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Quaestiones Infinitiae PUBLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UTRECHT UNIVERSITY VOLUME LIX © 2009, Mark Aalderink All rights reserved. Printed by Ridderprint Offsetdrukkerij BV, Ridderkerk Cover designed by Simone Vinke ISBN 978 90 393 5281 6 Philosophy, Scientific Knowledge, and Concept Formation in Geulincx and Descartes Filosofie, wetenschappelijke kennis en begripsvorming bij Geulincx en Descartes (met een samenvatting in het Nederlands) Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. J.C. Stoof, ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 15 februari 2010 des middags te 12.45 uur door Mark Jan Herman Aalderink geboren op 24 september 1976 te Manderveen Promotor: Prof. dr. Th.H.M. Verbeek Contents Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Geulincx: His life and works in brief 7 Interpretations of Geulincx’ philosophy in the secondary literature 10 PART I - THE THEORY OF ERROR Chapter 1: Aristotelian Errors: Bacon, Descartes, and Geulincx on Aristotelian Philosophy 17 Introduction 17 1.1 Renaissance Aristotelians and their adversaries 19 1.1.1 Aristotelianisms 19 1.1.2 Renaissance criticism of Aristotelian philosophy 20 1.2 Bacon’s critique of Aristotelian concepts and his theory of the Idols 21 1.2.1 Two anti-Aristotelian approaches 21 1.2.2 Bacon’s rejection of Aristotelian method and concept formation 22 1.2.3 The flaws of human nature: Bacon’s theory of the Idols 26 1.3 Descartes’ ambiguous relation to Aristotelianism 30 1.3.1 Introduction 30 1.3.2 Descartes’ relation to Aristotelian philosophy 31 1.3.3 Descartes’ objections to Aristotelian philosophy 34 1.3.4 The psychological origins of the errors of Aristotelians 37 1.3.5 A comparison with Bacon 39 1.4 Aristotelianism and Dutch Cartesianism 41 1.4.1 Problems for Cartesian philosophy on Dutch universities 41 1.4.2 De Raey’s two approaches to Aristotelianism 43 1.4.3 Clauberg’s ‘scholastic’ Cartesianism 45 1.5 Geulincx’ refutation of Aristotelianism in his Louvain period 46 1.5.1 Geulincx’ inaugural address of 1652 46 1.5.2 A comparison with Descartes and Bacon 52 1.6 Geulincx’ later criticism of Aristotelian philosophy 55 1.6.1 Introduction 55 1.6.2 Geulincx’ main objection to Aristotelian philosophy 55 1.6.3 The extent of Geulincx’ criticism of Aristotelian philosophy 57 1.6.4 A Platonic alternative 61 1.7 Conclusions 62 CONTENTS Chapter 2: The Theory of Error: Judgement and Prejudices 65 Introduction 65 2.1 The freedom of the will 66 2.1.1 Introduction 66 2.1.2 Descartes on the will and its freedom 67 2.1.3 The freedom of the will as crucial for Cartesian philosophy 74 2.1.4 Geulincx’ theory of the will 82 2.1.5 Conclusions 90 2.2 The theory of judgement 91 2.2.1 Introduction 91 2.2.2 Descartes’ theory of judgement: Undermining resemblance-judgements 92 2.2.3 Geulincx’ theory of judgement 97 2.2.4 Conclusions 100 2.3 Prejudices 101 2.3.1 Introduction 101 2.3.2 Descartes: Overcoming prejudices to counter Aristotelian physics 101 2.3.3 Geulincx: Separating prejudices from judgements 104 2.3.4 Geulincx on the origin of the prejudices 108 2.3.5 Conclusions 112 2.4 Conclusions 113 PART II – THE THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE Chapter 3: Scientific Knowledge (scientia) in Aristotelian and Cartesian Philosophy 117 Introduction 117 3.1 Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge (êpistême) and demonstration (apodeixis) 118 3.1.1 Scientific demonstration and the objects of scientific knowledge 118 3.1.2 The elements of proof: Subject, unique property, and principle 121 3.2 Late-Aristotelian conceptions of scientific knowledge: Zabarella and Burgersdijk 125 3.2.1 Zabarella on necessity and contingency 125 3.2.2 Zabarella’s account of the praecognita: Subject, property, and principle 129 3.2.3 Leiden Aristotelianism: Franco Burgersdijk 133 3.3 Descartes on scientific knowledge 140 3.3.1 Introduction 140 3.3.2 Descartes’ early account of scientific knowledge in the Rules 140 3.3.3 The later account in the Principles of Philosophy 146 3.3.4 Descartes and the traditional terminology regarding scientific knowledge 152 3.4 Conclusions 154 Chapter 4: Geulincx’ Notion of Scientia 157 Introduction 157 4.1 Reason as a scientific instrument 159 4.1.1 Introduction 159 4.1.2 Scientific instruments 160 vi CONTENTS 4.1.3 Reason (ratio) 165 4.1.4 Conclusions 169 4.2 Logical containment 170 4.2.1 Introduction 170 4.2.2 Logical containment and relations between identity and difference 170 4.2.3 Assertions and logical consequence 173 4.2.4 Relations between terms 175 4.3 The principles of scientific knowledge 178 4.4 Essences and properties 183 4.5 The subject matter of the sciences 188 4.6 Two examples: Physics and ethics 195 4.6.1 Introduction 195 4.6.2 Physics 195 4.6.3 Ethics 199 4.7 Conclusions 203 PART III – THE THEORY OF COGNITION: THE FORMATION OF CONCEPTS Chapter 5: Descartes’ Ways of Ideas: Representation, Sensory Cognition, and the Imagination 207 Introduction 207 5.1 The early notion of idea: Corporeal ideas 208 5.1.1 Introduction 208 5.1.2 Corporeal ideas in the Rules 209 5.1.3 The early notion of idea in later works 216 5.1.4 Conclusions 218 5.2 Descartes’ later notion of idea as a mental item 219 5.2.1 Introduction 219 5.2.2 The extension of Descartes’ notion of mental idea 220 5.2.3 The strict notion of mental idea as representational content 222 5.2.4 Conclusions 226 5.3 Representation and resemblance 227 5.3.1 Introduction 227 5.3.2 Two notions of representation: Resemblance and referential representation 227 5.3.3 Ideas as ‘images’ or ‘likenesses’ 229 5.3.4 Conclusions 234 5.4 Idea and imagination 234 5.4.1 Introduction 234 5.4.2 The imagination 236 5.4.3 The representational status of sensory cognitions 238 5.4.4 Qualitative sensations 243 5.4.5 Descartes’ alternative account of qualitative perceptions in the Principles 246 5.4.6 Conclusions 248 5.5 Conclusions 249 vii CONTENTS Chapter 6: Geulincx’ Theory of Ideas and the Classifications of Cognitions 251 Introduction 251 6.1 The opposition of imagination and idea: Geulincx’ inaugural address of 1665 254 6.1.1 Introduction 254 6.1.2 The address of 1665 255 6.2 Geulincx’ classifications of cognitions 260 6.2.1 Introduction 260 6.2.2 The first classification: The opposition between ideas and species 260 6.2.3 The classification of the True metaphysics 262 6.2.4 The second kind of knowledge: Experience 263 6.2.5 The third kind of knowledge: Abstract scientific knowledge (doctrina) 266 6.2.6 Comprehensive knowledge of reality: Theoretical wisdom (sapientia) 269 6.2.7 Conclusions 273 6.3 Geulincx’ notion of idea 273 6.3.1 Introduction 273 6.3.2 Ideas as concepts of essences 274 6.3.3 The location of ideas 279 6.3.4 Conclusions 282 6.4 Idea, imagination and representation 282 6.4.1 Introduction 282 6.4.2 Geulincx’ notion of idea in his commentary on Descartes’ Principles 283 6.4.3 The truth criteria 286 6.4.4 Perceptions of primary and secondary qualities 289 6.4.5 Conclusions 292 6.5 Conclusions 292 Chapter 7: Mental Activity and Concept Formation 295 Introduction 295 7.1 Aristotelian accounts of intelligible species and the operations of the intellect 296 7.1.1 Introduction 296 7.1.2 Intelligible species 297 7.1.3 The three acts of thinking: Simple apprehension, judgement and reasoning 299 7.1.4 Zabarella’s view of intelligible species and acts of the intellect 302 7.2 Descartes on the activity of the intellect 306 7.2.1 Introduction 306 7.2.2 The Rules: Intuition and deduction 307 7.2.3 Descartes’ later philosophy 310 7.3 Geulincx’ account of species as mental acts 317 7.3.1 Introduction 317 7.3.2 Species as modes of thinking (modi cogitandi) 317 7.3.3 Intelligible species or acts of the intellect 320 7.4 Conclusions 322 viii CONTENTS Chapter 8: The Production of Conceptual Content: Abstraction, Separation and Distinction 323 Introduction 323 8.1 Verum-factum: Maker’s knowledge 324 8.2 Theories of abstraction 327 8.2.1 Introduction 327 8.2.2 Two notions of abstraction: Consideration and separation 328 8.2.3 Descartes on abstraction and distinctions 331 8.2.4 Geulincx’ theory of abstraction 337 8.3 The precise meaning and extent of doctrina 346 PART IV – THOUGHT AND REALITY: STRUCTURES OF INTELLIGIBILITY Chapter 9: General Ontological Notions and Intelligibility 353 Introduction 353 9.1 Intelligibility and transcendental notions 354 9.1.1 Introduction 354 9.1.2 Duns Scotus: Transcendental notions and intelligibility of reality 355 9.1.3 Descartes’ on transcendental notions and substance 358 9.1.4 Clauberg on the epistemological status of ontological notions 362 9.1.5 De Raey: Aristotelian’ ontology as common sense understanding of reality 372 9.1.6 Geulincx: Ontology as describing the conceptual structures of intelligibility 380 9.1.7 Conclusions 388 9.2 Scientific knowledge, philosophy (wisdom) and knowledge of external reality 389 9.3 Doctrina and true philosophy 394 9.4 Concluding remarks 395 Conclusion 397 Appendix: Early Idealism 401 Bibliography 405 Samenvatting 425 Index 435 ix Acknowledgements Writing a doctoral dissertation is an arduous undertaking. I could not have finished this project without the support and guidance of many people.
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