moravia concept has since nourished several generations of Slovak nationalists.

With the collapse of Great Moravia, Slovak terri­ tory came under the domination of the Magyars where it remained until 1918. During those centuries the Slovaks lived in the mountains and valleys of Upper Hungary or in Slovakia as peasants, woodcutters, and peddlers,

1 Slovaks arrived in the present Slovakia in the 6th and 7th centuries. There is no satisfactory history of Slovakia in English. /The best history is Dr. Fr^.n- tisek gokes, De.iinv Slovakov a Slovenska od naistarsich &ias az no ■pritomnost1 (Bratislava*Slovensk£ akademi^f vied, 19^6), 6 virtually unnoticed and untouched by the outside world.

Before the 19th century the Slovaks were, moreover, without any real culture of their own, and before the

184-01s had no political organization to represent them.

Nevertheless Slovak nationalists have argued that the idea of a Slovak nation survived through these centuries from the time of Great Moravia. Moreover, some maintain that degrees of Slovak political autonomy existed even 2 in the Magyar period. For at least three centuries following the fall of Great Moravia, for example, Slo­ vakia constituted a separate administrative unit in the

Hungarian Kingdom. In the 14-th century, from 1301-1321, a Magyar nobleman, Matus Csak, (I296-I32 I) taking advan­ tage of the extinction of the Arpad dynasty in Hungary, ruled practically all of Slovakia independently of

Budapest from his castle near Trencin, Csak's domain was not a real Slovak state, but it did provide a missing link for Slovak nationalist historians of the 19th and

20th centuries searching for evidence of Slovak histor­ ical continuity,

2 See Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia! Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York* Robert Speller, i9 6 0), pp. 66-yk, Joseph Mikus, Slovakia* A Political History. 1918-1950 (Milwaukee* The Marquette Univer­ sity Press, 1963). PP. XXII-XXXIII. 7

The Slovak people, however, were not yet nationally

conscious in the 17th century; nor did they understand

the meaning of a nation in the modern sense. The Slovak

national awakening began only in the late 18th and early

19th centuries. Before that renaissance there were only

a few nationally conscious Slovaks: Samuel Timon (1673-

1736), Stefan Dubnicay (1675-1725)» and J, B. Magin

(1682-1735).^ These men established some of the ground­ work for the later movement. They made studies of Great

Moravia, of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and thereby

resurrected the concept of a Slovak nation.

National consciousness developed in the late 18th

century with the first codification and standardization

of the Slovak language by Anton Bernolak (I762-I8I3 ).

Y/riters of the Bernolak school, especially Jan Holly

(1785-18^9), known as the Slovak Homer, revived the legends in Slovak history.

Bernolak's work on the Slovak language appealed mainly to Slovak Catholics; Slovak Lutherans, meanwhile continued to prefer the old Czech of the Kralice Bible

^See Dr, John Rekem, Slovak Literature and National Consciousness before Anton Bernolak (1762-1813) (Cleve­ land: Slovak Institute, 196^). 8

and Prayer Book of Tranoscius, which they used in their

liturgy. In the 18^0's in face of the threat of Magyar-

ization, some Slovak Lutherans, too, came to feel a need

for a separate Slovak literary language - one which would

be satisfactory to both Catholics and Lutherans. The

task of such linguistic reform and corollary national

V* / unification was accomplished by Ludovit Stur (1815-185^)

perhaps the single most important Slovak nationalist in / / the 19th century. In the 18^0*s Stur codified the Slovak

language, basing it on the central Slovak dialect, which

then became the standard literary medium of all Slovaks.

Not all Slovak intellectuals accepted this solution.

Slovak scholars Jan Kollar (1?93“1852) and Pavel Safarik

(1795-1861) were inclined more towards a greater Slavism.

Kollar and Safarik represented the Czechoslovak tradi­

tion in Slovak intellectual history. Members of this

school believed that Slovaks were a branch of the Czech­ oslovak nation and that Slovak was a dialect of Czech.

Adherents of the Czechoslovak orientation also inter­ preted Slovak history in relation to Czech history. Both the Slovak nationalist tradition and the Czechoslovak tradition are to be found in Slovak history after the

19th century. The Slovak nationalist tradition beginning 'Z t with Bernolak and Stur has been accepted by Catholics,

Populists, conservative Lutherans and some Communists, the Czechoslovak by Social Democrats, Lutherans and the progressive intelligentsia. / / Stur merits a place in Slovak history not only for his contribution to the Slovak Renaissance, but also for his assertion of Slovak political rights and formulation of the first Slovak political program. Until the 18^0's

Slovak nationalism was primarily cultural but with the increasing aggressiveness of Magyar nationalism, Slovak ✓ / intellectuals like Stur, too, turned more to politics.

In 18*1-8 at a historic meeting at Liptovsky sv. Mikulas,

✓ * Stur along with two other Slovak leaders of the day,

Jozef Hurban and Michal Hodza, formulated the first political manifesto of the Slovak nation. They demanded cultural and political equality as a distinct national group in Hungary. Specifically, they requested equality of the Slovak language with Magyar in the Hungarian

Parliament, freedom of the press, and a democratically II elected assembly, v t Stur, as chief author of this program, came to be regarded as spiritual father of the Slovak national movement, its first real Slovak political leader, and

II 1/ V Text of the manifesto is in Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovensk^ de.iinv (Tur^iansky sv. Martin: Slovenska Matica, 1939)» PP. 263 -270, 10 its ideologist. Virtually all Slovak nationalist leaders Y I since Stur have claimed to be his ideological descendents.

The name of £tur has come to symbolize the defense of the rights of the Slovak nation and the unification of

Slovak Catholics with Slovak Lutherans.

Surpassing the Manifesto of 18^8 in regard to political importance was the Memorandum of 1861, This v c document drawn up by Stefan Marko Daxner (1822-1892),D one of the leading Slovak political leaders following v * Stur's death, contained the basic principles of the

Slovak national idea: the individuality of the Slovak nation, the individuality of the Slovak language, and the right to the territory of Slovakia.^

The Manifesto of 18^8 and the Memorandum of 1861 established the foundations of a Slovak national ideology.

The signatories of these manifestoes came to constitute the first political party of the Slovaks: The Slovak

National Party. This party in the dark years of the second half of the 19th century was in the forefront of the struggle for Slovak national rights. It included

£- V if t ■^See Stefan M, Daxner, V sluzbe' naroda (Bratislava: Slovenske vydavatel'stvo krasny literatury, 1958)*

^Text of Memorandum is found in Mikus, pp. 320 -330 . 11 many of the outstanding Slovak intellectuals of the day: poets, historians, church leaders, including the

Bishop of the Lutheran Church, Karol Kuzmany, and a V rp Catholic bishop Stefan Moyses, who together presented the Memorandum of 1861 to the Habsburg emperor.

The years between 1861 and 1918 were very difficult ones for the Slovak nation, Along with the rise of Slo­ vak nationalism came an increasing aggressiveness on the part of the Magyars, marked by a growing determination to preserve the integrity of the Kingdom of St. Stephen at all costs. Magyar leaders realizing that Slovak nationalism represented a threat to a unified Hungary, set out to denationalize the Slovaks through Magyariza- tion. Meanwhile the Slovak National Party was almost helpless politically during the 1870’s and 1880*s. The electoral laws kept Slovak representation in the Hungar­ ian Parliament at a minimum. Slovak politics in the latter half of the 19th century were ineffective, also for lack of good leadership. Its leaders were poets

7 V 'Karol Kuzmany (1806-1866) and Stefan Moyses (1797- 1868) were national leaders in the mid-19th century. Moyses served as president of the Slovak cultural institute, Slovenska Matica and Kuzmany as its vice- president. Moyses and Kuzmany have represented national unity of Slovak Catholics an£ Lutherans, See Dr. Pavel Buynak, Dr. Karol Kuzmany; zivot a dielo (Liptovsky sv. Mikula^ 1 Tranoscius, 1927). 12

and artists, and the Slovak intelligentsia was becoming more and more Magyarized. The last "real” Slovak Catho- ✓ lie bishop was Stefan Moysesi thereafter all Slovak bishopries were occupied by Magyars or Magyarized Slo­ vaks. The church became in fact one of the most success- O ful instruments of Magyarization.

Another weakness of the Slovak national movement

in the 19th century was the fact that it had no urban national center.^ Since the Slovaks had no large capital city, the political and cultural groups shifted from one small town to another, from Ruzomberok to Liptovsky sv.

Mikulas to TurSiansky sv. Martin.'1'0 Martin became the nearest thing to a national capital but it lacked the size of Budapest or Prague, Only later after 1918 did

Bratislava become the national capital of the Slovaks.

The most serious deficiency of Slovak politics related to tactics. Slovak political leaders were both romantic and fatalistic in asserting Slovak national and political equality. Ultimately all they really did

8 * • Dr, Ferdinand Durcansky, Pohlad na Slovensku politicku minulost (Bratislava, 19^3)» p. 102 and pp. 117-118.

^Bratislava (Pressburg, Pozsony) was more of a German and Magyar town than a Slovak one in the 19th century, 10^ * Durcansky, p. 125. 13 was make paper plans and paper protests. They wrote articles and manifestoes in journals and newspapers, but these periodicals reached only a small number of those

Slovaks who were literate, while ignoring the mass of 11 illiterate Slovak peasants. Moreover, the Slovak masses were poor and backward; they were concerned with daily economic needs, not the nationalism of intellectuals. What was needed therefore was a program which could combine national demands with socio-economic ones. This was provided by the Slovak Populists.

In the 1890's a new Slovak political movement was born. Led mainly by Catholic priests, it proved to be very successful in reaching the peasant masses and was primarily responsible for the Slovak national revival in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Specifically, in 189^# to counteract a liberal attempt to introduce anti-clerical legislation in Hungary, a new party was formed; it was called the Hungarian People's Party and was led by Count Aladar 2ichy, Since the party stood for the equality of nationalities, and was also opposed to traditional liberal programs, which might include, among

Ibid.. pp./123-12^. The newspaper of the Slovak National Party, Narodny noviny at this time had only about 500 subscribers. lb other things, demands for civil marriages, it attracted

Slovak Catholics, who joined it in significant numbers.

The ideology of the party was similar to that of Chris­ tian Socialism, so popular in German Austria at that time. The party was anti-Semitic and stood for the interests of the little man; moreover, it supported the Slovaks in their dealings with Magyars and Jews,

The first major leader of this movement was a

Catholic priest, Andrej Hlinka, He was born the son of , v a Slovak peasant in Orava Zupa (County) in 1864-, Hlinka was ordained a Catholic priest in 1889 and a few years later began his political career in the Hungarian

People's Party, Imprisoned by the government and even suspended from the priesthood by his own bishop for his political activity, Hlinka by 191^ had become the fore- 12 most champion of the Slovak cause.

In 1905 the Slovaks led by Hlinka left the Hungar­ ian People's Party to form a separate Slovak party, the Slovak People's Party.^ Both before 1905 and after

■^See Karol Sidor, Andrei Hlinka (186^-1926) (Bratislava, 193^).

13 -'The Slovak People's Party was renamed in the early 1920*s as Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSL'S). Hereafter the People's Party will be called Populist Party, People's Party, or HSL'S. 15 the Slovaks achieved very limited success in securing seats to the Hungarian Parliament, In 1901 the Slovaks sent four deputies to the Parliament; in 1905i two; in

1907t seven; and in the last election in 1910 before the outbreak of the war, again only two.

Until the turn of the century there were no major ideological or political differences which divided

Slovak nationalists. Catholics, Lutherans, liberals, free-thinkers, and conservatives alike joined together in the struggle against Magyar chauvinism. But about the turn of the century an ideological rift began to divide the Slovaks. Specifically in the early 1900's progressive Slovak students, studying in Prague, began to urge close cooperation with the Czechs, Members of the group were known as Hlasists, named after their periodical, Hlas (Voice). They became bearers of the

Czechoslovak idea, namely that the Slovaks were only a branch of a Czechoslovak nation, that the Slovak lan­ guage was merely a dialect of a Czechoslovak one. The

Hlasists, moreover, argued that Great Moravia was not essentially a Slovak state, but a Czechoslovak one, and chat the _all of Moravia and subsequent incorporation of Slovakia into Hungary had forcibly separated Czechs from Slovaks until modern times. Hlasists believed, however, that during the thousand years since the collapse 16

of Moravia, there had been sufficient contact between

Czechs and Slovaks to keep alive the Czechoslovak idea.

For one, many Slovak students attended Charles Univer­

sity in Prague, thus strengthening the common cultural

bonds between Czechs and Slovaks, In addition, the

Protestant Reformation, and even the Hussite invasion

of Slovakia, Hlasists maintained, had helped keep alive

the idea of a Czechoslovak nation. The continued use

of the Czech Kralice Bible by Slovak Lutherans was

proof to the Hlasists of the unity of a Czechoslovak 14 lxterary language.

By 1914 there were three Slovak political parties 1

the old Slovak National Party (1861), the Slovak People*s

Party (1905), and a Slovak Social Democratic Party,

organized as a separate unit in 1904, after fourteen

years during which Slovaks belonged to the Hungarian

Social Democratic Party, All three political parties

participated in the fight against Magyars.

The First World War finally provided Slovaks with

the opportunity for the long-awaited national libera­

tion. However, most Slovaks during the first years of

14 v Dr, Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko 1 Pamati z rokov 1918-1920 (Praha, 1928), pp, 7-12, DurSansky, pp. 255-256. 17

the war were politically passive. It was only after the

Austrian armies suffered major defeats that a liberation

movement began to grow, taking on a Czechoslovak char­

acter, Slovaks and Czechs living abroad were first to

organize. For example, Slovaks living in Kiev, Moscow,

Paris and elsewhere worked ardently for the liberation

of Slovakia, A major step toward this goal was taken in

1916 with the formation of the Czechoslovak National

Council, Its founders were Thomas Masaryk and Edward

Benes, - both Czechs - and the Slovak, Milan Stefanik. J

The stated aim of the council was to establish a

Czechoslovak state on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire,

In the early years of the war Russian Slovaks pre­ sented a memorandum to the tsar's government asking for

Russia's aid in freeing the Slovaks. Later on August 29,

1916, these Russian Slovaks and Czechoslovak Legionaires

(Czech and Slovak deserters from Austrian armies) signed a pact with the newly formed Czechoslovak National

•^General Milan Ratislav Stefanik (I88O-I9I9 ) was the leading Slovak revolutionary abroad between 191b and 1918, He was trained as an astronomer. During the war he was a general in the French army and was sent to organize the Czechoslovak Legionaires in Russia, He was later appointed Minister of War for Czechoslovakia, but before he could assume his post he was killed in an airplane crash. Some Populists have maintained that his plane was shot down by Czechs. 18

Council. The document known as the Kiev Memorandum,

stated* "The Czechs and Slovaks conscious that they are

closely hound to one another not only by their vital

interests but also by bonds of culture and especially

ties of kinship, desire to evolve into an united, poli­

tical, indivisible and free nation."'*'^ This statement

was characteristic of many Czech and Slovak declara­

tions during the war, which emphasized not only the need

for close cooperation, but common national ties. During

the war, however, the future status of Slovakia in the

new state of Czechoslovakia was left undefined. Some

Slovaks were concerned over the future status of Slova­

kia in a Czechoslovak state. Since the Slovaks made up only about 2,5 million people compared to six million

Czechs there was an effort by Slovaks to secure some

guarantees of autonomy for Slovakia.

The idea of an autonomous Slovakia within a

Czechoslovak .state was actually born in the United States among American Slovaks, American Slovaks, economically better off and politically freer than Slovaks in Hungary, willingly expressed their views on conditions in Slo­ vakia. In the American Slovak community before the

^ I v a n Derer, The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks (Prague* Orbis, 1938), p. 19. 19 outbreak of the war there were two schools of thought on the Slovak problemi one centered in Pittsburgh, led by

Albert Mamatey, preferred an independent Slovakia within a federalized Hungary; the other based in New York, led by Milan Getting, aimed at close cooperation with the 17 Czechs in order to create a common Czechoslovak state.

Most American Slovaks in 1914 still believed a solution for the Slovak problem could be found within the frame­ work of the Habsburg Empire, but as the war dragged on and the collapse of the empire seemed inevitable, more and more American Slovaks were won over to the idea of a common state with the Czechs.

Whenever the idea of a Czechoslovakia was considered,

American Slovaks sought to secure specific national guarantees for Slovaks in the new state. For example, on October 22, 1915 representatives from the Slovak

League of America and the Czech National Federation of

America signed an agreement in Cleveland, Ohio. In it they agreed that Czechoslovakia, was to be a union of the

Czech and Slovak nations in a federated state; Slovakia, in other words, was to have political autonomy. It was

^Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Brati­ slava, 1937)» PP. 20-24, 20 to have its own Parliament, its own state administration, 18 and complete cultural freedom. The Cleveland agree­ ment in reality was only an understanding between Ameri­ can Czechs and American Slovaks, but it did reveal the concern of the immigrants for the future status of

Slovakia in the event a Czechoslovak state emerged.

Much more important than the Cleveland Agreement was the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 signed by Thomas Masaryk, head of the Czechoslovak National Council, Masaryk's decision to visit the United States was based primarily on the desire to rally support for the idea of Czech­ oslovakia among members of the American Slovak community.

His arrival in Pittsburgh in May, 1918, in fact, touched off one of the greatest national demonstrations in Slo­ vak history. Thousands of American Slovaks lined the streets in Pittsburgh to see Masaryk, and came to regard him a national savior, confident he would treat the

Slovaks fairly in Czechoslovakia.1^ For that reason they attached considerable significance to his signing of the Pittsburgh Pact (May 3 0 , I9I8), By this agree-

18Ibid., p. ?8.

•^Ibid.. pp. 1^2-156. 21

ment (between Slovak and Czech American organizations),

Slovaks were guaranteed political and cultural autonomy

in the Czechoslovak state:

The Czecho-Slovak Pact agreed upon in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on May 30 th, 1918. Representatives of the Slovak and Czech organizations in the United States - the Slovak League, the Czech National Alliance, and the Alliance of Czech Catholics - discussed the Czecho-Slovak question in the presence of the chairman of the Czecho­ slovak National Council, Prof. Masaryk, and the program declaration made up to this time, and resolved the following:

We approve the political program which endeavors to unite the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state of the Czech lands and Slovakia.

Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament, and its own courts.

The Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in office, and in public life in general.

The Czecho-Slovak State shall be a republic, its constitution shall be democratic.

The organization of the cooperation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the USA shall be intensified and arranged with mutual understanding as necessity and the changing conditions shall require.

The detailed regulations for the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated -Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives.20

20 Rev. B. S. Buc, Slovak Nationalism (Middletown, Pennsylvania: Slovak League of America, i960), p. ^8. 22

The Pittsburgh Pact did not immediately affect developments in Slovakia! in fact, Hlinka saw the text of the document only a year later. It is unknown whether Masaryk ever took the document seriously or whether he simply regarded it as an agreement between

American Slovaks and American Czechs. At any rate, he certainly did not seem bound by it later in formulating the constitutional structure of the Czechoslovak Repub­ lic. In 1920, for example, Masaryk pointed to the last clause in the agreement, which stipulated that "detailed regulations concerning the establishment of the Czecho­ slovak state are left to liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives," implying that these legal representatives might make decisions which could 21 alter specific points in the agreement. However, irrespective of Masaryk1s intentions with regard to the document, it is important to remember that the document with Masaryk's signature on it, became in effect the magna carta of Slovak rights, particularly for the Slovak

People's Party for the next twenty years.

21(5ulen, pp. *J-10-4l2, The signing of the Pittsburgh Pact was later played down by opponents of Slovak autonomy, who maintained that it was only one of several Slovak war-time declarations.

Slovaks in Slovakia toward the end of the war had issued several manifestoes marking the end of Magyar rule and declaring their intention to join with the Czechs in a new state. In May of 1918 a mass meeting of Slovaks in

Liptovsky sv. Mikulas attended by most of the prominent

Slovak leaders of the day, including Hlinka, - a resolu­ tion was passed, affirming the right of self-determina-

p p tion for those in the "Czechoslovak family.” In •/ October of that year Perdis Juriga, one of the Slovak

Populists, in a noted speech in the Hungarian Parliament, presented to Budapest the decision of the Slovaks to separate from Hungary, Finally at an historic meeting at the end of October, 1918 in Turciansky sv. Martin the principle of self-determination was again affirmed. It also designated the Slovak National Council, recently organized, as the only representative body which could legitimately speak for the Slovak nation. Also included in the declaration was the following statement* "The

pp Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1955)r Document #2, pp. 287-288. Slovak Nation is a part of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, united in language and in the history of its culture."2-^

Czech centralists later used this statement to mean that the Slovak people had accepted the principle of Czecho­ slovak national unity, Slovak Populists were particular­ ly embarrassed since Hlinka had signed it. Some Populists, however, claimed that Hlinka was tricked into signing.

Apparently he was told not to take seriously the phrase expressing Czechoslovak national unity for it had been ok included to get Allied support for Czechoslovakia.

Indeed a few days prior to the signing of the Martin

Declaration formal recognition was extended to the

Czechoslovak National Council by the Allies? it became the legitimate provisional government of the new Czecho­ slovak Republic, and proceeded to set up a temporary central government in Prague.

Slovaks were represented in the new government's

Revolutionary National Assembly, a temporary body, which would govern until regular elections could be held. The

2-^Ibid.. Document pp. 288-289.

Oh, yf Mikus, pp. 8-9 , Professor Francis Jehlicka, Father Hlinka*s Struggle for Slovak Freedom: Reminiscences of Professor Francis Jehli&ka (London: Slovak Council, 1928), p. 15. 25

41 Slovak members of the assembly organized themselves

into a Slovak Club.2^ In the provisional government, a v Slovak Agrarian and progressive, Vavro Srobar, was appointed Minister for Slovakia in the central govern­ ment and headed a Slovak sub-cabinet seated in Bratislava.

There was no smooth transfer of power from the

Magyars to the new Czechoslovak government in Slovakia.

A variety of problems had to be solved before Slovakia was securely a part of the new state. One was delineat­ ing Slovak frontiers with Hungary. Most Magyars felt it was necessary and still possible to keep Slovakia within the traditional boundaries of the Kingdom of St. Stephen.

And in the spring of 1919 the Hungarian Communist regime of B^la Kun launched an attack on Slovakia, establishing a Slovak Communist regime which survived only a few weeks 26 before the Communists were driven out of Slovakia.

In 1919, too, Slovak administration needed to be

Slovakized, Loyal and able Slovaks had to be found to fill the many government posts and teaching positions in

-*The 4-1 members, to v/hich 1^ others were later added, were chosen on the advice of Vavro Srobar and the Slovak National Council.

26 • f See Martin Vietor, Slovenska sovietska republika (Bratislava: Slovenske vydavatel'stvo politicky literatury, 1955). 2 6

Slovakia, formerly held largely by Magyars. It proved, however, virtually impossible to find enough competent and loyal Slovaks to fill the many vacant positions.

Consequently Czech teachers and Czech officials had to be imported into Slovakia, But, although Czech officials and teachers were needed in 1919» their presence con­ tinued in later years when it was no longer warranted.2?

To the Slovaks it seemed that Slovakia was being used as a colony for Prague's bureaucratic surplus. Furthermore, the Czech officials and teachers, many of whom were socialists and Legionaries, were offensive to the Slovaks.

C. A. Macartney describes the Czech administrators in

Slovakia in this way: "They were crude, they were ill- mannered, they were aggressively egalitarian, and they were almost fanatically anti-clerical, seeing in the

Church in Slovakia a two-fold enemy, social and mater­ ial."28

Another major post-v/ar concern was the reorganiza­ tion of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. New Slovak

2?In 1930t ^1.3 percent of those employed in the state administrative services in Slovakia were Czechs. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors (London: Oxford University^Press, 1^65)» p. See Konstantin fiulen, Slovaci a Cesi v statnvch sluzbach $SR (Bratislava: Vedecky ustav pre zahranidnych Slovdkov, 19^*0. pO Macartney, p. 126. 27 bishops had to be appointed to replace the Magyar ones,2^ dioceses needed to be redrav/n and the question of church ✓ property had to be settled, Srobar*s handling of these questions did much to spread distrust between his govern­ ment and the Slovak Catholic leadership. Related to this was the fact that Srobar's cabinet, as well as the cen­ tral government, was assuming the character of a Protes­ tant regime. Out of the 55 Slovak deputies seated in the National Revolutionary Assembly, only ten were

Catholic and the rest Lutheran. In the zupa (county) councils in Slovakia one-third of the members were

Catholic and two-thirds Lutheran.This seemed inequitable when compared to statistics regarding religious affiliation. About 78 percent of all Slovaks were Catholic while only 15 percent were Lutheran.

On November 28, 1918 a delegation of Slovak priests met at Ruzomberok to discuss Church questions. It was agreed at this meeting that new Slovak bishops should be appointed immediately by the government.-^ Two

2 9 7The Magyar bishops of Slovakia were V, Batthyanyi (Nitra), \I. Radnay (Bystricky), A. Parvy (Spis), and L, Balaza (Roznava).

-^°Sidor, Andrei Hlinka. p. 350,

S r o b a r , pp. 282-283. 28 months later January 21-22, 1919 at another Catholic conference a memorandum was compiled recommending Hlinka for the Bishopric of Nitra, and Frantisek Jehlicka for

Presporok,-^2 A few weeks earlier (on January 8, 1919) a delegation of Catholic priests headed by Hlinka and

Jehlicka paid a visit to Srobar demanding that he immediately appoint Slovak bishops. Srobar replied that he had no authority to do this, that it could only be done by the Vatican. During the meeting with Srobar,

Hlinka expressed objections to socialist agitation among

Slovak workers, Srobar replied that such could not be * curtailed in a democracy. Srobar then told a story he had heard about Hlinka allegedly telling someone in v Ruzomberok, that it would be better to give Czechs poison than to invite them into Slovakia, ^ ✓ Although personal animosity between Srobar and

Hlinka over the nomination of Slovak bishops was a cause of clerical opposition to the new government, it has v been somewhat overemphasized. Srobar did not really

02 ✓ / J Juraj Kramer, Slovenske autonomisticke hnutie v rokoch 1918-1929 (Bratislava: Slovensky akademie vied, 19^2 ), pp."28-29.

^Srobar, pp. 458-^6 0. It was true that Hlinka and Jehlicka wanted their own bishoprics, and when Srobar refused them, the Slovak church men only had more reason for disliking the new regime. 29 object to replacing Slovakia's Kagyar bishops with

Slovaks, in fact, it would have been in the best interest of the new state. One of the real obstacles to Hlinka's / and Jehlicka's ambitions was the Vatican's slov/ness to accept the new state of Czechoslovakia; therefore the appointment of new bishops was delayed. ^

The real reason for the initial Slovak clerical opposition was the progressive character of the new government.The length of the war and the collapse of the old Habsburg Empire intensified the demand for radical reform; and thus the new government was impressed with a progressive stamp. This was reflected by attacks on traditional institutions, especially the Catholic

Church. Czech soldiers and officials serving in Slovakia in 1918 and 1919 did much to offend the religious sensi­ bilities of the Slovaks by desecrating churches and religious statues, Until December, 1918 Hlinka had been on fairly good terms with the government, and at times was even an enthuiastic advocate of the Czechoslovak state, but within a matter of weeks after the National

Revolution of October, I9I8 Hlinka went into opposition,

'iL J Kramer, pp, 21-31.

35ibid.. pp, 35-39. 30

The new Czechoslovakia, based on the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation and common Czechoslovak lan­ guage was a victory for the Hlasists and their ideology; it was on the other hand a defeat for the Populists who had always defended the individuality of the Slovak nation and language. The Hlasists were only a minority among the Slovaks, but were able to achieve power because their views coincided with those of the Czechs and the new regime.The Hlasist became the Slovak leaders of the new state and were members of the Czechoslovak or government parties, all of which were exponents of

Czechoslovak national unity to some degree. Bitter hostilities quickly developed between the Populists and the Slovak progressive Hlasists. Populists considered the Hlasists materialistic, irreligious, free-thinkers, and because of their support for the idea of a Czecho­ slovak nation, Slovak traitors. On the other hand, the

Populists were looked upon as clerical reactionaries and Magyarones. Very often it came down to the question of Catholic versus Lutheran, for Slovak Lutherans during the interwar period played a role in Slovak public life far out of proportion to their numbers in Slovakia. In

^ Ibid.. p, 18, 31

a real sense Slovakia was run from 1918 to 1938 by a

handful of Slovak Lutherans* Vavro Isrobar, Milan Ivanka, t ^ Ivan .Derer, and Milan Hodza, to mention the most pro­

minent. Anti-Protestant sentiment became very strong

in Slovakia, and one might say, before I9 3 8 , it was

even stronger than anti-Semitism.

The Church question, personal rivalries, the pro­

gressive nature of the new government, and the exclusion

of Catholics from political power led Hlinka as well as

the bulk of the Slovak Catholic clergy, to oppose the new regime. In addition it soon became apparent that there were basic historic, economic, and psychological

differences between Czechs and Slovaks. Proponents of

the Czechoslovak idea based their enthuiasm for unity

on the linguistic affinity between Czech and Slovak, but they soon discovered that this was all the two ethnic groups had in common in 1918. For a thousand years

Czechs and Slovaks had had separate historical exper­ iences. The argument that Great Moravia was the first

Czechoslovak state, even if true, was as irrelevant to modern Czechoslovak experience as ancient Rome was to

Mussolini's Italy. Moreover the Czechs were much more advanced than the Slovaks, economically; they had a larger middle class, and were more mature politically. Economic differences were the most outstanding, Bohemia was highly 32

industrialized, while Slovakia was still basically

agricultural.

Hlinka began to organize opposition to the new government on December 19» 1918 when he convened a meet- v ing in Zilina for the purpose of reviving the Slovak

People's Party. At this convention Hlinka was chosen president of the party, Martin Micura became vice- president and Stefan Mnohel editor-in-chief of the party's t no daily, Slovak.Priests occupied most of the important positions in the party organizations; in 1920, of twelve of the party deputies to the Prague Parliament seven were priests. At the party conference held in September,

1920, there were fifty-eight priests out of 122 attending.

The remainder were: officials fifteen, teachers fourteen, tradesmen fourteen, lawyers eight, merchants four, and others nine,-^

Conditions in Slovakia allowed the Catholic clergy to exercise overwhelming political power. There were few cities in Slovakia; most Slovaks lived in one of several thousand villages. In these small villages the

37Sidor, pp. 331-332.

•^Kramer, p, 12^, 33

priest was held in high esteem by the peasants, being

not only a spiritual leader, but also lawyer, advisor,

and in many cases the only person the peasant trusted.

A few priests were responsible for keeping alive Slovak

nationalism during the years before 1918; they also con­

stituted the nucleus of a Slovak intelligentsia. Priests

were in daily contact with Slovak peasants in their

pastoral duties. They understood the mentality and needs of the peasants, and therefore could mold them

into a political force. Slovak lay intelligentsia had been largely Magyarized or Czechized, and Hlasists, in particular, were men, who after years of study in Prague

or Brno, lost real contact with the simple Slovak people.

They were often considered foreigners in their own coun­ try.

In the first years after the establishment of the republic there were, in addition to the large number of priests in the People's Party, many so-called "October

Slovaks," Magyarized Slovaks who after the National

Revolution of 1918 quickly declared themselves Slovaks.

Some were opponents of the Czechoslovak state since during the revolution they had lost their jobs or because they felt they could gain more in a Magyar state. They often joined the People's Party believing that its demand for Slovak autonomy would help the 3^ cause of Hungarian revisionism. This Magyarphile element in the People's Party, though strong immediately after the war, was gradually reduced in the late 1920's,

Generally, the party presented itself as a party of the small man in Slovakia, - the peasant, the artisan, the party defending the rights of the Slovak nation. It was most basically opposed to capitalist exploitation, which v/as generally linked by it to Jewish capitalism.

The party developed in the 1920*s into a mass party, drawing support from all classes, and was supported by the strongest single institution in Slovakia, the Catho­ lic Church. The party was strong in most areas of

Slovakia but particularly in Northwest Slovakia in the

Zupas of Trencin, Nitra, Liptov, Turiec, and Orava.

It was most powerful in the Nitra and Vah River Valleys.

The Slovak People's Party, though never receiving more than between twenty-one to thirty-two percent of the total number of votes cast in Slovakia in legisla­ tive elections, was still the strongest single party in

Slovakia, It was also the main purely Slovak party, the only other being the old Slovak National Party, This party, led throughout most of the interwar period by the poet-politician Martin Razus, represented the small conservative Lutheran population who favored Slovak 35 autonomy. It was weak and at most was able to send one deputy, Razus himself, to the Prague Parliament. The

Agrarian Party, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party,

National Socialist Party, and National Democratic Party were termed Czechoslovak parties since they were organ­ ized on a statewide basis. The Agrarian Party usually ran a close second to the People's Party in the Parlia­ ment elections. It was also widely supported in Slovakia, but particularly in the areas of Eastern Slovakia

(Zemplin, Saris, and Spis), and in the mixed Slovak-

Magyar region of the south (Tekov, Komarno, Hont, and

Novohrad). Slovak Agrarians favored some form of Slovak autonomy but rejected the demands of the Populists for full autonomy, fearing this would weaken the structure of the Czechoslovak state. The Communists made up the third largest party in Slovakia drawing votes from agrarian workers, the industrial proletariat, and from the protest voter who was dissatisfied with the parties and the system, The party was weak in the predominantly

Slovak districts of the north and east, but strong in the Magyar districts of the south around Novy" Znamky 36

v 39 and Kosice. 7

The undisputed leader of the Slovak People's Party

was Andrej Hlinka. Hlinka commanded much respect in both

Slovakia and abroad, for he had devoted his life to the

Slovak cause. Nevertheless, in many ways he was ill-

suited to be a political leader. He was highly emotional,

obstinate, easily maneuvered by others, and above all,

uncritical especially in his selection of co-workers and

advisors. Hlinka, moreover, seldom dealt with theore­

tical questions, but preferred to leave such things to

others.^ 0

In the first months after the National Revolution v v /ii Hlinka was influenced most by Frantisek Jehlicka, a

highly ambitious Magyarphile Slovak priest, Hlinka

heeded his advice and this, no doubt, led Hlinka to

make several mistakes in the crucial months of 1918-1919,

-^See Frantisek Vnuk, Kanitolv z deiin komunistickv stranv SIovenski (Middletown, Pennsylvania: Slovak v Amerike, 1 9 6 8), pp. 31 -^2 . In addition to these parties there were also in Slovakia: Social Democratic Party, National Socialist Party, National Democratic Party, Magyar National Party, Magyar Christian Socialist Party, and German National Party.

^ J o r g K, Hoensch, Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostnolitik (Kb*ln: Bohlau Verlag, 1965)1 PP* 5"6.

^Frantilsek Jehlicka v/as born in Kuty, Slovakia January 20, 1879, and v/as ordained a priest in 1902. In 1906 he became a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament for the Slovak People's Party. He died January, 1939* 37

Jehlicka for many years had nourished an ambition for

a bishopric, and when he was not appointed to one in 1919,

he turned against the republic, Jehlicka accompanied

Hlinka to the Paris Peace Conference in August, 1919 at which a memorandum containing demands for Slovak autonomy

on the basis of the Pittsburgh Pact was presented. The memorandum was rejected and Hlinka imprisoned by the

Prague government as a Habsburg agent, Jehlicka never returned to Czechoslovakia but instead worked for the remainder of his life in Vienna, Budapest and other cities for the cause of Hungarian revisionism,

Hlinka next fell under the influence of another

Magyarophile by the name of Vojtech Tuka, Tuka was born in 1880 of Slovak parentage and educated in universities in Berlin, Paris, and Budapest, In 191^ he was appointed

Professor of Law in the Magyar Bratislava University, In

1918 when Bratislava became a Slovak university most of the professors left for Hungary, Tuka, however, remained in Slovakia, joined Hlinka's party, and became the leading intellectual in the Slovak People's Party, He remained h p the leading party ideologist until the late 1920's,

hp f Jan E. Bor (Peter Zatrko), Dr. Adalbert Tuka* - Kaenrofer und Staatsmann (Bratislava* Dr, J, 0, Petreas, 19^3)i PP* 1^-16, Fora more extensive treatment of his life and work see: v Jan E, Bor, Vo.i tech Tuka: uvod do %ivota a diela (Turciansky sv, Martin: Kompas, 19^0), 38

Tuka was highly ambitious and dreamt of becoming a great national leader like Mussolini in Italy. Until his COn- lj.'a viction and imprisonment for treason J in 1929 Tuka occupied several key posts in the party, namely, editor- in-chief of the party daily, Slovak and member of the party presidium.

The next man to gain Hlinka's confidence was Jozef

Tiso, a man of different motives and nature than either

Jehlicka or Tuka, Tiso replaced Tuka as the party ideo­ logist and Hlinka*s confidant. Let us turn to a closer look at Tiso and trace his rise in the Populist party.

*^See below Chapter II, pp, 59-6 0, CHAPTER II

THE FORMATIVE YEARS AND EARLY POLITICAL

CAREER (TO 1929)

Jozef Tiso, like most Slovaks who attained national

prominence, had very simple, humble beginnings, Tiso

was born on October 13» 1887 of peasant stock in the i / small Slovak town of Velky Bytea. Two days later he

was christened a Roman Catholic with the Jozef Ga&par.

With regard to the origin of the name Tiso there is no

agreement, but most likely it was derived from the

Slavic word, tis, meaning yew tree. The name Tiso in

Ve^ky Byt^a has been traced back to 1525* Several

individuals of that name achieved some distinction in

Slovak history. One of them, a priest, Mikulas Tiso, was active in the Slovak national movement during the

19th century.^

^"Most of the biographical information on Tiso's family, and early life, is^taken from Konstantin Culen, Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Clevelands Pi^va Katolicka slovenskA jednota, 19^7) and "2 bohateho Jfivota nasho prveho prezidenta”: Slovak. XXI/2^8 (Bratislava), October 27, 1939.

39 Most of Jozef Tiso's ancestors, however, were sim­ ple peasants or tradesmen. His grandfather, Jozef Tiso, also of Vellcy By tea, was horn on August 11, ,1838, In

I860 he married Veronica Fundarak, who hore him a son in 1862i he was Gaspar Tiso, father of the future leader of Slovakia. Gaspar Tiso during most of his adult life / ^ operated a butcher business in Velky Bytca, He was a nationally conscious Slovak and active during most of his adult life in Slovak national and political organiza­ tions. In 189^ he founded a Catholic Circle in Vellcy

Bytca, which was dissolved by the Hungarian government in 1901 but later revived. Even after 1918 Gaspar Tiso o represented the Slovak People's Party in his town.

On September 2, 1882 Gaspar Tiso married Terezia Budi^ka, a member of a well-known family of potters from Vellcy

Bytca, From this union seven children were born* Pavol,

Jozef, Maria, Jan, Hanna, Jozefka, and Terezia.

Gaspar and Terezia Tiso were simple people who instilled in their children the simple peasant virtues* the value of hard work and a firm belief in God, Their

2 "Smutok Pan Prezidenta," Katolicke novinv (Brati­ slava), February 1^, 19^3. Jj-l

family mottos were* "Pray and work," and "Fellow strive and God will bless you,"-'

Jozef Tiso spent most of his formative years in the town of Ve^ky Bytca, Situated in the northwest corner of Slovakia, it was that area which was a traditional stronghold of Slovak nationalism. Vellcy Bytca had with­ stood the onslaught of Magyarization and survived as a nationally conscious town. Reminiscing many years later

Tiso said of BytSa:

I am a BytSan. If tinkers have a kingdom, well now Bytca would certainly be the chief city of this kingdom. Well, if you will, I am also a descendant of tinkers. Among us there are no differences between artisans and farmers and workers. A tinker is an artisan, but also a worker and the poorest salaried, working on a patch of land which is more rock than soil - in a word also a farmer.^

Tiso's family was not expecially poor nor was it a rich one: it can be classified as a middle peasant family.

Regarding his family's situation Tiso said:

Yfe had a decent roof over our heads, we had a clean, nice village home and always a loaf of bread on a table covered with a cloth. Thus we had what a man needs for a decent life. This was our wealth. And what we had was from work,5

/^Jozef Kr Hrabovsky, "U Tisovcov vo Velsky Bytca," Slovak XXXI/24, January 29, 1939.

^Quoted in Culen, Po Svatonlukovi.... p. 2^.

^Quoted in Ibid., p. 29. 42

Tiso began his formal education in the lower school

in Bytca in 1894. At that time the Bytca school was a

three language one. During the first year Slovak and

Magyar were taught; in the second year, German; and in

the third year all three languages were alternated. Sub­

jects included in the curriculum were the natural sciences,

Hungarian history, and geography. Although the purpose of the curriculum was to Magyarize, there were several nationally conscious Slovak instructors in the Bytca school: one of these, Pavel Trusina, taught Tiso the

Slovak language.

Jozef Tiso during these years of study in Bytca proved to be a good student; therefore in I898 after the completion of his fourth year he was sent to the middle school in nearby Filina. Gaspar and Terezia Tiso had originally planned to educate their eldest son, Pavol, v but he dropped out after one year at the Zilina school to take up the family butcher trade in Bytca. Jozef Tiso soon proved to be a much better student than his brother,

He won the admiration of all his professors. He did well in all his subjects and showed a special talent in

^"Z bohateho zivota..." Slovak. October 27, 1939. mastering foreign languages. Magyar and German were mere playthings to him according to the recollections 7 ^ of one of his classmates. One professor named Bicovsky referring to Tiso allegedly told the class, "You will o see this boy one day will be a great man," Jozef Tiso was also well liked by his fellow classmates. He was remembered as being humble, pleasant, and easygoing, always demonstrating an uncommon interest in helping his classmates with their work,^ While in Filina Tiso lived with Anton Sturm, a friend of the family, who remembered him as a conscientious student who never had 10 to be forced to prepare his school assignments.

It v/as in Zilina that Tiso made the decision to enter the priesthood. This was not an uncommon choice for Slovak peasants. Many Slovak peasant families had a son or daughter in the Church. A clerical career was one of the few ways a Slovak peasant could raise his

?J., "Za Boha a narod: Spomienlw na skolske roky prezidenta Jozefa Tisu," Slovak. XXl/2^8, October 27, 1939.

^Quoted in Ibid. O / 7Tido Gaspar, Per Praesident der Slowakischen Renublik (Fressburg: Johann 0. Petreas, 19*1-3), p. 6, in ✓ * / "Z bohateho zivota,.," Slovak. October 27, 1939. 44

social status or acquire an education. Having made the

decision, Tiso set off in 1902 after the completion of v his fourth year at Zilina for the Nitra Gymnasium, The

Nitra school was much more a Magyar institution than the v Zilina one had been. The Nitra faculty, moreover, had v a low opinion of the Zilina school, regarding its curri­

culum in Magyar subjects particularly inferior to its

own. Young students there were frequently ridiculed,

but Tiso was not for he proved to be an exceptional

student. He mastered with little difficulty the most

difficult assignments in Latin and German, and remained

there four years,'*''1*

The outstanding theological students of the time were sent to Vienna to the Pazmaneum, the leading Catho­

lic seminary in the Habsburg Empire, Tiso in 1906 was

one of those chosen to complete his theological studies

there. Once at the Pazmaneum, he continued his good

scholastic record and came into contact with some of the

leading clerics of the Empire. He received lectures 12 from Franz Martin Schindler and Ignaz Seipel, leaders

in * "Za Boha a narod,,." Slovak. October 27, 1939.

■^Franz Martin Schindler (1847-1922) was professor of moral theology in Vienna, He was one of the ideolo­ gists of the Christian Social movement. of the Austrian Christian Social movement. During Tiso's years of study at the Pazmaneum Pope Leo's social encyclical, Rerum Novarum was receiving wide attention.

Many seminars were devoted to it and came to form an important part of Tiso's social philosophy. Tiso's training was otherwise in traditional Catholic theology and Thomistic philosophy, According to the confidential files of the Pazmaneum Tiso was an exemplary seminarian.

Concerning Tiso the psychological-moral profile stated*

"Natural behavior* serious; morals* exemplary; mode of conversation with superiors* humble, with equals* affable; character* outstanding; application* indefatigable.

Observations* behaves with a mature character.

The intellectual atmosphere of Vienna was very different from what Tiso was accustomed to in Nitra and v Zilina, There were Socialists, Christian Socials, liber­ als, and others, some of them hostile to the Catholic world view that Tiso espoused. It was in Vienna in fact that Tiso had his first contact with the progressive wing of the Slovak intelligentsia, the Hlasists, Tiso opposed Hlasist thought even then; he regarded it a

TO V •^Quoted in Milan S, Durica, Die slowakische Politik 1938/39 im Lichte der Staatslehre Tisos (Bonn* Emil Semmel Verlag, 1967), p. 21, 46 threat to the conservative Catholic view. Friction between Tiso and a Hlasist even took place in Tiso's home town of Bytca where he spent the holidays. The medical doctor in Bytca, Minarik, a Hlasist, accused

Tiso of not being a real Slovak, when Tiso supported the parish priest, Teselsky, a member of the Hungarian

People * s Party and a known Magyarone. There were differences between Tiso and Teselsky, but Tiso pre­ ferred the Kagyarone to the progressive minded Kinarik,^

Jozef Tiso was ordained a priest on July 14, 1910 by Bishop August Fischer-Colbrie, and shortly thereafter said his first mass in his home parish church in Velky yf Bytca, A year later he was awarded a doctorate in theology. Tiso's first assignment as a priest was to the small remote village of Oscadnice, a typically poor, backward Slovak village of the time. Tiso was not only concerned with the spiritual welfare of the people of Oscadnice, but also became very interested in their economic standard, their health, sanitation, and dietary habits. He organized self-help associations and tackled the problem of alcoholism which was so wide­ spread in Slovak villages. Tiso referred to his exper-

1 I* V « Culen, Po Svatonlukovi.... pp. 33-34. b ? ience in Oscadnice as his second university.^ After about a year in Oscadnice, Tiso was transferred to another village, Rajec, where he continued his work.

In Rajec he founded a Slovak peasant bank designed to strengthen the financial resources of the village and free the peasant from debts.^

Tiso was not in Rajec long before he was again transferred, this time to a larger town, BanOvce nad

Behravou, located about 70 miles northwest of Bratislava.

He was appointed chaplain there and in 192^ promoted to pastor, a post he held until 19^5* Tiso, during the many years of his pastorate in Banovce did much for the improvement of the town. He undertook the pavement of the town's streets and the regulation of the Behrava

River and Radisla Creek which ran near Banovce. To further the interests of the town's noted cabinet makers he organized a cooperative. He worked, too, with the city council.and founded a bank to finance a sewer system and water supply. Tiso formulated other plans for the modernization of Banovce, such as electrifica­ tion and pavement of roads to every village in the

•^Ibid.. p. 3 6 .

l6Ibid.. pp. 37-38. district, but these remained only in the planning stage.

His primary goal remained the industrialization of 17 Banovce. r Alarmed by the spread of secularism and progressive thought, Tiso also set out to strengthen

Catholic education in Banovce, He revived the Catholic educational society Orol and he founded both a Catholic 18 teachers' college and a Catholic cultural house. All

Tiso's work did much to make him popular in the Banovce area and to make it the center of his political strength.

In 191^ Tiso was called up by the government to serve as chaplain in the Austrian army. Toward the end of 191^ he was sent to Maribor in Styria. There he became acquainted with Slovene priests and their work in organizing peasant cooperatives. He later applied some of their ideas in his work for the economic develop­ ment of Banovce.^ After a year in the military service,

Tiso contracted nephritis and had to be recalled from the front. Following his recovery he was appointed

■^Albert Ivli&tina, "Tiso-clovek," Slovenska otcina. Vol. Ill (Hamilton, Ontarioi Franti^ek Fuga, 1967), pp. 9-12, "1 Q / Ibid.. Dr. Jan Gleiman, "Tisova mesto," Slovenska otcina. Vol. Ill, pp. 20-25. IQ ^ sokol, 1952)■ pp. 101- 102. spiritual director at the Nitra seminary, later professor

of theology, and personal secretary to the Bishop of

Nitra. Tiso maintained these posts throughout the

remainder of the war.

Tiso was later attacked for his activity during the war and during the Slovak National Revolution (when

Slovakia seceded from Hungary to join with the Czechs

in the new Czechoslovakia (1918-1919)). His political

opponents charged him with having had pro-Magyar

sympathies at the time. These charges resulted from

the fact that Tiso contributed to Nvtramegyei Szemle.

a Magyar journal in Nitra, articles glorifying Hungary's war effort. Ivan DeVer, Social Democratic Minister of

Education in Czechoslovakia in the 1920's, largely responsible for such charges, also maintained that Tiso before 1918 spelled his name, Tiszo, in the Magyar

fashion, and that Tiso had supported the integrity of the Hungarian state. De'rer wrote that Tiso, moreover, was opposed to the Martin Declaration and had even served 20 on the Magyar Nitra Council. Tiso came naturally under

20 * Dr. Ivan Derer, Slovenskv vvvo.i a ludacka zrada (Prahai Kvasnicka a Hampl, ^19*4-6), pp. 3^7-348. Imrich Stanek, Zrada a -pad Hlinkovsti seuaratiste a tak zvanv slovensk^ Stat (Praha . !Qq6). pp.387-388. : 50

suspicion since he served during the war as personal

secretary to the Bishop, Viliam Battanyhanyi, of Nitra, a notorious advocate of Magyarization, Labeling a

Populist a Magyarone was a favorite device of Czech and

Slovak centralists used to discredit the idea of Slovak autonomy. It was done repeatedly in the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic, Sometimes the charges were appropriate as with Voject Tuka while at other times, as with Tiso, they had little basis in fact.

Whatever pro-Magyar feelings Tiso may have had before

1918 were gone by the time the Czechoslovak army approached Nitra,

Before 1918 Tiso belonged to the politically passive

Slovak majority. He was active before October, 1918 but mainly v/ith v/elfare and town improvement projects.

Prior to 1918 he had neither planned to enter politics 21 nor v/as he trained for such a career. Tiso's rather sudden involvement in politics is difficult to explain, but very likely, much like Hlinka, Tiso was drawn into the Populist movement by the revolutionary anti-clerical character of the new state, Indeed soon after the

2^Tiso o sebe. p, 122. 51

National Revolution Tiso joined the Slovak People's

Party and began to work for it in Nitra. He was largely responsible for making the whole south Nitra district a 22 party stronghold, Nitra in 1918 was very much a Magyar town with only two educated Slovak leaders, Dr, Eugen

Filkorn and Jozef Tiso, Both worked hard in Nitra to obliterate its Magyar character and make it Slovak once more. They published a Slovak newspaper entitled, Nitra and organized a Slovak National Council.

Meanwhile Slovak Populists under Hlinka's direction prepared themselves for the first legislative election, scheduled for April, 1920. In this election Hlinka formed a common front with the Czech Populists, led

■* v by Msgr, Jan Sramek; it was known as the Czechoslovak

People's Party. The election was a great disappointment to the Slovak Populists who secured only twelve seats out of fifty-seven assigned to Slovakia in the Prague

Parliament.^ The Social Democrats were the big winners there with twenty-three mandates. The revolutionary wave that swept Slovakia after the war was mainly

22 v / t Gaspar, p. 11. Culen, Po Svatonlukovi.... pp. 63 - 66.

^Mikus, p. 1 6. 52

responsible for the Social Democratic victory, though

the fact that there v/as little in the Populist platform

to attract the peasant masses of Slovakia also partly

explains the vote, Hlinka's main concern at the time

was the progressive, anti-clerical character of the new

government, not the social and economic condition of

peasants. This is clear from Hlinka's decision to pre­

sent a common front with Czech Catholics,

Tiso in a newspaper editorial of the time attributed

the success of the Social Democrats to the fact that

some 200,000 Czech soldiers and officials had voted for

the Social Democrats and other Czechoslovak parties. This gave the world a false picture of true political feelings oh of the Slovaks. Tiso no doubt exaggerated the numbers, but the presence of Czechs in Slovakia did have a bearing

on the electoral victory of the Socialists.

In that election Tiso won in the Trnava district but turned his post over to another candidate. Tiso remained in Nitra dividing his time between teaching and his work for the Populists, He delivered speeches,

organized party activities, and contributed articles to / the party's leading organ, Slovak. In 1921 he was

2^Sidor, p. ^3 8 . 53 appointed personal secretary to the new bishop in Nitra,

Karol Kmet'ko, a former member of the Czechoslovak

Revolutionary Council. For the next few years both worked together in building up the party strength in

Nitra, But v/hile Kmet'ko preferred peaceful discussion,

Tiso felt the Slovak cause benefited more by demonstra­ tions and strong words. As a result, a certain coolness developed between the two men. Even worse, Tiso's inflammatory speeches soon got him into trouble with the authorities. In 1923 Tiso was sentenced to six weeks imprisonment, of which he served two, because he delivered a fiery speech in Nitra, which was said to have incited the people. Following this episode Tiso felt it best to-resign his post as secretary to Kmet'ko, knowing the bishop's feeling with regard to such activity.

Tiso then in 1924 left Nitra to become pastor of the

Catholic church in Banovce,There, away from the eye of his bishop, Tiso had more freedom for his political activity.

Meanwhile the Slovak Populists were making their recovery from the election disappointment of I920. The

^58u}en, Po Svatoolukovi.... pp. 66-67, "Z bohateho zivota,,,," Slovhk. October 27, 1939. 2 6 fruitless union with the Czech Lidaks was ended in

1921 and an individual Slovak People's Party formed. A year later, the party's name was changed to the Hlinka's

Slovak People's Party (HSL'S), The Centralistic policies of Prague and the economic problems in Slovakia con­ tributed to the growth of the HSL'S. Within three or four years of 1920 it became a broad-based mass party,

By I923 the party could claim 876 city organizations,

IO65 village organizations and nine newspapers. But not all were content with the party's leadership. Many of the radical members in the party were displeased with what they considered Hlinka's conciliatory position toward the government. The party had approved the Constitution of 1920 and supported Masaryk in the first presidential election. But on the other hand Hlinka did keep the party in opposition throughout the first legislature, and in 1922 presented to the Prague Parliament the first proposal for Slovak autonomy. Accordingly, Czechoslovakia would be divided into three parts: Bohemia-Moravia-

Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, each with its own diet

Lidaks were the members of Sramek’s Czechoslovak People's Party.

2^Kramer, pp. 263 -266. 55

having authority over local administration, school, 28 churches, justice, public welfare, and finances.

The proposal was rejected. In the next election in 1925

the HSL'S scored its greatest success receiving ^89»111 votes2^ and 23 seats in Prague. Tiso was elected deputy

again and took up his seat in Parliament.

At this time Tiso was not yet a leading member of

the Populist party, but nevertheless one of the party's

rising young stars. Much of the leadership still belonged to the prgfTprevratow group, those from the pre-1918 era which included besides Hlinka, Ferdis Juriga,

Jozef Buday,Florian Tomanek to name a few. Tiso belonged to the younger group of party deputies, those between 30 and 40 years of age. Tiso was young and

inexperienced when he walked into the Prague Parliament, yet within a few years had gained the reputation of being one of the most skillful representatives in the

28 / A .See Karol Sidor, Slovenska politika na node nrazskehe snemu (1918-1Q38). Vol. I (Bratislava* 19^3), p. 8?.

2% 1acartney, p. 118,

^°Jozef Buday was born in I887 in Trencin and ordained a priest in I8 9 9. During Hlinka's imprisonment 1919-1920 he served as acting president of the party. He was deputy and senator in 1920's and 1930's, He was a leader of the Society of St. Adalbert and author of several Catholic books, He died in#1939» Jan Mestancik, "Jozef Buday- v slu)£bach cirkev a naroda," Literarnv Almanach (1970), pp. 89-IO6. Slovak Club, Hlinka soon cane to appreciate his parlia­

mentary ability and his capacity for long, tedious work.

There were considerable differences though between Tiso and Hlinka, Tiso was not as impulsive nor romantically

oriented toward politics as was Hlinka; he was more a hard, cold realist when it came to appraising political

situations, ^ Though Tiso became frequently impassioned while speaking, his ideas always conformed to a logical pattern and were argued from a philosophical or historical point of view.

In 1925-1926 the new central government of Anton

Svehla, in face of a renewed campaign of Hungarian revisionism, set out to broaden the government coalition by bringing in German and Slovak opposition parties,

Tiso favored participating in the government. He felt something could be gained by it for Slovakia, At this critical time Hlinka departed for the United States to attend a Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. In his absence a directory of five, including Tiso, ran the party. Also, before Hlinka left he designated Tiso

J Prantisek Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso (Sydney* The Association of Australian Slovaks, 1967), p, 12. 57 president of the Slovak Club in Prague to manage party affairs in the parliament. Soon after Hlinka was gone a struggle developed between the old x>redorevratorv

Populists and the younger generation. Juriga and

Tomanek were offended by Hlinka's passing over them in favor of the younger Tiso to head the Slovak Club, 32

The friction, however, was mild since Hlinka's authority was strong enough to prevent such inter-party squabbles from becoming serious.

In Hlinka's absence it was left to Tiso to take up the whole question of HSL'S* position with regard to the government coalition. Tiso led the negotiations with V Svehla, but felt unqualified to make a final decision alone. In July, 1926 Tiso sent a letter to Hlinka urging him to return quickly from the United States so

33 that a decision could be made. ^ Hlinka at first opposed the idea of entering a coalition, but during the course of his visit to the United States he was urged by

American Slovaks to try cooperation with the government.

Hlinka arrived in Slovakia in October, negotiations were

32 Sidor, Andre.i Hlinka. p. 55°•

33 Ibid.. pp. 550-551. 58

immediately accelerated and an agreement concluded for

HSL'S participation in the coalition, Tiso had hoped

to obtain some concessions for Slovakia as a condition for the party's participation in the government, but the party was disappointed, especially the radicals, ✓ The hated Zupa law of 1923 which had centralized govern­ ment administration was removed and the country was divided into three administrative units: Bohemia-Ivloravia-Silesia,

Slovakia, and Ruthenia, each with a kra.iinv (regional) president and a council with powers to handle cultural, educational, and humanitarian affairs. The powers of the council were, however, limited, since the kraiinv president, who was nominated by the central government, had power to veto any resolution passed by the council,

Furthermore, the central government had powers in the selection of the council's members,^ Tiso at first spoke out against the law, but after its passage defended it to a degree. At least, he said, with the new law there was recognition of a Slovak kra.iinv and from this, autonomy could be built,

o /l y J Sidor, Slovenska nolitika. I, pp. 303-30^,

35Ibid,, p. 31^. 59

The People's Party officially entered the government

in January, 1927, with Tiso as Minister of Health and ✓ Marko Gazik as Minister of Unification, Tiso in his capacity accomplished much. His greatest efforts were turned toward the modernization of the health spas of

Polianka, Strbske pleso, Tatranska lomnica, Cerveny klastor and Sliac in Slovakia. Due to Tiso's work,

Sliac became the most well-known and most frequented of all Slovak spas,-^ Tiso’s support of the government during these years was regarded by the radical Populists as a betrayal of party principles. These extremists, moreover, disliked the new administration law of 1928 which had replaced the 1923 one.

Tiso at this time together with Jozef Buday belonged to the moderate wing of the party, while the radicals gathered around their leader, Vojtech Tuka, Tuka, who felt he could personally benefit from it, in the early

1920's established secret contact with Hungarian military leaders to work out plans for a coordinated Slovak up-

-^’’Z bohateho zivota..." Slovak. October 27, 1929. rising and Hungarian invasion of Slovakia,Later when

the Hungarian scheme failed to materialize, Tuka began talks with Czech fascists to plan a c o u p d ’etat.-^8 Then on January 1, 1928 Tuka published a sensational article which claimed that the declaration signed in Martin in

1918 contained a secret clause, (Vacuum Juris) stating that after ten years the Slovaks could reconsider their union with the Czechs, Tuka was subsequently put on trial and shown to have been in receipt of Hungarian money. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

The whole Tuka affair caused great turmoil in the country.

To the opponents of Slovak autonomy Tuka was proof that the Slovak People*s Party had dangerous Magyarone elements in it. Many Populists, on the other hand, made the Tuka trial into a cause celebre. regarding Tuka a martyr for the Slovak cause, Hlinka made the mistake

■^Kramer, pp. 307-31°• To prepare Slovakia for the uprising Tuka organized the Rodobranna, a paramilitary group similar to the Black Shirts of Italy, By 1926 it had over 30,000 members. The highly ambitious and mysterious Tuka felt that by cooperating with the Hungarians he could further his own personal career. He believed the Magyars would award him with political power,

38 Ibid.. pp. 3 *K)-3 ^8. 61 of refusing to condemn Tuka, and, in a gesture of dis­ approval at Tuka's imprisonment, pulled the party out of the government and once again put it into opposition.

It lost some 85,000 votes and five seats in the Parlia­ ment in the 1929 elections.^

With the removal of Tuka from the scene, Tiso's importance and influence in the party in the next few years climbed steadily. At a Populist meeting in

Ruzomberok in January, 1930» Tiso was chosen, along with

Karol Mederly,^ 0 one of the party's vice-presidents.**'1

By this time, too, Tiso had established himself as the leading ideologist in the party and one of the most articulate spokesmen for the Slovak cause. Tiso was well on his way to becoming successor to Andrej Hlinka as leader of the Slovak Populist movement.

■^Macartney, p. 118, Juriga and Tomanek left the party in protest to Hlinka's defense of Tuka and formed their own party, Juriga's People's Party. It got about 5 ,0 0 0 votes in the 1929 election,

^°Karol r/iederly (b, 1887) - was the party's legal expert and v/as responsible for drav/ing up proposals for autonomy. He v/as also director of Populist press works. From 1929 he served as a party deputy and senator, and after November, 1938 vice-president of the Slovak Parlia ment. He was a member of the party Praesidium and the party's central court. On October 18, 19^7 he was sentenced by the National Tribunal to six year^ imprison ment. Jozef Chreno, I/!alv slovnik slovenskeho statu. 1918-19^5 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 122-123,

^ L . G. Fagula, Andrei Hlinka (Bratislava: Generalny sekretariat HSL'S, 19^3)* P* 120, CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

Throughout the 1930's Jozef Tiso served the Slovak

People*s Party in various capacities - as party nego­ tiator, party tactician, but above all as the party's principal theoretician. In speeches and articles pub­ lished in party periodicals, Tiso provided the party with a philosophical base in its struggle for Slovak autonomy. Tiso began his work as an ideologist in the early 1920's, submitting articles to the newspapers

Slovak (Bratislava, 1918-19^5)* Slovak tvzdennik

(Bratislava 1919-19^5), while still a professor of theology at the Nitra seminary. At that time his writings did not attract any wide attention in party circles but the religious content of many of his articles appealed to Hlinka and its clerical wing.

Hlinka, recognizing Tiso as a man of his own stamp, the cleric entrusted him with an important political posi­ tion while Tiso v/as still a relatively young man. He appointed him philosopher and teacher of the party,^

1 v Gaspar, p. 15. 62 63

Jozef Tiso left no single work containing all his V 2 ideas on Slovak autonomy. Stefan Polakovifc in two books,

2 Tisovho bo.ia an<_ ^isova nauka has attempted, however,

to catalogue Tiso's writings and speeches. These two

works, together with Tiso's own speech at his defense

trial, remain the most important sources for a study of

his political thought during the interwar period. How­

ever, to formulate a more complete picture of Tiso's

political views during the interwar period one has also

to sift through his various speeches and writings.

Tiso's political ideology was a combination of

Thomistic philosophy, the Christian world view, and

Slovak nationalism. Tiso's whole approach, reduced to

its simplest form, was contained in the party maxim,

Za Boha a narod. "For God and nation." This phrase not

only served as the party's motto, but expressed Tiso's

own personal political ethic to the end of his life.^

Stefan Polakovic (b. 1912) was one of the leading ideologists of the Slovak state, 1939-19^5. He was also professor at the Philosophical Faculty at the Bratislava University, See page 200,

■^Tiso o sebe. pp. 123-126, Throughout his career Tiso always defended his position and supported his argument with frequent reference to divine sanction, natural law, and to national obligation.

For Tiso the highest source of power and law was divine will as revealed to man through natural law. This natural law for him v/as that which governed all human activity, Christian doctrine which was based on natural law taught Tiso of a hierarchy of values in the world - the individual, the family, and the nation, each having rights and potential to be developed. The highest earthly value for Tiso was the nation. The 'nation' was not for him a man-made social unit, but a community ordained by

God and obligated to serve a specific purpose in the divine scheme. The nation, as a divine creation, more­ over, possessed certain natural rights which were in­ alienable. These included the right to existence and the right to develop innate potentialities, so that it might fulfill its purpose in the world of nations, Tiso also spoke of this divinely-ordained nation as a living, spiritual organism made up of people occupying the same territory and sharing the same interests and customs.^

h.S y Stefan Polakovic, Tisova nauka (Bratislava* Nakladatelstvo HSL'S, 194-1), p. 7 and pp. 17-18. He wrote, "The nation according to the broadest defini­

tion, is a society of people who are of one origin, of

one bodily type, of one nature, of one past, of one lan­

guage, of similar customs, of one culture, of one equal

whole and creating on a coherent territory an organic

whole,"'’ For Tiso the nation was not a political crea­

tion, but a divinely-ordained social organization, and

the nature of the nation was determined by a common

territory, a common morality and common customs,^

Tiso, then, considered the Slovak nation a social

and spiritual community, composed of those who inhabited

the area south of the Tatra Mountains and north of the

Hungarian Plain, those who shared the Slovak language,

Slovak customs, and other Slovak characteristics.

'Nation' for him was not a topographical designation,

but rather referred to something organic in its develop­

ment and could be traced in history from the time of

Ratislav and Svatopluk,^ He wrote:

^Ibid.. p, 7.

6Ibid., p. 7.

^Ibid.. pp. 44-51. Ratislav and Svatopluk were rulers of Great Moravia, in the ninth century, Ratislav invited Sts. Cyril and Methodius to Slovakia. 66

Unity of blood, unity of territory, unity of language, unity of manners and customs, spiritual and cultural unity and a consciousness of the common fate are already today established in the consciousness of every Slovak, and this conscious­ ness separates us from every other nation. We are then an independent nation and on the basis of this independence we will build our politics,8

Since Tiso viewed the existence of the nation as

divinely willed, denial of its existence violated natural

law i

As the fifth commandment commands, "Thou shalt not kill," applies to the whole Slovak nation. Who impedes the nation to live an individual life and does not recognize it as a nation sins against the fifth commandment,”

Tiso felt a twofold obligation to serve both God and the nation. His duty to the nation followed, he claimed,

the pastoral principle which commanded him as a priest

to serve the people, the nation,^*0 Tiso believed man was commanded to love and serve all men but first he needed to fulfill his obligation to his own people, his own kind, his own nation. To love ones own, he wrote, was a principle of Christianity*

8Ibid.. p. 54-,

^Stefan Polakovic, 2 Tisovho bo.ia (Bratislava: Nakladatelstvo HSL'S, 194-1), Speech in Trnava October 14-, 193^» P. 107.

^ Tiso o sebe. pp. 122-1 2 3 , 6?

To love oneself is the basis of Christian love. Christian nationalism is deduced from this which means to love your nation first and others after­ wards, But nationalism which loves only its nation is unchristian and will grow into chau­ vinism. 11

Nationalism contributed much to Tiso's personal

philosophy. Nationalism for him was not irreligious

or pagan but rather something rooted in natural law;

to love one's own was a commandment of God. Tiso con­

ceded that at first glance it might appear that universal

Catholicism and nationalism were antithetical, closer

analysis, however, would reveal that they were in fact

closely related. Catholicism, Tiso wrote, applied to

all men irrespective or origin and time in which they

lived; on the other hand nationalism pertained to

thoughts, feelings, and strivings of a specific people

at a particular historical time. To put it more simply, 12 Catholicism v/as the universal, nationalism, particular,

Tiso wrote, "God created the world and its uniform

community but also divided it into various races, depend­

ing on various climatic, biological and ethnographic

11 Tisova nauka. pp. 23. The idea of loving one's nation first and other afterwards can be deduced from scripture Matthew 19:19* Mark 12:31, Luke 10:27. The word neighbor comes from the Greek, Plesion. meaning the 'one near or close.'

12Ibid.. pp. 26-2 7. 68

conditions,"'*'3 Tiso denied Slovak nationalism was in any

way chauvinistic or hostile to other people. It was

concerned with the well being of the Slovak nation, but Ik was not covetous of any foreign territory,

V / For Tiso, Ludovit Stur was the symbol of the Slovak

nation, Tiso made regular references to the great Slovak * national leaders of the past, to Stefan I.Tarko Daxner, y Stefan Moyses, Karol Kuzmany, but most frequently he Vi Vi returned to Stur, Stur's nationalism was for Tiso the

best example of what nationalism should be, because it was active and positive. It was the "dynamic strength

of the individual who was driven toward work and toward

sacrifice for the nation,rather than an undue roman­

ticizing of the past found among many other Slovak nation- V / alists, Stur's commitment to the nation, wrote Tiso, was the "union of the individual to the homogeneous 16 v / whole with one goal and with one will." Stur's nation­ alism was also important to Tiso because it was founded

13 Ibid., p. 28, 1 Zl Speech in Bratislava June 5» 1938, Z Tisovho boia. p. 180.

•^Tisova nauka, p. 9 0*

^ Ibid.. p, 90, Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, Nas bo.i o samostatnost slovenska (Cleveland* Slovensky ustav, 1958), p. W . 69 on two principles dear to him - the individuality of the Slovak nation and the purity of the Slovak language.^

These two principles, Tiso said, were the basic dogma of

Slovak nationalism, the past's heritage to the nation, v t Ludovit Stur recognized and emphasized the individuality of the Slovak nation, for which he worked with enthusiasm and fanaticism. He indi­ cated the purity of the Slovak language as the most valuable property of the nation, and so in all possible ways strove to establish it on the level of a written language. These two basic theses of Stur* the individuality of the Slovak language and Slovak literature formed for the Slovak Catholic youth the basic direction for its work in the future progress of the nation.18 v t Tiso believed his nationalism resembled Stur*s. Like ✓ t Stur, Tiso consciously strove to serve the interests of the whole nation and he urged in his writings and speeches that others do the same.

According to Tiso the nation was of a value higher than the state, The state for Tiso did not exist unto itself, but existed primarily to serve the nation. It was a means, not an end; it had no worth apart from that of service to the people. Tiso believed that the state had to provide for the individual those things

^Speech in Banovc^ August JO, 1936 2 Tisovho boia. p. I3 8 , Kirschbaum, Nlis bo.ia pp. 15-1^

1 R Speech in Parliament, 2 Tisovho bo.ia. pp. 136 -137 , which the individual could not provide for himself.^

The state in Tiso's words was the Forma dat esse rei. or 20 in other words gave beauty to the nation. Tiso believed that the relationship between a nation and a state was similar to that between individual parts to a whole organism. An organism could be a physical or a moral one. In a physical organism, such as a man, all parts - arms, legs, etc., - work for the whole body. In a moral organism such as a 'nation* the same was true. For

Tiso the whole served its components by fulfilling and uniting the activity of the individual parts, bringing them to a higher level of existence, but without sacri­ ficing the part's individuality. In every moral organism

Tiso believed there existed a double responsibility of the parts towards the whole; the part must serve itself in addition to serving the whole. In Tiso's reasoning the state was the whole and the people composing the nation or nations, it parts. A nation, he wrote, was responsible to the state but in turn the state was obligated to serve the nation by safeguarding its develop-

^ Tisova nauka. p. 107 and pp. 109-110.

20 ^ * Parliamentary speech quoted in Culen, Po Svato plukovi.... pp. 110-111, 71 ment. In Tiso's system power or sovereignty resided with the nation, the state merely administered this 21 sovereignty or power as a functioning apparatus.

Sovereignty is a quality of power, which the state executes. The source of power is the sovereignty of the nation. The state is only the administrator of sovereignty. A nation without a state is possible but a state without a nation is impossible. 22

Czechoslovakia, as Tiso saw it, was a state com­ posed of two main nations, the Czech and the Slovak.

Both delegated power to the state which they had created in 1918, to protect and safeguard their develop­ ment. The Czech and Slovak nation were obligated in return, to support the Czechoslovak state so that it could fulfill its function. But, added Tiso, if support of the state jeopardized the existence of the nation, it was no longer obligated to serve the state. He said*

Let me then be permitted to speak a few words about the thesis, which I proclaimed, that we will not renounce our own Slovak nation not even for the price of the republic,....The nation is for us such a high value which we do not permit outweighed. The nation is the one living organism, the one and natural bearer of all rights. Therefore the nation is also the single sovereign determinant of our life as the natural law so dictates.23

21 Tisova nauka. pp. 105-107. op Speech in Brno February 28, 19^1, Z Tisovho boia. P. 78.

^Speech in Parliament February 23 , 1938, Ibid.. P. 173. 72

Recognizing the Slovak nation as a separate entity within

the Czechoslovak state, granting the Slovaks autonomy was for Tiso a fulfillment of the command of natural lav/,

Tiso wrote in Slovak in 1933! '’Autonomy is the realiza­ tion of the rights of the Slovak nation and as such it is the one and only basis for the cultural and economic oh, elevation of the Slovak country." In the simplest form autonomy for Tiso meant recognition of the sover­ eignty of the Slovak nation.

Autonomy is the application of the sovereignty of the nation in all aspects of its life. Practically, it means independence. By this is meant that the nation is able to determine all aspects of its national life,25

Tiso*s basic political program was to achieve the above in accordance v/ith the principles contained in the

Pittsburgh Pact signed in 1918. It included demands for a separate Slovak administration, a Slovak parliament, full judicial and cultural autonomy. Tiso pointed out, however, that these demands v/ere not rootless provisions designed specifically at Pittsburgh. They were founded in natural law; they v/ere such as those belonging to any

o/l y Written report given in Trencin 1934, Ibid.. p. ?4,

2% > i d .. p. 75. 73 nation. Tiso maintained that if the Pittsburgh Pact had not come into existence the Slovak nation would have had 2 6 * to create it. He wrote in Slovak in 1923*

The Pittsburgh Pact is our sacred national law which was given to us from the thunder and lightning of the world war. In this law are contained the guarantees of our national self- existence, therefore, to the extent that Slovaks will be loyal and perservering toward this law, we will have hope that we will be able to pre­ serve our own independence,27

In speech after speech Tiso evoked the guarantees of the

Pittsburgh Pact. For him the document was of primary importance because it was first a manifestation of Slovak national consciousness, but also because it was proof of

Czech recognition of Slovak natural rights as related to 28 the establishment of a Czechoslovak state.

In June, 193& the Slovak Populists even commemorated the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Pittsburgh

Pact. For the occasion a delegation from the Slovak

League of America, led by Peter Hletko, brought the original copy to Bratislava, The event was the scene

Culen, Po Svato-plukovi p. 123,

^"Dufajme a nedajme so," Slovak tvzdennik 192^, Z Tisovho bo.ia. pp. 28-29,

Pft ^ V / "Nase narodnopoliticke paladium," Slovak. 1938, Ibid.. pp. 177-178, 74 of perhaps the largest Slovak political demonstration of the interwar years. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pact, Tiso wrotei

For a whole twenty years we have expended all our efforts. V/e have popularized the concept and contents of the Pittsburgh Pact and now on the occasion of its twentieth jubilee it is appro­ priate that we in Slovakia receive the original Pittsburgh Pact. In it v/e see a historical docu­ ment of first class importance which by its own contents and by everything which has happened in connection with it is clear proof of the v/orthiness of our struggle for Slovak autonomy,29

For the Populists the most important provision in the Pittsburgh Pact was for an autonomous Slovak Parlia­ ment, This in fact remained the key political demand of the Populists throughout the period of the interwar

Czechoslovak Republic, Although the Pittsburgh document did not indicate the exact nature of the proposed parlia­ ment,-^0 the Populists envisioned it as wielding full legislative power in matters of Slovak cultural and administrative affairs. The central government, however, remained adamantly opposed to the creation of a Slovak parliament. The government at times was willing to

29Ibid.

J Derer, Unity of Czechs and Slovaks, p. 63 . 75 compromise on other Populist demands, hut on the question of a parliament its stand was firm. Even non-Populist

Slovaks opposed a Slovak parliament. The Slovak Agrarian, / O] Jan Ursiny,^ though not a vehement opponent of Slovak autonomy, pointed out that a Slovak parliament would create two sovereignties within the state, an impossi­ bility for a united Czechoslovakia,-^2 Along the same lines Vavro Srohar, another Slovak Agrarian, presented his argument against a Slovak parliament in a letter to the Slovak League of America, He conjectured that the

Slovaks would not for certain dominate such a body, due to the large number of Magyars and smaller number of

Ruthenians and Germans in Slovakia who would presumably elect representatives of their own nationality. This would allow the Slovaks only a twenty delegate majority in any representative assembly, Srobar guessed, and his calculations did not even include the number of Kagyarone

^ Jan Ursiny was one of Milan Hpdza's closest collaborators. He took part in the Zilina Conference with the Populists in October, 193$. Later he became involved in the Slovak resistance movement. After 19^5 he served as deputy premier to the Czechoslovak govern­ ment. He died January, 1972.

J Speech quoted in Culen, Po Svatonlukovi p. 118, Slovaks or otherwise disloyal Slovaks in Slovakia.

Prague on the other hand throughout the interwar period was concerned that an autonomous Slovakia would weaken the state and make it easy prey for Hungarians,

Poles, and Germans. The government was sure, too, that there were many disloyal Magyarone or Germanophile ele­ ments in the Populist party; thus to grant an autonomous parliament would play right into the hands of foreign aggressors. It was common knowledge that Slovak autonomy was supported for example by Budapest which saw it as a step toward the eventual reunion of Slovakia to Hungary,

Prague trusted Hlinka and the older generation of Popu­ lists, Buday, Tomanek, and Juriga, but feared the inten­ tions of younger members of the party, such as Tiso,

Karol Sidor and others. For in spite of Hlinka*s occa- t sional emotional tirades against the government, he was still basically loyal to the state. Prague had con­ fidence in Hlinka*s loyalty, but was concerned that he

-^Letter quoted in Culen, Pittsburghski dohoda. p. 378* Srobar in an article in Slovenskv dennik (Bratislava), July 17, 1921, wrote; "Realization of the program of autonomy for Slovakia in the intention and content of Hlinka's party can lead only to revolu­ tion." Dr.yFerdinand Durcansky, Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost vo svetle dokumentov (Buenos Aires, 195*0» p. 318. 77 could not control the radical and disloyal elements in his party. Since 1918 Hlinka had not restricted admis­

sion to membership in the party, welcoming anyone who showed willingness to fight for the cause of Slovak autonomy. By the mid-1930's, it is true, the Magyarone element in the party had been reduced in insignificance, but they v/ere being replaced by a new radical group of V y Germanophiles like the Durcansky brothers, Alexander

Mach, and Karol Murgas,-'

Edward Benes, Foreign Minister for Czechoslovakia, held that Slovak autonomy could weaken the structure of the state and hinder the biological and sociological development of the "Czechoslovak nation." In order to v have a healthy state, Benes maintained, it was necessary to have educated Slovak officials, as well as Czech ones, dispersed not in Slovakia but throughout the state apparatus. Both parts of the "Czechoslovak nation" needed one another. The Czech parts being more indus-

^ Karol Murgas, born 1899 in Budapest, attended gymnasia in Banska and Lucenec. In October, 1938 he became Chief of Staff of the Hlinka Guards, In 19^1 he was appointed Slovak minister to Croatia, During the years of the Slovak republic he was one of the leading Germanophile radicals and Nazi collaborators. For Sidor, Mach, and the Durcanskys see Chapters IV and V, ?8

trialized and urbanized needed the less developed Slo­

vaks - the latter being closer to national roots.^

The two parts v/ere very close Benes felt; there were

more differences between Bavarians and Germans from

Oldenburg, he maintained than between Czechs and

Slovaks.-3 Because of this Benes and others in the

centralist camp refused to abandon the concept of a

united Czechoslovak nation, But the refusal to grant

Slovak autonomy was the source of more friction between

Czechs and Slovaks in the interwar period than any other

single issue. To centralists like Benes the idea of a

Czechoslovak nation was both a fact and a necessity for

the security of the state, but for Tiso it was a viola­

tion of natural law and natural rights, and in the long

run a danger to the state, Tiso argued that to stress

the Czechoslovak idea at the expense of the Slovak idea

meant future generations would end up with no conscious­

ness at all,-^ History had, after all, spoken only of

Q C V 7 ^ -'-'Dr. Edward Benes, Rec k Slovakom a nase.i narodne.j oritomnosti a buducnosti (Bratislava; Slovenska odbofcka, 193^)» PP. ^7-5^*

-^Benes, p. 50*

*37 v -"speech in Trencin January 2, 1938* 2 Tisovho boia. pp. 166-167. 79

a Slovak nation, not of a Czechoslovak one. A Czecho­

slovak state, of course existed, hut it was a man-made

creation. The Slovak nation, however, was a work of

God.38

Tiso's argument was always that autonomy would

actually strengthen the state rather than weaken it, as

the centralists feared.3^ He said it would settle the

outstanding internal question of the republic, the

Czech-Slovak problem, and thus normalize relations

between the two groups. It would also strengthen Slovak

confidence in the republic, thereby further fortifying

it. Tiso on several occasions tried to allay the fears

of the Prague government on the question of Slovak autonomy. In 1935 he told Parliament:

I proclaimed and I will proclaim again that our autonomy is not against the constitution, on the contrary, it flows from it. V/e stand on the basis of the constitution as on the basic lav; of this state. With Slovak autonomy the nation lives and falls. The question is asked: "How far will we go v/ith our autonomy?" Solemnly I proclaim: V/e will go to the unity of the state.^0

38Ibid., p. 176. tq'/ »* •^Culen, Po Svatonlukovi.... p. 136,

k0Z Tisovoho bo.ia. p, 125. 80

Tiso promoted the creation of two sovereign law­ making bodies, one for Slovakia, one for Czechia

(Bohemia-i.’oravia-Silesia). The central government in

Prague would see to those affairs pertaining to the interests of the dual state*, the army, foreign affairs, 4l and state finances.

Among the moderate centralists, one of the regular objections to demands for Slovak autonomy, was that the autonomous program was never defined. Tiso was more guilty of this omission than other Populist leaders.

In general Tiso talked more about philosophy, natural law, national unity and history than he did of specific political programs. Some detailed resolutions and mani­ festoes were presented but even these were not always clear on the position for autonomy. Tiso at times professed loyalty to Czechoslovakia but always qualified his statements with forceful assertions that Slovaks would not abandon their rightful demands for autonomy.

The centralists v/ere therefore left with a feeling of uncertainty regarding the question of Slovak self-govern' ment.

hi * Speech quoted in Sidor, Slovenska nolitika.... II, p. 1&5, 81

The second formal proposal for autonomy was drawn

up by Karol Mederly and submitted to Parliament in Kay,

1930. It was similar in content to the proposal of 1920,

Both declared that the Slovak Populists stood for the

integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, but demanded a

Slovak parliament with jurisdiction over language, edu­

cation, local administration, and the appointment of a

Slovak governor by the president of the republic on It 2 recommendation of the Slovak government. The proposal,

hov/ever, received little attention on the floor of the

Prague Parliament,

Some of the strongest opponents to Slovak autonomy were Slovaks themselves, Slovak Social Democrats Ivan

/ V* Derer and Ivan ISarkovic were among the staunchest defend­

ers of the idea of a united "Czechoslovak nation,"

Communists, on the other hand, since 1924 supported the

right of self-determination for the Slovak nation, and

in 1926 even came out in favor of Slovak independence,^

Milan Ivanka, the only Slovak deputy for the National

Democratic Party also opposed Slovak autonomy. In one

•^Culen, Po Svatonlukovi..,. pp. I33 -I3 4 . Vnuk, Kapitolv z de.iin KSS. pp, 51-61. Mikus, p, 19, 81 speech he even compared Hlinka and Razus, the Nationalist leader to Gapon and Rasputin, maintaining that Tiso's plan for sovereignty for two million Slovaks, if imple­ mented, would only invite Hungarian aggression. More­ over, Ivanka said it was useless to talk about Populist demands, since no one was clear on what Populist meant by a state, a nation, a sovereign nation, and a sovereign / lie / state. The Slovak Agrarians, Milan Hodza, J Jan ka Ursiny, Pavol Teplansky and others took a moderate position on the issue. They were opposed to both extreme centralism and to those autonomist demands which they thought might weaken the state. They accepted the idea of a United "Czechoslovak nation," but for them its purpose was largely to present a show of unity, not to be taken too seriously. The Agrarians considered that kind of Czechoslovak unity necessary in the face of

Magyar revisionism.

^Sidor, Slovenska nolitika. IX, pp. 66-6 7.

^^I.’ilan Hod^a emigrated to United States in 1939. During the war he made several statements indicating the need for more equality between Czech and Slovaks in any new Czechoslovak state. See Dr, Michael Mudry, Milan Hodza v Amerike (Chicago: Geringer Press, 194-9). h.A Pavol Teplansky was later named Minister of Economy in the first Slovak autonomous government formed October, 1938* During the March crisis of 1939 he served as one of the negotiators for the Slovak govern­ ment in Prague, 82

A low point in state - Populist relations was reached in 1933 due to a Populist demonstration in Nitra on the occasion of the 1100th anniversary celebration of the consecration of the first church in Slovakia. The

government had planned to go along with the festivities; important government officials and representatives were

scheduled to speak. Hov/ever, Tiso felt that the cele­ bration should not be a political one, but rather a non­ partisan commemoration of the Christianization of the ho Slovaks. The Populists, moreover, felt the celebration should be mainly a Slovak Catholic affair, and were offended by the number of Czechs, many of whom were not Catholics, scheduled to speak, In spite of this, when the festivities began everything seemed to be in order, but during the celebration some confusion developed regarding the speakers' agenda. The Populists stormed into the celebration bearing Hlinka on their shoulders, he then turned the whole affair into an emotional ho political demonstration. Prague considered the inci­ dent a scandal; moreover it had caused some embarrassment

^Sidor, Slovenska nolitika.... II, pp. 76-77,

^Lettrich, pp. 78-79* 83

to the government which had invited some foreign dig- Ao nitaries to the celebration. 7 Malypetr, the Prime

Minister responded by suspending the publication of the

Populist daily, Slovak, for three months and also several

Slovak professors and teachers from their professions.

Tiso referred to these government measures as "Agrarian-

Socialist terror. " '’0

The world economic crisis of the 1930's only

aggravated the Slovak problem. In 193^ there were over

1^0,000 registered unemployed workers in Slovakia, To

an extent, it can be said that the Slovak economy had

been in a slump ever since 1918. Before 1918 Slovakia

had been tied economically to Hungary proper; the two

formed a natural economic unit. After the creation of

Czechoslovakia, however, the Slovak economy had to make

some major adjustments. For example, Slovak industries

after 1918 had to compete with the more technologically

ko * / 7Derer, Slovenskv vvvoi.... pp. 150-151.

e n V •• J Culen, Po Svatoolukovi.... p. 99.

^ Ibid.. p. 113. Sidor, Slovenska' oolitika.. .. II, p. 181, Economic conditions in Slovakia were probably one of the most important factors in the growth of the Populist movement. Ladislav Lipscher, Ludacka autonomia; iluzie a skuto£nost (Bratislava, 1957)t PP. 35"5°. 84 advanced Czech industries. Altogether some 109 Slovak industrial enterprises, mostly from Eastern Slovakia, were forced to close down in the first 15 years of the

Republic.

Jozef Tiso was very concerned about the economic situation in Slovakia, He maintained first and foremost that the Czechs were hindering Slovakia's economic growth.

To many Slovaks therefore autonomy became a panacea for all Slovakia's problems, including those of an economic nature, Tiso did much to make autonomy a bread and butter issue. He remarked once, "Slovak autonomy as a program concerns also the economic question, it means defense of our national individuality, defense of our economic life, it means bread for every Slovak."-^ Tiso reacted strongly against the promotion of Czech indus­ tries in Slovakia, while native Slovak industries were apparently neglected by the government.^ Tiso said in the Parliament in defense of Slovak industries:

It is said that Slovak industries are artificial flowers which have no vitality, so to keep up the industries would not be rational. But it is not understood that Slovak industry is an integral part of the Slovak economy, Slovak industry has

-^Speech in Parliament February 9, 19311 Z Tisovho bo.ia. pp. 212-21 3 .

-^This pertained mainly to lumber and related industries, 85

a great mission in that it gives life and liveli­ hood to those who are unable to get by with agriculture, V/e see in Slovak industry employ­ ment for the many, unemployed Slovaks and for Slovak families,^

It seemed to many that the government regarded Slovakia as mainly agricultural, a region for the industrial areas of Bohemia and Moravia to exploit,^5 This sharply con­ trasted with the period before 1918, when Budapest invested large sums for the industrial development of

Slovakia,

Slovakia and Ruthenia were considerably behind the

Czech provinces economically. Most Slovaks still worked on the land.-^ But even Slovak land resources v/ere inferior to those in Czech lands, Slovakia's natural resources, lumber, iron ore, coal, for example, were left unexploited, One of Tiso's recommendations for the alleviation of Slovakia's economic problem was for a separate budget for Slovakia, Such a measure, he believed, would provide a more equitable distribution of state funds. The yearly government budgets were

^Speech in Parliament February 9» 1931» Z Tisovho bo.ia, p. 215,

^Lipscher, pp. 36~37.

-^In 1930, 57*6 percent were engaged in agriculture and 18,8 percent in industry, Lipscher, p. 37. 86

usually contested in Parliament by Tiso, During the

budget debates Tiso usually took to the speaker's plat­

form to attack Prague's centralism. Tiso was particularly

concerned about the large emigration of Slovaks from the

m m Republic, Slovak emigration accounted for seventy per­

cent of the state's total emigration most of which went

to Argentina and Canada, He was also concerned about the

fact that 4-0,000 to 80,000 Slovak laborers v/ere forced to

seek employment outside Slovakia each year, Tiso hoped

to industrialize Slovakia sufficiently to prevent this loss of Slovak manpower and talent.

Although Tiso concentrated on the ill effects of

centralism on Slovakia, the opposition continued to

stress the positive factors of Slovak union with the

Czechs. It was pointed out that Slovakia had more political and cultural freedom than at any time in her history. Slovakia, it was said, had been saved by the

Czechs from total denationalization by the Hungarians.

In 1918 there were only 276 schools left in which Slovak was still used as the language of instruction, there were no secondary schools or teachers training colleges using Slovak, By 1934- there were 3»3^2 Slovak primary schools and 160 secondary institutions.Populists,

-^Macartney, p. 120, 8?

however, objected to the large number of Czech teachers

in Slovak schools; this was regarded as a Czech attempt

at Slovak cultural assimilation. In 1930-1931 'the

department of education in Bratislava showed that

fifty-eight percent of the teachers in Slovakia were

Czechs. And of the 417 positions in the central govern­

ment's Ministry of Education there were only four filled

by Slovaks.

During this time there were only 131 Slovaks out

of 7»^70 working in the civil service. In the Justice

Department there were twelve Slovaks out of 143 civil

servants, in Agriculture eleven out of 391» in Commun­

ications nine out of 1,006, in Public Works four out of

82, and in'Foreign Affairs thirty-three out of 1,246. In

addition 225 out of the 5,553 magistrates in Slovakia were Czechs, thirteen out of the 77 district heads v/ere

Czechs, and 3 55 out of the 1,377 magistrate clerks were

Czechs.^ Thus, one of the People's Party's main demands was for priority in employment of Slovaks in the central

administration and in offices in Slovakia. This demand / was expressed in a party slogan, Slovensko Slovakom

^ Culen, Slovaci a Cesi. .. . pp. 155-156, p. 150, 88

(Slovakia for Slovaks). The Czechs on their part would have liked to fill the various teaching positions and the government positions with Slovaks but in most cases it was impossible to find enough qualified Slovaks, The

Slovaks had a very small middle class from which civil servants and teachers could be recruited, A good part of the middle class in Slovakia was still Magyar and

Jewish, Another reason for the lack of Slovaks in government position was that Slovaks were viewed by

Prague as Magyarones and possible traitors,59

In 1930 fifty percent of the railway clerks and twenty-nine percent of the postal employees in Slovakia were Czechs. These Czechs v/ere brought to Slovakia in

1919 because of a general strike of postal and railway employees organized from 3udapest, During the same period police and other administrators v/ere brought to

Slovakia because the central government looked upon

Slovaks as potential disloyal elements.

Another complaint of Tiso and the Populists revolved around the government’s attempts at the secularization

59c. A. Macartney, pp. 119 and 124. Hugh Seton- Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars (New Yorks Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 175. of Slovakia's confessional schools. In 1929 Ivan Derer introduced a plan which called for secularization of all school administrations and the creation of large multi­ class schools to replace the lower and middle school divisions. In 1933 in a debate over the projected plan,

Tiso compared the government's efforts to Bismarck's

Kulturkamof. calling it a violation of the democratic right of association of those Catholics who wished to run their own schools,^ 0

The Socialists saw the Slovak problem as basically a class problem. For them Slovaks were the proletariat exploited by the Czech bourgeoisie. Other parties, too, pointed to the economic backwardness and poverty of

Slovakia as the cause of the Slovak problem. Tiso disagreed with these views, Tiso admitted that economic conditions in Slovakia intensified the movement for

Slovak autonomy, gave it more "strength, greater elan" but added that even if there were no economic problems, there would still be a Slovak autonomous movement.^

Tiso illustrated his point by a story about Slovaks who

£. A ^ Sidor, 'Slovenska politika..., II, p, 9 9,

^Speech 1933, Z Tisovho bo.ia, p, 103, 90

did not have salt on their tables, much less money to

buy train tickets, walked fifty to sixty kilometers to 62 attend a national demonstration, Tiso said, "Not

territory, not the roads, not the waterworks, not the

canalization, stand in the first place, but the Slovak

nation with its own ethnographic basis with its own

thousand years past, with its own language, with its

own culture, with its own claim to develop itself in

the future; this is the Slovak problem.

Tiso viewed the Slovak problem in Czechoslovakia as a problem of Slovak nationalism. He said, "It is a question of the denial or acceptance of Slovak national- 6k ism," A Slovak loves his homeland, his culture, and heritage, Tiso said in Parliament, and so wants only to

"rule for himself for the material and spiritual pros­ perity of the nation.This desire of a Slovak to rule himself, Tiso went on, comes from a love of his own kind. He continued*

62Ibid.

63 Ibid.. p. 102.

6k Speech in Parliament, 1935» 2 Tisovho bo.ia. p. 129,

65Ibid. 91

To solve the Slovak problem means to stand on the basis of such a conception of Slovak national­ ism, by which the nation is able to assert its own power united with all national forces in the service of its own culture by way of a parliament, by its own administration, by its own judiciary, and by application of the Slovak language in Slovak life, 66

Tiso regarded the many facets of the Slovak problem as

"indivisible," They could not be approached without taking into consideration the whole nation in all its needs. The problem could not be solved with mere material improvement in Slovakia, raising the living standard to match that in the Czech provinces. What good would such improvement do if Slovak themselves,

Tiso said, did not control the process, or if financing it was left to Prague banks.

Who then wants to solve the Slovak problem to the satisfaction of the Slovak nation must take in consideration all elements and sections of the national life. It is true that a nation lives in its own language but the nation must also rule over the economic and social organiza­ tion of that territory so that it can create and build its own culture. Therefore, to solve the Slovak problem satisfactorily means to fix the living conditions of the Slovak nation so that the nation might live and in full measure take up its distinguished place in the family of nations.67

66Ibid.. p. 1 3 0 ,

6?Ibid.. pp. 132 -1 3 3 . 92

Tiso termed the government's approach to the Slovak problem "regionalism," that is, an approach which did not acknowledge the existence of a Slovak nation. Such an approach might serve as a temporary solution to the problem, but in the long run Tiso felt it could not be a final solution. Tiso felt it would do the Slovaks no good if buildings, factories, and dams built in Slovakia were only leased by Slovaksi similarly it would do

Slovakia no good to have new schools unless they were governed by the Slovak spirit, Tiso compared Prague's handling of Slovakia to Britain's colonial policy in

India, Britain invested a large amount of capital in

India but, Tiso added, it cannot be said that it was done primarily out of interest for the Indian people,

Such was true also of Czech investments in Slovakia.

It was done to strengthen the state, but not for the

Slovak nation. Tiso rejected regionalism because it 68 "smacked of colonial imperialism." He said*

The Slovak nation as a separate nation is a moral personality and as such is the bearer of all rights to the Slovak territory. But terri­ tory, regio, is only an object which possesses the personality, Regio is able to be only the

68Ibid., p. 13k, 93

foundation of rights, never the hearer of rights. Slovakia has the right for improvement, for cultural and economic equality because the Slovak nation occupies this territory and the nation vindicates this right for itself by its claim for autonomy,°9

The government's failure to resolve the Slovak problem turned Tiso against the parliamentary system in

Czechoslovakia. Tiso concluded the party's goals of

Slovak autonomy could not be realized through parlia­ mentary means. The Slovaks who held less than half

(sixty) of the total number of Czechs mandates could not possibly achieve autonomy through a parliamentary vote. Democracy, according to Tiso, to be truly equit­ able, had first to recognize the Slovak nation and place it on an equal footing with the Czech one by the estab­ lishment of an individual Slovak Parliament on equal footing with a Czech one,^° Tiso believed only this could establish the basis for a true democracy, Tiso referred to the existing system as the "greatest mock and misuse of democracy.'''^

^Rep ort given in Trencin 1932 Ibid.. p. 7^. 90 Speech in Parliament February 23, 1938* Ibid.. P. 175. 71 Speech in Parliament June 25» 1935» Ibid., pp. 126-12?. 94

Democracy for Tiso was not simply the will of a

majority of voters, but a political system which recog­

nized equality among people, respecting each according

to his own merits. The majority, as far as Tiso was

concerned, did not always represent the truth. He pointed to Socrates, Galileo, and Christ whose teachings

had come to represent truth, even though these men had not been accepted during their own life times. In the

same way, Tiso continued, the truth of the Slovak nation has existed though it has been denied by the Magyars and 72 Czechs. Tiso therefore rejected the Czechoslovak democratic system for it recognized the representative body of Parliament as the supreme source of truth and power in the country. To Tiso there was a higher source of truth and right; it was God. Tiso felt that there was a mystique which falsely idealized democracy in Czecho­ slovakia.

If we want to find a just concept of democracy, I believe that it has to be a democracy which as a system does not allow a physical majority to rule over truth and one which does not choose immoral means for the attainment of its goals. Among the concepts of democracy - agrarian demo­ cracy, cultural democracy, and authoritarian democracy, I believe that our concept of demo­ cracy based on Christian thought comes closest to the true democracy,73

"^Speech in Kyjova, December 24, 1936, Ibid., p. 44.

^Speech in Parliament December 1, 193&, Ibid.. p. 1 5 8, 95

Tiso described his democracy as Christian Democracy. It

was a democracy in which the state respected the rights

of the individual and one which is guided by Christian

ideals, Tiso said:

The state is founded on the individuality of its citizens whose interests it promotes rather than absorbs. The State does not assume the obligations of individuals but it discharges those functions that are essential for the life of man and tasks for which the capacities of the individ­ ual alone can not commensurate.... We subordinate the powers of the state to the laws of morality and justice. In keeping with this principlet the state must respect the rights of the individuals " ( society and local self-governing

Tiso, however, never clearly defined what type of demo­

cracy he wanted. He favored an authoritarian system of

government based on-one party rule. He was opposed to

the many party divisions that existed in Czechoslovakia.

A small nation like Slovakia, he felt, was only weakened by the many party divisions.

The idea of general equality is nonsense, We were born with differences. Our system of democracy prevents us from nurturing individuality. In order to create a mass, it excludes talents. A mass never builds, a mass knows only to destroy. Yes we are equal but we are not the same. Our democracy wants to fulfill its historic task it must return to individuality. If it wants to be a true democracy, it must be qualitative,75

^Quoted in Jozef Pauco (ed.), "Dr. Jozef Tiso* Christian Democrat," Slovakia. VII/2 (June, 1957), pp. 39-^0,

^-’Speech in Kyjova, December Zkt 1936, Ibid.. pp. 4-3 9 6

Tiso could not see any value for Slovakia in a democratic system which divided the country into many parties and splinter groups. Tiso believed Slovakia was too small to allow for so many different factions. In this vein

Tiso did not view the People*s Party as one which defended specific interests of class or economics, but rather it was the embodiment of the nation itself. It had only one goal, according to Tiso, and that was to serve the whole nationi

The Slovak People*s Party as one which has regard for the happiness of the Slovak nation is and must be a total national party which includes all levels and classes of the nation. In its operation it must have consideration for all classes because all these belong to the national whole and because only with the unanimous agreement of all classes can the happiness of the whole nation be obtained and secured.7°

Much of Tiso's work in the interwar period was related to party tactics. One of Tiso’s main aims was to replace the pessimism in the party ranks with a sense of confidence and righteousness. Unlike others in the party like Juriga who stressed only Czech sins against the Slovaks, Tiso spoke more of deficiencies of the Slovaks themselves and of positive steps the Slovaks must take if they wish to win autonomy.^ At the 6th

^"Bohati-chudobni," Slovak tyjfdennik. 192^, Ibid.. p. 26. 77 * • "Culen, Po Svatonlukovi..... p . 73, 97

✓ party conference held at Zilina in April, 1933* Tiso

presented the party with his program of "activism,"

which meant an intensification or activization of party

efforts exclusive of party participation in the govern­

m e n t . ^

When it came to tactics Tiso was a realist. He was

willing to take the risks of forming a coalition with

the government, if he felt something would be gained for

the Slovak cause. He preferred this to the romantic

orientation of some Populists, The formation of a

political bloc or the support of a specific political

leader in an election was not, as he explained at the

Piestany Party Congress in 193^* a deviation from the

party program, but simply a question of tactics. Tactics

to be really workable could not be based solely on

tradition, Tiso said, but must fit the conditions of the

time and the needs of the people and party. For Tiso

the life of a party was like that of a spiritual organ­

ism; it possessed both a static and dynamic element.

The unchangeable aspects of the organism related to basic

immovable principles or ideology; the dynamic part

related to application of that ideology. For too long,

continued Tiso, the People's Party had emphasized the

7 8 * f Report given in Zilina April 20, 1933* Z Tisovho bo.ia, pp. 81-91, 98

static element. He felt more could be accomplished by

action, putting party principles to work, as opposed to 79 constant reiteration of party demands/ 7

Tiso tried several times in the 1930's to form

coalitions with other parties in order to increase

Populist strength in the Parliament, Shortly after the

1929 elections Tiso under Hlinka's instructions began

negotiating the formation of a Catholic bloc, to include

all Catholics in the republic regardless of nationality.

Such a coalition, Tiso believed, would serve to strengthen

the state and improve relations between politically

opposing groups (even between Czechs and Sudeten 80 Germans), The project failed. The main obstacle to f V Q-l such a coalition was Msgr. Jan Sramek, leader of the

Czechoslovak People's Party, Sramek's party which held

two ministerial posts in the cabinet in the early 1 9 3 0 's

was quite content, preferring to support an Agrarian-

Socialist government, rather than risk a coalition with

separatist Slovaks and Magyars, And it was clear that

79 ^ ^Speech at VII party conference in Piestany September, 1 9 3 6 , Ibid.. pp. 138 -1^6, 80 / v Sidor, Slovenska politika....II. pp. 21-22, Culen, Po Svatoplukovi.... p, 153* 81^ Sramek was one of the strongest opponents of Slovak autonomy. Culen referred to him as the number two enemy of the Slovak nation, second only to Benes, who was labeled number one. Po Svatoplukovi.... p, 153. 99

Tiso did not envision the block as a buttress for the

regimei

We are for the Catholic bloc, but we will not serve the national unity of Czechoslovakia under the shroud of the Catholic bloc. We consider this as treason to the nation and Catholicism. It is not Catholic politics to want a Catholic bloc, to work with it and then oppress the Slovaks.82

Tiso's efforts to form a Catholic bloc were fruitless.

He then briefly courted'the Magyar elements, but this

also came to naught.

The Populists did succeed, however, in forming a

coalition with the Slovak National Party, Slovak Luther­

ans in favor of autonomy. At a historic meeting in

Zvolen October 16, 1932, the Populists and Nationalists

agreed to cooperate drawing up a manifesto opposing the

idea of a united Czechoslovak nation, favoring the appli­

cation of Pittsburgh Pact principles.®-^ Tiso was one of the principal architects of this alliance with the

Nationalists, It was at this conference that Tiso made his famous statement, "In national politics a Slovak O h Protestant is closer to us than a Czech Catholic." The

82v Culen, Po Svatonlukovi..., p. 153*

®^Speech in Zvolen October 16, 1932, Z Tisovho boia. pp. 66-7 0. i QIl'* »• , Culen, Po Svatoplukovi.... p. 14-6, Tiso o sebe. p. 14-2, Vnuk, Dr. Joseph Tiso. p. 14-. 100

coalition with the Slovak National Party did not have any far-reaching effects in increasing Populist strength in the Parliament, In the next parliamentary elections in

1935 "the Populists and Nationalists ran as an autonomous 1 bloc, Together they polled 4-89,6^1 votes, a gain of some

80,000 for the HSL'S since 1929t represented no gain over the 1935 election. And the Nationalist-Populist coalition barely survived the election of I93 5 . More­ over, the Nationalists, though autonomists, were implicitly loyal to the Czechoslovak state. They therefore espec­ ially disliked the demogoguery of the Populists and their frequent anti-republican statements,

Jozef Tiso and most of the Populists worked for the goal of Slovak autonomy but did not agree on method.

During the First Czechoslovak Republic (I9I8-I938) there were two major groups within the Slovak People's Party, one conservative, one radical, Both included Populists from the t>red-prevratory or old guard and from the younger generation.®-’ For many years the conservative wing of the party was led by Jozef Buday, but about 1935 he was replaced by the younger, Jozef Tiso, Besides Buday and

^^Jozef Kirschbaum, "Dr, Jozef Tiso in My Remin- escences," Notes for My Memoirs (unpublished). 101

Tiso the conservative group included other prominent

Populists, such as Martin Sokol and Jozef Sivak. Tiso and the conservatives were moderate in voicing party demands and were more willing to compromise with the government. Of the conservative group the most moderate were members of the old guard such as Jozef Buday, and before 1929 Ferdis Juriga and Florian Tomanek, These were more convinced of the necessity of preserving

Czechoslovakia. They had lived and fought the old regime in Hungary before 1918, and so better understood the threat of Hungarian revisionism to the Slovak nation.

The younger Populists like Tiso, though opposed to a return of Slovakia to Hungary, were not as aware of the danger of Hungarian aggression, nor did they grasp the importance of a Czechoslovak orientation for the survival of the Slovak nation. Nevertheless, at least until I938

Tiso sought a solution to the Slovak question within

Czechoslovakia, The radical faction in the party was led, after 1929, by Karol Sidor, one of the most talented individuals in the party. Sidor was one of the party's leading writers and journalists; he worked for many years on the editorial staff of the party's daily, 102

/ 86 Slovak, and in 1935 became.its editor-in-chief. He was highly regarded and admired by the younger generation 87 of Populists. { Whereas Tiso was primarily an orator,

Sidor was a man of the pen. His articles and speeches QO were characterized by directness, but, though Sidor was an ambitious and aggressive politician, he seemed

to lack an ability to make crucial political decisions. 89 This, in part, cost him his political career, 7 In 1927,

Sidor published a travelogue, Cestou so Polsku (Journey

Through Poland), establishing his reputation as a Pola- phile, He hoped to secure Polish help in the struggle for Slovak autonomy, toying with the idea of federation with Poland.

Frantisek Vnuk, ‘’Karol Sidor, profil politickeho pracovnika," Karol Sidort nolitik, novinar, soisovatel. ed. Jozef Pauco (Middletoyn, Pennsylvania, 1962), pp. 11- 20. Sidor was born in Ruzomberok in 1901. He began his career as a writer while a gymnasium student, writing under the name, "Student from the Vah," He was an editor and writer to a student monthly, Vatra. He joined the editorial staff of Slovak in the 1920's and became one of its most energetic contributors. In 1935 be was elected deputy to the Parliament,

87 ^ 'Jozef Pauco, Tak sme sa noznali: Predstavitelia slovenske.i renublikv v suomienkach (Middletown. Pennsyl­ vania: Slovak v Amerike, I967), p. 37*

88Ibid., p. 231 .

89 7Hoensch, p. 79. 103

In 1935 the aged president - founder of Czecho­

slovakia, Thomas Masaryk, announced he would not seek

another term, It was common knowledge that Kasaryk wanted his co-founder of the Republic and foreign sf minister of sixteen years, Edward Benes, to be his

successor. The other candidate was Prantisek Nemec,

The presidential elections were to be held in the

Parliament, In preparation for elections each party bargained with individual candidates, Tiso represented

the HSL'S in its dealings with Benes. In return for v Populist support Benes promised Tiso that he would,

immediately after assuming office, tackle the Slovak question and end all economic inequalities, Tiso there­ fore pledged to Bene^ HSL'S' support. Hlinka and the radicals in the party were not at all enthuiastic about * Benes. Hlinka was won over to the idea of supporting \f 90 Benes only when told that Nemec was a freemason. The vote in Parliament went overwhelmingly for Benes who received 3^° votes to Nemec's twenty-four, The Populists' v support of Benes was a definite victory for Tiso over the radicals in the party. But in the next few years

9°CJulen, Po Svatoulukovi.... pp, I67-I7 3 , 104-

Benes proved to be as much opposed to Slovak autonomy as was Masaryk, Tiso later stated that his support of Benes

in the 1935 election had been a mistake, one of the three

great mistakes made by the HSL'S in the inter-war period

(the other two being support of the Constitution of 1920

and the party's participation in the government in the years 1927-1928), Tiso, believed, however, that even if v not all party demands were met by Benes at least a mea­

sure of self-government would have been achieved; full autonomy could be built upon it.^

In the late 1930's in the face of a threatening

international situation, and with the rise of Nazism, a sense of urgency surrounded talks between the Populists and the government attempting to solve the Slovak ques­ tion, The new prime minister in 1936 was Milan Hodza, the first Slovak to hold that position in the Republic,

A personal friend of Hlinka from the days of the Habs- v/ burg Empire, Hodza sought desperately to work out a solution v/ith the Populists in order to put the Czecho­ slovak state on more solid foundations. From 1936 through the Munich crisis of September, 1938 negotiations con­ tinued between Populists and the Prague government. Tiso

91Ibid.f pp. 173-175. 105

along with Karol Mederly and Martin Sokol,was usually

one of the main participants in these talks. The talks

ended with the recognition of Slovak autonomy in Novem­

ber, 1938* At the same time Jozef Tiso became political

leader of the Slovak nation,

9 Martin Sokol (b, 1901) was one of the leading Populists during the 1930's and 19^0's. He joined the HSL'S in the 1920's while a student in Bratislava, Dur­ ing the 1 9 2 0's he was active in the student movement, edited a periodical Rozvo.ia and served as president of the Slovak Catholic student society (USKS), From 1929- 1939 he served as Secretary-General of the HSL'S, He was also a member of the party presidium. In March, 1939» he was appointed Minister of Interior and in January, 19391 president of the Slovak Parliament, In 19^7 he was sentenced to five years imprisonment by the National Tribunal, CHAPTER IV

PROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE (1938-1939)

In January, 1938 Andrej Hlinka designated the words,

V novom roku - do utoku. (in the new year - to the attack)

as the party slogan for that year. This conveyed the

party’s belief that 1938 would be of great importance

for the question of Slovak autonomy. Already at a meeting

of the party's Presidium on November 26, 1937 Tiso ex­ pressed his feeling that the international situation was

favorable for the final attainment of Slovak autonomy.

Later in March, 1938 at another Presidium meeting Hlinka

said 1938 would be as important for the Slovaks as was

1918.2

Hlinka and Tiso were correct in sensing that a decisive moment was near. The Sudeten Nazi party of

Konrad Henlein, which received sixty-three percent of the

German vote in Bohemia and fifty-six percent in Moravia

Hoensch, p, 36 . 2 n/ , / Jozef Danas, Ludacky seuaratizmus a Hitlerovske Nemecko (Bratislava* Vydavatel'stvo politicky litera- tury, 1963)1 P. kb*

106 107 in the 1935 elections had come with its fifty-five dele­ gates to constitute the second largest single party in the Prague Parliament. The fall of Austria in March,

1938 and the accelerated anti-Czech campaign by Hitler in the spring of 1938 prepared for the crisis that would shake the Czechoslovak state to its very foundations.

Tiso and the Slovak People's Party welcomed the crisis, seeing in it an opportunity to step up the campaign for autonomy and to extract concessions from the Prague government. They began by focusing on the 20th Anni­ versary of the Pittsburgh Pact to be celebrated in June,

1938# for which in 1937 Konstantin Jfulen wrote a book,^

In preparation for the celebration Tiso also traveled to the United States as part of a delegation of the Society II of St. Adalbert, Tiso hoped to drum up support among

American Slovaks for the cause of Slovak autonomy and to secure the help of the powerful Slovak League of

JCulen wrote two books on the Pittsburgh Pact, one in 1937 and a smaller edition in 1938 .

^The Society of St. Adalbert was a religious society founded in the 19th century. Its main work was directed towards publication and distribution of religious litera­ ture in the Slovak language. See K. E. Hvozdovic, "History and Accomplishments of the Society of St. Adal­ bert, Trnava, Slovakia," Slovak Studies V (Cleveland- Romet Slovak Institute, 1965)* PP* 205-239* 108

America, for the American-Slovak community could serve as

a strong moral weapon in the fight. Before departing for

Czechoslovakia Tiso was shown the original copy of the

Pittsburgh Pact, and he conferred with the president of

the League, Peter Hletko, who was to head the American-

Slovak delegation to the jubilee demonstration in Brati­

slava scheduled for June, 1938.-*

There was a noticeable radicalization of Tiso's

political views in 1937**1938, for Tiso wished to take

full advantage of the domestic and international situa­

tion to further the Slovak cause. In Parliament on

December 1, 1937 Tiso said he would support the defense

of the state but would not vote for any defense budget while the government continued its unjust taxing of £ Slovaks. Then on February 23, 1938 Tiso delivered a

famous speech in which he said the Slovaks would never give up their nation even at the price of the republic.

Such statements naturally alarmed the central govern-

^Hoensch, p. j6. While in America Tiso attended several conferences and visited numerous Slovak Catholic parishes. He met the important leaders of the Slovak- American community, Msgr. F. J, Duboshj Msgr, S, Krasula and others. See Culen, Po Svatonlukovi.... pp. 18*1— 187, and Jozef Pauco, 7 5 Rokov nrve.i katolicke.i slovenske.i .iednotv (Cleveland* Prva katolicka slovenska jednota, 1965)» PP. 287-291.

^2 Tisovho bo.ja, pp. 159-160. 109

ment which interpreted them as proof of the separatist

tendencies in the Slovak People's Party* To counter Tiso's

increasing radicalism came a hardening of position on the 1/ 1/ part of President Benes and the central government. Benes,

conscious of both the internal (especially vis-a-vis the

Sudeten Germans) and external threats, was anxious for

some normalization in Czech-Slovak relations, but at the

same time, given the threats of German and Hungarian

aggression, understood the growing necessity of upholding

the concept of a united Czechoslovak nation. Both Tiso

and Benes moved into increasingly inflexible positions in

1938 making any compromise virtually impossible. On v March 15» 1938 Benes and Tiso embarked on discussions on v the question of the HSL'S entering the government. Benes

demanded as a condition that Tiso accept his standpoint

on the Slovak question as expressed in his Rec k Slovakom

(Speech to the Slovaks) of 1934. He insisted that the

Populists must first enter the government before their

demands could be heard. Tiso, because he rejected Benes

position in the Rec k Slovakom naturally turned down his

1938 proposal. Tiso in turn demanded more concessions

from Prague before his party would even take up the

question of supporting a coalition. The talks were then

broken off.^

7 / rSidor, Slovenska politika.... II, p. 247. Culen, pp. 193-194. 110

The Slovak People's Party had two sets of demands which were used as the basis of discussions with the Prague regime in the late 1930's. One comprised the minimal program of five points.

1. Recognition of the individuality of the Slovak nation,

2. A new language law whereby Slovak would be used equally with Czech in all areas,

3. A Slovak diet in keeping with the sense of the Pittsburgh Pact.

4. A new organization of the ministerial depart­ ments.

5. School reform and execution of the educational system according to Christian principles,8

A second list consisted of the thirty-two points drawn up in 1935 (see Appendix), and contained detailed demands regarding education, employment of Slovaks in government o service, and so on.7

Milan Hodza, Agrarian prime minister from 1935 to

1938, probably the most capable Slovak politician of the period, wanted to bring the Populists into the government in order to aid the working out his program of ’’regional- isrn" (a decentralization of the state administration and extension of a limited measure of self-government to the

a Sidor, p. 16 9. Hoensch, p. ^0,

^Sidor, p. I65. Slovaks). He hoped by taking the Populists out of oppo­

sition to reduce some of their extremism and demagoguery which was to a degree responsible for his own Agrarian party's decline in popularity among the Slovak masses.10

Hodza, however, had little success. He was handicapped

in that he had limited influences in the formulation of

the government's Slovak policy. There was a great deal of opposition to concessions to the Populists from Benes and others in the government, especially from individuals V y like Msgr, Jan Sramek and Ivan Derer, Of all the members of the Prague government in the late 19 30 's, Hodza was the most compromising and the only one who really had a workable solution to the Slovak problem. True, he did not recognize the existence of a 'political Slovak nation' and therefore did not conceive of a Slovak diet such as the Populists had in mind, but he did sympathize with many Slovak demands and was sincere in his efforts to find some equitable solution to the Slovak problem.

After the failure of Tiso's talks with Benes, Hlinka called a meeting of the Party Presidium which drew up a new manifesto, and read to Parliament by Tiso on March 29.

It was a reaffirmation of the party's principal demand

10Lipscher, pp. 89-9 0. 112

for the recognition of the individuality of the Slovak nation and a plea for national unity. ^ Along with the

intensification of the campaign for autonomy in 1938

came a move by the Populists to open up contacts with the state's national minoritiest especially with the

Sudeten Germans, The first meeting with the Sudeten

Nazis during the 1938 crisis took place in Hlinka*s rectory in Ruzomberok February 8, 1938. Present, besides

Hlinka were K. H. Frank, Sudeten German Nazi deputy and

Franz Karmasin, leader of the Carpathian Germans. Hlinka indicated that he was in favor of some cooperation with the Sudeten German party, and promised to appoint a 12 liaison soon. Tiso showed a similar willingness to work with the Germans, when an assembly of the HSL'S

Presidium May 3» 1938 Tiso proposed cooperation with the

Germans, Poles, and Magyars. No opposition” was recorded,^

^Manifesto is in 2 Tisovho bo.ia. pp. 170-171,

12 Archiv des Deutschen Auswartigen Amts, Akten zur Deutschen Auswkrtigen Politik. 1918-19^5 - hereafter cited as A.D.A.P. Series D, Vol. II, pp. 97-98. Stefan Ha&sik was appointed to this position as liaison, Hassik, born in I8 9 8, was HSL'S deputy to Prague Parliament, 1935-1938, President of Zemplin Zupa party organization after 19^0, and in 1 9 ^ named as Slovak Minister of National Defense, There is no evidence showing that the HSL'S worked closely with the Sudeten Germans before 1938 .

■ ^D an as, p , 51* 113

For Tiso, however, any cooperation with the national minorities especially with the Sudeten German was mainly for tactical reasons, rather than out of any sympathy for

Nazi ideology. During 1938» on the other hand, Tiso rarely demonstrated any great loyalty to the state hut still probably favored an autonomous Slovakia within the

Czechoslovak state. He opposed the Soviet-Czech Pact of 1935» and at the Pittsburgh Pact jubilee celebration of June, 1938 denounced that Soviet-Czech agreement, saying he did not want to see Russian troops marching all over Czechoslovakia,^ On an earlier occasion, Tiso condemned the same agreement believing it served only the goals of the Comintern, that is, *'to lead the nation to moral decay and so to secure a new bastion in Central

Europe.

Until the 1930’s there were still two major factions in the HSL’S, - the radicals led by Karol Sidor and the moderates led by Jozef Tiso, But, in the 1930’s there

Ibid,. p. 53 , On the evening of June 4, 1938 Slovak radicals Alexander Mach and Ludovit Mutnansky publicly burned the Soviet flag and a copy of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact. At the demonstration of June 5 there were over 251000 people. It was the last public appearance of Hlinka,

"^Sidor, pp. 222-223. n 4

emerged yet another group of radicals known as Nastupists, ✓ so called after their periodical, Nastup. This faction

represented the younger generation of Populists. They were Germanophile and considerably more radical than

Sidor's group. Whereas Sidor looked toward Poland, the

Nastupists sought the help of Hitler*s Germany. They were not Nazis but admired the totalitarian organization

of Germany and the achievements of Hitler. Their aim at

first was the federalization of the republic, the crea­ tion of two independent units joined only by a personal union. They saw in federation the best solution to the

Slovak problem, one which would give the Slovak nation everything it rightfully deserved to safeguard its 16 national development. In the late 193°'s the Nastu­ pists came out in support of complete secession of Slo­ vakia from the republic and the creation of an indepen­ dent state under German protection. The leading Nastu-

Durcansky, pp. 195-198. Tiso at his trial claimed that he had very little to do with the journal Nastup or with its editor, Ferdinand Durcansky in the 1930*s. He said he knew Durcansky as a gymnasium student but after that had no contacts with him. Tiso o sebe. pp. 113-11^, 115

V in pist was Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky f and probably after

Tuka possessed the most outstanding mind in the party.

Some other prominent Nastupists were Karol Murgas, Jozef

Kirschbaum, Alexander Mach, Stefan Polakovic, and Anton

Vasek. Hlinka was able to hold together the major fac­ tions of the party, to preserve at least the appearance of cohesion, for he was widely respected in the party by both radicals and moderates. Tiso, who would finally succeed Hlinka never commanded as much respect or authority in the party. By 1938 Hlinka had been involved in the

Slovak national struggle for over forty-five years, Tiso only eighteen, Hlinka was regarded by the Populists as father of the nation, as the greatest Slovak patriot of the century, Tiso did not have any such claim, at least in 1938. Hlinka, however, by the mid 1930's was failing in health and became more a symbol of the Slovak cause rather than actual leader of the party. Naturally the

17 ^ * 'Ferdinand Durcansky, born in 1906, became professor of law at Bratislava University, From 1939 - July 19^0 he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Interior for the Slovak Republic. He was tried and sen­ tenced to death in absentia by the National Tribunal in 19^7t and is presently living in West Germany, Jan Durcansky was born in 1902. He became a mem­ ber of the^executive committee of HSL'S and president of the party Zupa organization for Bratislava, 116 question of succession emerged. Of the leading Populists there were five major contenders* Buday, Sivak, Sokol,

Tiso, and Sidor. Buday a member of the old generation was well respected, hut was too old to he given serious 18 consideration. Jozef Sivak, a year older than Tiso, had heen active in the party for many years as a writer, and involved in cultural and educational organizations.

He was moderate and honest, hut did not have the reputa­ tion of Tiso or Sidor. Sokol controlled the party organ­ ization but in national prestige was behind Tiso and

Sidor. It came therefore down to a contest between Sidor and Tiso.

Jozef Tiso and Karol Sidor had been rivals in the party for many years. It was not so much a question of personal dislike or ideological differences as much as it was a simple power struggle, Sidor was one of the most popular individuals in the party particularly among the

18 Jozef Sivak was ^orn in 1886 in Bahrovca and raised in Liptovsky sv, Mikulas, He was educated as a teacher. In 1918, he joined the People's Party and served as a deputy to the Parliament and on the editorial staff of Slovak, For six years, he was president of the Society of Slovak Artists and in the Prague Parliament, vice- president of the Cultural Council. ‘'Poslanec Jozef Sivak," Slovak XXI/17, January 21, 1939* 117 younger, non-clerical members. The geographic center of

Sidor's strength was Ruzomberok, Tiso's was in the Nitra

area. While Tiso and the conservatives controlled the party apparatus, Sidor commanded the weapons of the party, the press and the military wind, the Hlinka Guard,

Through his control of the press Sidor therefore gave

Tiso as little publicity as possible, trying always to play down Tiso's activities in the party, Sidor, although popular in the party, ultimately did not have the mass support Tiso had outside the party. People v/ere fright- tened by Sidor*s radicalism. Tiso appeared to be milder and also had the backing of the Catholic Church, Tiso, moreover, was a gifted speaker and ranked as one of the best Populist orators in Parliament. In addition, Tiso possessed a certain charisma and was well liked by the peasants, for Tiso had a way of identifying himself with the peasants, their problems, and their desires.^ In this way, he gained the confidence and loyalty of the 20 masses. Sidor kept his distance from Tiso, but he

IQ 7Jozef Kirschbaum, "^sobnost a politicke koncepie Dr, Jozefa Tisu," Literarny almanach. ed. Jozef Pauco (Middletown, Pennsylvania* Slovak v Amerike. 1972), p. 7t Jozef Kirschbaum, Notes for My Memoirs.

20 Kirschbaum, "Osobnost,.,," p. 7» 21 envied Tiso's public popularity. In the early 1930's

Tiso had been the number two man in the party, but about

1935 Sidor began to get the edge. Sidor had become

Hlinka's personal advisor and confidant, and by 1938 was regarded as his most logical successor. Hlinka, however, had difficulty deciding who should succeed him as leader of the party. At first Hlinka favored Sidor, but this choice was opposed by some Church leaders. In a letter to Hlinka, December 7» 1937, the Bishop of Spis, Jan

Vojtassak, expressed his fears of entrusting the leader­ ship of the party to Karol Sidor, a non-clerical radi- 22 cal. Hlinka, however, did not have complete confidence in Tiso, nor did he consider him the best possible can­ didate for the position.2^ Much of Slovak political history in 1938 and 1939 can be better understood, know­ ing the realities of the power struggle between Sidor and Tiso.

Hlinka's end finally came August 16, 1938. His funeral in Ruzomberok was the occasion for another Popu-

21 v Pauco, Tak sme sa noznali. pp. 230-231.

22Dana^, p. 5 8. Vojtassak wrote, "I am afraid that not even fifty percent of our young worldly generation will be faithful to our ideals."

2-^Derer, Slovensky vvvo.i.... p. 198. 1 1 9 list demonstration, Tiso spoke these words at Hlinka's grave t

One has died and departed from us who beared the torch of Slovak patriotism from heart to heart* from Slovak to Slovak, from village to village, from city to city throughout Slovakia - everywhere building up self-confidence and national conscious­ ness, always strengthening the struggle for rights of the nation.

While standing in the service of Christ, he stood in service of a great idea, sacrificing all on the altar for this idea, Hlinka, the priest and patriot, lived with the conviction that he did not serve all things but that which has roots in the thousand year past and in the present Christian life of the nation.24.

About two weeks after Hlinka's death a party conference was called to resolve the question of a successor to the presidency of the Slovak People's Party, No decision could be reached, so the election was postponed. Mean­ while Tiso, as the party's vice-president, and Jozef

Sivak, as its second vice-president, served as temporary leaders, performing all duties normally executed by the president, ^ Tiso, however, for all practical purposes was president. He controlled the party Presidium with a majority of four votes out of six. Sokol and Sivak were

Tiso men, and so usually supported him in Presidium voting.

Culen, pp. I97-I98,

2 k V •'Hoensch, p. 81. Danas, p, 59. 120

Buday was sympathetic to Sidor's Polophilism but as a 26 moderate voted with Tiso, Only Mederly voted with Sidor.

Later in October, 1939 Tiso was made officially President

of the HSL'S,

Hlinka's death came on the eve of the Munich crisis,

which soon decided the question of Slovak autonomy and

sealed the fate of the Czechoslovak state. Therefore,

on September 15» Tiso led a Slovak delegation (including

Buday, Sokol, and Sivak) to discussions with Benes at

Prague. Once again Benes tried to circumvent the issue of

the individuality of the Slovak nation by proposing that

Czechs and Slovaks be designated members of the "national

Czechoslovak family," Benes' proposal prevented an

agreement; the Slovak delegation departed, but the door was left open for future talks, 27 In 1938 Tiso spent more time than any other Populist in conferences with

Benes. Benes theorized, suggested creating commissions and subcommissions, but would make no written promises to pQ Tiso's demands. Neither, in fact abandoned his original position.

2^Hoensch, pp. 81-82,

27Ibid.. pp. 85-8 6.

28 ^ Culen, p, 202, 121

After the discussions of September 15 Tiso and the

Populist delegation returned to Bratislava to report to

the party and receive new directives for the next round

of talks, A party communique was issued re-stating party principles, but denouncing cooperation with "non Slavic political parties,"2^ Tiso was instructed in the next

session with Benes to work for "recognition of self- determination for Slovakia, respect of the individuality of the Slovak nation and language,"-^ With these new directives Tiso returned to Prague on September 21 with

Martin Sokol, Many of the Populists believed that the crisis had reached a peak and were confident that Benes would soon have to surrender to Populist demands. On

September 19 the British and French had forwarded an ultimatum expressing their support of German demands for

Sudeten territory. On September 20 Hodza resigned, initiating another government crisis, Benes was forced to bow to some major Populist demands. On September 23

Benes presented Tiso with a plan for his solution to the

Slovak question, stating that "all political, economic, and cultural differences of opinion would be solved

2^Hoensch, p. 87, Sidor, p, 251*

^°Hoensch, p. 87. 122

between Czechs and Slovaks in the spirit of brother­

hood."-^ It declared the Slovaks would be given a

provincial diet with competency in legislative, admini­

strative, and economic affairs. This diet could pass laws

in the area of social welfare, health, economy, and all

other issues before the Prague Parliament which pertained

to Slovakia, It was obvious to Tiso that Benesh granted

these concessions solely because of international pressure rather than out of any basic change of attitude toward the question of Slovak autonomy. Nevertheless, Tiso was generally satisfied with Benes' proposal and agreed to use it as the basis for further discussions. The radical- separatists were opposed to a compromise settlement at the time, preferring to prolong the crisis as long as possible in order to obtain full possible benefits, for example an independent Slovak state.

Ibid.. p. 88. Lettrich, p. 92. Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), pp. 142-1^3. FrantiSek Vnuk, "Slovakia's Six Eventful Months," Slovak Studies IV (Cleveland-Rome: Slovak Insti­ tute, 196^), p._25. Complete text of the proposal is in Mikus, pp. 3*K)-344, The party was divided over how nego­ tiations should be^carried on with Bene^, One group, Sidor, Mach, Murgas, Durifansky and Kirschbaum did not want to bargain with Prague, but just give demands. Tiso belonged tovthe cautious group and was for negotiations. Karol Murgas, Narod medzi Duna.iom a Karpatmi (Turciansky sv. Martin: Kompas, 194-0), p. 7 6. 123

On the day following the presentation of Benes* scheme for solving the Slovak problem a new government was formed (after Hodza's resignation) under General Jan

Syrovy, an Agrarian. Included in the new government were three Slovaks* Matus Cernak,-^2 Imrich Karvas, and

Vladimir Fajnor, Seven days later Britain and France agreed to German demands for Sudeten territory at Munich, thus destroying for all practical purposes the indepen­ dence of Czechoslovakia, The rump state survived a mere four and a half months before it totally disappeared from the map of Europe.

On September 30 only a few hours after the results of the Munich crisis were known, Tiso announced that

October 6. Obviously this was not to be any ordinary meeting of the party, for the Munich Conference had altered not only the physical structure of the state but also its ideological basis. The time clearly was ripe

^ Matus Cernak (b. 1903) was one of the leading young radicals. During the years of the Slovak Republic he served as ambassador to Germany and General-Secretary of the Slovak-German Society, He was assassinated in Germany in 1955* See Wer war Matus Cernak? (Munchen, 1955). 124

for the achievement of full Slovak autonomy. Represen­

tatives from other Czechoslovak parties who sensed what

was in the air also attended the conference,33 The first

session of that meeting was run by the Populists. Tiso

expressed these v/ords at the opening of the conference:

"After many stations on the Slovak Way of the Cross we v have finally come to 2ilina...Today crowns the work of

our past struggles...The moment has arrived when the

Slovaks as a sovereign and an independent nation start

to write their own history,"^ The Populists delegates

then drew up a party manifesto:

MANIFESTO OF THE SLOVAK PEOPLE'S PARTY

We Slovaks, as an independent nation which has inhabited the territory of Slovakia since antiquity, hereby put into effect our right to self-determina­ tion and appeal for an international guarantee of the indivisibility of our national unity and of our territorial boundaries as they are inhabited by our people. We desire freely, that is, accord­ ing to the will of our own people and nation, to manage'our future life in all its ramifications, this to include the structure and functioning of our state in friendly relationships with all neighbouring countries, so that we may thus con­ tribute to a Christian disposition of affairs in Central Europe.

^Lettrich, pp. 95-96. Vnuk, pp. 25-26. Hoensch, pp. 98-1 1 3 .

^Vnuk, pp. 26-27, 125

We shall persevere at the side of all nations fighting against Jewish Marxism, its ideology, revolution and violence.

We are for the friendly solution of all con­ troversial problems in the spirit of the Munich Agreement,

We protest most energetically against any territorial changes of Slovakia without our participation, since we are the only plenipotentiary representatives of the Slovak nation.

We demand international protection for the Slovak minorities abroad.

We demand speedy demobilization.

We demand that in keeping with the spirit of the right of self-determination, an immediate assumption of legislative and executive powers be accorded to Slovaks in Slovakia, To the Slovak people this right to self-determination is a victorious conclusion of its long-fought battle.

Long live the freedom of the Slovak nation. Long live the Slovak Government in Slovakia,35

The manifesto contained parts of the programs of each of the three wings of the party, conservatives, radicals, and radical separatists, V ^ The meeting took place three days after Matus Cernak,

Populist representative in the Prague government, sub­ mitted to Benes an ultimatum demanding that Slovaks be

3%bid,, p, 32. 126 given ''full autonomy within twenty-four hours” or he would "36 v v resign.J Benes refused and Cernak stepped down. Two days later on the eve of the Zilina gathering Benes him­ self resigned. These two acts created another major government crisis, bettering Tiso’s chances for pushing through his autonomist plans. Consequently, in the after- noon of October 6 at Zilina a joint assembly of Populists and representatives from the Agrarian and National Parties, and a few from smaller parties, it was agreed to create an autonomous Slovak government headed by a prime minister and four ministries. Nominated for the post of Prime

Minister and Minister of Interior was Jozef Tiso. The other appointments announced later were Deputy Prime

Minister and Minister of Social Welfare and Health

Ferdinand Durcansky, Minister of Education Matus Cernak,

Minister of Economy Pavol Teplansky, and Minister of

Transport and Posts Jan Lichner. Tiso immediately tele­ phoned the new Prime Minister, Syrovy, in Prague to v inform him of the results of the Zilina meeting and to present him with the Slovak demands for autonomy and with nominees for a Slovak government, Syrovy accepted

•^Ibid.. p, 25. Lipscher, p. 12?. 12? the demands and officially appointed Jozef Tiso Prime

Minister. ^ Tiso also contacted Karol Murgas, in v Bratislava at the time, to broadcast the news of Zilina to the people. In the following month of November 19

Slovak autonomy became a legal reality.

Zilina amounted to a Populist coup d'etat. It marked the end of party politics in Slovakia. From then on there was to be only one Slovak Party, the HSL'S disguised as the Party of Slovak National Unity. In theory all parties were represented in the new unified party but for all practical purposes Slovakia after October 6 was run by the Populists. Tiso, too, because he called the conference and because he was nominated Prime Minister had greatly enhanced his own power and position with the party as well as in Slovakia. Sidor attended the meeting and signed the Zilina agreement but was not included in the first autonomist government, and he was angry about it,

Tiso and the Populists were naturally content with their accomplishment, nevertheless they had some cause to

-^Culen, p. 214, Documents on British Foreign Policv- hereafter cited as D.B.F.P. - Series A, Vol. Ill ed. E, L, Y/oodward and Rohlan Butler (London* His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1949-1951), p. 114. 128 worry about Hungarian, Polish, and Germany revisionism.

Slovak autonomy had been achieved only because Czecho-

Slovakia was a weakened state. During and after the

Munich Crisis Germans, Poles, and Hungarians quickly put forth demands for Slovak territory,-^ In September,

1938 Hitler could not decide whether Hungary should be permitted to occupy Slovakia or not. Hitler had tried to interest Budapest in it during the Munich Crisis in order to affect an action against Czecho-Slovakia, but had little success in doing so. Hungary then on Sep­ tember 22 presented its demands for border revision and self-determination for Slovakia and Ruthenia,39 Prague refused Budapest's demands of September 22 but after the

Munich Crisis had to submit to negotiations with Hungary.

Tiso led the talks with the Hungarians at Komarno on

October 9* The Hungarians presented Tiso with a virtual ultimatum to cede what amounted to eleven percent of

After Munich and the achievement of Slovak autonomy Czecho-Slovakia was spelled with the hyphen to denote the equal status between Czechs and Slovaks in the state.

3®See Vnulc, pp. 33**63.

39A.D.A.P. II, p. 7 2 7. 1 2 9

Slovak territory with 400,000 Magyar and Slovak inhabi­

tants. The Hungarian delegates, moreover, behaved

arrogantly, insisting for example, that the talks be

carried on in French, a language the Slovaks could not use, rather than in Magyar, one which at least Tiso 40 could speak. The talks broke off m a stalemate.

These negotiations having failed drove Tiso to seek

Hitler's intercession to save Slovakia from Budapest, On

October 19 Tiso and Durcansky, together with Ruthenian minister Bacinsky, presented their case against Hungary's revisionist demands to Hitler. Tiso tried to convince him of the necessity that Slovakia retain the cities of i/ Bratislava and Kosice demanded by Hungary. Tiso left the decision to Hitler hoping he would intercede favorably 41 for Slovakia. The issue was settled on November 2 by

Germany and Italy in Vienna but not to Tiso's satisfac­ tion. In accordance with the Vienna Awards Slovakia

C. A. Macartney, A History of Hungary. 1929-1946. Part I (New Yorki Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), ppT 284- 285. Vnuk, pp. 45-47. Culen, pp. 220-222.

4l A.D.A.P. IV, pp. 79-83. On the question of Hungar ian demands for Slovak territory Tiso felt Hitler and Goering were more pro-Slovak while Ribbentrop was pro- Hungarian. Tiso 0 sebe. p. 46. 130 lost ^#071 square miles and 859*882 inhabitants of which

276-287 were Slovaks, The area included the southern

V f fringe of Slovakia with the cities of Kosice and Novy

Znamky, German and Polish demands were also met,

Germany took the west bank of the Danube, that is the

Petrzalka section of Bratislava, and the area around v Devin? Poland took the regions of Cadca and Javorina,

In the months after October, 1938* Tiso and the autonomous Slovak government transformed Slovakia into a thorough authoritarian regime with many fascist trap­ pings, one party rule, one national ideology, as inter­ preted by Tiso, and suppression of civil liberties. The opposition presses (Social Democrat, Agrarian and others) were brought under government control, A commissioner was appointed to supervise the publication of each paper.

The Communist Party was outlawed and all other parties were absorbed into the new Party of Slovak National Unity,

In the first election for the Slovak Parliament held

December 18, 1938 only one slate of candidates was

I12 Vnuk, p, 51. For a history of southern glovakia, 1938“19^5 see Martin Vie tor, De.iinv okunacie .iuzneho Slovenska. 1938-19^5 (Bratislava!Slovenskjf akademia vied, I9 6 8), 131 offered. Out of 100 candidates, sixty-three were elected.^ Thereafter measures were taken to eliminate

Czech and Czechoslovak officials and teachers from

Slovak public life and to replace them with Slovaks,

Many were removed from government offices, from factories, and in some cases, expelled from Slovakia, A campaign was also launched to limit Jewish influence in the ■ . kk country's economic life.

If one understands fascism as that phenomenon of the

1 9 3 0 's and 19^0 's which combined a reactionary ideology with mass support, emphasis on action for action's sake, violence, and a contempt for democracy, one would have to say that Slovakia was a fascist state after 1938* There was one party rule of the HSL'S, political persecutions, and a corporate construction of society.

The main "fascist" organization was the Hlinka Guard

(H.G.) the main security and policy force of Slovakia,

1938-19^5* Organized and modeled along the lines of Ger­ many's S.A, and the Italian Black Shirts, it was generally an independent force controlled by the radicals. The organizer and its first Commander-in-Chief was Karol Sidor,

h ' i -'The list of deputies can be found in Vnuk, pp. 73 7 4 .

Lipscher. pp. 147-185. Lettrich, pp. 110-1 2 2 , 132

The Vice Commander was another radical, Alexander Mach V and Chief of Political Staff was Karol Murgas. Its main activity was the eviction or persecution of Czechs, Jews and other undesirables in Slovakia, and in general carry­ ing out the will of Tiso and the Slovak government.

Later it was used to round up Jews in camps and help in their deportation to Poland. In addition to the H.G, an academic organization called the University Guards and the Hlinka Youth (H.M.) were founded.

The small German ethnic group in Slovakia became Ilc almost a state within a state. J Their leader, Franz

Karmasin organized Slovak-Germans following the Nazi model, Karmasin served as a State Secretary in the

Slovak government and a member of the Slovak Parliament.

In the months from October, 1938 to March, 1939 Tiso sought to undermine Sidor*s position in the party. As noted above Sidor was not included in the Slovak govern-

%jettrich, p. 97. There were about 150,821 Germans in Slovakia in 193° distributed in three areas: the Spis region (Zips) around Poprad, Kezmarok and in Lower Spis* in the region around Zvolen known as the Hauerlandj and in Bratislava. Until 1935 most of the Germans sided with Magyar parties. In 1935 they voted with Henlein/s party. Dokumentation der Vertreibung des Deutschen aus Ost- Mitteleuropa. Vol. IV. The Expulsion of the German Popu­ lation from Czechoslovakia (Berlin, 1957), pp. 129-14-6. Franz Karmasin was born in 1901 in Moravia. He became the Volksgruppenfuhrer of the Slovak-Germans or Carpathian-Germans. He was sentenced to death in absentia by the National Tribunal. He died in West Germany in 1971. 133 ment, but virtually exiled instead to Prague as Slovak minister to the central government. With Sidor away at

Prague* Tiso was able to build his strength in the party,^

Sidor*s chances for leadership quickly waned for he was in a peculiar position. He was unacceptable to the moder­ ates for whom he was too radical, and for the radical- separatists he was too conservative, Sidor, too, with

Hlinka’s death lost his major supporter in the party.

Moreover, the H.G. which he had organized gradually fell out of his control and into the hands of Mach and Murgas,

Tiso, at this time however, was still far from having full control over the party, though he did speak for party moderates. * v The radical-separatist group of Durcansky, Mach, and Tuka, (then recently released from prison) lost no time in establishing contacts with Germans in order to get support for the eventual secession of Slovakia from the Czech-Slovak state. It was Hitler’s aim to make full possible use of the Slovak question to destroy the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. He hoped that a Slovak declaration

^Pauco, Tak sme sa poznali, p. 233 , 134 of independence would aid his intervention into Bohemia-

Moravia. fiurcansky met Herman Goering in October, 1938 in Germany and told him that the Slovaks desired full independence, and promised that such a state would have Rn strong political and economic ties with Germany. ' At another conference in November of that year between v v Goering, Durcansky, Seyss-Inquart, and Karmasin, Goering indicated that the framework of Czecho-Slovakia would still be maintained temporarily, but that the ultimate goal 48 was still to be an independent Slovakia. In the fall and winter of 1938-1939* Goering, the Austrian Nazi

Seyss-Inquart, and Gauleiter of Austria Josef Buerkel

V V worked closely with Durcansky and with Viennese Slovaks, 49 Rudolph Vavra 7 and Ludovit Kutnansky to develop plans for the creation of an independent Slovak state. Mean­ while Tiso's position with respect to the question of

^Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945 - hereafter cited as D.G.F.P. - Series D. Vol. IV (Washing- ton, 1949“1951)f PP. 82-83 . A.D.A.P. IV, p. 76.

^D.G . F . P ., D/IV, pp. 142-143.

^Rudolph Vavra - leader of the Viennese Slovaks was born in Vienna in 1905. In 1938-1939 he served as contact man between Slovak radicals and German Nazis. "Rudo Vavra, naS viedensky konzul," Slovak XXI/208, September 10, 1939. 135

Slovak independence remained ambiguous in I938 -I939 ,

Tiso was satisfied with the autonomous status of Slovakia and quite willing to have Slovakia remain a part of

Czecho-Slovakia but also understood that future circum­ stances might require him to change his attitude.

The new president of Czecho-Slovakia Emil Hacha, elected October 10, 1938 was confident that Czech-Slovak relations would improve. To demonstrate goodwill Hacha traveled to Slovakia and took part in discussions with

Tiso at the Tatra resort of Tatra Lomnica, Hacha got the impression that Tiso was a moderate but felt he was too much under the control of the radicals.^ In the following weeks Hacha's optimism was dispelled. It was hoped that the autonomy law of November would finally normalize Czech-Slovak relations. It was soon clear, however, that several problems and points of disagree­ ment between Bratislava and Prague remained. There was still a large number of Czech officials in Slovakia, and most of the officers in the gendarmerie and in the regular army stationed in Slovakia were Czech, But per-

-^Dr. Ladislav Feierabend, Ve vladach druke renublikv (New York: Universum Press, 1961), pp. 120-121. 136

haps the most serious problem precluding better Czech-

Slovak relations was financial. By March, 1939» the

Slovak government was in dire financial straits.^

Czechs and Jewsf principal investors in Slovakia, were gradually withdrawing their capital in reaction to

Bratislava's anti-Czech and anti-Semitic campaigns.

Moreover* the Vienna Awards cost Slovakia some of its most valuable agricultural lands and a sizable portion of Slovakia's industry. At the end of February the

Slovak government was in need of a loan of 60 million crowns from Prague to defray government expenses. These factors helped precipitate the Slovak-Czech crisis of

March, 1939 which ended with German intervention and a declaration of Slovak independence.

Tiso failed to be as trustworthy and moderate as

Hacha had hoped. After October, 1938 Tiso seldom made any public defense of the state, in fact he hardly mentioned Czecho-Slovakia at all. He acted and spoke

^ See Vnuk, pp. 8*4—93. George F. Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers. 1938-1940 (Princeton 1 Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 75-7 6. X.Y.Z, "Hospodarstvo autonomneho Slovenska," Literarnv' almanach (1972), pp. ^5~55« 137

as if Slovakia were a completely independent sovereign

agent, capable of handling both its domestic and foreign

affairs. Tiso feared that unless Slovakia asserted her­

self with an independent foreign policy, she would be

swallowed up by Hungary or Germany. Then on February 21,

1939 Tiso delivered a famous speech in the Slovak Parlia­

ment outlining the tasks and programs of the Slovak

government. He said <

The Slovak nation after a thousand year struggle for its nationality, has its parliament, and is building its government, Here on the floor of our parliament we will build our state, our new state, our own Slovak state. In the Czechoslovak state we were concerned with the interests of the nation, and secondly the interests of the state,.,This unnatural situation is over. Slovakia is building its own state with its own sovereignty. It is the doer of its will, it is the defense of its interests,

Tiso emphasized that the Slovak state would be at the

service of the nation; it would not be chauvinistic,

totalitarian, or the slave of any foreign ideology,^

Prague was understandably upset by the speech.

Since the middle of October, Hitler had been waiting

for the opportune moment to liquidate the remainder of

Czecho-Slovakia. At the end of January, 1939 Hitler inten-

-^Jozef Tiso, "Buduyeme si svoj stat," Slovak XXI/44, February 22, 1939.

53IMd. 138 sified the activities of German agents in Slovakia and established more contacts with the radical-separatist

Populists, hoping that Slovak-Czech differences would prompt Slovak separatists to declare independence, thus making his intervention into Bohemia-Moravia easier.

All he needed was a pretext to act. This was provided by the March Crisis of 1939#

The first two weeks of March, 1939 were probably the most important and most confusing of any in Slovak history. On March 1, Karol Sidor attended a central government ministerial council in Prague to present

Slovak demands. Prime Minister Rudolph Beran, and Jan

Syrovy still angry over Tiso's speech of February 21, insisted Sidor make a public declaration of loyalty to the state on behalf of the Slovak government, Sidor refused, saying he could not do so until all Slovak requests had been satisfied. The meeting adjourned, but before Beran.left he invited Sidor and Tiso to another conference on March 9# The following day Sidor left

Ch, y J Karol Sidor, Mo.ie poznamky k historickvm dnom. prepared for the press by Frantisek Vnuk (Middletown, Pennsylvania, 1971), pp. 58-6 0, Ripka, p. 361 . Feierabend, pp, 144-1^5# 139

for Slovakia and on March k at a party meeting he reported to Tiso on the negotiations in Prague. ^ At that same meeting Durcansky and Pruzinsky reported on their talks with Goering in February. Goering had prom­ ised economic aid to Slovakia but only when Slovakia declared its independence from Prague.-^ Before the meeting ended on March 6, Tiso declared his resolution not to proclaim an independent Slovak state but instead to continue to work toward that goal by evolutionary means. ^ On the next day, March ?, Seyss-Inquart and his secretary, Hammerschmidt, informed Tiso that the time had come for the Slovaks to declare independence from Prague. Tiso repeated his decision of the previous day to reach independence by peaceful, evolutionary means.

Seyss-Inquart maintained that this was not enough, one *>8 had to take "jumps."J Sidor returned to Prague March 8

^^Sidor. Mo.ie ooznamkv. p. 6 7.

56Ibid., p. 67. KO m y Ibid., p. 71. Karol Sidor, "Ako doslo k vyhlaseniu lovensky republiky," Slovenska republika, ed, Mikulas fprinc (Scranton: Obrana Press, 195*0, p. *1-6, <58 ^ J Murgas, on. 114— 11 *5. Sidor. Mo.ie noznamkv. on. 71- 7k. Sidor, "Ako doslo.,., pp. 4 6 - 4 7 7 ^ ” ^ 1^0 to attend the next round of discussions with Beran and

Syrovy. Tiso, however, chose to remain in Bratislava.

Beran was furious upon learning that Tiso would not come to Prague for the meeting, for Beran had some knowledge of the secret talks between Seyss-Inquart, Hammerschmidt and T i s o . All of this prompted Beran and Hacha on the

7th to reassert government authority in Slovakia, replacing Tiso with Sidor as Prime Minister of the Slovak government and taking action against the separatist

Slovaks. At the meeting of March 9 Sidor attempted to defend Tiso saying he felt Tiso's attendance unnecessary.

This was to no avail. Beran replied that he felt Tiso was not qualified to head the Slovak government, Tiso having found enough time to talk with German agents but no time to come to Prague.^®

On the morning of March 10 Czechoslovak government troops entered Bratislava, disarmed Guardists and in­ terned over three hundred Slovak leaders. President Hacha

^^Feierabend, pp. 1*16-1^7 •

^ Ibid.. pp. 146-1^9, The Czech Minister of Rail­ ways and Posts, Alois Elias felt that Tiso should be removed from the position as Slovak Prime Minister. Elias claimed that the Slovak radicals were having secret talks with the Germans and that Tiso knew about them and supported them, Feierabend, pp. 137-138, 1 ^ 1

dismissed Tiso along with the two ministers Durcansky v and Pruzinsky, and appointed as temporary Prime Minister 61 Jozef Sivak. Tiso accepted his dismissal without much

protest, retiring to the Jesuit monastery in Bratislava.

Sidor returned to Bratislava on the evening of March 10.

A conference was called immediately to discuss the Czech

coup and to nominate ministers for a new government.

Sidor was selected Prime Minister but before accepting

the position he drew up eight demands for the central 62 government. The demands were accepted and Sidor was

officially appointed by President Hacha,

The removal of Tiso and appointment of Sidor angered

the Germans as well as the Slovak separatists. The

latter refused to recognize Sidor, maintaining Tiso was

still the legitimate prime minister,^ Durcansky who

escaped to Vienna during the coup, delivered a radio broadcast declaring the central government's action of

6lD,B.F.P. on. ^0-4^5. PP. 219-220. Sidor, Mo.ie poznamky, pp. 93**97. Teplansky took over Sivak's posi­ tion since at that time Sivak was in Rome,

62 Sidor, Moie noznamkv. p, 104. The demands included the removal of 5»000 Czech officers, an end to the suspen­ sion of certain officers, and removal of General Homola, For German opinion of Sidor see A.D.A.P. IV, p. 206.

^Murgas, pp. 126-128 and p. 133 * 142

64 March 9 and 10 unlawful. In other broadcasts from

Vienna and in the press Sidor and Teplansky were attacked * y as traitors. Durcansky and other radical-separatists were convinced that the eleventh hour was fast approaching for Slovakia, She would have to make the move in the direction of independence, or else risk occupation by

Hungarians, Tiso, too, was aware that the time was near but as yet was not prepared to make any proclamation of independence. Instead he returned to his parish town of

Banovce to await developments,

Sidor, on the other hand, refused to cooperate with

Germans or Slovak separatists in declaring Slovak indepen­ dence, He was approached by Kurgafe^ and by Kirschbaum^ who asked him to proclaim Slovakia's independence, but he refused. On the evening of March 11 Sidor was visited by

Seyss-Inquart, Buerkel, Karmasin and Germany's Secretary of State, Wilhelm Keppler. Keppler informed Sidor that the moment had arrived for the Slovaks to declare their

64v v Durcansky's speech quoted in Sidor, Moie ooznamkv. pp. 109-111, A ^ u -iMurgas, p. 138 . Tiso told Murgas, "You know how the situation might be in a given moment in Bratislava, I stand for an independent Slovak state, I will go in that direction, you just perservere,"

^Kirschbaum, Slovakia.... p, 126, 1^3

independence, and when they did so Germany would give full

support. Sidor replied that a proclamation of independence

could be made only with the consent of the Slovak Parlia­ ment. Buerkel, who had been drinking, became rude. He pulled from his pocket a list of ministers for the inde- ' v pendent Slovak state drawn up by Durcansky in Vienna.

Buerkel then added that unless Slovakia declared its independence it would suffer the consequences, meaning that it would be left to the mercy of the Hungarians.

Sidor however, again declined to take any step in the direction of a proclamation,^

The failure of the Keppler mission induced Hitler to approach Tiso himself. On March 13 Tiso received word in Banovce that Hitler wanted to see him in Berlin. Tiso proceeded immediately to Bratislava to consult with the party Presidium and the Slovak government about the invi­ tation. Approval was given for the trip but Tiso was instructed not to make any permanent commitments.

Tiso went from Bratislava to Vienna where he was joined V v* by Durcansky and then both proceeded by plane to Berlin,

v ^Sidor, Mo.ie noznamkv. pp. 125-128. Sidor, "Ako doslo..., p. 53 , Ripka, p. 369. D.B.F.P.. p. ^3 8 . 68 Sidor, Mo.ie noznamkv. p. 1^9. Vnuk, p. 115. Arriving in Berlin, Tiso was given first an audience with

Joachim Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ribben-

trop apologized for the Vienna Awards, but added that the

Slovak cause was not well known to Germans at that time,

Ribbentrop continued talking about Germany's dissatis-

faction with the Prague government and its "Benes spirit."

The Germans were displeased with the Czechs, Ribbentrop

said, because of their continued mistreatment of Germans

in Czechoslovakia, the Czech coup d'etat in Slovakia and

the dictatorship in Ruthenia, Ribbentrop then stated

that Germany still regarded Tiso legitimate Prime Mini­

ster of Slovakia. He then asked Tiso why Slovaks had been so hesitant in proclaiming their independence from

Prague. Tiso said he did not believe there was sufficient personnel to run an independent state, but that if such a declaration was necessary for the nation's survival, he would take that step,

Tiso was then taken to see Hitler. Hitler talked at length about Czech maltreatment of Germans, and then expressed his displeasure with the Slovaks who had failed to show any willingness to decide their own fate. Hitler indicated that German interest did not extend east of the

Carpathians; that Germany did not have designs on Slo­ vakia. If the Slovaks wanted independence Hitler said he would support and defend them! if not, he would let the 145 issue be decided by the Hungarians, Hitler stressed the point that the Slovaks must decide immediately, - blitzschne11. whether or not they wanted independence.

At that moment Ribbentrop arrived with information of

Hungarian troop movements along the Slovak border, Tiso thanked Hitler for the meeting but said he could make no decision without consulting the Slovak Parliament; he added, however, that the Puhrer would not be disappointed with the Slovaks,

Tiso phoned Sidor to arrange for a special session of the Slovak Parliament for the next day, March 14,

Sidor, then, called Hacha in Prague for permission to convene Parliament, On the morning of March 14 Tiso returned to Bratislava where he related the nature of his conversation with Hitler to the government and Presi- 70 dium, Tiso was then nominated Slovak Prime Minister,

Sidor was obliged to step down. The Slovak Parliament met at 11:00.A,M, Sidor opened the session by announcing that his government was no longer acceptable to Germany,

69D.G.F.P. IV, pp. 243-245. A.D.A.P. IV, pp. 212-214.

70 ' Sidor, Mo.ie poznamkv. p. 164, 146

71 that he was handing in his resignation, Tiso then

outlined his discussions with Ribbentrop and Hitler.^2

He indicated the danger of Hungarian occupation if the

Slovaks hesitated on the question of independence, A

standing vote was then taken? it was unanimous for inde­

pendence, The new Slovak government was then accounced.

Tiso was named Prime Minister, Karol Sidor became Mini- 7 0 v ster of Interior, J Ferdinand Durcansky Minister of v 4 Foreign Affairs, Ferdinand Catlos Minister of Defense,

Jozef Sivak Minister of Education, Gejza Medricky Minister

of Economy, Mikulas Pruzinsky Minister of Finances,

Julius Stano Minister of Transportation and Public Works,

and Gejza Fritz Minister of Justice. All were approved by the delegates. The following morning German troops

entered Prague, ending the existence of a Czechoslovak

state.

71 r Tesnopisecke zapisky - Stenographic notes of the Slovak Parliament in dulen, pp. 235-237. Translation in Kirschbaum, Slovakia pp. 235-237.

72 / f Tesnopisecke zapisky, Culen, pp. 237-244. Trans­ lation in Kirschbaum, Slovakia pp. 257-262.

^Sidor received an ultimatum from the Germans to go either into exile or face imprisonment. He went to Rome and remained there throughout the war as Slovak minister to the Vatican. After the war he emigrated to Canada v/here he died in 1953. 147

Tiso by his actions of March 13 and 14, by accepting

Hitler's invitation to go to Berlin and by seizing the

initiative to declare independence, secured his own posi­

tion both as the political leader of the Slovak nation

and as head of the Slovak People's Party. This consti­

tuted the final victory of Tiso over Karol Sidor who had

refused to cooperate with the Germans for control of the

party. Sidor, being ambitious by nature, was at the

height of his career as Prime Minister and had been

therefore reluctant to risk his position. Sidor was also

somewhat anti-German, He did not speak German and dis­

liked the arrogant attitude of German emissaries that were sent to him during the March Crisis. Although a

radical Slovak nationalist he was nevertheless a Slavo­

phile, preferring Czechs to Germans. Finally Sidor's own

lack of resoluteness and personal dislike of disorder and violence caused him to shy away from taking bold steps.

Tiso, on the other hand, was more resolute and did not

fear taking revolutionary steps on behalf of Slovak

independence if it were necessary. All during the period

of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic (1938-1939) Tiso played the middle of the road leaving open the possi­ bilities of either complete independence or continuation of the association with the Czechs. In the months after

Munich Tiso did not always support the activities of the 1^8 radical-separatists Durcansky, Murgas, nor did he dis­ courage them or make an effort to stop them. Tiso had the knack of making himself acceptable to both the radical-separatists and the moderates at least on the question of Slovak independence. For Tiso two things were at stake t the survival of the Slovak nation and his own personal political career. In back of Tiso*s mind was the fear of Hungarian occupation. In the end he had to decide between Slovak independence or occupa­ tion of Slovakia by Hungary. Tiso chose to take Slovakia down what he felt was the safer path of independence. CHAPTER V

HEAD OF THE SLOVAK STATE (1939-19^5)

The proclamation of Slovak independence was not

followed by favorable popular demonstrations. Most

Slovaks took the news calmly and if anything, many

greeted the news with some apprehension. They knew

that Slovak independence was the result of Hitler's

intervention; thus they did not know how independent

Slovakia would really be. Apologists for independence v „ like Ferdinand Durcansky argued, however, that the

birth of the Slovak state was not unlike the beginnings

of other states which had emerged as a result of inter- national conflict.

Hitler's motives in supporting the creation of an

independent Slovak state have never been determined

precisely. It was certainly not done out of sympathy

Ferdinand Durcansky, Die Existenzberechtigung der kleinen Staat (Bratislava: Wissenschaftliche Gessel- schaf$ fUr das Auslandsslowakentum, 19^4), p, 55, See also Stefan Polakovi&, Warum eine freie Slowakei (Bratislava: V/issenschaftliche Gesselschaft fur das Auslandsslowakentum, n.d,). 150 for the Slovak people; after all the Slovaks were Slavs and according to Nazi ideology, racially inferior. The chief motive was probably military, Slovakia occupied a strategic position in the Carpathian Mountains separat­ ing Russia from the Hungarian Plain and Central Europe.

Hitler felt it was preferable to have a small reliable state here, rather than have the territory become part of a bigger more powerful Hungary. Some believed, too, that Hitler wished to have Slovakia serve as an example to the world that Germany could have good relations with a Slavic state headed by a Catholic priest. Hitler*s immediate interest, however, was to have a secure south­ ern flank for his move against Poland. Whatever his ultimate motives, however, it was likely that the crea­ tion of an independent Slovak state was to be only temporary; at the end of the war the status of Slovakia would again be reconsidered,-^

2 Interview with Jozef Kirschbaum, January, 1972.

•^There is evidence that Hitler gave some assurances to Horthy of Hungary regarding Slovakia, See letter of Horthy to Hitler March 24, 1939 in U. S, National Archives, Washington, D.C. German Records microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. identified by microcopy number (T), roll number (R) and frame number T120-R1139/442969-10. 151

The Slovak State was given de jure recognition by

twenty-seven countries including Hungary, Switzerland,

the U.S.S.R. and the Vatican, and de facto recognition li by Great Britain, France, and Belgium. The United

States never recognized Slovakia,-' a setback for the

new state, Slovak diplomatic emmissaries were sent to

Germany, Hungary, the Vatican, Italy, Spain, Bulgaria,

Rumania, and later Croatia, Slovaks also maintained

their own army, coinage, postage, and the tricolor

(white-blue-red) served as the national banner, Slo­

vakia, thus, took on all the appearances of a fully

independent state.

Other states recognizing Slovakia were* Poland, Germany, Italy, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Spain, Liberia, Japan, Manchuria, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Rumania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Holland, China-Nanking, Croatia, Finland, Denmark, France-Vichy, Siam, and Burma. Kirschbaum, Slovakia.,., p. 13^. See also Dr. J, M. Kirschbaum, "Slovenske diplomaticke zastupenia v neutralnych statoch," Kalendar Jednota (1971), pp. 6-17.

% o r a discussion of this question see Sister M. Evangela Lubek, "An Inquiry into United States-Czecho- slovak Relations Between 1918 and 19^8 with Special Reference to the Munich Crisis and the Slovak Question" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, Georgetown University), pp. 191-206, 152

Slovakia, however, was closely tied to Germany economically and politically. On the day after the declaration of Slovak independence Tiso formally asked

Hitler to place Slovakia under Germany’s protection,

A treaty was worked out and signed by Ribbentrop and Tiso on March 18th, The treaty stated that Germany would protect the political independence of Slovakia, In order to facilitate this task, Germans were given the right to garrison troops and build military fortifica­ tions in an area defined as the Western borders along the Lower Carpathians, White Carpathians and Javornik

Mountains, Included in this agreement was the important

Article IV which stated: "In accordance with the agreed relationship the Slovak government will conduct its foreign policy in close understanding with the German government.The treaty also contained a secret pro­ tocol outlining a program for close economic cooperation between Slovakia and the Reich, It called for an increase of Slovakia's industrial and agricultural output to help meet the needs of Germany, It also stipulated that

^A.D.A.P. VI, p. 8.

7A.D.A.P. VI, pp. 35-38. 153 exploitation of Slovakia's mineral resources be under- p taken. Other treaties followed which spelled out the details of the military and economic arrangements between the two countries.9

The Slovak state under Tiso had no independent foreign policy. No diplomatic initiative could be taken without first consulting Berlin, Slovakia had, for example, to participate in the war against Poland, At the time the German government demanded the use of

Slovakia's airfield in Spis and specified that the

Slovak Army be placed at Germany's disposal.Slovak troops also fought against Poland, but on a very minor scale, and in return received the districts ceded to

Poland in 1938*

The Slovak state also became an economic satellite to Germany, Over seventy-five percent of Slovakia's exports and imports went or came from Germany and the

8Ibid,, pp. 35-38.

9A.D.A.P. VI. pp. 95-96, 97. 121-122, 211-212, 2h4-2^5. 631-638, 647, 703-704, 746-747.

10A.D.A.P. VI, pp. 895-896. 15^

Protectorates, (Bohemia-Moravia)German capital

controlled a good part of Slovak industry. In all

Slovak enterprises with capital of over twenty million 12 crowns, German capital controlled 61.8 percent. In

mining and refining industries Germany held 100 percent

of the capital; in metal industries, 5 9 .9 percent; in

chemical industries, 7 6 .5 percent; in cellulose and paper, 3 8 .8 percent; and in the lumber industry, 2 3 .5 percent. Some twenty-seven large factories were under direct German military control including the refineries and machinery works in Trnava, Povazska, Bystrica,

Prakovice, and the naptha refinery in Harmanec.1^

To see that Tiso and the Slovak government remained dependent, German advisors supervised Slovak military and economic development. It was the duty of the German representatives in Bratislava, Hans Bernard, Manfred von

Killinger and Hans Elard Ludin to keep an eye on develop' ments in the Slovak government. There was also a S.S.

11 Herman Gross, "Die Slowakei in der Grossraum- wirtschaft Europas," Slowakische Rundschau V/l (19^*0, p, 21.

■^Lubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20 storoci (Bratislava1 Vydavatel'stvo politicked literatury, 1968), p. 195*

13Ibid.. p. 195. 155 representative, Haupsturmfuhrer Dieter Wisliceny, to see that the Jewish question was handled to Germany's satisfaction. But as long as Slovak leaders played the role of obedient servants to Germany's wishes in foreign policy and economics, there was little German inter­ ference in Slovakia's internal affairs.

In July, 1939 a constitution for the Slovak Republic was ratified. It combined authoritarianism with

Christian principles. Most power was granted the Parlia­ ment; a state president was to be elected by it for a term of seven years. He in turn could appoint and dis­ miss ministers, was commander-in-chief of the army, but had only a suspensive veto over legislation passed by

Parliament, Tiso, as expected, was elected president on

October 26, 1939* On that day, Tiso was sworn in by

Martin Sokol, president of the Parliament,

I swear to God all powerful and omiscient, that as President of the Slovak Republic I will be the loyal defender of the constitution and laws, that I will have always before my eyes the moral and material elevation of the people and I will lead the state so as to apply the spirit of Christian justice and love. So help me God.i^

l4Sulen, Fo Svatonlukovi.... p, 252, 156

There was some indication that Tiso was not overly enthu siastic about accepting the office. Discussing it later in 19^7i he indicated that he assumed the position only out of a sense of obligation to the Slovak people.^

Some of Tiso's hesitancy might be explained by concern over the Vatican*s position on the matter. In

August, 1939 Sidor, the newly appointed Slovak repre­ sentative to Rome, reminded Tiso of the Vatican's unfavorable attitude toward priests in politics. Sidor maintained that the Vatican would prefer that a civilian be president of the Slovak Republic.^ In order to obtain a clarification of the Vatican's position, Tiso sent his close friend, Ksgr. Michal Buzalka, to Rome,

At an audience September 8, 1939 Pius XII told Buzalka that it was one thing to have a priest like Hlinka head a political party, but a different matter to have a priest become- head of a state. For if a priest assumed the leadership of a state, then the Church, Pius main­ tained, was technically responsible for that state and

•^Ibid.. p. 251. Tiso o sebe. p. 3 5 , 16 v Karol Sidor, Sest rokov nri Vatikane (Scranton: Obrana Press, 19^7), PP* 58-60, 157

17 its affairs. f The Pope, however, did not give Tiso any explicit instructions. At the time of the election Tiso accepted the outcome without consulting the Vatican 1 o directly. ■ On December 5» 1939 Pius XII sent a letter of congratulations to Tiso on his election.

For my beloved son, illustrious and honorable man, President of the Slovak Republic.

We learned from an official announcement of last month that you were elected president of the Slovak Republic and that you have already assumed your office. We give you thanks for this report and ask God to graciously grant you great love and true prosperity and happiness to your nation which is enriched and strengthened by Catholic faith. In this letter, we express the hope that in the performance of your duties you will preserve and constantly improve existing relations between us. We promise that in realizing these goals your efforts will not be in vain. Meanwhile as a sign of the heavenly gifts we extend to you beloved son, illustrious and honorable man, and to the whole Slovak nation the apostolic blessing.

Given in Rome at St. Peter's, December 5» 1939 in the first year of our pontificate. . Pope Pius XII1?

Slovakia's diplomatic mission at the Vatican was one of the most important for the young Republic. The

Vatican constituted an influential international force,

•^Ibid., p. 61.

l8Ibid., p. 66.

■^Ibid,, pp. 63-65. thus good relations with it were essential for the

Slovak state. Karol Sidor, through persona non grata

with the Germans, headed the Slovak delegation in Rome until the end of the war. The post was viewed by Sidor,

however, as political exile. Though never intentionally undermining Tiso, some maintain that Sidor probably did not always do his best in representing Tiso to the

Vatican.20

Jozef Tiso's political power never approximated that of Hitler or Mussolini. It was limited by the

constitution, the H.G. and by German pressures. Tiso*s

strength came from the Church and the Populist party to which he had been elected president at a party confer­ ence on October 1, 1939* As head of the HSL'S Tiso controlled the party organization and its press. To

safeguard his authority in the party, Tiso placed his own men or lesser known individuals into key party 21 positions. In 1939 for example he nominated the then

20 Jozef Kirschbaum, "Karol Sidor in My Reminiscences, Notes to Mv Memoirs (unpublished). 21 German Documents filmed in Berlin for the American Historical Association. T-580/R^58. 159

22 twenty-six year old Jozef Kirschbaum for the Secretary-

Generalship of the party. In 19^2 he made the twenty- eight year old Jozef Pauco J editor-in-chief of Slovak, which had become the official voice of Jozef Tiso's government. It was Tiso's aim to make the HSL'S repre­ sent the state much as the NSDAP did in Germany. He especially wanted the HSL'S to control the government, 2& the army and the Hlinka Guards. This plan was never fully realized. The party was never the sole exerciser of political power in the Slovak state but had to share power with the Hlinka Guards and the radical faction in the state government.

Internal politics in the Slovak state were marked by struggle between two major groups. On one side were

pp Jozef Kirschbaum was born 1913» studied law in Warsaw and Bratislava. He was an active student leader at the Bratislava University. In 1938 he became leader of the Academic Hlinka Guards, and in April, 1939 he was appointed Secretary-General of HSL'S, After July, 19^0 he went into the diplomatic service serving as charge d'affaires of the Slovak Republic in Bern (19^2-19^5).

^Jozef Pauco was born 191^ near Tucenec and was educated at the University of Bratislava. From 1938“ 1939» he served as General-Secretary of the student organization, USKS. He was an editor of Slovenska pravda (193Q-1942) and 19^2 appointed as Editor-in-Chief of Slovak.

2^T-580/R-66. l6o

Jozef Tiso, the moderates and the clericals, on the other,

Germanophile radicals, - Vojtech Tuka, Alexander Mach and Karol Murgas, J Tuka, released from prison in I938 , found his way hack into politics, though he did not receive the popular welcome he had expected. Since he did not enjoy Tiso-like popularity among the Slovak people, he had to rely on German support to further his 26 political career, Tuka in courting German favor, became the main exponent for close collaboration between 2 7 the Slovak state and Germany. { Tiso's relations with

Tuka were strictly formal. He neither trusted Tuka or pQ liked him personally, and Tiso rarely spoke of him.

Each went his own wayj there was little contact between them. 29 Tiso feared that with German backing Tuka would organize a coup against him and seize full power in the

25T-120R130lA7987?-8. T-58O/R6 6.

See Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Hlinka's Slovak People's Party" (unpublished dissertation, Dept, of History, Indiana University, 1966), pp. 107-109,

27T-120R130lA79877. nQ J Pauco, Tak sme sa poznali. pp. 25^-25 6, Inter­ view with Jozef PauSo, March, 1972*

29D.G.F.P. XIII, p. 825. 161 state.The other leading pro-German radical was

Alexander Mach,-^ leader of the H.G, and Minister of

Propaganda.-^2 Mach*s goal was to create a guardist state in Slovakia on the model of Croatia and the Ustashi, but like Tuka had no mass following. A Croatophile and close friend to several Slovak Communists, Mach was a romantic and highly ambitious.

The Germans watched closely the struggle between

Tiso and Tuka, Hitler had confidence in Tiso but disliked his Catholic Action (see Chapter VI) and his efforts to build a Catholic state.Tiso did little to antagonize

Hitler. He was not a Nazi sympathizer but a realist.-^

3 °T-580/R66.

•^Alexander Mach was born in 1902, From 1924 to 1929 he served as General-Secretary of.HSL'Sj in 1926 he was imprisoned for anti-state activities. In October, 1938 he was given the leadership of the Office of Propaganda and March 14, 1939 made Chief leader of the H.G, He was sentenced May 1 5, 1947 to thirty years in prison, Jozef Chreno, Maly slovnik.... pp. II5-H 6.

32pokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske nolitikv 1939-1945. prepared bv Libusa Otahal and Milada Cervinek (PrahajCeskoslovenske academie ved, 1966), pp. 724- 725. Jelinek, p. 2 6,

-^Jelinek, pp. 86-87 and 13 6 , T-120R1301/47878, T-580/R6 6. D.G.F.P. XI, pp. 693-698. Ol(, y J Vilem Precan, Slovenske narodne povstanie- Dokumentv (Bratislava: Vydavetel'stvo politicky literatury, 1965)1 pp. 45-46, 162

He knew he had to maintain Hitler's confidence to stay in power and to implement his program for the Slovak nation. The Germans used Tuka and Maeh to counteract

Tiso, but never placed either in full power, for the

Germans realized that Tuka, Mach, and Wurgas were not popular with the Slovak people. Tuka, moreover, was ill and losing his vision; Mach, as the Germans said, was a man without character; and Kurgas was an alcoholic,

Also, many Germans serving in Slovakia generally pre­ sented Tiso in a favorable light in their reports to

Berlin, One German who was sympathetic with the Slovak cause was ambassador Hans Elard Ludin, For about a year after his arrival in Slovakia Ludin opposed Tiso, but soon became his real supporter and close personal friend to Tiso's secretary, Karol Kurin, On several occasions he intervened on Tiso's behalf, thus saving Slovakia from Razification.-^

Germany by the spring of 19^0 was becoming dis­ satisfied with developments in Slovakia, especially with

35 T-580/R66, Sidor, p. 163 .

-^Personal correspondence of the author. Letter from Karol I.Curin, Kay 1, 1972. 163

the activities of Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs

and Interior, Ferdinand Durcansky, durcansky did not bow

sufficiently to Germany's superior position. He tried

also to minimize Germany's economic control over Slo- T7 v y vakia,-" As a Slovak radical nationalist Durcansky had

worked with Germany before I'arch 1^, 1939 but only to

further the Slovak cause. He had no wish now to replace

the Czechs with the Germans. About this time Tiso also

delivered a speech in Presov June 3 0 , 19*1-0 where he

said Slovaks needed no foreign ideology to supplement

their Catholicism.-^® This display of independence

alarmed the Germans.

Hitler then in July, 19*J-0 decided to bring an end

to Slovak anti-German currents and to increase economic

control over Slovakia.On July 28 Hitler summoned Tiso,

3?A.D.A.P. IX. p. 12. A.D.A.P. X, pp. 221-222. Germans were also upset over the replacement of N.ach as head of the Propaganda Office with Konstantin Culen whose wife was Jewish. Culen was after Tiso the most popular man in Slovakia. A well known publicist he was born in Slovakia in 1904, He died in New York in 196*1-,

-^®See below, page 220, *

-^Lubomir Liptak, "Priprava a priebeh Salzburskych rokovani roku 19^-0 medzi predstavitel'mi a slovenskeho statu," Historickv casonis XIII/ 3 (1965), p. 337 . 16^

Tuka, and Mach to Salzburg for a conference, Tiso according to Kirschbaum was at first optimistic, believing the meeting would only have something to do with minor hO * v revision of the Slovak-Hunganan frontiers. Durcansky came along to the conference but was immediately dis­ missed by Hitler who said, “I do not wish to see this hi gypsy again," Hitler then told Tiso that two hundred

German divisions stood at Slovakia's defense but that in ho return Slovakia must be "clear cut and loyal to Germany,"

Hitler added that Slovakia's Jewish problem had not been solved to Germany's satisfaction. Tiso was told to make v v certain changes m the Slovak government. Durcansky for one was to be removed from the joint posts of Foreign

Affairs and Interior and replaced by Vojtech Tuka (For- eigh Minister) and Alexander Mach (Interior),^ Tiso's protests were in vain.

The Salzburg Diktat was a major defeat for Tiso and a burning point in Slovak politics. Tuka was still not

hr) Interview with Jozef Kirschbaum, January, 1972.

^Mikus, p. 12 0 .

42A.D.A.P._ X, p. 28^.

^Kikus, p. 120, Culen, pp. 263 -266, 165

satisfied with his new position and continued to fight

Tiso, After Salzburg Tuka introduced German National

Socialism into Slovakia with the aim of transforming it

into a "Fuhrerstaat." Tiso opposed this attempt to

impose a foreign ideology and was backed by the Academic lilt Guards (A.H.G.) led by Jozef Kirschbaum, Under German pressure, however, the A,H.G, was dissolved and Kirsch­ baum was relieved of his position as Secretary-General ✓ of the HSL'S and in March, 19^2 replaced by Aladar Kocis.^^

The contest between Tuka and Tiso was played out in a struggle between the party and the H.G. It was reflected in the press particularly in Slovak, the leading party organ, and Gardista. the official voice of the Hlinka / ✓ Guard. Slovak and other party newspapers Slovenska pravda, Slovenska oolitika. and Slovenska"sloboda sup­ ported Tiso's Christian socialism, while Gardista pro-

^ V - 5 8 0/R66.

^Aladar Kocis (b, 1907) served.the HSL'S in various capacities. From 1926 he worked in the editorial office of Slovak. After October 6, 1938 he became editor-in- chief of Slovenska oravda. In September, 1 9 ^ he was appointed Minister of Education. In November, 19^7 he was sentenced by the National Tribunal for six years in prison. 166

moted Tuka's National Socialism, In October, 19^0 Tuka

submitted demands to Tiso that the ministers Sivak, Stano V V and Medricky be removed leaving Tuka, Mach, Catlos, and

Pruzinsky. Tiso rejected the idea completely. This resulted in new tension and a renewed anti-Tiso campaign

in Gardista, Kurgas and Tuka followed this up with a new plan involving collaboration with Karol Sidor, The

former knew they lacked popular support so set out to

induce the more popular Sidor to return to Slovakia, hoping Germans would support him against Tiso, Pavol

Carnogursky was sent to Rome to ask Sidor to return.

He refused, re-iterating his earlier decision to stay out kg of Slovak politics until the war ended, Tiso, learning V of the proposed scheme, confronted Tuka, Murgas, Kach and Carnogursky, The latter denied any complicity in a plot against Tiso; he stated that he had been approached by Kurgas, who suggested that he try to urge Sidor to

Jtjg )f ^ Mikulas Pruzinsky, one of the leading radicals in the HSL'S was born in Liptovsky sv. f/Iikula^ in 1886, He studied lav/ in Budapest where he earned a doctrate in 1909. He was active in the co-operative movement,

^T-580/R66.

^®Sidor, p, 119. 167 return to Slovakia because Tiso was about to be removed v by the Germans. Carnogursky, then, at Tiso's request

swore before a crucifix that he had not been involved in the affair, Kurgas was exposed as the initiator of the Zlo scheme, 7 and was removed by Tiso from the Propaganda

Office and replaced with Tido Gaspar.^ 0

The conflict between Tiso and Tuka was never resolved. Neither Tuka, nor any other radicals ever succeeded in deposing Tiso, And after the Salzburg meeting Germans had only marginal interest in Slovak internal politics. They were preoccupied with the war and as long as Tiso remained behind Germany in the struggle against the Soviet Union, Hitler was willing to permit a continuation of the Slovak political status quo,51

Tiso, at least outwardly, played the role of a model puppet leader. He always praised Hitler and expressed gratefulness for his help in achieving Slovak independence.

^ Ibid.. ppt 120-I23. tjn v J Tido Gaspar, a Don Juan figure and one of the most talented individuals in the Slovak state was born in I893 . He was known primarily as a novelist before 1939. He became a deputy for the HSL’S in the Slovak Parliament from 1939 and in 19^0 was appointed Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Switzerland.

51T-120R3*H/249556-8. 168

In 19^-1 Tiso said the following on the occasion of Hi tier* s

"birthdays

Mr. President, we the Slovak nation, a branch of the tribe of Benjamin, building a new Europe see Adolf Hitler as the father of the great family of nations. Adolf Hitler is for us a real father and rightfully therefore on the day of his birthday, Slovaks as upright children give to him for his love a wreath of flowers....The Fuhrer showed a great understanding for the Slovaks and the Slo­ vak nation. He took us under his fatherly pro­ tection and for this the Slovaks are immensely grateful with filial loyalty and devotion to the great personality of the Fuhrer,52

Tiso, according to his personal secretary Karol

Murin, was not fooled by Hitler, He was fully aware of his position with respect to Hitler.In the fall of

1939 in Trnava at the Thanksgiving celebration (dozinkove

slavnostiV Tiso said: "Do not think that the Germans Ch. do anything whatsoever for us because of our blue eyes,"-'

His praise of Hitler and cooperation with Germany were

tactical and not done out of any great admiration for

Hitler or of Nazi ideology. Tiso told the National Tri­ bunal in Bratislava in 19^7 that his political principles

-^Jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovak XXIIl/92, April 22, 19^1,

-^Personal letter from Karol Murin, May 1, 1972.

5^Ibid. 169

were the same as before 1939 . New politics were those

dictated to him by forced cooperation with Germany,

and fear of German occupation (the Czech case provided

sufficient example) , ^ His goal was to continue building

the Slovak nation with as little German interference as

possible. He did not feel the need or have the power to

challenge the Germans. In his view, more could be

accomplished for the Slovak people through limited cooper- 67 ation with Germany.

Tiso's aim was to make Slovakia as economically

self-sufficient as possible. He wanted to prove to the

Magyars and Czechs that Slovakia could be an economically viable state,In February, 1939 Tiso outlined his program for Slovakia, He set out to increase hydro­

electric power in Slovakia and proposed a major railroad

construction program,^ This was what Tiso called his

^Tiso o sebe. p. 3 9 .

^ Ibid.. pp.

^Ibid., p. 7 0.

^ Tiso o sebe. pp. 3 6 , 38 “3 9 t 207.

^ J o z e f Tiso, Speech in the Slovak Parliament February 21, 1939. Slovak. XXl/*i4 (February 22, 1939), 170

"building program," Many of Tiso's plans were realized

during the years 1939 to 19^5. While between 1918 and

1938 hydroelectric power was increased to only 12,000 kw.

in Slovakia, the independent Slovak state managed to

start building several dams with a total capacity of

95*000 kw,^ Also over 95*006 km, of new railroad track

and 113»062 of secondary track were built between 1939

and 19*1-2. The long desired railroad line from Presov V 6l to Vranov to Strazke was completed during these years.

Also under Tiso's presidency output of hard coal increased

from 92,^ 71 tons in I938 to 1*1-5 *035 tons in 19*1-0 ; brown

coal from 735*575 tons to 832,375 in 19*1-3 ; iron ore

1,027*358 tons in 1938 to 1**1-50,727 in 19*f2; and mangan­

ese ore from 50**1-65 tons in 1938 to l*f7,*l-15 in 19*1-3 . ^

One of Tiso's major projects in the Slovak state was

electrification. The number of villages with electricity

increased from 775 in 1939 to 1,130 in 19**'^■ Tiso,

6oT-580/R*i-58.

^ Ibid. See Julius Stano, "Fuhf Jahre Aufbauarbeit," Slowakische Rundschau V/2-3 (19^)* PP. *f,3-*J-7.

62 * V Statisticka nrirucka slovenska 19*1-8 (Bratislava* Statny planovaci a statisticky urad v Bratislave, 19*1-8), p. 119.

^Mikus, pp, 112-113 , 171

also was concerned with Slovak agriculture. He said that

since sixty percent of Slovaks were engaged in farming,

it was important to have a healthy agricultural economy,

A farmer's organization was set up by Tiso with the main purpose of educating Slovak farmers in agricultural 6k technology in order to increase productivity.

There was no separation of Church and State in the

Slovak state. According to Tiso the Slovak government and the Church would work in close cooperation, The government Tiso said, would protect the Church and would not pass any law in contradiction to Church laws,^

Education in Tiso's view was to be conducted in the

Christian spirit. After October, 1938 the Church regained much of its influence in education. Crucifixes were placed in all classrooms and religion instruction was made compulsory in all grades,

Tiso hoped to eradicate all Czech cultural influ­ ences in Slovakia and to increase Slovak national con­ sciousness in the country. He proposed that a cultural house he built in every village to foster Slovak national-

6\jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovak XXIV/5 2 (March kt igk2).

^Tiso, Slovak (February 22, 1939). 172

ism. Tiso also had plans for opening up clinics and

launching a campaign against tuberculosis and other diseases prevalent in Slovakia,^ The war conditions, however, prevented the realization of many of these proposals.

One of the most controversial aspects of Tiso's 67 reign was the handling of the Jev/ish question. ' In

1939 there were some 90,000 Jews in Slovakia, by 19^5 68 only about 3°,000 were still alive. Most of the remaining perished in German concentration camps in

Poland. The Slovak People’s Party had a long tradition of anti-Semitism, going back even to the pre-1914 era.

Jews had since the 19th century been identified with the enemies of the Slovak nation. Before 191^ they had traditionally sided with the Magyars, after 1918 many became supporters of Prague’s policies. The Jev/s were prominent in the economic life of Slovakia, they

66Ibid.

67 ^ fSee Milan Durica, Dr. Joseph Tiso and The Jev/ish Problem in Slovakia (Padova: Stamperia sell’ Universita, i 9 & r . ------68 This 90,000 figure is for Jev/s in Slovakia after the Vienna Awards. There were 136,737 Jews in Slovakia before 1938. T-120R4W/S08^322. G, Reitlinger, The Final Solution (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 195377™ PP. 385t ^92. 173 controlled a sizable portion of Slovak industry. The

Slovak tavern owner was proverbially Jewish, and for that reason was looked upon as the cause of alcoholism which had been so widespread in the Hungarian days.

According to one group of statistics, Jews made up of

3 7 ,1 percent of merchants and 2 6 ,3 percent of indus- 6<5 trialists in Slovakia, 7 Jews also constituted one of the major intellectual groups in the Slovak village.

They were, however, associated with materialism and skepticism, bringing them into direct conflict with the other major intellectual element, the clergy, Tiso in his defense speech stated that his only aim was to limit the economic and intellectual influence of Jews in Slovak iife. His program of "Aryanization** set out to reduce Jewish economic control to four percent in keeping with the proportion of Jews in the state, 70

By October, 19^1 50,000 Jev/ish business enterprises with an estimated value of 300 million crowns were Aryanized 71 and transferred to Slovaks, In defense of his Jewish

69T-580/R66.

7°Tiso o sebe. p. 320.

71T-580/r 66. 174 policy, Tiso said in Holic in 1942:

It is asked, is this Christian what we are doing, is this Populist? Is this not pillage? But I ask, is it not Christian if the Slovak nation wants to get rid of its eternal enemy, the Jew? Love of oneself is a command of the divine and to love oneself is commanded us so that we might remove all what harms us, v/hat threatens our life. I "believe it is not necessary to convince anyone that the Jewish element threatens Slovak life.,,. In 1840 Jews lived in large towns. In large towns like zilina, Nitra, there were 3,040 Jews. In a hundred years they have multiplied 10 fold. We have determined that Jews control thirty-eight percent of the national income but the Jev/s make up only five percent of the people.72

In 194? Tiso added that he had set out to limit Jewish economic pov/er, but that it was not "brutal, inhuman or..,done out of racial hatred.He maintained that he v/anted to give the Slovak nation only v/hat rightfully belonged to it.

The first anti-Jev/ish legislation in the Slovak

Republic was introduced on April 3°» 1939. By it Jews could continue the management of their enterprises but had to permit fifty-one percent Slovak participation.

On September 3 , 1940 a new lav/ v/as introduced by Tuka

72Jozef Tiso, Slovak XXIV/186, August 18, 1942.

^^Tiso o sebe. p, 319 . 175

and Mach laying out details for systematic Aryanization.7^

A year later on September 3 , 19^1 the notorious Jewish

Codex was issued by Tuka, According to this lav/ anyone who had three Jewish grandparents was to be considered a Jew. I-larriage between Jew and non-Jew was made a crime, carrying the penalty of three years imprisonment and loss of public office. Practically, Jews were stripped of citizenship. A Jew could not be a member of the HSL'S,

H.G., H.M. or edit a newspaper. The president of the state, however, was given the power to make individual exceptions to these provisions.7-> Tiso did not sign the

Codex and the Church reacted against it. In a Memoran- dum to Tiso, Bishop Jan Vojtassak of Spis issued a v/arning that Slovakia must remain true to its Christian traditions and that the Jewish Codex was a serious and dangerous mistake.7<^ Soon after the Vatican gave Sidor a letter denouncing the prohibition of marriage between Jew and

Slovak. Sidor passed the letter on to Bratislava, but 77 received no reply.

7^Ibid.. p. 320 , Burica, pp. 8-9.

7-*per slowakische Judenkodex (Pressburg* Roland * Verlag, 19^1)7

7^Sidor, pp. 136 -137 .

77Ibid.. pp. 138-139. In 19^1 Jews were at first interned in labor camps

in Slovakia, Until this time Slovakia was actually a

safe refuge for Jev/s. Then after March, 19^2 Jews

were deported by train for so-called resettlement areas

in Poland somewhere between the Vistula and Bug Rivers,

The work of deportation v/as done under German pressure 70 v and carried out by Tuka,17 Mach, and Anton Vasek, head

of the notorious Department IV of the Ministry of Inter­

ior, To inspect these resettlement areas Tiso sent Isidor 80 Koso, who v/as shown normal Jewish towns in Poland, The

Vatican made efforts to stop these deportations through

its Charge d'Affaires in Bratislava Msgr. Guiseppe Burzio

and through the Slovak representative in the Vatican,

Karol Sidor, On March 1^, 19^2 Cardinal Luigi Kaglione,

the Vatican State Secretary, protested to Sidor that

Jev/s were being deported to Poland v/ithout regard to religion, sex, or age, and that parents were being On separated from their children. About a week later

78 vr Personal letter from Frano Tiso June 5» 1972. See Durica,

^ I t is not known v/hether Tuka was a real anti- Semite or whether he worked for the deportations out of opportunism.

®°Reitlinger, p. 3^7.

^Sidor, p, 141. 177

Kaglione urged Sidor to intervene to stop the removal of

Jews from Slovakia. Sidor, then, went to Bratislava to Q p discuss the Vatican request, Only in May did the foreign affairs office reply with assurance that Jewish families would be kept together. 8-^ They would be resettled in

Lubin, where they could live and work freely. The Germans moreover, had said, they were "providing for the Jews as OJi humanly as was possible." In July, 19^-2 Tiso learned from the Vatican v/hat deportation really meant, Tiso immediately demanded that the deportations be stopped.8^

By September, 19^2 the deportations had practically ceased,

Tiso's anti-Semitism was of the traditional type.

For one he made a distinction between baptized and non­ baptized Jews. The deportation and execution of Jews, however, was not Tiso's plan. Clearly, Tiso at first agreed to German orders for deportation, but presumably

82Ibid.. p. 1^2.

83Ibid., pp. 1^3-1^,

8^Ibid.. p. 1W-,

8^Reitlinger, p. 391. Letter from Frano Tiso June 5 t 1972. 178 not knowing that this would mean certain death for Jews.

On the other hand Tiso did intervene to save many Jev/s.

And compared to many other German dominated countries in

Eastern Europe, Slovakia v/as a virtual haven for Jews.

Tiso could not have prevented the deportations,®'* but the question remains, as to whether Tiso could have done more for the Jews, If he had protested to Hitler anymore than he did, according to some, it would have meant his overthrow and replacement by the more dangerous, Tuka,

This Slovak Jews themselves sensed and after the Salzburg meeting, when Tiso seriously considered resigning, he v/as urged by Slovak Jews to stay in office.

As already noted, Tiso represented the clerical and moderate group in the independent Slovak state. Included in this group were the Minister of Education Jozef Sivak,

President of the Slovak Parliament Martin Sokol, Minister of Economics Gejza Medricky, Minister of Transportation

86 Sidor, p. 1^8, Tiso gave presidential exception to 9,96*1- Jews, Mikus, p. 97.

®^Tiso o sebe. p. 322, 179

88 and Public Works Julius Stano. and Minister of Justice

Gejza Fritz. ^ Tiso's relations with these ministers were formal; he developed no deep personal association with any of them. One of Tiso's closest collaborators was Minister of Defense Ferdinand Catlos.^0 Ratios, a

Lutheran and one of the best administrators in the

Slovak government, was responsible for the organization of the Slovak Army. During the first years of the republic Catlos worked closely with Tiso, then in 19^4 went over to the side of the resistance.

The inner circle of Tiso's camp was composed of the

Church leaders and the Catholic Church was the main buttress of Tiso's regime.^ All the bishops (with the

n o Julius Stano was born in 1900, He served in various capacities in the party organization before being appointed Minister of Transportation. He was a Vice- President of the HSL'S and President of the Slovak- Rumanian Society, He was sentenced by the National Tri­ bunal to four years in prison in 19^7. He died January, 1972.

^ G e j z a Fritz was born in 1880. He was a deputy and senator to the Prague Parliament. He was President of the Slovak-Eulgarian Society. He was sentenced November, 19^7 to two years imprisonment by the National Tribunal,

9°Precan, "Dispatch of Jan Masaryk," p. 78.

9‘*’T-120R1318/498511. Interview with Dr, Jozef Pauco March, 1972. 180

exception of the Greek Catholic Bishop, who was a Mag-

yarone)92 and the vast majority of parish priests

supported Tiso and his efforts to create a Christian

socialist state.9-^ They were, like Tiso, realists.

They saw some cooperation with Germany as a necessary

evil but as Catholics had no sympathy for Nazism. Tiso

worked especially closely with the Slovak bishops Karol

Kmet'ko9^ (Archbishop of Nitra), Michal Buzalka (Auxil­

iary Bishop of Trnava) and Andrej Skrabik (Bishop of

Banska Bystrica). Buzalka came most often to see Tiso,

though Skrabik was probably the closest to him,9-*

Kmet'ko was Tiso's immediate ecclesiastical superior and was in regular contact with him for that reason, When

Tiso drove back to his parish in Banovce on Saturdays he

frequently stopped in Nitra to consult with Kmet'ko.

92T-120R1318A93513.

9^Precan, "Report of Gustav Husak," p. 9*1-7,

9^Karol Kmet'ko was born in the Trencin Zupa in I876, He studied theology at the University of Budapest. There was some friction between Tiso an$ Kmet'ko before 1938 since Kmet'ko was associated with Sramek's Czecho­ slovak People's Party,

9-*Letter from Karol Murin May 1, 1972, 181

In fact Tiso made few important decisions while president without first consulting him,^ Other officials who supported Tiso's concept of a Catholic state v/ere Karol

Korper and the deputies Jozef Drobny, Stefan Surovjak and v 0 7 Stefan Polyak, f Germans were suspicious of these clerical elements in the Slovak government and kept a close eye on them, Germans saw in Tiso another Dollfuss who might set up a state in opposition to Germany,

Tiso tried, he said, to rule Slovakia without any cliques or secret organizations,^ The function of politics, Tiso repeated many times, was to serve the whole nation. He maintained that he did not depend on any financial group or social class, but rather on all the people,'1'00 Tiso tried to cultivate in his politics

•^Interview with Jozef Pauco March, 1972,

9?T-58o/r 66. Karol Korper (b. 189*0 v/as ordained a priest in 1925* He worked as secretary to the bishop's chancellery in Trnava, In 1937 be accompanied Tiso to the United States, In the Slovak Republic he served as spiritual leader of the H.G. Drobny, Surovjak, and Polyak v/ere deputies to the Slovak Republic,

^^Lubomir Liptak, ’’Politicky rezim na Slovensku v rokoch 1939-19^5»" Slovenslce narodne novstanie roku 19*14 (Bratislava* Slovensky akademia vied, 1965), pp. 30 -3 1 ,

^ Tiso o sebe. p, 35* Interview with Jozef Kirsch- baum, January, 1971,

^00Tiso o sebe. p, 1*J4, pp. 131-132. 182

and in those around him a dedication to service to the

nation. He hoped to extend a priest's dedication to his

congregation to politics,Tiso thought of himself as

3.0 ? a shepherd to his flock, as a priest to his parishioners.

This can be seen in his concern not only for the economic betterment of the people, but also in his dedication to

their spiritual and moral welfare. Tiso ran his office much the same as a priest does his parish. This was

Tiso's political style. Compared with many of the other personalities in the Slovak state, Tiso displayed a sincerity and unselfishness in the performance of his duties, rare among Slovak politicians at that time,^0^

Many of the leaders in Slovakia, Tuka, Mach, Catlos,

Murgas and others were opportunists who saw the Slovak

Republic as a chance for quick advancement.

101Ibid., pp. 120-1 2 3 . 102 Interview with Jozef Kirschbaum January, 1972. Tiso 0 sebe. p. 123 .

■^■^See Karol Murin, "Dr. Jozef Tiso ako clovek," Slovak v Amerike LXXXII/793» April 12, 1972, See also Tisova nauka. pp. 115-117* 183

Tiso according to Kirschbaum v/ished to avoid any 104 personal favoritism from entering his politics. In selecting men for public office Tiso first considered personal qualifications - ability, honesty,-avoiding appointment on the basis of influence.'**^ Tiso, too, believed in division of responsibility. According to close associate Kirschbaum, in council he would listen to ministers, heed their advice, but always would leave the final decision up to the individual minister. His words were, 'I understand your point of view, but you must make the decision and you will take the responsi­ bility for it.*’*’^ For example, Tiso rarely gave Jozef

Pauco, editor-in-chief of Slovak any directives. He simply told him, "hold your line,"^®^ Tiso tried to conduct his politics in a personal manner. He was patient and always accessible to those who had business with him. On weekends while in Banovce ministers and 108 others were always welcomed in the rectory. He was

■'■^Interview with Kirschbaum, January, 1972.

10^Ibid.

106Ibid.

^■°^Jozef Pauco, Tak sme sa poznali. pp. 248-24-9, Jozef Pau£o, "I was Editor of President Tiso’s Newspaper," Slovakia VII (March, 1957)» PPt 9-12,

^°®Jozef Pauco, Tak sme sa noznali. pp. 251-252. 184- cordial and friendly with people he met. Any discussion with officials started with an inquiry about one's family and their health, for as Tiso always said, he felt first an obligation to serve the people. If the people rejected him, he maintained he would gladly return to his parish in Banovce, At the same time, Tiso could be severe when it came to dealing with his enemies. It v/as

Tiso's hope that his political opponents from the Czecho­ slovak Republic would forget the past and all join together in working for the nation. After 1938 Tiso if urged Milan Hodza, who had left Slovakia, to return, but to no avail.

While serving as president Tiso continued his priestly duties. He said Mass every day and on Satur­ days, unless detained with business in Bratislava, drove to Banovce to be with his parishioners on Sunday, Tiso kept in close contact with his superior Karol Kmet'ko,

Bishop of Nitra, Their earlier differences were appar­ ently sufficiently resolved to allow for a working relationship. Later Kmet'ko defended Tiso more force­ fully than any witness at Tiso's trial, Kmet'ko said he regarded Tiso's regime as a guarantee that Slovaks would not have to fear Nazism,The Slovak state, Kmet'ko

10^Culen, Po Svatoulukovi.... p, 370. 185 said, was, moreover, supported by ninety percent of the people, and despite German influence, life was ten times better there than in the Protectorates.

Tiso was a man of the people. He did not place himself above the people or draw any distance between himself and the masses. There v/as little aloofness about him or affectation in his manner,Tiso never lost his "peasantness," He felt at home among the people and could easily relate to them. Unlike Hitler who only used the German people, Tiso had a basic love for the people. Before a crowd of some 100,000 people in front of the National Theatre in Bratislava, Tiso started his 112 speech saying "My nation, I love you." Every Sunday,

Tiso could be found speaking in some village and mixing freely among the people. Tiso never evoked the kind of mass hysteria Hitler did. He walked freely about the streets of Bratislava without a bodyguard. When asked about this, he only replied "Why should I be afraid,

110Ibid.t p. 376.

Ill v Pauco, Tak sme sa -poznali, p. 268,

112Ibid.. p. 258, 186

these are my people."'*''^ Tiso disliked intellectualizing.

He instructed intellectuals to state things simply in order to communicate with the people. On one occasion in the presidential palace a professor delivered a report using many erudite expressions. When he had finished,

Tiso said, "And now .Mr, Professor speak to us nicely in

Slovak,"11^ At another time Tiso said, "We are all from the village - why walk under a mask, why put on airs and 11 *5 denounce the people?" J It v/as Tiso's personal manner, sincerity and dedication which the people admired, Tiso was at first the symbol of the Slovak state. Until 194-1 at the outbreak of the war against Russia, Tiso's supporters.contend that eighty percent of the people supported Tiso.^^ But many had mixed feelings over the viability of the Slovak state. Some no doubt were confused by the mixture of National Socialism and anti-

^-^Interview with Jozef Pauco March, 1972.

■^^Pauco, Tak sme sa noznali, p. 273 .

115Ibid.. p. 273.

■^^Letter from Karol Murin May 1, 1972, Interview with Jozef Kirschbaum January, 1972. Tiso's enemies maintained the opposite - that ^ighty percent were against the Slovak state and Tiso. Precan, p. 61. 187

Semitism with traditional Populist Catholic ideology.

The deportation of the Jews, imprisonment of other party leaders and the outv/ard imitation of Fascist Italy and

Nazi Germany was incomprehensible to some. The people, too, could not understand why they were fighting on the side of Germany against the United States, The war against Poland was defended as one to recover lost terri­ tories and the one against Russia as against Bolshevism, but Tiso could offer little reason for the war against

America. Even so the war against Poland was opposed by many, especially Polophiles, and that against Russia by

Greek Catholics and Lutherans, Although Tiso was at first regarded by Slovaks as a defense against Nazism, it became clear that Tiso was powerless to stop German and radical influence. However, the resistance movement which blossomed in the spring and summer of 19*j4 was not so much a movement against Tiso as against German influ­ ence.

Opposition to Jozef Tiso and the Slovak state as it grew came from several groups: Lutherans, the Slovak

Officer Corps, some young peasants, and Communist-minded workers. No one could deny that the Slovak state was predominantly Catholic. There were a few Lutherans in the government and high positions - Catlos, Imrich Karvas and Peter Zat'ko to name a few, but the ruling elite v/as 188

Catholic. The Lutherans from the Agrarian and other

Czechoslovak parties were opposed to Tiso's Catholic state and the dictatorship of the HSL'S. Many, including Milan

Hodsfa, Juraj Slavik and Jan Papanek fled to the West in

1938-1939 "to work with Benes' exile government in London,

The second element in the Tiso opposition was the Slovak

Officer Corps, at the head of the Slovak Army which was a remnant of the former Czechoslovak Army. Officers in the Slovak Army were of Czechoslovak spirit, Lutheran, many were former Legionaires, and many were married to

Czechs.^^ In 19*i4 when the defeat of Germany appeared almost a certainty, Catlos, the Defense Minister, felt it imperative for Slovakia to get on the winning side before the war was over. He devised a scheme whereby

Slovakia could switch sides by declaring war against

Hungary, which he reasoned would be very popular, Tiso rejected the proposal, saying he would have nothing to do with the Soviets or with the re-creation of a Czechoslovak

119 y rAnton Rasla, Civlista v.armade; Soomienkv na rokv 1918-19*1-5 (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, 1967), pp. 71-7 2. -,. 118 Republic,

The first active resistance group was the Communist,

Outlawed in 1938 the Slovak Communist Party (formed from the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1938) went under­ ground forming Communist cells in factories and mines.

Some of the leading Slovak Communists went abroad, Viliam

Siroky to Moscow and Vladimir dementis to London, while others like Laco Novomesky and Gustav Husak remained in

Slovakia, In September, 19^3 ihe Communists and leaders of non-Communist resistance (Jozef Lettrich, Jan Ursiny) formed the Slovak National Council. Its aims were for­ mulated in the Christmas Agreement of 19^3* Among the goals it put forth were the destruction of Tiso's govern­ ment and the establishment of the Slovak National Council as the legitimate government for the Slovak people. In

Liptak, Slovensko v 20 storoci. p. 190, Accord­ ing to Karol Kurin it v/as Tiso's intention when the Soviet Army entered Slovakia to order the Slovaks to lay down their arms and thus prevent Slovakia from becoming a blood bath. Personal letter from Karol Kurin May 3 0 , 1972.

119 ?See Anna Kociska, Robotnicka trieda v bo.ii nroti fasizmu na slovensku (1938-19^-1) (Bratislava: Slovensky akademie vied, 196*0 , pp. 13 ~^0 « 190

addition, it proposed that the new Czechoslovakia should

be a "joint state" based on the equality of the Slovak

nation and the Czech nation. Also included in the 19^3

agreement was the demand for the removal of Church i 20 influence from Slovak political life.

This resistance movement was no secret in Slovakia.

Most were aware of it, including Tiso, In the first years of the Slovak state, the resistance did not pose any serious problems to him, but toward the end of the war the resistance gathered real strength. The guerrilla formations swelled in 19^3 and 1 9 ^ so that by August of

19*j4 there were some forty brigades operating in the 121 mountains of Slovakia, The actual uprising of August-

September, 1 9 ^ was a joint one involving Communists and non-Communist democrats in cooperation with the Slovak V v Army. Catlos had come into conflict with the German

General Keitel in the spring and summer of 19^. At that time Field Marshal Keitel under Hitler's orders had

120I/!ikus, pp. 3^-3^7.

See Andrew Elias, "The Slovak Uprising of 19*J4," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, New York University, I9 6 3 ) and Slovenske narodne Povstanie. 1 9 ^ . 191

demanded a greater contribution by the Slovak Army in the

war against Russia. This Catlos refused, Catlos and

General Gustav Malar worked out an agreement with the

Soviets whereby when the Red Army approached the Slovak

borders the Slovak Army and guerrillas would attack the

Germans and allow Russians to quickly occupy Slovakia. V y This Catlos reasoned would save Slovakia from becoming

a battleground. September 15 was suggested by Catlos to

the Russians as the approximate date for the beginning

of the operation. A group of guerrillas in Turiec and

a few army officers, though, became impatient and triggered

off a premature action which ended in disaster. On

August 25 a German military mission detained in Turciansky

sv, Martin because of a demolished railroad tunnel, was attacked by Slovak soldiers. On the following day the

Slovak uprising began on a wide scale. Almost simul­ taneously three republics were proclaimed* a Communist

Republic in Martin, a Slovak Soviet in Nemecke Pravno, and a Czechoslovak Republic in Banska Bystrica.^2-^ Tiso was baffled and naturally alarmed by the insurrection.

122T-120R779/372495, 372498, and 3725OI.

12%!ikus, pp. I38 -W 9 . 192

The German General Hubitzky in Bratislava requested Tiso 'J V 124 dismiss Catlos as head of the army, Tiso complied and appointed General Turanec in his stead as Commander-in- chief of the Slovak Army, Tiso was uncertain as to what action to take against the rebels. He hoped that the rebellion would somehow disintegrate by itself. ^2-* Tiso knew that Slovak forces alone could not handle the situa­ tion so he took Hubitzky's advice and called in German

X? 6 * troops. This was perhaps one of the most controversial decisions of Tiso's career. At the same time Tiso accepted

Ludin's proposal and demobilized the Slovak Army.***2'7 Ger­ man troops and S.S, units smashed the revolt, destroying

some sixty villages. In a radio broadcast to the

Slovak people, Tiso said that the Germans had come to restore order,^2^ The exact number of partisans killed during the uprising reached several thousands. By

December, 1944, 18,000 people had been arrested of which

^2^Anton Rasla, Tiso o oovstanie. Dokumentv (Brati­ slava* Nakladatel'stvo pravda, 1947), pp. 36-37*

^2^Pre^an, "Testimony of General Herman Ho'fle," pp. 1082-1110.

126Rasla, p. 43. T-120R779/372486-7.

127T-120R779/372486-7.

128Rasla, p. 89.

^2^Precan, pp. 415-416, see 784-788, 193 many were shipped to German concentration camps. After the war 3»131 people were uncovered in mass graves in

Slovakia.

The uprising failed for several reasons. It was begun prematurely and poorly coordinated. The leadership, which was composed of both Communists and democrats was not agreed in its political aims. There was also only minimal military support from the Soviet armies. They wanted the Slovak rebels to exhaust themselves first, so that the Russians could enter Slovakia as the sole liberators. Furthermore, they hoped German intervention would totally discredit Tiso and his governmentThis last objective was achieved. Tiso's regime was dis­ credited by the suppression of the uprising. From Sep­ tember, 1 9 ^ Tiso's authority extended only to Bratislava and its environs." ^ 2 With the army dismantled Tiso had to rely on the H.G. to carry out its orders. In the fall of

19*j4 a home guard, the Domobrana was created to assist in the defense of the state. But for practical purposes

■^Lettrich, p. 216 and 3 IO-3 II,

^■^Lettrich, pp. 211-212, Mikus, pp. 148-1^9* Elias P. 13^.

132Elias, pp. 110-111. 19^

the German army was the real authority in the country

until the end of the war, Tiso reorganized the Slovak

government in September# 19^. A distant cousin of Tiso, >/ v, v Stefan Tiso was appointed Prime Minister, Stefan Hassik, / v Minister of Defense, Aladar Kocis, Minister of Education v * and Stefan Polakovic, Minister of Propaganda, Tiso tried

to place blame for the rebellion on Communists, Jews,

Czechoslovaks, but mostly on the war conditions. He tried to re-establish faith of the people in the Slovak

state and in the struggle against Russia. In a speech in

Bratislava December, 1 9 ^ Tiso said:

I believe in victory because I know I have the truth. All of us support the right for life, the right for an independent national state. Only the Germans recognize this and support us in this fight. All speculate on our death, on our being trampled over. Every Slovak must prepare himself against this. We would lose our reputation as a nation if we thought this way, and I would consider any Slovak narrow-minded who would want to swallow this propaganda. Therefore, if the German Reich recognizes and supports us, we will go v/ith this guarantee and truth with them and win, or at least be honorably defeated.^33

Tiso refused to the very end to cooperate with the Czecho­ slovak government in exile or to work for a renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic.

^■^Jozef Tiso, Slovenska nravda IX/2 8 7 December 12, 19^, 195

The inevitable end to the Slovak state came with the invading Red Army in April, 19^5. In early April, Tiso instructed his private secretary Karol Murin to go to

Munich to seek the help of Cardinal Faulhaber in obtain­ ing asylum for him. At the same time Tiso left Bratislava for Kremsmunster in Austria, Faulhaber invited Tiso to

m * the monastery at Alt-Otting near Munich, meanwhile trying to contact the Vatican to work out some arrangements for permanent asylum.But before this could be accomplished,

Tiso was discovered by the American Army and in the following October handed over to Czechoslovak authorities, v Benes as well as other Czechs and Slovaks in exile or in underground organizations in Slovakia had said that

Tiso and associates had been quislings and traitors.^ 5

It was not unexpected then that purge trials were begun in Slovakia after the war. There were district courts set up to try local offenders and a main court, the

National Tribunal in Bratislava to take care of the leaders of the Slovak state.

■'■■^Karol Murin, "Eight Fatal Days in the Life of Dr. Joseph Tiso," Slovakia VII (March, 1957). pp. 13-18. Toe* y/ V ■'■'Dr. Edward Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edward Benesi From Munich to New Y/ar and New Victory (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 195^. PP* 58-59. Precan, "Viewpoint of President Edward Benes towards the Populist (19^2).,.," P. 55. 196

Tiso's trial began December 2, 19^6 and lasted until

March 19, 19*J-7, The head of the National Tribunal was

Igor Daxner, a Slovak Lutheran Communist and a bitter opponent of Tiso, There were three prosecutors: Anton

Rasla, J. Sujan, and L, Rigan, Tiso was provided with two defenders by Daxner. During the trial hundreds of people were summoned to testify,' Most were little known figures, but others were of national stature, Tiso was charged with 113 counts and convicted on ninety-seven.

He was charged, for example, with actions against the former Czechoslovak Republic, and although he did not participate directly in all discussions with Germany, because he had been head of HSL'S, he was held respon­ sible.1-^ Other charges involved responsibility for the war, imprisonment of Jews and others, and the brutal suppression of the Slovak uprising. The purpose of the trial went beyond that of trying Tiso for specific crimes, v v Also on trial, according to Konstantin Culen, was the whole idea of Slovak independence. The prosecution aimed at discrediting Tiso, the Slovak state, and the influence of priests in Slovak politics.

^-^Igor Daxner, Ludactvo ured narodnvm sudom 19**-5- 19*17 (Bratislava: Slovensk,f akademiaTvied, I96I), p. 1^7. 197

Tiso handled himself very well during the trial.

He never admitted he was wrong and said if he had to do it again, he would do exactly the same thing. His own prepared defense, lasting nine hours, is considered a literary masterpiece. All of Slovakia followed the trial closely. Daxner received some four thousand letters containing threats to him and his family if he passed a death sentence on Tiso. ’*'37 Any demonstration of sympathy to Tiso or against the Communist dominated government were immediately crushed.

A sentence of death was pronounced on April 15» 19^7.

Everyone expected it. No matter what had "been said during the trial it was clear Daxner was determined to punish Tiso with the death penalty. Several attempts were made to postpone the sentence or to plead clemency,

Jozef Lettrich, President of the Slovak Democratic Party, approached both Daxner and Benes" to ask for mercy. ‘*’38

Lettrich did not want the government to make a martyr of Tiso and thereby create more friction between Catholic V' Slovaks and the government. Benes was also approached by

137 Ibid., p. 187.

138 Ibid.. p. 172. Lettrich, p. 2^. 198

Jozef Beran, Archbishop of.Prague, and others but to no avail. Benes would make no effort to intervene, but let the decision rest with the Communist government of

Klement Gottwald. To prevent any trouble the government dispatched military units equipped with tanks and other artillery to Bratislava, The atmosphere was tense through out Slovakia but the government had things well under control to prevent disorder.

Tiso spent his last hours before his execution on

April 2 7, 19^7 in prayer and in saying his last Mass.

About two hours before his execution he wrote this final message to the Slovak nation:

In the spirit of this sacrifice which I am about to make, I send this message to the Slovak nation that it always harmoniously and together follow the great principle "For God and Nation" - always, everywhere and in every case.

This is not only the clear sense of Slovak history but the expressed command of God who created it as the natural law and incorporated it into the nation and everyone of its members,

This lav/ I have served all my life and therefore, I consider myself a martyr in the first case in the defense of Christianity against Bolshevism, which the nation, not only in the spirit of its Christian character but also in the interest of its future, must defend with all possible means.

As I ask from you, that you remember me in your prayers, so too I will ask almighty God that He will bless the Slovak nation in its living struggle for God so that the Slovak nation will _ alv/ays be a true and loyal son of Christ's Church. ^

^-^Tiso Q sebe. introduction, translated in Mikus, p. 182, (Author's translation.) In Bratislava, April 18, 19^7* about 3 o'clock in the morning Jozef Tiso died on the gallows. One of his last requests that his body be buried in Banovce was not granted. His body was hidden and never found.

A freshly covered grave was discovered in a church cemetery in Bratislava. Some believed it was Tiso's grave and covered it with flowers. Others claimed that his body had been cremated. CHAPTER VI

IDEOLOGIST OF THE NATIONAL STATE

From 1939 to 19^5 Jozef Tiso served as political

leader, but perhaps more importantly as spiritual leader

to the Slovak nation. In his speeches and messages to

the people, Tiso added new dimension to the Slovak

national ideology,1 Tiso considered himself successor

to former Slovak leaders, the interpretator of their national thought. The Slovak political tradition, Tiso ✓ / believed, began with Stur was passed to Daxner, Kuzmany,

Moyses, Hlinka and finally to himself. Tiso tried always to speak within this tradition and claimed continuity with it.

In 1941 the 80th Anniversary of the 1861 Memo­ randum (see Chapter I) was celebrated, Tiso considered

I v Other ideologists in the Slovak state were Stefan Polakovic and Stanislav Me^iar. Polakovi£ < . was born in Chtelnice and studied at the Lateran Univer­ sity in Rome, From 19^1 he worked in the Propaganda Office and was also professor of philosophy at the^, , Slovak University, His works include Slovenskv narodnv socializmus (19*4-0), K zakladom slovenskeho statu (1939), and NaT duch (19^2), Mefiiar (1910-1972) studied Slavic and German philology and literature at several univer­ sities. In 19*44 he was appointed professor by Tiso. , His best known ideological work was Slovenskv narodnv socializmus (19*J-2 ).

200 201

this document the most important in Slovak history for

it served as an inspiration to every subsequent national

movement. The existence of an independent Slovak state

in 19^1* Tiso wrote, was the result of past Slovak

strivings and in historical continuity with the princi­ ples of the Memorandum. On the occasion of that anniver­

sary Tiso wrotei

We are not celebrating for the sake of a celebra­ tion but for the sake of emphasis on the eternal living values of our national life which the Memo­ randum injected into our spiritual life. V/e fought the good fight in the past because we concentrated on these three values: the nation, the territory and the Slovak language. These three stars of the Memorandum led us when others wanted to dis­ orient us with a fiction of the Czechoslovak nation, when they wanted to divide us and transfer our territory to Moravia, and when they confused us with the higher value of the Czechoslovak language. We have held on and v/e have been victorious because the light of the Memorandum values were for us the one marked way and directed our politics in the year 1938, in Komarno and on the day of March 14, 1939. 2

Slovak national ideology before World War I focused on the independence of the ethnic Slovak nation. Slovak national leaders wanted an autonomous national develop­ ment, but the idea of an independent sovereign Slovak state did not overly concern them, Most felt the Slovak nation and the territory it occupied was too small for

^Jozef Tiso, "Slovenske Turice," Slovak XXIII/125, June 1, 19^1. 202 independence, so they worked for federation with the

Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, or the Russians.

Before 1939 Tiso had maintained the state, because it was Czechoslovak was the enemy of the Slovak nation; therefore he too emphasized the rights of the ethnic unit. But after 1939 Slovaks had their own state, and there was no longer a conflict between nation and state.^ Prior to 1939 Tiso maintained one could be a good Slovak patriot without expressing loyalty to the state, but thereafter no one could be called a patriot unless he expressed allegiance to the Slovak Republic.^

It was left to Tiso then, to establish the ideological foundations for a Slovak state.

Tiso wrote in 1939 that Slovak independence had not resulted from the destruction of Czechoslovakia, but was the culmination of a one thousand year struggle which began with the fall of Great Moravia,-* It was the final outcome of all the efforts of national leaders

•^Jozef Tiso, Speech to USKS, Slovak XXII/100, April 27» 19^0. Jozef Tiso, Speech to the Military School, Slovak XXII/3 8 1 February 15* 19^0.

^Jozef Tiso, Speech, Gardista IV/262 (Bratislava), November 15, 19^2,

-\lozef Tiso, "Prve posolstvo prezidenta Slovensky republiky," Slovak XXI/252, November 1, 1939. 203 from Bernolak to Hlinka,^ In a radio broadcast Tiso expressed this when he talked about the meaning of

March 14, Slovak independence day:

The day March 14, 1939 is the birth date of the independent Slovak state. It is the fulfillment of our national desire which has propelled the living forces of the nation to this point so that we could have complete and unconditional management of our own affairs in our own hands. Our independent Slovak state was born from the consistent development of the will of the Slovak nation to rule itself completely and independently from everyone.7

For Tiso independence had become essential to the survival of the Slovak nation. The possession of state power meant the Slovak nation would be protected in its national development and not be threatened again by

Magyarization or Czechization, Moreover, Tiso believed independence strengthened the organic relationship of o the Slovak national heritage with the present. In its simplest terms, Tiso said, independence infused each

Slovak with the feeling, "I am a Slovak and I want to remain a Slovak for all times.

6 / Ibid.. Jozef Tiso. Radio broadcast, Slovenska Pravda IY/76 (Bratislava), April 1, 1939.

^Jozef Tiso, Radio broadcast, Slovak XXI/63 , March 16, 1939.

®Jozef Tiso, "Slovenska sloboda," Slovak XXIV/61, March 14, 1942,

^ J o z e f Tiso, Speech, Slovak XXIV/146, July 1, 1942, 20^

The Slovaks in an independent state were experiencing

a new freedom, Tiso wrote, In previous times national

freedom meant doing only what was possible, but now it meant that the "nation did what it has to do as a nation,

We are a free nation because we are able to fulfill the commands of our fathers. We are a free nation because in an independent Slovak state we are doing that which according to our own national character and our historical mission we have to do.H

Tiso compared the experience of the Slovak nation to that of Jewish people exiled in Egypt, The Jewish nation had lived for many years in bondage in Egypt, yet never forgot its traditions or history or gave up hope of reaching the promised land. Its passage through the Red Sea was a cleansing, a rebirth, marking the beginning of a new life. In a similar way the Slovak nation after years of bondage needed to experience a

"revitalization" to prepare itself for a new life in the Slovak Republic, It meant bringing the people to a 12 purer love for the nation, by solving the Czech ques-

■^Jozef Tiso, "Slovenska sloboda," Slovak. March 1^, 19^2 ,

1:iIbid.

•to I Jozef Tiso, Speech in Vel'ky Bytca, Slovak XXI/25, January 31, 1939. 205 tion and the Jewish question. Tiso was therefore most concerned with the spiritual forces of the nation. These forces* Tiso argued, determined v/hether or not the nation survived. The Slovak nation needed to display the will to live, and Tiso cited the Germans as an example of a nation which had indicated inner strengths; Germans 11 had shown a determination to live. J

For Tiso the events of March, 1939 culminating in the declaration of Slovak independence, amounted to a

Slovak national revolution. Tiso, then, often talked about rebuilding Slovakia to meet the challenges of this revolution, Tiso, for example spoke of a "new

Slovak man," a man committed to the great ideals: "belief in God and spiritual values, belief in authority as a * necessary principle of Slovak social organization and belief in the Christian unity of the Slovak family Ik. from which comes a healthy youth. Slovaks had to be re-educated, Tiso said. They had to cast aside feelings of inferiority which resulted from years of Magyar and

Czech rule and be reminded they were members of a race, capable of ruling itself and doing good work. A Slovak,

■^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Dubnice, Slovak XXII/257, October 29, 19^0,

Jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovenska nravda IV/1^6, June 27, 1939. 206

Tiso felt, must never again be ashamed that the Slovak 16 nation is a small one. J A Slovak, according to Tiso,

had to be educated as a Christian and as a Slovak, for

education limited a vague humanitarianism without

corresponding infusion of national consciousness would

lead to egotism. A man, Tiso added, must know first

what his obligations are to his people, he must have

national consciousness before he can serve himself.

Tiso believed national consciousness served to guide

man down the right road, away from Bolshevism and other

parasitic ideologies evident within the Slavic family.

In this regeneration Tiso assigned an important

role to youth, much as did other fascist and authori­

tarian states at the time. The youth organization, the

H.M., was to help form a new Slovakia,*^ and the nation's

youth, Tiso emphasized, v/ould carry on the important

task of safeguarding the nation's future. Youth would

cultivate the values of work, discipline, national

■^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Dlhe pole, Slovak XXl/197i August 20, 1940.

■^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Sliac, Slovenska nravda IX/128, June 7» 1 9 ^ •

"^Jozef Tiso, Speech to Slovak XXIl/135, / June 11, 1940, Jozef Tiso, Speech in Chtelnice, Slovak XXIII/271» November 25» 1941, Jozef Tiso, Speech to H.M., Slovak XXIV/30 , February 6, 1942. 207

solidarity, - emphasizing the interest of the nation

above personal interest. To a meeting of the H.M. in

19^0 Tiso said:

The H.M. is the bearer of the great hopes of the Slovak nation. In former generations this nation died but was resurrected in this free statei in the H.M. it began a new life. The H.M. cultivates a new type of Slovak man, who from the highest ideals of his fathers and forefathers draws the direction, the enthuiasm, the strength, connecting his own corporal and spiritual forces for the enrichment of the nation.1®

Tiso's plan was to establish a Christian social state or just a "social state;" his guide posts were probably Salazar's Portugal, Othmar Spann's standisch theory, and the Church's social encyclicals.*^ It was a value plan evoking Christian solidarity and national unity, and also a return to medieval universalism. In working toward this goal, Tiso first sought to construct what might be called a 'totalitarian nation,' that is, eliminating all geographical, ideological, and religious

■^Tiso, Slovak. June 11, 19^0,

*^But according to Kurin, Tiso was not influenced by Spann. Nevertheless there are others who believed Tiso was acquainted to a degree with Spann's ideas. Tiso's private secretary, Karol Murin, recalled Tiso once read a book about Salazar whom he esteemed. Per­ sonal letter from Karol Kurin Kay 1, 1972. Personal letter from Jozef Kirschbaum Kay 30, 1972. Spann's standisch theory proposed the construction of industrial and agricultural corporative units not unlike medieval guilds. See Dr, Othmar Spann, Per wahre Staat (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1938)* 208 divisions between Slovaks (as between Eastern Slovaks and Yfestern Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics). It meant, too, the acceptance of the Slovak spirit and Slovak tradition as interpreted by Tiso. He said, "There are no Westerners, Easterners, no differences among Slovaks, there is one will, one mind, one willingness to sacrifice 20 life for our brothers in the Slovak nation,"

Tiso's "social state," was to be a state without classes and one where personal interests would be sub- 21 ordinated to the betterment of society in general.

In this social state the "law of universal happiness" was to be applied, meaning everyone by work and sacrifice would serve the interests of the whole society and there-

p p by help himself. Such a society could not tolerate any sub-interest group. The existence of any class or sub-interest organization would constitute the "intro­ duction of foreign elements into the national organism and therefore carried with it the stamp of sabotage to the nation.

2®Jozef Tiso, Radio broadcast, Slovak XXI/222, September 27, 1939.

^J o z e f Tiso, "Posolstvo. 11 Slovak XXIl/62, March 16, 19^0, Jozef Tiso, Speech Slovak XXIV/280, December 5» 19^2, pp y/ Jozef Tiso, "Zakon vseobecneho blaha" (reprint from Organizacne zvesti). Slovak XXIII/177, August 3 , 19^1,

^Tiso, Slovak.April 27, 19^0, 209

In his social state especially two types were to be 2Il excluded: egotistical men and political opportunists.

He said, "Nothing will be placed above the nation, not the individual, not position, not religious confession."2^

Tiso admitted that man's actions were motivated by per­ sonal interests? this was natural, and to destroy this motivation would be "unthinkable and anti-cultural,"

But personal interests were the moving force not only of the individual but of the nation as well. There was a reciprocal relationship between individual interest and national interests. One could not exist without the other. At times, however, it was necessary to sacrifice private interests, partially or completely, for the pub­ lic welfare, Tiso said:

'Nothing for ourselves, all for the nation,' means that a nationally conscious man would not do anything either for himself or his personal interest if it v/ould mean harm to the nation. It means an individual, conscious of his relationship to the national whole, endeavors to direct his personal interests for the service of the national whole,,,,27

oh Jozef Tiso, Speech to Cultural Department of the H.G., Slovak XXIII/260, November 11, 19^1.

2-\Jozef Tiso, Speech, Gardista IV/174, August 2, 19^2 . 26 / Joze;f Tiso, Speech in Sliac, Slovenska nolitika XXIV/237 , (Zilina), October 15. 19^3.

27Ibid. 210

In Tiso's view man was a social being. Alone he

could not survive, therefore society had been formed,

Tiso believed that society was a 'heterogeneous whole'

made up of individuals who had an obligation to and

association with the whole. This society constituted a

higher value than any of its members, or, as Tiso said, 2 0 "the whole is better than the best of its parts,"

Tiso always sought to reinforce his arguments by drawing

from Christian thought. He said Christ's teachings were

founded on a hierarchy of values, the soul above the body and the whole before the parts. There would be no peace,

Tiso believed, unless the hierarchy of values were

followed,

Tiso placed a strong emphasis, as in other authori­ tarian or Fascist states, on the value of work and

sacrifice. To Tiso work was a basic human function and the essential part of man's social obligation, V/ork had had different meanings throughout history, Tiso said.

In pagan times work was viewed as something humiliating.

In later times it was considered a means to personal gain, Tiso then added his Christian and socialist view of work which he felt appropriate for Slovaks, God gave

2^Tiso o sebe. p. 2*1-9.

2^Ibid,, p, 2*1-9, 211

man physical, mental, and spiritual strength to use and

talents to develop, and in Slovakia everyone needed to work for his livelihood; no one could get by without work. Work was to be performed with a desire for "per­

fection, sacrifice and devotion."^ 0 The Slovak nation was a small nation with limited resources, therefore to

overcome this disadvantage one had to perform "quality work," Moreover, Tiso said, "Consciousness of responsi' bility and sacrifice in work gives work a value, and no one would be a greater enemey and commit a greater injustice to the national society who performed without regard to achievement."^

Work was regarded by Tiso as part of the Slovak national character. At a drotar (peddler's) exhibition in Dlhe pole in August, 19*1-0 Tiso said the drotar embodied the Slovak character, A drotar. he said, was a man who was forced to leave his home to become an intinerant in order to find a livelihood. He did this not out of choice, but out of need. However, instead of becoming a beggar, the drotar worked. Such was also true of Slovaks who had had to leave their homeland to

■^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Banovce. Slovak XXIIl/lCK. May 8, 19*H.

3 lIbid, 212

go to America. The Slovak character, Tiso explained, was not found in drotars as such, but in their nraceschonnost1

and vvtravalost' - their work ability and perserverence.^

In Tiso's social state national wealth would be

shared by all who worked for the society.Wages, choice

of work, and so on would be determined by the needs of

the nation at the particular time. In relation to this,

Tiso defined the new Slovakia in this wayi

The Slovak nation in its structure is a collective group of working people; the Slovak state is an organization of the Slovak working society. By every member of the nation working for the whole we will rebuild our economic life and give the people a sense of life because work enables the individual and the working community of nation and state to strengthen the union of nation and state. We will produce capital not from the exploitation of the socially weak but from the strong spiritual essence of our national char­ acter. Capital is not the international deper­ sonalized adoration of gold but the individual working happily for the interests of his nation and state,3^

Tiso's social state required a rejection of capitalism.

It was condemned by Tiso because it placed emphasis on personal gain.-^ Capitalism, Tiso claimed, preached

■^Jozef Tiso, Slovak XXII/197» August 20, 19^0,

-^Tiso, "Posolstvo," Slovak, March 16, 19^-0. Tiso, Slovak. October 29» 19^0*

•^Tiso, "Posolstvo," Slovak. November 1, 1939*

-^Quoted in "Jednotlivec, rodina, narod," Slovak XXIII/211, September 13» 19^1. 213

freedom and equality yet did not protect the weak in

society.^ Tiso saidi

We do not recognize those who reach government by power of money. We recognize only integrity, work, industriousness and thriftiness, We are not against money or capital but against capi­ talists. A capitalist is a man who recognizes only his money and a man who, if he is an entre- peneur, closes his factory if he does not get the high profits he expected.37

An essential part of Tiso's social state was to be

the creation of economic and professional organizations

similar to the Stand of Spann and the corporate organiza­

tions of Italy and Germany. Each organization repre­

senting an industry or profession was to be independent with its own statutes but all were to be connected to the

HSL'S in the person of the Secretary-General,3® The purpose of these organizations was to create a harmon­ ious working society, in a way a return to the build

system of the middle ages. They were organized under the motto, "Profit and justice for the individual but service to the nation."-^

-^Tiso, Gardista, September 8, 19^2,

■^Tiso, Slovak. September 10, 19^1. See Tisova nauka. pp. 323 -32 ^.

^®Tiso o sebe. p. 229.

^^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Bratislava, Gardista IV/20^, September 8, 19^2. 21^

In this spirit, a grain monopoly was set up "before

March, 1939 to protect and stabilize the price of grain.

Tiso said subsidies would no longer be given to individ­ ual farmers but only to projects that would benefit all farmers in general, Tiso also maintained he would protect private property and private industry in the Slovak state but would not tolerate big capitalists that worked against the interests of the nation. As in Petain's France Tiso emphasized the importance of protecting the small craft industry so widespread in Slovakia. Other than this, however, little was done to realize the goals of the

"social state,"

Tiso read attentively the Church's social encyclicals,

Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931 ) . ^

These encyclicals, Tiso believed, interpreted natural law, and Tiso maintained that his Christian social pro­ gram was an implementation of these encyclicals. Both the encyclicals and his Christian socialism, he asserted, provided for brotherly cooperation of workers and employers by the creation of a cooperative society.^

if. 0 Personal correspondence of the author, letter from Karol Murin, May 1, 1972. Jf.1 / Jozef Tiso, Speech in Bratislava, Slovak XXIII/17, January 21, 19^1. Jozef Tiso, Speech in Povazsky bystrica, Slovak XII/208, September 10, 19^-1. 215

Tiso's politics in the Slovak state were authori­

tarian, for he felt that centralized authority v/as

necessary if a small nation wished to survive.

Authority which Tiso believed founded in natural law,

was necessary in all aspects of life. A family, for

example, could not survive unless the father had author­

ity, In 19^7 in his defense Tiso wrote: "Authority in

the nation, in the state is required - therefore I did I13 not believe this would be regarded as one of our faults." J

Tiso, however, was opposed to an absolute authoritarian

or totalitarian regime. Political power, in Tiso's view, was limited by the existence of spiritual values,

individual rights and society's welfare.^ In indepen­

dent Slovakia, moreover, Tiso did not possess the power

to implement the kind of totalitarianism which reigned

in Germany. Tiso admitted that some of his ideas were

similar to Nazism and Fascism, He said there were ele­

ments of the.natural law in the latter two also, He

simply incorporated into this program those things in

[ip 4 / Tiso o sebe, pp. 190-191. Tiso, Slovenska pravda. June 27, 1939. Tiso.'Slovak. February 22, 1939. Tiso used the terms authority and authoritarian inter­ changeably, but by authority he meant authoritarianism.

^ Tiso o sebe. p. 191. ^ Ibid. . p. 2^7. 216

Fascism and Nazism, which were compatible with natural law, while rejecting those which were not, such as racism and sterilization, Tiso maintained that he had never systematically studied either Nazism or Fascism.

Slogans used by him, such as "one nation, one party, one will" v/ere not, he maintained, derived from Hitler. Such he insisted, had existed for centuries.^

Tiso declared the political principles of the

Slovak state were the same that guided the twenty year struggle for autonomy - natural law and the interest of the nation above everything else, V/hile president,

Tiso maintained, he was guided by the old motto, Sloven­ sko Slovakom (Slovakia for Slovaks), that is, that all the wealth of the country belonged to the Slovak people,

Christian doctrine, which Tiso said was the way to inter­ pret natural law, had taught him that there was a hierarchy of values — progressing from the individual, to the family, and to the nation, - each with a God- given individuality and capacity for development, Tiso felt an obligation to safeguard the development of each.

^ Tiso o sebe, pp. 195-197•

^ Tiso o sebe. p, 38 * 21?

Christian doctrine also taught him that the whole was Zl9 greater than the part, r Tiso said:

The object of the efforts of the Populist party was nothing more or less than the good of the Slovak nation, so that it could become morally and economically self-sufficient. Not only material interest but also spiritual, and cul­ tural ideals were: nothing for ourselves, all for the nation!

With regard to the party Tiso pointed out that the

KSL'S was not a conventional one. It did not serve any special interest group nor was it an end in itself, but existed solely to serve the whole nation.^ It was viewed by Tiso as part of the Slovak organism, the sum total of Slovak politics, the working apparatus of the people, "the oil of the organization of the state,

Tiso felt the party interpreted the will of the nation and then directed the state in the performance of this w i l l , ^ To put it another way, the state government was the machinery, the party was the operator. The party

*^Ibid.. pp. 12*J— 126.

48Ibid.. pp. 131 -132 .

^ Tiso o sebe. p, 171,

-^Jozef Tiso, Speech in Sliac, Gardista IY/223, September 3°* 19^2,

^ J ozef Tiso, Speech in Banovce, Gardista V/^4, February 2 3 , 19*1-3,

52Quoted in "Stat pre narod," Slovak XXIIl/207, September 9t 19^1. Tiso, Gardista. September 30* 19^2. 218 had an additional function as an educator in the Slovak state. The party's task was to penetrate Slovak society and imbue the inhabitants of every village with the new national values. ^ The city organization, Tiso said, must expand itself beyond the normal functions of nominat­ ing parliamentary candidates and submitting proposals for electoral commissions,^ It must mold Slovak life,-^

It must also cultivate "political idealism," apply the idea of working for the general welfare and national interest. Tiso said:

To cultivate the idea of political idealism means to hold to the motto, For God and Nation, to educate people in service to these ideals,^ to honestly and honorably increase the economic and social prosperity for the benefit of the nation. Idealistic politics then does not refer to a dreamer flying in the clouds, revolving around the abstract, or to an ascetic who despises the material part of man. Neither does it refer to a politician who dedicates himself to the ideal of public happiness with complete neglect of his personal obligations, but it refers to one who knows how to make sacrifices and above all knows how to direct his public tasks without betraying the public welfare for his own personal benefit.56

^Tiso, Gardista. September 30» 19^2.

^Jozef Tiso, "Miestna organizaci," (reprint from Organizacne zvesti) Slovak XXIV/6, January 9» 19^2,

-^Tiso, Gardista, September 301 19^2.

-^Tiso, Slovak, September 9» 19^1. 219

Tiso's state was clearly a Catholic state, Catholi­ cism formed the real basis of Tiso's ideology in the

Slovak state. Tiso believed that Christianity was an integral part of Slovak tradition. The mission of Sts.

Cyril and Methodius, the consecration of the first church in Nitra, and the beginnings of Christian learning in

Great Moravia, Tiso identified as the beginnings of

Slovak national life. Since that time Slovaks had remained true to Christianity,^ and Slovak youth would continue to be educated as Christians and as Slovaks,

Nationalism and Christianity were, Tiso wrote, "combined in the creation of our national character,"-' A Slovak cannot be a Slovak, Tiso added, without being a Christian, nor can there be a Christian in Slovakia who has no Slo- vaki consciousness.-'7 • 59

Tiso recognized only the Cyril and Methodius tradi­ tion. The St, Stephen tradition (of the Hungarian Church), which had been associated with Slovaks, was foreign in

Tiso's view since it represented Hungarian imperialistic

-^Tiso, "Posolstvo," Slovak. November 1, 1939.

-*®Tiso, Slovenska oravda, June 7» 1 9^ .

-^Ibld. 220 goals over Slovaks, Croats, as well as Magyars. Because

Slovaks revered St. Ignatius and St, Francis of Assisi did not mean that Slovaks had to accept a Spanish or

Italian orientation, Tiso said,^0 Similarly their association with St, Stephen did not require them to accept a Hungarian orientation.

In a speech delivered in Presov June 30, 19^-0, Tiso stressed the importance of Slovaks remaining true to their own Catholic traditions. He maintained the Slovak struggle in the past twenty years had been guided by self-sufficient religious principles, Slovaks then needed to remain loyal to this tradition. In our spiritual life, Tiso said, we must have "full autarky."^'1'

We as Catholics do not need any instruction from anyone. We have our own system. Catholic teaching is such an all encompassing science to the smallest detail that it is not dependent on any other philosophy, Catholicism in its own system is so perfect, so universal, so rich that it does not need any contribution from any other teaching either religious, social or poli­ tical.

60 ' Jozef Tiso, Speech in Nitra, Slovenska nolitika XXIV/186, August 1?, 19^3 .

61 * ' Jozef .Tiso, Speech in Presov, Slovenska sloboda 111/1^7 (Presov), July 2, 19^0.

62Ibid, 221

Catholicism must be at the basis of every people's society and its politics,^ Tiso said. He who fears the mixing of politics with religion does not understand the meaning of either. Religion, he maintained, was more than liturgy and church ceremony, but the directing principle of all aspects of life. Religion in politics did not mean that priests would run the state but that religious principles would provide the "spirit, the principle of the state, its teachings, nothing more."

Tiso remarked that the condition of the world was proof that the world had not developed according to Catholic principles,^ Tiso therefore instituted a program called Catholic Action,^ to promote the spirit of

Catholicism in Slovak public life. Accordingly, everyone would be an apostle applying Catholic principles in one's life's work, Hitler disliked Tiso's Catholic

Action, regarding it as anti-Nazi.

Although Tiso frequently spoke about national unity between Catholics and Lutherans, he clearly gave Catho-

63Ibid.

^ J o z e f Tiso, Soeech, Slovak XXII/228, September 25> 19^0 .

65Ibid. / Jozef Tiso, Lecture, Slovak XXI/28, February 3» 1939. 222 lies and Catholicism priority in the Slovak state. To a considerable degree the Catholic Church ran the Slovak state between 1939 and 19^5* Tiso later denied that his politics were confessional. Tiso justified the large number of priests in the government, saying it was nec­ essary since the government did not have the money to pay regular administrators,^ Tiso said:

Our activity was not in any way confessional because it had regard for the whole nation as such, as it lived, as it was composed, as it really existed.,.the Christian churches operated in brotherly cooperation, everyone in his own church according to his own methods and according to his own rules, so that all could lift up their own people.

One of the most striking features of Tiso's speeches and writings during this period v/as the constant fusing of religious ideas with his national ideology. This v/as especially true of Tiso's Christmas messages. In his

Christmas Eve piece of 1939i Svetlo Betlehema Tiso v/rote that just as little Bethlehem v/as chosen to be the light of the v/orld, so too little Slovakia had been chosen to hold up the principles of the light of Bethlehem. He

^ Tiso o sebe, p. 1*10.

68Ibid.. pp. 141-1^3. 223 wrote:

The Slovak nation celebrates, this first Christmas in an independent state in peace. It does not desire anything, only to preserve and maintain this peace. Therefore amidst the storms and tempests of international and social affairs we will vigilantly guard and protect the light of Bethlehem so that it will illuminate for us the building of the state, to bring peace to all those erring captives of foreign ideologies and so that the peace of Christ will rule in the Slovak state and in the soul of all its inhab­ itants. °9

After the Salzburg Diktat of 1940 National Socialism was introduced into Slovakia from Germany. Tuka and the two young ideologists, Polakovic and Keciar tried to adapt German National Socialism to traditional Slovak thought and institutions,^0 Tiso, however, preferred the Slovaks developed their own National Socialism, It would mean uprooting secret societies, cliques and liberal economics and installing a new social order where money would be handled with regard to the needs of all 71 the people,' Prom the balcony of the National Theatre

^'Jozef Tiso, "Svetlo Betlehema," Slovak XXI/296, Vianoce, 1939.

^°See Vojtech Tuka, Slovak XXII/181, August 1, 19^0, Vojtech Tuka, Slovenska sloboda III/198. August 27, 194(3,

"^Jozef Tiso, "Posolstvo," Slovak XXIII/32, February 7, 19^1. Jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovak XXIIl/13. January 22, 19^1. Slovak National Socialism was a combination of Christianity, the idea of a People's Slovakia, authori­ tarianism and exclusion ^of^, Jews and Czechs. L'udo Zachar, Katolicizmus a slovenskv narodn^ socializmus (Bratislava: Slovensko-nemecko spolocnost, 19^0), p. 60, 224 in Bratislava, Tiso proclaimeds

We will build a people's Slovakia in the tempo of National Socialism, But in order for this to happen we must all be reborn in the spirit of the new Slovakia, Is it possible to join Christ with a program of National Socialism? For the old, it is not possible. But for those who want to understand they must be reborn by water and spirit. Water of the National Socialist school is that which purges us from the old internationalists, from Jewish Bolsheviks and Marxists. We must be reborn by the spirit too, and not remain a nation in which people are satisfied to call themselves revolutionaries yet do not want to do a stitch of work and care only for rewards,72

In a large measure, however, Tiso's espousal of National

Socialism v/as an attempt to appease Berlin, recognizing

Germany's dominance over Slovakia, recently defined at

Salzburg. Tiso, however, used the language of National

Socialism more than he accepted its principles.

The only element of German National Socialism that

Tiso really adopted v/as the volkisch principle,^ For

Tiso, this meant conducting European international rela­ tions on the basis of equality of nations and with respect to the national principle. For Tiso, the

Vdlkisch principle provided the best solution for

Europe's problems since it acknowledged national equality

?^Jozef Tiso, Slovak XXIl/209, September 3» 1940,

"^Personal interview with Jozef Kirschbaum, Jan­ uary, 1972. ok which v/as basic to natural law, Tiso hoped that empha­ sizing this principle would bind Germans to treating non-German nations justly.^ Tiso frequently spoke about the creation of a "New Europe" based on the volkisch idea.

Every nation regardless of size v/ould be allowed free national development. No longer v/ould nations be mea­ sured by material v/ealth or power. The Slovak Republic

Tiso believed was as an example of such a free nation - state in the emerging "New Europe."f For that reason,

Tiso once referred to the Slovak Republic as a "spiritual monarchy" embodying this new spirit of equality of nations in Europe.

The moving force in the liberation movement and in the creation of the Slovak state v/as not geographical expansion, economic power, ethnic distinction, but the new world spirit, the spirit of equality of nations. It is because of this spirit that v/e are to thank for the origin of the Slovak state, therefore Slovakia is called a "spiritual monarchy,"77

"^Jozef Tiso, "Slovensky stat je duchovym mocnarstvom, Slovak XXII1/62, March 14, 1941,

^Letter from Kurin, Kay 1, 1942.

^ J o z e f Tiso, Speech to the H.G., Slovak XXIIl/290, December 18, 1941, Jozef Tiso, "Sud dejin," Slovak XXII/ 208, September 1, 1940. Jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovdk XXI/ 200, September 1, 1939.

^Tiso, "Slovensky stat je duchovym mocnarstvom," Slovak, March 14, 1941. 226

It might have appeared to some that this "New Europe" was becoming a reality. In addition to the Slovak state

an independent Croatia had emerged. Several border adjustments, too, had been made for Hungary, Germany and other states, according to Tiso’s conception of the national principle, Slovakia maintained close relations with such non-German states in Eastern Europe, A little entente between Slovakia, Croatia and Roumania was even discussed at one time,?8 The Slovak state's closest relations were with Croatia,17 based on a long tradition of Croat-Slovak cooperation. Both peoples had parallel histories in their struggle against Hungary before 1918 and thereafter in their efforts to obtain autonomy in the interwar years. After 1941, a Slovak-Croatian Society headed by the Croatophile, Alexander Mach published its own newspaper. There v/as also a Slovak-Roumanian Society and a Slovak-Bulgarian Society, Tiso signed cultural pacts v/ith these nations,

78 ^ f Liptak, Slovensko v 20 storoci. pp. I85-I87.

^^See Tiso’s official greetings to Croatian deputies in Slovak XXIII/I76, August 2, 1941, Slovak XXIV/157, July 14, 1942, Slovak XXIIl/292, December 20, 1941 and Dr, Ante Pavelic's message to Slovakia, Slovak XXIV/81, April 10, 1942, See also Alexander Mach, "Stare priatel- stva," Gardista IV/81, April 10, 1942,

80Slovak XXIV/276, December 1, 1942, Slovenska sloboda V I A 61. July 8, 1943. Tiso v/as awarded by Boris III of Bulgaria, the "Order of the Cross of St. Cyril and Methodius," 227

Pan-Slavism, however, played no part in Tiso's Pi thought. He considered Fan-Slavism simply a camouflage for Bolshevik imperialism. He felt Moscow knew Communism would be unattractive to Christian Slovaks, so it had to conceal its motives with the appeal of Slavic brotherhood,

Tiso said:

First a Slovak, then a Slav, A Slovak must be taught to depend on himself. He wants to be and remain a Slovak and never be torn from his Slovak roots for some imaginery Slavic superstructure, A Slovak will not be fooled by Bolshevik propaganda, with a motto of Slavdom, but on the other hand by a real understanding of Slavic feeling, the Slovak nation will happily and heroically give proof to the world that the Slavic race is not Bolshevik, but that Jewish sadism has saddled the Russian nation so by the misuse of its great forces that it proceeds in the conquest of Christianity and Europe,®2

Jozef Tiso was one of the few Slovak leaders in history who believed in the self-sufficiency of the

Slovak people, that it had the potential for independence and did not need to rely on Czechs, Russians or anyone else.^ Tiso might be called a Pan-Slovak, To Tiso all

Ol There v/as an attempt by some Slovaks to show a close historical cultural relationship between Slovakia and Germany, Tido Ga^par, Ruckschau auf die slowakisch- deutschen kulturellen Beziehungen (Bratislava: J. 0. Petreas, 19*4*3), pp. 1-23,

^Jo zef Tiso, Speech in Bratislava, Gardista V/103, May 5, 19*^3.

®-^See Tiso o sebe, p, 192, 207. 228

Slovaks whether they lived in Slovakia, Hungary or the ON United States were members of the Slovak nation. He said:

We worked, as I mentioned, everywhere, wherever a Slovak v/as found. We tried to include the Slovak person whether in Austria, v/hether in Belgium, whether in France, whether in America, v/hether in Hungary. Everywhere, because to us every Slovak person v/as important, Everyone v/as precious to us. We wanted to join them to the Slovak community and to preserve them in living unity with the Slovak organism, 85

Tiso was especially interested in the American Slovaks and concerned about their loss of national consciousness.

He hoped that the Society of St. Adalbert v/ould serve to keep alive the Slovak language and national character in 86 America, Relations, however, between the Slovak state and the American-Slovak community were touchy indeed, especially after America's entry into the war. There v/as hardly a family in Slovakia which did not have relatives in the United States. America v/as looked up to and admired by Slovaks. 3ut the declaration of war against United States v/as incomprehensible. Moreover,

American-Slovaks v/ere divided over Jozef Tiso and the

8^Ibid«» pp. 136-137 and pp. 1*1-3

8^Ibid.. pp. 143-144.

86Ibid.. p. 137 . 229

Slovak Republic. Many supported the Slovak state until

1942, but others in the Slovak National Society and

Slovak Lutheran affiliated organizations were skeptical about the durability of a Slovak state allied to Nazi

Germany. Most American Slovaks, though having doubts about the Slovak state, sympathized with Tiso especially during his trial in 1946-194?, In June, 19^1 Tiso sent a message to American-Slovaks which v/as read in Chicago at a convention of the Slovak League of America. In the message Tiso explained the significance of October 6th and March 14th and pointed to the economic progress of the Slovak state, ^ An argument against Tiso and the

Slovak state v/as presented by Juraj Slavik, a Slovak

Agrarian, maintained that Slovakia v/as not a free state, Op but only a "servant of Germandom."

Tiso v/ell understood that the outcome of the war v/ould decide his fate and the future of Slovakia. He felt the war was being fought to secure a place for

^Jozef Tiso, "Posolstvo Vodcu a^prezidenta Dr, Jozefa Tisu Americkym Slovakom," Slovak XXIII/141, June 22, 19^1.

^Juraj Slavik, Zanreriane Slovensko (Chicago! Slovenske narodne sdruzenie, 1939), pp. 7-8. 230

Slovakia in the "New Europe," and to rid the world of

plutocrats and unscrupulous capitalists. In particular,

Tiso viewed the war against the Soviet Union as a cru- Og sade against Bolshevism. y Since the 1920's he had

fought Communism and non-Christian socialism. Both

were regarded a threat to European civilization, Bol­

shevism v/as for him the antithesis of Christian thought,

the destroyer of the family and the "supreme wrath against

Christ and his teachings."^ 0 Tiso said, "Not one other

heretic or philosopher joined together such a brutal 91 persecution of the people as had Bolshevism." Tiso

suggested that anyone v/ho sympathized with the Soviet

Union go to the Ukraine and observe for himself the

Bolshevik paradise.In his Christmas Message of 19^1

Tiso justified Slovakia's participation in the war*

®9jozef Tiso, Speech, Slovenska -politika XXIV/l^l, June 22, 19^3. Jozef Tiso, Speech in Michalovce, Gar­ dista IV/151, July 7« 19^2. Jozef Tiso, "Das Verbaltnis des Slawentums zum Bolshevismus," Slowakische Rundschau IV/5 (Pressburg, 19^3), pp. 129-131.

9®Jozef Tiso, "Vianoce posolstva," Gardista IV/296, December 29, 19^2,

91Ibid.

^2Tiso himself toured the Eastern Front in 19^1. See Juraj Ohrival, "S panom prezidentom na fronte," Slovak XXIII/269-272, November 21, 19^1 - November 26,

19^1. " 231

Godless and international Bolshevism v/as the attacker, which for twenty years armed and prepared itself to attack Europe in order to ignite the fuse of world revolution. This v/as forced upon us by the threat of Bolshevik danger and our participa­ tion in it v/as only the result of our determination tov/ard an independent life. We certainly do not belong among those v/ho would cause a war in order to obtain something but alas v/e must fight if v/e want to show our strength, our sacred conviction, our life values and our desire to protect ourselves. V/e are not from those who believe war is a value in itself because it cultivates heroism but it would be bad for us if v/e did not prepare ourselves to stand our ground in war for the sacred values of our life,93

Tiso tried to reconcile Christian beliefs v/ith the v/ar in his article at Christmas, 19^2, "Pokoja ludom dobrej vole," He reminded the Slovak people that the angel announced the birth of Christ with the word 'Peace on

Earth,* but only to those of good will. Tiso continued that "One v/ould be v/rong to explain Christ's peace as passive, as v/eak, as defeatist..." and by an understanding of Christ became an easy going fellow v/ho v/ants to be alv/ays and everyone, for any price, who would rather suffer injustice and injury only in order to have peace.

Slovakia sent several divisions into the war against

Russia, The most famous was the Rvchla Division (Speed

^ J o z e f Tiso, "Vianoce posolstvo," Slovak XXIII/299t December 28, 19^1,

^J o z e f Tiso, "Fokoja l ’udom dobrej vole," Slovak XXIV/295. Vianoce, 19*1-2, 232

Division) under Augustin Kalar and later under Jozef O K Turanec."'-^ Another noted division was the Zaistovaci one

(Security Division), which v/as assigned to protect bridges and communication centers in the Ukraine, In the spring of 1942 it participated in anti-partisan actions in the

Pinsk region. Toward the end of the war, a small mili­ tary work force was sent also into Italy,

Tiso believed the new equality among nations obligated all nations to contribute their share to pro­ tect Europe from Bolshevism and other dangers to it.^

The participation of the Slovak Army in this war proved to the world Tiso said, that the Slovak nation valued its independence and v/as willing to demonstrate this not just by speeches but by sacrifice of Slovak men,^ Tiso often repeated this theme of sacrifice, trying to con­ vince the people that peace and freedom were born only Qp from sacrifice,-' Tiso, also discussed the importance of the 'home front' in the war effort, the duty of the

^ S e e Armada v obrane a nraci (Bratislava: Kinisterstvo narodnej Obrany, 1944-),

-^Jozef Tiso, "Armadny rozkaz," Gardista V/62, Karch 16, 194-3.

97Ibid.

-^Tiso, "Vianoce posolstvo," Slovak. December 28, 1941. 233 people at home to be united in spirit for the cause of the nation. The greatest enemy to the nation* Tiso main­ tained, v/as one which v/ould stir up dissatisfaction among the people, thereby destroying the unity of the home oo front,'"

°°Jozef Tiso, Srteech in Bratislava, Slovak XXV1/59> March 11, 19^. CONCLUSIONS

Most of the literature on Jozef Tiso and the Slovak

Republic reflects either of two points of view. One has it that Tiso by his cooperation with the Germans was a traitor not only to the Slovak people but to all

Slavs. This school of thought contends that despite any temporary advantages gained by cooperating with the

Germans, Tiso was supporting an imperialistic racist state v/hich had as its goal the conquest and perhaps extermination of all Slavic peoples. The other maintains that Tiso saved Slovakia from complete German and radi­ cal Slovak control. This school argues that had it not been for Tiso, Tuka and other Nazi sympathizers would have turned Slovakia into a model totalitarian Nazi state, or even worse, Germans might have occupied Slo­ vakia as they had Eohemia-Moravia,

There is evidence to support both views. To assess the latter view, one must evaluate Tiso's success in limiting Nazi influence in Slovakia. To a large extent it v/as a failure. He could not stop the deporta­ tion and execution of many Slovak Jev/s nor could he prevent German economic control of Slovakia, Moreover,

23^ Tiso had to bow to German pressure at Salzburg and at other times dismiss Slovak moderates and anti-Germans at Hitler's bidding. Nevertheless Tiso v/as the moder­ ating influence in the Slovak state. Slovakia under

Tuka's leadership might have become another German- occupied Bohemia-Moravia or Poland. Tiso’s authority in the Slovak state v/as moral, not political. Hitler kept him in pov/er because he was highly respected by the Slovak people; Tuka v/as not. Hitler backed Romania’s

General Antonescu in a similar way. Tiso was not unlike

Marshal Petain, who led the German puppet Vichy French government. Such men, by cooperating v/ith Hitler, hoped to save their countries from complete German occupation and total Nazification.

Tiso, nevertheless, as head of the Slovak state must bear responsibility for what happened in the state whether he condoned it or not. Although Tiso disliked the terrorist actions of the Hlinka Guard he did not disband the Guard. He had the intention of bringing the Guard under his control but was unable to do so,

Tiso, too, as a Catholic priest could not justify the execution of the Slovak Jews, nevertheless must be held partially responsible for v/hat happened since he took the first steps towards their deportation by his

Aryanization program and allowing the confinement of 2 3 6

Jews in labor camps, Tiso also must carry some respon­

sibility for the disintegration of the Czechoslovak

Republic in the months after Munich. As de facto head of the Popolust party Tiso must take responsibility for the actions of frurcansky, Kurgas, and other extremists in the party, Tiso did not always agree with what they did, but he also failed to discourage them. Finally by accepting the invitation to go to Berlin and by cooperating with Hitler in declaring Slovak independence

Tiso personally contributed to the destruction of

Czechoslovakia.

If we understand fascism as a reactionary ideology enjoying mass support and possessing certain character­ istics such as an emphasis on action for action's sake, a belief in the fuhrer principle, use of violence, con­ tempt for democracy, and a corporate view of society, one would have to conclude that Tiso v/as not a true fascist.

It is true that there was much in Tiso's ideology that is akin to fascism. There was a clear emphasis on action and work. Tiso's idea of a social state, too, was not unlike other corporate views of society found in other fascist states. Under Tiso’s presidency over three thousand people were imprisoned for political reasons,

Nevertheless Tiso's state lacked the degree of violence found in other fascist states. Until August, 19^(4 there were very few, if any political executions in Slovakia.

Nor did Tiso use the violent rhetoric on v/hich Hitler and Mussolini relied. Tiso v/as pastoral in his politi­ cal style. His speeches and writings were homiletic.

Finally, Tiso did not display the deep contempt for democracy that Hitler did. Tiso did not believe the state should possess absolute power. He felt the individ­ ual had certain rights v/hich the state must never absorb.

A small nation, though, like Slovakia, Tiso believed, required an authoritarian system of government; it did not need the many party organizations which had existed in the old Czechoslovak Republic, Tiso was a Christian

Socialist like the Austrian Seipel and the Slovene

Korosec. Tiso's political and social ideology can definitely be linked to Catholic Austria, to Seipel, to

Spann and others,

It was clear that Tiso did not always carry out the wishes of the Slovak people, for example with regard to Slovakia’s participation in the v/ar against Poland and Russia. One of Tiso's major fallacies, moreover, v/as his contention that the HSL'S was the only party qualified to represent the Slovak people, It is true that the HSL'S received a sizable portion of the vote in

Slovakia in the last election in 1935 but this amounted to only thirty percent of the total vote. It cannot be 238

said with certainty that Tiso's actions in October, 1933

and March, 1939 expressed the will of the other parties

in Slovakia. Even the Slovak National Party, although

autonomist, was unquestionally loyal to the Czechoslovaks,

and v/ould have not on its own followed the course of

action that Tiso took after October, 1938.

The motivating force of Tiso's whole political career

'v/as Slovak nationalism. He was driven by an unselfish

love of the Slovak people and their traditions. Kis

national ideology v/as in keeping v/ith a prominent tradi­

tion in Slovak intellectual history, - that of Stur and

Hlinka, - to which Tiso added the new principle of

Slovak state independence. Tiso v/as one of the few, if

not the only Slovak national leader v/ho articulated

the belief that Slovaks could be politically self-

reliant. Even Stur, disappointed with the outcome of

the 18^8 Revolution, became a Russophile Pan-Slav.

Other Slovaks became either Czechophiles, Polophiles

or Russophiles, feeling that Slovaks alone would be

unable to hold their own. It was unfortunate that Tiso's

experiment in independence took place in a Nazi dominated

Europe, APPENDIX A

GOVERNMENTS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I, Vlastimil Tusar (Social Democrat) - Prime Minister

April, 1920 - September, 1920, if Edward J3enes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Anton Svehla (Agrarian) - Interior Alfred Meissner (Social Democrat) - Justice Vlastimil Tusar (Social Democrat) - Defense Karol Pra&ek (Agrarian) - Agriculture Gustav Hahrman (Social Democrat) - Education Vavro Srobar (Agrarian) - Unification and Health Lev Winter (Social Democrat) - Welfare Kunesa Sonntag (Agrarian) - Commerce Jiri St£ibrny (National Socialist) - Railways Frantisek Stanek (Agrarian) - Posts Bohuslav Urbensky (National Socialist) - Public Works VaclavyJohanis (Social Democrat) - Supply Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Slovakia

v II, Jan Cernv - Prime Minister September, 1920 - Septem­

ber, 1921, (Ministers in Cerny's government were

called officials and were not representative of

parties,)

Edward Benes - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior Augustin Po^elka - Justice Karol Englis - Finances Otakar Husak - Defense Vladimir Brdlik - Agriculture Jozef Susta - Education Ladislav Prochazka - Health Jozef Gruber - V/e If are Vaclav 3urger - Railways Max Fatka - Posts Frantisek Kovarik - Public Works

239 240

Vladimir Fa^or - Unification Leopold Prusa - Supply Martin Micura - Slovakia

III, Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Prime Minister

September, 1921 - October, 1922,

Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior Jozef Dolansky (Czech People's Party) - Justice Augustin Novak (National Democrat) - Finances Frantisek Udrsal (Agrarian) - Defense Frantisek Stanek (Agrarian) - Agriculture Vavro Srobar (Agrarian) - Education Bohuslav Urbensky (National Socialist) - Health Gustav Habrman (Social Democrat) - Welfare Ladi^lav Novak (National Democrat) - Commerce Jan Sramek (Czech People’s Party) - Railways Anton Srba (Social Democrat) - Posts Alojz Tucny (National Socialist) - Public Works Ivan Dere£ (Social Democrat) - Unification Martin Micura - Slovakia

v IV, Anton Svehla (Agrarian) - Prime Minister October,

1922 - December, 1925.

Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jan Malypetr (Agrarian) - Interior Jozef Dolansky (Czech People's Party) - Justice Alojz Rasin (Rational Democrat) - Finances Frantisek Udrzal (Agrarian) - Defense Milan Hodza (Agrarian) - Agriculture Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Education Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Health Gustav Habrman (Social Democrat) - Welfare Ladisla^ Novak (National Democrat) - Commerce Jiri Stribny (National Socialist) - Railways Alojz Tucny (National Socialist) - Posts Anton Srba (Social Democrat) - Public Works Ivan Markovic (Social Democrat) - Unification Emil Frank (National Socialist) Jozef Kallay - Slovakia Zkl

V, Anton Svehla (Agrarian) - Prime Minister December,

1925 - March, 1926.

EdwardvBenes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Frantise^ Nosek (Czech People’s Party) - Interior Karol V^skovsky (Agrarian) - Justice Jiri Stri^rny (National Socialist) - Defense Milan Hodza (Agrarian) - Agriculture Otokar Srdinko (Agrarian) - Education Alojz Tu^ny (National Socialist) - Health Lev Winter JSocial Democrat) - Welfare Karol Kramar (National Democrat) - Commerce Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Railways Jan sramek (Czech People's Party) - Posts Rudolf/Mlcoch (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Public Works Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Unification Jozef Dolansky (Czech People's Party) Jozef Kallay - Slovakia 1/ VI, Jan Cernv - Prime Minister, March, 1926 - October, 1926. v Jan Cerny - Interior Jiri Kausman - Justice Karol Englis - Finances Jan Syrovy - Defense Juraj ^lavik - Agriculture and Unification Jan lvrcmar - Education Jozef §chiesl - Health and Welfare Frantisek Peroutka - Commerce Jan Kiha - Railways Maximilian Fatka - Posts Vaclav Roubik - Public Works Jozef Kallay - Slovakia

V VII, Anton Svehla (Agrarian) - Prime Minister October,

1926 - February, I9 2 9. V Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior and Supply - Robert Mayer-Harting (German Christian Socialist) - Justice Karol Englis - Finances Frantisek Udrzal (Agrarian) - Defense Otokar Srdinko (Agrarian) - Agriculture 2k2

V Milan Hodza (Agrarian) - Education and Unification (Karko Gazik of Slovak People's Party replaced Hodza as Minister of Unification January, 1927.) Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Health and Wel­ fare (Jozef Tiso of Slovak People's Party re­ placed Sramek as Minister of Health January, 1927.) Frantisek Peroutka - Commerce Jozef Vaclav Hajman (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Rail­ way § Frantisek Nosek (Czech People's Party) - Posts Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Fublic Works Jozef Kallay - Slovakia

VIII, Frantisek Udrzal (Agrarian) - Prime Minister 1 February, 1929 - December, 1929.

Edward Benes (national Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior Robert Kayer-Harting (German Christian Socialist) - Justice Bohumi^ Vlasak - Finances Frantisek Udrzol (Agrarian) - Defense Otokar Srcjinko (Agrarian) - Agriculture Milan Hodza (Agrarian) - Education Jozef Tiso (Slovak People's Party) - Health Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Welfare Ladislav Novak (National Democrat) - Commerce Jozef Vaclav Najman (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Railways Frantisek Nosek (Czech People's Party) - Posts Franz Sp^na (German Agrarian) - Public Works Karko Gazik (Slovak People's Party) - Unification

IX. Frantisek Udrzal (Agrarian) - Prime Minister

December, 1929 - October, 1932.

Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Juraj Slavik (Agrarian) - Interior Alfred Meissner (Social Democrat) - Justice Karol Englis - Finances (after October, 1932 Karol Trapl) Karol Viskovsky (Agrarian) - Defense Bohuni^ Bradac (Agrarian) - Agriculture Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Education 2^3

Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Health Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Welfare Jozef Katousek (National Democrat) - Commerce Rudolf Kl^och (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Railv/ay (after April, 1932 Jozef Hula) Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Jan Dostolek (Czech People's Party) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Cjjech People's Party) - Unification Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Supply

X. Jan Malypetr (Agrarian) - Prime Minister October,

1932 - February, 193^*

Edward Eene^f (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jan Malypetr (Agrarian) - Interior Alfred Meissner (Social Democrat) - Justice Bohumir Bradac (Agrarian) - Defense Milan Hod^a (Agrarian) - Agriculture Ivan D^rer (Social Democrat) - Education Karol Trapl - Finances Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Health Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Welfare Jozef Katousek (National Democrat) - Commerce Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Railways Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Jan Qostalek (Czech People's Party) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Unification Jan Malypetr (Agrarian) - Supply

XI, Jan Malypetr (Agrarian) - Prime Minister February,

1934 _ June, 1935.

Edward Benes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jozef perny (Agrarian) - Interior Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Justice Karol Trapl - Finances Bohumir Bradac (Agrarian) - Defense Milan Hod2a (Agrarian) - Agriculture Jan Krcma^ - Education Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Health Alfred Meissner (Social Democrat) - Welfare Jan Dostalek (Czech People's Party) - Commerce Rudolf Eechynd? (Social-Democrat) - Railways Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Unification zhh -

XII. Jan Nalvoetr (Agrarian) - Prime Minister June, 1935-

No vember, 1935*

Edward yBenes (National Socialist) - Foreign Affairs Jozef Cerny (Agrarian) - Interior Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Justice Karol Trapl - Finances Franti^ek^Machnik (Agrarian) - Defense Milan Jtodz^a (Agrarian) - Agriculture Jan Krcmar - Education Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Health Jaromir Necas (Social Democrat) - Welfare Jozef Najman (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Commerce Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Railways Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Jan Dostalek (Czech People's Party) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Unification

XIII. Milan Hod%a (Agrarian) - Prime Minister November,

1935 ~ September, I93 8 ,

Milan Hod^a (Agrarian) - Foreign Affairs (Kai^il Krofta replaced Hodza February, 1936) Jozef Cerny (Agrarian) - Interior Ivan Derer (Social Democrat) - Justice Karol Trapl - Finances Frantisek Machnik (Agrarian) - Defense Jozef Zad^na - Agriculture Jan Krcmar - Education Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Health Jaromir Ne&as (Social Democrat) - Welfare Jozef Najman (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Commerce Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Railways Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Jan Dostalek (Czech People's Party) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Unification Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Minister without portfolio Ervin Zajicek (German Christian Socialist) - Minister without portfolio after 1936 2^5

XIII. ft?ilan Hodza (Agrarian) - Prime Minister November,

1935 - September, 1938.

Milan Hodza (Agrarian) - Foreign Affairs (Kamil Krofta replaced Hodza February, 1936). Jozef Cerny (Agrarian) - Interior Ivan De'rer (Social Democrat) - Justice Karol Trapl - Finances Frantisek Machnik (Agrarian) - Defense Jozef ^adjna - Agriculture Jan Krcmar - Education Ludwig Czech (German Social Democrat) - Health Jaromir Kecas (Social Democrat) - Welfare Jozef Najman (Czech Tradesmen Party) - Commerce Rudolf Bechyne (Social Democrat) - Railways Emil Franke (National Socialist) - Posts Jan Dostalek (Czech People's Party) - Public Works Jan Sramek (Czech People's Party) - Unification Franz Spina (German Agrarian) - Minister without portfolio Ervin Zajicek (German Christian Socialist) - Minister without portfolio after 193^

XIV. Jan Svrovv - Prime Minister September 22, 193® “

October 4, 1938 .

Kami^ Krofta - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior Valdimir Fajnor - Justice Jozef Kalfus - Finances Jan Syrovy - Defense Eduard Reich - Agriculture Engelbert Subert - Education Stanislav Mentl - Health Bedrich j^orak - Welfare Jan Janacek - Commerce Jindrich Kamenicky - Railways Karol ^unovsky - Posts Frantisek Hosal - Public Works Jozef Frit^ - Unification Hugj Vavrecek - Propaganda Stanislav Budovsky, Peter Zenkl, Matus Cernak, and Imrich Karvas - Ministers without portfolio 2^6

XV, Jan Syrovy - Prime Minister October k, 1938 -

December 1, 1938*

Frantisek Chvalkovsky - Foreign Affairs Jan Cerny - Interior Vladimir Fajnor - Justice (after October 15 Ladislav Feierabend) Jozef Kalfus - Finances Jan Syrovy - Defense Ladislav Feierabend - Agriculture Stanislav Bukovsky - Education Petr Zenkl - Health and Welfare Imrich Karvas -r. Commerce Vladimir Kajdos - Railways and Posts Karol Kusarek - Publis Works Vladimir Fajor - Unification (after October 15 Ladislav Feierabend) Hugo Vavrecek, Ivan Parkanyi - Ministers without portfolio

XVI, Rudolf Beran - Prime Minister December lf I938 -

March, 1939.

Frantisek Chvalkovsky - Foreign Affairs Otokar Fischer - Inter Jaroslav Krejci - Justice Jozef Kalfus - Finances Jan Syrovy - Defense Ladislav Feierabend - Agriculture Jan Kapras - Education Vladislav Klumpar - Health and Welfare Alojz Elias - Railways and Posts Dominik Cipera - Public Works Jaroslav Krejci - Unification Juraj Havelka - Minister without portfolio APPENDIX B

TRNAVA MANIFESTO (November, 1925)

1. We stand on the basis of the Czechoslovak Repub­

lic in which the autonomous Slovakia belongs. We demand

that the Slovak language be the official language and

the language of instruction in the schools.

2. We demand complete independence in the framework

of autonomy. The Judiciary must be independent, we want

the establishment of our own parliament, police and

gendarmerie.

3. We demand that the government better care for

the needs of the Slovak poor people, that they have work

and livelihood, and that the tax burden be lowered for

them.

The Prague bureaucratic offices do not understand

the Slovak spirit, therefore, they have passed restric­

tive law so that they have systematically deprived sons

of the Slovak nation of a livelihood. We demand there-

'fore the dismissal of all non-Slovak state employees

living in Slovakia, an immediate end to the dismissal

of Slovak state employees, and an immediate inspection

of tradesmen and artisans v/ith this motto* Slovakia -

for Slovaks. 2*J7 248

5, We demand that Slovak industry develop indepen­

dently, that industrial work and products in Slovakia be given only to Slovaks and the organization of an indepen­ dent land office v/ith the intention of passing a lav/ for land reform and the immediate suspension of colonializa- tion by non-Slovaks,

6, We demand that the railroad tax be lowered to a parity v/ith the historical kingdoms,

7, We demand food for the seasonal agricultural workers, v/hich are forced to leave their dear fatherland,

8, We demand guaranteed rights for all citizens.

What is most important, v/e protest against persecution by censure, confiscation of the news. We demand general amnesty for political offenders. APPENDIX C

THE THIRTY-TWO DEMANDS OF THE HSL*S

DRAWN UP IN 1935

1, The organization of a school council for Slo­

vakia,

2, The amendment of the language lav; so that in

Slovakia officials will officiate in Slovak,

3 , The organization of a Catholic theological

faculty in Bratislava as part of the Komensky Univer­

sity,

The organization of technical schools in Slovakia,

5. The complete rebuilding and equipping of

Komensky University,

6. The more intensive support of Slovak cultural

institutions of national importance,

7. The establishment of equality between Church

teachers and state teachers by means of a law and the return of state held Catholic gymnasiums.

8. The amendment of the law for the organization of political administration (expansion of the powers of

the kra.iinv president, council and Diet),

9. The establishment of a separate status for state employees in Slovakia, 2^9 250

10, The de-politicizing of districts (okres).

11, The proportional placement of Slovaks in the central offices in Prague,

12, The organization of a general directory for state forests and property in Slovaks,

13, The organization of a "branch post office bank in Slovakia.

1^, The combination of the branches of the land and mortgage banks and the organization of a Slovak financial institution,

15, The nationalization of roads.

16, The de-politicizing of the economic and social institutions in which the state has control,

17, The securing of a quota of state benefits for

Slovaks according to the percentage of the population.

18, The withdrav/al of the railroad tariffs,

19, The securing of a quota from state funds according to the percentage of the population,

20, The allotment of agricultural products v/ith regard to the economic structure of Slovakia.

21, The building of an agricultural store room in

Slovakia,

22, The removal of price differences in the grain monopoly.

2 3 , The securing of proportionate participation of

Slovaks in all economic and social state bodies. 251

2*f. The lowering of the tax rates,

25. The securing of prices for live-stock produc­ tion and feed,

26, The regulation of agricultural and trade debts,

2 7. The participation of Slovak economic groups in the concluding of interstate commercial agreements,

28, Better sales promotion for the lumber industry both at home and abroad,

2 9. The naming of specialists to Slovak regional and district councils in Slovakia in accordance with election results,

3 0 , An end to election persecutions.

31, The operation of a productive v/elfare system for the unemployed v/ith special regard for poverty in

Slovakia,

32. The establishment of a system for changes of notaries and district officials. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Tiso's V/ritings and Speeches v V Polakovic, Stefan. Tisova nauka (Tiso's Teachings), Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo H S L 'S , 19*H, A collection of Tiso's writings and speeches 1920-19^1 .

______, Z Tisovho bo.ia (From Tiso's Struggle), Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo H S L 'S , 19*f-l. A collection of Tiso's writings and speeches 1920- 19^1 . Tiso, Jozef. Tiso o sebe (Tiso about Himself), Edited by Jozef Faubo. Passaic, New Jersey: Slovensky katolicky sokol, 1952.

Other speeches and writings from 1939“19*J-5 found in Slovak (Bratislava) 1939 -1 9 ^ 1 Slovenska nravda (Bratislava) 1939-19*14, Gardista (Bratislava) 1939-19^^» Slovenska politika (Zilina) 1939-19*J4, Slovenska sloboda (Presov) 1939-19^» and Slowakische Rundschau (Bratislava) 19*J-0-19*j4,

II. Documents 4 * Aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswartigen Amtes, Akten zur deutschen auswart.igen Politik. 1918-19*J4. Series D, Vol. II Vol. IV Vol. VII Vol. VIII Vol. IX Vol. X

Per Prozess ^eaen die drei slowakischen Bisho*fe Jan Vo.itaSsak, Dr. Th. I'lichal 3uzalka~~and Pavol Go.idic. Prag: Orbis, 1951 *

Per slowakische Judenkodex. Pressburg: Roland Verlag, 19^1. 252 253

Documents on British Foreign Policy Series D. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohlan Butler. London* His Majesty*s Stationary Office, 19^9-1951. Vol. II Vol. Ill Vol. IV Vol. V

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-19^5. Series D. Washington, 1949-1951. Vol. II Vol. IV Vol. VI Vol. VII Vol. VIII Vol. IX Vol. X Vol. XI Vol. XII Vol. XIII .* Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost- Mitteleurooa. The Expulsion of the German Popula" from Czechoslovakia. Edited by Theodor Schieder. Bonn, i960.

Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske oolitikv 1939-19*n, 3 vols. Prepared by Libuse OtahctL and Milada Cervin- ek. Praha* Ceskoslovenske academie ved, 1966.

Durcansky, Ferdinand (ed,), Pravo slovakov na samostat- nost v svetle dokumentov (The Right of Slovaks for Independence in the light of documents). Buenos Aires, 195^«

Kennan, George F, From Prague After Munich* Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940. Princeton* Princeton University Press, 1968.

yf / / Precan, Vilem (ed.), Slovenske narodne novstanie - Dok­ umenty (The Slovak National Uprising - Documents), Bratislava* Uydavatel'stvo politicly literatury, 1965.

Rasla, Dr. Anton (ed.). Tiso a novstanie* Dokumenty (Tiso and the Uprising* Documents). Bratislava* Nakladatel*stvo Pravda, 19^7# 254

v V*

Statisticka •prirucka slovenska 1948. (Statistical Hand- book of Slovakia). Bratislava: Statny planovaci a statisticky urad v Bratislave, 1948.

U. S. National Archives, Washington, D, C, German Records microfilmed at Alexander, Virginia, Iden­ tified by microcopy number (T), roll number (R) and serial number (S).

T-120 German Foreign Office Records R65-S73 R341-S613 R779-S1515 R916-S1613 R1074-S1918 R1139-S2006 R1141-S2002, 2050 R1301-S2276 R1318-S2380 R1422-S2919 R2433-S4738 R4744-SK1643-4

U, S, National Archives. Washington, D, C, German Documents filmed in Berlin for the American His­ torical Association, Identified by microcopy num­ ber (T) and roll number (R), These have no serial numbers 1 T-580 R66 R355 R432 R458 R459 R877 255

III. Personal Correspondence and Interviews

Personal Correspondence of the Author with Jozef Kirsch- baum, Letter dated Kay 30> 1972,

Personal Correspondence of the Author with Jozef Kikus. (.Slovak Charge d*Affaires in Madrid 19*K)-19*(4) Letter dated June 1*1-, 1972.

Personal Correspondence of the Author with Karol Kurin. Letters dated Kay 1, 1972, Kay 30, 1972,

Personal Correspondence of the Author v/ith Frano Tiso. Letter dated June 5, 1972.

Personal Interview of the Author v/ith Jozef Kirschbaum January, 1972.

Personal Interview of the Author with Jozef Pauco March, 1972.

IV, Dissertations

Elias, Andrew. "The Slovak Uprising of 19*14." Unpub­ lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Mew York University, 1963*

Jelinek, Yeshayahu Andrew, "Hlinka's Slovak People*s Party 1939-19^5*” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Indiana University, 1966,

Lubek, Evangela. "An Inquiry into United States- Czechoslovak Relations Between 1918 and 19*1-8 with Special Reference to the Munich Crisis and the Slovak Question," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Georgetov/n University, 1969.

V. Newspapers, Periodicals

Deutsche Stimmen (Bratislava)

Gardista (Bratislava)

Jednota Slovensko (Kovy Znamky)

Katolicke novinv (Bratislava)

Katolickv sokol (Passaic, Mew Jersey) 256

Nastup (Bratislava)

Novo Slovensko (Turciansky sv. Martin)

Slovak (Bratislava)

Slovak Pondelnik (Bratislava)

Slovak v Amerike (Middletown, Pennsylvania) , V Slovenska politika (Zilina)

Slovenska pravda (Bratislava)

Slovenska sloboda (Presov)

Slowakische Rundschau (Bratislava)

Uradne novinv (Bratislava)

VI. Memoirs, Diaries, Speeches

Benes, Dr. Eduard, Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes* From Munich To New War and New Victory. Translated by Godfrey Lias, London* George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 195^. • . Reo k Slovakom o nasei narodne.i pri- -fcomnosti a buducnosti (Speech to the Slovaks con- cerning our national present and future), Brati­ slava* Slovenska odbocka, 193^.

Sulen, Konstantin. Zum slowakisch-ungarnischen Verhaltnis. Rede des abgeordneten Konstantin Culen in slowakisch- en Parlament. Bratislava* Tatra, 194-0,

Feierabend, Dr.Ladislav. Ve vladach druhe republikv (In the government of the Second Republic). New York* Universum Press Co., 1961.

Gottwald, Kleraent, Vvbrane spisv. 2 vols, Praha* Statni nakladatelstvi politicke literatury, 1955.

Jehlicka, Frantisek, Father Hlinka*s struggle for Slovak Freedom* Reminiscences of Professor Francis JehliCka.London 1 The Slovak Council, 1938, 257 Kallay, Nicholas, Hungarian Premier. New York: Columbia University Press, 195^*

Kirschbaum, Jozef, Notes to Mv Memoirs. (Unpublished),

Kurgas, Karol, Ncirod medzi Duna.jom a Karnatmi (Nation Between the Danube and Carpathians), Turciansky sv, Martin: Kompas, 19^0,

Pauco, Jozef. Tak sme sa poznali: Predstavitelia Slovenske.i republikv v spomienkach^TSe"* WeBecame Acquainted: Representatives of the Slovak Republic in Reminiscences), Middletown, Pennsyl­ vania: Slovak v Amerike, 196?.

Rasla, Anton, Civilista v. Armade: Spomienky na rokv 1938-19*H (A Civilian in the Army: Reminiscences for the years 1938-19^5)* Bratislava: Vydavatel' stvo politicky literatury, 1 9 6 7.

Sidor, Karol, Mo.ie poznamky k historickvm dnom (My Notes to the Historical Days), Prepared by Frantisek Vnuk, Middletown, Pennsylvania, 1971• v , Sest' rokov pri Vatikane (Six Years at the Vatican), Scranton: Obrana Press, 19^7.

Slavik, Juraj, Zapredane Slovensko (Betrayed Slovakia), Chicago: Slovenske narodne sdruzenie, 1939, v .. Srobar, Dr, Vavro, Osvobodene Slovensko: Pamati z rokov 1918-1920 (Liberated Slovakia:v Memoirs from the Years 1918-1920), Praha: Cin, 1928,

Weizsacker, Ernst von, Erinnerungen. Munchen, 1950*

VII, Important Works

Clementis, Vlado, Usmernovane Slovensko (Regimented Slovakia), London, 19^2.

Culen, Konstantin, Pittsburghska dohoda (Pittsburgh Pact). Bratislava, 1937,

______, Po Svatoolukovi riruha na&a hlava (After Svatopluk Our Second Head). Cleveland: Frva katolicka slovenska jednota, 19^7, 258

v V ^ ______, Slovaci a Cesi v statnvch sluzbach C S R ~. (Slovaks and" Czechs in state Service of CSR), Bratislava, 19^.

Daxner, Igor. Ludactvo ored n^rodnvm sudom ■19^-1Q^7 (Populism Before the National Judge). Bratislava: Slovenska akademie vied, 1961.

Derer, Ivan, Slovensky vvvoi a ludacka zrada (Slovak Development and Populist Treason), Praha: Kvasnicka a Hampl, 19^6,

______. The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Prague: Orbis, 1938.

ISurcansky, Ferdinand, Die Existenzberechtigung der kleinen Staaten. Bratislava: V/issenschaft- liche Gesellschaft fur das Auslandsslowakentum, 1 9 ^ . y Gaspar, Tido, Das slowakische Nationale Bewusstsein. Bratislava: Dr. J, 0, Petreas, 19^3.

______, Der Frasident der slowakischen Republik. Bratislava: J, 0, Petreas, 19^3.

______. Ruckschau auf die slowakisch-deutschen kulturellen Beziehungen. Bratislava: J. 0, Petreas, 19^3.

______. Vel'kv rok. (The Great Year), Turciansky sv, Kartin: Katica slovensko, 1939. Kirschbaum, Jozef. Nas bo.i o samostatnost Slovenska (Our struggle for an Independent Slovakia). Cleveland: Slovensky ustav, 1958,

______, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Eurone. New York: Robert Speller, I960.

Lettrich, Jozef. History of Modern Slovakia. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1955*

Kudry, Dr. Hichal, Milan Hod^a v Amerike medzi Ameri- ckym Slovakmi (Milan Hod^a in Timerica among American Slovaks), Chicago: Geringer Press, 19^9. 259

Murgas, Karol. Per Pakt der Mannhaften Vernflichtungen. Turciansky sv, Martini Kompasf 1941. V Pokornyf Ctibor. Zidovstvo na Slovenska (Jewry in Slovakia). Turciansky sv. Martini Kompas, 1940, v v / / / Polakovic, Stefan. Slovensky narodnv socializmus (Slovak National Socialism). Bratislava, 1941,

■_____^______. Warum eine freie Slowakei. Brati­ slava i Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft fur das Auslandsslowakentum, n.d,

Ripka, Dr, Hubert. Munichi Before and After. Londoni Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1939.

Sidor, Karol. Andrei Hlinka (1864-1926). Bratislava, 1934. •______Slovenska nolitika na pftde prazskeho snemu (1918-1938) (Slovak Politics on the Floor of the Prague Parliament), 2 vols. Bratislava, 1943.

Siroky, Viliam. Za stastne Slovensko v socialist!ckom Ceskoslovensku (For a happy Slovakia in a Socialist Czechoslovakia"), Prague, 1952. V ^ / Sprinc, Mikulas (ed.). Slovenska republika. Scrantoni Obrana Press, 1949.

Vasek, Anton. Die Losung der Judenfrage in der Slowakei. Bratislavai Globus, ,

VIII, Secondary Works

Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York* The Viking Press, 1964, V s Bokes, Frantisek, De.iinv Slovakov a slovenska od naistar- sich cias. az so pritomnost (History of Slovaks and Slovakia from the Oldest Times till the Present).

Bor, Jan E. Dr, Adalbert Tukai Kamnfer und Staatsmann. Bratislavai J. 0. Petreas, 1943.

Borovicka, Jozef. Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics. Prague* Orbis, 1929. 260

Bujnak, Dr. Pavel, Dr. Karol Kuzmanv* zivot a dielo (Dr. Karol Kuzmany: Life and Work), Liptovsky sv. Mikulas* Tranoscius, 1927, * y/ Danas, Jozef. Ludacky senaratizmus a Hitlerovske Nemecko (Populist Separation and Hitler's Germany), Bratislava* Vydavatel1stvo politicky literatury, 1963.

Daxner, Stefan. V ,sluzbe naroda (In the Service of the Nation). Bratislava, 1958.

Dolezal, J, Ivan. Fasistickv rezim na Slovensku a ieho •protlnarodnv charakter (Fascist Regime in Slovakia and Its Anti-national Character). Turciansky sv. Martin, n.d.

Durica, Milan, Die slowakische Politik 19?8/39 in Lichte der Staatslehre Tisos, Bonn* Emil Semmel Verlag, 1967. ,______, Dr. Joseph Tiso and The Jewish Problem in Slovakia. Padua* Stamperia Dell* Universita, 1964,

Fagula, L. G. Andrei Hlinka. Bratislava* Generainy sek- retariat HSL'S, 19^3. f * v / Faltan, Samo, Slovenska otazka v ceskoslovensku (The Slo­ vak Question in Czechoslovakia), Bratislava, 1968, * r Hoensch,, Joerg K, Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostuolitik. Koln-Graz Verlag, 1965. V V Hrusovsky^ Frantisek. Slovenske de.iinv (Slovak History). TurcianBky sv. Martin* Slovenska Matica, 1939.

Kociska, Anna, Rohotnici v bo.ii proti fasizmu na Slovensku v rokoch. 1938-194l (Workers in the Struggle against Fascism in Slovakia in the Years, 1938-19^1). Bratislava* Slovenska akademia vied, 196^.

Kramer, Juraj, Slovenske" Autonomisticke hnutie v rokoch 1918-1928 (The Slovak Autonomist Movement in the Years 1918-1928). Bratislava, 19^2.

Kropilak, Miroslav (ed.), Slovenske narodne novstanie roku 1 9 ^ (Slovak National Uprising of the Year 19 W . 261

Lipscher, Ladislav. Ludacka autonomia* iluzie a skutocnost (Populist Autonomy* Illusion and Reality). Bratislava, 19^7.

Liptak, Lubomir. Slovensko v 20 storoci (Slovakia in the 20th CenturyT^ Bratislava, 1968.

Macartney, C. A, A History of Hungary. 2 vols. New York* Frederick A , Praeger, 195^.

. _____ Hungary and Her Successors. London* Oxford University Press, 19^5.

Mikus, Joseph, Slovakia* A Political History 1918-19SO. Milwaukee * Marquette University Press, 1903 .

Neuman, Jirmejahu Oskar. Im Schatten des Todes. Tel- Avav* Olamenu, 1956*

Oddo, Gilbert. Slovakia and Its People. New York* Robert Speller,19£o.

Pauco, Jozef (ed.), Karol Sidor* Politik. novinar. snisovatel. Middletown, Pennsylvania, 1962,

______75 rokov nrve.i katolicky slovenske .i iednoty (75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union). Cleveland* Prva katolicka slovenska jednota, 19^5#

______. Slovaci a komunizmus (Slovaks and Communism*}"^ Whiting, Indiana: Rev. Jan Lach, 1957*

______1___ . Tisov odkaz (Tiso's Message). Middle­ town, Pennsylvania, 1953*

Reitlinger, G. The Final Solution. London: Vallentine- Mitchell, 1933*

Schwartz, Michael, Die Slowakei; Der iungste Staat Euronas. Leipzig* Wihelm Goldraann, 1939.

Siracky, Andrej. Klerofasisticka ideologia ludactva (Clerical Fascist Ideology of Populism), Brati­ slava* Slovenska akademia vied, 1955* 262

v * Stanek, Imr ich. 2rada a pad; Hlinkovsti separatiste a tak zvanv slovenskV stat (Treason and Fall* Hlinka's Separatists and the so-called Slovak State). Praha, 1958.

Woytko, Sister Mary Gabrielle. Slovakia's Road to State­ hood. Whiting, Indianai Rev. John Lach, 1957. */ v ______, Wer war Matus C emak. Munchen, 1955*

Vie tor, Martin, De.iiny okunacie iuzneho slovenska (1938- 19^5) (History of Occupied Southern Slovakia), Bratislava* Slovenska akademia vied, 1968,

Vnuk, Frantisek. Dr. Jozef Tiso. Sydney* The Association of Australian Slovaks, 19^7.

;______. Kanitolv 2 deiin kommunistickei stranv Slovenska (Chapters from the History of the Slovak Communist Party), Middletown,Pennsylvania, 1968,

Yurchak, Peter, The Slovaks. Whiting, Indiana* Rev. John Lach, 19^6.

Zachar, Dr, Ludo, Katolicizmus a slovensky narodnv socializmus (Catholicism and Slovak National Socialism), Bratislava: Slovensko-nemecko spolocnosti, 19^0 ,

IX, Articles

Delaney, Edward L. “I was in Slovakia," Slovakia II (March, 1952), 25-^. v Durica, Milan S. "Dr. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Pro­ blem in Slovakia," Slovakia VII (September- December, 1957)» 1-22.

Kirschbaum, Dr. J. M, "Osobnost a politicke koncepcie Dr. Jozefa Tisu," (The Personality aijd Pplitical Conception of Dr. Jozef Tiso), Literarnv almanach (1972), 3-19. 263

______. "Slovenske diplomaticke zastupenia v neutralnych statoch," (Slovak Diplomatic Repre­ sentation in the Neutral States), Kalendar .iednota (1971), 6-17,

Liptak, Lubamir, "Priprava a priebeh Salzburskych roko- vani roku 1940 medzi predstavitel'mi a slovenskeho statu," (Preparation and Course of the Salzburg Discussions of the year 1940 among-Representatives of the Slovak State), Historickv caSonis XIII/3 (1965)i 329-365. Mestancik, Jan, "Dr. Jozef Buday-v slu^bach cirkev a naroda," (Dr, Jozef Budav - in Service of the Church and Nation), Literarnif almanach (1970), 89-106.

Murin, Karol, "Eight Fatal Days in the Life of Dr, Joseph Tiso," Slovakia VII (March, 1957)» 13-18,

Pauco, Joseph, "Dr, Joseph Tiso* Christian Democrat," Slovakia VII (March, 1957)1 9-12,

, ______"I was Editor of President Tiso's News­ paper," Slovakia VII (March, 1957) t 9-12.

Vnuk, Frantisek, "Karol Sidor (1901-1953)1" Slovakia XXI (1971), 180-188,

XYZ, "Hospodarstvo Autonommeho Slovenska," (The Economy of Autonomous Slovakia). Literarny almanach (I972), 45-55.

X, Miscellaneous

Armada v obrane a uraci (The Army in Defense and Work). Bratislava* Ministerstvo narodny obrany, 1944,

Bercsenyi, F. and others. Die Slowakische Renublik. Bratislava* Tatra, 1943,

Chreno, Jozef, Maly slovnik slovenskeho statu (Small Dictionary of the Slovak State), Bratislava* Slovenska archivna sprava, 1965, 264

Kalendar der Deutschen in der Slowakei fur das Jahr. 1941. Bratislava! Buch und Zeitungs-verlagsgenossenschaft, 1941.

Kalendar der Deutschen in der Slowakei. Bratislava* Roland Verlag, 1944.

Kalendar slovenskeho vo.iska (Calendar of the Slovak Army), Bratislava* Ministerstvo narodny obrany, 1944,

Kocis, Dr. A, and others. Die Klinka Fartei. Bratislava, 19^3. Murgas", Kalo (ed.), Straz vlasti* Kalendar slovenske.i brannosti na rok 1944 (Home Guard*Calendar of Slovak Defense for the Year 1944), Bratislava, 1944.

Slovenska otcina (Slovak Fatherlapd), 3 vols. Hamilton, Ontario: Frantisek Fuga, I963, 19^7.